@broberg/secret-scan 0.1.0

package/README.md

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+# @broberg/secret-scan
+
+Pure, dependency-free **secret/credential redaction** for the broberg.ai fleet.
+Catch leaked API keys and tokens at your write + egress boundaries so a key never
+lands in a database, a chat answer, a search result, or a shared knowledge base.
+
+Lifted from [`broberg/trail` F197](https://github.com/broberg-ai/trail) — the
+second-brain safeguard that found 9 real leaked keys already sitting in a shared
+KB. `components` owns + publishes it; every repo consumes the same canonical
+pattern set, so detection never drifts.
+
+```bash
+npm i @broberg/secret-scan
+```
+
+## Usage
+
+```ts
+import { redactSecrets, hasSecret } from "@broberg/secret-scan";
+
+const { redacted, findings } = redactSecrets("the key is sk-ant-api03-… use it");
+// redacted → "the key is [REDACTED:anthropic-api-key] use it"
+// findings → [{ label: "anthropic-api-key", count: 1 }]
+
+hasSecret("nothing here"); // false
+```
+
+`redactSecrets` is **pure + deterministic**: clean input returns byte-identical
+with `findings: []`. It replaces every detected secret with `[REDACTED:<label>]`
+and never blocks the write — the surrounding knowledge survives.
+
+## Two recommended integration shapes
+
+1. **Write boundary (ingest gate)** — redact before you persist, so secrets never
+   enter storage:
+   ```ts
+   await db.insert({ content: redactSecrets(content).redacted });
+   ```
+2. **Egress guardrail** — scrub before a value leaves to a user or an LLM. The
+   highest-value guard is scrubbing retrieved context before it enters a prompt,
+   so the model can never see (and never echo) a secret that predates the gate.
+
+## Custom / per-tenant patterns
+
+Add your own patterns on top of the canonical set — they run **after** the
+canonical patterns, so canonical attribution always wins:
+
+```ts
+redactSecrets(text, {
+  extraPatterns: [{ label: "acme-key", description: "ACME key", regex: /\bACME-[0-9]{6}\b/g }],
+});
+```
+
+## What it detects
+
+A curated, **ordered** set (`SECRET_PATTERNS`) of named, low-false-positive
+regexes — most-specific first so attribution is correct:
+
+- **LLM:** Anthropic (`sk-ant-…`, incl. `oat01-`), OpenAI (`sk-`/`sk-proj-`),
+  OpenRouter (`sk-or-v1-`), ElevenLabs, fal.ai, Google/Gemini (`AIza…`),
+  Google OAuth (`GOCSPX-`).
+- **Cloud / infra:** AWS (`AKIA…`), GitHub, GitLab, Slack, Stripe live, Resend,
+  Fly.io, Cloudflare global key, Supabase (`sbp_` / `sb_secret_`), npm (`npm_…`).
+- **Fleet:** upmetrics (`uk_`), cardmem (`pa_/pi_/pk_`, `piw_`), cms (`wh_`),
+  trail (`trail_`).
+- **Generic:** JWT (`eyJ…` — also Turso + Supabase service_role tokens), PEM
+  private-key blocks, Discord bot/MFA tokens, and `labeled-hex-secret` (a 40+ hex
+  value assigned to a `secret`/`token`/`password`/`api-key`-named field).
+
+### Design notes
+
+- **Pattern-based, not entropy** — a redacted *real* fact corrupts knowledge, so
+  we accept missing an exotic token over false-positiving.
+- **Never a bare hex pattern** — it would hit git shas/hashes. Prefix-less service
+  secrets are caught only via the `labeled-hex-secret` name-context rule.
+- **Order is API** — specific patterns run before generic ones (`sk-ant-` before
+  `sk-`); a test asserts it.
+
+## API
+
+```ts
+interface SecretPattern { label: string; description: string; regex: RegExp; }
+interface RedactionFinding { label: string; count: number; }
+interface RedactionResult { redacted: string; findings: RedactionFinding[]; }
+interface RedactOptions { extraPatterns?: SecretPattern[]; }
+
+const SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[];
+function redactSecrets(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): RedactionResult;
+function hasSecret(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): boolean;
+function redactionMarker(label: string): string; // `[REDACTED:${label}]`
+```
+
+MIT · part of the [`@broberg/*`](https://github.com/broberg-ai/components) shared-library family.

package/dist/index.cjs

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+'use strict';
+
+// src/index.ts
+var SECRET_PATTERNS = [
+  {
+    label: "private-key",
+    description: "PEM private key block (RSA/EC/OPENSSH/DSA/PGP)",
+    regex: /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "anthropic-api-key",
+    description: "Anthropic API key (sk-ant-\u2026)",
+    regex: /sk-ant-(?:api03-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // OpenRouter — distinct from OpenAI; runs BEFORE the generic sk- (which would
+    // otherwise also match + mislabel it).
+    label: "openrouter-api-key",
+    description: "OpenRouter API key (sk-or-v1- + 64 hex)",
+    regex: /\bsk-or-v1-[0-9a-f]{64}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "openai-api-key",
+    description: "OpenAI API key (sk-\u2026 / sk-proj-\u2026)",
+    regex: /sk-(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // ElevenLabs — sk_ with UNDERSCORE (vs OpenAI sk-), 48 hex.
+    label: "elevenlabs-api-key",
+    description: "ElevenLabs API key (sk_ + 48 hex)",
+    regex: /\bsk_[0-9a-f]{48}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    // fal.ai — uuid:hex32 (key_id:key_secret); the colon is the signal.
