@broberg/secret-scan 0.1.7 → 0.2.0

package/README.md

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import { redactSecrets, hasSecret } from "@broberg/secret-scan";
 
 const { redacted, findings } = redactSecrets("the key is sk-ant-api03-… use it");
 // redacted → "the key is [REDACTED:anthropic-api-key] use it"
-// findings → [{ label: "anthropic-api-key", count: 1 }]
+// findings → [{ label: "anthropic-api-key", count: 1, confidence: "format" }]
 
 hasSecret("nothing here"); // false
 ```
@@ -29,6 +29,70 @@ hasSecret("nothing here"); // false
 with `findings: []`. It replaces every detected secret with `[REDACTED:<label>]`
 and never blocks the write — the surrounding knowledge survives.
 
+## Announced secrets — when the label is the only evidence (v0.2.0, opt-in)
+
+`Adgangskode: hunter2` has **no format to match.** Everything above recognises a
+key by its *shape* (`sk-ant-…`, `ghp_…`, `AKIA…`); here the value is arbitrary
+human text and the only signal is that someone wrote the word "password" next to
+it. cardmem found exactly this as the **first line of an ingested mail**, and
+`redactSecrets()` passed it through unchanged.
+
+```ts
+redactSecrets("Adgangskode: hunter2");                      // ← UNCHANGED. Off by default.
+redactSecrets("Adgangskode: hunter2", { announced: true });
+// redacted → "Adgangskode: [REDACTED:announced-secret]"   ← the label is kept on purpose
+// findings → [{ label: "announced-secret", count: 1, confidence: "announced" }]
+```
+
+Findings now carry `confidence`, so you can tell the two axes apart: `"format"`
+(the value identifies itself — safe anywhere) vs `"announced"` (a label claims
+the next word is a credential).
+
+### Why it is opt-in — the measurement, not a hunch
+
+> Measured **2026-08-14** against this repo: **548 tracked files, 544 readable as
+> text**, containing essentially no real secrets. The shipped pattern matched
+> **97 times, all of them noise.** Per label: `secret` **61**, `api key` **33**,
+> `password` **4**, every Danish label **0**.
+
+So 94 of the 97 come from the two words that are also ordinary **identifiers in
+source code** — `secret: config.secret`, `apiKey: Record<…>`. That is the real
+finding, and it is sharper than "the pattern is noisy": **its precision depends
+entirely on what you are scanning.** In an inbound mail body `Adgangskode:` is a
+strong signal; in a TypeScript file it is a variable name. The package cannot
+know which corpus it is looking at — **only you can** — so you make the call, and
+the default cannot be on.
+
+That is the opposite of this repo's usual defaults-ON stance (webpush F067.1,
+lens-engine F065). The numbers above are the reason, and they are why tuning is
+not the answer either: a broader label+separator+value pattern measured **305**
+on the same corpus, and refining it only reached **202**. A template/env-guard
+(`${FOO}`, `<your-key>`) was written and then dropped — it changed the count by
+**exactly 0**, because the noise here is identifiers, not templates.
+
+### `hasAnnouncedSecret` — for when the right answer is to refuse
+
+```ts
+import { hasAnnouncedSecret } from "@broberg/secret-scan";
+
+if (hasAnnouncedSecret(mailBody)) return; // don't send this to a model at all
+```
+
+A boolean, with no redaction built. For **untrusted inbound text heading to an
+LLM**, refusing beats redacting: a false positive costs a slightly worse
+classification, a false negative costs a leak. (buddy's reasoning, F035.8 — and
+it is the better half of this feature.)
+
+It fires on `Password: hunter2` and **not** on `"I forgot my password"` — a
+label with no separator and value is prose, not a credential. Beware the
+tempting-but-wrong version: a bare "3–32 alphanumerics on the first line" regex
+matches `Hej`, `Tak` and `FYI`. Harmless where a non-match costs nothing,
+dangerous in anything that redacts.
+
+**Detection order is load-bearing.** The announced pass runs *last* and refuses a
+value that is already a redaction marker, so `API key: sk-ant-…` still redacts as
+`anthropic-api-key` rather than flattening to a generic `announced-secret`.
+
 ## Classify a single token — `classify`
 
 The inverse of redaction: given a **single pasted token**, tell the caller what
@@ -103,19 +167,30 @@ regexes — most-specific first so attribution is correct:
   secrets are caught only via the `labeled-hex-secret` name-context rule.
 - **Order is API** — specific patterns run before generic ones (`sk-ant-` before
   `sk-`); a test asserts it.
+- **`hue-application-key` is the one unprefixed shape, and it runs LAST.** A Hue
+  v2 key is 40 chars of `[A-Za-z0-9-]` with nothing to anchor on, so the regex
+  carries a negative lookahead — `\b(?![0-9a-f]{40}\b)[A-Za-z0-9-]{40}\b` — that
+  excludes **git commit SHAs**. This is not an optimisation: telemetry and error
+  output are full of SHAs, and a redactor that mangles commit hashes gets turned
+  off within a week, after which it protects nothing. Hue keys are mixed-case,
+  SHAs are lowercase hex. Do not "simplify" the lookahead away; `test/hue-key.test.ts`
+  asserts real SHAs stay untouched, standalone and in prose.
 
 ## API
 
 ```ts
 interface SecretPattern { label: string; description: string; regex: RegExp; }
-interface RedactionFinding { label: string; count: number; }
+type SecretConfidence = "format" | "announced";
+interface RedactionFinding { label: string; count: number; confidence: SecretConfidence; }
 interface RedactionResult { redacted: string; findings: RedactionFinding[]; }
-interface RedactOptions { extraPatterns?: SecretPattern[]; }
+interface RedactOptions { extraPatterns?: SecretPattern[]; announced?: boolean; }
 interface ClassifyResult { label: string; description: string; }
 
 const SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[];
+const ANNOUNCED_LABEL: string;                   // "announced-secret"
 function redactSecrets(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): RedactionResult;
-function hasSecret(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): boolean;
+function hasSecret(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): boolean; // honours opts.announced
+function hasAnnouncedSecret(text: string): boolean;              // the refuse-path
 function classify(value: string, opts?: RedactOptions): ClassifyResult | null; // single-token type detection
 function redactionMarker(label: string): string; // `[REDACTED:${label}]`
 ```

package/dist/index.cjs

@@ -241,8 +241,25 @@ var SECRET_PATTERNS = [
     label: "cloudflare-global-key",
     description: "Cloudflare global API key (37-hex)",
     regex: /\b[0-9a-f]{37}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    // LAST on purpose: this is the only unprefixed shape in the list, so every
+    // anchored pattern above must get first refusal.
+    //
+    // Philips Hue v2 application key — 40 chars of [A-Za-z0-9-] with NO prefix,
+    // so there is nothing to anchor on. The negative lookahead is load-bearing,
+    // not decoration: a bare [A-Za-z0-9-]{40} also matches a GIT COMMIT SHA, and
+    // telemetry/error output is full of those. A redactor that eats commit
+    // hashes gets switched off within a week, after which it protects nothing.
+    // Hue keys are mixed-case; SHAs are lowercase hex — that asymmetry is the
+    // whole guard. (Pattern contributed + field-tested by beacon, F035.7.)
+    label: "hue-application-key",
+    description: "Philips Hue v2 application key (40 chars, no prefix)",
+    regex: /\b(?![0-9a-f]{40}\b)[A-Za-z0-9-]{40}\b/g
   }
 ];
+var ANNOUNCED_LABEL = "announced-secret";
+var ANNOUNCED_SECRET = /(\b(?:adgangskode|kodeord|hemmelighed|password|passwd|api[ -]?key|apinøgle|secret|kode|pwd)\s*[:=]\s*)(?!\[REDACTED:)\S+/gi;
 var redactionMarker = (label) => `[REDACTED:${label}]`;
 function patternsFor(opts) {
   return opts?.extraPatterns && opts.extraPatterns.length > 0 ? [...SECRET_PATTERNS, ...opts.extraPatterns] : SECRET_PATTERNS;
@@ -257,11 +274,28 @@ function redactSecrets(text, opts) {
       count++;
       return redactionMarker(p.label);
     });
-    if (count > 0) findings.push({ label: p.label, count });
+    if (count > 0) findings.push({ label: p.label, count, confidence: "format" });
+  }
+  if (opts?.announced) {
+    let count = 0;
+    const redactedAnnounced = redacted.replace(ANNOUNCED_SECRET, (_match, prefix) => {
+      count++;
+      return prefix + redactionMarker(ANNOUNCED_LABEL);
+    });
+    if (count > 0) {
+      redacted = redactedAnnounced;
+      findings.push({ label: ANNOUNCED_LABEL, count, confidence: "announced" });
+    }
   }
   return { redacted, findings };
 }
+function hasAnnouncedSecret(text) {
+  if (!text) return false;
+  ANNOUNCED_SECRET.lastIndex = 0;
+  return ANNOUNCED_SECRET.test(text);
+}
 function hasSecret(text, opts) {
+  if (opts?.announced && hasAnnouncedSecret(text)) return true;
   return patternsFor(opts).some((p) => {
     p.regex.lastIndex = 0;
     return p.regex.test(text);
@@ -278,8 +312,10 @@ function classify(value, opts) {
   return null;
 }
 
+exports.ANNOUNCED_LABEL = ANNOUNCED_LABEL;
 exports.SECRET_PATTERNS = SECRET_PATTERNS;
 exports.classify = classify;
+exports.hasAnnouncedSecret = hasAnnouncedSecret;
 exports.hasSecret = hasSecret;
 exports.redactSecrets = redactSecrets;
 exports.redactionMarker = redactionMarker;

package/dist/index.cjs.map

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* @broberg/secret-scan — fleet secret/credential redaction.\n *\n * `redactSecrets(text)` replaces every matched secret with `[REDACTED:<label>]`\n * and reports what it found. PURE + deterministic (regex/string only, no deps,\n * no I/O) so an engine write-gate, an egress scrub, a CLI, an admin preview UI,\n * and any repo all share the EXACT same detection — and it's trivially testable.\n *\n * Lifted verbatim from broberg/trail F197 (the second-brain safeguard); see\n * docs/features/F035-secret-scan.md. components owns + publishes this; @trail/shared\n * re-exports it.\n *\n * Design choices:\n * - Pattern-based, NOT entropy/generic-randomness — a redacted real fact would\n *   corrupt knowledge, so we accept missing an exotic token over false positives.\n * - Order matters: most-specific patterns run first (e.g. `sk-ant-` before the\n *   generic OpenAI `sk-`; `sk-or-v1-` before `sk-`), because each match is\n *   consumed before the next pattern runs → order = attribution.\n * - Redact, never reject — the surrounding knowledge survives; only the\n *   credential substring is neutralised.\n * - NEVER a bare high-entropy/hex pattern (it would hit git shas/hashes).\n *   Prefix-less service secrets are caught only via `labeled-hex-secret` (a 40+\n *   hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field).\n *\n * Two recommended integration shapes for consumers:\n *  (a) write boundary — `redactSecrets(text)` before persist (ingest gate);\n *  (b) egress — scrub before a value leaves to a user/LLM (highest-value guard).\n */\n\nexport interface SecretPattern {\n  /** stable id shown in the redaction marker + findings */\n  label: string;\n  /** human description of what this matches */\n  description: string;\n  /** global regex (used for replace-all + counting) */\n  regex: RegExp;\n}\n\n/** Ordered most-specific → least. Every regex carries the `g` flag. */\nexport const SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[] = [\n  {\n    label: 'private-key',\n    description: 'PEM private key block (RSA/EC/OPENSSH/DSA/PGP)',\n    regex:\n      /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\\s\\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'anthropic-api-key',\n    description: 'Anthropic API key (sk-ant-…)',\n    regex: /sk-ant-(?:api03-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // OpenRouter — distinct from OpenAI; runs BEFORE the generic sk- (which would\n    // otherwise also match + mislabel it).