@bsv/dpp-core 0.3.0-beta.1

package/dist/constants.js

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/**
+ * DPP Token Standard v1 - constants (`spec/record-model.md` §2-§3).
+ *
+ * Encoding decisions pinned by this reference implementation (the standard
+ * fixes field order and semantics; byte encodings are pinned here):
+ * - protocol_marker: UTF-8 "dpp"
+ * - version: UTF-8 "1"
+ * - passport_id, op, timestamp, actor_keyID, event_data, payload_public: UTF-8
+ * - owner_identity_key, actor_identity_key: 33-byte compressed public key (raw)
+ * - payload_owner_hash: 32-byte SHA-256 digest (raw). Zero-length when absent
+ * - previous_txid: 32-byte txid, big-endian display order (raw). Zero-length at genesis
+ * - user_signature, server_signature: DER-encoded ECDSA signature
+ *
+ * Zero-length fields are encoded as OP_0. Within the standard's value domain
+ * this is unambiguous: no field may legitimately be the single byte 0x00.
+ */
+export const PROTOCOL_MARKER = 'dpp';
+export const STANDARD_VERSION = '1';
+/**
+ * BRC-43 protocol ID under which both token signatures are created, always
+ * with counterparty 'anyone' so any third party can derive the verification
+ * key from on-chain data alone (§3 fields 7/8, §5).
+ * - user_signature:   actor identity key + keyID = actor_keyID (field 8)
+ * - server_signature: service identity key + keyID = passport_id (field 3)
+ */
+export const DPP_PROTOCOL_ID = [1, 'dpp token v1'];
+/**
+ * BRC-43 protocol ID of the owner key (`spec/custody.md` §2, `spec/record-model.md`
+ * §3 field 6): field 6 SHOULD be the owner's root derived under this protocol
+ * with keyID = passport_id and counterparty 'self', one level, so a BRC-100
+ * wallet produces it with getPublicKey and spends a tip locked to it with the
+ * PushDrop unlock (`spec/custody.md` §3). 'self' is what makes holdings
+ * unlinkable: nobody but the root can compute or confirm the child.
+ */
+export const OWNER_PROTOCOL_ID = [1, 'dpp owner v1'];
+/**
+ * The event_data property a TRANSFER carries to prove, under the optional
+ * owner-signed transfer invariant (`spec/custody.md` §4), that the actor's root
+ * derived the previous owner key: the BRC-69 specific key linkage, 64 lower-case
+ * hex characters. Reserved on TRANSFER; meaningless elsewhere.
+ */
+export const OWNER_LINKAGE_KEY = 'owner_linkage';
+/** The one accepted spelling of the linkage scalar: one value, one spelling. */
+export const OWNER_LINKAGE_HEX = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/;
+/**
+ * What a BRC-100 wallet encrypts the linkage under when it reveals it
+ * (revealSpecificKeyLinkage: `[2, 'specific linkage revelation <level> <name>']`
+ * of the target protocol, keyID = the target keyID, counterparty = the
+ * verifier). The verifier decrypts with the prover as counterparty.
+ */
+export const OWNER_LINKAGE_REVELATION_PROTOCOL_ID = [
+    2,
+    `specific linkage revelation ${OWNER_PROTOCOL_ID[0]} ${OWNER_PROTOCOL_ID[1]}`,
+];
+/**
+ * Upper bounds on the two fields that are also BRC-42 key identifiers
+ * (`spec/record-model.md` §3, §5): passport_id keys the server signature,
+ * actor_keyID keys the user signature. A conforming wallet refuses a key
+ * identifier above 800 characters, so an unbounded field would be a valid
+ * record no wallet can sign; the standard bounds them tighter, in bytes of
+ * UTF-8, and matches the anchor's subject bound for passport_id.