+    label: "fal-api-key",
+    description: "fal.ai key (uuid:hex32)",
+    regex: /\b[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}:[0-9a-f]{32}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "google-api-key",
+    description: "Google / Gemini API key (AIza\u2026)",
+    regex: /AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "google-oauth-secret",
+    description: "Google OAuth client secret (GOCSPX-\u2026)",
+    regex: /GOCSPX-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{28}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "aws-access-key-id",
+    description: "AWS access key id (AKIA\u2026)",
+    regex: /\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "github-token",
+    description: "GitHub token (ghp_/gho_/ghs_/ghu_/ghr_\u2026)",
+    regex: /\bgh[posru]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "gitlab-token",
+    description: "GitLab personal access token (glpat-\u2026)",
+    regex: /\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "slack-token",
+    description: "Slack token (xox[baprs]-\u2026)",
+    regex: /\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "stripe-secret-key",
+    description: "Stripe live secret/restricted key (sk_live_/rk_live_\u2026)",
+    regex: /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // Resend (re_…). Lookahead requires a digit in the body so we don't redact
+    // long snake_case identifiers like re_compute_the_thing.
+    label: "resend-api-key",
+    description: "Resend API key (re_ + token)",
+    regex: /\bre_(?=[A-Za-z0-9_]*\d)[A-Za-z0-9_]{24,}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "supabase-access-token",
+    description: "Supabase personal/management access token (sbp_ + 40 hex)",
+    regex: /\bsbp_[0-9a-f]{40}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "supabase-secret-key",
+    description: "Supabase secret API key (sb_secret_\u2026)",
+    regex: /\bsb_secret_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // Used by every @broberg/* publish — the highest-value leak from a .env / commit history.
+    label: "npm-token",
+    description: "npm publish/automation token (npm_ + 36 base62)",
+    regex: /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "fly-api-token",
+    description: "Fly.io API token (FlyV1 fm2_\u2026 / fo1_\u2026)",
+    regex: /(?:FlyV1 fm2_[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{20,}|\bfo1_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,})/g
+  },
+  {
+    // Also covers Turso DB/platform auth tokens AND Supabase anon/service_role
+    // keys — both are JWTs (eyJ…), so the single JWT pattern catches them.
+    label: "jwt",
+    description: "JSON Web Token (eyJ\u2026) \u2014 incl. Turso + Supabase service_role tokens",
+    regex: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // genApiKey = randomBytes(24).hex → uk_ + exactly 48 lowercase hex.
+    label: "upmetrics-key",
+    description: "Upmetrics project key (uk_ + 48 hex)",
+    regex: /\buk_[0-9a-f]{48}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "cardmem-key",
+    description: "Cardmem personal/incident/project key (pa_/pi_/pk_ + 64 hex)",
+    regex: /\bp[aik]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // cardmem inbox-webhook key — piw_ isn't matched by p[aik]_ above (3rd char 'w' ≠ '_').
+    label: "cardmem-webhook-key",
+    description: "Cardmem inbox-webhook key (piw_ + 64 hex)",
+    regex: /\bpiw_[0-9a-f]{64}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "trail-key",
+    description: "Trail personal API key (trail_\u2026)",
+    regex: /\btrail_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // randomBytes(32).hex → wh_ + 64 lowercase hex (67 chars total).
+    label: "cms-access-token",
+    description: "webhouse.app CMS access token (wh_ + 64 hex)",
+    regex: /\bwh_[0-9a-f]{64}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // Context-based catch for prefix-less high-entropy service secrets
+    // (CMS_JWT_SECRET, revalidateSecret, fleet openssl-rand-hex secrets): a 40+
+    // hex value assigned to a field whose name contains
+    // secret/token/password/api-key. The name requirement keeps the
+    // false-positive rate near zero (a bare 40/64-hex would hit shas/hashes).
+    label: "labeled-hex-secret",
+    description: "A 40+ hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field",
+    regex: /\b[A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:secret|token|password|api[_-]?key)\b\s*[:=]\s*["'`]?[0-9a-f]{40,}/gi
+  },
+  {
+    // Discord bot token — three base64url segments. Anchored both sides so it
+    // can't partial-match a longer dotted string.