\n    label: 'openrouter-api-key',\n    description: 'OpenRouter API key (sk-or-v1- + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsk-or-v1-[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // DeepSeek — shares the sk- prefix with OpenAI, so it MUST run before the\n    // generic openai pattern (specific-before-generic = correct attribution).\n    // DeepSeek's documented shape is sk- + 32 lowercase hex (GitGuardian confirms\n    // an sk- prefix but hides the exact regex); the hex-only body + {32,} length\n    // distinguishes it from OpenAI's mixed-case base62 keys, so a real OpenAI key\n    // is never mislabelled. The field-anchored fallback below catches any\n    // DEEPSEEK_API_KEY value that doesn't fit this canonical shape.\n    label: 'deepseek-api-key',\n    description: 'DeepSeek API key (sk- + 32 lowercase hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsk-[0-9a-f]{32,}(?![0-9a-z])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'openai-api-key',\n    description: 'OpenAI API key (sk-… / sk-proj-…)',\n    regex: /sk-(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // ElevenLabs — sk_ with UNDERSCORE (vs OpenAI sk-), 48 hex.\n    label: 'elevenlabs-api-key',\n    description: 'ElevenLabs API key (sk_ + 48 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsk_[0-9a-f]{48}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // fal.ai — uuid:hex32 (key_id:key_secret); the colon is the signal.\n    label: 'fal-api-key',\n    description: 'fal.ai key (uuid:hex32)',\n    regex: /\\b[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}:[0-9a-f]{32}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Black Forest Labs (FLUX) API key — bfl_ prefix + a long token (sample\n    // bfl_Qo1…). The distinctive prefix + {20,} length keeps false positives near\n    // zero; image-provider sibling of the fal key above.\n    label: 'bfl-api-key',\n    description: 'Black Forest Labs / FLUX API key (bfl_ + token)',\n    regex: /\\bbfl_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'google-api-key',\n    description: 'Google / Gemini API key (AIza…)',\n    regex: /AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'google-oauth-secret',\n    description: 'Google OAuth client secret (GOCSPX-…)',\n    regex: /GOCSPX-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{28}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'aws-access-key-id',\n    description: 'AWS access key id (AKIA…)',\n    regex: /\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'github-token',\n    description: 'GitHub token (ghp_/gho_/ghs_/ghu_/ghr_…)',\n    regex: /\\bgh[posru]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // GitHub fine-grained PAT — distinct prefix `github_pat_` (not caught by the\n    // classic gh[posru]_ above), then base62 + a `_` separator (~82 chars total).\n    // The prefix is so distinctive that {50,} keeps false positives at zero.\n    label: 'github-fine-grained-pat',\n    description: 'GitHub fine-grained personal access token (github_pat_…)',\n    regex: /\\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{50,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'gitlab-token',\n    description: 'GitLab personal access token (glpat-…)',\n    regex: /\\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'slack-token',\n    description: 'Slack token (xox[baprs]-…)',\n    regex: /\\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'stripe-secret-key',\n    description: 'Stripe live secret/restricted key (sk_live_/rk_live_…)',\n    regex: /\\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Resend (re_…). Lookahead requires a digit in the body so we don't redact\n    // long snake_case identifiers like re_compute_the_thing.\n    label: 'resend-api-key',\n    description: 'Resend API key (re_ + token)',\n    regex: /\\bre_(?=[A-Za-z0-9_]*\\d)[A-Za-z0-9_]{24,}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'supabase-access-token',\n    description: 'Supabase personal/management access token (sbp_ + 40 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsbp_[0-9a-f]{40}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'supabase-secret-key',\n    description: 'Supabase secret API key (sb_secret_…)',\n    regex: /\\bsb_secret_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Used by every @broberg/* publish — the highest-value leak from a .env / commit history.\n    label: 'npm-token',\n    description: 'npm publish/automation token (npm_ + 36 base62)',\n    regex: /\\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'fly-api-token',\n    description: 'Fly.io API token (FlyV1 fm2_… / fo1_…)',\n    regex: /(?:FlyV1 fm2_[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{20,}|\\bfo1_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,})/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Also covers Turso DB/platform auth tokens AND Supabase anon/service_role\n    // keys — both are JWTs (eyJ…), so the single JWT pattern catches them.\n    label: 'jwt',\n    description: 'JSON Web Token (eyJ…) — incl. Turso + Supabase service_role tokens',\n    regex: /\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // genApiKey = randomBytes(24).hex → uk_ + exactly 48 lowercase hex.\n    label: 'upmetrics-key',\n    description: 'Upmetrics project key (uk_ + 48 hex)',\n    regex: /\\buk_[0-9a-f]{48}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'cardmem-key',\n    description: 'Cardmem personal/incident/project key (pa_/pi_/pk_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bp[aik]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // cardmem inbox-webhook key — piw_ isn't matched by p[aik]_ above (3rd char 'w' ≠ '_').\n    label: 'cardmem-webhook-key',\n    description: 'Cardmem inbox-webhook key (piw_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bpiw_[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'trail-key',\n    description: 'Trail personal API key (trail_…)',\n    regex: /\\btrail_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Cronjobs API key (cronjobs.webhouse.net) — cj_ + randomBytes(32).base64url =\n    // exactly 43 base64url chars (46 total). Prefix + fixed length = very low FP.\n    // The UI's truncated cj_<8 chars>… preview is shorter than {43} → not matched.\n    // Negative lookahead (not \\b) because base64url's `-` breaks a trailing \\b.\n    label: 'cronjobs-api-key',\n    description: 'Cronjobs API key (cj_ + 43 base64url)',\n    regex: /\\bcj_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // randomBytes(32).hex → wh_ + 64 lowercase hex (67 chars total).\n    label: 'cms-access-token',\n    description: 'webhouse.app CMS access token (wh_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bwh_[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Cloudflare API token (R2 / DNS management) — 40 base64url chars, NO prefix.\n    // A bare {40} would false-positive broadly, so this is CONTEXT-ONLY: it only\n    // fires next to a cf/cloudflare-api-token-named field. Runs before\n    // labeled-hex-secret so a hex-valued CF token is attributed correctly.\n    label: 'cloudflare-api-token',\n    description: 'Cloudflare API token (cf/cloudflare-api-token field + 40 base64url)',\n    regex: /\\b(?:cf|cloudflare)_?api_?token\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Mistral API key — prefix-less ~32 base62 (Christian-confirmed sample). A bare\n    // [A-Za-z0-9]{32} would FP on every ID/hash, so CONTEXT-ONLY: anchored on a\n    // mistral-(api-)key/token-named field. Runs before labeled-hex for attribution.\n    label: 'mistral-api-key',\n    description: 'Mistral API key (mistral-(api-)key/token field + 24+ base62)',\n    regex: /\\bmistral(?:[_-]?api)?[_-]?(?:key|token)\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // DeepSeek — field-anchored fallback for any DEEPSEEK_API_KEY/TOKEN value that\n    // doesn't fit the canonical sk-+hex shape (mirrors the Mistral context-only\n    // approach). The field name is the signal → near-zero false positives. The\n    // sk-+hex format pattern above already attributes the canonical shape; this\n    // backstops a format change or an opaque token.\n    label: 'deepseek-api-key',\n    description: 'DeepSeek API key (deepseek-(api-)key/token field + 20+ token)',\n    regex: /\\bdeepseek(?:[_-]?api)?[_-]?(?:key|token)\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Vimeo personal access token — ~32 lowercase hex, no prefix (sanne). A bare\n    // hex32 would FP massively (MD5/UUID), so CONTEXT-ONLY: anchored on a\n    // vimeo-(access-)token-named field.\n    label: 'vimeo-access-token',\n    description: 'Vimeo access token (vimeo-(access-)token field + 20+ base62)',\n    regex: /\\bvimeo(?:[_-]?access)?[_-]?token\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Context-based catch for prefix-less high-entropy service secrets\n    // (CMS_JWT_SECRET, revalidateSecret, fleet openssl-rand-hex secrets): a 40+\n    // hex value assigned to a field whose name contains\n    // secret/token/password/api-key. The name requirement keeps the\n    // false-positive rate near zero (a bare 40/64-hex would hit shas/hashes).\n    label: 'labeled-hex-secret',\n    description: 'A 40+ hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field',\n    regex: /\\b[A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:secret|token|password|api[_-]?key)\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[0-9a-f]{40,}/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Discord bot token — three base64url segments. Anchored both sides so it\n    // can't partial-match a longer dotted string.\n    label: 'discord-bot-token',\n    description: 'Discord bot token (3 base64url segments)',\n    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,26}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,40}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'discord-mfa-token',\n    description: 'Discord MFA token (mfa. + 84 chars)',\n    regex: /\\bmfa\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{84}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Cloudflare Turnstile PROD secret (sanne, verified 2/2) — 0x4 + 6×A prefix,\n    // then 26 base64url (35 total). The 24-char SITE key + 1x/2x/3x TEST keys are\n    // intentionally NOT matched (the {26} length gate misses them) so a public\n    // key is never redacted.\n    label: 'cloudflare-turnstile-secret',\n    description: 'Cloudflare Turnstile secret key (0x4AAAAAA + 26 base64url, 35 total)',\n    regex: /0x4AAAAAA[A-Za-z0-9_-]{26}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'cloudflare-global-key',\n    description: 'Cloudflare global API key (37-hex)',\n    regex: /\\b[0-9a-f]{37}\\b/g,\n  },\n];\n\nexport interface RedactionFinding {\n  label: string;\n  count: number;\n}\n\nexport interface RedactionResult {\n  /** input with every secret replaced by `[REDACTED:<label>]` */\n  redacted: string;\n  /** per-pattern counts of what was redacted (empty = clean) */\n  findings: RedactionFinding[];\n}\n\nexport interface RedactOptions {\n  /**\n   * Extra consumer/per-tenant patterns, run AFTER the canonical set (so canonical\n   * attribution wins). Backs a future self-service \"paste a key → detector\" UI.