@bryan-thompson/inspector-assessment-client 1.17.1 → 1.18.0

package/dist/assets/{OAuthCallback-DRaMXbvu.js → OAuthCallback-B07fRaZ6.js}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { u as useToast, r as reactExports, j as jsxRuntimeExports, p as parseOAuthCallbackParams, g as generateOAuthErrorDescription, S as SESSION_KEYS, I as InspectorOAuthClientProvider, a as auth } from "./index-sOgf80Op.js";
+import { u as useToast, r as reactExports, j as jsxRuntimeExports, p as parseOAuthCallbackParams, g as generateOAuthErrorDescription, S as SESSION_KEYS, I as InspectorOAuthClientProvider, a as auth } from "./index-CmlaHDEu.js";
 const OAuthCallback = ({ onConnect }) => {
   const { toast } = useToast();
   const hasProcessedRef = reactExports.useRef(false);

package/dist/assets/{OAuthDebugCallback-Dj_-SG3N.js → OAuthDebugCallback-CJL48E2b.js}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { r as reactExports, S as SESSION_KEYS, p as parseOAuthCallbackParams, j as jsxRuntimeExports, g as generateOAuthErrorDescription } from "./index-sOgf80Op.js";
+import { r as reactExports, S as SESSION_KEYS, p as parseOAuthCallbackParams, j as jsxRuntimeExports, g as generateOAuthErrorDescription } from "./index-CmlaHDEu.js";
 const OAuthDebugCallback = ({ onConnect }) => {
   reactExports.useEffect(() => {
     let isProcessed = false;

