@browserstack/mcp-server 2.2.0-beta.2 → 2.2.0

package/capability/tm.capability-index.json

@@ -3,8 +3,7 @@
   "version": "1.46",
   "build_id": "cb63a4a5_2026-09-16T18:02:57Z",
   "tm": {
-    "routing_terms": ["team", "setting", "workspace", "suite"],
-    "summary": "BrowserStack Test Management: author and organise test cases, plan and track their execution, and report on the results. Everything is scoped to a project, which owns the folders, cases, runs, plans and reports beneath it. Search and filter cases; create and update cases, runs and plans; record results; bulk edit, move, copy, archive and delete; restructure folders; manage tags and custom-field definitions; assign, clone and close runs; review AI duplicate recommendations; read the activity feed and a case's version history; and create, schedule and download reports. Cases are authored and their outcomes recorded here, but tests are not RUN here: execution happens in your own runner or another BrowserStack product. Renaming and deleting a project are not exposed. A run is executed against a named configuration and environment, and records the app version and build its results came from. Destructive capabilities exist and always need explicit human approval.",
+    "summary": "BrowserStack Test Management: author and organise test cases, plan and track their execution, and report on the results. Everything is scoped to a project, which owns the folders, cases, runs, plans and reports beneath it. Search and filter cases; create and update cases, runs and plans; record results; bulk edit, move, copy, archive and delete; restructure folders; manage tags and custom-field definitions; assign, clone and close runs; review AI duplicate recommendations; read the activity feed and a case's version history; and create, schedule and download reports. Cases are authored and their outcomes recorded here, but tests are not RUN here: execution happens in your own runner or another BrowserStack product. Renaming and deleting a project are not exposed. Destructive capabilities exist and always need explicit human approval.",
     "capabilities": [
       {
         "name": "assign_test_run_owner",

package/dist/tools/ask-browserstack/central-oauth.d.ts

@@ -1,15 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * Atlas's view of the central-OAuth mint.
- *
- * The MECHANISM — the form, the transport, the classification, the cache — moved to
- * `src/lib/central-oauth.ts` when the capability registry needed the same exchange for
- * products whose APIs take a Bearer JWT rather than `Api-Token`. Two minters would have
- * drifted, and the one that drifted would have been the one with fewer tests.
- *
- * What stays here is everything ATLAS-SPECIFIC and nothing else: the scope pair, the skew
- * that exists because Atlas holds the token for a whole run, and the messages — which say
- * "nothing reached the agent" and name `ai_agent_notify`, and would be actively wrong in
- * front of a capability-registry user.
+ * Mint a BrowserStack central-OAuth JWT from the caller's username and access key.
  *
  * This replaces a shared delegation token, and the upgrade is not cosmetic.
  * `validate_delegation_token` refuses any token without `user.user_id`/`user.group_id`, so
@@ -17,17 +7,20 @@
  * user from signed claims rather than from anything we put in the request body, and reuses
  * this same JWT as its `egress_token` — so the product call a human approves runs as that
  * human, not as a shared service account.
+ *
+ * SECRET HYGIENE IS THE WHOLE POINT OF THIS MODULE, and Atlas's `central_oauth.py` learned
+ * it the hard way: "The body can echo the credential back on some errors, so it is NOT
+ * logged or raised — only the status." Neither the access key nor the minted token is ever
+ * logged, returned, or put in an error message. Only a status code is.
  */
-import { Credentials, mintCentralToken as mintShared } from "../../lib/central-oauth.js";
-export { fetchTokenTransport, refusalIsAboutScope, REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN, resetTokenCache, TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MS, type TokenResponse, type TokenTransport, } from "../../lib/central-oauth.js";
+import { Credentials } from "./egress.js";
 /**
  * BOTH PARTS ARE REQUIRED, AND THERE IS NO FALLBACK TO ANOTHER SCOPE.
