@buildbase/sdk 0.0.53 → 0.0.54

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1116,6 +1116,8 @@ declare abstract class BaseApi {
     private reportError;
     /** Execute fetch with timeout, retries, debug logging, and error callback. */
     private executeFetch;
+    /** Backoff sleep that ends early (with an AbortError) when the signal fires. */
+    private static delay;
     /** Internal: execute fetch against a resolved URL with timeout, retries, debug logging, and error callback. */
     private executeFetchUrl;
     /**
@@ -1860,15 +1862,40 @@ declare function cleanBBParams(): void;
 /**
  * Security utilities for the SDK.
  */
+/** Options for {@link validateRedirectUrl}. */
+interface RedirectValidationOptions {
+    /**
+     * Require absolute URLs to be same-origin with the current page
+     * (`window.location.origin`). Relative paths always pass. Use for any
+     * user-controllable target (return URLs, `?next=` params) — it turns an
+     * open redirect into a same-site navigation. Outside a browser there is no
+     * origin to compare against, so absolute URLs are rejected.
+     */
+    sameOrigin?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Origins additionally allowed for absolute URLs, e.g.
+     * `['https://checkout.stripe.com']`. Matched against `URL.origin` exactly.
+     */
+    allowedOrigins?: string[];
+}
 /**
- * Validate that a URL is safe to redirect to.
- * Prevents open redirect attacks by ensuring the URL uses https (or http on localhost).
- * Returns the URL if safe, or null if not.
+ * Validate that a URL is safe to redirect to. Returns the URL if safe, null if
+ * not.
+ *
+ * - **Relative paths** (`/dashboard`) are safe and always allowed —
+ *   protocol-relative (`//evil.com`) and backslash (`/\evil.com`) forms are
+ *   not treated as relative.
+ * - **Absolute URLs** must be `https:` (or `http:` on localhost). By default
+ *   any such URL passes (needed for cross-origin targets like Stripe checkout);
+ *   pass `sameOrigin` and/or `allowedOrigins` to restrict — then the URL must
+ *   match at least one of them. Always restrict user-controllable targets.
  */
-declare function validateRedirectUrl(url: string | null | undefined): string | null;
+declare function validateRedirectUrl(url: string | null | undefined, options?: RedirectValidationOptions): string | null;
 /**
  * Safely redirect to a URL after validating it.
- * Falls back to fallbackUrl if the target URL is invalid.
+ * Falls back to fallbackUrl (itself validated — else `/`) if the target URL is
+ * invalid. Pass `options` to restrict user-controllable targets (see
+ * {@link validateRedirectUrl}).
  *
  * Browser-only: navigation requires `window.location`. On non-browser runtimes
  * (Node, edge, Deno, Bun) there is nothing to navigate, so this is a no-op that
@@ -1876,7 +1903,7 @@ declare function validateRedirectUrl(url: string | null | undefined): string | n
  * that needs the resolved target should call {@link validateRedirectUrl} and
  * issue the redirect with its own framework (e.g. `Response.redirect`).
  */
-declare function safeRedirect(url: string | null | undefined, fallbackUrl?: string): boolean;
+declare function safeRedirect(url: string | null | undefined, fallbackUrl?: string, options?: RedirectValidationOptions): boolean;
 
 /**
  * Auth intent preservation — saves and restores the URL the user was on
@@ -1884,7 +1911,8 @@ declare function safeRedirect(url: string | null | undefined, fallbackUrl?: stri
  */
 /**
  * Save the current URL as the post-auth redirect target.
- * Validates the URL before storing — rejects unsafe URLs silently.
+ * Validates the URL before storing — rejects unsafe URLs silently. Same-origin
+ * only: the return URL is "where the user was", never another site.
  */
 declare function saveAuthIntent(returnUrl: string): void;
 /**
@@ -1916,7 +1944,15 @@ declare const PLAN_CURRENCY_OPTIONS: {
     value: "usd" | "eur" | "gbp" | "jpy" | "cad" | "aud" | "chf" | "cny" | "hkd" | "sgd" | "inr" | "mxn" | "brl" | "nzd" | "sek" | "nok" | "dkk" | "pln" | "thb";
     label: string;
 }[];
-/** Format cents as money string (e.g. 1999, "usd" -> "$19.99"). Caller must pass currency (e.g. from plan or workspace). */
+/** True when `currency` has no minor unit (JPY, KRW, …) — amounts are whole units, not cents. */
+declare function isZeroDecimalCurrency(currency: string | null | undefined): boolean;
+/**
+ * Convert a minor-unit amount to its display number for `currency`:
+ * `minorAmountToDisplay(1999, 'usd')` → `"19.99"`,
+ * `minorAmountToDisplay(1000, 'jpy')` → `"1,000"` (zero-decimal — no division).
