@bridge4dev/runner 0.22.1 → 0.26.0

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@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
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+ import { execFile } from 'node:child_process';
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+ import fs from 'node:fs';
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+ import os from 'node:os';
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+ import path from 'node:path';
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+ import { promisify } from 'node:util';
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+ import { knownWorkspacesPath } from './paths.js';
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+ const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
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+ export function runnerIdentity() {
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+ const uid = typeof process.getuid === 'function' ? process.getuid() : -1;
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+ const gid = typeof process.getgid === 'function' ? process.getgid() : -1;
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+ let user = process.env['USER'] ?? process.env['LOGNAME'] ?? '';
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+ if (!user) {
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+ try {
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+ user = os.userInfo().username;
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+ }
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+ catch {
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+ user = uid === 0 ? 'root' : String(uid);
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+ }
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+ }
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+ return { user, uid, gid, home: os.homedir(), isRoot: uid === 0 };
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+ }
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+ /** As root every access check passes, which is true and worth saying out loud. */
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+ function canAccess(target, mode) {
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+ try {
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+ fs.accessSync(target, mode);
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+ return true;
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+ }
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+ catch {
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ export function inspectPath(target) {
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+ const me = runnerIdentity();
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+ const base = {
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+ path: target,
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+ exists: false,
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+ isDirectory: false,
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+ ownerUid: -1,
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+ ownedByUs: false,
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+ readable: false,
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+ writable: false,
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+ unreachable: false,
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+ };
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+ let stat;
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+ try {
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+ stat = fs.statSync(target);
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+ }
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+ catch (error) {
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+ const code = error.code;
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+ return code === 'ENOENT' || code === 'ENOTDIR' ? base : { ...base, unreachable: true };
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+ }
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+ return {
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+ path: target,
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+ exists: true,
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+ isDirectory: stat.isDirectory(),
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+ ownerUid: stat.uid,
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+ ownedByUs: me.uid < 0 || stat.uid === me.uid,
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+ readable: canAccess(target, fs.constants.R_OK),
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+ writable: canAccess(target, fs.constants.W_OK),
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+ unreachable: false,
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+ };
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * The first directory on this path the runner cannot enter.
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+ *
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+ * «Permission denied» on `/srv/apps/shop` is usually not about `shop` at all —
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+ * it is about `/srv/apps`, and naming the wrong one sends the person to chmod
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+ * a directory that was never the problem.
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+ */
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+ export function firstUnreachableAncestor(target) {
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+ const parts = path.resolve(target).split(path.sep).filter(Boolean);
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+ let current = path.sep;
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+ for (const part of parts) {
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+ current = path.join(current, part);
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+ try {
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+ fs.statSync(current);
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+ }
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+ catch (error) {
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+ const code = error.code;
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+ // ENOENT here means the path simply ends — not a permission problem.
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+ return code === 'ENOENT' || code === 'ENOTDIR' ? null : current;
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+ }
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+ if (!canAccess(current, fs.constants.X_OK))
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+ return current;
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+ }
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Git refuses to work in a repository owned by somebody else — since 2022, and
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+ * with no exception for root. So the "obvious" fix for a dedicated user (chown
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+ * the project to it) breaks git for the person who was committing there before,
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+ * and the exception has to be added on BOTH sides.
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+ */
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+ export function safeDirectoryCommand(repoPath) {
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+ return `git config --global --add safe.directory ${repoPath}`;
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+ }
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+ export function looksLikeDubiousOwnership(message) {
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+ return /dubious ownership|safe\.directory/i.test(message);
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+ }
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+ /** Is this path already excused in the current user's git config? */
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+ export async function hasSafeDirectory(repoPath) {
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+ try {
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+ const { stdout } = await execFileAsync('git', ['config', '--global', '--get-all', 'safe.directory'], { timeout: 10_000 });
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+ const entries = stdout.split('\n').map((line) => line.trim());
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+ return entries.includes(repoPath) || entries.includes('*');
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+ }
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+ catch {
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+ // No git config at all (exit 1) — nothing is excused.