\n   */\n  extraPatterns?: SecretPattern[];\n}\n\n/** Replacement marker for a redacted secret. */\nexport const redactionMarker = (label: string): string => `[REDACTED:${label}]`;\n\nfunction patternsFor(opts?: RedactOptions): SecretPattern[] {\n  return opts?.extraPatterns && opts.extraPatterns.length > 0\n    ? [...SECRET_PATTERNS, ...opts.extraPatterns]\n    : SECRET_PATTERNS;\n}\n\n/**\n * Scan `text` and replace every detected secret with its redaction marker.\n * Pure: clean input returns byte-identical (`findings: []`).\n */\nexport function redactSecrets(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): RedactionResult {\n  if (!text) return { redacted: text, findings: [] };\n  let redacted = text;\n  const findings: RedactionFinding[] = [];\n  for (const p of patternsFor(opts)) {\n    let count = 0;\n    redacted = redacted.replace(p.regex, () => {\n      count++;\n      return redactionMarker(p.label);\n    });\n    if (count > 0) findings.push({ label: p.label, count });\n  }\n  return { redacted, findings };\n}\n\n/** True if `text` contains at least one detectable secret. */\nexport function hasSecret(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): boolean {\n  return patternsFor(opts).some((p) => {\n    p.regex.lastIndex = 0;\n    return p.regex.test(text);\n  });\n}\n\nexport interface ClassifyResult {\n  /** the matching pattern's stable label (e.g. `openai-api-key`) */\n  label: string;\n  /** the matching pattern's human description (e.g. `OpenAI API key (sk-… / sk-proj-…)`) */\n  description: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify a SINGLE pasted token — the INVERSE of redaction. Returns the first\n * (most-specific) pattern the value matches, or `null`. Backs a \"paste a key →\n * detect its type\" UI (cardmem F214 Secrets Vault) so every consumer shares the\n * same classification, not just the same redaction.\n *\n * First-match-wins over the ordered `SECRET_PATTERNS`, so `sk-ant-…` classifies\n * as `anthropic-api-key`, never the generic `openai-api-key`. Field-anchored\n * context-only patterns (mistral / vimeo / cloudflare-api-token /\n * labeled-hex-secret / deepseek-fallback) only match when the pasted value\n * includes their `NAME=` context; a bare provider token classifies via its\n * prefix pattern, and a prefix-less bare token (e.g. a raw Mistral key) is\n * genuinely unidentifiable → `null`. `opts.extraPatterns` run AFTER the\n * canonical set (canonical attribution wins). Input is trimmed; empty /\n * whitespace-only → `null`.\n */\nexport function classify(value: string, opts?: RedactOptions): ClassifyResult | null {\n  if (!value) return null;\n  const v = value.trim();\n  if (!v) return null;\n  for (const p of patternsFor(opts)) {\n    p.regex.lastIndex = 0;\n    if (p.regex.test(v)) return { label: p.label, description: p.description };\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n"]}
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* @broberg/secret-scan — fleet secret/credential redaction.\n *\n * `redactSecrets(text)` replaces every matched secret with `[REDACTED:<label>]`\n * and reports what it found. PURE + deterministic (regex/string only, no deps,\n * no I/O) so an engine write-gate, an egress scrub, a CLI, an admin preview UI,\n * and any repo all share the EXACT same detection — and it's trivially testable.\n *\n * Lifted verbatim from broberg/trail F197 (the second-brain safeguard); see\n * docs/features/F035-secret-scan.md. components owns + publishes this; @trail/shared\n * re-exports it.\n *\n * Design choices:\n * - Pattern-based, NOT entropy/generic-randomness — a redacted real fact would\n *   corrupt knowledge, so we accept missing an exotic token over false positives.\n * - Order matters: most-specific patterns run first (e.g. `sk-ant-` before the\n *   generic OpenAI `sk-`; `sk-or-v1-` before `sk-`), because each match is\n *   consumed before the next pattern runs → order = attribution.\n * - Redact, never reject — the surrounding knowledge survives; only the\n *   credential substring is neutralised.\n * - NEVER a bare high-entropy/hex pattern (it would hit git shas/hashes).\n *   Prefix-less service secrets are caught only via `labeled-hex-secret` (a 40+\n *   hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field).\n *\n * Two recommended integration shapes for consumers:\n *  (a) write boundary — `redactSecrets(text)` before persist (ingest gate);\n *  (b) egress — scrub before a value leaves to a user/LLM (highest-value guard).\n */\n\nexport interface SecretPattern {\n  /** stable id shown in the redaction marker + findings */\n  label: string;\n  /** human description of what this matches */\n  description: string;\n  /** global regex (used for replace-all + counting) */\n  regex: RegExp;\n}\n\n/** Ordered most-specific → least. 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Lookahead requires a digit in the body so we don't redact\n    // long snake_case identifiers like re_compute_the_thing.\n    label: 'resend-api-key',\n    description: 'Resend API key (re_ + token)',\n    regex: /\\bre_(?=[A-Za-z0-9_]*\\d)[A-Za-z0-9_]{24,}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'supabase-access-token',\n    description: 'Supabase personal/management access token (sbp_ + 40 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsbp_[0-9a-f]{40}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'supabase-secret-key',\n    description: 'Supabase secret API key (sb_secret_…)',\n    regex: /\\bsb_secret_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Used by every @broberg/* publish — the highest-value leak from a .env / commit history.\n    label: 'npm-token',\n    description: 'npm publish/automation token (npm_ + 36 base62)',\n    regex: /\\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'fly-api-token',\n    description: 'Fly.io API token (FlyV1 fm2_… / fo1_…)',\n    regex: /(?:FlyV1 fm2_[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{20,}|\\bfo1_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,})/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Also covers Turso DB/platform auth tokens AND Supabase anon/service_role\n    // keys — both are JWTs (eyJ…), so the single JWT pattern catches them.\n    label: 'jwt',\n    description: 'JSON Web Token (eyJ…) — incl. Turso + Supabase service_role tokens',\n    regex: /\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // genApiKey = randomBytes(24).hex → uk_ + exactly 48 lowercase hex.\n    label: 'upmetrics-key',\n    description: 'Upmetrics project key (uk_ + 48 hex)',\n    regex: /\\buk_[0-9a-f]{48}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'cardmem-key',\n    description: 'Cardmem personal/incident/project key (pa_/pi_/pk_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bp[aik]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // cardmem inbox-webhook key — piw_ isn't matched by p[aik]_ above (3rd char 'w' ≠ '_').\n    label: 'cardmem-webhook-key',\n    description: 'Cardmem inbox-webhook key (piw_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bpiw_[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'trail-key',\n    description: 'Trail personal API key (trail_…)',\n    regex: /\\btrail_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Cronjobs API key (cronjobs.webhouse.net) — cj_ + randomBytes(32).base64url =\n    // exactly 43 base64url chars (46 total). 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Runs before\n    // labeled-hex-secret so a hex-valued CF token is attributed correctly.\n    label: 'cloudflare-api-token',\n    description: 'Cloudflare API token (cf/cloudflare-api-token field + 40 base64url)',\n    regex: /\\b(?:cf|cloudflare)_?api_?token\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Mistral API key — prefix-less ~32 base62 (Christian-confirmed sample). A bare\n    // [A-Za-z0-9]{32} would FP on every ID/hash, so CONTEXT-ONLY: anchored on a\n    // mistral-(api-)key/token-named field. Runs before labeled-hex for attribution.\n    label: 'mistral-api-key',\n    description: 'Mistral API key (mistral-(api-)key/token field + 24+ base62)',\n    regex: /\\bmistral(?:[_-]?api)?[_-]?(?:key|token)\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // DeepSeek — field-anchored fallback for any DEEPSEEK_API_KEY/TOKEN value that\n    // doesn't fit the canonical sk-+hex shape (mirrors the Mistral context-only\n    // approach). The field name is the signal → near-zero false positives. The\n    // sk-+hex format pattern above already attributes the canonical shape; this\n    // backstops a format change or an opaque token.\n    label: 'deepseek-api-key',\n    description: 'DeepSeek API key (deepseek-(api-)key/token field + 20+ token)',\n    regex: /\\bdeepseek(?:[_-]?api)?[_-]?(?:key|token)\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Vimeo personal access token — ~32 lowercase hex, no prefix (sanne). A bare\n    // hex32 would FP massively (MD5/UUID), so CONTEXT-ONLY: anchored on a\n    // vimeo-(access-)token-named field.\n    label: 'vimeo-access-token',\n    description: 'Vimeo access token (vimeo-(access-)token field + 20+ base62)',\n    regex: /\\bvimeo(?:[_-]?access)?[_-]?token\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Context-based catch for prefix-less high-entropy service secrets\n    // (CMS_JWT_SECRET, revalidateSecret, fleet openssl-rand-hex secrets): a 40+\n    // hex value assigned to a field whose name contains\n    // secret/token/password/api-key. The name requirement keeps the\n    // false-positive rate near zero (a bare 40/64-hex would hit shas/hashes).\n    label: 'labeled-hex-secret',\n    description: 'A 40+ hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field',\n    regex: /\\b[A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:secret|token|password|api[_-]?key)\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[0-9a-f]{40,}/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Discord bot token — three base64url segments. Anchored both sides so it\n    // can't partial-match a longer dotted string.\n    label: 'discord-bot-token',\n    description: 'Discord bot token (3 base64url segments)',\n    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,26}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,40}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'discord-mfa-token',\n    description: 'Discord MFA token (mfa. + 84 chars)',\n    regex: /\\bmfa\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{84}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Cloudflare Turnstile PROD secret (sanne, verified 2/2) — 0x4 + 6×A prefix,\n    // then 26 base64url (35 total). The 24-char SITE key + 1x/2x/3x TEST keys are\n    // intentionally NOT matched (the {26} length gate misses them) so a public\n    // key is never redacted.\n    label: 'cloudflare-turnstile-secret',\n    description: 'Cloudflare Turnstile secret key (0x4AAAAAA + 26 base64url, 35 total)',\n    regex: /0x4AAAAAA[A-Za-z0-9_-]{26}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'cloudflare-global-key',\n    description: 'Cloudflare global API key (37-hex)',\n    regex: /\\b[0-9a-f]{37}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // LAST on purpose: this is the only unprefixed shape in the list, so every\n    // anchored pattern above must get first refusal.