@browserstack/mcp-server 1.4.0-beta.1 → 1.5.0-beta.1

package/dist/tools/ask-browserstack/relay.d.ts

@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * The decision mapping and the result assembly — the two places where being wrong is
- * expensive, kept pure so they can be tested without a server, a socket or a client.
- */
-import { ElicitResult } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js";
-import { AgentResponse } from "./egress.js";
-import { ApprovalRecord, AskResult, AskStatus, Decision, DecisionReason, RelayMode } from "./types.js";
-export declare const RELAY_ON_DETAIL: string;
-/**
- * Used when the channel worked and every ask came back with nobody behind it.
- *
- * `RELAY_ON_DETAIL` cannot be used here and saying it was a bug, observed live: it claims
- * "BrowserStack asked before each change and the answers are in `approvals`" while the
- * trail says `refused: nobody was there to be asked`. Both sentences were in the same
- * result, contradicting each other — the same class of confusion as `disabled` vs a human
- * saying no, and it is the reader who pays for it. The channel being usable and a person
- * actually answering are different facts, and only the second one licenses the word
- * "answers".
- */
-export declare const RELAY_ON_NO_ANSWER_DETAIL: string;
-/**
- * One sentence per way the relay can fail to run, because they call for different things
- * from the person reading them, and a caller who cannot tell them apart retries forever.
- *
- * `no_human` is ours (CONTRACT §7's last row); the rest are Atlas's (v1.1 §D).
- */
-export declare const RELAY_OFF_DETAILS: Record<string, string>;
-/** Kept for anything still importing the old single constant. */
-export declare const RELAY_OFF_DETAIL: string;
-/** The sentence that goes with a `{used, reason}` pair, whoever produced it. */
-export declare function relayDetail(used: boolean, reason: string): string;
-/**
- * Did this request die before the agent ever started?
- *
- * Atlas omits its `permission_relay` verdict on refusals that never reach the delegation
- * layer — 401 unauthorized, 400 bad body, 503 delegation-not-enabled all answer with a bare
- * `{"detail": …}` — and a transport failure has no body at all. Read naively, "no verdict"
- * looks identical to "an Atlas older than v1.1", and the optimistic fallback for THAT case
- * then claims the channel was used and answers were collected when zero prompts appeared.
- *
- * Which is the same confusion the `disabled` sentence exists to prevent, one layer earlier:
- * a caller who cannot tell "nobody was asked" from "somebody said no" retries forever.
- */
-export declare function looksLikeDelegationResult(body: unknown): boolean;
-/**
- * Is this Atlas saying the ACCOUNT is not enabled for the product's agent?
- *
- * Atlas gained an entitlement gate on `POST /agent` (`flags.is_agent_enabled`, AIC-386) that
- * the WebSocket path already had. The flags are PER PRODUCT — `aiHarnessAgent` for tm,
- * `aiHarnessAgentTRA`, `aiHarnessAgentA11y` — so an account can be entitled for one product
- * and not another. It is also FAIL-OPEN on Atlas's side: Redis down, a flag never seeded, or
- * an unknown product all allow the request. So a 403 here is a real, deliberate "this account
- * is not enabled", never an outage.
- *
- * KEYED STRUCTURALLY, NEVER ON THE PROSE. Matching the sentence would break silently the
- * first time someone rewords it, falling through to a generic error.
- *
- * TODO(atlas/9.md): Atlas is deciding whether to add a `code` field to this body. When it
- * lands, prefer it over the status — add the check as the first rung here and leave the
- * status as the fallback for an older Atlas. Until then the status IS the structural signal.
- */
-export declare function isNotEntitled(response: AgentResponse): boolean;
-/**
- * The sentence the user asked for, with the product named.
- *
- * Entitlement is per product, so a bare "not enabled" sends someone to their admin asking
- * about the wrong thing. The disambiguation from a 401 is deliberate and load-bearing:
- * without it, a working access key gets rotated in response to a permissions problem.
- */
-export declare const NOT_ENTITLED_DETAIL: (product: string) => string;
-export declare function neverReachedAgent(response: AgentResponse): boolean;
-/**
- * Atlas's own verdict on the relay (v1.1 §D), when it gave one.
- *
- * Present ONLY when we supplied a `permission_relay` block, so its absence is either "we
- * never offered one" or "this Atlas predates v1.1" — neither of which is an error. A block
- * we cannot read is treated as no block at all rather than half-trusted.
- */
-export declare function atlasRelayVerdict(payload: Record<string, unknown>): {
-    used: boolean;
-    reason: string;
-} | null;
-/**
- * Product-language framing for the prompt (v1.1 §G, approved).
- *
- * `product` is the ONLY thing added — it is all §2 carries, and the route, method and path
- * never reach this side by design. The description itself is passed through untouched:
- * paraphrasing or truncating it would mean the human approves something other than what the
- * model actually said. Atlas sends it as the model wrote it (its route guard was removed —
- * CONTRACT v2 §3, amended), so this prefix is the only thing in front of the model's own
- * sentence. A placeholder can still arrive from an older Atlas and reads fine after it.
- */
-export declare const PRODUCT_LABELS: Record<string, string>;
-export declare function elicitationMessage(product: string, description: string): string;
-/**
- * CONTRACT §7. THE ACTION IS THE WHOLE ANSWER.