+ */
+export const MAX_PASSPORT_ID_BYTES = 512;
+export const MAX_ACTOR_KEY_ID_BYTES = 256;
+/** Total PushDrop fields per state (`spec/record-model.md` §3). */
+export const FIELD_COUNT = 14;
+/** Zero-based indices into the 14-field layout. */
+export const Field = {
+    protocolMarker: 0,
+    version: 1,
+    passportId: 2,
+    op: 3,
+    timestamp: 4,
+    ownerIdentityKey: 5,
+    actorIdentityKey: 6,
+    actorKeyId: 7,
+    eventData: 8,
+    payloadPublic: 9,
+    payloadOwnerHash: 10,
+    previousTxid: 11,
+    userSignature: 12,
+    serverSignature: 13,
+};
+export const DPP_OPS = [
+    'ACTIVATE',
+    'SOLD',
+    'RESOLD',
+    'REPAIRED',
+    'RECYCLED',
+    'EDIT',
+    'TRANSFER',
+];
+/** Ops that may change payload_public / payload_owner_hash (§6 invariant 7). */
+export const PAYLOAD_CHANGE_OPS = ['ACTIVATE', 'EDIT', 'TRANSFER'];
+/** Ops on which event_data must be the empty string (§3 field 9). */
+export const NO_EVENT_OPS = ['ACTIVATE', 'EDIT'];
+/**
+ * JSON property inside payload_public carrying the data-carrier reference
+ * (chip UID). The lookup service indexes it alongside passport_id, as the
+ * `uid` query key in `contracts/overlay.yaml`.
+ */
+export const PAYLOAD_DATA_CARRIER_KEY = 'dataCarrier';
+/*
+ * DPP Token Standard version 2 (`spec/record-model-v2.md`). A second wire
+ * contract beside version 1, never a reinterpretation of it: a reader decodes
+ * each version under its own rules, and a version 1 state keeps the meaning
+ * it had when it was written. What version 2 adds is stated once here and
+ * enforced in the codec, the preimages and the transition rules.
+ *
+ * - Four operations: ISSUE, UPDATE, TRANSFER, RETIRE. Sector events live on
+ *   the attestation rail, not in the token.
+ * - Seventeen fields: the fourteen of version 1 with the predecessor named as
+ *   an outpoint, the lineage bound to its genesis outpoint, the control proof
+ *   carried as its own field and a commitment to off-chain authorisation
+ *   evidence.
+ * - Both signature preimages are length-framed and domain-tagged, so two
+ *   different field tuples never share signed bytes and a signature made for
+ *   one purpose or version never verifies for another.
+ * - Retirement is terminal under the DPP validity rules: no state may follow
+ *   a RETIRE. The simple locking script does not make a later Bitcoin spend
+ *   impossible; a reader refuses what such a spend would carry.
+ */
+export const STANDARD_VERSION_V2 = '2';
+/** The record versions a reader of this release decodes; any other value is refused by name. */
+export const SUPPORTED_VERSIONS = ['1', '2'];
+/**
+ * BRC-43 protocol ID of both version 2 record signatures, counterparty
+ * 'anyone' as in version 1. Distinct from `DPP_PROTOCOL_ID` so a key derived
+ * for one version signs nothing under the other.
+ */
+export const DPP_PROTOCOL_ID_V2 = [1, 'dpp token v2'];
+/** Total PushDrop fields per version 2 state. */
+export const FIELD_COUNT_V2 = 17;
+/** Zero-based indices into the seventeen-field layout. */
+export const FieldV2 = {
+    protocolMarker: 0,
+    version: 1,
+    passportId: 2,
+    op: 3,
+    timestamp: 4,
+    controllerKey: 5,
+    actorIdentityKey: 6,
+    actorKeyId: 7,
+    eventData: 8,
+    payloadPublic: 9,
+    payloadOwnerHash: 10,
+    lineageGenesis: 11,
+    previousOutpoint: 12,
+    controlLinkage: 13,
+    authorisationCommitment: 14,
+    actorSignature: 15,
+    publisherSignature: 16,
+};
+export const DPP_OPS_V2 = ['ISSUE', 'UPDATE', 'TRANSFER', 'RETIRE'];
+/** Version 2 ops that may change payload_public / payload_owner_hash. RETIRE changes neither. */
+export const PAYLOAD_CHANGE_OPS_V2 = ['ISSUE', 'UPDATE', 'TRANSFER'];
+/** Version 2 ops whose actor must prove control of the predecessor. */
+export const CONTROL_PROOF_OPS_V2 = ['UPDATE', 'TRANSFER', 'RETIRE'];
+/**
+ * The domain tags that open the two version 2 preimages. Each preimage is the
+ * tag, then every signed field, each as a Bitcoin VarInt length followed by
+ * its bytes (`spec/record-model-v2.md` §5), so the actor preimage and the
+ * publisher preimage of one state, and the preimages of any two states,
+ * never share bytes by accident.