  *
  * `oauth_user_profile` stays because it is what makes the pair obtainable through the
- * username+access_key flow at all — measured, not assumed: the paired scope mints, and the
- * other half alone comes back `400 invalid_request`. `ai_agent_notify` is what Atlas matches
- * on (`delegation.required_scope`, checked as exact membership of the token's `scopes` claim
- * in `web/oauth.py`); both halves move together with Atlas.
+ * username+access_key flow at all. `ai_agent_notify` is what Atlas matches on
+ * (`delegation.required_scope`, checked as exact membership of the token's `scopes` claim in
+ * `web/oauth.py`); both halves move together with Atlas.
  *
  * THIS SCOPE MAY SIMPLY NOT BE ISSUABLE TO US, and the reasons are worth stating rather than
  * discovering. From the merged `browserstack/railsApp#175367` (2026-08-24):
@@ -49,11 +42,10 @@ export { fetchTokenTransport, refusalIsAboutScope, REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN, resetTo
  * application — and it is reported as one, naming the scope. It is never retried with a
  * different scope: a silent downgrade to a different authorization is exactly the kind of
  * thing nobody notices until it matters.
- *
- * Named here rather than taken from the shared default, so that changing the registry's
- * scopes can never silently change what Atlas is authorised for.
  */
 export declare const CENTRAL_SCOPE = "oauth_user_profile ai_agent_notify";
+/** What we ask for. The endpoint clamps to its own maximum, so the response wins. */
+export declare const REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN = 3600;
 /**
  * Treat a token as stale this long before it actually expires.
  *
@@ -64,6 +56,26 @@ export declare const CENTRAL_SCOPE = "oauth_user_profile ai_agent_notify";
  * expired credential, which is the exact mid-flight expiry this cache exists to prevent.
  */
 export declare const REFRESH_SKEW_MS: number;
+/** The token endpoint gets its own, much shorter budget than `/agent`. */
+export declare const TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MS = 15000;
+export interface TokenResponse {
+    status: number;
+    body: unknown;
+    /** Only when there was no response at all to speak for itself. */
+    error?: string;
+}
+export type TokenTransport = (url: string, form: Record<string, string>) => Promise<TokenResponse>;
+/**
+ * Was this refusal about the SCOPE or about the CREDENTIAL?
+ *
+ * The two need completely different fixes — provisioning versus a password — so collapsing
+ * them into one message sends someone to the wrong place entirely. Our form has five fields
+ * and four of them are constants, so a refusal of the REQUEST (as opposed to the caller) can
+ * only really be about the scope.
+ *
+ * Nothing from the body is ever surfaced; the code is used to classify and then discarded.
+ */
+export declare function refusalIsAboutScope(status: number, body: unknown): boolean;
 /**
  * The ways authentication can fail, kept apart because a user cannot act on them otherwise.
  *
@@ -87,13 +99,22 @@ export declare const AUTH_UNREACHABLE_DETAIL: string;
  */
 export declare const AUTH_SERVER_ERROR_DETAIL: (status: number) => string;
 export declare const AUTH_UNUSABLE_DETAIL: (status: number) => string;
-/** The exact form body of the `client_credentials` grant, at Atlas's scope. */
+/** Drop every cached token. For tests, and for a credential rotation. */
+export declare function resetTokenCache(): void;
+/**
+ * The token endpoint, through `apiClient` per rules/security.md — no bare `fetch`.
+ *
+ * `raise_error: false` keeps the status-first contract this transport has always had: the
+ * caller distinguishes a 400 scope refusal from a 401 rejection from an unreachable host,
+ * so a thrown AxiosError on any non-2xx would destroy the only signal it reads.
+ */
+export declare function fetchTokenTransport(timeoutMs?: number): TokenTransport;
+/** The exact form body of the `client_credentials` grant. */
 export declare function mintForm(credentials: Credentials): Record<string, string>;
 /**
  * Return a valid token, minting one only when the cache has nothing fresh.
  *
- * NOT CACHED IN HOSTED MODE. These tokens are per-user, attested credentials, and the
- * process is shared by every tenant — `rules/multi-tenant-safety.md` forbids holding user
- * data in module-level state there, so remote mode mints per call.
