@bymax-one/nest-notification 1.3.1 → 1.4.1

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@@ -483,6 +483,10 @@ interface GlobalOptions {
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  * Resolves the tenant id from the request. When provided, the module prefers
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  * this source over a tenant id passed in the body/argument — preventing tenant
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  * spoofing.
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+ *
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+ * What it returns must identify a tenant: a value that is not a string, is empty or
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+ * is whitespace-only is refused by the audit interceptor rather than recorded (see
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+ * `audit.swallowErrors` for what the caller then sees).
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  */
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  tenantIdResolver?: (req: NotificationRequest) => string | Promise<string>;
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  }
@@ -1074,6 +1078,16 @@ declare class OtpService {
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  private buildOtpEmail;
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  /** Finalizes a correct verification: consume-and-clear, or mark `validated`. */
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  private finalizeVerifySuccess;
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+ /**
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+ * Refuses a tenant id or recipient that identifies nobody, before any storage call.
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+ *
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+ * The reference storage already refuses these through `hashTenantRecipient`, but a
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+ * consumer-supplied {@link IOtpStorage} is not required to, and a blank scope would
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+ * then be shared by every caller that sent one.
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+ *
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+ * @throws NotificationException `INVALID_SCOPE_IDENTIFIER` when either is blank.
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+ */
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+ private assertScope;
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  /** Returns the resolved OTP options or throws `OTP_STORAGE_NOT_CONFIGURED`. */
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  private requireOtpOptions;
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  /** Builds an OTP audit entry with the recipient masked and never the code. */
@@ -1204,6 +1218,10 @@ declare class NotificationService {
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  * tenant id is taken from `global.tenantIdResolver(request)` when configured,
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  * which OVERRIDES any `tenantId` carried in the dispatch payload — closing the
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  * tenant-spoofing vector where a caller forges another tenant's id in the body.
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+ * A tenant id that is not a string, is empty or is whitespace-only is refused on every
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+ * path that produces it (the resolver, the payload with no resolver, the payload when
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+ * there is no HTTP request) instead of being recorded; a dispatch-shaped argument whose
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+ * payload `tenantId` is not a string is not recognised as a dispatch and is skipped.
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  *
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  * The entry NEVER carries the dispatched payload (an OTP `verify` payload holds a
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  * guessed code) — only the channel, the masked recipient, the purpose/template,
@@ -1253,8 +1271,21 @@ declare class NotificationAuditInterceptor implements NestInterceptor {
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  /** Narrows an unknown argument to a {@link DispatchInput} by structural shape. */
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  private isDispatchInput;
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  /**
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- * Resolves the trusted tenant id: `tenantIdResolver(request)` when configured and
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- * a request is available, otherwise the payload-supplied `fallback`.
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+ * Resolves the trusted tenant id from `tenantIdResolver(request)`.
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+ *
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+ * Falls back to the payload-supplied value only when no resolver is configured or
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+ * no request is available — the payload reaches the handler from the caller, so
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+ * that value is asserted rather than authenticated, and an entry built from it
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+ * attributes the event to whichever tenant the caller named. Configure a resolver
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+ * whenever this interceptor runs on an HTTP boundary.
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+ *
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+ * A value that identifies nobody is refused rather than recorded, on BOTH paths:
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+ * the resolver's answer and the payload fallback. The fallback is the default path
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+ * — most consumers configure no resolver — so guarding only the resolver would
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+ * leave the common case unchecked, which is where a blank tenant actually arrives.
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+ *
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+ * @throws Error When either the resolved or the fallback tenant id is not a
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+ * string, or is blank.
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  */
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  private resolveTenantId;
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  /** Reads the HTTP request from the context, returning `null` outside an HTTP context. */
@@ -1974,7 +2005,7 @@ interface InMemoryStorageSize {
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  /** Process-local `IOtpStorage` for dev/test. */
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  declare class InMemoryOtpStorage implements IOtpStorage {
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  readonly name = "memory";
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- /** OTP entries keyed by `${tenantId}::${recipient}::${purpose}`. */
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+ /** OTP entries keyed by `${hashTenantRecipient(tenantId, recipient)}::${purpose}`. */
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  private readonly store;
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  /** Cooldown expiries (epoch ms) keyed by the same composite key. */
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  private readonly cooldowns;
@@ -2066,7 +2097,15 @@ declare class InMemoryOtpStorage implements IOtpStorage {
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  * @returns The number of stored OTP entries and active cooldowns.
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  */
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  size(): InMemoryStorageSize;
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- /** Collapses the `(tenantId, recipient, purpose)` tuple into one map key. */
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+ /**
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+ * Collapses the `(tenantId, recipient, purpose)` tuple into one map key.
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+ *
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+ * The tenant and recipient go through {@link hashTenantRecipient}, which encodes
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+ * the pair unambiguously and rejects an empty component. Joining the raw values
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+ * around a delimiter would not: `('a::b', 'c', p)` and `('a', 'b::c', p)` produce
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+ * the same string. The digest is fixed-length, so appending the purpose after it
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+ * stays unambiguous too.
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+ */
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  private key;
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  }
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@@ -2081,9 +2120,11 @@ declare class InMemoryOtpStorage implements IOtpStorage {
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  * read → expiry/max check → increment → write sequence inside ONE Lua script
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  * (`EVAL`), so concurrent verifications cannot interleave and overshoot
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  * `maxAttempts`.
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- * 2. **PII-free keys** — every key carries `sha256(tenantId:recipient)`, never the
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- * plaintext email/phone, so an operator with `KEYS` access cannot enumerate
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- * recipients, and a cross-tenant key collision is computationally infeasible.
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+ * 2. **PII-free keys** — every key carries `sha256(sha256(tenantId):sha256(recipient))`,
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+ * never the plaintext email/phone, so an operator with `KEYS` access cannot
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+ * enumerate recipients. Each component is hashed before the join so the encoding
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+ * itself admits no ambiguity: joining the raw values would map `('a:b', 'c')` and
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+ * `('a', 'b:c')` onto one key, which no digest strength repairs.
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  *
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  * `ioredis` is an OPTIONAL peer dependency: this class forward-declares the slim
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  * {@link RedisLike} surface it needs (including `eval`/`pttl`) instead of importing
@@ -2206,9 +2247,9 @@ declare class RedisOtpStorage implements IOtpStorage {
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  * @param purpose - OTP purpose.
