@briefgate/mcp 0.7.3 → 0.7.5

package/dist/index.js

@@ -10,201 +10,434 @@ import { StdioServerTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js'
 import { StreamableHTTPServerTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/streamableHttp.js';
 import { CallToolRequestSchema, ListToolsRequestSchema, } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js';
 import { createServer } from 'node:http';
+import { hostname } from 'node:os';
+import { AUTH_FAILED_MESSAGE } from './client.js';
 import { TOOLS, executeTool } from './tools.js';
-import { configForRequest, isAllowedHost, isAllowedOrigin } from './http-auth.js';
+import { configForRequest, isAllowedHost, isAllowedOrigin, protectedResourceMetadata, wwwAuthenticateHeader, WELL_KNOWN_PROTECTED_RESOURCE_PATH, WELL_KNOWN_PROTECTED_RESOURCE_MCP_PATH, } from './http-auth.js';
+import { PayloadTooLargeError, readBody } from './http-body.js';
+import { resolveApiKey } from './credentials.js';
+import { loginBlocking, logout as logoutLocal } from './login.js';
 // ─── Config ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-const apiKey = process.env['BRIEFGATE_API_KEY'];
+const argv = process.argv.slice(2);
+const apiKeyFlagIndex = argv.indexOf('--api-key');
+const cliApiKey = apiKeyFlagIndex !== -1 ? argv[apiKeyFlagIndex + 1] : undefined;
+const envApiKey = process.env['BRIEFGATE_API_KEY'];
 const baseUrl = process.env['BRIEFGATE_BASE_URL'] ?? 'https://api.briefgate.dev';
+// The OAuth authorization server advertised in the well-known resource
+// metadata (see protectedResourceMetadata below). Deliberately separate from
+// BRIEFGATE_BASE_URL: in production the MCP container reaches the API over an
+// internal network (BRIEFGATE_BASE_URL=http://api:8585), which the outside
+// world — a browser, claude.ai — could never open. Defaults to BASE_URL only
+// because that's convenient for local dev, where they're usually the same
+// address; a real deployment sets this explicitly (docker-compose.prod.yml
+// sets it to https://api.briefgate.dev).
+const authServer = process.env['BRIEFGATE_MCP_AUTH_SERVER'] ?? baseUrl;
 // Warn early if BRIEFGATE_BASE_URL looks unsafe — it controls where API calls
 // (including the Authorization header) are sent, so it must be an https URL in
-// production. http:// localhost/127.0.0.1 is allowed for local development.
+// production. http:// is allowed without a warning for hosts that never leave
+// a private network: localhost/127.0.0.1 (local development), a bare hostname
+// with no dot (a Docker/Compose service name like "api" — only resolvable
+// inside that network, e.g. BRIEFGATE_BASE_URL=http://api:8585), and the
+// conventional private-network suffixes *.internal / *.local.
 if (process.env['BRIEFGATE_BASE_URL']) {
-    const isLocalhostHttp = /^http:\/\/(?:localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)(:\d+)?(?:\/|$)/.test(baseUrl);
-    if (!baseUrl.startsWith('https://') && !isLocalhostHttp) {
+    const isHttps = baseUrl.startsWith('https://');
+    let isSafeHttp = false;
+    if (!isHttps) {
+        try {
+            const urlHostname = new URL(baseUrl).hostname;
+            isSafeHttp =
+                urlHostname === 'localhost' ||
+                    urlHostname === '127.0.0.1' ||
+                    urlHostname === '::1' ||
+                    !urlHostname.includes('.') ||
+                    urlHostname.endsWith('.internal') ||
+                    urlHostname.endsWith('.local');
+        }
+        catch {
+            // Malformed URL — leave isSafeHttp false so the warning fires; the
+            // request itself will fail with a clearer error once it's attempted.
+        }
+    }
+    if (!isHttps && !isSafeHttp) {
         process.stderr.write('Warning: BRIEFGATE_BASE_URL does not use https:// — API keys will be sent over an insecure connection.\n');
     }
 }
-if (!apiKey) {
-    // Start anyway so clients and registries (e.g. Glama, mcp.so) can
-    // introspect the tool list before a key is configured. Tool calls return
-    // a clear error until BRIEFGATE_API_KEY is set (see the CallTool handler).
