@browserstack/mcp-server 1.4.0-beta.3 → 1.5.0-beta.10

package/dist/tools/ask-browserstack/central-oauth.js

@@ -1,277 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Mint a BrowserStack central-OAuth JWT from the caller's username and access key.
- *
- * This replaces a shared delegation token, and the upgrade is not cosmetic.
- * `validate_delegation_token` refuses any token without `user.user_id`/`user.group_id`, so
- * what we mint here is USER-ATTESTED: Atlas sets `principal_verified=True`, takes the acting
- * user from signed claims rather than from anything we put in the request body, and reuses
- * this same JWT as its `egress_token` — so the product call a human approves runs as that
- * human, not as a shared service account.
- *
- * SECRET HYGIENE IS THE WHOLE POINT OF THIS MODULE, and Atlas's `central_oauth.py` learned
- * it the hard way: "The body can echo the credential back on some errors, so it is NOT
- * logged or raised — only the status." Neither the access key nor the minted token is ever
- * logged, returned, or put in an error message. Only a status code is.
- */
-import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
-import { apiClient } from "../../lib/apiClient.js";
-import appConfig from "../../config.js";
-import logger from "../../logger.js";
-import { AGENT_TIMEOUT_MS, AskError } from "./config.js";
-/**
- * BOTH PARTS ARE REQUIRED, AND THERE IS NO FALLBACK TO ANOTHER SCOPE.
- *
- * `oauth_user_profile` stays because it is what makes the pair obtainable through the
- * username+access_key flow at all. `ai_agent_notify` is what Atlas matches on
- * (`delegation.required_scope`, checked as exact membership of the token's `scopes` claim in
- * `web/oauth.py`); both halves move together with Atlas.
- *
- * THIS SCOPE MAY SIMPLY NOT BE ISSUABLE TO US, and the reasons are worth stating rather than
- * discovering. From the merged `browserstack/railsApp#175367` (2026-08-24):
- *
- *   - `ai_agent_notify` is documented there as CLIENT_ID/SECRET auth, and
- *     `USERNAME_ACCESS_KEY_ONLY_SCOPES` remains only `user_management, oauth_user_profile`.
- *     We are on the username+access_key flow, which those restrictions are not written for.
- *   - It is additionally covered by a new
- *     `APP_REGISTERED_SCOPE_REQUIRED = %w[ai_agent ai_agent_notify]` gate, requiring the
- *     calling APPLICATION to be registered for it — though that gate sits in the
- *     `client_id + client_secret` path, not ours.
- *   - railsApp defines it as the PRODUCT -> AGENT direction: "a product reporting progress
- *     back to an AI agent for work the agent dispatched." We use it in the opposite
- *     direction, as an agent -> Atlas inbound credential.
- *   - `central_ai_s2s`, which this replaces, was deliberately EXCLUDED from that new gate.
- *
- * So this is strictly more restricted than what it replaces. If the endpoint refuses it, that
- * is a PROVISIONING problem — the scope is not available to this credential type or this
- * application — and it is reported as one, naming the scope. It is never retried with a
- * different scope: a silent downgrade to a different authorization is exactly the kind of
- * thing nobody notices until it matters.
- */
-export const CENTRAL_SCOPE = "oauth_user_profile ai_agent_notify";
-/** What we ask for. The endpoint clamps to its own maximum, so the response wins. */
-export const REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN = 3600;
-/**
- * Treat a token as stale this long before it actually expires.
- *
- * NOT the usual small skew. This token is not merely used to open the request — Atlas holds
- * it for the life of the run and re-uses it for product egress, so it has to outlive the
- * whole call, and our own `/agent` budget is already 330s. Handing out a token with 61
- * seconds left would mean a human approves a write and the egress that follows fails on an
- * expired credential, which is the exact mid-flight expiry this cache exists to prevent.
- */
-export const REFRESH_SKEW_MS = AGENT_TIMEOUT_MS + 60_000;
-/** The token endpoint gets its own, much shorter budget than `/agent`. */
-export const TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
-/**
- * The OAuth2 error codes we are willing to read out of a failure body.