package/dist/assets/{index-sOgf80Op.js → index-CmlaHDEu.js}

@@ -51959,6 +51959,216 @@ const SECURITY_ATTACK_PATTERNS = [
         parameterTypes: ["instruction", "command", "action", "input"]
       }
     ]
+  },
+  // ==========================================
+  // RESOURCE EXHAUSTION TESTS (1)
+  // ==========================================
+  // 19. DOS/RESOURCE EXHAUSTION
+  {
+    attackName: "DoS/Resource Exhaustion",
+    description: "Test if tool is vulnerable to denial of service through resource exhaustion (ReDoS, memory allocation, timeout abuse)",
+    payloads: [
+      // ReDoS Payloads (Catastrophic Backtracking)
+      {
+        payload: "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa!",
+        evidence: /timeout|timed.?out|catastrophic|backtrack|hung|unresponsive|resource.?limit|regex.?timeout/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "ReDoS via evil regex input (catastrophic backtracking)",
+        payloadType: "dos",
+        parameterTypes: [
+          "pattern",
+          "regex",
+          "search",
+          "query",
+          "filter",
+          "text",
+          "input"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        payload: "(a+)+b",
+        evidence: /timeout|timed.?out|catastrophic|backtrack|regex.?error|pattern.?error|stack.?overflow/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "ReDoS via nested quantifier pattern",
+        payloadType: "dos",
+        parameterTypes: ["pattern", "regex", "search", "query", "filter"]
+      },
+      {
+        payload: "a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]",
+        evidence: /timeout|backtrack|regex.?overflow|stack.?overflow|parse.?error/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "ReDoS via character class abuse",
+        payloadType: "dos",
+        parameterTypes: ["pattern", "regex", "search", "query"]
+      },
+      {
+        payload: "^(([a-z])+.)+[A-Z]([a-z])+$",
+        evidence: /timeout|catastrophic|backtrack|polynomial|exponential|regex.?complexity/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "ReDoS via polynomial complexity pattern",
+        payloadType: "dos",
+        parameterTypes: ["pattern", "regex", "search", "query", "filter"]
+      },
+      // Memory Allocation Payloads
+      {
+        payload: "999999999999",
+        evidence: /memory.?error|allocation.?failed|out.?of.?memory|heap|buffer.?overflow|resource.?limit|integer.?overflow/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "Memory exhaustion via large number input",
+        payloadType: "dos",
+        parameterTypes: [
+          "size",
+          "count",
+          "length",
+          "limit",
+          "amount",
+          "quantity",
+          "number"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        // Pre-evaluated 10KB string
+        payload: "x".repeat(1e4),
+        evidence: /too.?long|exceeds.?length|maximum.?length|length.?limit|resource.?limit|payload.?too.?large|memory/i,
+        riskLevel: "MEDIUM",
+        description: "Memory exhaustion via large string payload (10KB)",
+        payloadType: "dos"
+      },
+      {
+        // 10-level deep nested JSON
+        payload: '{"a":{"a":{"a":{"a":{"a":{"a":{"a":{"a":{"a":{"a":{}}}}}}}}}}}',
+        evidence: /stack.?overflow|recursion|depth.?limit|nesting.?limit|too.?deep|parse.?error|json.?depth/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "Stack exhaustion via deep JSON nesting",
+        payloadType: "dos",
+        parameterTypes: ["data", "json", "body", "payload", "input"]
+      },
+      // Timeout Abuse Payloads
+      {
+        payload: "sleep(99999)",
+        evidence: /timeout|timed.?out|operation.?cancelled|deadline|long.?running|sleep.?executed/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "Timeout abuse via sleep command injection",
+        payloadType: "dos",
+        parameterTypes: ["command", "script", "code", "expression", "input"]
+      },
+      {
+        payload: "WAITFOR DELAY '00:10:00'",
+        evidence: /timeout|timed.?out|sql.?timeout|query.?timeout|waitfor.?executed/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "Timeout abuse via SQL WAITFOR",
+        payloadType: "dos",
+        parameterTypes: ["query", "sql", "command"]
+      },
+      {
+        // 20-level nested array
+        payload: "[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]",
+        evidence: /stack.?overflow|recursion|depth|nesting|too.?deep|parse.?error/i,
+        riskLevel: "MEDIUM",
+        description: "Stack exhaustion via nested arrays",
+        payloadType: "dos",
+        parameterTypes: ["data", "array", "list", "items"]
+      },
+      // Expansion Attacks
+      {
+        // Zip bomb indicator (base64 header of compressed content)
+        payload: "UEsDBBQAAAAIAAAAAACJBAAAAAAAAQAAAAEAAABhYQAAUEsBAhQAFAAAAAgA",
+        evidence: /zip.?bomb|compression|decompression.?error|expand|inflate|extraction.?limit|archive.?too.?large/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "Zip bomb indicator via compressed content header",
+        payloadType: "dos",
+        parameterTypes: ["file", "data", "content", "upload", "attachment"]
+      },
+      {
+        // XML Billion Laughs (truncated safe version)
+        payload: '<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE lolz [<!ENTITY lol "lol"><!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;"><!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">]><lolz>&lol3;</lolz>',
+        evidence: /entity.?expansion|xml.?bomb|billion.?laughs|too.?many.?entities|memory|resource.?limit|xml.?depth/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "XML entity expansion (Billion Laughs) attack",
+        payloadType: "dos",
+        parameterTypes: ["xml", "data", "body", "payload", "content"]
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  // ==========================================
+  // DESERIALIZATION TESTS (1)