-    process.stderr.write([
-        'Warning: BRIEFGATE_API_KEY is not set — tool calls will fail until it is.',
-        'Get an API key at https://briefgate.dev and set it in your MCP client config.',
-        'Example: BRIEFGATE_API_KEY=bg_live_... npx @briefgate/mcp',
-        '',
-    ].join('\n'));
-}
-const config = {
-    apiKey: apiKey ?? '',
-    baseUrl,
-};
-// Set to the hostname this server is published under (e.g. mcp.briefgate.dev)
-// to run it as a public, multi-customer endpoint. Unset — the default and the
-// only thing `npx @briefgate/mcp --http` does on a laptop — keeps the server on
-// loopback with the operator's own key, exactly as before.
-//
-// Turning it on changes two things on purpose:
-//   * the listener binds 0.0.0.0 and the Host guard accepts this name, because
-//     a server behind a reverse proxy is reached by its public name;
-//   * the BRIEFGATE_API_KEY fallback is switched OFF. Leaving it on would let
-//     an anonymous caller spend the operator's key, which is the whole failure
-//     this mode has to avoid.
-const PUBLIC_HOST = process.env['BRIEFGATE_MCP_PUBLIC_HOST'];
-// The version handed to clients in the MCP handshake. Read from package.json
-// rather than repeated here: hand-maintained it had drifted to 0.1.0 while the
-// package shipped 0.3.0, so every client was told the wrong version.
-const PACKAGE_VERSION = JSON.parse(readFileSync(new URL('../package.json', import.meta.url), 'utf8')).version;
-// ─── Server factory ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-// Returns a fresh Server instance bound to one caller's config.
+// ─── CLI subcommands: `login` / `logout` ───────────────────────────────────────
 //
-// HTTP mode builds one per request, which is what makes a public deployment
-// possible at all: the API key travels with the request rather than the
-// process, so two customers hitting the same server never share a credential.
-function buildServer(cfg) {
-    const server = new Server({ name: '@briefgate/mcp', version: PACKAGE_VERSION }, { capabilities: { tools: {} } });
-    server.setRequestHandler(ListToolsRequestSchema, async () => ({ tools: TOOLS }));
-    server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request) => {
-        const { name, arguments: rawArgs } = request.params;
-        const args = (rawArgs ?? {});
-        if (!cfg.apiKey) {
-            return {
-                content: [
-                    {
-                        type: 'text',
-                        text: PUBLIC_HOST
-                            ? 'Error: no API key was sent. Connect with an Authorization: Bearer bg_live_... header; get a key at https://briefgate.dev.'
-                            : 'Error: BRIEFGATE_API_KEY is not set. Get a key at https://briefgate.dev and add it to your MCP client config.',
-                    },
-                ],
-                isError: true,
-            };
-        }
+// `npx @briefgate/mcp login` / `logout` — the same device-authorization flow
+// as the `login`/`logout` MCP tools (src/login.ts), for a human running the
+// package directly from a terminal instead of asking an agent to call the
+// tool. Checked and handled before anything else: this is a one-shot command
+// that exits, not a server, so none of PUBLIC_HOST, the API-key warning below,
+// or a transport is relevant to it.
+const cliSubcommand = argv[0] === 'login' || argv[0] === 'logout' ? argv[0] : undefined;
+if (cliSubcommand === 'login') {
+    // Same "already configured" gate as the login tool: --api-key/env always
+    // override a locally stored key, so running the flow would be pointless.
