@broberg/sso 0.1.0

package/dist/hono.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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* Configuration, read from the environment and nowhere else (F084.4 AC#5).\n *\n * An app mounts this package and sets env vars. It does not pass options in\n * code, because the moment configuration lives in code, two deployments of the\n * same app can disagree about who their identity provider is — and the symptom\n * is a token rejection nobody can trace back to a config line.\n */\n\nexport class SsoConfigError extends Error {\n  constructor(message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"SsoConfigError\";\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface SsoConfig {\n  /** Broberg ID's origin, e.g. https://id.broberg.ai — the BARE origin. */\n  issuer: string;\n  /** The client id this app was registered under (administratively, in BID). */\n  clientId: string;\n  /** Exactly the redirect registered in BID. Exact match — one character decides. */\n  redirectUri: string;\n  /** Requested scopes. */\n  scopes: string[];\n  /** Signs the local session cookie. 32+ bytes of randomness. */\n  cookieSecret: string;\n  /** Local session cookie name. */\n  cookieName: string;\n  /**\n   * How long this app trusts its OWN session, in seconds.\n   *\n   * F084.7 decided the fleet's numbers: 7 days for a normal app, and 12 hours\n   * + 30 minutes of inactivity for anything holding personal or health data.\n   * The default here is the 7 days. An app handling patient data MUST set\n   * SSO_SESSION_MAX_AGE=43200 — the default is a normal-app default, not a\n   * safe-for-everything one.\n   */\n  sessionMaxAge: number;\n  /** Where to send the browser after a logout completes. */\n  postLogoutRedirectUri?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * NOT `!value`. A blank string is falsy in JavaScript, so the obvious guard\n * lets `SSO_COOKIE_SECRET=\"   \"` boot an app whose sessions are signed with\n * whitespace. This fleet has measured that exact defect before (components\n * F004.7), which is why it is a trim-and-compare rather than a truthiness test.\n */\nfunction required(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, name: string, hint: string): string {\n  const raw = env[name];\n  if (typeof raw !== \"string\" || raw.trim() === \"\") {\n    throw new SsoConfigError(`${name} is not set (or is blank). ${hint}`);\n  }\n  return raw.trim();\n}\n\n/** Seconds in a week — the fleet default from F084.7. */\nexport const DEFAULT_SESSION_MAX_AGE = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;\n\nexport function loadSsoConfig(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): SsoConfig {\n  const rawIssuer = required(\n    env,\n    \"BID_ISSUER\",\n    \"It is Broberg ID's bare origin, e.g. https://id.broberg.ai\",\n  );\n\n  let issuer: string;\n  try {\n    const url = new URL(rawIssuer);\n    if (url.protocol !== \"https:\" && url.hostname !== \"localhost\") {\n      throw new SsoConfigError(\n        `BID_ISSUER must be https (got ${url.protocol}//). Only localhost may be http.`,\n      );\n    }\n    // Normalised to the origin: a trailing slash makes it a DIFFERENT issuer to\n    // a strict OIDC client, and the mismatch surfaces as an opaque token\n    // rejection rather than as a configuration error anyone can read.\n    issuer = url.origin;\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof SsoConfigError) throw err;\n    throw new SsoConfigError(`BID_ISSUER is not a valid URL: ${rawIssuer}`);\n  }\n\n  const cookieSecret = required(\n    env,\n    \"SSO_COOKIE_SECRET\",\n    \"Generate one with `openssl rand -hex 32`. It signs this app's session cookie.\",\n  );\n  if (cookieSecret.length < 32) {\n    throw new SsoConfigError(\n      `SSO_COOKIE_SECRET is ${cookieSecret.length} characters; it must be at least 32. ` +\n        \"A short secret is a forgeable session, and a forged session is any user you like.\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  const rawMaxAge = env.SSO_SESSION_MAX_AGE?.trim();\n  let sessionMaxAge = DEFAULT_SESSION_MAX_AGE;\n  if (rawMaxAge) {\n    const n = Number(rawMaxAge);\n    // A non-number here would silently become NaN and then a cookie that\n    // expires immediately — an app that cannot keep anyone logged in, with no\n    // error anywhere. Refuse instead.\n    if (!Number.isFinite(n) || n <= 0) {\n      throw new SsoConfigError(\n        `SSO_SESSION_MAX_AGE must be a positive number of seconds (got ${JSON.stringify(rawMaxAge)}).`,\n      );\n    }\n    sessionMaxAge = Math.floor(n);\n  }\n\n  return {\n    issuer,\n    clientId: required(env, \"SSO_CLIENT_ID\", \"The id this app is registered under in Broberg ID.\"),\n    redirectUri: required(\n      env,\n      \"SSO_REDIRECT_URI\",\n      \"Must match the registered redirect EXACTLY — one trailing slash is a different address.\",\n    ),\n    scopes: (env.SSO_SCOPES?.trim() || \"openid profile email\").split(/\\s+/),\n    cookieSecret,\n    cookieName: env.SSO_COOKIE_NAME?.trim() || \"bid_session\",\n    sessionMaxAge,\n    postLogoutRedirectUri: env.SSO_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI?.trim() || undefined,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * The signing-key cache.\n *\n * ── THE ONE BEHAVIOUR THIS FILE EXISTS FOR ────────────────────────────────\n *\n * It refetches on an UNKNOWN KEY ID, not on a timer (F084.4's constraint, and\n * it is the right one). An interval is a guess about when somebody else will\n * rotate their key; an unknown kid is the event itself. With an interval, the\n * window between \"BID rotated\" and \"the interval elapsed\" is a window where\n * every login in every app fails, and the length of that window is a number\n * nobody chose on purpose.\n *\n * ── AND THE PART AN OBVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION GETS WRONG ─────────────────────\n *\n * \"Unknown kid ⇒ refetch\" turns anyone who can send this app a token into\n * someone who can make it hammer BID: a stream of tokens with random kids is a\n * stream of fetches against the one service the whole fleet logs in through.\n * So a refetch is rate-limited by time. The cost of the floor is real and worth\n * stating: a rotation landing inside the cooldown makes logins fail for up to\n * that many milliseconds. Seconds of failure for one app beats a way to aim\n * traffic at BID from outside.\n */\n// jose 6 dropped the `KeyLike` alias; importJWK now answers\n// `CryptoKey | Uint8Array` directly. Taking the type FROM the function\n// rather than naming it means a future rename cannot silently widen it.