+ */
+export const RECORD_V2_ACTOR_TAG = 'dpp-record-v2/actor-signature';
+export const RECORD_V2_PUBLISHER_TAG = 'dpp-record-v2/publisher-signature';
+/**
+ * Byte bounds on the two JSON fields, in UTF-8 bytes (§3). Version 1 left
+ * them unbounded; version 2 keeps on-chain data intentional. A profile may
+ * bound them tighter, never wider.
+ */
+export const MAX_EVENT_DATA_BYTES_V2 = 4096;
+export const MAX_PAYLOAD_PUBLIC_BYTES_V2 = 65535;
+/** An outpoint field: the 32-byte txid in display order, then the output index as four big-endian bytes. */
+export const OUTPOINT_FIELD_BYTES = 36;
+/** The custody profile Part B delivers: managed custody with explicit recipient acceptance (`spec/managed-custody.md`). */
+export const MANAGED_CUSTODY_PROFILE = 'managed-custody@1';
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package/dist/did.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+import type { DppState } from './types.js';
+/** Thrown when a string is not a DID this method can read. */
+export declare class DidFormatError extends Error {
+    constructor(message: string);
+}
+/**
+ * A `did:key` for a 33-byte compressed secp256k1 identity key.
+ *
+ * Pure, offline and bidirectional: no registry, no network call, and the DID
+ * document is computable from the string alone. That is the property that makes
+ * this worth doing at all, because it means a verifier needs nothing from us
+ * except the key we already published on chain.
+ */
+export declare function didKeyFromIdentityKey(identityKeyHex: string): string;
+/**
+ * The identity key inside a `did:key`, or a refusal.
+ *
+ * Refuses another curve rather than returning bytes that would fail to verify
+ * later: an Ed25519 DID is a well-formed `did:key` and a meaningless secp256k1
+ * identity key, and the difference is two bytes at the front.
+ */
+export declare function identityKeyFromDidKey(did: string): string;
+/**
+ * The public key that actually signed a state's `user_signature`.
+ *
+ * The step `spec/identity.md` §2 names. `verifyUserSignature` derives exactly this and then
+ * throws it away inside a boolean; a verifier who wants to say *which key* signed,
+ * or to match a chain state against an SD-JWT's `iss`, needs it in the open.
+ *
+ * Counterparty `'anyone'`, so this runs with no wallet and no secret, which is the
+ * whole reason the standard chose that counterparty for both signatures
+ * (`spec/record-model.md` §3 fields 7/8, §5).
+ */
+export declare function signingPublicKeyFor(state: Pick<DppState, 'actorKeyId' | 'actorIdentityKey'>): string;
+/** The `did:key` of the key that signed, as distinct from the actor it belongs to. */
+export declare function signingDidFor(state: Pick<DppState, 'actorKeyId' | 'actorIdentityKey'>): string;
+//# sourceMappingURL=did.d.ts.map

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package/dist/did.js

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+import { CachedKeyDeriver, PublicKey, Utils } from '@bsv/sdk';
+import { DPP_PROTOCOL_ID } from './constants.js';
+/**
+ * `did:key` for the identity keys this standard already carries, and the one
+ * derivation step a verifier needs to get from a DID back to a signature.