+ */
+declare function minorAmountToDisplay(amount: number, currency: string): string;
+/** Format cents as money string (e.g. 1999, "usd" -> "$19.99"; 1000, "jpy" -> "¥1,000"). Caller must pass currency (e.g. from plan or workspace). */
 declare function formatCents(cents: number, currency: string): string;
 /** Translatable labels for overage/quota formatting */
 interface OverageLabels {
@@ -2957,17 +2993,17 @@ declare function parseWebhookEvent(options: {
  *
  * Makes a consuming app "agent ready" (see https://isitagentready.com) by
  * serving the standard machine-readable discovery documents an AI agent looks
- * for — with the BuildBase server as the source of truth.
- *
- * The heavy lifting already lives on the platform: an org admin configures
- * agent readiness once (protected resources, scopes, llms.txt) and the server
- * publishes the OAuth2 authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414) and the
- * per-resource protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728). This module lets an app
- * re-serve those documents from its own origin — where agents actually look —
- * plus generate the static discovery documents (Agent Card, Agent Skills,
- * security.txt) from local config. The result: an org admin adds full agent
- * support to their app in a couple of lines, and never hand-writes a
- * `.well-known` route.
+ * for.
+ *
+ * Ownership is split: the platform owns AUTH — it publishes the OAuth2
+ * authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414) and this module re-serves it from
+ * the app's origin, where agents actually look. Everything else (protected
+ * resources and their scopes, RFC 9728 metadata, llms.txt, sitemap, Agent
+ * Card, Agent Skills, security.txt) is CONTENT the app owns — declared locally
+ * in {@link AgentReadyConfig} and generated here; the shared authorization
+ * server stays scope- and resource-agnostic. The result: an org admin adds
+ * full agent support to their app in a couple of lines, and never hand-writes
+ * a `.well-known` route.
  *
  * Zero React and no framework types — every function returns plain data. The
  * only runtime dependency is `fetch`; SHA-256 (for Agent Skills digests) is a
@@ -3054,7 +3090,7 @@ interface ApiCatalogApi {
     /** Optional human title for the API. */
     title?: string;
 }
-/** MCP Server Card (SEP-1649 / SEP-2127), advertising a live MCP server. */
+/** MCP Server Card (SEP-1649 v1.0), advertising a live MCP server. */
 interface McpServerCard {
     /** Server name. */
     name: string;
@@ -3064,13 +3100,50 @@ interface McpServerCard {
     endpoint: string;
     /** Transport type. Defaults to `"streamable-http"`. */
     transport?: string;
-    /** Capabilities object, e.g. `{ tools: {}, resources: {} }`. */
+    /** MCP protocol version the server speaks. Defaults to `"2025-06-18"`. */
+    protocolVersion?: string;
+    /**
+     * Capability flags. Booleans per SEP-1649 v1.0; a legacy object value
+     * (e.g. `{ tools: {} }`) is normalized to booleans by presence.
+     */
     capabilities?: Record<string, unknown>;
     /** Optional human description. */
     description?: string;
     /** Documentation URL. */
     documentationUrl?: string;
 }
+/** One OAuth scope an app declares in its scope catalog. */
+interface AppScope {
+    /** Scope name, e.g. `designs:read`. */
+    name: string;
+    /** Human-readable description, shown on the consent screen. */
+    description: string;
+}
+/** One skill advertised on the A2A Agent Card. */
+interface A2ACardSkill {
+    id: string;
+    name: string;
+    description: string;
+    tags?: string[];
+}
+/**
+ * Overrides for the A2A Agent Card (`/.well-known/agent-card.json`). Every
+ * field is optional — the card is fully derived from `site` + `skills` by
+ * default. See {@link buildA2AAgentCard}.
+ */
+interface A2ACardConfig {
+    name?: string;
+    version?: string;
+    description?: string;
+    /** The endpoint agents connect to. Defaults to `siteUrl`. */
+    serviceUrl?: string;
+    /** Transport protocol advertised for `serviceUrl`. Defaults to `'http'`. */
+    transportProtocol?: string;
+    /** A2A capability flags. Defaults to `{ streaming: false, pushNotifications: false }`. */
+    capabilities?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** Skills; defaults to a mapping of `config.skills` (or a generic site skill). */
+    skills?: A2ACardSkill[];
+}
 /** One robots.txt policy group (a `User-agent:` block). */
 interface RobotsPolicy {
     /** User-agent(s) this group applies to, e.g. `'*'` or `'GPTBot'`. */
@@ -3151,6 +3224,15 @@ interface AgentReadyConfig {
     };
     /** Agent Skills to publish. Omit to skip the Agent Skills documents. */
     skills?: AgentSkill[];
+    /**
+     * The app's OAuth scope catalog — the source of truth for `scopes_supported`
+     * in this app's RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata (served from your own
+     * origin). Declare real, per-app scopes here (`designs:read`,
+     * `render:execute`, …) instead of placeholders. A `protectedResources` entry
+     * without its own `scopes` list inherits every catalog scope name. Scopes are
+     * app-owned: the shared BuildBase authorization server stays scope-agnostic.
+     */
+    scopes?: AppScope[];
     /** security.txt fields (RFC 9116). Omit to skip serving security.txt. */
     security?: {
         /** Contact URI(s) — email (`mailto:`) or URL. */
@@ -3181,6 +3263,41 @@ interface AgentReadyConfig {
      * from the platform bundle — use when the app owns richer llms.txt content.