- *
- * `error` is a fixed enum token in the spec, so it cannot carry a credential; `error_description`
- * is free text and demonstrably CAN ("access_key <key> is invalid"), which is why only the
- * code is ever looked at and only when it is one of these. Anything else is ignored entirely
- * and the classification falls back to the status.
- */
-const SCOPE_ERROR_CODES = [
-    "invalid_scope",
-    "unauthorized_client",
-    "invalid_request",
-];
-const CREDENTIAL_ERROR_CODES = [
-    "invalid_client",
-    "invalid_grant",
-    "access_denied",
-];
-/**
- * Was this refusal about the SCOPE or about the CREDENTIAL?
- *
- * The two need completely different fixes — provisioning versus a password — so collapsing
- * them into one message sends someone to the wrong place entirely. Our form has five fields
- * and four of them are constants, so a refusal of the REQUEST (as opposed to the caller) can
- * only really be about the scope.
- *
- * Nothing from the body is ever surfaced; the code is used to classify and then discarded.
- */
-export function refusalIsAboutScope(status, body) {
-    const payload = typeof body === "object" && body !== null
-        ? body
-        : {};
-    const code = typeof payload.error === "string" ? payload.error : "";
-    if (SCOPE_ERROR_CODES.includes(code))
-        return true;
-    if (CREDENTIAL_ERROR_CODES.includes(code))
-        return false;
-    // No usable code. OAuth2 answers a bad REQUEST with 400 and a bad CLIENT with 401/403, so
-    // the status is the next best evidence.
-    return status === 400;
-}
-/**
- * The ways authentication can fail, kept apart because a user cannot act on them otherwise.
- *
- * `scope refused` is a provisioning problem; `rejected` is "your credentials are wrong";
- * `unreachable` is "auth is down". A fourth — Atlas refusing a token we minted successfully —
- * is a server misconfiguration and lives in `relay.ts`, because it is discovered from
- * `/agent`. Four different fixes, so four different sentences.
- */
-export const AUTH_SCOPE_REFUSED_DETAIL = (status) => `BrowserStack auth would not issue a token for the scope "${CENTRAL_SCOPE}" (HTTP ${status}). ` +
-    `YOUR CREDENTIALS ARE NOT THE PROBLEM — this is a provisioning problem: \`ai_agent_notify\` ` +
-    `is documented as a client_id/secret scope, it is not in the username+access_key allow ` +
-    `list, and it carries an application-registration requirement. It has to be enabled for ` +
-    `this account or application; a different password will not help, and this server will ` +
-    `NOT quietly retry with a weaker scope. NOTHING REACHED THE AGENT — no request was made, ` +
-    `no prompt appeared and nothing was changed.`;
-export const AUTH_REJECTED_DETAIL = (status) => `Your BrowserStack credentials were rejected by BrowserStack auth (HTTP ${status}). ` +
-    `NOTHING REACHED THE AGENT — no request was made, no prompt appeared and nothing was ` +
-    `changed. Check BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME and BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY.`;
-export const AUTH_UNREACHABLE_DETAIL = "Could not reach BrowserStack auth to sign in. NOTHING REACHED THE AGENT — no request " +
-    "was made, no prompt appeared and nothing was changed. This is a connectivity or " +
-    "auth-server problem, not a problem with your credentials.";
-/**
- * A 5xx from auth: their service is down, not your password.
- *
- * Split out because routing 5xx to `AUTH_REJECTED_DETAIL` actively misdirects the reader,
- * and did: a preprod outage returned 503 and the tool answered "Your BrowserStack
- * credentials were rejected … Check BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME and BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY",
- * sending someone to audit env vars that had worked minutes earlier. The status alone
- * settles it — OAuth2 says a bad client is 401/403 and a bad request is 400, so nothing in
- * the 5xx range is ever a statement about the caller.
