@bquery/bquery 1.3.0 → 1.4.0

package/dist/sanitize-1FBEPAFH.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"sanitize-1FBEPAFH.js","sources":["../src/security/constants.ts","../src/security/sanitize-core.ts","../src/security/sanitize.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Security constants and safe lists.\n *\n * @module bquery/security\n */\n\n/**\n * Trusted Types policy name.\n */\nexport const POLICY_NAME = 'bquery-sanitizer';\n\n/**\n * Default allowed HTML tags considered safe.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS = new Set([\n  'a',\n  'abbr',\n  'address',\n  'article',\n  'aside',\n  'b',\n  'bdi',\n  'bdo',\n  'blockquote',\n  'br',\n  'button',\n  'caption',\n  'cite',\n  'code',\n  'col',\n  'colgroup',\n  'data',\n  'dd',\n  'del',\n  'details',\n  'dfn',\n  'div',\n  'dl',\n  'dt',\n  'em',\n  'figcaption',\n  'figure',\n  'footer',\n  'form',\n  'h1',\n  'h2',\n  'h3',\n  'h4',\n  'h5',\n  'h6',\n  'header',\n  'hgroup',\n  'hr',\n  'i',\n  'img',\n  'input',\n  'ins',\n  'kbd',\n  'label',\n  'legend',\n  'li',\n  'main',\n  'mark',\n  'nav',\n  'ol',\n  'optgroup',\n  'option',\n  'p',\n  'picture',\n  'pre',\n  'progress',\n  'q',\n  'rp',\n  'rt',\n  'ruby',\n  's',\n  'samp',\n  'section',\n  'select',\n  'small',\n  'source',\n  'span',\n  'strong',\n  'sub',\n  'summary',\n  'sup',\n  'table',\n  'tbody',\n  'td',\n  'textarea',\n  'tfoot',\n  'th',\n  'thead',\n  'time',\n  'tr',\n  'u',\n  'ul',\n  'var',\n  'wbr',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Explicitly dangerous tags that should never be allowed.\n * These are checked even if somehow added to allowTags.\n */\nexport const DANGEROUS_TAGS = new Set([\n  'script',\n  'iframe',\n  'frame',\n  'frameset',\n  'object',\n  'embed',\n  'applet',\n  'link',\n  'meta',\n  'style',\n  'base',\n  'template',\n  'slot',\n  'math',\n  'svg',\n  'foreignobject',\n  'noscript',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Reserved IDs that could cause DOM clobbering attacks.\n * These are prevented to avoid overwriting global browser objects.\n */\nexport const RESERVED_IDS = new Set([\n  // Global objects\n  'document',\n  'window',\n  'location',\n  'top',\n  'self',\n  'parent',\n  'frames',\n  'history',\n  'navigator',\n  'screen',\n  // Dangerous functions\n  'alert',\n  'confirm',\n  'prompt',\n  'eval',\n  'function',\n  // Document properties\n  'cookie',\n  'domain',\n  'referrer',\n  'body',\n  'head',\n  'forms',\n  'images',\n  'links',\n  'scripts',\n  // DOM traversal properties\n  'children',\n  'parentnode',\n  'firstchild',\n  'lastchild',\n  // Content manipulation\n  'innerhtml',\n  'outerhtml',\n  'textcontent',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Default allowed attributes considered safe.\n * Note: 'style' is excluded by default because inline CSS can be abused for:\n * - UI redressing attacks\n * - Data exfiltration via url() in CSS\n * - CSS injection vectors\n * If you need to allow inline styles, add 'style' to allowAttributes in your\n * sanitizeHtml options, but ensure you implement proper CSS value validation.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTRIBUTES = new Set([\n  'alt',\n  'class',\n  'dir',\n  'height',\n  'hidden',\n  'href',\n  'id',\n  'lang',\n  'loading',\n  'name',\n  'rel',\n  'role',\n  'src',\n  'srcset',\n  'tabindex',\n  'target',\n  'title',\n  'type',\n  'width',\n  'aria-*',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Dangerous attribute prefixes to always remove.\n */\nexport const DANGEROUS_ATTR_PREFIXES = ['on', 'formaction', 'xlink:', 'xmlns:'];\n\n/**\n * Dangerous URL protocols to block.\n */\nexport const DANGEROUS_PROTOCOLS = ['javascript:', 'data:', 'vbscript:', 'file:'];\n","/**\n * Core HTML sanitization logic.\n *\n * @module bquery/security\n * @internal\n */\n\nimport {\n  DANGEROUS_ATTR_PREFIXES,\n  DANGEROUS_PROTOCOLS,\n  DANGEROUS_TAGS,\n  DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTRIBUTES,\n  DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS,\n  RESERVED_IDS,\n} from './constants';\nimport type { SanitizeOptions } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Check if an attribute name is allowed.