\nimport { importJWK, type JWK } from \"jose\";\n\ntype SigningKey = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof importJWK>>;\n\nexport interface JwksCacheOptions {\n  /** Absolute URL of the key set, taken from BID's discovery document. */\n  jwksUri: string;\n  /**\n   * The floor between two refetches. Below it, an unknown kid is rejected\n   * without asking BID again.\n   */\n  minRefetchIntervalMs?: number;\n  /** Injectable for tests. */\n  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Injectable for tests, so the cooldown can be exercised without waiting. */\n  now?: () => number;\n}\n\nexport interface JwksCache {\n  /** Resolve a key for this kid, refetching once if it is unknown. */\n  getKey(kid: string, alg: string): Promise<SigningKey>;\n  /** How many times the remote key set has actually been fetched. */\n  readonly fetchCount: number;\n}\n\nexport class JwksError extends Error {\n  constructor(message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"JwksError\";\n  }\n}\n\nexport function createJwksCache(options: JwksCacheOptions): JwksCache {\n  const {\n    jwksUri,\n    minRefetchIntervalMs = 10_000,\n    fetchImpl = fetch,\n    now = () => Date.now(),\n  } = options;\n\n  let keys: JWK[] = [];\n  let lastFetchAt = -Infinity;\n  let fetchCount = 0;\n  /** Collapses concurrent refetches into one request. */\n  let inFlight: Promise<void> | null = null;\n\n  async function refresh(): Promise<void> {\n    if (inFlight) return inFlight;\n    inFlight = (async () => {\n      const res = await fetchImpl(jwksUri);\n      if (!res.ok) {\n        throw new JwksError(`${jwksUri} answered ${res.status} — cannot verify any token`);\n      }\n      const body = (await res.json()) as { keys?: JWK[] };\n      if (!Array.isArray(body.keys)) {\n        throw new JwksError(`${jwksUri} returned no \"keys\" array`);\n      }\n      // Replace rather than merge. Merging would keep a REVOKED key usable\n      // forever, which is the one thing rotating a key is meant to stop.\n      keys = body.keys;\n      lastFetchAt = now();\n      fetchCount++;\n    })().finally(() => {\n      inFlight = null;\n    });\n    return inFlight;\n  }\n\n  return {\n    get fetchCount() {\n      return fetchCount;\n    },\n\n    async getKey(kid: string, alg: string) {\n      let jwk = keys.find((k) => k.kid === kid);\n\n      if (!jwk) {\n        const sinceLast = now() - lastFetchAt;\n        if (sinceLast < minRefetchIntervalMs) {\n          throw new JwksError(\n            `no signing key with kid ${kid}, and the key set was refreshed ${sinceLast}ms ago ` +\n              `(floor is ${minRefetchIntervalMs}ms). Refusing to refetch — retry shortly.`,\n          );\n        }\n        await refresh();\n        jwk = keys.find((k) => k.kid === kid);\n      }\n\n      if (!jwk) {\n        throw new JwksError(\n          `Broberg ID does not publish a signing key with kid ${kid}. ` +\n            `The token was not signed by this issuer.`,\n        );\n      }\n      return importJWK(jwk, alg);\n    },\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * The core: framework-free, public-client OAuth 2.1 against Broberg ID.\n *\n * ── THIS PACKAGE IS A PUBLIC CLIENT. THERE IS NO CLIENT SECRET. ───────────\n *\n * Deliberate, and F084.4 AC#4 greps the published tarball to keep it that way.\n * PKCE alone carries the exchange. That is safe here for a reason worth stating\n * rather than assuming: BID matches redirect addresses EXACTLY (measured — one\n * trailing slash is refused), so the authorization code is delivered to this\n * app's own server and nowhere else. An attacker who knows the client id can\n * start a flow; they cannot receive its result.\n *\n * What it buys is the thing the card actually asks for: a secret that does not\n * exist cannot be committed, leaked in a log, copied into a second app, or left\n * behind in a repository someone later makes public.\n *\n * ── AND WHAT THIS PACKAGE MUST NEVER LEARN TO DO ──────────────────────────\n *\n * No passwords. No passkey registration. No social-provider keys. No email\n * verification. All of it lives in BID. A client that CAN do any of it is a\n * client somebody eventually uses to do it — and then the identity rules exist\n * in two places and drift.\n */\nimport { decodeProtectedHeader, jwtVerify, type JWTPayload } from \"jose\";\nimport type { SsoConfig } from \"./config.js\";\nimport { createJwksCache, type JwksCache } from \"./jwks.js\";\n\n/* ── discovery ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */\n\nexport interface Discovery {\n  issuer: string;\n  authorization_endpoint: string;\n  token_endpoint: string;\n  jwks_uri: string;\n  userinfo_endpoint?: string;\n  end_session_endpoint?: string;\n}\n\nexport class SsoError extends Error {\n  constructor(message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"SsoError\";\n  }\n}\n\n/* ── PKCE ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */\n\nconst b64url = (bytes: ArrayBuffer | Uint8Array) => {\n  const view = bytes instanceof Uint8Array ? bytes : new Uint8Array(bytes);\n  let s = \"\";\n  for (const b of view) s += String.fromCharCode(b);\n  return btoa(s).replace(/\\+/g, \"-\").replace(/\\//g, \"_\").replace(/=+$/, \"\");\n};\n\nconst randomToken = (bytes = 32) => b64url(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(bytes)));\n\nasync function challengeFor(verifier: string): Promise<string> {\n  return b64url(await crypto.subtle.digest(\"SHA-256\", new TextEncoder().encode(verifier)));\n}\n\n/* ── the shapes a caller handles ─────────────────────────────────────────── */\n\n/**\n * What `beginLogin` produces. Every field except `url` must survive the round\n * trip to BID and back — the adapter stores them in a short-lived cookie.\n *\n * They are NOT optional extras. `state` is what makes the callback provably the\n * answer to THIS request, and `nonce` is what stops a valid token minted for\n * some other login from being replayed into this one.\n */\nexport interface LoginStart {\n  url: string;\n  state: string;\n  codeVerifier: string;\n  nonce: string;\n}\n\nexport interface SsoClaims extends JWTPayload {\n  sub: string;\n  email?: string;\n  name?: string;\n  picture?: string;\n  email_verified?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface LoginResult {\n  claims: SsoClaims;\n  idToken: string;\n  accessToken?: string;\n  refreshToken?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * `prompt=none` asks BID to answer WITHOUT showing anything (F084.6).