+ * Minting per tool call would add a round trip to every request and make the token endpoint
+ * a hot dependency of the whole surface.
  */
-export declare function mintCentralToken(url: string, credentials: Credentials, transport: Parameters<typeof mintShared>[0]["transport"], now?: number): Promise<string>;
+export declare function mintCentralToken(url: string, credentials: Credentials, transport: TokenTransport, now?: number): Promise<string>;

package/dist/tools/ask-browserstack/central-oauth.js

@@ -1,15 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * Atlas's view of the central-OAuth mint.
- *
- * The MECHANISM — the form, the transport, the classification, the cache — moved to
- * `src/lib/central-oauth.ts` when the capability registry needed the same exchange for
- * products whose APIs take a Bearer JWT rather than `Api-Token`. Two minters would have
- * drifted, and the one that drifted would have been the one with fewer tests.
- *
- * What stays here is everything ATLAS-SPECIFIC and nothing else: the scope pair, the skew
- * that exists because Atlas holds the token for a whole run, and the messages — which say
- * "nothing reached the agent" and name `ai_agent_notify`, and would be actively wrong in
- * front of a capability-registry user.
+ * Mint a BrowserStack central-OAuth JWT from the caller's username and access key.
  *
  * This replaces a shared delegation token, and the upgrade is not cosmetic.
  * `validate_delegation_token` refuses any token without `user.user_id`/`user.group_id`, so
@@ -17,20 +7,24 @@
  * user from signed claims rather than from anything we put in the request body, and reuses
  * this same JWT as its `egress_token` — so the product call a human approves runs as that
  * human, not as a shared service account.
+ *
+ * SECRET HYGIENE IS THE WHOLE POINT OF THIS MODULE, and Atlas's `central_oauth.py` learned
+ * it the hard way: "The body can echo the credential back on some errors, so it is NOT
+ * logged or raised — only the status." Neither the access key nor the minted token is ever
+ * logged, returned, or put in an error message. Only a status code is.
  */
-import { CentralAuthError, mintCentralToken as mintShared, mintForm as mintFormShared, REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN, } from "../../lib/central-oauth.js";
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { apiClient } from "../../lib/apiClient.js";
 import appConfig from "../../config.js";
 import logger from "../../logger.js";
 import { AGENT_TIMEOUT_MS, AskError } from "./config.js";
-export { fetchTokenTransport, refusalIsAboutScope, REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN, resetTokenCache, TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MS, } from "../../lib/central-oauth.js";
 /**
  * BOTH PARTS ARE REQUIRED, AND THERE IS NO FALLBACK TO ANOTHER SCOPE.
  *
  * `oauth_user_profile` stays because it is what makes the pair obtainable through the
- * username+access_key flow at all — measured, not assumed: the paired scope mints, and the
- * other half alone comes back `400 invalid_request`. `ai_agent_notify` is what Atlas matches
- * on (`delegation.required_scope`, checked as exact membership of the token's `scopes` claim
- * in `web/oauth.py`); both halves move together with Atlas.
+ * username+access_key flow at all. `ai_agent_notify` is what Atlas matches on
+ * (`delegation.required_scope`, checked as exact membership of the token's `scopes` claim in
+ * `web/oauth.py`); both halves move together with Atlas.
  *
  * THIS SCOPE MAY SIMPLY NOT BE ISSUABLE TO US, and the reasons are worth stating rather than
  * discovering. From the merged `browserstack/railsApp#175367` (2026-08-24):
@@ -52,11 +46,10 @@ export { fetchTokenTransport, refusalIsAboutScope, REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN, resetTo
  * application — and it is reported as one, naming the scope. It is never retried with a
  * different scope: a silent downgrade to a different authorization is exactly the kind of
  * thing nobody notices until it matters.
- *
- * Named here rather than taken from the shared default, so that changing the registry's
- * scopes can never silently change what Atlas is authorised for.