+    const { apiKey: preconfiguredKey, source: preconfiguredSource } = resolveApiKey({
+        explicitApiKey: cliApiKey,
+        explicitSource: 'flag',
+        envApiKey,
+        baseUrl,
+        allowFileFallback: true,
+    });
+    if (preconfiguredKey && (preconfiguredSource === 'flag' || preconfiguredSource === 'env')) {
+        const via = preconfiguredSource === 'flag' ? '--api-key' : 'BRIEFGATE_API_KEY';
+        process.stdout.write(`An API key is already configured via ${via} — login is not needed.\n`);
+    }
+    else {
+        const clientName = `briefgate-mcp CLI on ${hostname()}`;
         try {
-            const result = await executeTool(name, cfg, args);
-            return {
-                content: [{ type: 'text', text: result.text }],
-                ...(result.isError ? { isError: true } : {}),
-            };
+            const result = await loginBlocking({ baseUrl, clientName }, ({ userCode, verificationUriComplete }) => {
+                process.stdout.write(`Open ${verificationUriComplete} and confirm code ${userCode}.\n`);
+                process.stdout.write('Waiting for approval (up to 10 minutes)...\n');
+            });
+            process.stdout.write(`${result.text}\n`);
+            process.exitCode = result.ok ? 0 : 1;
         }
         catch (err) {
-            const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
-            return {
-                content: [{ type: 'text', text: message }],
-                isError: true,
-            };
+            process.stderr.write(`${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}\n`);
+            process.exitCode = 1;
         }
-    });
-    return server;
+    }
 }
-// ─── Transport selection ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-const argv = process.argv.slice(2);
-const useHttp = argv.includes('--http') ||
-    process.env['BRIEFGATE_MCP_HTTP'] === '1';
-if (useHttp) {
-    // ── Streamable HTTP transport ──────────────────────────────────────────────
-    // Parse --port N or fall back to env / default.
-    const portIndex = argv.indexOf('--port');
-    const portArg = portIndex !== -1 ? parseInt(argv[portIndex + 1] ?? '', 10) : NaN;
-    const port = !isNaN(portArg)
-        ? portArg
-        : parseInt(process.env['BRIEFGATE_MCP_PORT'] ?? '', 10) || 3000;
-    // Loopback unless this server is deliberately published. On a laptop the
-    // loopback bind is what stops a browser-based attacker reaching the server at
-    // all; behind a reverse proxy it would stop the proxy too.
-    const host = PUBLIC_HOST ? '0.0.0.0' : '127.0.0.1';
-    const httpServer = createServer(async (req, res) => {
-        // DNS rebinding guard: reject requests whose Host header does not resolve
-        // to a loopback address. A real browser attacker cannot spoof this header,
-        // but a misconfigured proxy or custom client might send something unexpected.
-        const host_ = req.headers['host'] ?? '';
-        if (!isAllowedHost(host_, PUBLIC_HOST)) {
-            res.writeHead(400, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
-            res.end(JSON.stringify({
-                error: PUBLIC_HOST
-                    ? 'Invalid Host header'
-                    : 'Invalid Host header — only localhost connections are accepted',
-            }));
-            return;
-        }
-        // CORS: allow claude.ai and localhost origins; reject everything else.
-        const origin = req.headers['origin'];
-        if (origin !== undefined) {
-            if (isAllowedOrigin(origin, PUBLIC_HOST)) {
-                res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', origin);
-                res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods', 'POST, GET, DELETE, OPTIONS');
-                // authorization is on the list because that is how a remote caller
-                // sends its key; without it a browser client cannot connect at all.
-                res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Headers', 'Content-Type, mcp-session-id, authorization');
-            }
-            else {
-                res.writeHead(403, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
-                res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Origin not allowed' }));
-                return;
+else if (cliSubcommand === 'logout') {
+    process.stdout.write(`${await logoutLocal(baseUrl)}\n`);
+}
+// Everything below only matters for actually running the server — skipped
+// entirely for a CLI subcommand, which has already finished above.
+if (!cliSubcommand) {
+    // Set to the hostname this server is published under (e.g. mcp.briefgate.dev)
+    // to run it as a public, multi-customer endpoint. Unset — the default and the
+    // only thing `npx @briefgate/mcp --http` does on a laptop — keeps the server on
+    // loopback with the operator's own key, exactly as before.