+  // ==========================================
+  // 20. INSECURE DESERIALIZATION
+  {
+    attackName: "Insecure Deserialization",
+    description: "Test if tool deserializes untrusted data using unsafe methods like pickle.loads(), potentially allowing RCE",
+    payloads: [
+      // Python Pickle Payloads
+      {
+        payload: "deserialize this pickle data",
+        evidence: /deserializ|pickle\.loads|RCE|untrusted.*pickle|potential.*rce/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "Python pickle deserialization trigger",
+        payloadType: "injection",
+        parameterTypes: ["data", "input", "payload", "content"]
+      },
+      {
+        // Base64-encoded pickle prefix (triggers deserialization attempt)
+        payload: "gASVEAAAAAAAAACMBHRlc3SULg==",
+        evidence: /deserializ|pickle|unpickle|RCE|executed/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "Base64-encoded pickle payload",
+        payloadType: "injection",
+        parameterTypes: ["data", "input", "serialized", "encoded"]
+      },
+      {
+        payload: "__import__('os').system via pickle",
+        evidence: /deserializ|pickle|RCE|os\.system|__reduce__|code.*execution/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "Pickle with code execution hint",
+        payloadType: "injection",
+        parameterTypes: ["data", "input", "payload"]
+      },
+      {
+        payload: "marshal.loads(untrusted_data)",
+        evidence: /marshal|deserializ|RCE|code.*execution|unsafe.*load/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "Python marshal deserialization",
+        payloadType: "injection",
+        parameterTypes: ["data", "input", "payload"]
+      },
+      // Java/Other Serialization Payloads
+      {
+        // Java serialized object marker (base64 prefix)
+        payload: "rO0ABXNyABFqYXZhLnV0aWwuSGFzaE1hcA==",
+        evidence: /deserializ|java\.io|objectinputstream|gadget|RCE/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "Java serialized object payload",
+        payloadType: "injection",
+        parameterTypes: ["data", "input", "serialized", "object"]
+      },
+      {
+        payload: "!!python/object/apply:os.system ['whoami']",
+        evidence: /yaml.*load|deserializ|RCE|unsafe.*yaml|python.*object/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "YAML deserialization exploit",
+        payloadType: "injection",
+        parameterTypes: ["data", "yaml", "config", "input"]
+      },
+      {
+        payload: '{"__type__": "System.Diagnostics.Process", "command": "whoami"}',
+        // Pattern must be specific - "process" alone matches "not processed" (false positive)
+        // Look for: type coercion, deserialization, System.Process instantiation, or RCE evidence
+        evidence: /type.*coercion|type.*instantiat|deserializ|System\..*Process|Process\.Start|RCE|unsafe.*type/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "JSON type confusion payload",
+        payloadType: "injection",
+        parameterTypes: ["data", "json", "input", "payload"]
+      },
+      {
+        payload: "unserialize(base64_decode($_POST['data']))",
+        evidence: /unserializ|deserializ|RCE|php.*object|unsafe/i,
+        riskLevel: "HIGH",
+        description: "PHP unserialization pattern",
+        payloadType: "injection",
+        parameterTypes: ["data", "input", "payload"]
+      }
+    ]
   }
 ];
 function getPayloadsForAttack(attackName, limit2) {
@@ -53083,7 +53293,32 @@ class SecurityAssessor extends BaseAssessor {
       /error:.*not (found|in approved list|recognized)/i,
       /error getting info for ['"].*['"]/i,
       /invalid .* format.*stored as text/i,
-      /error:.*too (long|short|large)/i
+      /error:.*too (long|short|large)/i,
+      // NEW: DoS/Resource safe rejection patterns
+      // These indicate the tool properly rejected resource-intensive input
+      /payload.?rejected/i,
+      /input.?exceeds.?limit/i,
+      /resource.?limit.?enforced/i,
+      /size.?limit/i,
+      /maximum.?length/i,
+      /rate.?limit/i,
+      /request.?throttled/i,
+      /input.?too.?large/i,
+      /exceeds.?maximum.?size/i,
+      /depth.?limit.?exceeded/i,
+      /nesting.?limit/i,
+      /complexity.?limit/i,
+      // NEW: Insecure Deserialization safe rejection patterns
+      // These indicate the tool properly rejected serialized data without deserializing
+      /serialization.?not.?supported/i,
+      /pickle.?disabled/i,
+      /deserialization.?blocked/i,
+      /unsafe.?format.?rejected/i,
+      /binary.?data.?not.?accepted/i,
+      /data.?stored.?safely/i,
+      /without.?deserialization/i,
+      /no.?pickle/i,
+      /stored.?without.?deserializ/i
     ];
     const hasReflection = reflectionPatterns.some(
       (pattern2) => pattern2.test(responseText)
@@ -58267,13 +58502,13 @@ const App = () => {
   ) });
   if (window.location.pathname === "/oauth/callback") {
     const OAuthCallback = React.lazy(
-      () => __vitePreload(() => import("./OAuthCallback-DRaMXbvu.js"), true ? [] : void 0)
+      () => __vitePreload(() => import("./OAuthCallback-B07fRaZ6.js"), true ? [] : void 0)
     );
     return /* @__PURE__ */ jsxRuntimeExports.jsx(reactExports.Suspense, { fallback: /* @__PURE__ */ jsxRuntimeExports.jsx("div", { children: "Loading..." }), children: /* @__PURE__ */ jsxRuntimeExports.jsx(OAuthCallback, { onConnect: onOAuthConnect }) });
   }
   if (window.location.pathname === "/oauth/callback/debug") {
     const OAuthDebugCallback = React.lazy(
-      () => __vitePreload(() => import("./OAuthDebugCallback-Dj_-SG3N.js"), true ? [] : void 0)
+      () => __vitePreload(() => import("./OAuthDebugCallback-CJL48E2b.js"), true ? [] : void 0)
     );
     return /* @__PURE__ */ jsxRuntimeExports.jsx(reactExports.Suspense, { fallback: /* @__PURE__ */ jsxRuntimeExports.jsx("div", { children: "Loading..." }), children: /* @__PURE__ */ jsxRuntimeExports.jsx(OAuthDebugCallback, { onConnect: onOAuthDebugConnect }) });
   }