  */
 export const CENTRAL_SCOPE = "oauth_user_profile ai_agent_notify";
+/** What we ask for. The endpoint clamps to its own maximum, so the response wins. */
+export const REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN = 3600;
 /**
  * Treat a token as stale this long before it actually expires.
  *
@@ -67,6 +60,49 @@ export const CENTRAL_SCOPE = "oauth_user_profile ai_agent_notify";
  * expired credential, which is the exact mid-flight expiry this cache exists to prevent.
  */
 export const REFRESH_SKEW_MS = AGENT_TIMEOUT_MS + 60_000;
+/** The token endpoint gets its own, much shorter budget than `/agent`. */
+export const TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
+/**
+ * The OAuth2 error codes we are willing to read out of a failure body.
+ *
+ * `error` is a fixed enum token in the spec, so it cannot carry a credential; `error_description`
+ * is free text and demonstrably CAN ("access_key <key> is invalid"), which is why only the
+ * code is ever looked at and only when it is one of these. Anything else is ignored entirely
+ * and the classification falls back to the status.
+ */
+const SCOPE_ERROR_CODES = [
+    "invalid_scope",
+    "unauthorized_client",
+    "invalid_request",
+];
+const CREDENTIAL_ERROR_CODES = [
+    "invalid_client",
+    "invalid_grant",
+    "access_denied",
+];
+/**
+ * Was this refusal about the SCOPE or about the CREDENTIAL?
+ *
+ * The two need completely different fixes — provisioning versus a password — so collapsing
+ * them into one message sends someone to the wrong place entirely. Our form has five fields
+ * and four of them are constants, so a refusal of the REQUEST (as opposed to the caller) can
+ * only really be about the scope.
+ *
+ * Nothing from the body is ever surfaced; the code is used to classify and then discarded.
+ */
+export function refusalIsAboutScope(status, body) {
+    const payload = typeof body === "object" && body !== null
+        ? body
+        : {};
+    const code = typeof payload.error === "string" ? payload.error : "";
+    if (SCOPE_ERROR_CODES.includes(code))
+        return true;
+    if (CREDENTIAL_ERROR_CODES.includes(code))
+        return false;
+    // No usable code. OAuth2 answers a bad REQUEST with 400 and a bad CLIENT with 401/403, so
+    // the status is the next best evidence.
+    return status === 400;
+}
 /**
  * The ways authentication can fail, kept apart because a user cannot act on them otherwise.
  *
@@ -105,51 +141,137 @@ export const AUTH_SERVER_ERROR_DETAIL = (status) => `BrowserStack auth is unavai
     `BrowserStack auth is back.`;
 export const AUTH_UNUSABLE_DETAIL = (status) => `BrowserStack auth answered HTTP ${status} without issuing a token. NOTHING REACHED THE ` +
     `AGENT — no request was made, no prompt appeared and nothing was changed.`;
-/** The exact form body of the `client_credentials` grant, at Atlas's scope. */
+const cache = new Map();
+/** Drop every cached token. For tests, and for a credential rotation. */
+export function resetTokenCache() {
+    cache.clear();
+}
+/**
+ * The cache key.
+ *
+ * Keyed on the access key so that ROTATING it mints immediately rather than leaving a
+ * revoked credential working until expiry — but on a SHA-256 of it, never the value, so the
+ * secret is not left sitting in a map key for the life of the process.
+ */
+function cacheKey(url, credentials) {
+    const digest = createHash("sha256")
+        .update(credentials.accessKey)
+        .digest("hex");
+    return `${url} ${credentials.username} ${CENTRAL_SCOPE} ${digest}`;
+}
+/**
+ * The token endpoint, through `apiClient` per rules/security.md — no bare `fetch`.
+ *
+ * `raise_error: false` keeps the status-first contract this transport has always had: the
+ * caller distinguishes a 400 scope refusal from a 401 rejection from an unreachable host,
+ * so a thrown AxiosError on any non-2xx would destroy the only signal it reads.