+ *
+ * **Additive by construction.** Nothing here touches the field layout, the field
+ * count, either signature preimage or the codec: it re-encodes bytes that are
+ * already on chain and re-derives a key that is already derivable. Hard rule 3
+ * holds, and no published record moves.
+ *
+ * **Why it lives in the token core rather than in a consumer.** The standard
+ * says actor identity keys must be representable as `did:key`, so token
+ * signatures and SD-JWT attestations are provably the same actor, and the
+ * derivation lives beside the signatures it explains (`spec/identity.md`).
+ *
+ * **The step nobody had written down, and the reason `signingPublicKeyFor`
+ * exists.** `actor_identity_key` (field 7) is the BRC-42 *parent*. The key that
+ * actually signs is its child at `(DPP_PROTOCOL_ID, actor_keyID, 'anyone')`, which
+ * is what `verifyUserSignature` derives. So there are two candidate DIDs per actor
+ * and the difference matters to exactly one reader: someone holding an SD-JWT whose
+ * `iss` is a `did:key`, trying to reach the chain. Give them the parent and they
+ * cannot verify a signature; give them the child and they cannot find the actor.
+ * They need both and the step between, which `@bsv/did` does not supply because it
+ * knows nothing of BRC-42.
+ *
+ * **No new dependency.** `@bsv/did` 0.1.1 would do the encoding and is compatible
+ * with the pinned `@bsv/sdk` 2.1.4, but it pulls `qrcode` into a package that
+ * promises to stay dependency-light. The encoding below is the same
+ * fifteen lines that library's `multibase.ts` runs, over the SDK's own base58.
+ */
+/**
+ * The multicodec prefix for a compressed secp256k1 public key: unsigned varint
+ * `0xe7`, which is two bytes once encoded. Fixed by the multicodec table, not by
+ * us, and the reason a `did:key` for this curve always starts `did:key:zQ3s`.
+ */
+const SECP256K1_PUB_MULTICODEC = [0xe7, 0x01];
+/** Multibase's prefix for base58btc. One character, and it is not optional. */
+const BASE58BTC = 'z';
+const anyone = new CachedKeyDeriver('anyone');
+/** Thrown when a string is not a DID this method can read. */
+export class DidFormatError extends Error {
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = 'DidFormatError';
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The canonical compressed key, or a refusal.
+ *
+ * The same rule the codec applies to fields 6 and 7 (`identityKeyHex`): the SDK
+ * accepts `x >= p` by reducing mod p, so a non-canonical encoding would produce a
+ * DID that resolves to a key nobody can find on chain.
+ */
+function canonicalKey(hex) {
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = PublicKey.fromString(hex);
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new DidFormatError('not a valid public key');
+    }
+    if (parsed.toString() !== hex) {
+        throw new DidFormatError('not a canonical compressed public key');
+    }
+    return parsed;
+}
+/**
+ * A `did:key` for a 33-byte compressed secp256k1 identity key.
+ *
+ * Pure, offline and bidirectional: no registry, no network call, and the DID
+ * document is computable from the string alone. That is the property that makes
+ * this worth doing at all, because it means a verifier needs nothing from us
+ * except the key we already published on chain.
+ */
+export function didKeyFromIdentityKey(identityKeyHex) {
+    const key = canonicalKey(identityKeyHex);
+    const bytes = [...SECP256K1_PUB_MULTICODEC, ...key.encode(true)];
+    return `did:key:${BASE58BTC}${Utils.toBase58(bytes)}`;
+}
+/**
+ * The identity key inside a `did:key`, or a refusal.
+ *
+ * Refuses another curve rather than returning bytes that would fail to verify
+ * later: an Ed25519 DID is a well-formed `did:key` and a meaningless secp256k1
+ * identity key, and the difference is two bytes at the front.