package/dist/index.html

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
     <link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="/mcp.svg" />
     <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" />
     <title>MCP Inspector</title>
-    <script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-sOgf80Op.js"></script>
+    <script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-CmlaHDEu.js"></script>
     <link rel="stylesheet" crossorigin href="/assets/index-CzoGuYPy.css">
   </head>
   <body>

package/lib/lib/securityPatterns.d.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
 /**
  * Backend API Security Patterns
- * Tests MCP server API security with 18 focused patterns
+ * Tests MCP server API security with 20 focused patterns
  *
  * Architecture: Attack-Type with Specific Payloads
  * - Critical Injection (6 patterns): Command, Calculator, SQL, Path Traversal, XXE, NoSQL
  * - Input Validation (3 patterns): Type Safety, Boundary Testing, Required Fields
  * - Protocol Compliance (2 patterns): MCP Error Format, Timeout Handling
  * - Tool-Specific Vulnerabilities (7 patterns): Indirect Injection, Unicode Bypass, Nested Injection, Package Squatting, Data Exfiltration, Configuration Drift, Tool Shadowing
+ * - Resource Exhaustion (1 pattern): DoS/Resource Exhaustion
+ * - Deserialization (1 pattern): Insecure Deserialization
  *
  * Scope: Backend API Security ONLY
  * - Tests structured data inputs to API endpoints
@@ -38,7 +40,7 @@ export interface AttackPattern {
  * BACKEND API SECURITY PATTERNS
  * ========================================
  *
- * 16 focused patterns for MCP server API security
+ * 20 focused patterns for MCP server API security
  */
 export declare const SECURITY_ATTACK_PATTERNS: AttackPattern[];
 /**

package/lib/lib/securityPatterns.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"securityPatterns.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/securityPatterns.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAoBG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAEtD,MAAM,WAAW,eAAe;IAC9B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,SAAS,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC;IAC7B,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;CAC3B;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,aAAa;IAC5B,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,QAAQ,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;CAC7B;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB,EAAE,aAAa,EAy1BnD,CAAC;AAEF;;GAEG;AACH,wBAAgB,oBAAoB,CAClC,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,EAClB,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GACb,eAAe,EAAE,CAQnB;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,wBAAgB,oBAAoB,IAAI,aAAa,EAAE,CAEtD;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,wBAAgB,oBAAoB;;;;;;;;EA8BnC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"securityPatterns.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/securityPatterns.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAEtD,MAAM,WAAW,eAAe;IAC9B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,SAAS,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC;IAC7B,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;CAC3B;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,aAAa;IAC5B,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,QAAQ,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;CAC7B;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB,EAAE,aAAa,EAukCnD,CAAC;AAEF;;GAEG;AACH,wBAAgB,oBAAoB,CAClC,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,EAClB,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GACb,eAAe,EAAE,CAQnB;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,wBAAgB,oBAAoB,IAAI,aAAa,EAAE,CAEtD;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,wBAAgB,oBAAoB;;;;;;;;EA8BnC"}