- */
-export const AUTH_SERVER_ERROR_DETAIL = (status) => `BrowserStack auth is unavailable (HTTP ${status}). YOUR CREDENTIALS ARE NOT THE ` +
-    `PROBLEM — a 5xx is the auth service failing, not a rejection, so there is nothing to ` +
-    `change on your side and nothing to retry differently. NOTHING REACHED THE AGENT — no ` +
-    `request was made, no prompt appeared and nothing was changed. Try again once ` +
-    `BrowserStack auth is back.`;
-export const AUTH_UNUSABLE_DETAIL = (status) => `BrowserStack auth answered HTTP ${status} without issuing a token. NOTHING REACHED THE ` +
-    `AGENT — no request was made, no prompt appeared and nothing was changed.`;
-const cache = new Map();
-/** Drop every cached token. For tests, and for a credential rotation. */
-export function resetTokenCache() {
-    cache.clear();
-}
-/**
- * The cache key.
- *
- * Keyed on the access key so that ROTATING it mints immediately rather than leaving a
- * revoked credential working until expiry — but on a SHA-256 of it, never the value, so the
- * secret is not left sitting in a map key for the life of the process.
- */
-function cacheKey(url, credentials) {
-    const digest = createHash("sha256")
-        .update(credentials.accessKey)
-        .digest("hex");
-    return `${url} ${credentials.username} ${CENTRAL_SCOPE} ${digest}`;
-}
-/**
- * The token endpoint, through `apiClient` per rules/security.md — no bare `fetch`.
- *
- * `raise_error: false` keeps the status-first contract this transport has always had: the
- * caller distinguishes a 400 scope refusal from a 401 rejection from an unreachable host,
- * so a thrown AxiosError on any non-2xx would destroy the only signal it reads.
- */
-export function fetchTokenTransport(timeoutMs = TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MS) {
-    return async (url, form) => {
-        try {
-            const response = await apiClient.post({
-                url,
-                headers: {
-                    "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-                    Accept: "application/json",
-                },
-                body: new URLSearchParams(form).toString(),
-                timeout: timeoutMs,
-                raise_error: false,
-            });
-            return { status: response.status, body: response.data ?? null };
-        }
-        catch {
-            // DNS, TLS, timeout — all of them mean "no token". The reason is deliberately not
-            // carried: it can name the URL and, on some stacks, echo the request body.
-            return { status: 0, body: null, error: "auth could not be reached" };
-        }
-    };
-}
-/** The exact form body of the `client_credentials` grant. */
-export function mintForm(credentials) {
-    return {
-        grant_type: "client_credentials",
-        username: credentials.username,
-        access_key: credentials.accessKey,
-        scope: CENTRAL_SCOPE,
-        expires_in: String(REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN),
-    };
-}
-async function mintOnce(url, credentials, transport) {
-    const response = await transport(url, mintForm(credentials));
-    if (response.status === 0)
-        throw new AskError(AUTH_UNREACHABLE_DETAIL);
-    // 5xx BEFORE the refusal branch: a server error is not a refusal, and reading it as one
-    // is worse than saying nothing — it names the caller's credentials as the fault.
-    if (response.status >= 500) {
-        throw new AskError(AUTH_SERVER_ERROR_DETAIL(response.status));
-    }
-    if (response.status !== 200) {
-        // ONLY THE STATUS CROSSES. The body is read solely to tell a provisioning problem from a
-        // credential one, and nothing out of it is ever put in the message — a non-200 body can
-        // echo the access key straight back.
-        throw new AskError(refusalIsAboutScope(response.status, response.body)
-            ? AUTH_SCOPE_REFUSED_DETAIL(response.status)
-            : AUTH_REJECTED_DETAIL(response.status));
-    }
-    const body = typeof response.body === "object" && response.body !== null
-        ? response.body
-        : {};
-    const token = body.access_token;
-    if (typeof token !== "string" || !token) {
-        throw new AskError(AUTH_UNUSABLE_DETAIL(response.status));
-    }
-    // Trust the SERVER's lifetime over what we asked for — it clamps to its own maximum, and
-    // caching for the requested hour when it granted less would hand out a dead token.
-    const granted = Number(body.expires_in);
-    const seconds = Number.isFinite(granted) && granted > 0 ? granted : REQUESTED_EXPIRES_IN;
-    return { token, lifetimeMs: seconds * 1000 };
-}
-/**
- * Return a valid token, minting one only when the cache has nothing fresh.
- *
- * Minting per tool call would add a round trip to every request and make the token endpoint
- * a hot dependency of the whole surface.