\n *\n * The delivery method decides whether it works, and this package only ever\n * produces a URL for a FULL TOP-LEVEL REDIRECT. It never returns anything an\n * app could put in a hidden iframe, because an iframe against the identity\n * provider is third-party context: Safari has blocked it for years and Chrome\n * is retiring it. That path works in testing on a Mac and fails for every user\n * on an iPhone — a failure that looks like \"you are not logged in\".\n */\nexport interface BeginLoginOptions {\n  prompt?: \"none\" | \"login\" | \"consent\" | \"select_account\";\n  /** Extra scopes for this one request, on top of the configured set. */\n  scopes?: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface SsoClient {\n  discovery(): Promise<Discovery>;\n  beginLogin(options?: BeginLoginOptions): Promise<LoginStart>;\n  completeLogin(input: {\n    params: URLSearchParams;\n    state: string;\n    codeVerifier: string;\n    nonce: string;\n  }): Promise<LoginResult>;\n  verifyIdToken(idToken: string, options?: { nonce?: string }): Promise<SsoClaims>;\n  logoutUrl(options?: { idTokenHint?: string; postLogoutRedirectUri?: string }): Promise<string>;\n  /** Exposed for tests and for a health check; not needed in normal use. */\n  readonly jwks: JwksCache;\n}\n\nexport interface CreateSsoClientOptions {\n  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Passed through to the key cache; see jwks.ts for why there is a floor. */\n  minRefetchIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\nexport function createSsoClient(\n  config: SsoConfig,\n  options: CreateSsoClientOptions = {},\n): SsoClient {\n  const fetchImpl = options.fetchImpl ?? fetch;\n  let discoveryPromise: Promise<Discovery> | null = null;\n  let jwksCache: JwksCache | null = null;\n\n  async function discovery(): Promise<Discovery> {\n    discoveryPromise ??= (async () => {\n      const url = `${config.issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;\n      const res = await fetchImpl(url);\n      if (!res.ok) throw new SsoError(`${url} answered ${res.status}`);\n      const doc = (await res.json()) as Discovery;\n\n      // STRICT equality, and it is not pedantry. Better Auth's default basePath\n      // advertised `<origin>/api/auth` as the issuer — measured on a running\n      // BID during F084.1. If the document's issuer and our configured issuer\n      // disagree, every token this app later verifies will be rejected for a\n      // reason that reads as a signature problem. Refuse at boot instead.\n      if (doc.issuer !== config.issuer) {\n        throw new SsoError(\n          `BID_ISSUER is ${config.issuer} but ${url} says its issuer is ${doc.issuer}. ` +\n            `These must match exactly — tokens are validated against the issuer string.`,\n        );\n      }\n      return doc;\n    })().catch((err) => {\n      discoveryPromise = null; // let a later call retry rather than cache a failure\n      throw err;\n    });\n    return discoveryPromise;\n  }\n\n  async function keys(): Promise<JwksCache> {\n    if (!jwksCache) {\n      const { jwks_uri } = await discovery();\n      jwksCache = createJwksCache({\n        jwksUri: jwks_uri,\n        fetchImpl,\n        ...(options.minRefetchIntervalMs !== undefined\n          ? { minRefetchIntervalMs: options.minRefetchIntervalMs }\n          : {}),\n      });\n    }\n    return jwksCache;\n  }\n\n  async function verifyIdToken(idToken: string, opts: { nonce?: string } = {}) {\n    const cache = await keys();\n    const header = decodeProtectedHeader(idToken);\n    if (!header.kid) throw new SsoError(\"ID token has no kid — cannot pick a signing key\");\n\n    const { payload } = await jwtVerify(\n      idToken,\n      async () => cache.getKey(header.kid!, header.alg ?? \"RS256\"),\n      { issuer: config.issuer, audience: config.clientId },\n    );\n\n    if (opts.nonce !== undefined && payload.nonce !== opts.nonce) {\n      throw new SsoError(\n        \"ID token nonce does not match this login request — refusing a token minted for another sign-in.\",\n      );\n    }\n    if (typeof payload.sub !== \"string\" || payload.sub === \"\") {\n      throw new SsoError(\"ID token has no sub — there is no user to be\");\n    }\n    return payload as SsoClaims;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Fetch the profile claims and fold them in.\n   *\n   * NOT an optimisation — it is the only way to learn a user's name. MEASURED\n   * against the live Broberg ID on 16 Sep 2026:\n   *\n   *   ID token   iss · sub · aud · iat · exp · auth_time · acr · at_hash\n   *   userinfo   sub · name · given_name · family_name · email · email_verified\n   *\n   * That is correct OIDC for an authorization-code flow: profile claims belong\n   * to the userinfo endpoint, and an ID token proving WHO you are does not have\n   * to say what you are called. An app that only reads the ID token gets a\n   * signed identity and a blank name — which is exactly what the first run of\n   * the example app showed on screen.\n   *\n   * ── THE CHECK A NAIVE VERSION SKIPS ───────────────────────────────────────\n   *\n   * The `sub` from userinfo MUST equal the `sub` in the ID token (OIDC Core\n   * 5.3.2 says MUST). Without it, a userinfo response for a DIFFERENT user\n   * would be merged over a correctly verified identity — the app would show,\n   * and act as, somebody else, with a valid signature underneath. A mismatch is\n   * refused outright rather than reconciled.\n   */\n  async function withUserInfo(claims: SsoClaims, accessToken: string): Promise<SsoClaims> {\n    const doc = await discovery();\n    if (!doc.userinfo_endpoint) return claims;\n\n    const res = await fetchImpl(doc.userinfo_endpoint, {\n      headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}` },\n    });\n    // A failure here must NOT lose the sign-in: the identity is already proven\n    // by the ID token. The user ends up with a session and no display name,\n    // which is worse than having one and far better than being logged out.\n    if (!res.ok) return claims;\n\n    const info = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n    if (info.sub !== claims.sub) {\n      throw new SsoError(\n        `userinfo describes ${String(info.sub)} but the ID token is for ${claims.sub} — ` +\n          `refusing to merge another user's profile onto this session.`,\n      );\n    }\n    return { ...claims, ...info, sub: claims.sub };\n  }\n\n  return {\n    discovery,\n    get jwks() {\n      if (!jwksCache) throw new SsoError(\"the key cache is created on first verification\");\n      return jwksCache;\n    },\n    verifyIdToken,\n\n    async beginLogin(opts: BeginLoginOptions = {}): Promise<LoginStart> {\n      const { authorization_endpoint } = await discovery();\n      const codeVerifier = randomToken();\n      const state = randomToken(16);\n      const nonce = randomToken(16);\n\n      const params = new URLSearchParams({\n        response_type: \"code\",\n        client_id: config.clientId,\n        redirect_uri: config.redirectUri,\n        scope: [...new Set([...config.scopes, ...