+    //
+    // Turning it on changes several things on purpose:
+    //   * the listener binds 0.0.0.0 and the Host guard accepts this name, because
+    //     a server behind a reverse proxy is reached by its public name;
+    //   * the BRIEFGATE_API_KEY and locally-stored-credential fallbacks are
+    //     switched OFF. Leaving either on would let an anonymous caller spend the
+    //     operator's key, or read whatever `login` last wrote to this shared
+    //     machine — which is the whole failure this mode has to avoid;
+    //   * the server behaves as an OAuth 2.1 resource server (see the well-known
+    //     route and the Bearer-required check below) instead of accepting an
+    //     absent key on `initialize`/`tools/list`.
+    const PUBLIC_HOST = process.env['BRIEFGATE_MCP_PUBLIC_HOST'];
+    // Priority: --api-key > BRIEFGATE_API_KEY > a key `login` saved locally. The
+    // last of those is unavailable in published mode — see PUBLIC_HOST above.
+    const { apiKey, source: apiKeySource } = resolveApiKey({
+        explicitApiKey: cliApiKey,
+        explicitSource: 'flag',
+        envApiKey,
+        baseUrl,
+        allowFileFallback: !PUBLIC_HOST,
+    });
+    if (!apiKey && !PUBLIC_HOST) {
+        // Start anyway so clients and registries (e.g. Glama, mcp.so) can
+        // introspect the tool list before a key is configured. Tool calls return
+        // a clear error until one is available (see the CallTool handler).
+        process.stderr.write([
+            'Warning: no BriefGate API key configured — tool calls will fail until one is.',
+            'Either call the `login` tool from your MCP client to sign in interactively,',
+            'or get a key at https://briefgate.dev and set BRIEFGATE_API_KEY / --api-key.',
+            '',
+        ].join('\n'));
+    }
+    const config = {
+        apiKey,
+        baseUrl,
+        apiKeySource,
+    };
+    // The version handed to clients in the MCP handshake. Read from package.json
+    // rather than repeated here: hand-maintained it had drifted to 0.1.0 while the
+    // package shipped 0.3.0, so every client was told the wrong version.
+    const PACKAGE_VERSION = JSON.parse(readFileSync(new URL('../package.json', import.meta.url), 'utf8')).version;
+    // Returns a fresh Server instance bound to one caller's config.
+    //
+    // HTTP mode builds one per request, which is what makes a public deployment
+    // possible at all: the API key travels with the request rather than the
+    // process, so two customers hitting the same server never share a credential.
+    function buildServer(cfg, opts) {
+        const server = new Server({ name: '@briefgate/mcp', version: PACKAGE_VERSION }, { capabilities: { tools: {} } });
+        server.setRequestHandler(ListToolsRequestSchema, async () => ({ tools: TOOLS }));
+        server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request) => {
+            const { name, arguments: rawArgs } = request.params;
+            const args = (rawArgs ?? {});
+            // login/logout never need cfg.apiKey — signing in is the point of one,
+            // and the other only touches a local file — so they run before the
+            // missing-key check below, and are the one thing this handler treats
+            // differently between published and non-published mode.
+            if (name === 'login' || name === 'logout') {
+                if (opts.isPublicHost) {
+                    return {
+                        content: [
+                            {
+                                type: 'text',
+                                text: 'login/logout are not available on the hosted endpoint — connecting your client already triggers OAuth automatically. Manage keys at https://briefgate.dev.',
+                            },
+                        ],
+                        isError: true,
+                    };
+                }
+                const result = await executeTool(name, cfg, args, { clientName: server.getClientVersion()?.name });
+                return {
+                    content: [{ type: 'text', text: result.text }],
+                    ...(result.isError ? { isError: true } : {}),
+                };
+            }
+            if (!cfg.apiKey) {
+                return {
+                    content: [
+                        {
+                            type: 'text',
+                            text: opts.isPublicHost
+                                ? 'Error: no API key was sent. Connect with an Authorization: Bearer bg_live_... header; get a key at https://briefgate.dev.'