+    label: "discord-bot-token",
+    description: "Discord bot token (3 base64url segments)",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,26}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,40}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "discord-mfa-token",
+    description: "Discord MFA token (mfa. + 84 chars)",
+    regex: /\bmfa\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{84}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "cloudflare-global-key",
+    description: "Cloudflare global API key (37-hex)",
+    regex: /\b[0-9a-f]{37}\b/g
+  }
+];
+var redactionMarker = (label) => `[REDACTED:${label}]`;
+function patternsFor(opts) {
+  return opts?.extraPatterns && opts.extraPatterns.length > 0 ? [...SECRET_PATTERNS, ...opts.extraPatterns] : SECRET_PATTERNS;
+}
+function redactSecrets(text, opts) {
+  if (!text) return { redacted: text, findings: [] };
+  let redacted = text;
+  const findings = [];
+  for (const p of patternsFor(opts)) {
+    let count = 0;
+    redacted = redacted.replace(p.regex, () => {
+      count++;
+      return redactionMarker(p.label);
+    });
+    if (count > 0) findings.push({ label: p.label, count });
+  }
+  return { redacted, findings };
+}
+function hasSecret(text, opts) {
+  return patternsFor(opts).some((p) => {
+    p.regex.lastIndex = 0;
+    return p.regex.test(text);
+  });
+}
+
+exports.SECRET_PATTERNS = SECRET_PATTERNS;
+exports.hasSecret = hasSecret;
+exports.redactSecrets = redactSecrets;
+exports.redactionMarker = redactionMarker;
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map

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PURE + deterministic (regex/string only, no deps,\n * no I/O) so an engine write-gate, an egress scrub, a CLI, an admin preview UI,\n * and any repo all share the EXACT same detection — and it's trivially testable.\n *\n * Lifted verbatim from broberg/trail F197 (the second-brain safeguard); see\n * docs/features/F035-secret-scan.md. components owns + publishes this; @trail/shared\n * re-exports it.\n *\n * Design choices:\n * - Pattern-based, NOT entropy/generic-randomness — a redacted real fact would\n *   corrupt knowledge, so we accept missing an exotic token over false positives.\n * - Order matters: most-specific patterns run first (e.g. `sk-ant-` before the\n *   generic OpenAI `sk-`; `sk-or-v1-` before `sk-`), because each match is\n *   consumed before the next pattern runs → order = attribution.\n * - Redact, never reject — the surrounding knowledge survives; only the\n *   credential substring is neutralised.\n * - NEVER a bare high-entropy/hex pattern (it would hit git shas/hashes).\n *   Prefix-less service secrets are caught only via `labeled-hex-secret` (a 40+\n *   hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field).\n *\n * Two recommended integration shapes for consumers:\n *  (a) write boundary — `redactSecrets(text)` before persist (ingest gate);\n *  (b) egress — scrub before a value leaves to a user/LLM (highest-value guard).\n */\n\nexport interface SecretPattern {\n  /** stable id shown in the redaction marker + findings */\n  label: string;\n  /** human description of what this matches */\n  description: string;\n  /** global regex (used for replace-all + counting) */\n  regex: RegExp;\n}\n\n/** Ordered most-specific → least. Every regex carries the `g` flag. */\nexport const SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[] = [\n  {\n    label: 'private-key',\n    description: 'PEM private key block (RSA/EC/OPENSSH/DSA/PGP)',\n    regex:\n      /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\\s\\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'anthropic-api-key',\n    description: 'Anthropic API key (sk-ant-…)',\n    regex: /sk-ant-(?:api03-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // OpenRouter — distinct from OpenAI; runs BEFORE the generic sk- (which would\n    // otherwise also match + mislabel it).\n    label: 'openrouter-api-key',\n    description: 'OpenRouter API key (sk-or-v1- + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsk-or-v1-[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'openai-api-key',\n    description: 'OpenAI API key (sk-… / sk-proj-…)',\n    regex: /sk-(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // ElevenLabs — sk_ with UNDERSCORE (vs OpenAI sk-), 48 hex.\n    label: 'elevenlabs-api-key',\n    description: 'ElevenLabs API key (sk_ + 48 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsk_[0-9a-f]{48}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // fal.ai — uuid:hex32 (key_id:key_secret); the colon is the signal.\n    label: 'fal-api-key',\n    description: 'fal.ai key (uuid:hex32)',\n    regex: /\\b[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}:[0-9a-f]{32}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'google-api-key',\n    description: 'Google / Gemini API key (AIza…)',\n    regex: /AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'google-oauth-secret',\n    description: 'Google OAuth client secret (GOCSPX-…)',\n    regex: /GOCSPX-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{28}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'aws-access-key-id',\n    description: 'AWS access key id (AKIA…)',\n    regex: /\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'github-token',\n    description: 'GitHub token (ghp_/gho_/ghs_/ghu_/ghr_…)',\n    regex: /\\bgh[posru]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'gitlab-token',\n    description: 'GitLab personal access token (glpat-…)',\n    regex: /\\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'slack-token',\n    description: 'Slack token (xox[baprs]-…)',\n    regex: /\\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'stripe-secret-key',\n    description: 'Stripe live secret/restricted key (sk_live_/rk_live_…)',\n    regex: /\\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Resend (re_…). Lookahead requires a digit in the body so we don't redact\n    // long snake_case identifiers like re_compute_the_thing.\n    label: 'resend-api-key',\n    description: 'Resend API key (re_ + token)',\n    regex: /\\bre_(?=[A-Za-z0-9_]*\\d)[A-Za-z0-9_]{24,}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'supabase-access-token',\n    description: 'Supabase personal/management access token (sbp_ + 40 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsbp_[0-9a-f]{40}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'supabase-secret-key',\n    description: 'Supabase secret API key (sb_secret_…)',\n    regex: /\\bsb_secret_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Used by every @broberg/* publish — the highest-value leak from a .env / commit history.