@browserstack/mcp-server 2.1.0 → 2.2.0-beta.1

package/dist/tools/ask-browserstack/central-oauth.js

@@ -1,5 +1,15 @@
 /**
- * Mint a BrowserStack central-OAuth JWT from the caller's username and access key.
+ * Atlas's view of the central-OAuth mint.
+ *
+ * The MECHANISM — the form, the transport, the classification, the cache — moved to
+ * `src/lib/central-oauth.ts` when the capability registry needed the same exchange for
+ * products whose APIs take a Bearer JWT rather than `Api-Token`. Two minters would have
+ * drifted, and the one that drifted would have been the one with fewer tests.
+ *
+ * What stays here is everything ATLAS-SPECIFIC and nothing else: the scope pair, the skew
+ * that exists because Atlas holds the token for a whole run, and the messages — which say
+ * "nothing reached the agent" and name `ai_agent_notify`, and would be actively wrong in
+ * front of a capability-registry user.
  *
  * This replaces a shared delegation token, and the upgrade is not cosmetic.
  * `validate_delegation_token` refuses any token without `user.user_id`/`user.group_id`, so
@@ -7,24 +17,20 @@
  * user from signed claims rather than from anything we put in the request body, and reuses
  * this same JWT as its `egress_token` — so the product call a human approves runs as that
  * human, not as a shared service account.
- *
- * SECRET HYGIENE IS THE WHOLE POINT OF THIS MODULE, and Atlas's `central_oauth.py` learned
- * it the hard way: "The body can echo the credential back on some errors, so it is NOT
- * logged or raised — only the status." Neither the access key nor the minted token is ever
- * logged, returned, or put in an error message. Only a status code is.
  */
-import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
-import { apiClient } from "../../lib/apiClient.js";
+import { CentralAuthError, mintCentralToken as mintShared, mintForm as mintFormShared, REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN, } from "../../lib/central-oauth.js";
 import appConfig from "../../config.js";
 import logger from "../../logger.js";
 import { AGENT_TIMEOUT_MS, AskError } from "./config.js";
+export { fetchTokenTransport, refusalIsAboutScope, REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN, resetTokenCache, TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MS, } from "../../lib/central-oauth.js";
 /**
  * BOTH PARTS ARE REQUIRED, AND THERE IS NO FALLBACK TO ANOTHER SCOPE.
  *
  * `oauth_user_profile` stays because it is what makes the pair obtainable through the
- * username+access_key flow at all. `ai_agent_notify` is what Atlas matches on
- * (`delegation.required_scope`, checked as exact membership of the token's `scopes` claim in
- * `web/oauth.py`); both halves move together with Atlas.
+ * username+access_key flow at all — measured, not assumed: the paired scope mints, and the
+ * other half alone comes back `400 invalid_request`. `ai_agent_notify` is what Atlas matches
+ * on (`delegation.required_scope`, checked as exact membership of the token's `scopes` claim
+ * in `web/oauth.py`); both halves move together with Atlas.
  *
  * THIS SCOPE MAY SIMPLY NOT BE ISSUABLE TO US, and the reasons are worth stating rather than
  * discovering. From the merged `browserstack/railsApp#175367` (2026-08-24):
@@ -46,10 +52,11 @@ import { AGENT_TIMEOUT_MS, AskError } from "./config.js";
  * application — and it is reported as one, naming the scope. It is never retried with a
  * different scope: a silent downgrade to a different authorization is exactly the kind of
  * thing nobody notices until it matters.
+ *
+ * Named here rather than taken from the shared default, so that changing the registry's
+ * scopes can never silently change what Atlas is authorised for.
  */
 export const CENTRAL_SCOPE = "oauth_user_profile ai_agent_notify";
-/** What we ask for. The endpoint clamps to its own maximum, so the response wins. */
-export const REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN = 3600;
 /**
  * Treat a token as stale this long before it actually expires.
  *
@@ -60,49 +67,6 @@ export const REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN = 3600;
  * expired credential, which is the exact mid-flight expiry this cache exists to prevent.
  */
 export const REFRESH_SKEW_MS = AGENT_TIMEOUT_MS + 60_000;
-/** The token endpoint gets its own, much shorter budget than `/agent`. */
-export const TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
-/**
- * The OAuth2 error codes we are willing to read out of a failure body.
- *
- * `error` is a fixed enum token in the spec, so it cannot carry a credential; `error_description`
- * is free text and demonstrably CAN ("access_key <key> is invalid"), which is why only the
- * code is ever looked at and only when it is one of these. Anything else is ignored entirely
- * and the classification falls back to the status.
- */
-const SCOPE_ERROR_CODES = [
-    "invalid_scope",
-    "unauthorized_client",
-    "invalid_request",
-];