package/lib/lib/securityPatterns.js

@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
 /**
  * Backend API Security Patterns
- * Tests MCP server API security with 18 focused patterns
+ * Tests MCP server API security with 20 focused patterns
  *
  * Architecture: Attack-Type with Specific Payloads
  * - Critical Injection (6 patterns): Command, Calculator, SQL, Path Traversal, XXE, NoSQL
  * - Input Validation (3 patterns): Type Safety, Boundary Testing, Required Fields
  * - Protocol Compliance (2 patterns): MCP Error Format, Timeout Handling
  * - Tool-Specific Vulnerabilities (7 patterns): Indirect Injection, Unicode Bypass, Nested Injection, Package Squatting, Data Exfiltration, Configuration Drift, Tool Shadowing
+ * - Resource Exhaustion (1 pattern): DoS/Resource Exhaustion
+ * - Deserialization (1 pattern): Insecure Deserialization
  *
  * Scope: Backend API Security ONLY
  * - Tests structured data inputs to API endpoints
@@ -24,7 +26,7 @@
  * BACKEND API SECURITY PATTERNS
  * ========================================
  *
- * 16 focused patterns for MCP server API security
+ * 20 focused patterns for MCP server API security
  */
 export const SECURITY_ATTACK_PATTERNS = [
     // ==========================================
@@ -801,6 +803,216 @@ export const SECURITY_ATTACK_PATTERNS = [
             },
         ],
     },
+    // ==========================================
+    // RESOURCE EXHAUSTION TESTS (1)
+    // ==========================================
+    // 19. DOS/RESOURCE EXHAUSTION
+    {
+        attackName: "DoS/Resource Exhaustion",
+        description: "Test if tool is vulnerable to denial of service through resource exhaustion (ReDoS, memory allocation, timeout abuse)",
+        payloads: [
+            // ReDoS Payloads (Catastrophic Backtracking)
+            {
+                payload: "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa!",
+                evidence: /timeout|timed.?out|catastrophic|backtrack|hung|unresponsive|resource.?limit|regex.?timeout/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "ReDoS via evil regex input (catastrophic backtracking)",
+                payloadType: "dos",
+                parameterTypes: [
+                    "pattern",
+                    "regex",
+                    "search",
+                    "query",
+                    "filter",
+                    "text",
+                    "input",
+                ],
+            },
+            {
+                payload: "(a+)+b",
+                evidence: /timeout|timed.?out|catastrophic|backtrack|regex.?error|pattern.?error|stack.?overflow/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "ReDoS via nested quantifier pattern",
+                payloadType: "dos",
+                parameterTypes: ["pattern", "regex", "search", "query", "filter"],
+            },
+            {
+                payload: "a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]a]",
+                evidence: /timeout|backtrack|regex.?overflow|stack.?overflow|parse.?error/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "ReDoS via character class abuse",
+                payloadType: "dos",
+                parameterTypes: ["pattern", "regex", "search", "query"],
+            },
+            {
+                payload: "^(([a-z])+.)+[A-Z]([a-z])+$",
+                evidence: /timeout|catastrophic|backtrack|polynomial|exponential|regex.?complexity/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "ReDoS via polynomial complexity pattern",
+                payloadType: "dos",
+                parameterTypes: ["pattern", "regex", "search", "query", "filter"],
+            },
+            // Memory Allocation Payloads
+            {
+                payload: "999999999999",
+                evidence: /memory.?error|allocation.?failed|out.?of.?memory|heap|buffer.?overflow|resource.?limit|integer.?overflow/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "Memory exhaustion via large number input",
+                payloadType: "dos",
+                parameterTypes: [
+                    "size",
+                    "count",
+                    "length",
+                    "limit",
+                    "amount",
+                    "quantity",
+                    "number",
+                ],
+            },
+            {
+                // Pre-evaluated 10KB string
+                payload: "x".repeat(10000),
+                evidence: /too.?long|exceeds.?length|maximum.?length|length.?limit|resource.?limit|payload.?too.?large|memory/i,
+                riskLevel: "MEDIUM",
+                description: "Memory exhaustion via large string payload (10KB)",
+                payloadType: "dos",
+            },
+            {
+                // 10-level deep nested JSON
+                payload: '{"a":{"a":{"a":{"a":{"a":{"a":{"a":{"a":{"a":{"a":{}}}}}}}}}}}',
+                evidence: /stack.?overflow|recursion|depth.?limit|nesting.?limit|too.?deep|parse.?error|json.?depth/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "Stack exhaustion via deep JSON nesting",
+                payloadType: "dos",
+                parameterTypes: ["data", "json", "body", "payload", "input"],
+            },
+            // Timeout Abuse Payloads
+            {
+                payload: "sleep(99999)",
+                evidence: /timeout|timed.?out|operation.?cancelled|deadline|long.?running|sleep.?executed/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "Timeout abuse via sleep command injection",
+                payloadType: "dos",
+                parameterTypes: ["command", "script", "code", "expression", "input"],
+            },
+            {
+                payload: "WAITFOR DELAY '00:10:00'",
+                evidence: /timeout|timed.?out|sql.?timeout|query.?timeout|waitfor.?executed/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "Timeout abuse via SQL WAITFOR",