\n * @internal\n */\nconst isAllowedAttribute = (\n  name: string,\n  allowedSet: Set<string>,\n  allowDataAttrs: boolean\n): boolean => {\n  const lowerName = name.toLowerCase();\n\n  // Check dangerous prefixes\n  for (const prefix of DANGEROUS_ATTR_PREFIXES) {\n    if (lowerName.startsWith(prefix)) return false;\n  }\n\n  // Check data attributes\n  if (allowDataAttrs && lowerName.startsWith('data-')) return true;\n\n  // Check aria attributes (allowed by default)\n  if (lowerName.startsWith('aria-')) return true;\n\n  // Check explicit allow list\n  return allowedSet.has(lowerName);\n};\n\n/**\n * Check if an ID/name value could cause DOM clobbering.\n * @internal\n */\nconst isSafeIdOrName = (value: string): boolean => {\n  const lowerValue = value.toLowerCase().trim();\n  return !RESERVED_IDS.has(lowerValue);\n};\n\n/**\n * Normalize URL by removing control characters, whitespace, and Unicode tricks.\n * Enhanced to prevent various bypass techniques.\n * @internal\n */\nconst normalizeUrl = (value: string): string =>\n  value\n    // Remove null bytes and control characters\n    .replace(/[\\u0000-\\u001F\\u007F]+/g, '')\n    // Remove zero-width characters that could hide malicious content\n    .replace(/[\\u200B-\\u200D\\uFEFF\\u2028\\u2029]+/g, '')\n    // Remove escaped Unicode sequences\n    .replace(/\\\\u[\\da-fA-F]{4}/g, '')\n    // Remove whitespace\n    .replace(/\\s+/g, '')\n    // Normalize case\n    .toLowerCase();\n\n/**\n * Check if a URL value is safe.\n * @internal\n */\nconst isSafeUrl = (value: string): boolean => {\n  const normalized = normalizeUrl(value);\n  for (const protocol of DANGEROUS_PROTOCOLS) {\n    if (normalized.startsWith(protocol)) return false;\n  }\n  return true;\n};\n\n/**\n * Check if a URL is external (different origin).\n * @internal\n */\nconst isExternalUrl = (url: string): boolean => {\n  try {\n    // Normalize URL by trimming whitespace\n    const trimmedUrl = url.trim();\n\n    // Protocol-relative URLs (//example.com) are always external.\n    // CRITICAL: This check must run before the relative-URL check below;\n    // otherwise, a protocol-relative URL like \"//evil.com\" would be treated\n    // as a non-http(s) relative URL and incorrectly classified as same-origin.\n    // Handling them up front guarantees correct security classification.\n    if (trimmedUrl.startsWith('//')) {\n      return true;\n    }\n\n    // Normalize URL for case-insensitive protocol checks\n    const lowerUrl = trimmedUrl.toLowerCase();\n\n    // Check for non-http(s) protocols which are considered external/special\n    // (mailto:, tel:, ftp:, etc.)\n    const hasProtocol = /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:/i.test(trimmedUrl);\n    if (hasProtocol && !lowerUrl.startsWith('http://') && !lowerUrl.startsWith('https://')) {\n      // These are special protocols, not traditional \"external\" links\n      // but we treat them as external for security consistency\n      return true;\n    }\n\n    // Relative URLs are not external\n    if (!lowerUrl.startsWith('http://') && !lowerUrl.startsWith('https://')) {\n      return false;\n    }\n\n    // In non-browser environments (e.g., Node.js), treat all absolute URLs as external\n    if (typeof window === 'undefined' || !window.location) {\n      return true;\n    }\n\n    const urlObj = new URL(trimmedUrl, window.location.href);\n    return urlObj.origin !== window.location.origin;\n  } catch {\n    // If URL parsing fails, treat as potentially external for safety\n    return true;\n  }\n};\n\n/**\n * Parse an HTML string into a Document using DOMParser.\n * This helper is intentionally separated to make the control-flow around HTML parsing\n * explicit for static analysis tools. It should ONLY be called when the input is\n * known to contain HTML syntax (angle brackets).\n *\n * DOMParser creates an inert document where scripts don't execute, making it safe\n * for parsing untrusted HTML that will subsequently be sanitized.\n *\n * @param htmlContent - A string that is known to contain HTML markup (has < or >)\n * @returns The parsed Document\n * @internal\n */\nconst parseHtmlDocument = (htmlContent: string): Document => {\n  const parser = new DOMParser();\n  // Parse as a full HTML document in an inert context; scripts won't execute\n  return parser.parseFromString(htmlContent, 'text/html');\n};\n\n/**\n * Safely parse HTML string into a DocumentFragment using DOMParser.\n * DOMParser is preferred over innerHTML for security as it creates an inert document\n * where scripts don't execute and provides better static analysis recognition.