@bounded-sh/core 0.0.68 → 0.0.70

package/dist/{index-C9h-Bnjk.mjs → index-Csf_2uZF.mjs}

@@ -685,8 +685,8 @@ function refreshedTokenMayReplaceStored(newIdToken, storedAddress, decodeBase64U
  * event bus, so a session dying inside a session manager used to be invisible to
  * the SDK: `setCurrentUser(null)` was only ever called by `logout()` and `init()`.
  * The result was a UI that kept showing a connected wallet long after the session
- * it was showing had been wiped, which is exactly what let the Solana lab freeze a
- * review against a wallet the server no longer knew about.
+ * it was showing had been wiped, which is exactly what let a wallet-review UI
+ * freeze a review against a wallet the server no longer knew about.
  *
  * `js-sdk` registers a handler at init; core fires it ONLY when storage was
  * actually cleared, never on a failed-but-preserved refresh. Firing on a
@@ -4043,7 +4043,7 @@ class ServerSessionManager {
         const sessionConfig = (_a = this.sessionConfig) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : undefined;
         /* fetch nonce from auth API (bound to the snapshotted app+issuer) */
         const nonce = await genAuthNonce(sessionConfig);
-        const { genSolanaMessage } = await import('./solana-message-ngQQt80s.mjs');
+        const { genSolanaMessage } = await import('./solana-message-BFqre_Oi.mjs');
         const message = await genSolanaMessage(address, nonce, sessionConfig === null || sessionConfig === void 0 ? void 0 : sessionConfig.appId);
         /* sign the message */
         const sigBytes = nacl.sign.detached(new TextEncoder().encode(message), kp.secretKey);
@@ -5404,6 +5404,35 @@ async function getWsAuthToken(isServer) {
         throw rememberAmbientAuthFailure(normalizeAuthExpiredError(error, 'Authentication expired and refresh failed'));
     }
 }
+/**
+ * The server refused the token sent on the auth frame: its error frame arrives
+ * while the auth ack is still pending, just before the 1008 close. Local expiry
+ * had vouched for that exact token (unexpired but invalid - e.g. a rotated
+ * issuer key), so re-sending it would only be refused again. Force a genuinely
+ * new one: a definitive issuer rejection clears the session inside the shared
+ * helper (firing notifySessionCleared, which signs the UI out), a successful
+ * refresh commits a new token - and the ordinary reconnect loop picks up either
+ * outcome on its own. Fresh token: authenticates. No token: connects
+ * anonymously and public reads replay instead of erroring forever.
+ */
+async function recoverFromServerAuthRejection(connection) {
+    const rejected = connection.pendingAuthToken;
+    if (!rejected)
+        return;
+    // One forced refresh per distinct rejected token value: a transiently
+    // unreachable issuer must not turn the reconnect loop into a refresh storm.
+    if (connection.serverRejectedAuthToken === rejected)
+        return;
+    connection.serverRejectedAuthToken = rejected;
+    try {
+        await getFreshAuthToken(connection.isServer, { force: true });
+    }
+    catch (_a) {
+        // Every failure mode is already handled inside the helper: a dead
+        // session was cleared (auth listeners notified), a transient refresh
+        // failure keeps the session and the latch above stops the storm.
+    }
+}
 async function getConnectionAuthToken(isServer, authTokenProvider, anonymous) {
     // A read-only scoped instance connects anonymously: no auth frame, and it
     // must never read (or refresh) the ambient global session - that session
@@ -5727,6 +5756,8 @@ async function getOrCreateConnectionOnce(appId, isServer, routePath, authTokenPr
         authFailure: null,
         source,
         anonymous,
+        isServer,
+        serverRejectedAuthToken: null,
     };
     connections.set(connKey, connection);
     // URL provider for reconnection with fresh tokens
@@ -5992,6 +6023,16 @@ function handleServerMessage(connection, message) {
         }
         case 'error': {
             console.error('[WS v2] Server error:', message.code, message.message);
+            // The auth frame was just refused: while the auth ack is pending the
+            // server sends no other error frame, and this one is immediately
+            // followed by its 1008 close. Kick the forced-refresh recovery - the
+            // ordinary reconnect loop then re-auths with a fresh token or, once a
+            // definitively dead session is cleared, connects anonymously so
+            // public reads still replay. Ambient connections only: wallet-scoped
+            // connections refresh through their own provider.