\n    //\n    // Philips Hue v2 application key — 40 chars of [A-Za-z0-9-] with NO prefix,\n    // so there is nothing to anchor on. The negative lookahead is load-bearing,\n    // not decoration: a bare [A-Za-z0-9-]{40} also matches a GIT COMMIT SHA, and\n    // telemetry/error output is full of those. A redactor that eats commit\n    // hashes gets switched off within a week, after which it protects nothing.\n    // Hue keys are mixed-case; SHAs are lowercase hex — that asymmetry is the\n    // whole guard. (Pattern contributed + field-tested by beacon, F035.7.)\n    label: 'hue-application-key',\n    description: 'Philips Hue v2 application key (40 chars, no prefix)',\n    regex: /\\b(?![0-9a-f]{40}\\b)[A-Za-z0-9-]{40}\\b/g,\n  },\n];\n\n/**\n * WHY a finding was flagged — the two detection axes this package has.\n *\n * `format`   the VALUE carries the signal: `sk-ant-…`, `ghp_…`, `AKIA…`. Shape\n *            alone identifies it, so it is safe to run on anything.\n * `announced` the LABEL carries the signal: `Adgangskode: hunter2`. The value is\n *            arbitrary human text with no shape to match, so the only evidence\n *            is that someone wrote the word \"password\" next to it.\n */\nexport type SecretConfidence = 'format' | 'announced';\n\nexport interface RedactionFinding {\n  label: string;\n  count: number;\n  /** which axis matched — see SecretConfidence. */\n  confidence: SecretConfidence;\n}\n\nexport interface RedactionResult {\n  /** input with every secret replaced by `[REDACTED:<label>]` */\n  redacted: string;\n  /** per-pattern counts of what was redacted (empty = clean) */\n  findings: RedactionFinding[];\n}\n\nexport interface RedactOptions {\n  /**\n   * Extra consumer/per-tenant patterns, run AFTER the canonical set (so canonical\n   * attribution wins). Backs a future self-service \"paste a key → detector\" UI.\n   */\n  extraPatterns?: SecretPattern[];\n  /**\n   * Also detect ANNOUNCED secrets — `Adgangskode: hunter2` — where the label is\n   * the only evidence. **Off by default, and it must stay that way.** See\n   * ANNOUNCED_LABEL for the measurement that decided it.\n   */\n  announced?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Marker label for a secret detected by its announcing label rather than shape. */\nexport const ANNOUNCED_LABEL = 'announced-secret';\n\n/**\n * Label + separator + value. The label list is deliberately short and concrete;\n * this is not a general \"looks like config\" detector.\n *\n * WHY THIS IS OPT-IN, MEASURED RATHER THAN GUESSED. Over this repo on\n * 2026-08-14 — 548 tracked files, 544 readable as text, containing essentially\n * no real secrets — this exact regex matched **97 times**, and every one was\n * noise. Per label: `secret` 61, `api key` 33, `password` 4, and every Danish\n * label 0. So 94 of the 97 are the two words that are also ordinary IDENTIFIERS\n * in source code (`secret: config.secret`, `apiKey: Record<…>`).\n *\n * That is the real finding, and it is sharper than \"the pattern is noisy\": its\n * precision depends entirely on WHAT IS BEING SCANNED. In an inbound mail body\n * — buddy's actual case — `Adgangskode:` is a strong signal. In a TypeScript\n * file it is a variable name. **The package cannot know which corpus it is\n * looking at; only the caller can.** So the caller makes the decision, and the\n * default cannot be on. (This is the opposite of this repo's usual defaults-ON\n * stance — webpush F067.1, lens-engine F065 — and the numbers above are why.)\n *\n * A broader label+separator+value pattern measured 305 on the same corpus, and\n * refining it only reached 202 — no amount of tuning makes a generic version\n * safe. A template/env-reference guard (`${FOO}`, `<your-key>`) was written and\n * then dropped: it changed the count by exactly 0, because the noise here is\n * identifiers, not templates.\n *\n * The value must not already be a redaction marker, so this can run AFTER the\n * format pass without flattening its more specific attribution.\n */\nconst ANNOUNCED_SECRET =\n  /(\\b(?:adgangskode|kodeord|hemmelighed|password|passwd|api[ -]?key|apinøgle|secret|kode|pwd)\\s*[:=]\\s*)(?!\\[REDACTED:)\\S+/gi;\n\n/** Replacement marker for a redacted secret. */\nexport const redactionMarker = (label: string): string => `[REDACTED:${label}]`;\n\nfunction patternsFor(opts?: RedactOptions): SecretPattern[] {\n  return opts?.extraPatterns && opts.extraPatterns.length > 0\n    ? [...SECRET_PATTERNS, ...opts.extraPatterns]\n    : SECRET_PATTERNS;\n}\n\n/**\n * Scan `text` and replace every detected secret with its redaction marker.\n * Pure: clean input returns byte-identical (`findings: []`).\n */\nexport function redactSecrets(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): RedactionResult {\n  if (!text) return { redacted: text, findings: [] };\n  let redacted = text;\n  const findings: RedactionFinding[] = [];\n  for (const p of patternsFor(opts)) {\n    let count = 0;\n    redacted = redacted.replace(p.regex, () => {\n      count++;\n      return redactionMarker(p.label);\n    });\n    if (count > 0) findings.push({ label: p.label, count, confidence: 'format' });\n  }\n  // Announced runs LAST, and only on request. Order is not cosmetic: the format\n  // pass has already replaced everything it recognises, and this regex refuses a\n  // value that is already a marker — so `API key: sk-ant-…` keeps its specific\n  // `anthropic-api-key` attribution instead of being flattened to a generic one.\n  // The announcing label itself is KEPT in the output; only the value goes, so\n  // the redacted text still reads `Adgangskode: [REDACTED:announced-secret]` and\n  // a human or model reading it can still tell what was removed.\n  if (opts?.announced) {\n    let count = 0;\n    const redactedAnnounced = redacted.replace(ANNOUNCED_SECRET, (_match, prefix: string) => {\n      count++;\n      return prefix + redactionMarker(ANNOUNCED_LABEL);\n    });\n    if (count > 0) {\n      redacted = redactedAnnounced;\n      findings.push({ label: ANNOUNCED_LABEL, count, confidence: 'announced' });\n    }\n  }\n  return { redacted, findings };\n}\n\n/**\n * True if `text` announces a credential by label — `Adgangskode: hunter2` —\n * without building a redaction. Cheap enough to run on every inbound message.\n *\n * This exists because for untrusted inbound text heading to a model, the right\n * response is often to REFUSE rather than redact: a false positive costs a\n * slightly worse classification, a false negative costs a leak. That use needs a\n * boolean, not a redactor. (buddy's reasoning, F035.8.)\n */\nexport function hasAnnouncedSecret(text: string): boolean {\n  if (!text) return false;\n  ANNOUNCED_SECRET.lastIndex = 0;\n  return ANNOUNCED_SECRET.test(text);\n}\n\n/**\n * True if `text` contains at least one detectable secret. Honours\n * `opts.announced` — a caller who asks for the announced axis and is told\n * `false` must be able to believe it.\n */\nexport function hasSecret(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): boolean {\n  if (opts?.announced && hasAnnouncedSecret(text)) return true;\n  return patternsFor(opts).some((p) => {\n    p.regex.lastIndex = 0;\n    return p.regex.test(text);\n  });\n}\n\nexport interface ClassifyResult {\n  /** the matching pattern's stable label (e.g. `openai-api-key`) */\n  label: string;\n  /** the matching pattern's human description (e.g. `OpenAI API key (sk-… / sk-proj-…)`) */\n  description: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify a SINGLE pasted token — the INVERSE of redaction. Returns the first\n * (most-specific) pattern the value matches, or `null`. Backs a \"paste a key →\n * detect its type\" UI (cardmem F214 Secrets Vault) so every consumer shares the\n * same classification, not just the same redaction.\n *\n * First-match-wins over the ordered `SECRET_PATTERNS`, so `sk-ant-…` classifies\n * as `anthropic-api-key`, never the generic `openai-api-key`. Field-anchored\n * context-only patterns (mistral / vimeo / cloudflare-api-token /\n * labeled-hex-secret / deepseek-fallback) only match when the pasted value\n * includes their `NAME=` context; a bare provider token classifies via its\n * prefix pattern, and a prefix-less bare token (e.g. a raw Mistral key) is\n * genuinely unidentifiable → `null`. `opts.extraPatterns` run AFTER the\n * canonical set (canonical attribution wins). Input is trimmed; empty /\n * whitespace-only → `null`.\n */\nexport function classify(value: string, opts?: RedactOptions): ClassifyResult | null {\n  if (!value) return null;\n  const v = value.trim();\n  if (!v) return null;\n  for (const p of patternsFor(opts)) {\n    p.regex.lastIndex = 0;\n    if (p.regex.test(v)) return { label: p.label, description: p.description };\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n"]}

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -36,9 +36,21 @@ interface SecretPattern {
 }
 /** Ordered most-specific → least. Every regex carries the `g` flag. */
 declare const SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[];
+/**
+ * WHY a finding was flagged — the two detection axes this package has.
+ *
+ * `format`   the VALUE carries the signal: `sk-ant-…`, `ghp_…`, `AKIA…`. Shape
+ *            alone identifies it, so it is safe to run on anything.
+ * `announced` the LABEL carries the signal: `Adgangskode: hunter2`. The value is
+ *            arbitrary human text with no shape to match, so the only evidence
+ *            is that someone wrote the word "password" next to it.
+ */
+type SecretConfidence = 'format' | 'announced';
 interface RedactionFinding {
     label: string;
     count: number;
+    /** which axis matched — see SecretConfidence. */
+    confidence: SecretConfidence;
 }
 interface RedactionResult {
     /** input with every secret replaced by `[REDACTED:<label>]` */
@@ -52,7 +64,15 @@ interface RedactOptions {
      * attribution wins). Backs a future self-service "paste a key → detector" UI.
      */
     extraPatterns?: SecretPattern[];
+    /**
+     * Also detect ANNOUNCED secrets — `Adgangskode: hunter2` — where the label is
+     * the only evidence. **Off by default, and it must stay that way.** See
+     * ANNOUNCED_LABEL for the measurement that decided it.
+     */
+    announced?: boolean;
 }
+/** Marker label for a secret detected by its announcing label rather than shape. */
+declare const ANNOUNCED_LABEL = "announced-secret";
 /** Replacement marker for a redacted secret. */
 declare const redactionMarker: (label: string) => string;
 /**
@@ -60,7 +80,21 @@ declare const redactionMarker: (label: string) => string;
  * Pure: clean input returns byte-identical (`findings: []`).
  */
 declare function redactSecrets(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): RedactionResult;
-/** True if `text` contains at least one detectable secret. */
+/**
+ * True if `text` announces a credential by label — `Adgangskode: hunter2` —
+ * without building a redaction. Cheap enough to run on every inbound message.
+ *
+ * This exists because for untrusted inbound text heading to a model, the right
+ * response is often to REFUSE rather than redact: a false positive costs a
+ * slightly worse classification, a false negative costs a leak. That use needs a
+ * boolean, not a redactor. (buddy's reasoning, F035.8.)
+ */
+declare function hasAnnouncedSecret(text: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * True if `text` contains at least one detectable secret. Honours
+ * `opts.announced` — a caller who asks for the announced axis and is told
+ * `false` must be able to believe it.