\n *\n * This function includes input normalization to satisfy static analysis tools:\n * - Coerces input to string and trims whitespace\n * - For plain text (no HTML tags), creates a Text node directly without parsing\n * - Only invokes DOMParser for actual HTML-like content via parseHtmlDocument\n *\n * The separation between plain text handling and HTML parsing is intentional:\n * DOM text that contains no HTML syntax is never fed into an HTML parser,\n * preventing \"DOM text reinterpreted as HTML\" issues.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nconst parseHtmlSafely = (html: string): DocumentFragment => {\n  // Step 1: Normalize input - coerce to string and trim\n  // This defensive check handles edge cases even though TypeScript says it's a string\n  const normalizedHtml = (typeof html === 'string' ? html : String(html ?? '')).trim();\n\n  // Step 2: Create the fragment that will hold our result\n  const fragment = document.createDocumentFragment();\n\n  // Step 3: Early return for empty input\n  if (normalizedHtml.length === 0) {\n    return fragment;\n  }\n\n  // Step 4: If input contains no angle brackets, it's plain text - no HTML parsing needed.\n  // Plain text is handled as a Text node, never passed to an HTML parser.\n  // This explicitly prevents \"DOM text reinterpreted as HTML\" for purely textual inputs.\n  const containsHtmlSyntax = normalizedHtml.includes('<') || normalizedHtml.includes('>');\n  if (!containsHtmlSyntax) {\n    fragment.appendChild(document.createTextNode(normalizedHtml));\n    return fragment;\n  }\n\n  // Step 5: Input contains HTML syntax - parse it via the dedicated HTML parsing helper.\n  // This separation makes the data-flow explicit: only strings with HTML syntax\n  // are passed to DOMParser, satisfying static analysis requirements.\n  const doc = parseHtmlDocument(normalizedHtml);\n\n  // Move all children from the document body into the fragment.\n  // This avoids interpolating untrusted HTML into an outer wrapper string.\n  const body = doc.body;\n\n  if (!body) {\n    return fragment;\n  }\n\n  while (body.firstChild) {\n    fragment.appendChild(body.firstChild);\n  }\n\n  return fragment;\n};\n\n/**\n * Core sanitization logic (without Trusted Types wrapper).\n * @internal\n */\nexport const sanitizeHtmlCore = (html: string, options: SanitizeOptions = {}): string => {\n  const {\n    allowTags = [],\n    allowAttributes = [],\n    allowDataAttributes = true,\n    stripAllTags = false,\n  } = options;\n\n  // Build combined allow sets (excluding dangerous tags even if specified)\n  const allowedTags = new Set(\n    [...DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, ...allowTags.map((t) => t.toLowerCase())].filter(\n      (tag) => !DANGEROUS_TAGS.has(tag)\n    )\n  );\n  const allowedAttrs = new Set([\n    ...DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTRIBUTES,\n    ...allowAttributes.map((a) => a.toLowerCase()),\n  ]);\n\n  // Use DOMParser for safe HTML parsing (inert context, no script execution)\n  const fragment = parseHtmlSafely(html);\n\n  if (stripAllTags) {\n    return fragment.textContent ?? '';\n  }\n\n  // Walk the DOM tree\n  const walker = document.createTreeWalker(fragment, NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT);\n\n  const toRemove: Element[] = [];\n\n  while (walker.nextNode()) {\n    const el = walker.currentNode as Element;\n    const tagName = el.tagName.toLowerCase();\n\n    // Remove explicitly dangerous tags even if in allow list\n    if (DANGEROUS_TAGS.has(tagName)) {\n      toRemove.push(el);\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    // Remove disallowed tags entirely\n    if (!allowedTags.has(tagName)) {\n      toRemove.push(el);\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    // Process attributes\n    const attrsToRemove: string[] = [];\n    for (const attr of Array.from(el.attributes)) {\n      const attrName = attr.name.toLowerCase();\n\n      // Check if attribute is allowed\n      if (!isAllowedAttribute(attrName, allowedAttrs, allowDataAttributes)) {\n        attrsToRemove.push(attr.name);\n        continue;\n      }\n\n      // Check for DOM clobbering on id and name attributes\n      if ((attrName === 'id' || attrName === 'name') && !isSafeIdOrName(attr.value)) {\n        attrsToRemove.push(attr.name);\n        