      */
     llmsTxt?: string;
+    /**
+     * Local `/llms-full.txt` content (llmstxt.org expanded document). Omit to
+     * skip serving it (or serve your own static file, which then wins).
+     */
+    llmsFullTxt?: string;
+    /**
+     * A2A Agent Card served at `/.well-known/agent-card.json`. Served by
+     * DEFAULT, derived from `site` + `skills`, so readiness scanners find a
+     * valid card with zero config. Pass `false` to disable, or an object to
+     * override any derived field.
+     */
+    a2aCard?: false | A2ACardConfig;
+    /**
+     * Web Bot Auth key directory (IETF WebBotAuth) served at
+     * `/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory`. Only for apps whose own
+     * outbound bot/agent signs its requests — publish the JWKS public keys here
+     * so receiving sites can verify the signatures. Omitted = not served.
+     */
+    webBotAuth?: {
+        keys: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
+    };
+    /**
+     * Extra literal documents served by {@link resolveAgentPath}, keyed by exact
+     * request path. The escape hatch for anything the SDK has no builder for —
+     * commerce discovery (x402, UCP, ACP, MPP), `/openapi.json`, future
+     * `.well-known` documents. A string value infers its content type from the
+     * path extension. Extra paths take precedence over built-in documents, so
+     * they can also override any SDK-generated document.
+     */
+    extraPaths?: Record<string, string | {
+        body: string;
+        contentType?: string;
+        status?: number;
+        cacheControl?: string;
+    }>;
     /** robots.txt generation (`buildRobotsTxt`). Omitted = sane defaults. */
     robots?: RobotsConfig;
     /**
@@ -3258,11 +3375,12 @@ declare function buildAgentCard(config: AgentReadyConfig, bundle: AgentReadiness
  * Resolve the RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata for a request path, or null
  * if no configured resource maps to it.
  *
- * App-owned and local: built entirely from `config.protectedResources`, with
- * `authorization_servers` derived from `serverUrl`/`orgId` (the BuildBase
- * issuer). No platform round-trip.
+ * App-owned. `authorization_servers` uses the platform bundle's real
+ * `authorizationServer.issuer` when provided (so this doc can't advertise a
+ * different issuer than the AS metadata / agent card / auth.md), falling back
+ * to the `serverUrl`/`orgId` heuristic when the bundle isn't available.
  */
-declare function buildProtectedResourceMetadata(requestPath: string, config: AgentReadyConfig): DiscoveryDocument | null;
+declare function buildProtectedResourceMetadata(requestPath: string, config: AgentReadyConfig, authServerIssuer?: string): DiscoveryDocument | null;
 /** Agent Skills discovery index (Agent Skills Discovery RFC v0.2.0). */
 declare function buildAgentSkillsIndex(config: AgentReadyConfig): DiscoveryDocument | null;
 /** Serve a single skill's SKILL.md by request path, or null if none matches. */
@@ -3275,16 +3393,68 @@ declare function buildSecurityTxt(config: AgentReadyConfig): DiscoveryDocument |
  * not platform-managed.
  */
 declare function buildLlmsTxt(config: AgentReadyConfig): DiscoveryDocument | null;
+/**
+ * The `/llms-full.txt` document from `config.llmsFullTxt` (app-authored).
+ * Returns null when not set — serve your own static file instead.
+ */
+declare function buildLlmsFullTxt(config: AgentReadyConfig): DiscoveryDocument | null;
+/**
+ * A2A Agent Card (https://a2a-protocol.org) for `/.well-known/agent-card.json`.
+ * Served by default, fully derived from `site` + `skills`, so a consumer is
+ * A2A-discoverable with zero config; `config.a2aCard` overrides any field or
+ * disables the card entirely (`false`). Skills fall back to a generic
+ * site-content skill when none are configured — the card must carry at least
+ * one skill to validate.
+ */
+declare function buildA2AAgentCard(config: AgentReadyConfig): DiscoveryDocument | null;
+/**
+ * Web Bot Auth key directory (JWKS) for
+ * `/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory`. Returns null unless
+ * `config.webBotAuth.keys` is set — signing keys are the app's own and can't
+ * be derived.
+ */
+declare function buildWebBotAuthDirectory(config: AgentReadyConfig): DiscoveryDocument | null;
+/** One DNS record the org should publish for DNS-AID agent discovery. */
+interface DnsAidRecord {
+    /** Fully-qualified record name, e.g. `_a2a._agents.example.com`. */
+    name: string;
+    /** Record type — HTTPS for HTTPS endpoints, SVCB otherwise. */
+    type: 'HTTPS' | 'SVCB';
+    ttl: number;
+    /** Record data, e.g. `1 example.com. alpn="h2" port=443`. */
+    data: string;
+}
+/**
+ * DNS-AID (DNS for AI Discovery) records this app should publish under its
+ * domain's `_agents` namespace. DNS records can't be served over HTTP — hand
+ * these to the org's DNS provider (and DNSSEC-sign the zone). Derived from the
+ * same config as the HTTP discovery surface, so the two never disagree.