\n    label: 'npm-token',\n    description: 'npm publish/automation token (npm_ + 36 base62)',\n    regex: /\\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'fly-api-token',\n    description: 'Fly.io API token (FlyV1 fm2_… / fo1_…)',\n    regex: /(?:FlyV1 fm2_[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{20,}|\\bfo1_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,})/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Also covers Turso DB/platform auth tokens AND Supabase anon/service_role\n    // keys — both are JWTs (eyJ…), so the single JWT pattern catches them.\n    label: 'jwt',\n    description: 'JSON Web Token (eyJ…) — incl. Turso + Supabase service_role tokens',\n    regex: /\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // genApiKey = randomBytes(24).hex → uk_ + exactly 48 lowercase hex.\n    label: 'upmetrics-key',\n    description: 'Upmetrics project key (uk_ + 48 hex)',\n    regex: /\\buk_[0-9a-f]{48}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'cardmem-key',\n    description: 'Cardmem personal/incident/project key (pa_/pi_/pk_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bp[aik]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // cardmem inbox-webhook key — piw_ isn't matched by p[aik]_ above (3rd char 'w' ≠ '_').\n    label: 'cardmem-webhook-key',\n    description: 'Cardmem inbox-webhook key (piw_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bpiw_[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'trail-key',\n    description: 'Trail personal API key (trail_…)',\n    regex: /\\btrail_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // randomBytes(32).hex → wh_ + 64 lowercase hex (67 chars total).\n    label: 'cms-access-token',\n    description: 'webhouse.app CMS access token (wh_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bwh_[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Context-based catch for prefix-less high-entropy service secrets\n    // (CMS_JWT_SECRET, revalidateSecret, fleet openssl-rand-hex secrets): a 40+\n    // hex value assigned to a field whose name contains\n    // secret/token/password/api-key. The name requirement keeps the\n    // false-positive rate near zero (a bare 40/64-hex would hit shas/hashes).\n    label: 'labeled-hex-secret',\n    description: 'A 40+ hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field',\n    regex: /\\b[A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:secret|token|password|api[_-]?key)\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[0-9a-f]{40,}/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Discord bot token — three base64url segments. Anchored both sides so it\n    // can't partial-match a longer dotted string.\n    label: 'discord-bot-token',\n    description: 'Discord bot token (3 base64url segments)',\n    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,26}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,40}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'discord-mfa-token',\n    description: 'Discord MFA token (mfa. + 84 chars)',\n    regex: /\\bmfa\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{84}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'cloudflare-global-key',\n    description: 'Cloudflare global API key (37-hex)',\n    regex: /\\b[0-9a-f]{37}\\b/g,\n  },\n];\n\nexport interface RedactionFinding {\n  label: string;\n  count: number;\n}\n\nexport interface RedactionResult {\n  /** input with every secret replaced by `[REDACTED:<label>]` */\n  redacted: string;\n  /** per-pattern counts of what was redacted (empty = clean) */\n  findings: RedactionFinding[];\n}\n\nexport interface RedactOptions {\n  /**\n   * Extra consumer/per-tenant patterns, run AFTER the canonical set (so canonical\n   * attribution wins). Backs a future self-service \"paste a key → detector\" UI.\n   */\n  extraPatterns?: SecretPattern[];\n}\n\n/** Replacement marker for a redacted secret. */\nexport const redactionMarker = (label: string): string => `[REDACTED:${label}]`;\n\nfunction patternsFor(opts?: RedactOptions): SecretPattern[] {\n  return opts?.extraPatterns && opts.extraPatterns.length > 0\n    ? [...SECRET_PATTERNS, ...opts.extraPatterns]\n    : SECRET_PATTERNS;\n}\n\n/**\n * Scan `text` and replace every detected secret with its redaction marker.\n * Pure: clean input returns byte-identical (`findings: []`).\n */\nexport function redactSecrets(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): RedactionResult {\n  if (!text) return { redacted: text, findings: [] };\n  let redacted = text;\n  const findings: RedactionFinding[] = [];\n  for (const p of patternsFor(opts)) {\n    let count = 0;\n    redacted = redacted.replace(p.regex, () => {\n      count++;\n      return redactionMarker(p.label);\n    });\n    if (count > 0) findings.push({ label: p.label, count });\n  }\n  return { redacted, findings };\n}\n\n/** True if `text` contains at least one detectable secret. */\nexport function hasSecret(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): boolean {\n  return patternsFor(opts).some((p) => {\n    p.regex.lastIndex = 0;\n    return p.regex.test(text);\n  });\n}\n"]}

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/**
+ * @broberg/secret-scan — fleet secret/credential redaction.
+ *
+ * `redactSecrets(text)` replaces every matched secret with `[REDACTED:<label>]`
+ * and reports what it found. PURE + deterministic (regex/string only, no deps,
+ * no I/O) so an engine write-gate, an egress scrub, a CLI, an admin preview UI,
+ * and any repo all share the EXACT same detection — and it's trivially testable.
+ *
+ * Lifted verbatim from broberg/trail F197 (the second-brain safeguard); see
+ * docs/features/F035-secret-scan.md. components owns + publishes this; @trail/shared
+ * re-exports it.
+ *
+ * Design choices:
+ * - Pattern-based, NOT entropy/generic-randomness — a redacted real fact would
+ *   corrupt knowledge, so we accept missing an exotic token over false positives.
+ * - Order matters: most-specific patterns run first (e.g. `sk-ant-` before the
+ *   generic OpenAI `sk-`; `sk-or-v1-` before `sk-`), because each match is
+ *   consumed before the next pattern runs → order = attribution.
+ * - Redact, never reject — the surrounding knowledge survives; only the
+ *   credential substring is neutralised.
+ * - NEVER a bare high-entropy/hex pattern (it would hit git shas/hashes).
+ *   Prefix-less service secrets are caught only via `labeled-hex-secret` (a 40+
+ *   hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field).
+ *
+ * Two recommended integration shapes for consumers:
+ *  (a) write boundary — `redactSecrets(text)` before persist (ingest gate);
+ *  (b) egress — scrub before a value leaves to a user/LLM (highest-value guard).
