@broberg/sso 0.11.0 → 0.12.0

package/dist/hono.d.cts

@@ -439,7 +439,28 @@ interface SsoRoutesOptions {
      * Without it, login behaves exactly as in 0.8.0 and the tokens are dropped.
      */
     tokenStore?: TokenStore;
+    /**
+     * What the BROWSER is told when /callback refuses a login (F084.55, 0.12.0).
+     * "single" (default): an expired login and an unreadable cookie get the SAME
+     *   answer, `login_failed`. The two differ only in whether the cookie's
+     *   signature held against the current secret, and a stranger holding a
+     *   FOUND cookie must not be able to ask that.
+     * "granular": the 0.3.0–0.11.0 behaviour — `login_expired` and
+     *   `bad_login_cookie` told apart. For an app that knows its threat model
+     *   (e.g. internal, behind a VPN) and wants «dit login udløb» in the browser.
+     * `no_login_in_progress` is its own answer either way: it depends on no secret.
+     */
+    callbackErrors?: "single" | "granular";
+    /**
+     * Receives the PRECISE cause of every refused callback, whatever the browser
+     * was told — this is the operator's channel. `unreadable` on a real user's
+     * browser is what a rotated SSO_COOKIE_SECRET looks like from outside.
+     * Without it, the cause is written with console.warn so the log still has it.
+     */
+    onCallbackRefused?: (cause: CallbackRefusal, c: Context) => void | Promise<void>;
 }
+/** Why /callback refused: no login started here · too old · signature did not hold. */
+type CallbackRefusal = "absent" | "expired" | "unreadable";
 declare function ssoRoutes(options?: SsoRoutesOptions): {
     app: Hono<hono_types.BlankEnv, hono_types.BlankSchema, "/">;
     attach: MiddlewareHandler;
@@ -489,4 +510,4 @@ interface AccountRoutesInput {
  */
 declare function accountRoutes(sso: AccountRoutesInput): Hono<hono_types.BlankEnv, hono_types.BlankSchema, "/">;
 
-export { type AccountRoutesInput, type BackchannelOptions, type BackchannelStore, type SsoRoutesOptions, type TransactionFailure, accountRoutes, getSession, ssoRoutes };
+export { type AccountRoutesInput, type BackchannelOptions, type BackchannelStore, type CallbackRefusal, type SsoRoutesOptions, type TransactionFailure, accountRoutes, getSession, ssoRoutes };

package/dist/hono.d.ts

@@ -439,7 +439,28 @@ interface SsoRoutesOptions {
      * Without it, login behaves exactly as in 0.8.0 and the tokens are dropped.
      */
     tokenStore?: TokenStore;
+    /**
+     * What the BROWSER is told when /callback refuses a login (F084.55, 0.12.0).
+     * "single" (default): an expired login and an unreadable cookie get the SAME
+     *   answer, `login_failed`. The two differ only in whether the cookie's
+     *   signature held against the current secret, and a stranger holding a
+     *   FOUND cookie must not be able to ask that.
+     * "granular": the 0.3.0–0.11.0 behaviour — `login_expired` and
+     *   `bad_login_cookie` told apart. For an app that knows its threat model
+     *   (e.g. internal, behind a VPN) and wants «dit login udløb» in the browser.
+     * `no_login_in_progress` is its own answer either way: it depends on no secret.
+     */
+    callbackErrors?: "single" | "granular";
+    /**
+     * Receives the PRECISE cause of every refused callback, whatever the browser
+     * was told — this is the operator's channel. `unreadable` on a real user's
+     * browser is what a rotated SSO_COOKIE_SECRET looks like from outside.
+     * Without it, the cause is written with console.warn so the log still has it.
+     */
+    onCallbackRefused?: (cause: CallbackRefusal, c: Context) => void | Promise<void>;
 }
+/** Why /callback refused: no login started here · too old · signature did not hold. */
+type CallbackRefusal = "absent" | "expired" | "unreadable";
 declare function ssoRoutes(options?: SsoRoutesOptions): {
     app: Hono<hono_types.BlankEnv, hono_types.BlankSchema, "/">;
     attach: MiddlewareHandler;
@@ -489,4 +510,4 @@ interface AccountRoutesInput {
  */
 declare function accountRoutes(sso: AccountRoutesInput): Hono<hono_types.BlankEnv, hono_types.BlankSchema, "/">;
 
-export { type AccountRoutesInput, type BackchannelOptions, type BackchannelStore, type SsoRoutesOptions, type TransactionFailure, accountRoutes, getSession, ssoRoutes };
+export { type AccountRoutesInput, type BackchannelOptions, type BackchannelStore, type CallbackRefusal, type SsoRoutesOptions, type TransactionFailure, accountRoutes, getSession, ssoRoutes };

package/dist/hono.js

@@ -819,6 +819,8 @@ function ssoRoutes(options = {}) {
   }
   const onStoreError = backchannel?.onStoreError ?? "reject";
   const tokenStore = options.tokenStore;
+  const callbackErrors = options.callbackErrors ?? "single";
+  const onCallbackRefused = options.onCallbackRefused ?? ((cause) => console.warn(`[@broberg/sso] /callback refused: ${cause}`));
   async function liveSession(c) {
     const session = await verifySession(readCookie(c.req.header("cookie"), config.cookieName), config.cookieSecret);
     if (!session || !backchannel) return session;
@@ -905,7 +907,13 @@ function ssoRoutes(options = {}) {
           message: "This browser's login cookie could not be read. Begin again from the login page."
         }
       };
-      const { status, ...body } = failures[parsed.reason];
+      await onCallbackRefused(parsed.reason, c);
+      const shown = callbackErrors === "single" && parsed.reason !== "absent" ? {
+        status: 400,
+        error: "login_failed",
+        message: "This login could not be completed. Begin again from the login page."
+      } : failures[parsed.reason];
+      const { status, ...body } = shown;
       c.header("Set-Cookie", cookieHeader(txCookie, "", { maxAge: 0, secure: isSecure(c) }));
       return c.json(body, status);
     }