+ */
+declare function buildDnsAidRecords(config: AgentReadyConfig): DnsAidRecord[];
 /**
  * API Catalog (RFC 9727) as a `linkset+json` document for
  * `/.well-known/api-catalog`. Returns null when no APIs are configured.
  */
 declare function buildApiCatalog(config: AgentReadyConfig): DiscoveryDocument | null;
 /**
- * MCP Server Card (SEP-1649) for `/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json`. Returns
- * null when no card is configured (i.e. no MCP server is running).
+ * MCP Server Card (SEP-1649 v1.0) for `/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json`.
+ * Returns null when no card is configured (i.e. no MCP server is running).
  */
 declare function buildMcpServerCard(config: AgentReadyConfig): DiscoveryDocument | null;
+/**
+ * MCP discovery manifest (SEP-1960) for `/.well-known/mcp.json` — the
+ * origin-level index of every MCP server this app exposes. Complements the
+ * per-server card (SEP-1649): scanners and agents probe this path first, then
+ * follow `server_card` for detail. Returns null when no MCP server is
+ * configured.
+ *
+ * The transport endpoint may live on a different origin than the app serving
+ * this manifest (e.g. card on `www.`, server on `api.`); the `authentication`
+ * pointer is derived from the ENDPOINT's origin per RFC 9728 path derivation,
+ * so agents land on the metadata the server's own WWW-Authenticate challenge
+ * advertises.
+ */
+declare function buildMcpDiscoveryManifest(config: AgentReadyConfig): DiscoveryDocument | null;
 /**
  * The `/auth.md` document (agent registration + authentication instructions).
  * Uses `config.authMd` verbatim when provided; otherwise generates one from the
@@ -3470,11 +3640,8 @@ interface VerifyClientJwtOptions {
  * its payload. Checks the signature (timing-safe), the algorithm, `exp`/`nbf`,
  * and — by default — that an `exp` is present at all. Optionally pins `iss`/`aud`.
  * Throws {@link AppBridgeError} on any failure.
- *
- * The third argument accepts either the legacy `clockToleranceSec` number or a
- * {@link VerifyClientJwtOptions} object.
  */
-declare function verifyClientJwt(token: string, clientSecret: string, optionsOrTolerance?: number | VerifyClientJwtOptions): Record<string, any>;
+declare function verifyClientJwt(token: string, clientSecret: string, options?: VerifyClientJwtOptions): Record<string, any>;
 /** Extract the token from an `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header. */
 declare function extractBearerToken(authorization: string | null | undefined): string | null;
 /**
@@ -3855,5 +4022,198 @@ interface BuildBaseResult extends ScopedActions {
 }
 declare function BuildBase(config: BuildBaseConfig): BuildBaseResult;
 
-export { AI_BOT_USER_AGENTS, ApiVersion, AppBridgeError, AuthApi, AuthStatus, BBAction, BBScreen, BBStatus, BB_PARAM, BaseApi, BetaForm, BillingIntervals, BuildBase, CURRENCY_DISPLAY, CURRENCY_FLAG, CreditBucketSource, CreditBucketStatus, CreditTransactionType, DEFAULT_ROLE_PERMISSIONS, DunningState, EventEmitter, InvoiceStatuses, PLAN_CURRENCY_CODES, PLAN_CURRENCY_OPTIONS, PUSH_SERVICE_WORKER_SCRIPT, Permission, PushApi, SDKEvent, SettingsApi, SubscriptionItemType, SubscriptionStatus, UserApi, WorkspaceApi, appTokenFailure, appTokenSuccess, bearerChallenge, buildAgentCard, buildAgentSkillsIndex, buildApiCatalog, buildAuthMd, buildDiscoveryLinkHeader, buildLlmsTxt, buildMcpServerCard, buildProtectedResourceMetadata, buildRobotsTxt, buildSecurityTxt, buildSitemap, buildSkillMd, calculateBillableSeats, calculateSeatOverageCents, calculateTotalSubscriptionCents, cleanBBParams, clearAgentReadinessCache, clearAuthIntent, consumeAuthIntent, createBBUrl, createCheckoutRedirectUrls, createCreditPurchaseRedirectUrls, BuildBase as default, eventEmitter, extractBearerToken, fetchAgentReadiness, formatCents, formatOverageRate, formatOverageRateWithLabel, formatQuotaIncludedOverage, formatQuotaWithPrice, getAvailableCurrenciesFromPlans, getBasePriceCents, getBillingIntervalAndCurrencyFromPriceId, getCurrencyFlag, getCurrencySymbol, getDisplayCurrency, getPerSeatPriceCents, getPricingVariant, getQuotaDisplayValue, getQuotaDisplayWithVariant, getQuotaOverageCents, getQuotaUnitLabelFromName, getSeatPricing, getStripePriceIdForInterval, handleAppRevokeRequest, handleAppTokenRequest, hasPermission, invalidateCreditBalance, invalidateQuotaUsage, invalidateSubscription, negotiateMarkdown, parseWebhookEvent, provideWebMcpTools, readBBParams, resolveAgentPath, resolveMaxUsers, resolvePermissions, resolveWellKnown, safeRedirect, saveAuthIntent, sha256Digest, signClientJwt, validateInvite, validateRedirectUrl, verifyAppRevokeRequest, verifyAppTokenRequest, verifyClientJwt, verifyWebhookSignature, wantsMarkdown };