+ */
+interface SecretPattern {
+    /** stable id shown in the redaction marker + findings */
+    label: string;
+    /** human description of what this matches */
+    description: string;
+    /** global regex (used for replace-all + counting) */
+    regex: RegExp;
+}
+/** Ordered most-specific → least. Every regex carries the `g` flag. */
+declare const SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[];
+interface RedactionFinding {
+    label: string;
+    count: number;
+}
+interface RedactionResult {
+    /** input with every secret replaced by `[REDACTED:<label>]` */
+    redacted: string;
+    /** per-pattern counts of what was redacted (empty = clean) */
+    findings: RedactionFinding[];
+}
+interface RedactOptions {
+    /**
+     * Extra consumer/per-tenant patterns, run AFTER the canonical set (so canonical
+     * attribution wins). Backs a future self-service "paste a key → detector" UI.
+     */
+    extraPatterns?: SecretPattern[];
+}
+/** Replacement marker for a redacted secret. */
+declare const redactionMarker: (label: string) => string;
+/**
+ * Scan `text` and replace every detected secret with its redaction marker.
+ * Pure: clean input returns byte-identical (`findings: []`).
+ */
+declare function redactSecrets(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): RedactionResult;
+/** True if `text` contains at least one detectable secret. */
+declare function hasSecret(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): boolean;
+
+export { type RedactOptions, type RedactionFinding, type RedactionResult, SECRET_PATTERNS, type SecretPattern, hasSecret, redactSecrets, redactionMarker };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/**
+ * @broberg/secret-scan — fleet secret/credential redaction.
+ *
+ * `redactSecrets(text)` replaces every matched secret with `[REDACTED:<label>]`
+ * and reports what it found. PURE + deterministic (regex/string only, no deps,
+ * no I/O) so an engine write-gate, an egress scrub, a CLI, an admin preview UI,
+ * and any repo all share the EXACT same detection — and it's trivially testable.
+ *
+ * Lifted verbatim from broberg/trail F197 (the second-brain safeguard); see
+ * docs/features/F035-secret-scan.md. components owns + publishes this; @trail/shared
+ * re-exports it.
+ *
+ * Design choices:
+ * - Pattern-based, NOT entropy/generic-randomness — a redacted real fact would
+ *   corrupt knowledge, so we accept missing an exotic token over false positives.
+ * - Order matters: most-specific patterns run first (e.g. `sk-ant-` before the
+ *   generic OpenAI `sk-`; `sk-or-v1-` before `sk-`), because each match is
+ *   consumed before the next pattern runs → order = attribution.
+ * - Redact, never reject — the surrounding knowledge survives; only the
+ *   credential substring is neutralised.
+ * - NEVER a bare high-entropy/hex pattern (it would hit git shas/hashes).
+ *   Prefix-less service secrets are caught only via `labeled-hex-secret` (a 40+
+ *   hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field).
+ *
+ * Two recommended integration shapes for consumers:
+ *  (a) write boundary — `redactSecrets(text)` before persist (ingest gate);
+ *  (b) egress — scrub before a value leaves to a user/LLM (highest-value guard).
+ */
+interface SecretPattern {
+    /** stable id shown in the redaction marker + findings */
+    label: string;
+    /** human description of what this matches */
+    description: string;
+    /** global regex (used for replace-all + counting) */
+    regex: RegExp;
+}
+/** Ordered most-specific → least. Every regex carries the `g` flag. */
+declare const SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[];
+interface RedactionFinding {
+    label: string;
+    count: number;
+}
+interface RedactionResult {
+    /** input with every secret replaced by `[REDACTED:<label>]` */
+    redacted: string;
+    /** per-pattern counts of what was redacted (empty = clean) */
+    findings: RedactionFinding[];
+}
+interface RedactOptions {
+    /**
+     * Extra consumer/per-tenant patterns, run AFTER the canonical set (so canonical
+     * attribution wins). Backs a future self-service "paste a key → detector" UI.
+     */
+    extraPatterns?: SecretPattern[];
+}
+/** Replacement marker for a redacted secret. */
+declare const redactionMarker: (label: string) => string;
+/**
+ * Scan `text` and replace every detected secret with its redaction marker.
+ * Pure: clean input returns byte-identical (`findings: []`).
+ */
+declare function redactSecrets(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): RedactionResult;
+/** True if `text` contains at least one detectable secret. */
+declare function hasSecret(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): boolean;
+
+export { type RedactOptions, type RedactionFinding, type RedactionResult, SECRET_PATTERNS, type SecretPattern, hasSecret, redactSecrets, redactionMarker };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+// src/index.ts
+var SECRET_PATTERNS = [
+  {
+    label: "private-key",
+    description: "PEM private key block (RSA/EC/OPENSSH/DSA/PGP)",
+    regex: /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "anthropic-api-key",
+    description: "Anthropic API key (sk-ant-\u2026)",
+    regex: /sk-ant-(?:api03-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // OpenRouter — distinct from OpenAI; runs BEFORE the generic sk- (which would
+    // otherwise also match + mislabel it).
+    label: "openrouter-api-key",
+    description: "OpenRouter API key (sk-or-v1- + 64 hex)",
+    regex: /\bsk-or-v1-[0-9a-f]{64}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "openai-api-key",
+    description: "OpenAI API key (sk-\u2026 / sk-proj-\u2026)",
+    regex: /sk-(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // ElevenLabs — sk_ with UNDERSCORE (vs OpenAI sk-), 48 hex.