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  */
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  clearCooldown(tenantId: string, recipient: string, purpose: string): Promise<void>;
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- /** Builds the OTP entry key: `{namespace}:otp:{purpose}:{sha256(tenantId:recipient)}`. */
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+ /** Builds the OTP entry key: `{namespace}:otp:{purpose}:{hashTenantRecipient(...)}`. */
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  private otpKey;
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- /** Builds the cooldown key: `{namespace}:otp_cd:{purpose}:{sha256(tenantId:recipient)}`. */
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+ /** Builds the cooldown key: `{namespace}:otp_cd:{purpose}:{hashTenantRecipient(...)}`. */
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  private cooldownKey;
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  }
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@@ -2216,18 +2257,38 @@ declare class RedisOtpStorage implements IOtpStorage {
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  * @fileoverview SHA-256 hashing of `(tenantId, recipient)` for storage keys.
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  * @layer infrastructure
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  *
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- * Storage keys are `sha256(`${tenantId}:${recipient}`)` for two reasons:
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+ * Storage keys are `sha256(sha256(tenantId):sha256(recipient))` for two reasons:
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  * 1. Privacy — an operator with `KEYS`-level access to the store cannot enumerate
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  * the email/phone of every recipient with a pending OTP.
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- * 2. Multi-tenancy — SHA-256 preimage resistance makes a cross-tenant key
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- * collision computationally infeasible.
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+ * 2. Multi-tenancy — each component is hashed to a fixed length BEFORE the two are
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+ * joined, so no two distinct pairs can produce the same input string.
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+ *
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+ * The second point is about the encoding, not about the digest, and no property of
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+ * SHA-256 substitutes for it. Joining the raw values around a delimiter makes
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+ * `('acme:bob', 'x')` and `('acme', 'bob:x')` produce the same input string — and
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+ * therefore the same key — while preimage and collision resistance hold perfectly.
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+ *
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+ * What that buys is precise, and overclaiming it would repeat the mistake it fixes:
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+ * distinct pairs are no longer *constructibly* mapped onto one key, because the
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+ * ambiguity was in the encoding and the encoding is now unique. The key itself stays
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+ * collision-RESISTANT rather than collision-free — an unbounded domain cannot map
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+ * injectively into 256 bits, and no construction changes that.
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+ *
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+ * A component that names no tenant and no recipient is refused rather than hashed:
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+ * empty, whitespace-only, or not a string at all. `('', r)` would put every caller
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+ * that omits a tenant into one shared namespace — the same isolation failure arrived
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+ * at from the other side.
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  */
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  /**
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  * Derives a deterministic, PII-free storage key fragment from a tenant and recipient.
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  *
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- * @param tenantId - Tenant isolation scope.
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- * @param recipient - Pre-normalized recipient identifier.
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- * @returns A 64-character lowercase hex SHA-256 digest. Order-sensitive.
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+ * @param tenantId - Tenant isolation scope. Must be a non-blank string.
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+ * @param recipient - Pre-normalized recipient identifier. Must be a non-blank string.
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+ * @returns A 64-character lowercase hex SHA-256 digest. Order-sensitive, and unique
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+ * per pair up to SHA-256's collision resistance — the encoding contributes no
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+ * ambiguity of its own, so two distinct pairs never map onto one key by
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+ * construction.
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+ * @throws Error When either component is not a string, or is empty or whitespace-only.
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  */
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  declare function hashTenantRecipient(tenantId: string, recipient: string): string;
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@@ -2336,8 +2397,8 @@ declare function formatCooldown(remainingSeconds: number): string;
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  * Stable error-code identifiers, keyed by their symbolic name.
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  *
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  * Values are namespaced under `notification.*` and never change once published —
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- * consumers branch on them to localize messages. The 22 entries cover the email,
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- * template, OTP, SMS, push, audit, and channel-config failure surfaces.
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+ * consumers branch on them to localize messages. The 23 entries cover the email,
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+ * template, OTP, SMS, push, audit, channel-config and scoping failure surfaces.
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  */
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  declare const NOTIFICATION_ERROR_CODES: {
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  readonly EMAIL_PROVIDER_NOT_CONFIGURED: "notification.email_provider_not_configured";
@@ -2363,6 +2424,13 @@ declare const NOTIFICATION_ERROR_CODES: {
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  readonly PUSH_SEND_FAILED: "notification.push_send_failed";
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  readonly AUDIT_LOG_FAILED: "notification.audit_log_failed";
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  readonly CHANNEL_DISABLED: "notification.channel_disabled";
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+ /**
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+ * A `tenantId` or `recipient` that identifies nobody reached a scoping
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+ * boundary — empty, whitespace-only, or not a string at all. Distinct from
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+ * {@link EMAIL_INVALID_RECIPIENT}, which is about a malformed address rather
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+ * than a value that cannot scope anything.
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+ */
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+ readonly INVALID_SCOPE_IDENTIFIER: "notification.invalid_scope_identifier";
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  };
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  /**
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  * The literal-union type of every value in {@link NOTIFICATION_ERROR_CODES}.