-export type { AgentReadinessBundle, AgentReadyConfig, AgentSkill, ApiCatalogApi, AppRevokeRequestClaims, AppTokenRequestClaims, AppTokenResponseBody, AppTokenResult, BBActionType, BBScreenType, BBStatusType, BetaFormData, BetaFormResponse, BillingInterval, BuildBaseConfig, BuildBaseResult, BuildBaseSession, CheckoutResult, ContentSignals, CreditActions, CreditBucketSourceType, CreditBucketStatusType, CreditTransactionTypeValue, DiscoveryDocument, DunningStateType, EventData, EventType, FeatureActions, FormatQuotaWithPriceOptions, GetCheckoutStripeParams, HandlerResult, IAllQuotaUsageResponse, IBaseApiConfig, IBasePricing, IBetaConfig, ICheckoutSessionRequest, ICheckoutSessionResponse, ICheckoutStripeOptions, IConsumeCreditsRequest, IConsumeCreditsResponse, ICreditBalance, ICreditBucket, ICreditBucketsQuery, ICreditBucketsResponse, ICreditPackage, ICreditPackagePricingVariant, ICreditPurchaseRequest, ICreditPurchaseResponse, ICreditTransaction, ICreditTransactionsQuery, ICreditTransactionsResponse, IEventCallbacks, IExpiringCreditsResponse, IInvoice, IInvoiceListResponse, IInvoiceResponse, IOsConfig, IOsState, IPlan, IPlanGroup, IPlanGroupInfo, IPlanGroupLatestVersion, IPlanGroupResponse, IPlanGroupVersion, IPlanGroupVersionWithPlans, IPlanGroupVersionsResponse, IPlanVersion, IPlanVersionSummary, IPlanVersionWithPlan, IPricingVariant, IPublicCreditPackage, IPublicCreditPackagesResponse, IPublicPlanItem, IPublicPlanItemCategory, IPublicPlanVersion, IPublicPlansResponse, IQuotaByInterval, IQuotaIntervalValue, IQuotaOveragePriceIdsByInterval, IQuotaOveragesByInterval, IQuotaUsageStatus, IQuotaUsageStatusResponse, IRecordUsageRequest, IRecordUsageResponse, ISettings, IStripePricesByInterval, ISubscription, ISubscriptionItem, ISubscriptionResponse, ISubscriptionUpdateRequest, ISubscriptionUpdateResponse, IUsageLogEntry, IUsageLogsQuery, IUsageLogsResponse, IUser, IWorkspace, InviteBlockReason, InviteValidation, InvoiceActions, InvoiceStatus, InvoiceStatusType, MaxUsersConfig, McpServerCard, NotificationData, NotificationEvent, NotificationResult, OnWorkspaceChangeParams, PermissionActions, PermissionContext, PermissionKey, PlanActions, PlanVersionWithPricingVariants, QuotaDisplayValue, QuotaDisplayWithOverage, RobotsConfig, RobotsPolicy, RolePermissionMap, ScopedActions, SettingsActions, SitemapUrl, SubscriptionActions, SubscriptionItemTypeValue, SubscriptionStatusType, TranslationKey, UsageActions, UserActions, UserCreatedEventData, UserUpdatedEventData, WebMcpTool, WorkspaceActions, WorkspaceChangedEventData, WorkspaceCreatedEventData, WorkspaceDeletedEventData, WorkspaceUpdatedEventData, WorkspaceUserAddedEventData, WorkspaceUserRemovedEventData, WorkspaceUserRoleChangedEventData };
+/**
+ * MCP server toolkit (server-side, framework-agnostic).
+ *
+ * Turns a consuming app into a live MCP (Model Context Protocol) server so AI
+ * agents can operate its BuildBase capabilities — workspaces, subscriptions,
+ * quotas, credits, feature flags, permissions — plus any custom tools the app
+ * defines. The transport is stateless Streamable HTTP: a single JSON-RPC
+ * message per POST, no sessions and no SSE, which keeps the handler pure and
+ * identical on Node 18+, edge, Deno, and Bun.
+ *
+ * Zero framework types: the core `handle()` takes a plain
+ * `{ method, headers, body }` and returns `{ status, headers, body }` (wire it
+ * into Express/Fastify/Hono yourself), while `fetch()` adapts Web-standard
+ * `Request` → `Response` for Next.js App Router and edge runtimes.
+ *
+ * Agents authenticate with the Bearer tokens the app mints via the OAuth2
+ * app-bridge (`handleAppTokenRequest` + `signClientJwt`); the `auth.verify`
+ * callback maps a verified token to the BuildBase session the tools run under.