+ */
+export function identityKeyFromDidKey(did) {
+    if (!did.startsWith(`did:key:${BASE58BTC}`)) {
+        throw new DidFormatError('not a did:key in base58btc');
+    }
+    let bytes;
+    try {
+        bytes = Utils.fromBase58(did.slice(`did:key:${BASE58BTC}`.length));
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new DidFormatError('did:key is not valid base58btc');
+    }
+    const [first, second] = bytes;
+    if (first !== SECP256K1_PUB_MULTICODEC[0] || second !== SECP256K1_PUB_MULTICODEC[1]) {
+        throw new DidFormatError('did:key is not a compressed secp256k1 key');
+    }
+    const key = bytes.slice(2);
+    if (key.length !== 33) {
+        throw new DidFormatError('did:key payload must be 33 bytes');
+    }
+    return canonicalKey(Utils.toHex(key)).toString();
+}
+/**
+ * The public key that actually signed a state's `user_signature`.
+ *
+ * The step `spec/identity.md` §2 names. `verifyUserSignature` derives exactly this and then
+ * throws it away inside a boolean; a verifier who wants to say *which key* signed,
+ * or to match a chain state against an SD-JWT's `iss`, needs it in the open.
+ *
+ * Counterparty `'anyone'`, so this runs with no wallet and no secret, which is the
+ * whole reason the standard chose that counterparty for both signatures
+ * (`spec/record-model.md` §3 fields 7/8, §5).
+ */
+export function signingPublicKeyFor(state) {
+    return anyone
+        .derivePublicKey(DPP_PROTOCOL_ID, state.actorKeyId, state.actorIdentityKey)
+        .toString();
+}
+/** The `did:key` of the key that signed, as distinct from the actor it belongs to. */
+export function signingDidFor(state) {
+    return didKeyFromIdentityKey(signingPublicKeyFor(state));
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=did.js.map

package/dist/did.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/evidence.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+import { LockingScript, Transaction, type ChainTracker } from '@bsv/sdk';
+import { type SignedLifecycleClaim } from './attestation.js';
+import { type PublisherPolicy } from './publisherPolicy.js';
+import type { Outpoint } from './types.js';
+/**
+ * The one verification contract (`spec/verification.md`): sixteen named checks,
+ * four answers each, an independently expected subject and an observation of
+ * the latest state that is never a proof. `verifyChain` stays the verifier of
+ * supplied history; this is the report every surface produces from it and
+ * from the attestation, anchor and credential rails beside it.
+ *
+ * The core is dependency-light, so the pieces that need a proof suite, a
+ * status list or an authority registry arrive through the policy as
+ * functions. A caller that supplies none gets `unknown` on those checks, with
+ * a reason that says why, which is the contract's whole point: nothing is
+ * passed because it was not looked at.