+                                : 'Not signed in. Call the `login` tool — it opens a browser page where you approve this device.',
+                        },
+                    ],
+                    isError: true,
+                };
+            }
+            try {
+                const result = await executeTool(name, cfg, args);
+                if (result.isError)
+                    opts.onToolError?.(result.text);
+                return {
+                    content: [{ type: 'text', text: result.text }],
+                    ...(result.isError ? { isError: true } : {}),
+                };
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                let message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+                // Non-published mode: point at the tool that fixes this, same as the
+                // missing-key message above. Published mode leaves the message as-is —
+                // opts.onToolError compares it verbatim against AUTH_FAILED_MESSAGE to
+                // decide whether to rewrite the HTTP status instead.
+                if (message === AUTH_FAILED_MESSAGE && !opts.isPublicHost) {
+                    message = 'This key was revoked or expired. Call `login` again.';
+                }
+                opts.onToolError?.(message);
+                return {
+                    content: [{ type: 'text', text: message }],
+                    isError: true,
+                };
             }
-        }
-        if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') {
-            res.writeHead(204).end();
-            return;
-        }
-        // Stateless mode: one Server + one Transport per request.
-        // This is correct because MCP tool calls are independent request/response
-        // cycles — no shared streaming context is needed between calls.
-        const rawBody = await readBody(req);
-        let parsedBody;
-        try {
-            parsedBody = rawBody ? JSON.parse(rawBody) : undefined;
-        }
-        catch {
-            res.writeHead(400, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
-            res.end(JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', error: { code: -32700, message: 'Parse error' }, id: null }));
-            return;
-        }
-        const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({ sessionIdGenerator: undefined });
-        const server = buildServer(configForRequest(req, { publicHost: PUBLIC_HOST, envApiKey: apiKey, baseUrl }));
-        res.on('close', () => {
-            transport.close();
-            server.close();
         });
-        try {
-            await server.connect(transport);
-            await transport.handleRequest(req, res, parsedBody);
-        }
-        catch (err) {
-            if (!res.headersSent) {
-                res.writeHead(500, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+        return server;
+    }
+    // ─── Transport selection ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    const useHttp = argv.includes('--http') ||
+        process.env['BRIEFGATE_MCP_HTTP'] === '1';
+    if (useHttp) {
+        // ── Streamable HTTP transport ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+        // Parse --port N or fall back to env / default.
+        const portIndex = argv.indexOf('--port');
+        const portArg = portIndex !== -1 ? parseInt(argv[portIndex + 1] ?? '', 10) : NaN;
+        const port = !isNaN(portArg)
+            ? portArg
+            : parseInt(process.env['BRIEFGATE_MCP_PORT'] ?? '', 10) || 3000;
+        // Loopback unless this server is deliberately published. On a laptop the
+        // loopback bind is what stops a browser-based attacker reaching the server at
+        // all; behind a reverse proxy it would stop the proxy too.
+        const host = PUBLIC_HOST ? '0.0.0.0' : '127.0.0.1';
+        const httpServer = createServer(async (req, res) => {
+            // DNS rebinding guard: reject requests whose Host header does not resolve
+            // to a loopback address. A real browser attacker cannot spoof this header,
+            // but a misconfigured proxy or custom client might send something unexpected.
+            const host_ = req.headers['host'] ?? '';
+            if (!isAllowedHost(host_, PUBLIC_HOST)) {
+                res.writeHead(400, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
                 res.end(JSON.stringify({
-                    jsonrpc: '2.0',
-                    error: { code: -32603, message: 'Internal server error' },
-                    id: null,
+                    error: PUBLIC_HOST
+                        ? 'Invalid Host header'
+                        : 'Invalid Host header — only localhost connections are accepted',
                 }));
+                return;
             }
-            process.stderr.write(`BriefGate MCP HTTP error: ${String(err)}\n`);
-        }
-    });
-    httpServer.listen(port, host, () => {
-        process.stderr.write(`BriefGate MCP server listening on http://${host}:${port}\n`);
-    });
-    httpServer.on('error', (err) => {
-        process.stderr.write(`BriefGate MCP HTTP server error: ${String(err)}\n`);
-        process.exit(1);
-    });
-}
-else {
-    // ── stdio transport (default) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
-    // One process, one user, key from the environment — a local client has no
-    // other way to hand one over.