@@ -2500,6 +2568,11 @@ declare const NOTIFICATION_ERROR_DEFINITIONS: {
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  readonly status: HttpStatus.NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
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  readonly message: "Channel not enabled in module config";
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  };
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+ readonly INVALID_SCOPE_IDENTIFIER: {
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+ readonly code: "notification.invalid_scope_identifier";
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+ readonly status: HttpStatus.BAD_REQUEST;
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+ readonly message: "Tenant or recipient identifier does not identify anybody";
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+ };
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  };
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  /** The symbolic key of any entry in {@link NOTIFICATION_ERROR_DEFINITIONS}. */
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  type NotificationErrorKey = keyof typeof NOTIFICATION_ERROR_DEFINITIONS;
@@ -2632,4 +2705,5 @@ declare const DEFAULT_TTLS: {
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  readonly OTP_GENERIC_SECONDS: 600;
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  };
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- export { type AuditOptions, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_EMAIL_PROVIDER, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_LOG_REPOSITORY, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_OPTIONS, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_OTP_STORAGE, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_PUSH_PROVIDER, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_SMS_PROVIDER, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_TEMPLATE_RENDERER, BymaxNotificationModule, type BymaxNotificationModuleAsyncOptions, type BymaxNotificationModuleOptions, type BymaxNotificationModuleOptionsFactory, CANONICAL_EMAIL_TEMPLATES, type CanonicalEmailTemplate, type CanonicalNotificationPurpose, type ConsumeAttemptResult, DEFAULT_TTLS, DefaultTemplateRenderer, type DefaultTemplateRendererOptions, type DispatchInput, type DispatchResult, type EmailAttachment, type EmailChannelOptions, type EmailDispatchPayload, type EmailSendInput, type EmailSendOptions, type EmailSendResult, type EmailSendTemplateInput, EmailService, type GlobalOptions, type IEmailProvider, type IEmailTemplateRenderer, type INotificationLogRepository, type IOtpStorage, type IPushProvider, type ISmsProvider, InMemoryOtpStorage, type InMemoryStorageSize, type MissingVariableMode, NOTIFICATION_ERROR_CODES, NOTIFICATION_ERROR_DEFINITIONS, NOTIFICATION_PURPOSES, NoOpEmailProvider, NoOpNotificationLogRepository, NotificationAuditInterceptor, type NotificationChannel, type NotificationErrorCode, type NotificationErrorDefinition, type NotificationErrorKey, type NotificationErrorResponse, NotificationException, type NotificationExceptionOptions, type NotificationLogEntry, type NotificationLogVerb, type NotificationRequest, NotificationService, type OtpChannelOptions, type OtpConsumeInput, type OtpDispatchPayload, type OtpEntry, type OtpGenerateInput, type OtpGenerateResult, type OtpPurpose, type OtpPurposeConfig, OtpService, type OtpStatusInput, type OtpStatusResult, type OtpVerifyInput, type OtpVerifyResult, type PushChannelOptions, type PushSendOptions, type PushSendResult, type RedisLike, RedisOtpStorage, type RedisOtpStorageOptions, type RenderedEmail, ResendEmailProvider, type ResendEmailProviderOptions, type ResolvedAuditOptions, type ResolvedEmailOptions, type ResolvedGlobalOptions, type ResolvedNotificationOptions, type ResolvedOtpOptions, type SmsChannelOptions, type SmsSendOptions, type SmsSendResult, type SmtpCredentials, SmtpEmailProvider, type SmtpEmailProviderOptions, type SmtpTlsOptions, type TemplateDefinition, cooldownExpiresAt, formatCooldown, generateOtpCode, hashTenantRecipient, safeCompare, toRetryAfterHeader };
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+ export { BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_EMAIL_PROVIDER, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_LOG_REPOSITORY, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_OPTIONS, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_OTP_STORAGE, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_PUSH_PROVIDER, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_SMS_PROVIDER, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_TEMPLATE_RENDERER, BymaxNotificationModule, CANONICAL_EMAIL_TEMPLATES, DEFAULT_TTLS, DefaultTemplateRenderer, EmailService, InMemoryOtpStorage, NOTIFICATION_ERROR_CODES, NOTIFICATION_ERROR_DEFINITIONS, NOTIFICATION_PURPOSES, NoOpEmailProvider, NoOpNotificationLogRepository, NotificationAuditInterceptor, NotificationException, NotificationService, OtpService, RedisOtpStorage, ResendEmailProvider, SmtpEmailProvider, cooldownExpiresAt, formatCooldown, generateOtpCode, hashTenantRecipient, safeCompare, toRetryAfterHeader };
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+ export type { AuditOptions, BymaxNotificationModuleAsyncOptions, BymaxNotificationModuleOptions, BymaxNotificationModuleOptionsFactory, CanonicalEmailTemplate, CanonicalNotificationPurpose, ConsumeAttemptResult, DefaultTemplateRendererOptions, DispatchInput, DispatchResult, EmailAttachment, EmailChannelOptions, EmailDispatchPayload, EmailSendInput, EmailSendOptions, EmailSendResult, EmailSendTemplateInput, GlobalOptions, IEmailProvider, IEmailTemplateRenderer, INotificationLogRepository, IOtpStorage, IPushProvider, ISmsProvider, InMemoryStorageSize, MissingVariableMode, NotificationChannel, NotificationErrorCode, NotificationErrorDefinition, NotificationErrorKey, NotificationErrorResponse, NotificationExceptionOptions, NotificationLogEntry, NotificationLogVerb, NotificationRequest, OtpChannelOptions, OtpConsumeInput, OtpDispatchPayload, OtpEntry, OtpGenerateInput, OtpGenerateResult, OtpPurpose, OtpPurposeConfig, OtpStatusInput, OtpStatusResult, OtpVerifyInput, OtpVerifyResult, PushChannelOptions, PushSendOptions, PushSendResult, RedisLike, RedisOtpStorageOptions, RenderedEmail, ResendEmailProviderOptions, ResolvedAuditOptions, ResolvedEmailOptions, ResolvedGlobalOptions, ResolvedNotificationOptions, ResolvedOtpOptions, SmsChannelOptions, SmsSendOptions, SmsSendResult, SmtpCredentials, SmtpEmailProviderOptions, SmtpTlsOptions, TemplateDefinition };
@@ -483,6 +483,10 @@ interface GlobalOptions {
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483
  * Resolves the tenant id from the request. When provided, the module prefers
484
484
  * this source over a tenant id passed in the body/argument — preventing tenant
485
485
  * spoofing.
486
+ *
487
+ * What it returns must identify a tenant: a value that is not a string, is empty or
488
+ * is whitespace-only is refused by the audit interceptor rather than recorded (see
489
+ * `audit.swallowErrors` for what the caller then sees).
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  */
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  tenantIdResolver?: (req: NotificationRequest) => string | Promise<string>;
488
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  }
@@ -1074,6 +1078,16 @@ declare class OtpService {
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  private buildOtpEmail;
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  /** Finalizes a correct verification: consume-and-clear, or mark `validated`. */
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  private finalizeVerifySuccess;
1081
+ /**
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+ * Refuses a tenant id or recipient that identifies nobody, before any storage call.
1083
+ *
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+ * The reference storage already refuses these through `hashTenantRecipient`, but a
1085
+ * consumer-supplied {@link IOtpStorage} is not required to, and a blank scope would
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+ * then be shared by every caller that sent one.