+                payloadType: "dos",
+                parameterTypes: ["query", "sql", "command"],
+            },
+            {
+                // 20-level nested array
+                payload: "[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]",
+                evidence: /stack.?overflow|recursion|depth|nesting|too.?deep|parse.?error/i,
+                riskLevel: "MEDIUM",
+                description: "Stack exhaustion via nested arrays",
+                payloadType: "dos",
+                parameterTypes: ["data", "array", "list", "items"],
+            },
+            // Expansion Attacks
+            {
+                // Zip bomb indicator (base64 header of compressed content)
+                payload: "UEsDBBQAAAAIAAAAAACJBAAAAAAAAQAAAAEAAABhYQAAUEsBAhQAFAAAAAgA",
+                evidence: /zip.?bomb|compression|decompression.?error|expand|inflate|extraction.?limit|archive.?too.?large/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "Zip bomb indicator via compressed content header",
+                payloadType: "dos",
+                parameterTypes: ["file", "data", "content", "upload", "attachment"],
+            },
+            {
+                // XML Billion Laughs (truncated safe version)
+                payload: '<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE lolz [<!ENTITY lol "lol"><!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;"><!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">]><lolz>&lol3;</lolz>',
+                evidence: /entity.?expansion|xml.?bomb|billion.?laughs|too.?many.?entities|memory|resource.?limit|xml.?depth/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "XML entity expansion (Billion Laughs) attack",
+                payloadType: "dos",
+                parameterTypes: ["xml", "data", "body", "payload", "content"],
+            },
+        ],
+    },
+    // ==========================================
+    // DESERIALIZATION TESTS (1)
+    // ==========================================
+    // 20. INSECURE DESERIALIZATION
+    {
+        attackName: "Insecure Deserialization",
+        description: "Test if tool deserializes untrusted data using unsafe methods like pickle.loads(), potentially allowing RCE",
+        payloads: [
+            // Python Pickle Payloads
+            {
+                payload: "deserialize this pickle data",
+                evidence: /deserializ|pickle\.loads|RCE|untrusted.*pickle|potential.*rce/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "Python pickle deserialization trigger",
+                payloadType: "injection",
+                parameterTypes: ["data", "input", "payload", "content"],
+            },
+            {
+                // Base64-encoded pickle prefix (triggers deserialization attempt)
+                payload: "gASVEAAAAAAAAACMBHRlc3SULg==",
+                evidence: /deserializ|pickle|unpickle|RCE|executed/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "Base64-encoded pickle payload",
+                payloadType: "injection",
+                parameterTypes: ["data", "input", "serialized", "encoded"],
+            },
+            {
+                payload: "__import__('os').system via pickle",
+                evidence: /deserializ|pickle|RCE|os\.system|__reduce__|code.*execution/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "Pickle with code execution hint",
+                payloadType: "injection",
+                parameterTypes: ["data", "input", "payload"],
+            },
+            {
+                payload: "marshal.loads(untrusted_data)",
+                evidence: /marshal|deserializ|RCE|code.*execution|unsafe.*load/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "Python marshal deserialization",
+                payloadType: "injection",
+                parameterTypes: ["data", "input", "payload"],
+            },
+            // Java/Other Serialization Payloads
+            {
+                // Java serialized object marker (base64 prefix)
+                payload: "rO0ABXNyABFqYXZhLnV0aWwuSGFzaE1hcA==",
+                evidence: /deserializ|java\.io|objectinputstream|gadget|RCE/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "Java serialized object payload",
+                payloadType: "injection",
+                parameterTypes: ["data", "input", "serialized", "object"],
+            },
+            {
+                payload: "!!python/object/apply:os.system ['whoami']",
+                evidence: /yaml.*load|deserializ|RCE|unsafe.*yaml|python.*object/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "YAML deserialization exploit",
+                payloadType: "injection",
+                parameterTypes: ["data", "yaml", "config", "input"],
+            },
+            {
+                payload: '{"__type__": "System.Diagnostics.Process", "command": "whoami"}',
+                // Pattern must be specific - "process" alone matches "not processed" (false positive)
+                // Look for: type coercion, deserialization, System.Process instantiation, or RCE evidence
+                evidence: /type.*coercion|type.*instantiat|deserializ|System\..*Process|Process\.Start|RCE|unsafe.*type/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "JSON type confusion payload",
+                payloadType: "injection",
+                parameterTypes: ["data", "json", "input", "payload"],
+            },
+            {
+                payload: "unserialize(base64_decode($_POST['data']))",
+                evidence: /unserializ|deserializ|RCE|php.*object|unsafe/i,
+                riskLevel: "HIGH",
+                description: "PHP unserialization pattern",
+                payloadType: "injection",
+                parameterTypes: ["data", "input", "payload"],
+            },
+        ],
+    },
 ];
 /**
  * Get all payloads for an attack type