+ */
+export function fetchTokenTransport(timeoutMs = TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MS) {
+    return async (url, form) => {
+        try {
+            const response = await apiClient.post({
+                url,
+                headers: {
+                    "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+                    Accept: "application/json",
+                },
+                body: new URLSearchParams(form).toString(),
+                timeout: timeoutMs,
+                raise_error: false,
+            });
+            return { status: response.status, body: response.data ?? null };
+        }
+        catch {
+            // DNS, TLS, timeout — all of them mean "no token". The reason is deliberately not
+            // carried: it can name the URL and, on some stacks, echo the request body.
+            return { status: 0, body: null, error: "auth could not be reached" };
+        }
+    };
+}
+/** The exact form body of the `client_credentials` grant. */
 export function mintForm(credentials) {
-    return mintFormShared(credentials, CENTRAL_SCOPE, REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN);
+    return {
+        grant_type: "client_credentials",
+        username: credentials.username,
+        access_key: credentials.accessKey,
+        scope: CENTRAL_SCOPE,
+        expires_in: String(REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN),
+    };
 }
-/** Every failure kind gets Atlas's own sentence; none of them carries the response body. */
-function toAskError(error) {
-    if (!(error instanceof CentralAuthError))
-        return error;
-    switch (error.kind) {
-        case "no_credentials":
-            return new AskError("BrowserStack AI is not authenticated: BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME and " +
-                "BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY are required to sign in");
-        case "unreachable":
-            return new AskError(AUTH_UNREACHABLE_DETAIL);
-        case "server_error":
-            return new AskError(AUTH_SERVER_ERROR_DETAIL(error.status));
-        case "refused_scope":
-            return new AskError(AUTH_SCOPE_REFUSED_DETAIL(error.status));
-        case "refused_credentials":
-            return new AskError(AUTH_REJECTED_DETAIL(error.status));
-        default:
-            return new AskError(AUTH_UNUSABLE_DETAIL(error.status));
+async function mintOnce(url, credentials, transport) {
+    const response = await transport(url, mintForm(credentials));
+    if (response.status === 0)
+        throw new AskError(AUTH_UNREACHABLE_DETAIL);
+    // 5xx BEFORE the refusal branch: a server error is not a refusal, and reading it as one
+    // is worse than saying nothing — it names the caller's credentials as the fault.
+    if (response.status >= 500) {
+        throw new AskError(AUTH_SERVER_ERROR_DETAIL(response.status));
     }
+    if (response.status !== 200) {
+        // ONLY THE STATUS CROSSES. The body is read solely to tell a provisioning problem from a
+        // credential one, and nothing out of it is ever put in the message — a non-200 body can
+        // echo the access key straight back.
+        throw new AskError(refusalIsAboutScope(response.status, response.body)
+            ? AUTH_SCOPE_REFUSED_DETAIL(response.status)
+            : AUTH_REJECTED_DETAIL(response.status));
+    }
+    const body = typeof response.body === "object" && response.body !== null
+        ? response.body
+        : {};
+    const token = body.access_token;
+    if (typeof token !== "string" || !token) {
+        throw new AskError(AUTH_UNUSABLE_DETAIL(response.status));
+    }
+    // Trust the SERVER's lifetime over what we asked for — it clamps to its own maximum, and
+    // caching for the requested hour when it granted less would hand out a dead token.
+    const granted = Number(body.expires_in);
+    const seconds = Number.isFinite(granted) && granted > 0 ? granted : REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN;
+    return { token, lifetimeMs: seconds * 1000 };
 }
 /**
  * Return a valid token, minting one only when the cache has nothing fresh.
  *
- * NOT CACHED IN HOSTED MODE. These tokens are per-user, attested credentials, and the
- * process is shared by every tenant — `rules/multi-tenant-safety.md` forbids holding user
- * data in module-level state there, so remote mode mints per call.
+ * Minting per tool call would add a round trip to every request and make the token endpoint
+ * a hot dependency of the whole surface.