+ *
+ * @example Next.js App Router — the entire integration:
+ * ```ts
+ * // lib/mcp.ts
+ * import BuildBase from '@buildbase/sdk';
+ * import { createMcpHandler, verifyClientJwt } from '@buildbase/sdk/mcp';
+ *
+ * const buildbase = BuildBase({
+ *   serverUrl: process.env.BUILDBASE_URL!,
+ *   orgId: process.env.BUILDBASE_ORG_ID!,
+ * });
+ *
+ * export const mcp = createMcpHandler({
+ *   buildbase,
+ *   serverInfo: { name: 'imejis', version: '1.0.0' },
+ *   auth: {
+ *     verify: (token) => {
+ *       const c = verifyClientJwt(token, process.env.BUILDBASE_CLIENT_SECRET!);
+ *       return { sessionId: String(c.sid), userId: String(c.sub), scopes: c.scope };
+ *     },
+ *     resourceMetadataUrl: 'https://imejis.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource',
+ *   },
+ * });
+ *
+ * // app/api/mcp/route.ts
+ * import { mcp } from '@/lib/mcp';
+ * export const POST = (req: Request) => mcp.fetch(req);
+ * export const GET = (req: Request) => mcp.fetch(req);    // 405 per spec (no SSE)
+ * export const DELETE = (req: Request) => mcp.fetch(req); // 405 (stateless)
+ * ```
+ */
+
+/** A transport-agnostic HTTP request (mirror of the DiscoveryDocument idea). */
+interface McpHttpRequest {
+    /** HTTP method, e.g. `'POST'`. */
+    method: string;
+    /** Header map. Keys are matched case-insensitively. */
+    headers: Record<string, string | undefined>;
+    /** Raw JSON body string, or an already-parsed value (e.g. Express req.body). */
+    body?: string | unknown;
+}
+/** The identity a verified Bearer token resolves to. */
+interface McpAuthInfo {
+    /** BuildBase session all tool calls run under (`buildbase.withSession(...)`). */
+    sessionId: string;
+    /** The acting BuildBase user id — default subject for permission checks. */
+    userId?: string;
+    /** Pin tools to one workspace; used when the agent omits `workspaceId`. */
+    workspaceId?: string;
+    /** OAuth scopes granted to the agent; filters tools with `requiredScopes`. */
+    scopes?: string[];
+    /** Raw verified claims, passed through to tool context. */
+    claims?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * BuildBase agent-auth presets (server-side, framework-agnostic).
+ *
+ * The BuildBase security model: the platform runs the OAuth2 flow (login,
+ * consent, PKCE, refresh) but the APP mints and verifies its own user tokens,
+ * signed with the app's own secret. The platform only relays the minted token
+ * to the agent — it never sees the secret, so it can neither forge nor decode
+ * an app token. The per-user BuildBase session travels inside the token only
+ * as an AES-256-GCM-encrypted `sid` claim, so it is never stored and never
+ * plaintext anywhere; access to it expires with the token.
+ *
+ * These presets make that model a one-liner on each side of the flow, and run
+ * entirely in the app's process — pure local crypto, zero platform calls:
+ *
+ *   • {@link mintAgentToken}  — inside your `applicationTokenUrl` handler:
+ *     signs the app JWT (HS256) with your secret, stamps `aud` from the RFC
+ *     8707 resource, and embeds the encrypted `sid` automatically.
+ *   • {@link buildbaseAuth}   — the `auth` config for `createMcpHandler`:
+ *     verifies the JWT, enforces audience binding, decrypts the `sid`, and
+ *     maps the claims to `McpAuthInfo`.
+ *
+ * @example The full loop:
+ * ```ts
+ * // applicationTokenUrl route — the platform calls this on every grant
+ * const { status, body } = await handleAppTokenRequest({
+ *   authorization: req.headers.get("authorization"),
+ *   clientSecret: process.env.BUILDBASE_CLIENT_SECRET!,
+ *   mintToken: (claims) => mintAgentToken({ claims, secret: process.env.SYSTEM_SECRET! }),
+ * });
+ *
+ * // MCP server — verifies what the route above minted
+ * const mcp = createMcpHandler({
+ *   buildbase,
+ *   auth: buildbaseAuth({ secret: process.env.SYSTEM_SECRET!, resource: "https://app.example.com/api/mcp" }),
+ * });
+ * ```
+ *
+ * AES-GCM comes from WebCrypto (`globalThis.crypto.subtle`) — Node 18+, Bun,
+ * Deno, edge runtimes, browsers. The wire format is
+ * `base64url(iv(12) || authTag(16) || ciphertext)` with the key derived as
+ * `SHA-256(secret + ":bb-session")`, byte-compatible with Node
+ * `createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", ...)` implementations of the same layout.