+ */
+export declare const REPORT_VERSION: "1";
+export declare const EVIDENCE_CHECK_NAMES: readonly ["recordEncoding", "actorSignatures", "publisherSignatures", "linkage", "inclusion", "nativeAttestationSignature", "anchorSignature", "anchorKeyDerivation", "anchorDigestAndMetadataBinding", "externalCredentialProof", "subjectBinding", "issuerAuthority", "schema", "credentialTime", "credentialStatus", "evidenceAvailability"];
+export type EvidenceCheckName = (typeof EVIDENCE_CHECK_NAMES)[number];
+export type CheckStatus = 'pass' | 'fail' | 'unknown' | 'not-applicable';
+export type { Outpoint };
+export interface CheckScope {
+    artefact?: string;
+    digest?: string;
+    outpoint?: Outpoint;
+    stateIndex?: number;
+}
+export interface EvidenceCheck {
+    name: EvidenceCheckName;
+    status: CheckStatus;
+    reasonCode?: string;
+    evidenceRefs: string[];
+    scope?: CheckScope;
+    detail?: unknown;
+}
+export interface ExpectedSubject {
+    passportId: string;
+    source: 'request-context' | 'established-binding' | 'none';
+    productIdentifier?: string;
+    expectedIssuer?: string;
+    expectedGenesisOutpoint?: Outpoint;
+    expectedStateOutpoint?: Outpoint;
+}
+export type ObservationKind = 'overlay-lookup' | 'spend-status' | 'header-source' | 'registry' | 'other';
+export type ObservationResult = 'unspent' | 'spent' | 'not-found' | 'unavailable' | 'conflicting';
+export interface ObservationSource {
+    id: string;
+    kind: ObservationKind;
+    observedAt: string;
+    result: ObservationResult;
+    height?: number;
+    blockHash?: string;
+    spendingTxid?: string;
+    detail?: string;
+}
+export interface Observations {
+    latestState: 'observed' | 'superseded' | 'conflicting' | 'unknown';
+    sources: ObservationSource[];
+    queryScope: string;
+    observedAt: string;
+    candidateOutpoints: Outpoint[];
+}
+export interface EvidenceReport {
+    reportVersion: typeof REPORT_VERSION;
+    checkedAt: string;
+    expectedSubject: ExpectedSubject;
+    suppliedTip: Outpoint | null;
+    policyId: string;
+    checks: EvidenceCheck[];
+    observations: Observations;
+    limits: string[];
+}
+/** An anchor output as evidence: the script, where it sits, and the bytes it commits to when the caller has them. */
+export interface AnchorEvidence {
+    lockingScript: LockingScript | string;
+    txid?: string;
+    outputIndex?: number;
+    /** The complete secured representation, as bytes or as the exact UTF-8 string. */
+    securedBytes?: number[] | string;
+}
+/** A credential in a non-native representation, as the exact bytes that were issued. */
+export interface ExternalCredentialEvidence {
+    representation: string;
+    mediaType?: string;
+    bytes: number[] | string;
+}
+export interface PassportEvidence {
+    /** The token history, genesis first, as `chainFromBeef` orders it. */
+    tokenHistory?: Transaction[];
+    /**
+     * Other histories supplied under the same passport identifier: a second
+     * genesis is two candidates, not one winner (`spec/verification.md` §3).
+     */
+    alternativeHistories?: Transaction[][];
+    nativeClaims?: unknown[];
+    anchors?: AnchorEvidence[];
+    externalCredentials?: ExternalCredentialEvidence[];
+    /**
+     * Managed acceptance records (`spec/managed-custody.md` §3) the custodian
+     * retained for the version 2 TRANSFERs in the history. Each is bound to the
+     * TRANSFER whose `authorisation_commitment` names it; a commitment with no
+     * record supplied leaves `evidenceAvailability` unknown, never passed.
+     */
+    acceptanceRecords?: unknown[];
+}
+/** A check's answer from a pluggable verifier, before the report names and orders it. */
+export interface PartialCheck {
+    status: CheckStatus;
+    reasonCode?: string;
+    evidenceRefs?: string[];
+    detail?: unknown;
+}
+/** What a representation-specific verifier reports for one credential. */
+export interface ExternalCredentialVerification {
+    /** The credential's own identifier, when its representation defines one. */
+    id?: string;
+    issuer?: string;
+    /** Every subject identifier the credential names; the anchor's `subject` must be one of them. */
+    subjects?: string[];
+    /** The type the anchor's `attestationType` must carry for this credential. */
+    attestationType?: string;
+    proof: PartialCheck;
+    schema: PartialCheck;
+    time: PartialCheck;
+    status: PartialCheck;
+    authority: PartialCheck;