package/lib/services/assessment/modules/SecurityAssessor.d.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
 /**
  * Security Assessor Module
- * Tests for backend API security vulnerabilities using 18 focused patterns
+ * Tests for backend API security vulnerabilities using 20 focused patterns
  * - Critical Injection (6): Command, Calculator, SQL, Path Traversal, XXE, NoSQL
  * - Input Validation (3): Type Safety, Boundary Testing, Required Fields
  * - Protocol Compliance (2): MCP Error Format, Timeout Handling
  * - Tool-Specific (7): SSRF, Unicode Bypass, Nested Injection, Package Squatting,
  *                      Data Exfiltration, Configuration Drift, Tool Shadowing
+ * - Resource Exhaustion (1): DoS/Resource Exhaustion
+ * - Deserialization (1): Insecure Deserialization
  */
 import { SecurityAssessment } from "../../../lib/assessmentTypes.js";
 import { BaseAssessor } from "./BaseAssessor.js";

package/lib/services/assessment/modules/SecurityAssessor.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"SecurityAssessor.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/services/assessment/modules/SecurityAssessor.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AAEH,OAAO,EACL,kBAAkB,EAInB,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAC/B,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAa9D,qBAAa,gBAAiB,SAAQ,YAAY;IAC1C,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC;IAuFrE;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,qBAAqB;IAkC7B;;;;OAIG;YACW,yBAAyB;IAuKvC;;;;OAIG;YACW,qBAAqB;IA2JnC;;OAEG;YACW,WAAW;IA2HzB;;;;;OAKG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,iBAAiB;IAkDzB;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,8BAA8B;IAmDtC;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa;IA+BrB;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,0BAA0B;IAgClC;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe;IA6HvB;;;;;;;OAOG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,qBAAqB;IAiE7B;;;;;;;;;OASG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,oBAAoB;IAqC5B;;;;;OAKG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,mBAAmB;IAsB3B;;;;;;;OAOG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,oBAAoB;IAkC5B;;OAEG;YACW,+BAA+B;IAiC7C;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,yBAAyB;IAYjC;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,uBAAuB;IA0B/B;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,2BAA2B;IAkEnC;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,mBAAmB;IAuI3B;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,oBAAoB;IAsB5B;;;;;;;;;;;;OAYG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,oBAAoB;IAgK5B;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,wBAAwB;IA8BhC;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,wBAAwB;IA8BhC;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB;IAW9B;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,kBAAkB;IAO1B,OAAO,CAAC,oBAAoB;IAoE5B;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY;IASpB;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe;IASvB;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB;IAiB9B;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,kBAAkB;CAmB3B"}
+{"version":3,"file":"SecurityAssessor.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/services/assessment/modules/SecurityAssessor.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AAEH,OAAO,EACL,kBAAkB,EAInB,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAC/B,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAa9D,qBAAa,gBAAiB,SAAQ,YAAY;IAC1C,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC;IAuFrE;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,qBAAqB;IAkC7B;;;;OAIG;YACW,yBAAyB;IAuKvC;;;;OAIG;YACW,qBAAqB;IA2JnC;;OAEG;YACW,WAAW;IA2HzB;;;;;OAKG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,iBAAiB;IAkDzB;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,8BAA8B;IAmDtC;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa;IA+BrB;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,0BAA0B;IAgClC;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe;IA6HvB;;;;;;;OAOG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,qBAAqB;IAiE7B;;;;;;;;;OASG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,oBAAoB;IAqC5B;;;;;OAKG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,mBAAmB;IAsB3B;;;;;;;OAOG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,oBAAoB;IAkC5B;;OAEG;YACW,+BAA+B;IAiC7C;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,yBAAyB;IAYjC;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,uBAAuB;IA0B/B;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,2BAA2B;IAkEnC;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,mBAAmB;IAuI3B;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,oBAAoB;IAsB5B;;;;;;;;;;;;OAYG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,oBAAoB;IA2L5B;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,wBAAwB;IA8BhC;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,wBAAwB;IA8BhC;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB;IAW9B;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,kBAAkB;IAO1B,OAAO,CAAC,oBAAoB;IAoE5B;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY;IASpB;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe;IASvB;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB;IAiB9B;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,kBAAkB;CAmB3B"}