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ export async function addSafeDirectory(repoPath) {
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+ await execFileAsync('git', ['config', '--global', '--add', 'safe.directory', repoPath], {
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+ timeout: 10_000,
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+ });
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+ }
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+ function countAllowRules(file) {
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+ try {
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+ const parsed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8'));
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+ const allow = parsed.permissions?.allow;
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+ return Array.isArray(allow) ? allow.length : 0;
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+ }
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+ catch {
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ function countCommands(dir) {
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+ let total = 0;
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+ const walk = (current, depth) => {
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+ if (depth > 3)
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+ return;
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+ let entries;
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+ try {
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+ entries = fs.readdirSync(current, { withFileTypes: true });
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+ }
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+ catch {
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+ return;
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+ }
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+ for (const entry of entries) {
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+ if (entry.isDirectory())
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+ walk(path.join(current, entry.name), depth + 1);
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+ else if (entry.name.endsWith('.md'))
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+ total += 1;
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+ }
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+ };
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+ walk(dir, 0);
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+ return total;
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+ }
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+ export function agentConfigContour(home = os.homedir()) {
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+ const claudeDir = path.join(home, '.claude');
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+ const settings = path.join(claudeDir, 'settings.json');
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+ const localSettings = path.join(claudeDir, 'settings.local.json');
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+ const commandsDir = path.join(claudeDir, 'commands');
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+ const codexDir = path.join(home, '.codex');
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+ return {
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+ home,
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+ claudeDir: fs.existsSync(claudeDir),
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+ settings: fs.existsSync(settings),
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+ localSettings: fs.existsSync(localSettings),
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+ allowRules: fs.existsSync(localSettings)
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+ ? countAllowRules(localSettings)
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+ : fs.existsSync(settings)
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+ ? countAllowRules(settings)
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+ : null,
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+ commands: fs.existsSync(commandsDir) ? countCommands(commandsDir) : 0,
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+ plugins: fs.existsSync(path.join(claudeDir, 'plugins')),
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+ codexDir: fs.existsSync(codexDir),
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+ codexConfig: fs.existsSync(path.join(codexDir, 'config.toml')),
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+ };
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Another user's home that already has an agent set up.
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+ *
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+ * Only reported, never copied: a copied OAuth credential means two accounts
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+ * share one refresh token, and a rotation in either one silently invalidates
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+ * the other. Signing in as the runner's own user is the clean answer; the copy
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+ * is the fast one, and the person choosing between them deserves to be told
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+ * which is which.
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+ */
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+ export function otherHomeWithAgents(me = runnerIdentity()) {
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+ const candidates = me.isRoot ? [] : ['/root'];
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+ for (const home of candidates) {
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+ if (home === me.home)
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+ continue;
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+ if (fs.existsSync(path.join(home, '.claude')) || fs.existsSync(path.join(home, '.codex'))) {
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+ return home;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * `systemctl --user` talks over a per-user D-Bus socket, and finds it through
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+ * `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR`. Under `sudo -iu <user>` that variable is not set, and the
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+ * failure is worse than an error: it prints «Failed to connect to bus» and
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+ * exits **0**, so a health check reads it as success.
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+ */
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+ export function systemdUserEnv() {
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+ const env = { ...process.env };
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+ if (!env['XDG_RUNTIME_DIR']) {
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+ const uid = runnerIdentity().uid;
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+ if (uid >= 0)
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+ env['XDG_RUNTIME_DIR'] = `/run/user/${uid}`;
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+ }
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+ if (!env['DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS'] && env['XDG_RUNTIME_DIR']) {
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+ env['DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS'] = `unix:path=${env['XDG_RUNTIME_DIR']}/bus`;
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+ }
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+ return env;
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+ }
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+ /** True when the user bus is actually reachable — `systemctl --user` lies with exit 0. */
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+ export async function systemdUserBusReachable() {
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+ const dir = systemdUserEnv()['XDG_RUNTIME_DIR'];
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+ if (!dir || !fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, 'bus')))
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+ return false;
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+ try {
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+ const { stdout, stderr } = await execFileAsync('systemctl', ['--user', 'is-system-running'], {
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+ timeout: 10_000,
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+ env: systemdUserEnv(),
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+ });
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+ return !/Failed to connect to bus/i.test(`${stdout}${stderr}`);
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+ }
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+ catch (error) {
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+ // A non-zero exit is normal here (`degraded`, `starting`); only a bus
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+ // failure means we could not talk to systemd at all.