+    label: "elevenlabs-api-key",
+    description: "ElevenLabs API key (sk_ + 48 hex)",
+    regex: /\bsk_[0-9a-f]{48}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    // fal.ai — uuid:hex32 (key_id:key_secret); the colon is the signal.
+    label: "fal-api-key",
+    description: "fal.ai key (uuid:hex32)",
+    regex: /\b[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}:[0-9a-f]{32}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "google-api-key",
+    description: "Google / Gemini API key (AIza\u2026)",
+    regex: /AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "google-oauth-secret",
+    description: "Google OAuth client secret (GOCSPX-\u2026)",
+    regex: /GOCSPX-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{28}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "aws-access-key-id",
+    description: "AWS access key id (AKIA\u2026)",
+    regex: /\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "github-token",
+    description: "GitHub token (ghp_/gho_/ghs_/ghu_/ghr_\u2026)",
+    regex: /\bgh[posru]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "gitlab-token",
+    description: "GitLab personal access token (glpat-\u2026)",
+    regex: /\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "slack-token",
+    description: "Slack token (xox[baprs]-\u2026)",
+    regex: /\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "stripe-secret-key",
+    description: "Stripe live secret/restricted key (sk_live_/rk_live_\u2026)",
+    regex: /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // Resend (re_…). Lookahead requires a digit in the body so we don't redact
+    // long snake_case identifiers like re_compute_the_thing.
+    label: "resend-api-key",
+    description: "Resend API key (re_ + token)",
+    regex: /\bre_(?=[A-Za-z0-9_]*\d)[A-Za-z0-9_]{24,}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "supabase-access-token",
+    description: "Supabase personal/management access token (sbp_ + 40 hex)",
+    regex: /\bsbp_[0-9a-f]{40}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "supabase-secret-key",
+    description: "Supabase secret API key (sb_secret_\u2026)",
+    regex: /\bsb_secret_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // Used by every @broberg/* publish — the highest-value leak from a .env / commit history.
+    label: "npm-token",
+    description: "npm publish/automation token (npm_ + 36 base62)",
+    regex: /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "fly-api-token",
+    description: "Fly.io API token (FlyV1 fm2_\u2026 / fo1_\u2026)",
+    regex: /(?:FlyV1 fm2_[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{20,}|\bfo1_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,})/g
+  },
+  {
+    // Also covers Turso DB/platform auth tokens AND Supabase anon/service_role
+    // keys — both are JWTs (eyJ…), so the single JWT pattern catches them.
+    label: "jwt",
+    description: "JSON Web Token (eyJ\u2026) \u2014 incl. Turso + Supabase service_role tokens",
+    regex: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // genApiKey = randomBytes(24).hex → uk_ + exactly 48 lowercase hex.
+    label: "upmetrics-key",
+    description: "Upmetrics project key (uk_ + 48 hex)",
+    regex: /\buk_[0-9a-f]{48}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "cardmem-key",
+    description: "Cardmem personal/incident/project key (pa_/pi_/pk_ + 64 hex)",
+    regex: /\bp[aik]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // cardmem inbox-webhook key — piw_ isn't matched by p[aik]_ above (3rd char 'w' ≠ '_').
+    label: "cardmem-webhook-key",
+    description: "Cardmem inbox-webhook key (piw_ + 64 hex)",
+    regex: /\bpiw_[0-9a-f]{64}/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "trail-key",
+    description: "Trail personal API key (trail_\u2026)",
+    regex: /\btrail_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // randomBytes(32).hex → wh_ + 64 lowercase hex (67 chars total).
+    label: "cms-access-token",
+    description: "webhouse.app CMS access token (wh_ + 64 hex)",
+    regex: /\bwh_[0-9a-f]{64}/g
+  },
+  {
+    // Context-based catch for prefix-less high-entropy service secrets
+    // (CMS_JWT_SECRET, revalidateSecret, fleet openssl-rand-hex secrets): a 40+
+    // hex value assigned to a field whose name contains
+    // secret/token/password/api-key. The name requirement keeps the
+    // false-positive rate near zero (a bare 40/64-hex would hit shas/hashes).
+    label: "labeled-hex-secret",
+    description: "A 40+ hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field",
+    regex: /\b[A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:secret|token|password|api[_-]?key)\b\s*[:=]\s*["'`]?[0-9a-f]{40,}/gi
+  },
+  {
+    // Discord bot token — three base64url segments. Anchored both sides so it
+    // can't partial-match a longer dotted string.