- */
-export async function mintCentralToken(url, credentials, transport, now = Date.now()) {
-    // Refused before any network call, and by name: these ARE the auth credential now, not
-    // merely attribution, so an empty one is our missing configuration rather than the user's
-    // rejected password, and must not read like one.
-    if (!credentials?.username || !credentials?.accessKey) {
-        throw new AskError("BrowserStack AI is not authenticated: BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME and " +
-            "BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY are required to sign in");
-    }
-    // NOT CACHED IN HOSTED MODE. These tokens are per-user, attested credentials, and the
-    // process is shared by every tenant — `rules/multi-tenant-safety.md` forbids holding user
-    // data in module-level state there, so remote mode mints per call. Keying on
-    // username + sha256(accessKey) already means one user can never be SERVED another's token,
-    // but containment is not the contract; not holding it at all is.
-    if (appConfig.REMOTE_MCP) {
-        return mintOnce(url, credentials, transport).then(({ token }) => {
-            logger.info("askBrowserStackAI: signed in as %s", credentials.username);
-            return token;
-        });
-    }
-    const key = cacheKey(url, credentials);
-    const entry = cache.get(key);
-    if (entry && entry.token && now < entry.expiresAt - REFRESH_SKEW_MS) {
-        return entry.token;
-    }
-    // Double-checked through a shared promise: concurrent callers await the same mint.
-    if (entry?.inflight)
-        return entry.inflight;
-    const pending = mintOnce(url, credentials, transport)
-        .then(({ token, lifetimeMs }) => {
-        cache.set(key, { token, expiresAt: now + lifetimeMs });
-        logger.info("askBrowserStackAI: signed in as %s (lifetime %ss)", credentials.username, Math.round(lifetimeMs / 1000));
-        return token;
-    })
-        .catch((error) => {
-        // Never leave a rejected promise cached, or every later call inherits this failure.
-        cache.delete(key);
-        throw error;
-    });
-    cache.set(key, { token: "", expiresAt: 0, inflight: pending });
-    return pending;
-}

package/dist/tools/ask-browserstack/config.d.ts

@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Where Atlas lives, and the timeout ladder.
- *
- * The host IS compiled in, matching every other tool here — `TM_BASE_URLS`, the
- * instrumentation endpoint — so an install needs no configuration to work. One env var
- * overrides it. See the warning on `DEFAULT_ATLAS_URL`: the compiled-in value is currently
- * STAGING and is a deliberate placeholder.
- */
-/**
- * CONTRACT §4 — the timeout ladder, outermost first. EACH LAYER MUST EXCEED THE ONE INSIDE
- * IT, or a layer dies before the layer it is waiting on can answer:
- *
- *   MCP client -> tool call        longest, client-side, not ours
- *   POST /agent HTTP request       330s   <- here
- *   Atlas gate -> stream ask       300s   Atlas's `permission_relay_timeout`
- *   elicitInput                    270s   <- here
- *
- * 300s is the browser path's existing PERMISSION_TIMEOUT, which also auto-rejects.
- */
-export declare const AGENT_TIMEOUT_MS = 330000;
-export declare const ELICITATION_TIMEOUT_MS = 270000;
-/** Thrown for anything this tool refuses to attempt. Never carries a credential. */
-export declare class AskError extends Error {
-}
-/**
- * Off by default is wrong for a shipped feature, but a kill switch is not.
- *
- * The only setting here still read from `process.env` per call, and deliberately: a kill
- * switch that needs a process restart is slowest exactly when it is needed fastest. The
- * other three are on the config singleton (rules/tool-design.md).
- */
-export declare function isEnabled(): boolean;
-/**
- * May the relay be offered in the hosted (`REMOTE_MCP`) deployment?
- *
- * OFF BY DEFAULT, because it depends on something outside this package: the host has to
- * keep one `McpServer` alive per session. Stateless hosts build a fresh server per POST,
- * and an elicitation answer — which arrives as a SEPARATE POST — then reaches an instance
- * that never asked anything, leaving the real one suspended until it times out. So this
- * must stay opt-in per deployment rather than become a default that silently hangs.