  */
 export async function mintCentralToken(url, credentials, transport, now = Date.now()) {
-    try {
-        return await mintShared({
-            url,
-            scope: CENTRAL_SCOPE,
-            credentials,
-            transport,
-            refreshSkewMs: REFRESH_SKEW_MS,
-            cacheEnabled: !appConfig.REMOTE_MCP,
-            now,
-            onMinted: (lifetimeMs) => logger.info("askBrowserStackAI: signed in as %s (lifetime %ss)", credentials.username, Math.round(lifetimeMs / 1000)),
+    // Refused before any network call, and by name: these ARE the auth credential now, not
+    // merely attribution, so an empty one is our missing configuration rather than the user's
+    // rejected password, and must not read like one.
+    if (!credentials?.username || !credentials?.accessKey) {
+        throw new AskError("BrowserStack AI is not authenticated: BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME and " +
+            "BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY are required to sign in");
+    }
+    // NOT CACHED IN HOSTED MODE. These tokens are per-user, attested credentials, and the
+    // process is shared by every tenant — `rules/multi-tenant-safety.md` forbids holding user
+    // data in module-level state there, so remote mode mints per call. Keying on
+    // username + sha256(accessKey) already means one user can never be SERVED another's token,
+    // but containment is not the contract; not holding it at all is.
+    if (appConfig.REMOTE_MCP) {
+        return mintOnce(url, credentials, transport).then(({ token }) => {
+            logger.info("askBrowserStackAI: signed in as %s", credentials.username);
+            return token;
         });
     }
-    catch (error) {
-        throw toAskError(error);
+    const key = cacheKey(url, credentials);
+    const entry = cache.get(key);
+    if (entry && entry.token && now < entry.expiresAt - REFRESH_SKEW_MS) {
+        return entry.token;
     }
+    // Double-checked through a shared promise: concurrent callers await the same mint.
+    if (entry?.inflight)
+        return entry.inflight;
+    const pending = mintOnce(url, credentials, transport)
+        .then(({ token, lifetimeMs }) => {
+        cache.set(key, { token, expiresAt: now + lifetimeMs });
+        logger.info("askBrowserStackAI: signed in as %s (lifetime %ss)", credentials.username, Math.round(lifetimeMs / 1000));
+        return token;
+    })
+        .catch((error) => {
+        // Never leave a rejected promise cached, or every later call inherits this failure.
+        cache.delete(key);
+        throw error;
+    });
+    cache.set(key, { token: "", expiresAt: 0, inflight: pending });
+    return pending;
 }

package/dist/tools/capability-registry/bind.js

@@ -230,15 +230,6 @@ function coerceType(value, param, label = param.name) {
         if (expected === "integer" && !Number.isInteger(parsed)) {
             throw new InvocationError(`'${label}' must be a whole number, not ${JSON.stringify(raw)}`);
         }
-        // Past 2^53 `Number` rounds: TRA's 17-digit unique-error cluster ids came back as a
-        // neighbouring id, so the call silently targeted the wrong cluster. Keep the caller's
-        // exact digits instead — path and query serialise a string identically, and a JSON body
-        // carrying a digit string still binds to a Long on the server.
-        if (expected === "integer" &&
-            !Number.isSafeInteger(parsed) &&
-            /^-?\d+$/.test(raw)) {
-            return raw;
-        }
         return parsed;
     }
     if (expected === "boolean") {
@@ -289,12 +280,6 @@ function place(root, pointer, value) {
     }
     cursor[segments[segments.length - 1]] = value;
 }
-const MAP_KEY = /^[A-Za-z0-9][\w.-]*$/;
-function keyedParam(group, params) {
-    if (group !== "body")
-        return undefined;
-    return params.find((param) => /^\{\w+\}$/.test(param.name));
-}
 const GROUPS = [
     { group: "path_params", declared: "path_params" },
     { group: "query", declared: "query" },
@@ -313,10 +298,9 @@ export function bind(capability, args) {
         }
         const params = capability[declared] || [];
         const byName = new Map(params.map((param) => [param.name, param]));
-        const keyed = keyedParam(group, params);
         // Unknown arguments are an error rather than being dropped: silently ignoring a
         // misspelled filter would return a larger result set that looks like a correct answer.