+ */
 declare function hasSecret(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): boolean;
 interface ClassifyResult {
     /** the matching pattern's stable label (e.g. `openai-api-key`) */
@@ -86,4 +120,4 @@ interface ClassifyResult {
  */
 declare function classify(value: string, opts?: RedactOptions): ClassifyResult | null;
 
-export { type ClassifyResult, type RedactOptions, type RedactionFinding, type RedactionResult, SECRET_PATTERNS, type SecretPattern, classify, hasSecret, redactSecrets, redactionMarker };
+export { ANNOUNCED_LABEL, type ClassifyResult, type RedactOptions, type RedactionFinding, type RedactionResult, SECRET_PATTERNS, type SecretConfidence, type SecretPattern, classify, hasAnnouncedSecret, hasSecret, redactSecrets, redactionMarker };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -36,9 +36,21 @@ interface SecretPattern {
 }
 /** Ordered most-specific → least. Every regex carries the `g` flag. */
 declare const SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[];
+/**
+ * WHY a finding was flagged — the two detection axes this package has.
+ *
+ * `format`   the VALUE carries the signal: `sk-ant-…`, `ghp_…`, `AKIA…`. Shape
+ *            alone identifies it, so it is safe to run on anything.
+ * `announced` the LABEL carries the signal: `Adgangskode: hunter2`. The value is
+ *            arbitrary human text with no shape to match, so the only evidence
+ *            is that someone wrote the word "password" next to it.
+ */
+type SecretConfidence = 'format' | 'announced';
 interface RedactionFinding {
     label: string;
     count: number;
+    /** which axis matched — see SecretConfidence. */
+    confidence: SecretConfidence;
 }
 interface RedactionResult {
     /** input with every secret replaced by `[REDACTED:<label>]` */
@@ -52,7 +64,15 @@ interface RedactOptions {
      * attribution wins). Backs a future self-service "paste a key → detector" UI.
      */
     extraPatterns?: SecretPattern[];
+    /**
+     * Also detect ANNOUNCED secrets — `Adgangskode: hunter2` — where the label is
+     * the only evidence. **Off by default, and it must stay that way.** See
+     * ANNOUNCED_LABEL for the measurement that decided it.
+     */
+    announced?: boolean;
 }
+/** Marker label for a secret detected by its announcing label rather than shape. */
+declare const ANNOUNCED_LABEL = "announced-secret";
 /** Replacement marker for a redacted secret. */
 declare const redactionMarker: (label: string) => string;
 /**
@@ -60,7 +80,21 @@ declare const redactionMarker: (label: string) => string;
  * Pure: clean input returns byte-identical (`findings: []`).
  */
 declare function redactSecrets(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): RedactionResult;
-/** True if `text` contains at least one detectable secret. */
+/**
+ * True if `text` announces a credential by label — `Adgangskode: hunter2` —
+ * without building a redaction. Cheap enough to run on every inbound message.
+ *
+ * This exists because for untrusted inbound text heading to a model, the right
+ * response is often to REFUSE rather than redact: a false positive costs a
+ * slightly worse classification, a false negative costs a leak. That use needs a
+ * boolean, not a redactor. (buddy's reasoning, F035.8.)
+ */
+declare function hasAnnouncedSecret(text: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * True if `text` contains at least one detectable secret. Honours
+ * `opts.announced` — a caller who asks for the announced axis and is told
+ * `false` must be able to believe it.
+ */
 declare function hasSecret(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): boolean;
 interface ClassifyResult {
     /** the matching pattern's stable label (e.g. `openai-api-key`) */
@@ -86,4 +120,4 @@ interface ClassifyResult {
  */
 declare function classify(value: string, opts?: RedactOptions): ClassifyResult | null;
 
-export { type ClassifyResult, type RedactOptions, type RedactionFinding, type RedactionResult, SECRET_PATTERNS, type SecretPattern, classify, hasSecret, redactSecrets, redactionMarker };
+export { ANNOUNCED_LABEL, type ClassifyResult, type RedactOptions, type RedactionFinding, type RedactionResult, SECRET_PATTERNS, type SecretConfidence, type SecretPattern, classify, hasAnnouncedSecret, hasSecret, redactSecrets, redactionMarker };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -239,8 +239,25 @@ var SECRET_PATTERNS = [
     label: "cloudflare-global-key",
     description: "Cloudflare global API key (37-hex)",
     regex: /\b[0-9a-f]{37}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    // LAST on purpose: this is the only unprefixed shape in the list, so every
+    // anchored pattern above must get first refusal.
+    //
+    // Philips Hue v2 application key — 40 chars of [A-Za-z0-9-] with NO prefix,
+    // so there is nothing to anchor on. The negative lookahead is load-bearing,
+    // not decoration: a bare [A-Za-z0-9-]{40} also matches a GIT COMMIT SHA, and
+    // telemetry/error output is full of those. A redactor that eats commit
+    // hashes gets switched off within a week, after which it protects nothing.
+    // Hue keys are mixed-case; SHAs are lowercase hex — that asymmetry is the
+    // whole guard. (Pattern contributed + field-tested by beacon, F035.7.)
+    label: "hue-application-key",
+    description: "Philips Hue v2 application key (40 chars, no prefix)",
+    regex: /\b(?![0-9a-f]{40}\b)[A-Za-z0-9-]{40}\b/g
   }
 ];
+var ANNOUNCED_LABEL = "announced-secret";
+var ANNOUNCED_SECRET = /(\b(?:adgangskode|kodeord|hemmelighed|password|passwd|api[ -]?key|apinøgle|secret|kode|pwd)\s*[:=]\s*)(?!\[REDACTED:)\S+/gi;
 var redactionMarker = (label) => `[REDACTED:${label}]`;
 function patternsFor(opts) {
   return opts?.extraPatterns && opts.extraPatterns.length > 0 ? [...SECRET_PATTERNS, ...opts.extraPatterns] : SECRET_PATTERNS;
@@ -255,11 +272,28 @@ function redactSecrets(text, opts) {
       count++;
       return redactionMarker(p.label);
     });
-    if (count > 0) findings.push({ label: p.label, count });
+    if (count > 0) findings.push({ label: p.label, count, confidence: "format" });
+  }
+  if (opts?.announced) {
+    let count = 0;
+    const redactedAnnounced = redacted.replace(ANNOUNCED_SECRET, (_match, prefix) => {
+      count++;
+      return prefix + redactionMarker(ANNOUNCED_LABEL);
+    });
+    if (count > 0) {
+      redacted = redactedAnnounced;
+      findings.push({ label: ANNOUNCED_LABEL, count, confidence: "announced" });
+    }
   }
   return { redacted, findings };
 }
+function hasAnnouncedSecret(text) {
+  if (!text) return false;
+  ANNOUNCED_SECRET.lastIndex = 0;
+  return ANNOUNCED_SECRET.test(text);
+}
 function hasSecret(text, opts) {
+  if (opts?.announced && hasAnnouncedSecret(text)) return true;
   return patternsFor(opts).some((p) => {
     p.regex.lastIndex = 0;
     return p.regex.test(text);
@@ -276,6 +310,6 @@ function classify(value, opts) {
   return null;
 }
 
-export { SECRET_PATTERNS, classify, hasSecret, redactSecrets, redactionMarker };
+export { ANNOUNCED_LABEL, SECRET_PATTERNS, classify, hasAnnouncedSecret, hasSecret, redactSecrets, redactionMarker };
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* @broberg/secret-scan — fleet secret/credential redaction.\n *\n * `redactSecrets(text)` replaces every matched secret with `[REDACTED:<label>]`\n * and reports what it found. PURE + deterministic (regex/string only, no deps,\n * no I/O) so an engine write-gate, an egress scrub, a CLI, an admin preview UI,\n * and any repo all share the EXACT same detection — and it's trivially testable.\n *\n * Lifted verbatim from broberg/trail F197 (the second-brain safeguard); see\n * docs/features/F035-secret-scan.md. components owns + publishes this; @trail/shared\n * re-exports it.\n *\n * Design choices:\n * - Pattern-based, NOT entropy/generic-randomness — a redacted real fact would\n *   corrupt knowledge, so we accept missing an exotic token over false positives.\n * - Order matters: most-specific patterns run first (e.g. `sk-ant-` before the\n *   generic OpenAI `sk-`; `sk-or-v1-` before `sk-`), because each match is\n *   consumed before the next pattern runs → order = attribution.\n * - Redact, never reject — the surrounding knowledge survives; only the\n *   credential substring is neutralised.\n * - NEVER a bare high-entropy/hex pattern (it would hit git shas/hashes).\n *   Prefix-less service secrets are caught only via `labeled-hex-secret` (a 40+\n *   hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field).\n *\n * Two recommended integration shapes for consumers:\n *  (a) write boundary — `redactSecrets(text)` before persist (ingest gate);\n *  (b) egress — scrub before a value leaves to a user/LLM (highest-value guard).\n */\n\nexport interface SecretPattern {\n  /** stable id shown in the redaction marker + findings */\n  label: string;\n  /** human description of what this matches */\n  description: string;\n  /** global regex (used for replace-all + counting) */\n  regex: RegExp;\n}\n\n/** Ordered most-specific → least. Every regex carries the `g` flag. */\nexport const SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[] = [\n  {\n    label: 'private-key',\n    description: 'PEM private key block (RSA/EC/OPENSSH/DSA/PGP)',\n    regex:\n      /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\\s\\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'anthropic-api-key',\n    description: 'Anthropic API key (sk-ant-…)',\n    regex: /sk-ant-(?:api03-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // OpenRouter — distinct from OpenAI; runs BEFORE the generic sk- (which would\n    // otherwise also match + mislabel it).\n    label: 'openrouter-api-key',\n    description: 'OpenRouter API key (sk-or-v1- + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsk-or-v1-[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // DeepSeek — shares the sk- prefix with OpenAI, so it MUST run before the\n    // generic openai pattern (specific-before-generic = correct attribution).\n    // DeepSeek's documented shape is sk- + 32 lowercase hex (GitGuardian confirms\n    // an sk- prefix but hides the exact regex); the hex-only body + {32,} length\n    // distinguishes it from OpenAI's mixed-case base62 keys, so a real OpenAI key\n    // is never mislabelled. The field-anchored fallback below catches any\n    // DEEPSEEK_API_KEY value that doesn't fit this canonical shape.\n    label: 'deepseek-api-key',\n    description: 'DeepSeek API key (sk- + 32 lowercase hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsk-[0-9a-f]{32,}(?![0-9a-z])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'openai-api-key',\n    description: 'OpenAI API key (sk-… / sk-proj-…)',\n    regex: /sk-(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // ElevenLabs — sk_ with UNDERSCORE (vs OpenAI sk-), 48 hex.\n    label: 'elevenlabs-api-key',\n    description: 'ElevenLabs API key (sk_ + 48 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsk_[0-9a-f]{48}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // fal.ai — uuid:hex32 (key_id:key_secret); the colon is the signal.\n    label: 'fal-api-key',\n    description: 'fal.ai key (uuid:hex32)',\n    regex: /\\b[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}:[0-9a-f]{32}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Black Forest Labs (FLUX) API key — bfl_ prefix + a long token (sample\n    // bfl_Qo1…). The distinctive prefix + {20,} length keeps false positives near\n    // zero; image-provider sibling of the fal key above.