@bridge_gpt/mcp-server 0.2.38 → 0.2.39

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@bridge_gpt/mcp-server",
-  "version": "0.2.38",
+  "version": "0.2.39",
   "description": "Bridge API MCP server — exposes Jira endpoints as MCP tools for Claude Code agents",
   "license": "MIT",
   "type": "module",
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
     "test": "npm run test:normal && npm run test:module-mocks",
     "test:normal": "node scripts/run-unit-tests.js normal",
     "test:module-mocks": "node scripts/run-unit-tests.js module-mocks",
-    "test:integration": "node --test build/integration/refresh-main.integration.test.js build/integration/command-provisioning.integration.test.js build/integration/start-tickets.integration.test.js build/integration/start-tickets-tier-handoff.integration.test.js build/integration/doctor.integration.test.js build/integration/agent-capabilities.integration.test.js build/integration/conductor-producer.integration.test.js build/integration/conductor-message-relay.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-http-runner.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-job-behaviors.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-recovery-jobs.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-spec-review-prompt.integration.test.js build/integration/resume-pre-spawn.git.integration.test.js build/integration/worker-finalization-origin.integration.test.js build/integration/post-remediation-merge-ci-wait.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-merge-supervision.integration.test.js build/integration/attachment-binary-roundtrip.integration.test.js build/integration/dependent-ticket-fresh-base.integration.test.js build/integration/execute-plan-instructions.integration.test.js build/integration/implement-ticket-finalization-order.integration.test.js build/integration/conductor-bundle-artifacts.integration.test.js build/integration/install-bridge-repo-resolution.integration.test.js build/integration/capability-report-contract.integration.test.js build/integration/request-brainstorm-general.integration.test.js build/integration/request-council-trigger-drop.integration.test.js build/integration/install-bridge-onboarding-launch.integration.test.js build/integration/install-bridge-conductor.integration.test.js build/integration/install-bridge-failure-guards.integration.test.js build/integration/learn-repository-pipeline.integration.test.js build/integration/visual-diff-mcp.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-mcp-provisioning.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-worktree-reentry.integration.test.js build/integration/sfcc-read-error-contract.integration.test.js build/integration/sfcc-read-surface.integration.test.js build/integration/sfcc-response-envelope.integration.test.js build/integration/sfcc-total-error-contract.integration.test.js build/integration/serve-stdio.integration.test.js build/integration/install-alias.integration.test.js build/integration/setup-epic-validation.integration.test.js build/integration/plane-cli.integration.test.js",
+    "test:integration": "node --test build/conductor/conductor-runtime.integration.test.js build/integration/refresh-main.integration.test.js build/integration/command-provisioning.integration.test.js build/integration/start-tickets.integration.test.js build/integration/start-tickets-tier-handoff.integration.test.js build/integration/doctor.integration.test.js build/integration/agent-capabilities.integration.test.js build/integration/conductor-producer.integration.test.js build/integration/conductor-message-relay.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-http-runner.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-job-behaviors.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-recovery-jobs.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-spec-review-prompt.integration.test.js build/integration/resume-pre-spawn.git.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-containment.git.integration.test.js build/integration/conduct-epic-cli.integration.test.js build/integration/conduct-epic-corrections.integration.test.js build/integration/worker-finalization-origin.integration.test.js build/integration/post-remediation-merge-ci-wait.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-merge-supervision.integration.test.js build/integration/attachment-binary-roundtrip.integration.test.js build/integration/dependent-ticket-fresh-base.integration.test.js build/integration/execute-plan-instructions.integration.test.js build/integration/implement-ticket-finalization-order.integration.test.js build/integration/conductor-bundle-artifacts.integration.test.js build/integration/install-bridge-repo-resolution.integration.test.js build/integration/capability-report-contract.integration.test.js build/integration/request-brainstorm-general.integration.test.js build/integration/request-council-trigger-drop.integration.test.js build/integration/install-bridge-onboarding-launch.integration.test.js build/integration/install-bridge-conductor.integration.test.js build/integration/install-bridge-conductor-executor.integration.test.js build/integration/install-bridge-failure-guards.integration.test.js build/integration/learn-repository-pipeline.integration.test.js build/integration/visual-diff-mcp.