(opts.scopes ?? [])])].join(\" \"),\n        state,\n        nonce,\n        code_challenge: await challengeFor(codeVerifier),\n        code_challenge_method: \"S256\",\n      });\n      if (opts.prompt) params.set(\"prompt\", opts.prompt);\n\n      return { url: `${authorization_endpoint}?${params}`, state, codeVerifier, nonce };\n    },\n\n    async completeLogin({ params, state, codeVerifier, nonce }) {\n      // An ERROR comes back on the same redirect as a success — BID answers a\n      // refused `prompt=none` by redirecting here with ?error=login_required.\n      // Reading only for `code` would make a refusal look like a malformed\n      // response instead of the expected answer it is.\n      const error = params.get(\"error\");\n      if (error) {\n        throw new SsoError(\n          `Broberg ID refused this login: ${error}` +\n            (params.get(\"error_description\") ? ` — ${params.get(\"error_description\")}` : \"\"),\n        );\n      }\n\n      const returned = params.get(\"state\");\n      if (!returned || returned !== state) {\n        throw new SsoError(\n          \"state does not match the login this browser started — refusing the callback.\",\n        );\n      }\n\n      const code = params.get(\"code\");\n      if (!code) throw new SsoError(\"callback carried neither an error nor a code\");\n\n      const { token_endpoint } = await discovery();\n      const res = await fetchImpl(token_endpoint, {\n        method: \"POST\",\n        headers: { \"content-type\": \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" },\n        body: new URLSearchParams({\n          grant_type: \"authorization_code\",\n          code,\n          redirect_uri: config.redirectUri,\n          client_id: config.clientId,\n          code_verifier: codeVerifier,\n        }),\n      });\n\n      const body = (await res.json()) as {\n        id_token?: string;\n        access_token?: string;\n        refresh_token?: string;\n        error?: string;\n        error_description?: string;\n      };\n      if (!res.ok || !body.id_token) {\n        throw new SsoError(\n          `token exchange failed (${res.status}): ${body.error ?? \"no id_token in response\"}` +\n            (body.error_description ? ` — ${body.error_description}` : \"\"),\n        );\n      }\n\n      const claims = await verifyIdToken(body.id_token, { nonce });\n\n      return {\n        claims: body.access_token ? await withUserInfo(claims, body.access_token) : claims,\n        idToken: body.id_token,\n        ...(body.access_token ? { accessToken: body.access_token } : {}),\n        ...(body.refresh_token ? { refreshToken: body.refresh_token } : {}),\n      };\n    },\n\n    async logoutUrl(opts = {}) {\n      const doc = await discovery();\n      if (!doc.end_session_endpoint) {\n        throw new SsoError(\n          `${config.issuer} does not advertise end_session_endpoint — central logout is unavailable.`,\n        );\n      }\n      const params = new URLSearchParams();\n      if (opts.idTokenHint) params.set(\"id_token_hint\", opts.idTokenHint);\n      const post = opts.postLogoutRedirectUri ?? config.postLogoutRedirectUri;\n      if (post) params.set(\"post_logout_redirect_uri\", post);\n      params.set(\"client_id\", config.clientId);\n      return `${doc.end_session_endpoint}?${params}`;\n    },\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * The app's OWN session cookie — signed, not encrypted.\n *\n * Signed is the right choice and the distinction matters: the contents are not\n * secret (a user may read their own id and name), but they must not be\n * FORGEABLE. Encryption would hide a subject id the user already knows while\n * doing nothing extra about forgery, which is the actual risk.\n *\n * What goes in is deliberately small: who you are and when this stops being\n * true. Claims that can change — a name, a role, a picture — belong in the\n * app's own store keyed by `sub`, because a cookie is a cache nobody can\n * invalidate, and a stale role in a cookie is a permission that outlives its\n * revocation.\n */\n\nexport interface SessionPayload {\n  /** The subject from Broberg ID. The one stable identifier. */\n  sub: string;\n  /** Unix seconds. Checked on every read. */\n  exp: number;\n  /** Optional convenience copies; never authorisation data. */\n  email?: string;\n  name?: string;\n}\n\nconst enc = new TextEncoder();\n\nconst b64url = (bytes: Uint8Array) => {\n  let s = \"\";\n  for (const b of bytes) s += String.fromCharCode(b);\n  return btoa(s).replace(/\\+/g, \"-\").replace(/\\//g, \"_\").replace(/=+$/, \"\");\n};\n\nconst fromB64url = (s: string) => {\n  const pad = s.replace(/-/g, \"+\").replace(/_/g, \"/\");\n  const bin = atob(pad + \"=\".repeat((4 - (pad.length % 4)) % 4));\n  return Uint8Array.from(bin, (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));\n};\n\nasync function hmacKey(secret: string) {\n  return crypto.subtle.importKey(\"raw\", enc.encode(secret), { name: \"HMAC\", hash: \"SHA-256\" }, false, [\n    \"sign\",\n    \"verify\",\n  ]);\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign an arbitrary string. The primitive underneath BOTH cookies this package\n * sets — the session and the short-lived login transaction.\n *\n * They are separate functions on purpose. The first version of this file had\n * the transaction ride inside the session envelope with `exp: 0`, and the\n * expiry check (`exp * 1000 <= now()`) then rejected it every single time: the\n * transaction cookie could never be read back, so every login would have failed\n * with \"state does not match\" — a message pointing at the wrong thing entirely.\n * Two different lifetimes wanted two different envelopes, not one envelope with\n * a sentinel in it.\n */\nexport async function signValue(value: string, secret: string): Promise<string> {\n  const body = b64url(enc.encode(value));\n  const sig = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.sign(\"HMAC\", await hmacKey(secret), enc.encode(body)));\n  return `${body}.${b64url(sig)}`;\n}\n\n/** Verify the SIGNATURE only, returning the original string. No expiry notion. */\nexport async function verifyValue(\n  token: string | undefined | null,\n  secret: string,\n): Promise<string | null> {\n  if (!token) return null;\n  const dot = token.lastIndexOf(\".