\n    label: 'bfl-api-key',\n    description: 'Black Forest Labs / FLUX API key (bfl_ + token)',\n    regex: /\\bbfl_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'google-api-key',\n    description: 'Google / Gemini API key (AIza…)',\n    regex: /AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'google-oauth-secret',\n    description: 'Google OAuth client secret (GOCSPX-…)',\n    regex: /GOCSPX-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{28}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'aws-access-key-id',\n    description: 'AWS access key id (AKIA…)',\n    regex: /\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'github-token',\n    description: 'GitHub token (ghp_/gho_/ghs_/ghu_/ghr_…)',\n    regex: /\\bgh[posru]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // GitHub fine-grained PAT — distinct prefix `github_pat_` (not caught by the\n    // classic gh[posru]_ above), then base62 + a `_` separator (~82 chars total).\n    // The prefix is so distinctive that {50,} keeps false positives at zero.\n    label: 'github-fine-grained-pat',\n    description: 'GitHub fine-grained personal access token (github_pat_…)',\n    regex: /\\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{50,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'gitlab-token',\n    description: 'GitLab personal access token (glpat-…)',\n    regex: /\\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'slack-token',\n    description: 'Slack token (xox[baprs]-…)',\n    regex: /\\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'stripe-secret-key',\n    description: 'Stripe live secret/restricted key (sk_live_/rk_live_…)',\n    regex: /\\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Resend (re_…). Lookahead requires a digit in the body so we don't redact\n    // long snake_case identifiers like re_compute_the_thing.\n    label: 'resend-api-key',\n    description: 'Resend API key (re_ + token)',\n    regex: /\\bre_(?=[A-Za-z0-9_]*\\d)[A-Za-z0-9_]{24,}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'supabase-access-token',\n    description: 'Supabase personal/management access token (sbp_ + 40 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsbp_[0-9a-f]{40}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'supabase-secret-key',\n    description: 'Supabase secret API key (sb_secret_…)',\n    regex: /\\bsb_secret_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Used by every @broberg/* publish — the highest-value leak from a .env / commit history.\n    label: 'npm-token',\n    description: 'npm publish/automation token (npm_ + 36 base62)',\n    regex: /\\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'fly-api-token',\n    description: 'Fly.io API token (FlyV1 fm2_… / fo1_…)',\n    regex: /(?:FlyV1 fm2_[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{20,}|\\bfo1_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,})/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Also covers Turso DB/platform auth tokens AND Supabase anon/service_role\n    // keys — both are JWTs (eyJ…), so the single JWT pattern catches them.\n    label: 'jwt',\n    description: 'JSON Web Token (eyJ…) — incl. Turso + Supabase service_role tokens',\n    regex: /\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // genApiKey = randomBytes(24).hex → uk_ + exactly 48 lowercase hex.\n    label: 'upmetrics-key',\n    description: 'Upmetrics project key (uk_ + 48 hex)',\n    regex: /\\buk_[0-9a-f]{48}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'cardmem-key',\n    description: 'Cardmem personal/incident/project key (pa_/pi_/pk_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bp[aik]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // cardmem inbox-webhook key — piw_ isn't matched by p[aik]_ above (3rd char 'w' ≠ '_').\n    label: 'cardmem-webhook-key',\n    description: 'Cardmem inbox-webhook key (piw_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bpiw_[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'trail-key',\n    description: 'Trail personal API key (trail_…)',\n    regex: /\\btrail_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Cronjobs API key (cronjobs.webhouse.net) — cj_ + randomBytes(32).base64url =\n    // exactly 43 base64url chars (46 total). Prefix + fixed length = very low FP.\n    // The UI's truncated cj_<8 chars>… preview is shorter than {43} → not matched.\n    // Negative lookahead (not \\b) because base64url's `-` breaks a trailing \\b.\n    label: 'cronjobs-api-key',\n    description: 'Cronjobs API key (cj_ + 43 base64url)',\n    regex: /\\bcj_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // randomBytes(32).hex → wh_ + 64 lowercase hex (67 chars total).\n    label: 'cms-access-token',\n    description: 'webhouse.app CMS access token (wh_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bwh_[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Cloudflare API token (R2 / DNS management) — 40 base64url chars, NO prefix.\n    // A bare {40} would false-positive broadly, so this is CONTEXT-ONLY: it only\n    // fires next to a cf/cloudflare-api-token-named field. Runs before\n    // labeled-hex-secret so a hex-valued CF token is attributed correctly.\n    label: 'cloudflare-api-token',\n    description: 'Cloudflare API token (cf/cloudflare-api-token field + 40 base64url)',\n    regex: /\\b(?:cf|cloudflare)_?api_?token\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Mistral API key — prefix-less ~32 base62 (Christian-confirmed sample). A bare\n    // [A-Za-z0-9]{32} would FP on every ID/hash, so CONTEXT-ONLY: anchored on a\n    // mistral-(api-)key/token-named field. Runs before labeled-hex for attribution.\n    label: 'mistral-api-key',\n    description: 'Mistral API key (mistral-(api-)key/token field + 24+ base62)',\n    regex: /\\bmistral(?:[_-]?api)?[_-]?(?:key|token)\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // DeepSeek — field-anchored fallback for any DEEPSEEK_API_KEY/TOKEN value that\n    // doesn't fit the canonical sk-+hex shape (mirrors the Mistral context-only\n    // approach). The field name is the signal → near-zero false positives. The\n    // sk-+hex format pattern above already attributes the canonical shape; this\n    // backstops a format change or an opaque token.\n    label: 'deepseek-api-key',\n    description: 'DeepSeek API key (deepseek-(api-)key/token field + 20+ token)',\n    regex: /\\bdeepseek(?:[_-]?api)?[_-]?(?:key|token)\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Vimeo personal access token — ~32 lowercase hex, no prefix (sanne). A bare\n    // hex32 would FP massively (MD5/UUID), so CONTEXT-ONLY: anchored on a\n    // vimeo-(access-)token-named field.\n    label: 'vimeo-access-token',\n    description: 'Vimeo access token (vimeo-(access-)token field + 20+ base62)',\n    regex: /\\bvimeo(?:[_-]?access)?[_-]?token\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Context-based catch for prefix-less high-entropy service secrets\n    // (CMS_JWT_SECRET, revalidateSecret, fleet openssl-rand-hex secrets): a 40+\n    // hex value assigned to a field whose name contains\n    // secret/token/password/api-key. The name requirement keeps the\n    // false-positive rate near zero (a bare 40/64-hex would hit shas/hashes).\n    label: 'labeled-hex-secret',\n    description: 'A 40+ hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field',\n    regex: /\\b[A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:secret|token|password|api[_-]?key)\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[0-9a-f]{40,}/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Discord bot token — three base64url segments. Anchored both sides so it\n    // can't partial-match a longer dotted string.\n    label: 'discord-bot-token',\n    description: 'Discord bot token (3 base64url segments)',\n    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,26}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,40}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'discord-mfa-token',\n    description: 'Discord MFA token (mfa. + 84 chars)',\n    regex: /\\bmfa\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{84}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Cloudflare Turnstile PROD secret (sanne, verified 2/2) — 0x4 + 6×A prefix,\n    // then 26 base64url (35 total). The 24-char SITE key + 1x/2x/3x TEST keys are\n    // intentionally NOT matched (the {26} length gate misses them) so a public\n    // key is never redacted.\n    label: 'cloudflare-turnstile-secret',\n    description: 'Cloudflare Turnstile secret key (0x4AAAAAA + 26 base64url, 35 total)',\n    regex: /0x4AAAAAA[A-Za-z0-9_-]{26}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'cloudflare-global-key',\n    description: 'Cloudflare global API key (37-hex)',\n    regex: /\\b[0-9a-f]{37}\\b/g,\n  },\n];\n\nexport interface RedactionFinding {\n  label: string;\n  count: number;\n}\n\nexport interface RedactionResult {\n  /** input with every secret replaced by `[REDACTED:<label>]` */\n  redacted: string;\n  /** per-pattern counts of what was redacted (empty = clean) */\n  findings: RedactionFinding[];\n}\n\nexport interface RedactOptions {\n  /**\n   * Extra consumer/per-tenant patterns, run AFTER the canonical set (so canonical\n   * attribution wins). Backs a future self-service \"paste a key → detector\" UI.\n   */\n  extraPatterns?: SecretPattern[];\n}\n\n/** Replacement marker for a redacted secret. */\nexport const redactionMarker = (label: string): string => `[REDACTED:${label}]`;\n\nfunction patternsFor(opts?: RedactOptions): SecretPattern[] {\n  return opts?.extraPatterns && opts.extraPatterns.length > 0\n    ? [...SECRET_PATTERNS, ...opts.extraPatterns]\n    : SECRET_PATTERNS;\n}\n\n/**\n * Scan `text` and replace every detected secret with its redaction marker.\n * Pure: clean input returns byte-identical (`findings: []`).\n */\nexport function redactSecrets(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): RedactionResult {\n  if (!text) return { redacted: text, findings: [] };\n  let redacted = text;\n  const findings: RedactionFinding[] = [];\n  for (const p of patternsFor(opts)) {\n    let count = 0;\n    redacted = redacted.replace(p.regex, () => {\n      count++;\n      return redactionMarker(p.label);\n    });\n    if (count > 0) findings.push({ label: p.label, count });\n  }\n  return { redacted, findings };\n}\n\n/** True if `text` contains at least one detectable secret. */\nexport function hasSecret(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): boolean {\n  return patternsFor(opts).some((p) => {\n    p.regex.lastIndex = 0;\n    return p.regex.test(text);\n  });\n}\n\nexport interface ClassifyResult {\n  /** the matching pattern's stable label (e.g. `openai-api-key`) */\n  label: string;\n  /** the matching pattern's human description (e.g. `OpenAI API key (sk-… / sk-proj-…)`) */\n  description: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify a SINGLE pasted token — the INVERSE of redaction. Returns the first\n * (most-specific) pattern the value matches, or `null`. Backs a \"paste a key →\n * detect its type\" UI (cardmem F214 Secrets Vault) so every consumer shares the\n * same classification, not just the same redaction.\n *\n * First-match-wins over the ordered `SECRET_PATTERNS`, so `sk-ant-…` classifies\n * as `anthropic-api-key`, never the generic `openai-api-key`. Field-anchored\n * context-only patterns (mistral / vimeo / cloudflare-api-token /\n * labeled-hex-secret / deepseek-fallback) only match when the pasted value\n * includes their `NAME=` context; a bare provider token classifies via its\n * prefix pattern, and a prefix-less bare token (e.g. a raw Mistral key) is\n * genuinely unidentifiable → `null`. `opts.extraPatterns` run AFTER the\n * canonical set (canonical attribution wins). Input is trimmed; empty /\n * whitespace-only → `null`.\n */\nexport function classify(value: string, opts?: RedactOptions): ClassifyResult | null {\n  if (!value) return null;\n  const v = value.trim();\n  if (!v) return null;\n  for (const p of patternsFor(opts)) {\n    p.regex.lastIndex = 0;\n    if (p.regex.test(v)) return { label: p.label, description: p.description };\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n"]}