-const CREDENTIAL_ERROR_CODES = [
-    "invalid_client",
-    "invalid_grant",
-    "access_denied",
-];
-/**
- * Was this refusal about the SCOPE or about the CREDENTIAL?
- *
- * The two need completely different fixes — provisioning versus a password — so collapsing
- * them into one message sends someone to the wrong place entirely. Our form has five fields
- * and four of them are constants, so a refusal of the REQUEST (as opposed to the caller) can
- * only really be about the scope.
- *
- * Nothing from the body is ever surfaced; the code is used to classify and then discarded.
- */
-export function refusalIsAboutScope(status, body) {
-    const payload = typeof body === "object" && body !== null
-        ? body
-        : {};
-    const code = typeof payload.error === "string" ? payload.error : "";
-    if (SCOPE_ERROR_CODES.includes(code))
-        return true;
-    if (CREDENTIAL_ERROR_CODES.includes(code))
-        return false;
-    // No usable code. OAuth2 answers a bad REQUEST with 400 and a bad CLIENT with 401/403, so
-    // the status is the next best evidence.
-    return status === 400;
-}
 /**
  * The ways authentication can fail, kept apart because a user cannot act on them otherwise.
  *
@@ -141,137 +105,51 @@ export const AUTH_SERVER_ERROR_DETAIL = (status) => `BrowserStack auth is unavai
     `BrowserStack auth is back.`;
 export const AUTH_UNUSABLE_DETAIL = (status) => `BrowserStack auth answered HTTP ${status} without issuing a token. NOTHING REACHED THE ` +
     `AGENT — no request was made, no prompt appeared and nothing was changed.`;
-const cache = new Map();
-/** Drop every cached token. For tests, and for a credential rotation. */
-export function resetTokenCache() {
-    cache.clear();
-}
-/**
- * The cache key.
- *
- * Keyed on the access key so that ROTATING it mints immediately rather than leaving a
- * revoked credential working until expiry — but on a SHA-256 of it, never the value, so the
- * secret is not left sitting in a map key for the life of the process.
- */
-function cacheKey(url, credentials) {
-    const digest = createHash("sha256")
-        .update(credentials.accessKey)
-        .digest("hex");
-    return `${url} ${credentials.username} ${CENTRAL_SCOPE} ${digest}`;
-}
-/**
- * The token endpoint, through `apiClient` per rules/security.md — no bare `fetch`.
- *
- * `raise_error: false` keeps the status-first contract this transport has always had: the
- * caller distinguishes a 400 scope refusal from a 401 rejection from an unreachable host,
- * so a thrown AxiosError on any non-2xx would destroy the only signal it reads.
- */
-export function fetchTokenTransport(timeoutMs = TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MS) {
-    return async (url, form) => {
-        try {
-            const response = await apiClient.post({
-                url,
-                headers: {
-                    "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-                    Accept: "application/json",
-                },
-                body: new URLSearchParams(form).toString(),
-                timeout: timeoutMs,
-                raise_error: false,
-            });
-            return { status: response.status, body: response.data ?? null };
-        }
-        catch {
-            // DNS, TLS, timeout — all of them mean "no token". The reason is deliberately not
-            // carried: it can name the URL and, on some stacks, echo the request body.
-            return { status: 0, body: null, error: "auth could not be reached" };
-        }
-    };
-}
-/** The exact form body of the `client_credentials` grant. */
+/** The exact form body of the `client_credentials` grant, at Atlas's scope. */
 export function mintForm(credentials) {
-    return {
-        grant_type: "client_credentials",
-        username: credentials.username,
-        access_key: credentials.accessKey,
-        scope: CENTRAL_SCOPE,
-        expires_in: String(REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN),
-    };
+    return mintFormShared(credentials, CENTRAL_SCOPE, REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN);
 }
-async function mintOnce(url, credentials, transport) {
-    const response = await transport(url, mintForm(credentials));
-    if (response.status === 0)
-        throw new AskError(AUTH_UNREACHABLE_DETAIL);
-    // 5xx BEFORE the refusal branch: a server error is not a refusal, and reading it as one
-    // is worse than saying nothing — it names the caller's credentials as the fault.
-    if (response.status >= 500) {
-        throw new AskError(AUTH_SERVER_ERROR_DETAIL(response.status));
+/** Every failure kind gets Atlas's own sentence; none of them carries the response body. */
+function toAskError(error) {
+    if (!(error instanceof CentralAuthError))
+        return error;
+    switch (error.kind) {
+        case "no_credentials":
+            return new AskError("BrowserStack AI is not authenticated: BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME and " +