\");\n  if (dot <= 0) return null;\n  const body = token.slice(0, dot);\n  try {\n    const ok = await crypto.subtle.verify(\n      \"HMAC\",\n      await hmacKey(secret),\n      fromB64url(token.slice(dot + 1)),\n      enc.encode(body),\n    );\n    if (!ok) return null;\n    return new TextDecoder().decode(fromB64url(body));\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function signSession(payload: SessionPayload, secret: string): Promise<string> {\n  return signValue(JSON.stringify(payload), secret);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns null for ANY reason the cookie cannot be trusted — tampered,\n * truncated, wrong secret, expired, or simply not one of ours.\n *\n * Deliberately one return value rather than distinguishing them to the caller:\n * an app that can tell \"bad signature\" from \"expired\" will eventually branch on\n * it, and there is no branch where a forged cookie should do anything other\n * than what an absent one does.\n */\nexport async function verifySession(\n  token: string | undefined | null,\n  secret: string,\n  now: () => number = Date.now,\n): Promise<SessionPayload | null> {\n  // crypto.subtle.verify is constant-time; a hand-rolled string compare would\n  // leak the signature one byte at a time.\n  const body = await verifyValue(token, secret);\n  if (body === null) return null;\n\n  try {\n    const payload = JSON.parse(body) as SessionPayload;\n    if (typeof payload.sub !== \"string\" || payload.sub === \"\") return null;\n    if (typeof payload.exp !== \"number\" || payload.exp * 1000 <= now()) return null;\n    return payload;\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/** Serialise a Set-Cookie value. `secure` is off only for http://localhost. */\nexport function cookieHeader(\n  name: string,\n  value: string,\n  opts: { maxAge: number; secure: boolean; sameSite?: \"Lax\" | \"Strict\"; path?: string },\n): string {\n  const parts = [\n    `${name}=${value}`,\n    `Path=${opts.path ?? \"/\"}`,\n    `Max-Age=${opts.maxAge}`,\n    \"HttpOnly\",\n    // Lax, NOT Strict, and this is load-bearing: the callback from Broberg ID\n    // is a top-level GET navigation from another site. Strict withholds the\n    // cookie on exactly that navigation, so the login transaction cookie would\n    // be missing when it is needed and every sign-in would fail with \"state\n    // does not match\" — a message that sends you looking in the wrong place.\n    `SameSite=${opts.sameSite ?? \"Lax\"}`,\n  ];\n  if (opts.secure) parts.push(\"Secure\");\n  return parts.join(\"; \");\n}\n\nexport function readCookie(header: string | null | undefined, name: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!header) return undefined;\n  for (const part of header.split(\";\")) {\n    const eq = part.indexOf(\"=\");\n    if (eq === -1) continue;\n    if (part.slice(0, eq).trim() === name) return part.slice(eq + 1).trim();\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","/**\n * The Hono adapter — mounting, and nothing else.\n *\n * Every rule about what a valid session IS lives in the core (client.ts,\n * session.ts). This file only turns those into routes. F084.5 adds a Next.js\n * adapter on the SAME core, because a rule implemented twice is a rule that\n * eventually says two things.\n */\nimport { Hono, type Context, type MiddlewareHandler } from \"hono\";\nimport { loadSsoConfig, type SsoConfig } from \"./config.js\";\nimport { createSsoClient, type SsoClient } from \"./client.js\";\nimport {\n  cookieHeader,\n  readCookie,\n  signSession,\n  signValue,\n  verifySession,\n  verifyValue,\n  type SessionPayload,\n} from \"./session.js\";\n\n/** Where the adapter parks the session on the request, for `getSession`. */\nconst SESSION_KEY = \"bidSession\";\n\n/** Short-lived cookie holding the in-flight login. Five minutes is plenty for\n *  a person to type a password; longer just widens the window. */\nconst TRANSACTION_MAX_AGE = 300;\n\nexport interface SsoRoutesOptions {\n  config?: SsoConfig;\n  client?: SsoClient;\n  /** Path prefix these routes are mounted under. Used to build the return URL. */\n  loginPath?: string;\n  /** Where to send a user after a successful login when no returnTo is given. */\n  defaultReturnTo?: string;\n}\n\nfunction isSecure(c: Context): boolean {\n  // localhost over http is the one case where a Secure cookie would simply\n  // never be stored, making local development impossible for a reason no error\n  // would explain.\n  return new URL(c.req.url).protocol === \"https:\";\n}\n\n/**\n * Only same-origin, path-only return targets are honoured.\n *\n * Without this, `/auth/login?returnTo=https://evil.example` turns this app's\n * own login into an open redirect that arrives wearing our domain — the\n * classic phishing lever, and it is one line to close.\n */\nfunction safeReturnTo(raw: string | undefined, fallback: string): string {\n  if (!raw) return fallback;\n  if (!raw.startsWith(\"/\") || raw.startsWith(\"//\")) return fallback;\n  return raw;\n}\n\nexport function ssoRoutes(options: SsoRoutesOptions = {}) {\n  const config = options.config ?? loadSsoConfig();\n  const client = options.client ?? createSsoClient(config);\n  const loginPath = options.loginPath ?? \"/auth\";\n  const defaultReturnTo = options.defaultReturnTo ?? \"/\";\n  const txCookie = `${config.cookieName}_tx`;\n\n  const app = new Hono();\n\n  app.get(\"/login\", async (c) => {\n    const prompt = c.req.query(\"prompt\");\n    const start = await client.beginLogin(\n      prompt === \"none\" ? { prompt: \"none\" } : {},\n    );\n    const tx = JSON.stringify({\n      state: start.state,\n      codeVerifier: start.codeVerifier,\n      nonce: start.nonce,\n      returnTo: safeReturnTo(c.req.query(\"returnTo\"), defaultReturnTo),\n    });\n    c.header(\n      \"Set-Cookie\",\n      cookieHeader(txCookie, await signValue(tx, config.cookieSecret), {\n        maxAge: TRANSACTION_MAX_AGE,\n        secure: isSecure(c),\n      }),\n    );\n    // A FULL top-level redirect. Never a hidden iframe — see client.ts.\n    return c.redirect(start.url, 302);\n  });\n\n  app.get(\"/callback\", async (c) => {\n    const parsed = await parseTransaction(\n      readCookie(c.req.header(\"cookie\"), txCookie),\n      config.cookieSecret,\n    );\n    if (!parsed) {\n      return c.json(\n        { error: \"no_login_in_progress\", message: \"This browser did not start a login here, or it expired.