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* @broberg/secret-scan — fleet secret/credential redaction.\n *\n * `redactSecrets(text)` replaces every matched secret with `[REDACTED:<label>]`\n * and reports what it found. PURE + deterministic (regex/string only, no deps,\n * no I/O) so an engine write-gate, an egress scrub, a CLI, an admin preview UI,\n * and any repo all share the EXACT same detection — and it's trivially testable.\n *\n * Lifted verbatim from broberg/trail F197 (the second-brain safeguard); see\n * docs/features/F035-secret-scan.md. components owns + publishes this; @trail/shared\n * re-exports it.\n *\n * Design choices:\n * - Pattern-based, NOT entropy/generic-randomness — a redacted real fact would\n *   corrupt knowledge, so we accept missing an exotic token over false positives.\n * - Order matters: most-specific patterns run first (e.g. `sk-ant-` before the\n *   generic OpenAI `sk-`; `sk-or-v1-` before `sk-`), because each match is\n *   consumed before the next pattern runs → order = attribution.\n * - Redact, never reject — the surrounding knowledge survives; only the\n *   credential substring is neutralised.\n * - NEVER a bare high-entropy/hex pattern (it would hit git shas/hashes).\n *   Prefix-less service secrets are caught only via `labeled-hex-secret` (a 40+\n *   hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field).\n *\n * Two recommended integration shapes for consumers:\n *  (a) write boundary — `redactSecrets(text)` before persist (ingest gate);\n *  (b) egress — scrub before a value leaves to a user/LLM (highest-value guard).\n */\n\nexport interface SecretPattern {\n  /** stable id shown in the redaction marker + findings */\n  label: string;\n  /** human description of what this matches */\n  description: string;\n  /** global regex (used for replace-all + counting) */\n  regex: RegExp;\n}\n\n/** Ordered most-specific → least. Every regex carries the `g` flag. */\nexport const SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[] = [\n  {\n    label: 'private-key',\n    description: 'PEM private key block (RSA/EC/OPENSSH/DSA/PGP)',\n    regex:\n      /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\\s\\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'anthropic-api-key',\n    description: 'Anthropic API key (sk-ant-…)',\n    regex: /sk-ant-(?:api03-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // OpenRouter — distinct from OpenAI; runs BEFORE the generic sk- (which would\n    // otherwise also match + mislabel it).\n    label: 'openrouter-api-key',\n    description: 'OpenRouter API key (sk-or-v1- + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsk-or-v1-[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // DeepSeek — shares the sk- prefix with OpenAI, so it MUST run before the\n    // generic openai pattern (specific-before-generic = correct attribution).\n    // DeepSeek's documented shape is sk- + 32 lowercase hex (GitGuardian confirms\n    // an sk- prefix but hides the exact regex); the hex-only body + {32,} length\n    // distinguishes it from OpenAI's mixed-case base62 keys, so a real OpenAI key\n    // is never mislabelled. The field-anchored fallback below catches any\n    // DEEPSEEK_API_KEY value that doesn't fit this canonical shape.\n    label: 'deepseek-api-key',\n    description: 'DeepSeek API key (sk- + 32 lowercase hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsk-[0-9a-f]{32,}(?![0-9a-z])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'openai-api-key',\n    description: 'OpenAI API key (sk-… / sk-proj-…)',\n    regex: /sk-(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // ElevenLabs — sk_ with UNDERSCORE (vs OpenAI sk-), 48 hex.\n    label: 'elevenlabs-api-key',\n    description: 'ElevenLabs API key (sk_ + 48 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsk_[0-9a-f]{48}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // fal.ai — uuid:hex32 (key_id:key_secret); the colon is the signal.\n    label: 'fal-api-key',\n    description: 'fal.ai key (uuid:hex32)',\n    regex: /\\b[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}:[0-9a-f]{32}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Black Forest Labs (FLUX) API key — bfl_ prefix + a long token (sample\n    // bfl_Qo1…). The distinctive prefix + {20,} length keeps false positives near\n    // zero; image-provider sibling of the fal key above.\n    label: 'bfl-api-key',\n    description: 'Black Forest Labs / FLUX API key (bfl_ + token)',\n    regex: /\\bbfl_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'google-api-key',\n    description: 'Google / Gemini API key (AIza…)',\n    regex: /AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'google-oauth-secret',\n    description: 'Google OAuth client secret (GOCSPX-…)',\n    regex: /GOCSPX-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{28}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'aws-access-key-id',\n    description: 'AWS access key id (AKIA…)',\n    regex: /\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'github-token',\n    description: 'GitHub token (ghp_/gho_/ghs_/ghu_/ghr_…)',\n    regex: /\\bgh[posru]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // GitHub fine-grained PAT — distinct prefix `github_pat_` (not caught by the\n    // classic gh[posru]_ above), then base62 + a `_` separator (~82 chars total).\n    // The prefix is so distinctive that {50,} keeps false positives at zero.\n    label: 'github-fine-grained-pat',\n    description: 'GitHub fine-grained personal access token (github_pat_…)',\n    regex: /\\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{50,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'gitlab-token',\n    description: 'GitLab personal access token (glpat-…)',\n    regex: /\\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'slack-token',\n    description: 'Slack token (xox[baprs]-…)',\n    regex: /\\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'stripe-secret-key',\n    description: 'Stripe live secret/restricted key (sk_live_/rk_live_…)',\n    regex: /\\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Resend (re_…). Lookahead requires a digit in the body so we don't redact\n    // long snake_case identifiers like re_compute_the_thing.\n    label: 'resend-api-key',\n    description: 'Resend API key (re_ + token)',\n    regex: /\\bre_(?=[A-Za-z0-9_]*\\d)[A-Za-z0-9_]{24,}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'supabase-access-token',\n    description: 'Supabase personal/management access token (sbp_ + 40 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsbp_[0-9a-f]{40}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'supabase-secret-key',\n    description: 'Supabase secret API key (sb_secret_…)',\n    regex: /\\bsb_secret_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Used by every @broberg/* publish — the highest-value leak from a .env / commit history.\n    label: 'npm-token',\n    description: 'npm publish/automation token (npm_ + 36 base62)',\n    regex: /\\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'fly-api-token',\n    description: 'Fly.io API token (FlyV1 fm2_… / fo1_…)',\n    regex: /(?:FlyV1 fm2_[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{20,}|\\bfo1_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,})/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Also covers Turso DB/platform auth tokens AND Supabase anon/service_role\n    // keys — both are JWTs (eyJ…), so the single JWT pattern catches them.\n    label: 'jwt',\n    description: 'JSON Web Token (eyJ…) — incl. Turso + Supabase service_role tokens',\n    regex: /\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // genApiKey = randomBytes(24).hex → uk_ + exactly 48 lowercase hex.\n    label: 'upmetrics-key',\n    description: 'Upmetrics project key (uk_ + 48 hex)',\n    regex: /\\buk_[0-9a-f]{48}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'cardmem-key',\n    description: 'Cardmem personal/incident/project key (pa_/pi_/pk_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bp[aik]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // cardmem inbox-webhook key — piw_ isn't matched by p[aik]_ above (3rd char 'w' ≠ '_').\n    label: 'cardmem-webhook-key',\n    description: 'Cardmem inbox-webhook key (piw_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bpiw_[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'trail-key',\n    description: 'Trail personal API key (trail_…)',\n    regex: /\\btrail_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Cronjobs API key (cronjobs.webhouse.net) — cj_ + randomBytes(32).base64url =\n    // exactly 43 base64url chars (46 total). Prefix + fixed length = very low FP.\n    // The UI's truncated cj_<8 chars>… preview is shorter than {43} → not matched.\n    // Negative lookahead (not \\b) because base64url's `-` breaks a trailing \\b.\n    label: 'cronjobs-api-key',\n    description: 'Cronjobs API key (cj_ + 43 base64url)',\n    regex: /\\bcj_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // randomBytes(32).hex → wh_ + 64 lowercase hex (67 chars total).\n    label: 'cms-access-token',\n    description: 'webhouse.app CMS access token (wh_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bwh_[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Cloudflare API token (R2 / DNS management) — 40 base64url chars, NO prefix.\n    // A bare {40} would false-positive broadly, so this is CONTEXT-ONLY: it only\n    // fires next to a cf/cloudflare-api-token-named field. Runs before\n    // labeled-hex-secret so a hex-valued CF token is attributed correctly.\n    label: 'cloudflare-api-token',\n    description: 'Cloudflare API token (cf/cloudflare-api-token field + 40 base64url)',\n    regex: /\\b(?:cf|cloudflare)_?api_?token\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Mistral API key — prefix-less ~32 base62 (Christian-confirmed sample). A bare\n    // [A-Za-z0-9]{32} would FP on every ID/hash, so CONTEXT-ONLY: anchored on a\n    // mistral-(api-)key/token-named field. Runs before labeled-hex for attribution.\n    label: 'mistral-api-key',\n    description: 'Mistral API key (mistral-(api-)key/token field + 24+ base62)',\n    regex: /\\bmistral(?:[_-]?api)?[_-]?(?:key|token)\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // DeepSeek — field-anchored fallback for any DEEPSEEK_API_KEY/TOKEN value that\n    // doesn't fit the canonical sk-+hex shape (mirrors the Mistral context-only\n    // approach). The field name is the signal → near-zero false positives. The\n    // sk-+hex format pattern above already attributes the canonical shape; this\n    // backstops a format change or an opaque token.\n    label: 'deepseek-api-key',\n    description: 'DeepSeek API key (deepseek-(api-)key/token field + 20+ token)',\n    regex: /\\bdeepseek(?:[_-]?api)?[_-]?(?:key|token)\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Vimeo personal access token — ~32 lowercase hex, no prefix (sanne). A bare\n    // hex32 would FP massively (MD5/UUID), so CONTEXT-ONLY: anchored on a\n    // vimeo-(access-)token-named field.\n    label: 'vimeo-access-token',\n    description: 'Vimeo access token (vimeo-(access-)token field + 20+ base62)',\n    regex: /\\bvimeo(?:[_-]?access)?