+ */
+
+/** Encrypt/decrypt pair for the `sid` claim, bound to one app secret. */
+interface SessionRefCrypto {
+    /** Encrypt a BuildBase session id for embedding in an app JWT. */
+    encryptSessionRef(sessionId: string): Promise<string>;
+    /** Decrypt a `sid` claim. Returns null on any failure (wrong key, garbage). */
+    decryptSessionRef(ref: string): Promise<string | null>;
+}
+/**
+ * Session-ref crypto derived from the app's secret. Both sides of the loop
+ * ({@link mintAgentToken}, {@link buildbaseAuth}) use this internally — reach
+ * for it directly only when minting or verifying tokens by hand.
+ */
+declare function createSessionRefCrypto(secret: string): SessionRefCrypto;
+/** Options for {@link mintAgentToken}. */
+interface MintAgentTokenOptions {
+    /** The verified platform claims (from `handleAppTokenRequest`'s callback). */
+    claims: AppTokenRequestClaims;
+    /** The APP's token-signing secret. Never leaves this process. */
+    secret: string;
+    /** Token lifetime in seconds. Default 3600 — keep agent tokens short-lived. */
+    expiresInSec?: number;
+    /**
+     * App-specific claims merged into the token — e.g. a `workspaceId` resolved
+     * by your own user sync. Merged last, so they can override the defaults.
+     */
+    extraClaims?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+/**
+ * Mint the app's agent access token from a platform grant: HS256-signed with
+ * YOUR secret, `aud` bound to the granted RFC 8707 resource(s), scopes carried
+ * through, and the per-user BuildBase session embedded as an encrypted `sid`
+ * claim. The result plugs straight into `handleAppTokenRequest`'s `mintToken`.
+ */
+declare function mintAgentToken(options: MintAgentTokenOptions): Promise<{
+    token: string;
+    expiresIn: number;
+}>;
+/** Options for {@link buildbaseAuth}. */
+interface BuildBaseAuthOptions {
+    /** The APP's token-signing secret — the same one `mintAgentToken` used. */
+    secret: string;
+    /**
+     * The protected resource(s) this server IS. Enforces RFC 8707 audience
+     * binding — the token's `aud` must include one of these URIs. Pass an array
+     * when the server is addressable under more than one resource identifier
+     * (e.g. the canonical `<host>/mcp` plus the literal endpoint URL); the
+     * FIRST entry is the canonical one used to derive `resourceMetadataUrl`.
+     */
+    resource?: string | string[];
+    /**
+     * Explicit RFC 9728 metadata URL for the 401 challenge. Defaults to the
+     * path-derived `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource<path>` of the first
+     * `resource`.
+     */
+    resourceMetadataUrl?: string;
+    /**
+     * Reject tokens that carry no `aud` claim at all. Default false: audience is
+     * enforced when present, and legacy audience-less tokens still work. Turn
+     * this on once every minted token is audience-bound.
+     */
+    requireAudience?: boolean;
+    /** Extra JWT verification options (clock tolerance, issuer pinning). */
+    verify?: Pick<VerifyClientJwtOptions, 'clockToleranceSec' | 'issuer'>;
+}
+/**
+ * The `auth` config for `createMcpHandler`, prewired for BuildBase-minted app
+ * tokens: HS256 verification with your secret, RFC 8707 audience binding,
+ * `sid` decryption to the BuildBase session, claim mapping to `McpAuthInfo`,
+ * and the derived RFC 9728 `resourceMetadataUrl`. Entirely local — the token
+ * and secret never leave this process.
+ */
+declare function buildbaseAuth(options: BuildBaseAuthOptions): {
+    verify: (token: string, req: McpHttpRequest) => Promise<McpAuthInfo | null>;
+    resourceMetadataUrl?: string;
+};
+
+export { AI_BOT_USER_AGENTS, ApiVersion, AppBridgeError, AuthApi, AuthStatus, BBAction, BBScreen, BBStatus, BB_PARAM, BaseApi, BetaForm, BillingIntervals, BuildBase, CURRENCY_DISPLAY, CURRENCY_FLAG, CreditBucketSource, CreditBucketStatus, CreditTransactionType, DEFAULT_ROLE_PERMISSIONS, DunningState, EventEmitter, InvoiceStatuses, PLAN_CURRENCY_CODES, PLAN_CURRENCY_OPTIONS, PUSH_SERVICE_WORKER_SCRIPT, Permission, PushApi, SDKEvent, SettingsApi, SubscriptionItemType, SubscriptionStatus, UserApi, WorkspaceApi, appTokenFailure, appTokenSuccess, bearerChallenge, buildA2AAgentCard, buildAgentCard, buildAgentSkillsIndex, buildApiCatalog, buildAuthMd, buildDiscoveryLinkHeader, buildDnsAidRecords, buildLlmsFullTxt, buildLlmsTxt, buildMcpDiscoveryManifest, buildMcpServerCard, buildProtectedResourceMetadata, buildRobotsTxt, buildSecurityTxt, buildSitemap, buildSkillMd, buildWebBotAuthDirectory, buildbaseAuth, calculateBillableSeats, calculateSeatOverageCents, calculateTotalSubscriptionCents, cleanBBParams, clearAgentReadinessCache, clearAuthIntent, consumeAuthIntent, createBBUrl, createCheckoutRedirectUrls, createCreditPurchaseRedirectUrls, createSessionRefCrypto, BuildBase