+            if (connection.isAuthenticating && connection.pendingAuthToken && !connection.authTokenProvider && !connection.anonymous) {
+                void recoverFromServerAuthRejection(connection);
+            }
             // Build an Error that ALSO carries the stable `code` as a structured
             // field (not just string-interpolated into the message) so callers can
             // branch on it — e.g. `catch (e) { if (e.code === 'invariant_violation') }`
@@ -6775,7 +6816,7 @@ async function doReconnectWithNewAuth() {
         console.warn('[WS v2] Failed to clear HTTP read cache on auth change:', error);
     }
     try {
-        const { reconnectRealtimeStoreWithNewAuth } = await import('./realtime-store-B_Szs6F3.mjs');
+        const { reconnectRealtimeStoreWithNewAuth } = await import('./realtime-store-ByP5wYsa.mjs');
         await reconnectRealtimeStoreWithNewAuth();
     }
     catch (error) {
@@ -6886,7 +6927,7 @@ async function runNamedQueriesOverSocket(appId, queries, isServer) {
         return null; // timeout / disconnect / server error frame -> HTTP re-runs authoritatively
     }
     if ((data === null || data === void 0 ? void 0 : data.useHttp) === true)
-        return null; // server deferred (onchain/EVM, cross-room, malformed)
+        return null; // server deferred (onchain, cross-room, malformed)
     if (Array.isArray(data === null || data === void 0 ? void 0 : data.queries))
         return data.queries;
     return null; // unexpected shape -> HTTP
@@ -6999,456 +7040,6 @@ async function wsIntentReliable(appId, roomRoutePath, intent, isServer) {
     });
 }
 
-/**
- * Selectors derived from the canonical BoundedRuntime signatures (BoundedTypes.sol):
- *
- *   cast sig 'setDocuments(string,(string[],bool,(string,uint8,uint8,bytes)[])[])'
- *     => 0x0827b094
- *   cast sig 'setDocumentsAttested(string,(string[],bool,(string,uint8,uint8,bytes)[])[],(bytes32,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32))'
- *     => 0x87b111c4
- *
- * Keep the signatures beside the constants: changing either Solidity tuple is an
- * ABI break and must deliberately update these values and the Foundry goldens.
- */
-const BOUNDED_RUNTIME_SET_DOCUMENTS_SELECTOR = '0x0827b094';
-const BOUNDED_RUNTIME_SET_DOCUMENTS_ATTESTED_SELECTOR = '0x87b111c4';
-const SET_DOCUMENTS_SELECTOR = BOUNDED_RUNTIME_SET_DOCUMENTS_SELECTOR.slice(2);
-const SET_DOCUMENTS_ATTESTED_SELECTOR = BOUNDED_RUNTIME_SET_DOCUMENTS_ATTESTED_SELECTOR.slice(2);
-const MAX_CALLDATA_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
-const MAX_ARRAY_ITEMS = 2048;
-const BIGINT_ZERO = BigInt(0);
-const BIGINT_ONE = BigInt(1);
-const BIGINT_EIGHT = BigInt(8);
-const SECP256K1_N = BigInt('0xfffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd0364141');
-const SECP256K1_HALF_N = BigInt('0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff5d576e7357a4501ddfe92f46681b20a0');
-function hexBytes(raw) {
-    if (typeof raw !== 'string' || !/^0x[0-9a-fA-F]*$/.test(raw) || raw.length % 2 !== 0) {
-        throw new Error('EVM transaction calldata must be even-length 0x hex');
-    }
-    const hex = raw.slice(2);
-    if (hex.length / 2 > MAX_CALLDATA_BYTES)
-        throw new Error('EVM transaction calldata exceeds the client safety limit');
-    const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);
-    for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++)
-        out[i] = Number.parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
-    return out;
-}
-class AbiReader {
-    constructor(bytes) {
-        this.bytes = bytes;
-        this.maxRead = 0;
-        this.dynamicPayloadBytes = 0;
-        this.utf8 = new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true, ignoreBOM: false });
-    }
-    range(offset, length, label) {
-        if (!Number.isSafeInteger(offset) || !Number.isSafeInteger(length) || offset < 0 || length < 0 || offset + length > this.bytes.length) {
-            throw new Error(`Malformed EVM setDocuments calldata (${label})`);