- *
- * Turning it on does NOT force the relay on: `relayMode` still asks whether THIS client
- * declared the `elicitation` capability, and a client that did not still gets a read-only
- * run. This flag only removes the blanket refusal.
- */
-export declare function allowRemoteRelay(): boolean;
-/**
- * ============================================================================
- * PRODUCTION DEFAULTS
- * ============================================================================
- *
- * These hosts are PRODUCTION. They replace the interim staging placeholders that this
- * package shipped with while the relay was being built ("for now lets hardcode the
- * base_url to staging only then we will point this to prod url later") — that step is
- * now done.
- *
- * `https://workflows.browserstack.com` was verified, not guessed: its `/api/profiles`
- * answers `401 {"detail":"authentication required"}`, byte-identical to staging Atlas.
- * The production auth endpoint is `https://auth.browserstack.com/oauth2/v2/token`.
- *
- * WHY THIS MATTERS: this package publishes to npm as `@browserstack/mcp-server`, so an
- * install with no environment variables set now talks to PRODUCTION. That is correct for
- * a production deployment, but it removes the old safety property — a misconfigured or
- * test deployment that forgets `ASK_BROWSERSTACK_ATLAS_URL` no longer fails safe onto
- * staging, it reads and writes REAL customer data. Non-production deployments MUST set
- * that variable explicitly. The resolved host is logged at info on first use, naming
- * whether it came from the env var or from here, so a deployment pointing at the wrong
- * Atlas is visible in a log line rather than inferred later from confusing data.
- *
- * Staging hosts, for anyone setting the override:
- *   ASK_BROWSERSTACK_ATLAS_URL      = https://ai-platform-service.bsstag.com
- *   ASK_BROWSERSTACK_AUTH_TOKEN_URL = https://auth-preprod.bsstag.com/oauth2/v2/token
- *
- * The tests assert these literals precisely so that repointing has to be deliberate
- * rather than something that slips through.
- *
- * grep: DEFAULT-PROD-HOSTS
- */
-export declare const DEFAULT_ATLAS_URL = "https://workflows.browserstack.com";
-export declare const DEFAULT_AUTH_TOKEN_URL = "https://auth.browserstack.com/oauth2/v2/token";
-/** For tests, and for anything that legitimately re-resolves. */
-export declare function resetHostAnnouncements(): void;
-/**
- * Resolve Atlas's base URL:
- *
- *   1. ASK_BROWSERSTACK_ATLAS_URL   explicit override
- *   2. the built-in staging default (see the warning above)
- *
- * Matching every other tool here, which ships its host in the code and treats the env var as
- * an override — `TM_BASE_URLS`, the instrumentation endpoint. There is no environment map and
- * no selector: one default, one override.
- */
-export declare function atlasBaseUrl(): string;
-/** Resolved per call, never captured at construction. */
-export declare function agentUrl(): string;
-/**
- * Where a central-OAuth JWT is minted (CONTRACT v1.2 §I, as amended by task 7).
- *
- * The shared `delegation.token` path is gone from Atlas, so a user-attested central JWT is
- * the only way in. Same two rungs as the host, and the same staging default.
- */
-export declare function authTokenUrl(): string;

package/dist/tools/ask-browserstack/config.js

@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-import appConfig from "../../config.js";
-import logger from "../../logger.js";
-/**
- * Where Atlas lives, and the timeout ladder.
- *
- * The host IS compiled in, matching every other tool here — `TM_BASE_URLS`, the
- * instrumentation endpoint — so an install needs no configuration to work. One env var
- * overrides it. See the warning on `DEFAULT_ATLAS_URL`: the compiled-in value is currently
- * STAGING and is a deliberate placeholder.
- */
-/**
- * CONTRACT §4 — the timeout ladder, outermost first. EACH LAYER MUST EXCEED THE ONE INSIDE
- * IT, or a layer dies before the layer it is waiting on can answer:
- *
- *   MCP client -> tool call        longest, client-side, not ours
- *   POST /agent HTTP request       330s   <- here
- *   Atlas gate -> stream ask       300s   Atlas's `permission_relay_timeout`
- *   elicitInput                    270s   <- here
- *
- * 300s is the browser path's existing PERMISSION_TIMEOUT, which also auto-rejects.