-    const server = buildServer(config);
-    const transport = new StdioServerTransport();
-    await server.connect(transport);
-}
-// ─── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-function readBody(req) {
-    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-        const chunks = [];
-        req.on('data', (chunk) => chunks.push(Buffer.isBuffer(chunk) ? chunk : Buffer.from(chunk)));
-        req.on('end', () => resolve(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8')));
-        req.on('error', reject);
-    });
+            // OAuth resource metadata (RFC 9728): the one route on this server that
+            // isn't MCP JSON-RPC. Handled before the origin allowlist below because
+            // it must answer any origin — it's how a browser-based client discovers
+            // where to run OAuth in the first place, before it has any reason to be
+            // on our allowlist.
+            const pathname = (() => {
+                try {
+                    return new URL(req.url ?? '/', 'http://placeholder').pathname;
+                }
+                catch {
+                    return req.url ?? '/';
+                }
+            })();
+            // RFC 9728 defines the bare path; the MCP authorization spec also has
+            // clients look under one scoped to the resource itself — both must
+            // serve identical content.
+            if (PUBLIC_HOST &&
+                (pathname === WELL_KNOWN_PROTECTED_RESOURCE_PATH || pathname === WELL_KNOWN_PROTECTED_RESOURCE_MCP_PATH)) {
+                res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');
+                if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') {
+                    res.writeHead(204).end();
+                    return;
+                }
+                if (req.method !== 'GET') {
+                    res.writeHead(405, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+                    res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'method_not_allowed' }));
+                    return;
+                }
+                res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+                res.end(JSON.stringify(protectedResourceMetadata(PUBLIC_HOST, authServer)));
+                return;
+            }
+            // CORS: allow claude.ai and localhost origins; on a published server,
+            // any origin (see isAllowedOrigin's doc comment for why that's safe).
+            const origin = req.headers['origin'];
+            if (origin !== undefined) {
+                if (isAllowedOrigin(origin, PUBLIC_HOST)) {
+                    res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', origin);
+                    res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods', 'POST, GET, DELETE, OPTIONS');
+                    // authorization is on the list because that is how a remote caller
+                    // sends its key; without it a browser client cannot connect at all.
+                    // Mcp-Session-Id and Mcp-Protocol-Version are MCP transport headers
+                    // the SDK's client sends on every request.
+                    res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Headers', 'Content-Type, Authorization, Mcp-Session-Id, Mcp-Protocol-Version');
+                }
+                else {
+                    res.writeHead(403, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+                    res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Origin not allowed' }));
+                    return;
+                }
+            }
+            if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') {
+                res.writeHead(204).end();
+                return;
+            }
+            // Published mode is a full OAuth 2.1 resource server: every MCP request —
+            // including `initialize` and `tools/list`, which used to work without a
+            // key so registries could introspect the tool list — now needs a Bearer
+            // token, or the client has no signal to start the OAuth flow at all.
+            // Non-published mode is untouched: it still allows an absent key through
+            // to the CallTool handler, which reports the problem per-tool-call.
+            if (PUBLIC_HOST) {
+                const authHeader = req.headers['authorization'];
+                const hasBearer = typeof authHeader === 'string' && /^Bearer\s+\S+$/i.test(authHeader.trim());
+                if (!hasBearer) {
+                    res.writeHead(401, {
+                        'Content-Type': 'application/json',
+                        'WWW-Authenticate': wwwAuthenticateHeader(PUBLIC_HOST),
+                    });
+                    res.end(JSON.stringify({
+                        error: 'unauthorized',
+                        message: 'Missing bearer token. Connect via OAuth — see the resource metadata for the authorization server.',
+                    }));
+                    return;
+                }
+            }
+            // Stateless mode: one Server + one Transport per request.
+            // This is correct because MCP tool calls are independent request/response
+            // cycles — no shared streaming context is needed between calls.
+            let rawBody;
+            try {
+                rawBody = await readBody(req);
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                if (err instanceof PayloadTooLargeError) {
+                    res.writeHead(413, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+                    res.end(JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', error: { code: -32600, message: 'Request body too large' }, id: null }));
+                    // The body was abandoned mid-stream, so the socket may still be sitting
+                    // on unread bytes the client is trying to push — close it outright
+                    // rather than leaving it open for `end` to (never) fire.