-        const unknown = Object.keys(supplied).filter((name) => !byName.has(name) && !keyed);
+        const unknown = Object.keys(supplied).filter((name) => !byName.has(name));
         if (unknown.length > 0) {
             // A CALLER WHO SENT THE WRAPPER WE BUILD DESERVES TO BE TOLD SO.
             //
@@ -347,10 +331,7 @@ export function bind(capability, args) {
                     : ""));
         }
         for (const [name, raw] of Object.entries(supplied)) {
-            const param = byName.get(name) ?? keyed;
-            if (param === keyed && !MAP_KEY.test(name)) {
-                throw new InvocationError(`'${name}' is not a usable ${keyed.name} key: use the id exactly as a read returned it`);
-            }
+            const param = byName.get(name);
             const value = coerce(raw, param);
             if (group === "path_params") {
                 // Encode with nothing exempt: a `/` inside a path value would otherwise rewrite the
@@ -358,10 +339,7 @@ export function bind(capability, args) {
                 path = path.replaceAll(`{${name}}`, encodeURIComponent(pathSegment(value, name)));
             }
             else if (group === "body") {
-                const pointer = param.json_path || `/${param.name}`;
-                place(body, param === keyed && !byName.has(name)
-                    ? pointer.replace(keyed.name, name)
-                    : pointer, value);
+                place(body, param.json_path || `/${name}`, value);
             }
             else {
                 query[name] = value;
@@ -376,14 +354,9 @@ export function bind(capability, args) {
         if (group === "query")
             continue;
         const supplied = args[group] || {};
-        const params = capability[declared] || [];
-        const keyed = keyedParam(group, params);
-        const declaredNames = new Set(params.map((param) => param.name));
-        for (const param of params) {
-            const present = param.name in supplied ||
-                (param === keyed &&
-                    Object.keys(supplied).some((name) => !declaredNames.has(name)));
-            if (param.required && !present)
+        for (const param of capability[declared] ||
+            []) {
+            if (param.required && !(param.name in supplied))
                 missing.push(param.name);
         }
     }
@@ -394,14 +367,5 @@ export function bind(capability, args) {
     if (leftover) {
         throw new InvocationError(`path placeholder(s) not supplied: ${leftover.join(", ")}`);
     }
-    // An explicitly supplied empty body is still a body. Dropping it sent no request body at
-    // all, and a route with a required @RequestBody (TRA close_build, whose guidance says to
-    // send `{}`) answered 400 "Invalid request payload". GET/HEAD never carry one.
-    const sentEmptyBody = args.body !== undefined &&
-        !["GET", "HEAD"].includes(capability.method.toUpperCase());
-    return {
-        path,
-        query,
-        body: Object.keys(body).length > 0 || sentEmptyBody ? body : undefined,
-    };
+    return { path, query, body: Object.keys(body).length > 0 ? body : undefined };
 }

package/dist/tools/capability-registry/discovery.js

@@ -79,9 +79,7 @@ export async function discoverBaseUrl(product, source, credentials, transport) {
             `set probe_path in its index`);
     }
     // The same scheme the invocation will use, so a host that answers here answers there.
-    // Minted ONCE for the whole probe, not per candidate: the token is the caller's identity
-    // and does not vary by which region answers.
-    const headers = await authHeaders(credentials, source.auth, product);
+    const headers = authHeaders(credentials, source.auth);
     const failures = [];
     for (const candidate of candidates) {
         const response = await transport("GET", `${candidate}${path}`, headers, {});

package/dist/tools/capability-registry/egress.d.ts

@@ -16,10 +16,11 @@
  * Api-Token regardless, and the mismatch surfaced as a 401 that reads like the user's
  * credentials are wrong.