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+ *
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+ * @throws NotificationException `INVALID_SCOPE_IDENTIFIER` when either is blank.
1089
+ */
1090
+ private assertScope;
1077
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  /** Returns the resolved OTP options or throws `OTP_STORAGE_NOT_CONFIGURED`. */
1078
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  private requireOtpOptions;
1079
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  /** Builds an OTP audit entry with the recipient masked and never the code. */
@@ -1204,6 +1218,10 @@ declare class NotificationService {
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  * tenant id is taken from `global.tenantIdResolver(request)` when configured,
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1219
  * which OVERRIDES any `tenantId` carried in the dispatch payload — closing the
1206
1220
  * tenant-spoofing vector where a caller forges another tenant's id in the body.
1221
+ * A tenant id that is not a string, is empty or is whitespace-only is refused on every
1222
+ * path that produces it (the resolver, the payload with no resolver, the payload when
1223
+ * there is no HTTP request) instead of being recorded; a dispatch-shaped argument whose
1224
+ * payload `tenantId` is not a string is not recognised as a dispatch and is skipped.
1207
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  *
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  * The entry NEVER carries the dispatched payload (an OTP `verify` payload holds a
1209
1227
  * guessed code) — only the channel, the masked recipient, the purpose/template,
@@ -1253,8 +1271,21 @@ declare class NotificationAuditInterceptor implements NestInterceptor {
1253
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  /** Narrows an unknown argument to a {@link DispatchInput} by structural shape. */
1254
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  private isDispatchInput;
1255
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  /**
1256
- * Resolves the trusted tenant id: `tenantIdResolver(request)` when configured and
1257
- * a request is available, otherwise the payload-supplied `fallback`.
1274
+ * Resolves the trusted tenant id from `tenantIdResolver(request)`.
1275
+ *
1276
+ * Falls back to the payload-supplied value only when no resolver is configured or
1277
+ * no request is available — the payload reaches the handler from the caller, so
1278
+ * that value is asserted rather than authenticated, and an entry built from it
1279
+ * attributes the event to whichever tenant the caller named. Configure a resolver
1280
+ * whenever this interceptor runs on an HTTP boundary.
1281
+ *
1282
+ * A value that identifies nobody is refused rather than recorded, on BOTH paths:
1283
+ * the resolver's answer and the payload fallback. The fallback is the default path
1284
+ * — most consumers configure no resolver — so guarding only the resolver would
1285
+ * leave the common case unchecked, which is where a blank tenant actually arrives.
1286
+ *
1287
+ * @throws Error When either the resolved or the fallback tenant id is not a
1288
+ * string, or is blank.
1258
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  */
1259
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  private resolveTenantId;
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  /** Reads the HTTP request from the context, returning `null` outside an HTTP context. */
@@ -1974,7 +2005,7 @@ interface InMemoryStorageSize {
1974
2005
  /** Process-local `IOtpStorage` for dev/test. */
1975
2006
  declare class InMemoryOtpStorage implements IOtpStorage {
1976
2007
  readonly name = "memory";
1977
- /** OTP entries keyed by `${tenantId}::${recipient}::${purpose}`. */
2008
+ /** OTP entries keyed by `${hashTenantRecipient(tenantId, recipient)}::${purpose}`. */
1978
2009
  private readonly store;
1979
2010
  /** Cooldown expiries (epoch ms) keyed by the same composite key. */
1980
2011
  private readonly cooldowns;
@@ -2066,7 +2097,15 @@ declare class InMemoryOtpStorage implements IOtpStorage {
2066
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  * @returns The number of stored OTP entries and active cooldowns.
2067
2098
  */
2068
2099
  size(): InMemoryStorageSize;
2069
- /** Collapses the `(tenantId, recipient, purpose)` tuple into one map key. */
2100
+ /**
2101
+ * Collapses the `(tenantId, recipient, purpose)` tuple into one map key.
2102
+ *
2103
+ * The tenant and recipient go through {@link hashTenantRecipient}, which encodes
2104
+ * the pair unambiguously and rejects an empty component. Joining the raw values
2105
+ * around a delimiter would not: `('a::b', 'c', p)` and `('a', 'b::c', p)` produce
2106
+ * the same string. The digest is fixed-length, so appending the purpose after it
2107
+ * stays unambiguous too.
2108
+ */
2070
2109
  private key;
2071
2110
  }
2072
2111
 
@@ -2081,9 +2120,11 @@ declare class InMemoryOtpStorage implements IOtpStorage {
2081
2120
  * read → expiry/max check → increment → write sequence inside ONE Lua script
2082
2121
  * (`EVAL`), so concurrent verifications cannot interleave and overshoot
2083
2122
  * `maxAttempts`.
2084
- * 2. **PII-free keys** — every key carries `sha256(tenantId:recipient)`, never the
2085
- * plaintext email/phone, so an operator with `KEYS` access cannot enumerate
2086
- * recipients, and a cross-tenant key collision is computationally infeasible.
2123
+ * 2. **PII-free keys** — every key carries `sha256(sha256(tenantId):sha256(recipient))`,
2124
+ * never the plaintext email/phone, so an operator with `KEYS` access cannot
2125
+ * enumerate recipients. Each component is hashed before the join so the encoding
2126
+ * itself admits no ambiguity: joining the raw values would map `('a:b', 'c')` and
2127
+ * `('a', 'b:c')` onto one key, which no digest strength repairs.
2087
2128
  *
2088
2129
  * `ioredis` is an OPTIONAL peer dependency: this class forward-declares the slim
2089
2130
  * {@link RedisLike} surface it needs (including `eval`/`pttl`) instead of importing
@@ -2206,9 +2247,9 @@ declare class RedisOtpStorage implements IOtpStorage {
2206
2247
  * @param purpose - OTP purpose.
2207
2248
  */
2208
2249
  clearCooldown(tenantId: string, recipient: string, purpose: string): Promise<void>;
2209
- /** Builds the OTP entry key: `{namespace}:otp:{purpose}:{sha256(tenantId:recipient)}`. */
2250
+ /** Builds the OTP entry key: `{namespace}:otp:{purpose}:{hashTenantRecipient(...)}`. */
2210
2251
  private otpKey;
2211
- /** Builds the cooldown key: `{namespace}:otp_cd:{purpose}:{sha256(tenantId:recipient)}`. */
2252
+ /** Builds the cooldown key: `{namespace}:otp_cd:{purpose}:{hashTenantRecipient(...)}`. */
2212
2253
  private cooldownKey;
2213
2254
  }
2214
2255
 
@@ -2216,18 +2257,38 @@ declare class RedisOtpStorage implements IOtpStorage {
2216
2257
  * @fileoverview SHA-256 hashing of `(tenantId, recipient)` for storage keys.