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+ const text = String(error?.stderr ?? error);
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+ return !/Failed to connect to bus|No medium found/i.test(text);
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+ }
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+ }
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+ /** The command form that works under `sudo -iu <user>` — printed in hints. */
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+ export function systemctlHint(args) {
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+ const me = runnerIdentity();
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+ if (me.isRoot)
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+ return `systemctl --user ${args}`;
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+ return `sudo -iu ${me.user} env XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/${me.uid} DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/${me.uid}/bus systemctl --user ${args}`;
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+ }
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+ // ─── Which project directories this machine actually works in ────────
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+ /**
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+ * Remembered from binding and from session starts, so `doctor` can check the
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+ * permissions of real projects instead of asking the person to name them.
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+ * Best-effort on purpose: a runner that cannot write its own state directory
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+ * has bigger problems than a diagnostic list, and none of them should turn a
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+ * session start into an error.
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+ */
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+ export function rememberWorkspacePath(workspacePath) {
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+ try {
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+ const file = knownWorkspacesPath();
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+ const known = knownWorkspacePaths();
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+ if (known.includes(workspacePath))
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+ return;
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+ fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
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+ // Newest last, capped: this is a diagnostic aid, not a registry.
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+ const next = [...known, workspacePath].slice(-32);
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+ fs.writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify(next, null, 2), { mode: 0o600 });
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+ }
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+ catch {
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+ /* diagnostics only */
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+ }
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+ }
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+ export function knownWorkspacePaths() {
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+ try {
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+ const parsed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(knownWorkspacesPath(), 'utf8'));
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+ if (!Array.isArray(parsed))
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+ return [];
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+ return parsed.filter((entry) => typeof entry === 'string' && entry.length > 0);
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+ }
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+ catch {
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+ return [];
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+ }
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+ }
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+ function whichExecutable(name) {
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+ for (const dir of (process.env['PATH'] ?? '').split(path.delimiter).filter(Boolean)) {
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+ const candidate = path.join(dir, name);
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+ try {
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+ fs.accessSync(candidate, fs.constants.X_OK);
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+ return candidate;
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+ }
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+ catch {
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+ /* keep looking */
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+ }
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+ }
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Node, as THIS user sees it.
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+ *
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+ * A dedicated user does not automatically inherit a Node installed for
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+ * somebody else — fnm, nvm and a root-only prefix are all per-user by design.
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+ * The runner itself is running, so node clearly exists somewhere; the question
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+ * this answers is whether it is on the daemon user's own PATH, because that is
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+ * what agent tooling and `npm install -g` will look at.
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+ */
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+ export async function nodeCheck() {
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+ const found = whichExecutable('node');
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+ if (!found)
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+ return { path: null, problem: 'node is not on this user’s PATH' };
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+ try {
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+ const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(found, ['--version'], { timeout: 10_000 });
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+ const version = stdout.trim();
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+ const major = Number(version.replace(/^v/, '').split('.')[0]);
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+ return {
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+ path: found,
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+ version,
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+ ...(Number.isFinite(major) && major < 20 ? { problem: 'Node 20 or newer is required' } : {}),
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+ };
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+ }
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+ catch (error) {
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+ return { path: found, problem: String(error instanceof Error ? error.message : error) };
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+ }
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Docker, as THIS user sees it.