+                "BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY are required to sign in");
+        case "unreachable":
+            return new AskError(AUTH_UNREACHABLE_DETAIL);
+        case "server_error":
+            return new AskError(AUTH_SERVER_ERROR_DETAIL(error.status));
+        case "refused_scope":
+            return new AskError(AUTH_SCOPE_REFUSED_DETAIL(error.status));
+        case "refused_credentials":
+            return new AskError(AUTH_REJECTED_DETAIL(error.status));
+        default:
+            return new AskError(AUTH_UNUSABLE_DETAIL(error.status));
     }
-    if (response.status !== 200) {
-        // ONLY THE STATUS CROSSES. The body is read solely to tell a provisioning problem from a
-        // credential one, and nothing out of it is ever put in the message — a non-200 body can
-        // echo the access key straight back.
-        throw new AskError(refusalIsAboutScope(response.status, response.body)
-            ? AUTH_SCOPE_REFUSED_DETAIL(response.status)
-            : AUTH_REJECTED_DETAIL(response.status));
-    }
-    const body = typeof response.body === "object" && response.body !== null
-        ? response.body
-        : {};
-    const token = body.access_token;
-    if (typeof token !== "string" || !token) {
-        throw new AskError(AUTH_UNUSABLE_DETAIL(response.status));
-    }
-    // Trust the SERVER's lifetime over what we asked for — it clamps to its own maximum, and
-    // caching for the requested hour when it granted less would hand out a dead token.
-    const granted = Number(body.expires_in);
-    const seconds = Number.isFinite(granted) && granted > 0 ? granted : REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN;
-    return { token, lifetimeMs: seconds * 1000 };
 }
 /**
  * Return a valid token, minting one only when the cache has nothing fresh.
  *
- * Minting per tool call would add a round trip to every request and make the token endpoint
- * a hot dependency of the whole surface.
+ * NOT CACHED IN HOSTED MODE. These tokens are per-user, attested credentials, and the
+ * process is shared by every tenant — `rules/multi-tenant-safety.md` forbids holding user
+ * data in module-level state there, so remote mode mints per call.
  */
 export async function mintCentralToken(url, credentials, transport, now = Date.now()) {
-    // Refused before any network call, and by name: these ARE the auth credential now, not
-    // merely attribution, so an empty one is our missing configuration rather than the user's
-    // rejected password, and must not read like one.
-    if (!credentials?.username || !credentials?.accessKey) {
-        throw new AskError("BrowserStack AI is not authenticated: BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME and " +
-            "BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY are required to sign in");
-    }
-    // NOT CACHED IN HOSTED MODE. These tokens are per-user, attested credentials, and the
-    // process is shared by every tenant — `rules/multi-tenant-safety.md` forbids holding user
-    // data in module-level state there, so remote mode mints per call. Keying on
-    // username + sha256(accessKey) already means one user can never be SERVED another's token,
-    // but containment is not the contract; not holding it at all is.
-    if (appConfig.REMOTE_MCP) {
-        return mintOnce(url, credentials, transport).then(({ token }) => {
-            logger.info("askBrowserStackAI: signed in as %s", credentials.username);
-            return token;
+    try {
+        return await mintShared({
+            url,
+            scope: CENTRAL_SCOPE,
+            credentials,
+            transport,
+            refreshSkewMs: REFRESH_SKEW_MS,
+            cacheEnabled: !appConfig.REMOTE_MCP,
+            now,
+            onMinted: (lifetimeMs) => logger.info("askBrowserStackAI: signed in as %s (lifetime %ss)", credentials.username, Math.round(lifetimeMs / 1000)),
         });
     }
-    const key = cacheKey(url, credentials);
-    const entry = cache.get(key);
-    if (entry && entry.token && now < entry.expiresAt - REFRESH_SKEW_MS) {
-        return entry.token;
+    catch (error) {
+        throw toAskError(error);
     }
-    // Double-checked through a shared promise: concurrent callers await the same mint.
-    if (entry?.inflight)
-        return entry.inflight;
-    const pending = mintOnce(url, credentials, transport)
-        .then(({ token, lifetimeMs }) => {
-        cache.set(key, { token, expiresAt: now + lifetimeMs });
-        logger.info("askBrowserStackAI: signed in as %s (lifetime %ss)", credentials.username, Math.round(lifetimeMs / 1000));
-        return token;
-    })
-        .catch((error) => {
-        // Never leave a rejected promise cached, or every later call inherits this failure.
-        cache.delete(key);
-        throw error;
-    });
-    cache.set(key, { token: "", expiresAt: 0, inflight: pending });
-    return pending;
 }