\" },\n        400,\n      );\n    }\n\n    const result = await client.completeLogin({\n      params: new URL(c.req.url).searchParams,\n      state: parsed.state,\n      codeVerifier: parsed.codeVerifier,\n      nonce: parsed.nonce,\n    });\n\n    const exp = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + config.sessionMaxAge;\n    const session: SessionPayload = {\n      sub: result.claims.sub,\n      exp,\n      ...(result.claims.email ? { email: result.claims.email } : {}),\n      ...(result.claims.name ? { name: result.claims.name } : {}),\n    };\n\n    c.header(\n      \"Set-Cookie\",\n      cookieHeader(config.cookieName, await signSession(session, config.cookieSecret), {\n        maxAge: config.sessionMaxAge,\n        secure: isSecure(c),\n      }),\n    );\n    // Clear the transaction cookie: it has done its job, and a replayed one is\n    // only ever useful to someone who should not have it.\n    c.header(\n      \"Set-Cookie\",\n      cookieHeader(txCookie, \"\", { maxAge: 0, secure: isSecure(c) }),\n      { append: true },\n    );\n    return c.redirect(parsed.returnTo, 302);\n  });\n\n  app.get(\"/logout\", async (c) => {\n    c.header(\n      \"Set-Cookie\",\n      cookieHeader(config.cookieName, \"\", { maxAge: 0, secure: isSecure(c) }),\n    );\n    // Local cookie cleared FIRST, then central logout. If the redirect to BID\n    // fails or the user closes the tab, the worst case is \"signed out here but\n    // not everywhere\" — never the reverse, which would leave this app trusting\n    // a session the user believes is gone.\n    return c.redirect(await client.logoutUrl(), 302);\n  });\n\n  /** Reads the session and puts it on the context. Never blocks. */\n  const attach: MiddlewareHandler = async (c, next) => {\n    const cookie = readCookie(c.req.header(\"cookie\"), config.cookieName);\n    c.set(SESSION_KEY, await verifySession(cookie, config.cookieSecret));\n    await next();\n  };\n\n  /** Blocks and redirects to login, preserving where the user was going. */\n  const require: MiddlewareHandler = async (c, next) => {\n    const cookie = readCookie(c.req.header(\"cookie\"), config.cookieName);\n    const session = await verifySession(cookie, config.cookieSecret);\n    if (!session) {\n      const url = new URL(c.req.url);\n      return c.redirect(\n        `${loginPath}/login?returnTo=${encodeURIComponent(url.pathname + url.search)}`,\n        302,\n      );\n    }\n    c.set(SESSION_KEY, session);\n    await next();\n  };\n\n  return { app, attach, require, client, config };\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads the login transaction back out of its signed cookie.\n *\n * Signature only — the transaction's lifetime is the cookie's own Max-Age, not\n * a claim inside it. That is why it does NOT go through verifySession: an\n * envelope carrying an `exp` would need one, and the first version of this file\n * used `exp: 0`, which the expiry check rejected every time.\n */\nasync function parseTransaction(raw: string | undefined, secret: string) {\n  const body = await verifyValue(raw, secret);\n  if (body === null) return null;\n  try {\n    const tx = JSON.parse(body) as {\n      state: string;\n      codeVerifier: string;\n      nonce: string;\n      returnTo: string;\n    };\n    if (!tx.state || !tx.codeVerifier || !tx.nonce) return null;\n    return tx;\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/** Read the session a middleware attached. */\nexport function getSession(c: Context): SessionPayload | null {\n  return (c.get(SESSION_KEY) as SessionPayload | null) ?? null;\n}\n"]}

package/dist/hono.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+import * as hono_types from 'hono/types';
+import { Context, Hono, MiddlewareHandler } from 'hono';
+import { importJWK, JWTPayload } from 'jose';
+
+interface SsoConfig {
+    /** Broberg ID's origin, e.g. https://id.broberg.ai — the BARE origin. */
+    issuer: string;
+    /** The client id this app was registered under (administratively, in BID). */
+    clientId: string;
+    /** Exactly the redirect registered in BID. Exact match — one character decides. */
+    redirectUri: string;
+    /** Requested scopes. */
+    scopes: string[];
+    /** Signs the local session cookie. 32+ bytes of randomness. */
+    cookieSecret: string;
+    /** Local session cookie name. */
+    cookieName: string;
+    /**
+     * How long this app trusts its OWN session, in seconds.
+     *
+     * F084.7 decided the fleet's numbers: 7 days for a normal app, and 12 hours
+     * + 30 minutes of inactivity for anything holding personal or health data.
+     * The default here is the 7 days. An app handling patient data MUST set
+     * SSO_SESSION_MAX_AGE=43200 — the default is a normal-app default, not a
+     * safe-for-everything one.
+     */
+    sessionMaxAge: number;
+    /** Where to send the browser after a logout completes. */
+    postLogoutRedirectUri?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The signing-key cache.
+ *
+ * ── THE ONE BEHAVIOUR THIS FILE EXISTS FOR ────────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * It refetches on an UNKNOWN KEY ID, not on a timer (F084.4's constraint, and
+ * it is the right one). An interval is a guess about when somebody else will
+ * rotate their key; an unknown kid is the event itself. With an interval, the
+ * window between "BID rotated" and "the interval elapsed" is a window where
+ * every login in every app fails, and the length of that window is a number
+ * nobody chose on purpose.
+ *
+ * ── AND THE PART AN OBVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION GETS WRONG ─────────────────────
+ *
+ * "Unknown kid ⇒ refetch" turns anyone who can send this app a token into
+ * someone who can make it hammer BID: a stream of tokens with random kids is a
+ * stream of fetches against the one service the whole fleet logs in through.
+ * So a refetch is rate-limited by time. The cost of the floor is real and worth
+ * stating: a rotation landing inside the cooldown makes logins fail for up to
+ * that many milliseconds. Seconds of failure for one app beats a way to aim
+ * traffic at BID from outside.
+ */
+
+type SigningKey = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof importJWK>>;
+interface JwksCache {
+    /** Resolve a key for this kid, refetching once if it is unknown. */
+    getKey(kid: string, alg: string): Promise<SigningKey>;
+    /** How many times the remote key set has actually been fetched. */
+    readonly fetchCount: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The core: framework-free, public-client OAuth 2.1 against Broberg ID.
+ *
+ * ── THIS PACKAGE IS A PUBLIC CLIENT. THERE IS NO CLIENT SECRET. ───────────
+ *
+ * Deliberate, and F084.4 AC#4 greps the published tarball to keep it that way.