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-mcp-provisioning.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-worktree-reentry.integration.test.js build/integration/sfcc-read-error-contract.integration.test.js build/integration/sfcc-read-surface.integration.test.js build/integration/sfcc-response-envelope.integration.test.js build/integration/sfcc-total-error-contract.integration.test.js build/integration/sfcc-target-boundary.integration.test.js build/integration/serve-stdio.integration.test.js build/integration/install-alias.integration.test.js build/integration/setup-epic-validation.integration.test.js build/integration/plane-cli.integration.test.js build/integration/executor-auth-retirement.integration.test.js build/integration/decision-implications-command-scaffold.test.js build/integration/strict-mcp-worker-contract.test.js build/integration/executor-adapter-flow.test.js build/integration/install-cli-contract.integration.test.js build/integration/inline-phase-state-tools.test.js",
     "test:smoke": "node --test build/integration/packaged-cli-smoke.test.js",
     "canary:agent-capabilities": "npm run build && node scripts/agent-capabilities-canary.mjs",
     "prepublishOnly": "node scripts/bundle-assets.js && npm run build && node scripts/verify-shebang.cjs"
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
     "node": ">=18.0.0"
   },
   "overrides": {
-    "fast-uri": ">=4.1.1",
+    "fast-uri": ">=4.1.2",
     "hono": ">=4.13.1",
     "@hono/node-server": "^1.19.13",
     "ip-address": ">=10.1.1"

package/build/executor/worker-config-isolation.js

@@ -1,287 +0,0 @@
-/** Restrictive mode for the isolation directory itself (owner-only). */
-export const ISOLATION_DIR_MODE = 0o700;
-/** Owner-only mode for the seeded Bridge credential file. */
-export const ISOLATION_FILE_MODE = 0o600;
-/**
- * Fixed name prefix for every directory this module creates. The startup sweep
- * recognizes ONLY this prefix, which is what keeps it from deleting unrelated
- * temporary directories that happen to share the parent.
- */
-export const ISOLATION_DIR_PREFIX = "bapi-conductor-claude-cfg-";
-/**
- * Age past which the startup sweep may remove an orphan, deliberately far above
- * any supported worker lifetime (the longest executor job timeout is measured in
- * hours, not days). A directory younger than this may still belong to a LIVE
- * worker owned by a concurrent executor process, so the threshold is the only
- * thing preventing the sweep from deleting an in-use configuration.
- */
-export const ISOLATION_ORPHAN_MAX_AGE_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
-/** Platforms whose POSIX mode model supports the `0700` containment above. */
-const SUPPORTED_PLATFORMS = ["darwin", "linux"];
-/** Fixed remediation text per reason. Never includes a path or a value. */
-const REASON_MESSAGES = {
-    "unsupported-platform": "worker config isolation is not supported on this platform (POSIX 0700/0600 containment is required)",
-    "unsupported-auth-layout": "no ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is available to the executor; an OAuth/subscription-only login does not " +
-        "follow an isolated CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, and copying operator credentials is not permitted",
-    "missing-filesystem-dependency": "the executor was constructed without the filesystem boundaries worker config isolation requires",
-    "unsafe-isolation-parent": "the isolation parent directory is a symbolic link or not a directory; refusing to create an " +
-        "isolated config directory beneath it",
-    "directory-creation-failed": "the isolated config directory could not be created or permissioned",
-};
-/**
- * Render a capability failure as a bounded, secret-free sentence naming only the
- * platform and the fixed reason — the exact text posted as an `error_message`.
- */
-export function formatWorkerConfigIsolationReason(platform, reason) {
-    return `worker config isolation unavailable on ${platform}: ${REASON_MESSAGES[reason]}`;
-}
-/**
- * Decide whether isolation CAN be established here, without creating anything.
- *
- * Read-only by construction — this is what lets `doctor` reuse it (BAPI-731
- * requirement 4) while keeping doctor's no-writes contract. It never reads the
- * operator's `.claude.json`, never touches the credential store, and never
- * returns a credential value: the auth check is presence-only.
- */
-export function evaluateWorkerConfigIsolationCapability(deps) {
-    const platform = String(deps.platform);
-    if (!SUPPORTED_PLATFORMS.includes(deps.platform)) {
-        return { supported: false, platform, reason: "unsupported-platform" };
-    }
-    // Presence-only. The VALUE is never read into any result, log, or diagnostic.
-    const apiKey = deps.env?.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY;
-    if (typeof apiKey !== "string" || apiKey.trim().length === 0) {
-        return { supported: false, platform, reason: "unsupported-auth-layout" };
-    }
-    return { supported: true, platform, strategy: "api-key-env" };
-}
-function failure(platform, reason) {
-    return {
-        ok: false,
-        platform,
-        reason,
-        message: formatWorkerConfigIsolationReason(platform, reason),
-    };
-}
-/**
- * Create a private, owner-only configuration directory for ONE job attempt.