- */
-export const AGENT_TIMEOUT_MS = 330_000;
-export const ELICITATION_TIMEOUT_MS = 270_000;
-/** Thrown for anything this tool refuses to attempt. Never carries a credential. */
-export class AskError extends Error {
-}
-/**
- * Off by default is wrong for a shipped feature, but a kill switch is not.
- *
- * The only setting here still read from `process.env` per call, and deliberately: a kill
- * switch that needs a process restart is slowest exactly when it is needed fastest. The
- * other three are on the config singleton (rules/tool-design.md).
- */
-export function isEnabled() {
-    return (process.env.ASK_BROWSERSTACK_DISABLED || "").toLowerCase() !== "true";
-}
-/**
- * May the relay be offered in the hosted (`REMOTE_MCP`) deployment?
- *
- * OFF BY DEFAULT, because it depends on something outside this package: the host has to
- * keep one `McpServer` alive per session. Stateless hosts build a fresh server per POST,
- * and an elicitation answer — which arrives as a SEPARATE POST — then reaches an instance
- * that never asked anything, leaving the real one suspended until it times out. So this
- * must stay opt-in per deployment rather than become a default that silently hangs.
- *
- * Turning it on does NOT force the relay on: `relayMode` still asks whether THIS client
- * declared the `elicitation` capability, and a client that did not still gets a read-only
- * run. This flag only removes the blanket refusal.
- */
-export function allowRemoteRelay() {
-    return appConfig.ASK_BROWSERSTACK_ALLOW_REMOTE_RELAY;
-}
-/**
- * ============================================================================
- * PRODUCTION DEFAULTS
- * ============================================================================
- *
- * These hosts are PRODUCTION. They replace the interim staging placeholders that this
- * package shipped with while the relay was being built ("for now lets hardcode the
- * base_url to staging only then we will point this to prod url later") — that step is
- * now done.
- *
- * `https://workflows.browserstack.com` was verified, not guessed: its `/api/profiles`
- * answers `401 {"detail":"authentication required"}`, byte-identical to staging Atlas.
- * The production auth endpoint is `https://auth.browserstack.com/oauth2/v2/token`.
- *
- * WHY THIS MATTERS: this package publishes to npm as `@browserstack/mcp-server`, so an
- * install with no environment variables set now talks to PRODUCTION. That is correct for
- * a production deployment, but it removes the old safety property — a misconfigured or
- * test deployment that forgets `ASK_BROWSERSTACK_ATLAS_URL` no longer fails safe onto
- * staging, it reads and writes REAL customer data. Non-production deployments MUST set
- * that variable explicitly. The resolved host is logged at info on first use, naming
- * whether it came from the env var or from here, so a deployment pointing at the wrong
- * Atlas is visible in a log line rather than inferred later from confusing data.
- *
- * Staging hosts, for anyone setting the override:
- *   ASK_BROWSERSTACK_ATLAS_URL      = https://ai-platform-service.bsstag.com
- *   ASK_BROWSERSTACK_AUTH_TOKEN_URL = https://auth-preprod.bsstag.com/oauth2/v2/token
- *
- * The tests assert these literals precisely so that repointing has to be deliberate
- * rather than something that slips through.
- *
- * grep: DEFAULT-PROD-HOSTS
- */
-export const DEFAULT_ATLAS_URL = "https://workflows.browserstack.com";
-export const DEFAULT_AUTH_TOKEN_URL = "https://auth.browserstack.com/oauth2/v2/token";
-/** An operator's override may carry a trailing slash; the constants above do not. */
-function trimUrl(value) {
-    return value.trim().replace(/\/+$/, "");
-}
-/**
- * Announced ONCE per distinct resolution, not per tool call.
- *
- * The point is that a deployment talking to the wrong Atlas shows up in the log; repeating it
- * on every call would only make it easier to scroll past.