+ * PKCE alone carries the exchange. That is safe here for a reason worth stating
+ * rather than assuming: BID matches redirect addresses EXACTLY (measured — one
+ * trailing slash is refused), so the authorization code is delivered to this
+ * app's own server and nowhere else. An attacker who knows the client id can
+ * start a flow; they cannot receive its result.
+ *
+ * What it buys is the thing the card actually asks for: a secret that does not
+ * exist cannot be committed, leaked in a log, copied into a second app, or left
+ * behind in a repository someone later makes public.
+ *
+ * ── AND WHAT THIS PACKAGE MUST NEVER LEARN TO DO ──────────────────────────
+ *
+ * No passwords. No passkey registration. No social-provider keys. No email
+ * verification. All of it lives in BID. A client that CAN do any of it is a
+ * client somebody eventually uses to do it — and then the identity rules exist
+ * in two places and drift.
+ */
+
+interface Discovery {
+    issuer: string;
+    authorization_endpoint: string;
+    token_endpoint: string;
+    jwks_uri: string;
+    userinfo_endpoint?: string;
+    end_session_endpoint?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * What `beginLogin` produces. Every field except `url` must survive the round
+ * trip to BID and back — the adapter stores them in a short-lived cookie.
+ *
+ * They are NOT optional extras. `state` is what makes the callback provably the
+ * answer to THIS request, and `nonce` is what stops a valid token minted for
+ * some other login from being replayed into this one.
+ */
+interface LoginStart {
+    url: string;
+    state: string;
+    codeVerifier: string;
+    nonce: string;
+}
+interface SsoClaims extends JWTPayload {
+    sub: string;
+    email?: string;
+    name?: string;
+    picture?: string;
+    email_verified?: boolean;
+}
+interface LoginResult {
+    claims: SsoClaims;
+    idToken: string;
+    accessToken?: string;
+    refreshToken?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * `prompt=none` asks BID to answer WITHOUT showing anything (F084.6).
+ *
+ * The delivery method decides whether it works, and this package only ever
+ * produces a URL for a FULL TOP-LEVEL REDIRECT. It never returns anything an
+ * app could put in a hidden iframe, because an iframe against the identity
+ * provider is third-party context: Safari has blocked it for years and Chrome
+ * is retiring it. That path works in testing on a Mac and fails for every user
+ * on an iPhone — a failure that looks like "you are not logged in".
+ */
+interface BeginLoginOptions {
+    prompt?: "none" | "login" | "consent" | "select_account";
+    /** Extra scopes for this one request, on top of the configured set. */
+    scopes?: string[];
+}
+interface SsoClient {
+    discovery(): Promise<Discovery>;
+    beginLogin(options?: BeginLoginOptions): Promise<LoginStart>;
+    completeLogin(input: {
+        params: URLSearchParams;
+        state: string;
+        codeVerifier: string;
+        nonce: string;
+    }): Promise<LoginResult>;
+    verifyIdToken(idToken: string, options?: {
+        nonce?: string;
+    }): Promise<SsoClaims>;
+    logoutUrl(options?: {
+        idTokenHint?: string;
+        postLogoutRedirectUri?: string;
+    }): Promise<string>;
+    /** Exposed for tests and for a health check; not needed in normal use. */
+    readonly jwks: JwksCache;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The app's OWN session cookie — signed, not encrypted.
+ *
+ * Signed is the right choice and the distinction matters: the contents are not
+ * secret (a user may read their own id and name), but they must not be
+ * FORGEABLE. Encryption would hide a subject id the user already knows while
+ * doing nothing extra about forgery, which is the actual risk.
+ *
+ * What goes in is deliberately small: who you are and when this stops being
+ * true. Claims that can change — a name, a role, a picture — belong in the
+ * app's own store keyed by `sub`, because a cookie is a cache nobody can
+ * invalidate, and a stale role in a cookie is a permission that outlives its
+ * revocation.
+ */
+interface SessionPayload {
+    /** The subject from Broberg ID. The one stable identifier. */
+    sub: string;
+    /** Unix seconds. Checked on every read. */
+    exp: number;
+    /** Optional convenience copies; never authorisation data. */
+    email?: string;
+    name?: string;
+}
+
+interface SsoRoutesOptions {
+    config?: SsoConfig;
+    client?: SsoClient;
+    /** Path prefix these routes are mounted under. Used to build the return URL. */
+    loginPath?: string;
+    /** Where to send a user after a successful login when no returnTo is given. */
+    defaultReturnTo?: string;
+}
+declare function ssoRoutes(options?: SsoRoutesOptions): {
+    app: Hono<hono_types.BlankEnv, hono_types.BlankSchema, "/">;
+    attach: MiddlewareHandler;
+    require: MiddlewareHandler;
+    client: SsoClient;
+    config: SsoConfig;
+};
+/** Read the session a middleware attached. */
+declare function getSession(c: Context): SessionPayload | null;
+
+export { type SsoRoutesOptions, getSession, ssoRoutes };

package/dist/hono.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+import * as hono_types from 'hono/types';
+import { Context, Hono, MiddlewareHandler } from 'hono';
+import { importJWK, JWTPayload } from 'jose';
+
+interface SsoConfig {
+    /** Broberg ID's origin, e.g. https://id.broberg.ai — the BARE origin. */
+    issuer: string;
+    /** The client id this app was registered under (administratively, in BID). */
+    clientId: string;
+    /** Exactly the redirect registered in BID. Exact match — one character decides. */
+    redirectUri: string;
+    /** Requested scopes. */
+    scopes: string[];
+    /** Signs the local session cookie. 32+ bytes of randomness. */
+    cookieSecret: string;
+    /** Local session cookie name. */
+    cookieName: string;
+    /**
+     * How long this app trusts its OWN session, in seconds.
+     *
+     * F084.7 decided the fleet's numbers: 7 days for a normal app, and 12 hours
+     * + 30 minutes of inactivity for anything holding personal or health data.
+     * The default here is the 7 days. An app handling patient data MUST set
+     * SSO_SESSION_MAX_AGE=43200 — the default is a normal-app default, not a
+     * safe-for-everything one.
+     */
+    sessionMaxAge: number;
+    /** Where to send the browser after a logout completes. */
+    postLogoutRedirectUri?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The signing-key cache.