as default, eventEmitter, extractBearerToken, fetchAgentReadiness, formatCents, formatOverageRate, formatOverageRateWithLabel, formatQuotaIncludedOverage, formatQuotaWithPrice, getAvailableCurrenciesFromPlans, getBasePriceCents, getBillingIntervalAndCurrencyFromPriceId, getCurrencyFlag, getCurrencySymbol, getDisplayCurrency, getPerSeatPriceCents, getPricingVariant, getQuotaDisplayValue, getQuotaDisplayWithVariant, getQuotaOverageCents, getQuotaUnitLabelFromName, getSeatPricing, getStripePriceIdForInterval, handleAppRevokeRequest, handleAppTokenRequest, hasPermission, invalidateCreditBalance, invalidateQuotaUsage, invalidateSubscription, isZeroDecimalCurrency, minorAmountToDisplay, mintAgentToken, negotiateMarkdown, parseWebhookEvent, provideWebMcpTools, readBBParams, resolveAgentPath, resolveMaxUsers, resolvePermissions, resolveWellKnown, safeRedirect, saveAuthIntent, sha256Digest, signClientJwt, validateInvite, validateRedirectUrl, verifyAppRevokeRequest, verifyAppTokenRequest, verifyClientJwt, verifyWebhookSignature, wantsMarkdown };
+export type { A2ACardConfig, A2ACardSkill, AgentReadinessBundle, AgentReadyConfig, AgentSkill, ApiCatalogApi, AppRevokeRequestClaims, AppScope, AppTokenRequestClaims, AppTokenResponseBody, AppTokenResult, BBActionType, BBScreenType, BBStatusType, BetaFormData, BetaFormResponse, BillingInterval, BuildBaseAuthOptions, BuildBaseConfig, BuildBaseResult, BuildBaseSession, CheckoutResult, ContentSignals, CreditActions, CreditBucketSourceType, CreditBucketStatusType, CreditTransactionTypeValue, DiscoveryDocument, DnsAidRecord, DunningStateType, EventData, EventType, FeatureActions, FormatQuotaWithPriceOptions, GetCheckoutStripeParams, HandlerResult, IAllQuotaUsageResponse, IBaseApiConfig, IBasePricing, IBetaConfig, ICheckoutSessionRequest, ICheckoutSessionResponse, ICheckoutStripeOptions, IConsumeCreditsRequest, IConsumeCreditsResponse, ICreditBalance, ICreditBucket, ICreditBucketsQuery, ICreditBucketsResponse, ICreditPackage, ICreditPackagePricingVariant, ICreditPurchaseRequest, ICreditPurchaseResponse, ICreditTransaction, ICreditTransactionsQuery, ICreditTransactionsResponse, IEventCallbacks, IExpiringCreditsResponse, IInvoice, IInvoiceListResponse, IInvoiceResponse, IOsConfig, IOsState, IPlan, IPlanGroup, IPlanGroupInfo, IPlanGroupLatestVersion, IPlanGroupResponse, IPlanGroupVersion, IPlanGroupVersionWithPlans, IPlanGroupVersionsResponse, IPlanVersion, IPlanVersionSummary, IPlanVersionWithPlan, IPricingVariant, IPublicCreditPackage, IPublicCreditPackagesResponse, IPublicPlanItem, IPublicPlanItemCategory, IPublicPlanVersion, IPublicPlansResponse, IQuotaByInterval, IQuotaIntervalValue, IQuotaOveragePriceIdsByInterval, IQuotaOveragesByInterval, IQuotaUsageStatus, IQuotaUsageStatusResponse, IRecordUsageRequest, IRecordUsageResponse, ISettings, IStripePricesByInterval, ISubscription, ISubscriptionItem, ISubscriptionResponse, ISubscriptionUpdateRequest, ISubscriptionUpdateResponse, IUsageLogEntry, IUsageLogsQuery, IUsageLogsResponse, IUser, IWorkspace, InviteBlockReason, InviteValidation, InvoiceActions, InvoiceStatus, InvoiceStatusType, MaxUsersConfig, McpServerCard, MintAgentTokenOptions, NotificationData, NotificationEvent, NotificationResult, OnWorkspaceChangeParams, PermissionActions, PermissionContext, PermissionKey, PlanActions, PlanVersionWithPricingVariants, QuotaDisplayValue, QuotaDisplayWithOverage, RedirectValidationOptions, RobotsConfig, RobotsPolicy, RolePermissionMap, ScopedActions, SessionRefCrypto, SettingsActions, SitemapUrl, SubscriptionActions, SubscriptionItemTypeValue, SubscriptionStatusType, TranslationKey, UsageActions, UserActions, UserCreatedEventData, UserUpdatedEventData, WebMcpTool, WorkspaceActions, WorkspaceChangedEventData, WorkspaceCreatedEventData, WorkspaceDeletedEventData, WorkspaceUpdatedEventData, WorkspaceUserAddedEventData, WorkspaceUserRemovedEventData, WorkspaceUserRoleChangedEventData };