2217
2258
  * @layer infrastructure
2218
2259
  *
2219
- * Storage keys are `sha256(`${tenantId}:${recipient}`)` for two reasons:
2260
+ * Storage keys are `sha256(sha256(tenantId):sha256(recipient))` for two reasons:
2220
2261
  * 1. Privacy — an operator with `KEYS`-level access to the store cannot enumerate
2221
2262
  * the email/phone of every recipient with a pending OTP.
2222
- * 2. Multi-tenancy — SHA-256 preimage resistance makes a cross-tenant key
2223
- * collision computationally infeasible.
2263
+ * 2. Multi-tenancy — each component is hashed to a fixed length BEFORE the two are
2264
+ * joined, so no two distinct pairs can produce the same input string.
2265
+ *
2266
+ * The second point is about the encoding, not about the digest, and no property of
2267
+ * SHA-256 substitutes for it. Joining the raw values around a delimiter makes
2268
+ * `('acme:bob', 'x')` and `('acme', 'bob:x')` produce the same input string — and
2269
+ * therefore the same key — while preimage and collision resistance hold perfectly.
2270
+ *
2271
+ * What that buys is precise, and overclaiming it would repeat the mistake it fixes:
2272
+ * distinct pairs are no longer *constructibly* mapped onto one key, because the
2273
+ * ambiguity was in the encoding and the encoding is now unique. The key itself stays
2274
+ * collision-RESISTANT rather than collision-free — an unbounded domain cannot map
2275
+ * injectively into 256 bits, and no construction changes that.
2276
+ *
2277
+ * A component that names no tenant and no recipient is refused rather than hashed:
2278
+ * empty, whitespace-only, or not a string at all. `('', r)` would put every caller
2279
+ * that omits a tenant into one shared namespace — the same isolation failure arrived
2280
+ * at from the other side.
2224
2281
  */
2225
2282
  /**
2226
2283
  * Derives a deterministic, PII-free storage key fragment from a tenant and recipient.
2227
2284
  *
2228
- * @param tenantId - Tenant isolation scope.
2229
- * @param recipient - Pre-normalized recipient identifier.
2230
- * @returns A 64-character lowercase hex SHA-256 digest. Order-sensitive.
2285
+ * @param tenantId - Tenant isolation scope. Must be a non-blank string.
2286
+ * @param recipient - Pre-normalized recipient identifier. Must be a non-blank string.
2287
+ * @returns A 64-character lowercase hex SHA-256 digest. Order-sensitive, and unique
2288
+ * per pair up to SHA-256's collision resistance — the encoding contributes no
2289
+ * ambiguity of its own, so two distinct pairs never map onto one key by
2290
+ * construction.
2291
+ * @throws Error When either component is not a string, or is empty or whitespace-only.
2231
2292
  */
2232
2293
  declare function hashTenantRecipient(tenantId: string, recipient: string): string;
2233
2294
 
@@ -2336,8 +2397,8 @@ declare function formatCooldown(remainingSeconds: number): string;
2336
2397
  * Stable error-code identifiers, keyed by their symbolic name.
2337
2398
  *
2338
2399
  * Values are namespaced under `notification.*` and never change once published —
2339
- * consumers branch on them to localize messages. The 22 entries cover the email,
2340
- * template, OTP, SMS, push, audit, and channel-config failure surfaces.
2400
+ * consumers branch on them to localize messages. The 23 entries cover the email,
2401
+ * template, OTP, SMS, push, audit, channel-config and scoping failure surfaces.
2341
2402
  */
2342
2403
  declare const NOTIFICATION_ERROR_CODES: {
2343
2404
  readonly EMAIL_PROVIDER_NOT_CONFIGURED: "notification.email_provider_not_configured";
@@ -2363,6 +2424,13 @@ declare const NOTIFICATION_ERROR_CODES: {
2363
2424
  readonly PUSH_SEND_FAILED: "notification.push_send_failed";
2364
2425
  readonly AUDIT_LOG_FAILED: "notification.audit_log_failed";
2365
2426
  readonly CHANNEL_DISABLED: "notification.channel_disabled";
2427
+ /**
2428
+ * A `tenantId` or `recipient` that identifies nobody reached a scoping
2429
+ * boundary — empty, whitespace-only, or not a string at all. Distinct from
2430
+ * {@link EMAIL_INVALID_RECIPIENT}, which is about a malformed address rather
2431
+ * than a value that cannot scope anything.
2432
+ */
2433
+ readonly INVALID_SCOPE_IDENTIFIER: "notification.invalid_scope_identifier";
2366
2434
  };
2367
2435
  /**
2368
2436
  * The literal-union type of every value in {@link NOTIFICATION_ERROR_CODES}.