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+ *
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+ * Reported rather than judged: plenty of projects never touch it. But when the
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+ * project's own workflow is `docker compose`, a dedicated user without access
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+ * to the socket produces a session that fails on its first command, and the
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+ * error will be about a socket rather than about a group nobody was added to.
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+ *
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+ * Worth stating where it is stated: being in the `docker` group is equivalent
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+ * to root on this machine. That is a fact for the owner to accept knowingly.
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+ */
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+ export async function dockerCheck() {
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+ const found = whichExecutable('docker');
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+ if (!found)
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+ return { path: null };
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+ const socket = '/var/run/docker.sock';
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+ if (fs.existsSync(socket) && !canAccess(socket, fs.constants.R_OK | fs.constants.W_OK)) {
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+ const me = runnerIdentity();
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+ return {
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+ path: found,
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+ problem: `${me.user} cannot use the docker socket (membership of the docker group is equivalent to root here)`,
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+ };
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+ }
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+ try {
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+ await execFileAsync(found, ['info', '--format', '{{.ServerVersion}}'], { timeout: 15_000 });
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+ return { path: found };
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+ }
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+ catch (error) {
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+ return {
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+ path: found,
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+ problem: `docker is installed but did not answer: ${String(error instanceof Error ? error.message : error).slice(0, 160)}`,
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+ };
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+ }
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Does the service survive a logout?
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+ *
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+ * `loginctl enable-linger` is what keeps a user's systemd services running with
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+ * nobody logged in. `install-service` turns it on, but a unit installed by hand
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+ * — or a user created afterwards — can miss it, and the failure looks like
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+ * «the server goes offline whenever I close the terminal».
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+ */
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+ export async function lingerEnabled() {
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+ const me = runnerIdentity();
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+ try {
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+ const { stdout } = await execFileAsync('loginctl', ['show-user', me.user, '--property=Linger'], { timeout: 10_000 });
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+ return stdout.trim().endsWith('=yes');
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+ }
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+ catch {
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+ // No loginctl, or the user has no session recorded — unknown, not false.
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+ return null;
360
+ }
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+ }
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+ /**
363
+ * Make the agent CLIs findable, without taking anything away.
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+ *
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+ * A systemd user service starts with the manager's PATH, which is the
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+ * distribution default — `/usr/bin` and friends. Both agent CLIs are commonly
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+ * installed somewhere else: `~/.local/bin` for a per-user install, and a
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+ * node managed by fnm/nvm/volta lives under its own version directory. When
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+ * `codex` sits there, the runner scans PATH, does not find it, and reports to
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+ * the dashboard that this machine has no Codex at all — the agent the person
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+ * installed simply never appears.
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+ *
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+ * Deliberately APPEND-ONLY, and deliberately in the process rather than in the
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+ * unit file. Writing `Environment=PATH=…` into the unit would REPLACE whatever
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+ * systemd gives the service today (`/snap/bin`, anything set through
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+ * `environment.d`), trading something that works for something that is
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+ * missing. Here nothing can be lost: entries are only added when they are
378
+ * absent and the directory actually exists.
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+ *
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+ * Returns what it added, so the caller can say so once at startup.
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+ */
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+ export function ensureAgentPath() {
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+ const entries = (process.env['PATH'] ?? '').split(path.delimiter).filter(Boolean);
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+ const added = [];
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+ for (const candidate of [
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+ path.join(os.homedir(), '.local', 'bin'),
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+ // The directory of the node running us — under fnm/nvm the agent CLIs and
388
+ // other globally installed tools sit next to it.
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+ path.dirname(process.execPath),
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+ ]) {
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+ if (!candidate || entries.includes(candidate))
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+ continue;
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+ let usable;
394
+ try {
395
+ usable = fs.statSync(candidate).isDirectory();
396
+ }
397
+ catch {
398
+ usable = false;
399
+ }
400
+ if (!usable)
401
+ continue;
402
+ entries.push(candidate);
403
+ added.push(candidate);
404
+ }
405
+ if (added.length > 0)
406
+ process.env['PATH'] = entries.join(path.delimiter);
407
+ return added;
408
+ }
409
+ //# sourceMappingURL=environment.js.map
package/dist/git.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -5,6 +5,16 @@ export interface PathValidation {
5
5
  branch?: string;
6
6
  error?: string;
7
7
  }
8
+ /**
9
+ * Can this runner actually work in this directory — as the user it runs as?