- */
-const announced = new Set();
-/** For tests, and for anything that legitimately re-resolves. */
-export function resetHostAnnouncements() {
-    announced.clear();
-}
-function announce(what, url, source) {
-    const line = `${what}|${url}|${source}`;
-    if (announced.has(line))
-        return;
-    announced.add(line);
-    logger.info("askBrowserStackAI: %s is %s (source: %s)", what, url, source);
-}
-/**
- * Resolve Atlas's base URL:
- *
- *   1. ASK_BROWSERSTACK_ATLAS_URL   explicit override
- *   2. the built-in staging default (see the warning above)
- *
- * Matching every other tool here, which ships its host in the code and treats the env var as
- * an override — `TM_BASE_URLS`, the instrumentation endpoint. There is no environment map and
- * no selector: one default, one override.
- */
-export function atlasBaseUrl() {
-    const explicit = appConfig.ASK_BROWSERSTACK_ATLAS_URL;
-    const url = explicit && explicit.trim() ? trimUrl(explicit) : DEFAULT_ATLAS_URL;
-    announce("Atlas", url, explicit && explicit.trim() ? "env" : "default");
-    return url;
-}
-/** Resolved per call, never captured at construction. */
-export function agentUrl() {
-    return `${atlasBaseUrl()}/agent`;
-}
-/**
- * Where a central-OAuth JWT is minted (CONTRACT v1.2 §I, as amended by task 7).
- *
- * The shared `delegation.token` path is gone from Atlas, so a user-attested central JWT is
- * the only way in. Same two rungs as the host, and the same staging default.
- */
-export function authTokenUrl() {
-    const explicit = appConfig.ASK_BROWSERSTACK_AUTH_TOKEN_URL;
-    const url = explicit && explicit.trim() ? trimUrl(explicit) : DEFAULT_AUTH_TOKEN_URL;
-    announce("auth token endpoint", url, explicit && explicit.trim() ? "env" : "default");
-    return url;
-}

package/dist/tools/ask-browserstack/egress.d.ts

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * The pieces of the outbound `POST /agent` that are not the transport itself.
- *
- * The transport moved to `stream.ts` when A2 was removed: `/agent` is read as an event
- * stream now, so a one-request-one-response `AgentTransport` has nothing left to describe.
- * What stays here is what both halves always shared — the header set, the credential pair,
- * and the response shape `relay.ts` reads to tell a refusal from an unreachable service
- * apart, which the stream's JSON-degrade path still produces.
- *
- * AUTH HERE IS NOT THE PRODUCT-API AUTH. `/agent` accepts exactly two credentials, both in
- * `Authorization`: the shared delegation token or a BrowserStack central JWT. There is no
- * `Api-Token` path on this route (CONTRACT v1.2 §I), so sending one would not merely be
- * useless — it would push the user's `access_key` across a trust boundary to an endpoint
- * that has no use for it, and into every request log on the way. The capability registry's
- * `authHeaders` remains right for PRODUCT calls; it is simply not the header set for this
- * one, and is deliberately not imported here.
- */
-export interface Credentials {
-    username: string;
-    accessKey: string;
-}
-/**
- * The complete header set for `POST /agent` (CONTRACT v1.2 §4). Three headers, no more.
- *
- * The token is a secret and appears nowhere else: not in a log line, not in a result, not in
- * an error message.
- */
-export declare function agentHeaders(token: string): Record<string, string>;
-export interface AgentResponse {
-    status: number;
-    body: unknown;
-    /** Only when there was no response at all to speak for itself. */
-    error?: string;
-}

package/dist/tools/ask-browserstack/egress.js

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * The pieces of the outbound `POST /agent` that are not the transport itself.
- *
- * The transport moved to `stream.ts` when A2 was removed: `/agent` is read as an event
- * stream now, so a one-request-one-response `AgentTransport` has nothing left to describe.
- * What stays here is what both halves always shared — the header set, the credential pair,
- * and the response shape `relay.ts` reads to tell a refusal from an unreachable service
- * apart, which the stream's JSON-degrade path still produces.
- *
- * AUTH HERE IS NOT THE PRODUCT-API AUTH. `/agent` accepts exactly two credentials, both in
- * `Authorization`: the shared delegation token or a BrowserStack central JWT. There is no
- * `Api-Token` path on this route (CONTRACT v1.2 §I), so sending one would not merely be
- * useless — it would push the user's `access_key` across a trust boundary to an endpoint
- * that has no use for it, and into every request log on the way. The capability registry's
- * `authHeaders` remains right for PRODUCT calls; it is simply not the header set for this
- * one, and is deliberately not imported here.