@@ -2500,6 +2568,11 @@ declare const NOTIFICATION_ERROR_DEFINITIONS: {
2500
2568
  readonly status: HttpStatus.NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
2501
2569
  readonly message: "Channel not enabled in module config";
2502
2570
  };
2571
+ readonly INVALID_SCOPE_IDENTIFIER: {
2572
+ readonly code: "notification.invalid_scope_identifier";
2573
+ readonly status: HttpStatus.BAD_REQUEST;
2574
+ readonly message: "Tenant or recipient identifier does not identify anybody";
2575
+ };
2503
2576
  };
2504
2577
  /** The symbolic key of any entry in {@link NOTIFICATION_ERROR_DEFINITIONS}. */
2505
2578
  type NotificationErrorKey = keyof typeof NOTIFICATION_ERROR_DEFINITIONS;
@@ -2632,4 +2705,5 @@ declare const DEFAULT_TTLS: {
2632
2705
  readonly OTP_GENERIC_SECONDS: 600;
2633
2706
  };
2634
2707
 
2635
- export { type AuditOptions, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_EMAIL_PROVIDER, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_LOG_REPOSITORY, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_OPTIONS, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_OTP_STORAGE, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_PUSH_PROVIDER, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_SMS_PROVIDER, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_TEMPLATE_RENDERER, BymaxNotificationModule, type BymaxNotificationModuleAsyncOptions, type BymaxNotificationModuleOptions, type BymaxNotificationModuleOptionsFactory, CANONICAL_EMAIL_TEMPLATES, type CanonicalEmailTemplate, type CanonicalNotificationPurpose, type ConsumeAttemptResult, DEFAULT_TTLS, DefaultTemplateRenderer, type DefaultTemplateRendererOptions, type DispatchInput, type DispatchResult, type EmailAttachment, type EmailChannelOptions, type EmailDispatchPayload, type EmailSendInput, type EmailSendOptions, type EmailSendResult, type EmailSendTemplateInput, EmailService, type GlobalOptions, type IEmailProvider, type IEmailTemplateRenderer, type INotificationLogRepository, type IOtpStorage, type IPushProvider, type ISmsProvider, InMemoryOtpStorage, type InMemoryStorageSize, type MissingVariableMode, NOTIFICATION_ERROR_CODES, NOTIFICATION_ERROR_DEFINITIONS, NOTIFICATION_PURPOSES, NoOpEmailProvider, NoOpNotificationLogRepository, NotificationAuditInterceptor, type NotificationChannel, type NotificationErrorCode, type NotificationErrorDefinition, type NotificationErrorKey, type NotificationErrorResponse, NotificationException, type NotificationExceptionOptions, type NotificationLogEntry, type NotificationLogVerb, type NotificationRequest, NotificationService, type OtpChannelOptions, type OtpConsumeInput, type OtpDispatchPayload, type OtpEntry, type OtpGenerateInput, type OtpGenerateResult, type OtpPurpose, type OtpPurposeConfig, OtpService, type OtpStatusInput, type OtpStatusResult, type OtpVerifyInput, type OtpVerifyResult, type PushChannelOptions, type PushSendOptions, type PushSendResult, type RedisLike, RedisOtpStorage, type RedisOtpStorageOptions, type RenderedEmail, ResendEmailProvider, type ResendEmailProviderOptions, type ResolvedAuditOptions, type ResolvedEmailOptions, type ResolvedGlobalOptions, type ResolvedNotificationOptions, type ResolvedOtpOptions, type SmsChannelOptions, type SmsSendOptions, type SmsSendResult, type SmtpCredentials, SmtpEmailProvider, type SmtpEmailProviderOptions, type SmtpTlsOptions, type TemplateDefinition, cooldownExpiresAt, formatCooldown, generateOtpCode, hashTenantRecipient, safeCompare, toRetryAfterHeader };
2708
+ export { BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_EMAIL_PROVIDER, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_LOG_REPOSITORY, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_OPTIONS, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_OTP_STORAGE, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_PUSH_PROVIDER, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_SMS_PROVIDER, BYMAX_NOTIFICATION_TEMPLATE_RENDERER, BymaxNotificationModule, CANONICAL_EMAIL_TEMPLATES, DEFAULT_TTLS, DefaultTemplateRenderer, EmailService, InMemoryOtpStorage, NOTIFICATION_ERROR_CODES, NOTIFICATION_ERROR_DEFINITIONS, NOTIFICATION_PURPOSES, NoOpEmailProvider, NoOpNotificationLogRepository, NotificationAuditInterceptor, NotificationException, NotificationService, OtpService, RedisOtpStorage, ResendEmailProvider, SmtpEmailProvider, cooldownExpiresAt, formatCooldown, generateOtpCode, hashTenantRecipient, safeCompare, toRetryAfterHeader };
2709
+ export type { AuditOptions, BymaxNotificationModuleAsyncOptions, BymaxNotificationModuleOptions, BymaxNotificationModuleOptionsFactory, CanonicalEmailTemplate, CanonicalNotificationPurpose, ConsumeAttemptResult, DefaultTemplateRendererOptions, DispatchInput, DispatchResult, EmailAttachment, EmailChannelOptions, EmailDispatchPayload, EmailSendInput, EmailSendOptions, EmailSendResult, EmailSendTemplateInput, GlobalOptions, IEmailProvider, IEmailTemplateRenderer, INotificationLogRepository, IOtpStorage, IPushProvider, ISmsProvider, InMemoryStorageSize, MissingVariableMode, NotificationChannel, NotificationErrorCode, NotificationErrorDefinition, NotificationErrorKey, NotificationErrorResponse, NotificationExceptionOptions, NotificationLogEntry, NotificationLogVerb, NotificationRequest, OtpChannelOptions, OtpConsumeInput, OtpDispatchPayload, OtpEntry, OtpGenerateInput, OtpGenerateResult, OtpPurpose, OtpPurposeConfig, OtpStatusInput, OtpStatusResult, OtpVerifyInput, OtpVerifyResult, PushChannelOptions, PushSendOptions, PushSendResult, RedisLike, RedisOtpStorageOptions, RenderedEmail, ResendEmailProviderOptions, ResolvedAuditOptions, ResolvedEmailOptions, ResolvedGlobalOptions, ResolvedNotificationOptions, ResolvedOtpOptions, SmsChannelOptions, SmsSendOptions, SmsSendResult, SmtpCredentials, SmtpEmailProviderOptions, SmtpTlsOptions, TemplateDefinition };
@@ -144,7 +144,14 @@ var NOTIFICATION_ERROR_CODES = {
144
144
  PUSH_PROVIDER_NOT_CONFIGURED: "notification.push_provider_not_configured",
145
145
  PUSH_SEND_FAILED: "notification.push_send_failed",
146
146
  AUDIT_LOG_FAILED: "notification.audit_log_failed",
147
- CHANNEL_DISABLED: "notification.channel_disabled"
147
+ CHANNEL_DISABLED: "notification.channel_disabled",
148
+ /**
149
+ * A `tenantId` or `recipient` that identifies nobody reached a scoping
150
+ * boundary — empty, whitespace-only, or not a string at all. Distinct from
151
+ * {@link EMAIL_INVALID_RECIPIENT}, which is about a malformed address rather
152
+ * than a value that cannot scope anything.