-        }
-        this.maxRead = Math.max(this.maxRead, offset + length);
-    }
-    word(offset, label) {
-        this.range(offset, 32, label);
-        let value = BIGINT_ZERO;
-        for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++)
-            value = (value << BIGINT_EIGHT) | BigInt(this.bytes[offset + i]);
-        return value;
-    }
-    numberWord(offset, label, max = Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER) {
-        const value = this.word(offset, label);
-        if (value > BigInt(max))
-            throw new Error(`Malformed EVM setDocuments calldata (${label} too large)`);
-        return Number(value);
-    }
-    offset(base, wordOffset, min, label) {
-        const relative = this.numberWord(wordOffset, `${label} offset`, this.bytes.length);
-        if (relative < min || relative % 32 !== 0)
-            throw new Error(`Malformed EVM setDocuments calldata (${label} offset)`);
-        const absolute = base + relative;
-        this.range(absolute, 0, label);
-        return absolute;
-    }
-    dynamicBytes(at, label) {
-        const length = this.numberWord(at, `${label} length`, MAX_CALLDATA_BYTES);
-        this.dynamicPayloadBytes += length;
-        // ABI offsets may alias. Cap the cumulative decoded payload so a malicious
-        // 1 MB tail referenced by thousands of fields cannot amplify into a
-        // multi-gigabyte allocation/UTF-8 decode in the wallet process.
-        if (this.dynamicPayloadBytes > MAX_CALLDATA_BYTES) {
-            throw new Error('Malformed EVM setDocuments calldata (dynamic payload amplification)');
-        }
-        const start = at + 32;
-        const padded = Math.ceil(length / 32) * 32;
-        this.range(start, padded, label);
-        for (let i = start + length; i < start + padded; i++) {
-            if (this.bytes[i] !== 0)
-                throw new Error(`Malformed EVM setDocuments calldata (${label} padding)`);
-        }
-        return this.bytes.slice(start, start + length);
-    }
-    dynamicEnd(at, label) {
-        const length = this.numberWord(at, `${label} length`, MAX_CALLDATA_BYTES);
-        const end = at + 32 + Math.ceil(length / 32) * 32;
-        this.range(at + 32, Math.ceil(length / 32) * 32, label);
-        return end;
-    }
-    string(at, label) {
-        try {
-            return this.utf8.decode(this.dynamicBytes(at, label));
-        }
-        catch (_a) {
-            throw new Error(`Malformed EVM setDocuments calldata (${label} utf8)`);
-        }
-    }
-    finish() {
-        if (this.maxRead !== this.bytes.length)
-            throw new Error('Malformed EVM setDocuments calldata (unreferenced trailing bytes)');
-    }
-}
-function assertCanonicalOffset(actual, expected, label) {
-    if (actual !== expected)
-        throw new Error(`Malformed EVM setDocuments calldata (${label} non-canonical offset)`);
-}
-function decodeStringArray(reader, at, label) {
-    const count = reader.numberWord(at, `${label} count`, MAX_ARRAY_ITEMS);
-    const head = at + 32;
-    const min = count * 32;
-    const out = [];
-    let expectedTail = head + min;
-    for (let i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-        const itemAt = reader.offset(head, head + i * 32, min, `${label}[${i}]`);
-        assertCanonicalOffset(itemAt, expectedTail, `${label}[${i}]`);
-        out.push(reader.string(itemAt, `${label}[${i}]`));
-        expectedTail = reader.dynamicEnd(itemAt, `${label}[${i}]`);
-    }
-    return { value: out, end: expectedTail };
-}
-function decodeFields(reader, at) {
-    const count = reader.numberWord(at, 'fields count', MAX_ARRAY_ITEMS);
-    const head = at + 32;
-    const min = count * 32;
-    const out = [];
-    let expectedTail = head + min;
-    for (let i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-        const tuple = reader.offset(head, head + i * 32, min, `field[${i}]`);
-        assertCanonicalOffset(tuple, expectedTail, `field[${i}]`);