[_-]?token\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}(?![A-Za-z0-9])/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Context-based catch for prefix-less high-entropy service secrets\n    // (CMS_JWT_SECRET, revalidateSecret, fleet openssl-rand-hex secrets): a 40+\n    // hex value assigned to a field whose name contains\n    // secret/token/password/api-key. The name requirement keeps the\n    // false-positive rate near zero (a bare 40/64-hex would hit shas/hashes).\n    label: 'labeled-hex-secret',\n    description: 'A 40+ hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field',\n    regex: /\\b[A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:secret|token|password|api[_-]?key)\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[0-9a-f]{40,}/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Discord bot token — three base64url segments. Anchored both sides so it\n    // can't partial-match a longer dotted string.\n    label: 'discord-bot-token',\n    description: 'Discord bot token (3 base64url segments)',\n    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,26}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,40}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'discord-mfa-token',\n    description: 'Discord MFA token (mfa. + 84 chars)',\n    regex: /\\bmfa\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{84}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Cloudflare Turnstile PROD secret (sanne, verified 2/2) — 0x4 + 6×A prefix,\n    // then 26 base64url (35 total). The 24-char SITE key + 1x/2x/3x TEST keys are\n    // intentionally NOT matched (the {26} length gate misses them) so a public\n    // key is never redacted.\n    label: 'cloudflare-turnstile-secret',\n    description: 'Cloudflare Turnstile secret key (0x4AAAAAA + 26 base64url, 35 total)',\n    regex: /0x4AAAAAA[A-Za-z0-9_-]{26}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'cloudflare-global-key',\n    description: 'Cloudflare global API key (37-hex)',\n    regex: /\\b[0-9a-f]{37}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // LAST on purpose: this is the only unprefixed shape in the list, so every\n    // anchored pattern above must get first refusal.\n    //\n    // Philips Hue v2 application key — 40 chars of [A-Za-z0-9-] with NO prefix,\n    // so there is nothing to anchor on. The negative lookahead is load-bearing,\n    // not decoration: a bare [A-Za-z0-9-]{40} also matches a GIT COMMIT SHA, and\n    // telemetry/error output is full of those. A redactor that eats commit\n    // hashes gets switched off within a week, after which it protects nothing.\n    // Hue keys are mixed-case; SHAs are lowercase hex — that asymmetry is the\n    // whole guard. (Pattern contributed + field-tested by beacon, F035.7.)\n    label: 'hue-application-key',\n    description: 'Philips Hue v2 application key (40 chars, no prefix)',\n    regex: /\\b(?![0-9a-f]{40}\\b)[A-Za-z0-9-]{40}\\b/g,\n  },\n];\n\n/**\n * WHY a finding was flagged — the two detection axes this package has.\n *\n * `format`   the VALUE carries the signal: `sk-ant-…`, `ghp_…`, `AKIA…`. Shape\n *            alone identifies it, so it is safe to run on anything.\n * `announced` the LABEL carries the signal: `Adgangskode: hunter2`. The value is\n *            arbitrary human text with no shape to match, so the only evidence\n *            is that someone wrote the word \"password\" next to it.\n */\nexport type SecretConfidence = 'format' | 'announced';\n\nexport interface RedactionFinding {\n  label: string;\n  count: number;\n  /** which axis matched — see SecretConfidence. */\n  confidence: SecretConfidence;\n}\n\nexport interface RedactionResult {\n  /** input with every secret replaced by `[REDACTED:<label>]` */\n  redacted: string;\n  /** per-pattern counts of what was redacted (empty = clean) */\n  findings: RedactionFinding[];\n}\n\nexport interface RedactOptions {\n  /**\n   * Extra consumer/per-tenant patterns, run AFTER the canonical set (so canonical\n   * attribution wins). Backs a future self-service \"paste a key → detector\" UI.\n   */\n  extraPatterns?: SecretPattern[];\n  /**\n   * Also detect ANNOUNCED secrets — `Adgangskode: hunter2` — where the label is\n   * the only evidence. **Off by default, and it must stay that way.** See\n   * ANNOUNCED_LABEL for the measurement that decided it.\n   */\n  announced?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Marker label for a secret detected by its announcing label rather than shape. */\nexport const ANNOUNCED_LABEL = 'announced-secret';\n\n/**\n * Label + separator + value. The label list is deliberately short and concrete;\n * this is not a general \"looks like config\" detector.\n *\n * WHY THIS IS OPT-IN, MEASURED RATHER THAN GUESSED. Over this repo on\n * 2026-08-14 — 548 tracked files, 544 readable as text, containing essentially\n * no real secrets — this exact regex matched **97 times**, and every one was\n * noise. Per label: `secret` 61, `api key` 33, `password` 4, and every Danish\n * label 0. So 94 of the 97 are the two words that are also ordinary IDENTIFIERS\n * in source code (`secret: config.secret`, `apiKey: Record<…>`).\n *\n * That is the real finding, and it is sharper than \"the pattern is noisy\": its\n * precision depends entirely on WHAT IS BEING SCANNED. In an inbound mail body\n * — buddy's actual case — `Adgangskode:` is a strong signal. In a TypeScript\n * file it is a variable name. **The package cannot know which corpus it is\n * looking at; only the caller can.** So the caller makes the decision, and the\n * default cannot be on. (This is the opposite of this repo's usual defaults-ON\n * stance — webpush F067.1, lens-engine F065 — and the numbers above are why.)\n *\n * A broader label+separator+value pattern measured 305 on the same corpus, and\n * refining it only reached 202 — no amount of tuning makes a generic version\n * safe. A template/env-reference guard (`${FOO}`, `<your-key>`) was written and\n * then dropped: it changed the count by exactly 0, because the noise here is\n * identifiers, not templates.\n *\n * The value must not already be a redaction marker, so this can run AFTER the\n * format pass without flattening its more specific attribution.\n */\nconst ANNOUNCED_SECRET =\n  /(\\b(?:adgangskode|kodeord|hemmelighed|password|passwd|api[ -]?key|apinøgle|secret|kode|pwd)\\s*[:=]\\s*)(?!\\[REDACTED:)\\S+/gi;\n\n/** Replacement marker for a redacted secret. */\nexport const redactionMarker = (label: string): string => `[REDACTED:${label}]`;\n\nfunction patternsFor(opts?: RedactOptions): SecretPattern[] {\n  return opts?.extraPatterns && opts.extraPatterns.length > 0\n    ? [...SECRET_PATTERNS, ...opts.extraPatterns]\n    : SECRET_PATTERNS;\n}\n\n/**\n * Scan `text` and replace every detected secret with its redaction marker.\n * Pure: clean input returns byte-identical (`findings: []`).\n */\nexport function redactSecrets(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): RedactionResult {\n  if (!text) return { redacted: text, findings: [] };\n  let redacted = text;\n  const findings: RedactionFinding[] = [];\n  for (const p of patternsFor(opts)) {\n    let count = 0;\n    redacted = redacted.replace(p.regex, () => {\n      count++;\n      return redactionMarker(p.label);\n    });\n    if (count > 0) findings.push({ label: p.label, count, confidence: 'format' });\n  }\n  // Announced runs LAST, and only on request. Order is not cosmetic: the format\n  // pass has already replaced everything it recognises, and this regex refuses a\n  // value that is already a marker — so `API key: sk-ant-…` keeps its specific\n  // `anthropic-api-key` attribution instead of being flattened to a generic one.\n  // The announcing label itself is KEPT in the output; only the value goes, so\n  // the redacted text still reads `Adgangskode: [REDACTED:announced-secret]` and\n  // a human or model reading it can still tell what was removed.\n  if (opts?.announced) {\n    let count = 0;\n    const redactedAnnounced = redacted.replace(ANNOUNCED_SECRET, (_match, prefix: string) => {\n      count++;\n      return prefix + redactionMarker(ANNOUNCED_LABEL);\n    });\n    if (count > 0) {\n      redacted = redactedAnnounced;\n      findings.push({ label: ANNOUNCED_LABEL, count, confidence: 'announced' });\n    }\n  }\n  return { redacted, findings };\n}\n\n/**\n * True if `text` announces a credential by label — `Adgangskode: hunter2` —\n * without building a redaction. Cheap enough to run on every inbound message.\n *\n * This exists because for untrusted inbound text heading to a model, the right\n * response is often to REFUSE rather than redact: a false positive costs a\n * slightly worse classification, a false negative costs a leak. That use needs a\n * boolean, not a redactor. (buddy's reasoning, F035.8.)\n */\nexport function hasAnnouncedSecret(text: string): boolean {\n  if (!text) return false;\n  ANNOUNCED_SECRET.lastIndex = 0;\n  return ANNOUNCED_SECRET.test(text);\n}\n\n/**\n * True if `text` contains at least one detectable secret. Honours\n * `opts.announced` — a caller who asks for the announced axis and is told\n * `false` must be able to believe it.\n */\nexport function hasSecret(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): boolean {\n  if (opts?.announced && hasAnnouncedSecret(text)) return true;\n  return patternsFor(opts).some((p) => {\n    p.regex.lastIndex = 0;\n    return p.regex.test(text);\n  });\n}\n\nexport interface ClassifyResult {\n  /** the matching pattern's stable label (e.g. `openai-api-key`) */\n  label: string;\n  /** the matching pattern's human description (e.g. `OpenAI API key (sk-… / sk-proj-…)`) */\n  description: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify a SINGLE pasted token — the INVERSE of redaction. Returns the first\n * (most-specific) pattern the value matches, or `null`. Backs a \"paste a key →\n * detect its type\" UI (cardmem F214 Secrets Vault) so every consumer shares the\n * same classification, not just the same redaction.\n *\n * First-match-wins over the ordered `SECRET_PATTERNS`, so `sk-ant-…` classifies\n * as `anthropic-api-key`, never the generic `openai-api-key`. Field-anchored\n * context-only patterns (mistral / vimeo / cloudflare-api-token /\n * labeled-hex-secret / deepseek-fallback) only match when the pasted value\n * includes their `NAME=` context; a bare provider token classifies via its\n * prefix pattern, and a prefix-less bare token (e.g. a raw Mistral key) is\n * genuinely unidentifiable → `null`. `opts.extraPatterns` run AFTER the\n * canonical set (canonical attribution wins). Input is trimmed; empty /\n * whitespace-only → `null`.\n */\nexport function classify(value: string, opts?: RedactOptions): ClassifyResult | null {\n  if (!value) return null;\n  const v = value.trim();\n  if (!v) return null;\n  for (const p of patternsFor(opts)) {\n    p.regex.lastIndex = 0;\n    if (p.regex.test(v)) return { label: p.label, description: p.description };\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n"]}

package/package.json

@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
 {
   "name": "@broberg/secret-scan",
-  "version": "0.1.7",
+  "version": "0.2.0",
   "description": "Pure, dependency-free secret/credential redaction for the broberg.ai fleet — redactSecrets / hasSecret over a curated, ordered SECRET_PATTERNS set. Redact at write + egress boundaries so keys never land in a DB, chat, or KB. Lifted from broberg/trail F197.",
   "type": "module",
   "license": "MIT",
   "sideEffects": false,
-  "files": ["dist", "README.md"],
+  "files": [
+    "dist",
+    "README.md"
+  ],
   "main": "./dist/index.cjs",
   "module": "./dist/index.js",
   "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
@@ -41,5 +44,7 @@
     "url": "https://github.com/broberg-ai/components",
     "directory": "packages/secret-scan"
   },
-  "publishConfig": { "access": "public" }
+  "publishConfig": {
+    "access": "public"
+  }
 }