package/dist/tools/ask-browserstack/config.d.ts

@@ -30,6 +30,20 @@ export declare class AskError extends Error {
  * other three are on the config singleton (rules/tool-design.md).
  */
 export declare function isEnabled(): boolean;
+/**
+ * May the relay be offered in the hosted (`REMOTE_MCP`) deployment?
+ *
+ * OFF BY DEFAULT, because it depends on something outside this package: the host has to
+ * keep one `McpServer` alive per session. Stateless hosts build a fresh server per POST,
+ * and an elicitation answer — which arrives as a SEPARATE POST — then reaches an instance
+ * that never asked anything, leaving the real one suspended until it times out. So this
+ * must stay opt-in per deployment rather than become a default that silently hangs.
+ *
+ * Turning it on does NOT force the relay on: `relayMode` still asks whether THIS client
+ * declared the `elicitation` capability, and a client that did not still gets a read-only
+ * run. This flag only removes the blanket refusal.
+ */
+export declare function allowRemoteRelay(): boolean;
 /**
  * ============================================================================
  * PRODUCTION DEFAULTS

package/dist/tools/ask-browserstack/config.js

@@ -34,6 +34,22 @@ export class AskError extends Error {
 export function isEnabled() {
     return (process.env.ASK_BROWSERSTACK_DISABLED || "").toLowerCase() !== "true";
 }
+/**
+ * May the relay be offered in the hosted (`REMOTE_MCP`) deployment?
+ *
+ * OFF BY DEFAULT, because it depends on something outside this package: the host has to
+ * keep one `McpServer` alive per session. Stateless hosts build a fresh server per POST,
+ * and an elicitation answer — which arrives as a SEPARATE POST — then reaches an instance
+ * that never asked anything, leaving the real one suspended until it times out. So this
+ * must stay opt-in per deployment rather than become a default that silently hangs.
+ *
+ * Turning it on does NOT force the relay on: `relayMode` still asks whether THIS client
+ * declared the `elicitation` capability, and a client that did not still gets a read-only
+ * run. This flag only removes the blanket refusal.
+ */
+export function allowRemoteRelay() {
+    return appConfig.ASK_BROWSERSTACK_ALLOW_REMOTE_RELAY;
+}
 /**
  * ============================================================================
  * PRODUCTION DEFAULTS

package/dist/tools/ask-browserstack/register.d.ts

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 import { McpServer, RegisteredTool } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
 import { BrowserStackConfig } from "../../lib/types.js";
 import { Credentials } from "./egress.js";
-import type { AgentStreamTransport, DeferredTransport } from "./stream.js";
+import type { AgentStreamTransport, DecisionTransport } from "./stream.js";
 import { RelayMode } from "./types.js";
 export interface AskDeps {
     /** Resolved per call: a deployment's host is configuration, not a constructor argument. */
@@ -52,8 +52,7 @@ export interface AskDeps {
      * — ask, elicit, decide, result — without a socket.
      */
     streamTransport?: AgentStreamTransport;
-    /** The deferred START (one request, one JSON response). Substituted in tests. */
-    deferredTransport?: DeferredTransport;
+    decisionTransport?: DecisionTransport;
 }
 export declare function relayMode(server: McpServer): RelayMode;
 export declare function addAskBrowserStackAITool(server: McpServer, deps: AskDeps, config?: BrowserStackConfig): Record<string, RegisteredTool>;