+    label: "discord-bot-token",
+    description: "Discord bot token (3 base64url segments)",
+    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,26}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,40}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "discord-mfa-token",
+    description: "Discord MFA token (mfa. + 84 chars)",
+    regex: /\bmfa\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{84}\b/g
+  },
+  {
+    label: "cloudflare-global-key",
+    description: "Cloudflare global API key (37-hex)",
+    regex: /\b[0-9a-f]{37}\b/g
+  }
+];
+var redactionMarker = (label) => `[REDACTED:${label}]`;
+function patternsFor(opts) {
+  return opts?.extraPatterns && opts.extraPatterns.length > 0 ? [...SECRET_PATTERNS, ...opts.extraPatterns] : SECRET_PATTERNS;
+}
+function redactSecrets(text, opts) {
+  if (!text) return { redacted: text, findings: [] };
+  let redacted = text;
+  const findings = [];
+  for (const p of patternsFor(opts)) {
+    let count = 0;
+    redacted = redacted.replace(p.regex, () => {
+      count++;
+      return redactionMarker(p.label);
+    });
+    if (count > 0) findings.push({ label: p.label, count });
+  }
+  return { redacted, findings };
+}
+function hasSecret(text, opts) {
+  return patternsFor(opts).some((p) => {
+    p.regex.lastIndex = 0;
+    return p.regex.test(text);
+  });
+}
+
+export { SECRET_PATTERNS, hasSecret, redactSecrets, redactionMarker };
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/index.js.map

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PURE + deterministic (regex/string only, no deps,\n * no I/O) so an engine write-gate, an egress scrub, a CLI, an admin preview UI,\n * and any repo all share the EXACT same detection — and it's trivially testable.\n *\n * Lifted verbatim from broberg/trail F197 (the second-brain safeguard); see\n * docs/features/F035-secret-scan.md. components owns + publishes this; @trail/shared\n * re-exports it.\n *\n * Design choices:\n * - Pattern-based, NOT entropy/generic-randomness — a redacted real fact would\n *   corrupt knowledge, so we accept missing an exotic token over false positives.\n * - Order matters: most-specific patterns run first (e.g. `sk-ant-` before the\n *   generic OpenAI `sk-`; `sk-or-v1-` before `sk-`), because each match is\n *   consumed before the next pattern runs → order = attribution.\n * - Redact, never reject — the surrounding knowledge survives; only the\n *   credential substring is neutralised.\n * - NEVER a bare high-entropy/hex pattern (it would hit git shas/hashes).\n *   Prefix-less service secrets are caught only via `labeled-hex-secret` (a 40+\n *   hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field).\n *\n * Two recommended integration shapes for consumers:\n *  (a) write boundary — `redactSecrets(text)` before persist (ingest gate);\n *  (b) egress — scrub before a value leaves to a user/LLM (highest-value guard).\n */\n\nexport interface SecretPattern {\n  /** stable id shown in the redaction marker + findings */\n  label: string;\n  /** human description of what this matches */\n  description: string;\n  /** global regex (used for replace-all + counting) */\n  regex: RegExp;\n}\n\n/** Ordered most-specific → least. Every regex carries the `g` flag. */\nexport const SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[] = [\n  {\n    label: 'private-key',\n    description: 'PEM private key block (RSA/EC/OPENSSH/DSA/PGP)',\n    regex:\n      /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\\s\\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'anthropic-api-key',\n    description: 'Anthropic API key (sk-ant-…)',\n    regex: /sk-ant-(?:api03-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // OpenRouter — distinct from OpenAI; runs BEFORE the generic sk- (which would\n    // otherwise also match + mislabel it).\n    label: 'openrouter-api-key',\n    description: 'OpenRouter API key (sk-or-v1- + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsk-or-v1-[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'openai-api-key',\n    description: 'OpenAI API key (sk-… / sk-proj-…)',\n    regex: /sk-(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // ElevenLabs — sk_ with UNDERSCORE (vs OpenAI sk-), 48 hex.\n    label: 'elevenlabs-api-key',\n    description: 'ElevenLabs API key (sk_ + 48 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsk_[0-9a-f]{48}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // fal.ai — uuid:hex32 (key_id:key_secret); the colon is the signal.\n    label: 'fal-api-key',\n    description: 'fal.ai key (uuid:hex32)',\n    regex: /\\b[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}:[0-9a-f]{32}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'google-api-key',\n    description: 'Google / Gemini API key (AIza…)',\n    regex: /AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'google-oauth-secret',\n    description: 'Google OAuth client secret (GOCSPX-…)',\n    regex: /GOCSPX-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{28}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'aws-access-key-id',\n    description: 'AWS access key id (AKIA…)',\n    regex: /\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'github-token',\n    description: 'GitHub token (ghp_/gho_/ghs_/ghu_/ghr_…)',\n    regex: /\\bgh[posru]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'gitlab-token',\n    description: 'GitLab personal access token (glpat-…)',\n    regex: /\\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'slack-token',\n    description: 'Slack token (xox[baprs]-…)',\n    regex: /\\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'stripe-secret-key',\n    description: 'Stripe live secret/restricted key (sk_live_/rk_live_…)',\n    regex: /\\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Resend (re_…). Lookahead requires a digit in the body so we don't redact\n    // long snake_case identifiers like re_compute_the_thing.\n    label: 'resend-api-key',\n    description: 'Resend API key (re_ + token)',\n    regex: /\\bre_(?=[A-Za-z0-9_]*\\d)[A-Za-z0-9_]{24,}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'supabase-access-token',\n    description: 'Supabase personal/management access token (sbp_ + 40 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bsbp_[0-9a-f]{40}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'supabase-secret-key',\n    description: 'Supabase secret API key (sb_secret_…)',\n    regex: /\\bsb_secret_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Used by every @broberg/* publish — the highest-value leak from a .env / commit history.