- *
- * The directory lives under the executor's temporary root — never inside the
- * worktree, which would put executor-owned state into the diff the worker is
- * about to commit and would be destroyed by the worktree's own reset/clean paths.
- *
- * Seeds NOTHING of the operator's Claude configuration. Inventory finding 3
- * established that no trust entry is needed to keep a headless worker from
- * prompting, and finding 4 established that the ANTHROPIC credential travels in
- * the environment. No projected fragment of the operator's configuration is
- * written, so none can get stale or over-grant.
- *
- * The single exception is {@link SeededBridgeCredential} — see that type for why
- * an empty directory is NOT sufficient for the Bridge credential specifically:
- * finding 4 does not extend to `BAPI_API_KEY`, which is denied from the worker
- * environment on purpose, leaving the redirected store as its only route in.
- */
-export async function establishWorkerConfigIsolation(deps, options = {}) {
-    const capability = evaluateWorkerConfigIsolationCapability(deps);
-    if (!capability.supported) {
-        return failure(capability.platform, capability.reason);
-    }
-    const platform = capability.platform;
-    let parent;
-    try {
-        parent = deps.tmpdir();
-    }
-    catch {
-        return failure(platform, "unsafe-isolation-parent");
-    }
-    if (typeof parent !== "string" || parent.length === 0) {
-        return failure(platform, "unsafe-isolation-parent");
-    }
-    // Reject a symlinked or non-directory parent BEFORE creating anything beneath
-    // it: `mkdtemp` under a symlink would silently place a credential-adjacent
-    // directory wherever the link points.
-    try {
-        const parentMeta = await deps.lstatPath(parent);
-        if (!parentMeta || parentMeta.isSymbolicLink || !parentMeta.isDirectory) {
-            return failure(platform, "unsafe-isolation-parent");
-        }
-    }
-    catch {
-        return failure(platform, "unsafe-isolation-parent");
-    }
-    // `mkdtemp` is atomic and collision-free, so two concurrent jobs on the same
-    // executor can never be handed the same directory.
-    let created;
-    try {
-        created = await deps.mkdtemp(deps.join(parent, ISOLATION_DIR_PREFIX));
-        if (typeof created !== "string" || created.length === 0) {
-            return failure(platform, "directory-creation-failed");
-        }
-    }
-    catch {
-        // The raw error may carry a host path; only the fixed reason escapes.
-        return failure(platform, "directory-creation-failed");
-    }
-    // Verify what we actually got is a real directory and not a link, then narrow
-    // it to owner-only. `mkdtemp` already creates at 0700 on POSIX; the explicit
-    // chmod makes the guarantee independent of the platform's umask behavior.
-    try {
-        const meta = await deps.lstatPath(created);
-        if (!meta || meta.isSymbolicLink || !meta.isDirectory) {
-            await safeDispose(deps, created);
-            return failure(platform, "unsafe-isolation-parent");
-        }
-        await deps.chmod(created, ISOLATION_DIR_MODE);
-    }
-    catch {
-        await safeDispose(deps, created);
-        return failure(platform, "directory-creation-failed");
-    }
-    // The isolated XDG root lives INSIDE the disposable directory, so a single
-    // recursive removal reclaims both and no second lifetime needs tracking.
-    const xdgConfigHome = deps.join(created, "xdg");
-    try {
-        await deps.mkdir(xdgConfigHome, { recursive: true });
-        await deps.chmod(xdgConfigHome, ISOLATION_DIR_MODE);
-    }
-    catch {
-        await safeDispose(deps, created);
-        return failure(platform, "directory-creation-failed");
-    }
-    // Seed the one credential the redirect would otherwise strip. Fail-CLOSED,
-    // matching this module's posture: a worker that cannot reach its Bridge MCP
-    // tools cannot do the job it was dispatched for, and the failure mode is a
-    // clean exit that looks like success. Refusing to spawn is strictly better
-    // than spawning a worker guaranteed to accomplish nothing.