10
+ *
11
+ * Everything here answers with the fix rather than the symptom. Binding a
12
+ * project is the moment the two legitimate install choices (root / dedicated
13
+ * user) start to differ, and until now the second one failed by forwarding
14
+ * git's own words to a dashboard the person may have no shell behind:
15
+ * «git check failed: fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository at
16
+ * '/opt/ids'». That sentence is true and unactionable.
17
+ */
8
18
  export declare function validateWorkspacePath(workspacePath: string): Promise<PathValidation>;
9
19
  export declare function sessionShortId(sessionId: string): string;
10
20
  export declare function sessionWorktreePath(sessionId: string): string;
package/dist/git.js CHANGED
@@ -3,32 +3,121 @@ import fs from 'node:fs';
3
3
  import path from 'node:path';
4
4
  import { promisify } from 'node:util';
5
5
  import { previewsDir, worktreesDir } from './paths.js';
6
+ import { firstUnreachableAncestor, inspectPath, looksLikeDubiousOwnership, runnerIdentity, safeDirectoryCommand, } from './environment.js';
6
7
  const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
7
8
  const GIT_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
8
9
  async function git(cwd, ...args) {
9
10
  const { stdout } = await execFileAsync('git', args, { cwd, timeout: GIT_TIMEOUT_MS });
10
11
  return stdout.trim();
11
12
  }
13
+ /**
14
+ * Can this runner actually work in this directory — as the user it runs as?
15
+ *
16
+ * Everything here answers with the fix rather than the symptom. Binding a
17
+ * project is the moment the two legitimate install choices (root / dedicated
18
+ * user) start to differ, and until now the second one failed by forwarding
19
+ * git's own words to a dashboard the person may have no shell behind:
20
+ * «git check failed: fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository at
21
+ * '/opt/ids'». That sentence is true and unactionable.
22
+ */
12
23
  export async function validateWorkspacePath(workspacePath) {
13
- if (!fs.existsSync(workspacePath) || !fs.statSync(workspacePath).isDirectory()) {
14
- return { ok: false, exists: false, isGitRepo: false, error: 'Directory does not exist' };
24
+ const me = runnerIdentity();
25
+ const dir = inspectPath(workspacePath);
26
+ // «Cannot look» and «is not there» are opposite instructions to whoever reads
27
+ // this, and both arrive as a thrown `statSync`. A dedicated-user install hits
28
+ // the first one constantly — usually on a directory ABOVE the project, which
29
+ // is why the blocking one is named rather than the one that was asked about.
30
+ if (dir.unreachable) {
31
+ const blocked = firstUnreachableAncestor(workspacePath) ?? workspacePath;
32
+ return {
33
+ ok: false,
34
+ exists: true,
35
+ isGitRepo: false,
36
+ error: `The runner runs as ${me.user} and is not allowed into ${blocked}, so it cannot reach ${workspacePath}. ` +
37
+ `Grant that user access to the directory (for example \`chmod o+x ${blocked}\`, ` +
38
+ `or \`setfacl -m u:${me.user}:x ${blocked}\`), then try again.`,
39
+ };
40
+ }
41
+ if (!dir.exists || !dir.isDirectory) {
42
+ return {
43
+ ok: false,
44
+ exists: dir.exists,
45
+ isGitRepo: false,
46
+ error: dir.exists
47
+ ? `${workspacePath} is not a directory`
48
+ : `${workspacePath} does not exist on this server`,
49
+ };
50
+ }
51
+ // A directory we cannot even enter: as a non-root runner this is the most
52
+ // common outcome of pointing at somebody else's project, and git's error for
53
+ // it says nothing about permissions.