\n    label: 'npm-token',\n    description: 'npm publish/automation token (npm_ + 36 base62)',\n    regex: /\\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'fly-api-token',\n    description: 'Fly.io API token (FlyV1 fm2_… / fo1_…)',\n    regex: /(?:FlyV1 fm2_[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{20,}|\\bfo1_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,})/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Also covers Turso DB/platform auth tokens AND Supabase anon/service_role\n    // keys — both are JWTs (eyJ…), so the single JWT pattern catches them.\n    label: 'jwt',\n    description: 'JSON Web Token (eyJ…) — incl. Turso + Supabase service_role tokens',\n    regex: /\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // genApiKey = randomBytes(24).hex → uk_ + exactly 48 lowercase hex.\n    label: 'upmetrics-key',\n    description: 'Upmetrics project key (uk_ + 48 hex)',\n    regex: /\\buk_[0-9a-f]{48}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'cardmem-key',\n    description: 'Cardmem personal/incident/project key (pa_/pi_/pk_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bp[aik]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // cardmem inbox-webhook key — piw_ isn't matched by p[aik]_ above (3rd char 'w' ≠ '_').\n    label: 'cardmem-webhook-key',\n    description: 'Cardmem inbox-webhook key (piw_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bpiw_[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'trail-key',\n    description: 'Trail personal API key (trail_…)',\n    regex: /\\btrail_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // randomBytes(32).hex → wh_ + 64 lowercase hex (67 chars total).\n    label: 'cms-access-token',\n    description: 'webhouse.app CMS access token (wh_ + 64 hex)',\n    regex: /\\bwh_[0-9a-f]{64}/g,\n  },\n  {\n    // Context-based catch for prefix-less high-entropy service secrets\n    // (CMS_JWT_SECRET, revalidateSecret, fleet openssl-rand-hex secrets): a 40+\n    // hex value assigned to a field whose name contains\n    // secret/token/password/api-key. The name requirement keeps the\n    // false-positive rate near zero (a bare 40/64-hex would hit shas/hashes).\n    label: 'labeled-hex-secret',\n    description: 'A 40+ hex value assigned to a secret/token/password/api-key-named field',\n    regex: /\\b[A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:secret|token|password|api[_-]?key)\\b\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"'`]?[0-9a-f]{40,}/gi,\n  },\n  {\n    // Discord bot token — three base64url segments. Anchored both sides so it\n    // can't partial-match a longer dotted string.\n    label: 'discord-bot-token',\n    description: 'Discord bot token (3 base64url segments)',\n    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,26}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,40}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'discord-mfa-token',\n    description: 'Discord MFA token (mfa. + 84 chars)',\n    regex: /\\bmfa\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{84}\\b/g,\n  },\n  {\n    label: 'cloudflare-global-key',\n    description: 'Cloudflare global API key (37-hex)',\n    regex: /\\b[0-9a-f]{37}\\b/g,\n  },\n];\n\nexport interface RedactionFinding {\n  label: string;\n  count: number;\n}\n\nexport interface RedactionResult {\n  /** input with every secret replaced by `[REDACTED:<label>]` */\n  redacted: string;\n  /** per-pattern counts of what was redacted (empty = clean) */\n  findings: RedactionFinding[];\n}\n\nexport interface RedactOptions {\n  /**\n   * Extra consumer/per-tenant patterns, run AFTER the canonical set (so canonical\n   * attribution wins). Backs a future self-service \"paste a key → detector\" UI.\n   */\n  extraPatterns?: SecretPattern[];\n}\n\n/** Replacement marker for a redacted secret. */\nexport const redactionMarker = (label: string): string => `[REDACTED:${label}]`;\n\nfunction patternsFor(opts?: RedactOptions): SecretPattern[] {\n  return opts?.extraPatterns && opts.extraPatterns.length > 0\n    ? [...SECRET_PATTERNS, ...opts.extraPatterns]\n    : SECRET_PATTERNS;\n}\n\n/**\n * Scan `text` and replace every detected secret with its redaction marker.\n * Pure: clean input returns byte-identical (`findings: []`).\n */\nexport function redactSecrets(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): RedactionResult {\n  if (!text) return { redacted: text, findings: [] };\n  let redacted = text;\n  const findings: RedactionFinding[] = [];\n  for (const p of patternsFor(opts)) {\n    let count = 0;\n    redacted = redacted.replace(p.regex, () => {\n      count++;\n      return redactionMarker(p.label);\n    });\n    if (count > 0) findings.push({ label: p.label, count });\n  }\n  return { redacted, findings };\n}\n\n/** True if `text` contains at least one detectable secret. */\nexport function hasSecret(text: string, opts?: RedactOptions): boolean {\n  return patternsFor(opts).some((p) => {\n    p.regex.lastIndex = 0;\n    return p.regex.test(text);\n  });\n}\n"]}

package/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+{
+  "name": "@broberg/secret-scan",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "description": "Pure, dependency-free secret/credential redaction for the broberg.ai fleet — redactSecrets / hasSecret over a curated, ordered SECRET_PATTERNS set. Redact at write + egress boundaries so keys never land in a DB, chat, or KB. Lifted from broberg/trail F197.",
+  "type": "module",
+  "license": "MIT",
+  "sideEffects": false,
+  "files": ["dist", "README.md"],
+  "main": "./dist/index.cjs",
+  "module": "./dist/index.js",
+  "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+  "exports": {
+    ".": {
+      "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/index.js",
+      "require": "./dist/index.cjs"
+    }
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsup",
+    "test": "vitest run",
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "tsup": "^8.3.0",
+    "typescript": "^5.6.0",
+    "vitest": "^2.1.0"
+  },
+  "keywords": [
+    "secret",
+    "redaction",
+    "credentials",
+    "security",
+    "api-key",
+    "token",
+    "secret-scanning",
+    "broberg"
+  ],
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "https://github.com/broberg-ai/components",
+    "directory": "packages/secret-scan"
+  },
+  "publishConfig": { "access": "public" }
+}