153
+ */
154
+ INVALID_SCOPE_IDENTIFIER: "notification.invalid_scope_identifier"
148
155
  };
149
156
 
150
157
  // src/server/errors/notification-error-codes.ts
@@ -258,6 +265,11 @@ var NOTIFICATION_ERROR_DEFINITIONS = {
258
265
  code: NOTIFICATION_ERROR_CODES.CHANNEL_DISABLED,
259
266
  status: HttpStatus.NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
260
267
  message: "Channel not enabled in module config"
268
+ },
269
+ INVALID_SCOPE_IDENTIFIER: {
270
+ code: NOTIFICATION_ERROR_CODES.INVALID_SCOPE_IDENTIFIER,
271
+ status: HttpStatus.BAD_REQUEST,
272
+ message: "Tenant or recipient identifier does not identify anybody"
261
273
  }
262
274
  };
263
275
  var NOTIFICATION_ERROR_DEFINITION_MAP = new Map(
@@ -1184,6 +1196,23 @@ function formatCooldown(remainingSeconds) {
1184
1196
  }
1185
1197
  return parts.join(" ");
1186
1198
  }
1199
+
1200
+ // src/server/utils/tenant-scope.ts
1201
+ function refuse(owner, label, reason) {
1202
+ return new NotificationException(
1203
+ "INVALID_SCOPE_IDENTIFIER",
1204
+ { boundary: owner, parameter: label, reason },
1205
+ { message: `[${owner}] ${label} ${reason}` }
1206
+ );
1207
+ }
1208
+ function assertIdentifies(owner, label, value) {
1209
+ if (typeof value !== "string") {
1210
+ throw refuse(owner, label, `expected a string, received ${typeof value}`);
1211
+ }
1212
+ if (value.trim() === "") {
1213
+ throw refuse(owner, label, "empty or whitespace-only");
1214
+ }
1215
+ }
1187
1216
  function safeCompare(expected, actual) {
1188
1217
  const expectedBytes = Buffer.from(expected, "utf8");
1189
1218
  const actualBytes = Buffer.from(actual, "utf8");
@@ -1229,6 +1258,7 @@ var OtpService = class {
1229
1258
  */
1230
1259
  async generate(input) {
1231
1260
  const otp = this.requireOtpOptions();
1261
+ this.assertScope(input);
1232
1262
  const cfg = otp.resolveForPurpose(input.purpose);
1233
1263
  await this.acquireCooldownOrThrow(input, cfg.resendCooldownSeconds);
1234
1264
  const code = generateOtpCode(cfg.length, cfg.codeType);
@@ -1246,6 +1276,7 @@ var OtpService = class {
1246
1276
  */
1247
1277
  async verify(input) {
1248
1278
  const otp = this.requireOtpOptions();
1279
+ this.assertScope(input);
1249
1280
  const result = await this.storage.consumeAttempt(input.tenantId, input.recipient, input.purpose);
1250
1281
  if (result.status === "not_found") {
1251
1282
  await this.audit(this.otpAuditEntry("failed", input, { reason: "not_found" }));
@@ -1277,6 +1308,7 @@ var OtpService = class {
1277
1308
  */
1278
1309
  async consume(input) {
1279
1310
  this.requireOtpOptions();
1311
+ this.assertScope(input);
1280
1312
  await this.storage.delete(input.tenantId, input.recipient, input.purpose);
1281
1313
  await this.storage.clearCooldown(input.tenantId, input.recipient, input.purpose);
1282
1314
  }
@@ -1296,6 +1328,7 @@ var OtpService = class {
1296
1328
  * @returns Existence, expiry, attempt counters, validation flag, and cooldown.
1297
1329
  */
1298
1330
  async getStatus(input) {
1331
+ this.assertScope(input);
1299
1332
  const [entry, cooldownSeconds] = await Promise.all([
1300
1333
  this.storage.get(input.tenantId, input.recipient, input.purpose),
1301
1334
  this.storage.getCooldown(input.tenantId, input.recipient, input.purpose)
@@ -1417,6 +1450,19 @@ var OtpService = class {
1417
1450
  }
1418
1451
  await this.audit(this.otpAuditEntry("verified", input, void 0));
1419
1452
  }
1453
+ /**
1454
+ * Refuses a tenant id or recipient that identifies nobody, before any storage call.
1455
+ *
1456
+ * The reference storage already refuses these through `hashTenantRecipient`, but a
1457
+ * consumer-supplied {@link IOtpStorage} is not required to, and a blank scope would
1458
+ * then be shared by every caller that sent one.
1459
+ *
1460
+ * @throws NotificationException `INVALID_SCOPE_IDENTIFIER` when either is blank.
1461
+ */
1462
+ assertScope(ref) {
1463
+ assertIdentifies("OtpService", "tenantId", ref.tenantId);
1464
+ assertIdentifies("OtpService", "recipient", ref.recipient);
1465
+ }
1420
1466
  /** Returns the resolved OTP options or throws `OTP_STORAGE_NOT_CONFIGURED`. */
1421
1467
  requireOtpOptions() {
1422
1468
  if (!this.options.otp) {
@@ -1833,6 +1879,7 @@ function instantiate(valueOrClass) {
1833
1879
  }
1834
1880
  return new ctor();
1835
1881
  }
1882
+ var INTERCEPTOR_NAME = "NotificationAuditInterceptor";
1836
1883
  var INTERCEPTOR_PROVIDER_NAME = "__interceptor__";
1837
1884
  function toErrorMessage(error) {
1838
1885
  return error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
@@ -1908,19 +1955,36 @@ var NotificationAuditInterceptor = class {
1908
1955
  return typeof candidate.payload === "object" && candidate.payload !== null;
1909
1956
  }
1910
1957
  /**
1911
- * Resolves the trusted tenant id: `tenantIdResolver(request)` when configured and
1912
- * a request is available, otherwise the payload-supplied `fallback`.
1958
+ * Resolves the trusted tenant id from `tenantIdResolver(request)`.
1959
+ *
1960
+ * Falls back to the payload-supplied value only when no resolver is configured or
1961
+ * no request is available — the payload reaches the handler from the caller, so
1962
+ * that value is asserted rather than authenticated, and an entry built from it
1963
+ * attributes the event to whichever tenant the caller named. Configure a resolver
1964
+ * whenever this interceptor runs on an HTTP boundary.