-    const credential = options.bridgeCredential;
-    if (credential) {
-        if (!deps.writeFile) {
-            await safeDispose(deps, created);
-            return failure(platform, "missing-filesystem-dependency");
-        }
-        try {
-            const bridgeDir = deps.join(xdgConfigHome, "bridge");
-            await deps.mkdir(bridgeDir, { recursive: true });
-            await deps.chmod(bridgeDir, ISOLATION_DIR_MODE);
-            const storePath = deps.join(bridgeDir, "credentials.json");
-            await deps.writeFile(storePath, 
-            // Exactly the shape resolveCredentialBundle reads: a logical target
-            // mapping to its named secret values.
-            `${JSON.stringify({ [`bapi:${credential.repoName}`]: { BAPI_API_KEY: credential.apiKey } }, null, 2)}\n`);
-            // Narrow AFTER writing: the content is secret, and a permissive window
-            // between create and chmod is the whole risk being closed here.
-            await deps.chmod(storePath, ISOLATION_FILE_MODE);
-        }
-        catch {
-            // The raw error may carry a host path or the secret; only the fixed
-            // reason escapes.
-            await safeDispose(deps, created);
-            return failure(platform, "directory-creation-failed");
-        }
-    }
-    let disposed = false;
-    return {
-        ok: true,
-        isolation: {
-            claudeConfigDir: created,
-            xdgConfigHome,
-            async dispose() {
-                if (disposed)
-                    return null;
-                disposed = true;
-                try {
-                    await deps.rmRecursive(created);
-                    return null;
-                }
-                catch {
-                    // Best-effort by contract: cleanup failure must never replace an
-                    // already-determined job outcome, and the raw error never escapes.
-                    return "worker config isolation directory could not be removed";
-                }
-            },
-        },
-    };
-}
-/** Remove a partially-created directory, swallowing every failure. */
-async function safeDispose(deps, path) {
-    try {
-        await deps.rmRecursive(path);
-    }
-    catch {
-        /* best-effort */
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Remove stale isolation directories left behind by an ungraceful executor exit
- * (SIGKILL, OOM, host reboot) where per-job disposal never ran.
- *
- * Deliberately conservative, because this function deletes directories: it looks
- * only inside the executor's own temporary root, recognizes only entries
- * carrying {@link ISOLATION_DIR_PREFIX}, requires NON-following metadata to say
- * the entry is a real directory (so a symlink is skipped rather than followed),
- * and requires an age beyond {@link ISOLATION_ORPHAN_MAX_AGE_MS} so a live
- * concurrent executor's active job directory is never removed.
- *
- * Never throws: startup must proceed even if the sweep cannot run at all.
- */
-export async function sweepOrphanedWorkerConfigDirectories(deps) {
-    const result = { removed: 0, skipped: 0, diagnostics: [] };
-    const maxAgeMs = typeof deps.maxAgeMs === "number" ? deps.maxAgeMs : ISOLATION_ORPHAN_MAX_AGE_MS;
-    let parent;
-    try {
-        parent = deps.tmpdir();
-        if (typeof parent !== "string" || parent.length === 0) {
-            result.diagnostics.push("worker config isolation sweep skipped: no temporary root");
-            return result;
-        }
-    }
-    catch {
-        result.diagnostics.push("worker config isolation sweep skipped: no temporary root");
-        return result;
-    }
-    let entries;
-    try {
-        entries = await deps.readdir(parent);
-    }
-    catch {
-        result.diagnostics.push("worker config isolation sweep skipped: temporary root unreadable");
-        return result;
-    }
-    const cutoff = deps.now() - maxAgeMs;
-    for (const entry of entries) {
-        // Prefix match FIRST: anything the module did not create is not ours to
-        // delete, whatever its age.
-        if (typeof entry !== "string" || !entry.startsWith(ISOLATION_DIR_PREFIX)) {
-            result.skipped += 1;
-            continue;
-        }
-        const candidate = deps.join(parent, entry);
-        let meta;
-        try {
-            meta = await deps.lstatPath(candidate);
-        }
-        catch {
-            result.skipped += 1;
-            continue;
-        }
-        // A symlink is skipped, never followed — removing it recursively could
-        // delete whatever it points at.
-        if (!meta || meta.isSymbolicLink || !meta.isDirectory) {
-            result.skipped += 1;
-            continue;
-        }
-        if (!(meta.mtimeMs < cutoff)) {
-            result.skipped += 1;
-            continue;
-        }
-        try {
-            await deps.rmRecursive(candidate);
-            result.removed += 1;
-        }
-        catch {
-            result.skipped += 1;
-            result.diagnostics.push("worker config isolation sweep could not remove a stale directory");
-        }
-    }
-    return result;
-}