- */
-/**
- * The complete header set for `POST /agent` (CONTRACT v1.2 §4). Three headers, no more.
- *
- * The token is a secret and appears nowhere else: not in a log line, not in a result, not in
- * an error message.
- */
-export function agentHeaders(token) {
-    return {
-        Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
-        "Content-Type": "application/json",
-        // Attribution, so the downstream service can see the call came from an agent.
-        "request-source": "ai-chatbot",
-    };
-}

package/dist/tools/ask-browserstack/register.d.ts

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * `askBrowserStackAI` — one tool call in, one tool result out, with a human's approval
- * relayed through the middle of it.
- *
- * The shape, and why:
- *
- *   1. NEGOTIATE FIRST. `relayMode()` is consulted BEFORE Atlas is called, so Atlas learns
- *      whether a human is reachable before it starts rather than discovering it at the gate.
- *      Anything other than "offered" means `permission_relay` is omitted entirely and Atlas
- *      runs read-only — today's exact behaviour, and the path opencode and goose stay on.
- *      That also covers the hosted `REMOTE_MCP` deployment, where the relay cannot work at
- *      all; see `relayMode` for why. Nothing here depends on `sampling`, which Claude Code
- *      does not declare.
- *   2. LISTEN ON LOOPBACK. Transport is A2, so Atlas calls US back; because it initiates,
- *      the decision returns on the same connection to the same pod and PLAN.md's affinity
- *      problem never arises for this stdio deployment.
- *   3. ELICIT, ONCE. Atlas's `description` is the message, nothing is requested in the form,
- *      and the ACTION is mapped by CONTRACT §7 with no second chances.
- *   4. RETURN THE TRAIL. `approvals` and `applied_before_stop` are what let a caller tell
- *      "nothing happened" from "some steps applied, then stopped".
- *
- * FAIL CLOSED THROUGHOUT. A decline, a cancel, a timeout, a bad token, a body we cannot
- * parse, a handler that throws — every one of them denies. An unattended run cannot approve
- * itself because a headless client returns `cancel`, which is a deny.
- */
-import { McpServer, RegisteredTool } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
-import { BrowserStackConfig } from "../../lib/types.js";
-import { Credentials } from "./egress.js";
-import type { AgentStreamTransport, DecisionTransport } from "./stream.js";
-import { RelayMode } from "./types.js";
-export interface AskDeps {
-    /** Resolved per call: a deployment's host is configuration, not a constructor argument. */
-    agentUrl: () => string;
-    /**
-     * Sign in and return a bearer for `POST /agent`. Cached behind this, not minted per call.
-     *
-     * A function rather than a value because it is resolved per call for the same reason the
-     * host is, and because it can fail in ways a caller needs told apart.
-     */
-    mintToken: () => Promise<string>;
-    /**
-     * Read per call, not captured: the remote server rebuilds config per session, so a
-     * captured credential would outlive the session it belongs to.
-     *
-     * These are now THE AUTH CREDENTIAL, not merely attribution: the access key is exchanged
-     * for a user-attested central JWT, which is what lets Atlas run the approved product call
-     * as the human rather than as a shared service account.
-     */
-    credentialsFor: () => Credentials;
-    /**
-     * The two transport seams, injectable so a test can drive a whole approval round trip
-     * — ask, elicit, decide, result — without a socket.
-     */
-    streamTransport?: AgentStreamTransport;
-    decisionTransport?: DecisionTransport;
-}
-export declare function relayMode(server: McpServer): RelayMode;
-export declare function addAskBrowserStackAITool(server: McpServer, deps: AskDeps, config?: BrowserStackConfig): Record<string, RegisteredTool>;
-/** The tool-adder the server factory calls. */
-export declare function addAskBrowserStackAIToolFromConfig(server: McpServer, config: BrowserStackConfig): Record<string, RegisteredTool>;
-export default addAskBrowserStackAIToolFromConfig;