- *
- * | accept  | allow | ""        |
- * | decline | deny  | declined  |
- * | cancel  | deny  | cancelled |
- *
- * Nothing is requested in the form any more, so nothing can contradict the action. There used
- * to be a `confirm` boolean, and it had to go: with an `accept` action that ALREADY means the
- * human approved, `accept` + `confirm: false` is genuinely ambiguous between "I approved, and
- * a checkbox I never saw defaulted to false" and "I unticked it deliberately". The first is a
- * FALSE DENIAL — indistinguishable in the result from a human refusing, which is the exact
- * confusion D3 and N1 existed to remove — and a user hit it live. We cannot tell the two
- * apart, and guessing either way is wrong for the other. `decline` already gives an
- * unambiguous refusal in the same dialog, so the boolean bought nothing.
- *
- * FAIL-CLOSED IS UNCHANGED, and the boolean was never what provided it. A headless client with
- * no human at a terminal returns `cancel` — measured, not assumed (HANDOFF.md) — and `cancel`
- * is a deny. That is why an unattended run still cannot self-approve. It is also why an
- * elicitation is never retried: a second ask cannot conjure a human, only wear one down.
- */
-export declare function decide(result: ElicitResult): {
-    decision: Decision;
-    reason: DecisionReason;
-};
-/**
- * A one-line description of the SHAPE of what a client answered with — never its content.
- *
- * Which client sends what is currently guesswork: the elicitation bug in task 9 had to be
- * fixed without being able to confirm what Claude Code actually submits, because its binary
- * is compiled and its strings too fragmented to read. This line means the next person can
- * look it up instead of inferring it.
- *
- * `action` and `confirm` are a fixed enum and a boolean; neither can carry a description, a
- * credential or anything else a user typed.
- */
-export declare function elicitationShape(result: ElicitResult): string;
-/**
- * Read Atlas's `applied_before_stop`. NEVER DERIVE IT.
- *
- * This side used to compute it as CONTRACT §5's literal "any allow preceded a deny", which
- * could only ever be a guess: an approval whose request then failed counted as applied, so
- * the field lied in the exact direction it exists to prevent (D2). Atlas now computes it
- * from `applied`, which only Atlas can know, and sends it whenever a gate ran — including
- * `false`, including with an empty trail.
- *
- * So a MISSING field is never "false". It is "nobody measured this": either no gate ran, or
- * this Atlas predates the field. `null` says that out loud instead of asserting a fact.
- */
-export declare function readAppliedBeforeStop(payload: Record<string, unknown>): boolean | null;
-/**
- * Atlas's approval trail, when it sent one.
- *
- * Returns `null` — not `[]` — when the key is absent, because an empty trail Atlas DID send
- * ("the relay ran and nothing was asked") is a different fact from no trail at all, and only
- * the second is a reason to fall back to ours.
- *
- * Every entry is rebuilt rather than trusted: a `decision` that is not exactly `"allow"`
- * becomes `"deny"`, so a garbled trail fails closed in the reporting the same way the wire
- * does, and `applied` is carried only when it is genuinely a boolean.
- */
-export declare function parseAtlasApprovals(payload: Record<string, unknown>): ApprovalRecord[] | null;
-/**
- * One phrase per entry, because "approved, then it failed" and "refused" must not read
- * alike — conflating them is the whole reason D2 mattered.
- *
- * An `allow` with no `applied` key is NOT rendered as a failure: nobody measured it, and
- * saying otherwise would invent the very fact this is meant to report.
- */
-/**
- * Every ask was refused because no person was there — not because one said no.
- *
- * `cancelled` is what a client with nobody at the terminal returns (measured), and
- * `no_human` is our own word for the same thing. An EMPTY trail is not this case: nothing
- * was asked at all, which the existing sentences already describe correctly.
- */
-export declare function nobodyAnswered(trail: ApprovalRecord[]): boolean;
-export declare function approvalOutcome(entry: ApprovalRecord): string;
-/**
- * Atlas's own status wins when it declares one; otherwise it is derived from what we can
- * see. Deriving is a last resort, not an interpretation of the answer.
- */
-export declare function deriveStatus(response: AgentResponse, approvals: ApprovalRecord[], needsApproval: unknown[]): AskStatus;
-/** Assemble CONTRACT §5's result. Atlas's payload is carried, never rewritten. */
-export declare function buildResult(response: AgentResponse, approvals: ApprovalRecord[], mode: RelayMode, 
-/** Named in the not-entitled sentence, because entitlement is per product. */
-product?: string): AskResult;
-/**
- * A rejected credential and a refused action are unrelated problems, and a result that lets
- * them read alike sends someone hunting for a human who said no when the real answer is that
- * this server never got through the door.
- *
- * Atlas answers a bad `Authorization` with `401 {"detail": "unauthorized"}` — no `error`
- * string of its own — so without this the caller would see a bare "error" and nothing else.
- * A denial, by contrast, is `status: "blocked"` with a populated `approvals` trail.
- *
- * The token itself is NOT named here, only the variable that should hold it.
- */
-export declare const UNAUTHENTICATED_DETAIL: string;
-/**
- * A result for a call that never reached, or never got past, Atlas.
- *
- * It keeps §5's shape — including the approval trail — because a failure AFTER an approval
- * was granted is exactly the case where a caller most needs to know something may already
- * have been applied.
- */
-export declare function errorResult(message: string, approvals: ApprovalRecord[]): AskResult;