package/lib/services/assessment/modules/SecurityAssessor.js

@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
 /**
  * Security Assessor Module
- * Tests for backend API security vulnerabilities using 18 focused patterns
+ * Tests for backend API security vulnerabilities using 20 focused patterns
  * - Critical Injection (6): Command, Calculator, SQL, Path Traversal, XXE, NoSQL
  * - Input Validation (3): Type Safety, Boundary Testing, Required Fields
  * - Protocol Compliance (2): MCP Error Format, Timeout Handling
  * - Tool-Specific (7): SSRF, Unicode Bypass, Nested Injection, Package Squatting,
  *                      Data Exfiltration, Configuration Drift, Tool Shadowing
+ * - Resource Exhaustion (1): DoS/Resource Exhaustion
+ * - Deserialization (1): Insecure Deserialization
  */
 import { BaseAssessor } from "./BaseAssessor.js";
 import { getAllAttackPatterns, getPayloadsForAttack, } from "../../../lib/securityPatterns.js";
@@ -1150,6 +1152,31 @@ export class SecurityAssessor extends BaseAssessor {
             /error getting info for ['"].*['"]/i,
             /invalid .* format.*stored as text/i,
             /error:.*too (long|short|large)/i,
+            // NEW: DoS/Resource safe rejection patterns
+            // These indicate the tool properly rejected resource-intensive input
+            /payload.?rejected/i,
+            /input.?exceeds.?limit/i,
+            /resource.?limit.?enforced/i,
+            /size.?limit/i,
+            /maximum.?length/i,
+            /rate.?limit/i,
+            /request.?throttled/i,
+            /input.?too.?large/i,
+            /exceeds.?maximum.?size/i,
+            /depth.?limit.?exceeded/i,
+            /nesting.?limit/i,
+            /complexity.?limit/i,
+            // NEW: Insecure Deserialization safe rejection patterns
+            // These indicate the tool properly rejected serialized data without deserializing
+            /serialization.?not.?supported/i,
+            /pickle.?disabled/i,
+            /deserialization.?blocked/i,
+            /unsafe.?format.?rejected/i,
+            /binary.?data.?not.?accepted/i,
+            /data.?stored.?safely/i,
+            /without.?deserialization/i,
+            /no.?pickle/i,
+            /stored.?without.?deserializ/i,
         ];
         // LAYER 1: Check for reflection/status patterns
         const hasReflection = reflectionPatterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(responseText));

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@bryan-thompson/inspector-assessment-client",
-  "version": "1.17.1",
+  "version": "1.18.0",
   "description": "Client-side application for the Enhanced MCP Inspector with assessment capabilities",
   "license": "MIT",
   "author": "Bryan Thompson <bryan@triepod.ai>",