  */
-import { TokenTransport } from "../../lib/central-oauth.js";
 import { AuthScheme } from "./types.js";
-export type { Credentials } from "../../lib/central-oauth.js";
-import type { Credentials } from "../../lib/central-oauth.js";
+export interface Credentials {
+    username: string;
+    accessKey: string;
+}
 export interface HttpResponse {
     status: number;
     body: unknown;
@@ -38,14 +39,6 @@ export declare const DEFAULT_AUTH: AuthScheme;
  * the common case, not a hypothetical.
  */
 export declare function renderTemplate(template: string, credentials: Credentials): string;
-/**
- * The headers for one outbound call.
- *
- * ASYNC BECAUSE ONE SCHEME NEEDS A ROUND TRIP. `apiKey` and `http` are pure string work, but
- * `oauth2` exchanges the caller's credentials for a JWT before anything can be sent, and
- * there was nowhere to put that while this was synchronous. Both call sites were already
- * inside async functions, so the cost is two `await`s.
- */
-export declare function authHeaders(credentials: Credentials, auth?: AuthScheme, product?: string, tokenTransport?: TokenTransport): Promise<Record<string, string>>;
+export declare function authHeaders(credentials: Credentials, auth?: AuthScheme): Record<string, string>;
 /** A fetch-based transport. Redirects are NOT followed. */
 export declare function fetchTransport(timeoutMs?: number): Transport;

package/dist/tools/capability-registry/egress.js

@@ -16,9 +16,7 @@
  * Api-Token regardless, and the mismatch surfaced as a 401 that reads like the user's
  * credentials are wrong.
  */
-import { fetchTokenTransport, } from "../../lib/central-oauth.js";
 import { InvocationError } from "./index-loader.js";
-import { bearerToken } from "./oauth.js";
 /** What this server can put into a credential template. Nothing else is fillable. */
 const PLACEHOLDERS = ["username", "access_key"];
 /** The historical default, and what an index without an `auth` block still gets. */
@@ -50,15 +48,7 @@ export function renderTemplate(template, credentials) {
         .replaceAll("{username}", credentials.username)
         .replaceAll("{access_key}", credentials.accessKey);
 }
-/**
- * The headers for one outbound call.
- *
- * ASYNC BECAUSE ONE SCHEME NEEDS A ROUND TRIP. `apiKey` and `http` are pure string work, but
- * `oauth2` exchanges the caller's credentials for a JWT before anything can be sent, and
- * there was nowhere to put that while this was synchronous. Both call sites were already
- * inside async functions, so the cost is two `await`s.
- */
-export async function authHeaders(credentials, auth = DEFAULT_AUTH, product = "this product", tokenTransport = fetchTokenTransport()) {
+export function authHeaders(credentials, auth = DEFAULT_AUTH) {
     if (!credentials?.username || !credentials?.accessKey) {
         // Refusing here beats sending unauthenticated and surfacing the product's 401, which
         // reads like the user's problem when it is our missing configuration.
@@ -69,19 +59,6 @@ export async function authHeaders(credentials, auth = DEFAULT_AUTH, product = "t
         "request-source": "ai-chatbot",
         "Content-Type": "application/json",
     };
-    if (auth.type === "oauth2") {
-        // Refused rather than ignored, which is the same call `in: cookie` and `in: query` get
-        // below: a field that looks like it selects behaviour and does not is how someone
-        // spends an afternoon on a 401 they were never going to be able to explain.
-        const stray = ["in", "name", "template"].filter((field) => auth[field] !== undefined);
-        if (stray.length > 0) {
-            throw new InvocationError(`oauth2 auth does not take ${stray.join(", ")}: a bearer token's presentation is ` +
-                `fixed at 'Authorization: Bearer' (RFC 6750). Remove ${stray.length > 1 ? "them" : "it"}, ` +
-                `or use apiKey if this product really does read a different header.`);
-        }
-        const token = await bearerToken(product, auth, credentials, tokenTransport);
-        return { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`, ...common };
-    }
     const value = renderTemplate(auth.template || DEFAULT_AUTH.template, credentials);
     if (auth.type === "apiKey") {
         // Header only. `cookie` needs a session this server does not have, and `query` would