1965
+ *
1966
+ * A value that identifies nobody is refused rather than recorded, on BOTH paths:
1967
+ * the resolver's answer and the payload fallback. The fallback is the default path
1968
+ * — most consumers configure no resolver — so guarding only the resolver would
1969
+ * leave the common case unchecked, which is where a blank tenant actually arrives.
1970
+ *
1971
+ * @throws Error When either the resolved or the fallback tenant id is not a
1972
+ * string, or is blank.
1913
1973
  */
1914
1974
  async resolveTenantId(context, fallback) {
1915
1975
  const resolver = this.options.global.tenantIdResolver;
1916
1976
  if (resolver === void 0) {
1977
+ assertIdentifies(INTERCEPTOR_NAME, "the payload tenant id", fallback);
1917
1978
  return fallback;
1918
1979
  }
1919
1980
  const request = this.extractRequest(context);
1920
1981
  if (request === null) {
1982
+ assertIdentifies(INTERCEPTOR_NAME, "the payload tenant id", fallback);
1921
1983
  return fallback;
1922
1984
  }
1923
- return resolver(request);
1985
+ const resolved = await resolver(request);
1986
+ assertIdentifies(INTERCEPTOR_NAME, "the resolved tenant id", resolved);
1987
+ return resolved;
1924
1988
  }
1925
1989
  /** Reads the HTTP request from the context, returning `null` outside an HTTP context. */
1926
1990
  extractRequest(context) {
@@ -2048,7 +2112,8 @@ async function loadOptionalPeer(moduleName) {
2048
2112
  } catch (error) {
2049
2113
  if (isModuleNotFound(error, moduleName)) {
2050
2114
  throw new Error(
2051
- `\`${moduleName}\` package is not installed. Run \`pnpm add ${moduleName}\` in the consumer app.`
2115
+ `\`${moduleName}\` package is not installed. Run \`pnpm add ${moduleName}\` in the consumer app.`,
2116
+ { cause: error }
2052
2117
  );
2053
2118
  }
2054
2119
  const reason = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
@@ -2657,11 +2722,21 @@ _options2 = new WeakMap();
2657
2722
  SmtpEmailProvider = __decorateClass([
2658
2723
  Injectable()
2659
2724
  ], SmtpEmailProvider);
2725
+ function sha256(value) {
2726
+ return createHash("sha256").update(value).digest("hex");
2727
+ }
2728
+ function hashTenantRecipient(tenantId, recipient) {
2729
+ assertIdentifies("hashTenantRecipient", "tenantId", tenantId);
2730
+ assertIdentifies("hashTenantRecipient", "recipient", recipient);
2731
+ return createHash("sha256").update(`${sha256(tenantId)}:${sha256(recipient)}`).digest("hex");
2732
+ }
2733
+
2734
+ // src/server/providers/in-memory-otp.storage.ts
2660
2735
  var MS_PER_SECOND3 = 1e3;
2661
2736
  var InMemoryOtpStorage = class {
2662
2737
  constructor() {
2663
2738
  this.name = "memory";
2664
- /** OTP entries keyed by `${tenantId}::${recipient}::${purpose}`. */
2739
+ /** OTP entries keyed by `${hashTenantRecipient(tenantId, recipient)}::${purpose}`. */
2665
2740
  this.store = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
2666
2741
  /** Cooldown expiries (epoch ms) keyed by the same composite key. */
2667
2742
  this.cooldowns = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
@@ -2820,19 +2895,22 @@ var InMemoryOtpStorage = class {
2820
2895
  size() {
2821
2896
  return { otps: this.store.size, cooldowns: this.cooldowns.size };
2822
2897
  }
2823
- /** Collapses the `(tenantId, recipient, purpose)` tuple into one map key. */
2898
+ /**
2899
+ * Collapses the `(tenantId, recipient, purpose)` tuple into one map key.
2900
+ *
2901
+ * The tenant and recipient go through {@link hashTenantRecipient}, which encodes
2902
+ * the pair unambiguously and rejects an empty component. Joining the raw values
2903
+ * around a delimiter would not: `('a::b', 'c', p)` and `('a', 'b::c', p)` produce
2904
+ * the same string. The digest is fixed-length, so appending the purpose after it
2905
+ * stays unambiguous too.
2906
+ */
2824
2907
  key(tenantId, recipient, purpose) {
2825
- return `${tenantId}::${recipient}::${purpose}`;
2908
+ return `${hashTenantRecipient(tenantId, recipient)}::${purpose}`;
2826
2909
  }
2827
2910
  };
2828
2911
  InMemoryOtpStorage = __decorateClass([
2829
2912
  Injectable()
2830
2913
  ], InMemoryOtpStorage);
2831
- function hashTenantRecipient(tenantId, recipient) {
2832
- return createHash("sha256").update(`${tenantId}:${recipient}`).digest("hex");
2833
- }
2834
-
2835
- // src/server/providers/redis-otp.storage.ts
2836
2914
  var MS_PER_SECOND4 = 1e3;
2837
2915
  var _redis;
2838
2916
  var RedisOtpStorage = class {
@@ -2986,11 +3064,11 @@ var RedisOtpStorage = class {
2986
3064
  async clearCooldown(tenantId, recipient, purpose) {
2987
3065
  await __privateGet(this, _redis).del(this.cooldownKey(tenantId, recipient, purpose));
2988
3066
  }
2989
- /** Builds the OTP entry key: `{namespace}:otp:{purpose}:{sha256(tenantId:recipient)}`. */
3067
+ /** Builds the OTP entry key: `{namespace}:otp:{purpose}:{hashTenantRecipient(...)}`. */
2990
3068
  otpKey(tenantId, recipient, purpose) {
2991
3069
  return `${this.namespace}:otp:${purpose}:${hashTenantRecipient(tenantId, recipient)}`;
2992
3070
  }
2993
- /** Builds the cooldown key: `{namespace}:otp_cd:{purpose}:{sha256(tenantId:recipient)}`. */
3071
+ /** Builds the cooldown key: `{namespace}:otp_cd:{purpose}:{hashTenantRecipient(...)}`. */
2994
3072
  cooldownKey(tenantId, recipient, purpose) {
2995
3073
  return `${this.namespace}:otp_cd:${purpose}:${hashTenantRecipient(tenantId, recipient)}`;
2996
3074
  }