+    /** Whether every artefact the credential referenced (status list, DID document, predecessor) was available. */
+    availability?: PartialCheck;
+}
+export type ExternalCredentialVerifier = (input: {
+    representation: string;
+    mediaType?: string;
+    bytes: number[];
+    digest: string;
+    checkedAt: string;
+}) => Promise<ExternalCredentialVerification>;
+export interface AuthorityQuestion {
+    role: 'genesis-issuer' | 'lifecycle-claimant' | 'anchoring-service' | 'acceptance-custodian';
+    /** The identity as the evidence names it: a compressed key for native roles, a DID for claims. */
+    identity: string;
+    at?: string;
+    ref: string;
+}
+export type AuthorityPolicy = {
+    required: false;
+    reason: string;
+} | {
+    required: true;
+    /** Identity keys (hex) or did:key strings permitted to write a genesis state. */
+    genesisIssuers?: string[];
+    /** Issuer DIDs permitted to sign native lifecycle claims. */
+    claimIssuers?: string[];
+    /** Anchoring service identity keys whose anchors this policy accepts. */
+    anchoringServices?: string[];
+    /** Custodian identity keys whose managed acceptance records this policy accepts. */
+    acceptanceCustodians?: string[];
+    /** Verifies a role the lists above do not settle, on evidence the policy names. */
+    verify?: (question: AuthorityQuestion) => Promise<PartialCheck>;
+};
+export interface LatestStateObserver {
+    id: string;
+    kind: ObservationKind;
+    observe: (input: {
+        passportId: string;
+        tip: Outpoint | null;
+    }) => Promise<{
+        result: ObservationResult;
+        height?: number;
+        blockHash?: string;
+        spendingTxid?: string;
+        detail?: string;
+        candidateOutpoints?: Outpoint[];
+    }>;
+}
+export interface EvidencePolicy {
+    policyId?: string;
+    /** Publisher identity keys any one of which may have countersigned a state. None, and no `publisherPolicy`, means the check is not selected. */
+    publisherKeys?: string[];
+    /**
+     * A publisher key policy chain with the operator identity keys it is
+     * verified against (`spec/services.md` §1). The chain is verified first; if
+     * it does not hold, `publisherSignatures` is unknown with
+     * `publisher-policy-invalid` and no key from it is trusted. When it holds,
+     * each state is checked against the keys active at its own timestamp, and a
+     * countersignature by a policy key outside its window fails with
+     * `publisher-not-authorised`.
+     */
+    publisherPolicy?: {
+        chain: PublisherPolicy[];
+        operatorIdentityKeys: Record<string, string>;
+    };
+    ownerConsent?: boolean | {
+        authorities: string[];
+    };
+    /** Authorities for version 2 control proofs; defaults to the `ownerConsent` authorities (`VerifyChainOptions.controlAuthorities`). */
+    controlAuthorities?: string[];
+    /**
+     * The managed-custody profile (`spec/managed-custody.md`). `required` makes
+     * every version 2 TRANSFER carry an acceptance commitment; the check is
+     * otherwise read but not demanded. Supplied acceptance records are verified
+     * either way, and the custodian's authority is the `authority` policy's.
+     */
+    managedAcceptance?: {
+        required?: boolean;
+    };
+    chainTracker?: ChainTracker | 'scripts only';
+    authority?: AuthorityPolicy;
+    credentialVerifier?: ExternalCredentialVerifier;
+    /** Validates a native claim's payload against its declared profile and version; absent means `schema` is unknown for native claims. */
+    profileValidator?: (claim: SignedLifecycleClaim) => Promise<PartialCheck>;
+    observers?: LatestStateObserver[];
+    /** The observation time, injected for reproducibility. Defaults to now. */
+    checkedAt?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Evaluate the evidence for one passport and report it as `spec/verification.md`
+ * requires. Never throws for evidence that fails: every failure is a check with
+ * a reason. It throws only for a caller error, such as a malformed policy key.
+ */
+export declare function verifyPassportEvidence(evidence: PassportEvidence, expected: ExpectedSubject, policy?: EvidencePolicy): Promise<EvidenceReport>;
+/** The short label a surface may show beside a check; the technical name stays in the report. */
+export declare const EVIDENCE_CHECK_LABELS: Record<EvidenceCheckName, string>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=evidence.d.ts.map

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