continue;\n      }\n\n      // Validate URL attributes\n      if (\n        (attrName === 'href' || attrName === 'src' || attrName === 'srcset') &&\n        !isSafeUrl(attr.value)\n      ) {\n        attrsToRemove.push(attr.name);\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Remove disallowed attributes\n    for (const attrName of attrsToRemove) {\n      el.removeAttribute(attrName);\n    }\n\n    // Add rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" to external links for security\n    if (tagName === 'a') {\n      const href = el.getAttribute('href');\n      const target = el.getAttribute('target');\n      const hasTargetBlank = target?.toLowerCase() === '_blank';\n      const isExternal = href && isExternalUrl(href);\n\n      // Add security attributes to links opening in new window or external links\n      if (hasTargetBlank || isExternal) {\n        const existingRel = el.getAttribute('rel');\n        const relValues = new Set(existingRel ? existingRel.split(/\\s+/).filter(Boolean) : []);\n\n        // Add noopener and noreferrer\n        relValues.add('noopener');\n        relValues.add('noreferrer');\n\n        el.setAttribute('rel', Array.from(relValues).join(' '));\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Remove disallowed elements\n  for (const el of toRemove) {\n    el.remove();\n  }\n\n  // Serialize the sanitized fragment to HTML string.\n  // We use a temporary container to get the innerHTML of the fragment.\n  const serializeFragment = (frag: DocumentFragment): string => {\n    const container = document.createElement('div');\n    container.appendChild(frag.cloneNode(true));\n    return container.innerHTML;\n  };\n\n  // Double-parse to prevent mutation XSS (mXSS).\n  // Browsers may normalize HTML during serialization in ways that could create\n  // new dangerous content when re-parsed. By re-parsing the sanitized output\n  // and verifying stability, we ensure the final HTML is safe.\n  const firstPass = serializeFragment(fragment);\n\n  // Re-parse through DOMParser for mXSS detection.\n  // Using DOMParser instead of innerHTML for security.\n  const verifyFragment = parseHtmlSafely(firstPass);\n  const secondPass = serializeFragment(verifyFragment);\n\n  // Verify stability: if content mutates between parses, it indicates mXSS attempt\n  if (firstPass !== secondPass) {\n    // Content mutated during re-parse - potential mXSS detected.\n    // Return safely escaped text content as fallback.\n    return fragment.textContent ?? '';\n  }\n\n  return secondPass;\n};\n","/**\n * Security utilities for HTML sanitization.\n * All DOM writes are sanitized by default to prevent XSS attacks.\n *\n * @module bquery/security\n */\n\nimport { sanitizeHtmlCore } from './sanitize-core';\nimport type { SanitizeOptions } from './types';\nexport { generateNonce } from './csp';\nexport { isTrustedTypesSupported } from './trusted-types';\n\n/**\n * Sanitize HTML string, removing dangerous elements and attributes.\n * Uses Trusted Types when available for CSP compliance.\n *\n * @param html - The HTML string to sanitize\n * @param options - Sanitization options\n * @returns Sanitized HTML string\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const safe = sanitizeHtml('<div onclick=\"alert(1)\">Hello</div>');\n * // Returns: '<div>Hello</div>'\n * ```\n */\nexport const sanitizeHtml = (html: string, options: SanitizeOptions = {}): string => {\n  return sanitizeHtmlCore(html, options);\n};\n\n/**\n * Escape HTML entities to prevent XSS.\n * Use 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package/dist/type-guards-DRma3-Kc.js

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-const f = (e) => {
-  let s, a = !1;
-  const t = () => {
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-  return t(), () => {
-    a = !0, s && s(), n(t);
-  };
-}, l = (e) => e instanceof r, p = (e) => e instanceof o;
-export {
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-  f as e,
-  p as i
-};
-//# sourceMappingURL=type-guards-DRma3-Kc.js.map

package/dist/type-guards-DRma3-Kc.js.map

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package/dist/untrack-BuEQKH7_.js

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-import { w as t } from "./core-COenAZjD.js";
-const e = (r) => t(r);
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-//# sourceMappingURL=untrack-BuEQKH7_.js.map