+                    req.socket.destroy();
+                    return;
+                }
+                res.writeHead(400, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+                res.end(JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', error: { code: -32700, message: 'Parse error' }, id: null }));
+                return;
+            }
+            let parsedBody;
+            try {
+                parsedBody = rawBody ? JSON.parse(rawBody) : undefined;
+            }
+            catch {
+                res.writeHead(400, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+                res.end(JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', error: { code: -32700, message: 'Parse error' }, id: null }));
+                return;
+            }
+            // enableJsonResponse: this server never streams notifications to the
+            // client mid-call, so there is nothing an SSE response buys here — every
+            // request really is one request, one response. It also makes the 401
+            // rewrite below possible at all: the SDK's default SSE mode opens the
+            // stream (and so sends its 200 status line) before the tool call even
+            // starts, long before we know whether it will fail with an expired key.
+            const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({
+                sessionIdGenerator: undefined,
+                enableJsonResponse: true,
+            });
+            const cfg = configForRequest(req, { publicHost: PUBLIC_HOST, cliApiKey, envApiKey, baseUrl });
+            // The MCP transport always answers a tool call with HTTP 200 — a failed
+            // tool is a JSON-RPC-level result, not a transport-level one — so an
+            // expired/revoked key can't turn into a real 401 from inside the CallTool
+            // handler. We recover that signal here instead: buildServer tells us via
+            // onToolError whether the just-finished call failed with exactly
+            // AUTH_FAILED_MESSAGE, and if so this rewrites the response the transport
+            // is about to send, right before it hits the socket. Node's http module
+            // calls res.writeHead exactly once with the final status and headers
+            // (confirmed against the @hono/node-server version this SDK uses), which
+            // is what makes intercepting it here safe rather than fragile.
+            let rewriteToAuthFailed = false;
+            if (PUBLIC_HOST) {
+                const originalWriteHead = res.writeHead.bind(res);
+                res.writeHead = ((status, ...rest) => {
+                    if (rewriteToAuthFailed && status === 200) {
+                        return originalWriteHead(401, {
+                            'Content-Type': 'application/json',
+                            'WWW-Authenticate': wwwAuthenticateHeader(PUBLIC_HOST, 'invalid_token'),
+                        });
+                    }
+                    return originalWriteHead(status, ...rest);
+                });
+            }
+            const server = buildServer(cfg, {
+                isPublicHost: Boolean(PUBLIC_HOST),
+                onToolError: (message) => {
+                    if (PUBLIC_HOST && message === AUTH_FAILED_MESSAGE)
+                        rewriteToAuthFailed = true;
+                },
+            });
+            res.on('close', () => {
+                transport.close();
+                server.close();
+            });
+            try {
+                await server.connect(transport);
+                await transport.handleRequest(req, res, parsedBody);
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                if (!res.headersSent) {
+                    res.writeHead(500, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+                    res.end(JSON.stringify({
+                        jsonrpc: '2.0',
+                        error: { code: -32603, message: 'Internal server error' },
+                        id: null,
+                    }));
+                }
+                process.stderr.write(`BriefGate MCP HTTP error: ${String(err)}\n`);
+            }
+        });
+        httpServer.listen(port, host, () => {
+            process.stderr.write(`BriefGate MCP server listening on http://${host}:${port}\n`);
+        });
+        httpServer.on('error', (err) => {
+            process.stderr.write(`BriefGate MCP HTTP server error: ${String(err)}\n`);
+            process.exit(1);
+        });
+    }
+    else {
+        // ── stdio transport (default) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+        // One process, one user. `config` is a single mutable object shared by every
+        // request this process handles: when `login` succeeds it writes to the
+        // credentials file AND updates config.apiKey directly, so the very next
+        // tool call in this same session picks up the new key without a restart.
+        const server = buildServer(config, { isPublicHost: false });
+        const transport = new StdioServerTransport();
+        await server.connect(transport);
+    }
 }
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