54
+ if (!dir.readable) {
55
+ return {
56
+ ok: false,
57
+ exists: true,
58
+ isGitRepo: false,
59
+ error: `The runner runs as ${me.user} and cannot read ${workspacePath}. ` +
60
+ `Give that user access (for example \`setfacl -R -m u:${me.user}:rX ${workspacePath}\`, ` +
61
+ `or \`chown -R ${me.user} ${workspacePath}\` if the directory is meant to be theirs), then try again.`,
62
+ };
15
63
  }
16
64
  try {
17
65
  const inside = await git(workspacePath, 'rev-parse', '--is-inside-work-tree');
18
66
  if (inside !== 'true') {
19
67
  return { ok: false, exists: true, isGitRepo: false, error: 'Not a git work tree' };
20
68
  }
21
- const branch = await git(workspacePath, 'rev-parse', '--abbrev-ref', 'HEAD');
22
- return { ok: true, exists: true, isGitRepo: true, branch };
23
69
  }
24
70
  catch (error) {
71
+ const message = String(error instanceof Error ? error.message : error);
72
+ if (looksLikeDubiousOwnership(message)) {
73
+ // The single most common failure of a dedicated-user install, and the one
74
+ // whose fix is one line — which is why we print the line.
75
+ const owner = dir.ownerUid >= 0 ? ` (it belongs to uid ${dir.ownerUid})` : '';
76
+ return {
77
+ ok: false,
78
+ exists: true,
79
+ isGitRepo: false,
80
+ error: `Git refuses to use ${workspacePath} because the runner runs as ${me.user} and does not own it${owner}. ` +
81
+ `Run this on the server as ${me.user}: ${safeDirectoryCommand(workspacePath)} — ` +
82
+ `or run \`devbridge-runner doctor --fix\`, which does it for every bound project. ` +
83
+ `Note: if you instead hand the directory over with \`chown\`, add the same line for its previous owner, ` +
84
+ `who will otherwise lose git in that repository.`,
85
+ };
86
+ }
25
87
  return {
26
88
  ok: false,
27
89
  exists: true,
28
90
  isGitRepo: false,
29
- error: `git check failed: ${String(error instanceof Error ? error.message : error).slice(0, 300)}`,
91
+ error: `git check failed: ${message.slice(0, 300)}`,
30
92
  };
31
93
  }
94
+ // Sessions write here: a worktree registers itself inside `.git/worktrees`,
95
+ // and a DIRECT-mode session commits in the tree itself. Read-only access
96
+ // binds fine and then fails on the first session, which is the worst place
97
+ // to learn about it.
98
+ const gitDir = await resolveGitDir(workspacePath);
99
+ const gitAccess = gitDir ? inspectPath(gitDir) : null;
100
+ if (gitAccess && gitAccess.exists && !gitAccess.writable) {
101
+ return {
102
+ ok: false,
103
+ exists: true,
104
+ isGitRepo: true,
105
+ error: `The runner runs as ${me.user} and cannot write to ${gitDir}, so it could not create a branch or a worktree here. ` +
106
+ `Give that user write access to the repository (for example \`chown -R ${me.user} ${workspacePath}\`), then try again.`,
107
+ };
108
+ }
109
+ const branch = await git(workspacePath, 'rev-parse', '--abbrev-ref', 'HEAD');
110
+ return { ok: true, exists: true, isGitRepo: true, branch };
111
+ }
112
+ /** The real `.git` directory of a work tree (a linked worktree has a file there). */
113
+ async function resolveGitDir(workspacePath) {
114
+ try {
115
+ const common = await git(workspacePath, 'rev-parse', '--git-common-dir');
116
+ return path.resolve(workspacePath, common);
117
+ }
118
+ catch {
119
+ return null;
120
+ }
32
121
  }
33
122
  export function sessionShortId(sessionId) {
34
123
  return sessionId.replace(/-/g, '').slice(0, 8);