+ *
+ * ── THE ONE BEHAVIOUR THIS FILE EXISTS FOR ────────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * It refetches on an UNKNOWN KEY ID, not on a timer (F084.4's constraint, and
+ * it is the right one). An interval is a guess about when somebody else will
+ * rotate their key; an unknown kid is the event itself. With an interval, the
+ * window between "BID rotated" and "the interval elapsed" is a window where
+ * every login in every app fails, and the length of that window is a number
+ * nobody chose on purpose.
+ *
+ * ── AND THE PART AN OBVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION GETS WRONG ─────────────────────
+ *
+ * "Unknown kid ⇒ refetch" turns anyone who can send this app a token into
+ * someone who can make it hammer BID: a stream of tokens with random kids is a
+ * stream of fetches against the one service the whole fleet logs in through.
+ * So a refetch is rate-limited by time. The cost of the floor is real and worth
+ * stating: a rotation landing inside the cooldown makes logins fail for up to
+ * that many milliseconds. Seconds of failure for one app beats a way to aim
+ * traffic at BID from outside.
+ */
+
+type SigningKey = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof importJWK>>;
+interface JwksCache {
+    /** Resolve a key for this kid, refetching once if it is unknown. */
+    getKey(kid: string, alg: string): Promise<SigningKey>;
+    /** How many times the remote key set has actually been fetched. */
+    readonly fetchCount: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The core: framework-free, public-client OAuth 2.1 against Broberg ID.
+ *
+ * ── THIS PACKAGE IS A PUBLIC CLIENT. THERE IS NO CLIENT SECRET. ───────────
+ *
+ * Deliberate, and F084.4 AC#4 greps the published tarball to keep it that way.
+ * PKCE alone carries the exchange. That is safe here for a reason worth stating
+ * rather than assuming: BID matches redirect addresses EXACTLY (measured — one
+ * trailing slash is refused), so the authorization code is delivered to this
+ * app's own server and nowhere else. An attacker who knows the client id can
+ * start a flow; they cannot receive its result.
+ *
+ * What it buys is the thing the card actually asks for: a secret that does not
+ * exist cannot be committed, leaked in a log, copied into a second app, or left
+ * behind in a repository someone later makes public.
+ *
+ * ── AND WHAT THIS PACKAGE MUST NEVER LEARN TO DO ──────────────────────────
+ *
+ * No passwords. No passkey registration. No social-provider keys. No email
+ * verification. All of it lives in BID. A client that CAN do any of it is a
+ * client somebody eventually uses to do it — and then the identity rules exist
+ * in two places and drift.
+ */
+
+interface Discovery {
+    issuer: string;
+    authorization_endpoint: string;
+    token_endpoint: string;
+    jwks_uri: string;
+    userinfo_endpoint?: string;
+    end_session_endpoint?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * What `beginLogin` produces. Every field except `url` must survive the round
+ * trip to BID and back — the adapter stores them in a short-lived cookie.
+ *
+ * They are NOT optional extras. `state` is what makes the callback provably the
+ * answer to THIS request, and `nonce` is what stops a valid token minted for
+ * some other login from being replayed into this one.
+ */
+interface LoginStart {
+    url: string;
+    state: string;
+    codeVerifier: string;
+    nonce: string;
+}
+interface SsoClaims extends JWTPayload {
+    sub: string;
+    email?: string;
+    name?: string;
+    picture?: string;
+    email_verified?: boolean;
+}
+interface LoginResult {
+    claims: SsoClaims;
+    idToken: string;
+    accessToken?: string;
+    refreshToken?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * `prompt=none` asks BID to answer WITHOUT showing anything (F084.6).
+ *
+ * The delivery method decides whether it works, and this package only ever
+ * produces a URL for a FULL TOP-LEVEL REDIRECT. It never returns anything an
+ * app could put in a hidden iframe, because an iframe against the identity
+ * provider is third-party context: Safari has blocked it for years and Chrome
+ * is retiring it. That path works in testing on a Mac and fails for every user
+ * on an iPhone — a failure that looks like "you are not logged in".
+ */
+interface BeginLoginOptions {
+    prompt?: "none" | "login" | "consent" | "select_account";
+    /** Extra scopes for this one request, on top of the configured set. */
+    scopes?: string[];
+}
+interface SsoClient {
+    discovery(): Promise<Discovery>;
+    beginLogin(options?: BeginLoginOptions): Promise<LoginStart>;
+    completeLogin(input: {
+        params: URLSearchParams;
+        state: string;
+        codeVerifier: string;
+        nonce: string;
+    }): Promise<LoginResult>;
+    verifyIdToken(idToken: string, options?: {
+        nonce?: string;
+    }): Promise<SsoClaims>;
+    logoutUrl(options?: {
+        idTokenHint?: string;
+        postLogoutRedirectUri?: string;
+    }): Promise<string>;
+    /** Exposed for tests and for a health check; not needed in normal use. */
+    readonly jwks: JwksCache;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The app's OWN session cookie — signed, not encrypted.
+ *
+ * Signed is the right choice and the distinction matters: the contents are not
+ * secret (a user may read their own id and name), but they must not be
+ * FORGEABLE. Encryption would hide a subject id the user already knows while
+ * doing nothing extra about forgery, which is the actual risk.
+ *
+ * What goes in is deliberately small: who you are and when this stops being
+ * true. Claims that can change — a name, a role, a picture — belong in the
+ * app's own store keyed by `sub`, because a cookie is a cache nobody can
+ * invalidate, and a stale role in a cookie is a permission that outlives its
+ * revocation.
+ */
+interface SessionPayload {
+    /** The subject from Broberg ID. The one stable identifier. */
+    sub: string;
+    /** Unix seconds. Checked on every read. */
+    exp: number;
+    /** Optional convenience copies; never authorisation data. */
+    email?: string;
+    name?: string;
+}
+
+interface SsoRoutesOptions {
+    config?: SsoConfig;
+    client?: SsoClient;
+    /** Path prefix these routes are mounted under. Used to build the return URL. */
+    loginPath?: string;
+    /** Where to send a user after a successful login when no returnTo is given. */
+    defaultReturnTo?: string;
+}
+declare function ssoRoutes(options?: SsoRoutesOptions): {
+    app: Hono<hono_types.BlankEnv, hono_types.BlankSchema, "/">;
+    attach: MiddlewareHandler;
+    require: MiddlewareHandler;
+    client: SsoClient;
+    config: SsoConfig;
+};
+/** Read the session a middleware attached. */
+declare function getSession(c: Context): SessionPayload | null;
+
+export { type SsoRoutesOptions, getSession, ssoRoutes };