-        const nameAt = reader.offset(tuple, tuple, 128, `field[${i}].name`);
-        assertCanonicalOffset(nameAt, tuple + 128, `field[${i}].name`);
-        const name = reader.string(nameAt, `field[${i}].name`);
-        const nameEnd = reader.dynamicEnd(nameAt, `field[${i}].name`);
-        const ftype = reader.numberWord(tuple + 32, `field[${i}].ftype`, 255);
-        const op = reader.numberWord(tuple + 64, `field[${i}].op`, 255);
-        const valueAt = reader.offset(tuple, tuple + 96, 128, `field[${i}].value`);
-        assertCanonicalOffset(valueAt, nameEnd, `field[${i}].value`);
-        const value = reader.dynamicBytes(valueAt, `field[${i}].value`);
-        expectedTail = reader.dynamicEnd(valueAt, `field[${i}].value`);
-        out.push({ name, ftype, op, value });
-    }
-    return { value: out, end: expectedTail };
-}
-function decodeRuntimeWrite(rawData) {
-    const bytes = hexBytes(rawData);
-    if (bytes.length < 68)
-        throw new Error('Malformed EVM setDocuments calldata');
-    const selector = Array.from(bytes.slice(0, 4)).map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
-    const kind = selector === SET_DOCUMENTS_SELECTOR
-        ? 'setDocuments'
-        : selector === SET_DOCUMENTS_ATTESTED_SELECTOR
-            ? 'setDocumentsAttested'
-            : null;
-    if (!kind)
-        throw new Error('EVM transaction is not a supported BoundedRuntime document write');
-    const reader = new AbiReader(bytes);
-    reader.maxRead = 4;
-    const args = 4;
-    // ExternalCallAttestation is a fully-static six-word tuple and is therefore
-    // expanded inline into the top-level head: 2 dynamic offsets + 6 words.
-    const headBytes = kind === 'setDocumentsAttested' ? 256 : 64;
-    const appAt = reader.offset(args, args, headBytes, 'appId');
-    assertCanonicalOffset(appAt, args + headBytes, 'appId');
-    const opsAt = reader.offset(args, args + 32, headBytes, 'ops');
-    const appId = reader.string(appAt, 'appId');
-    const appEnd = reader.dynamicEnd(appAt, 'appId');
-    assertCanonicalOffset(opsAt, appEnd, 'ops');
-    const count = reader.numberWord(opsAt, 'ops count', MAX_ARRAY_ITEMS);
-    const head = opsAt + 32;
-    const min = count * 32;
-    const ops = [];
-    let expectedTail = head + min;
-    for (let i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-        const tuple = reader.offset(head, head + i * 32, min, `op[${i}]`);
-        assertCanonicalOffset(tuple, expectedTail, `op[${i}]`);
-        const pathAt = reader.offset(tuple, tuple, 96, `op[${i}].path`);
-        assertCanonicalOffset(pathAt, tuple + 96, `op[${i}].path`);
-        const deleteWord = reader.numberWord(tuple + 32, `op[${i}].isDelete`, 1);
-        const fieldsAt = reader.offset(tuple, tuple + 64, 96, `op[${i}].fields`);
-        const path = decodeStringArray(reader, pathAt, `op[${i}].path`);
-        assertCanonicalOffset(fieldsAt, path.end, `op[${i}].fields`);
-        const fields = decodeFields(reader, fieldsAt);
-        expectedTail = fields.end;
-        ops.push({
-            pathSegments: path.value,
-            isDelete: deleteWord === 1,
-            fields: fields.value,
-        });
-    }
-    let attestation;
-    if (kind === 'setDocumentsAttested') {
-        const callsHash = reader.word(args + 64, 'attestation.callsHash');
-        const nonce = reader.word(args + 96, 'attestation.nonce');
-        const deadline = reader.word(args + 128, 'attestation.deadline');
-        const v = reader.numberWord(args + 160, 'attestation.v', 255);
-        const r = reader.word(args + 192, 'attestation.r');
-        const s = reader.word(args + 224, 'attestation.s');
-        if (v !== 27 && v !== 28)
-            throw new Error('Malformed EVM setDocuments calldata (attestation.v must be 27 or 28)');
-        if (r === BIGINT_ZERO || r >= SECP256K1_N)
-            throw new Error('Malformed EVM setDocuments calldata (attestation.r is not canonical)');
-        if (s === BIGINT_ZERO || s > SECP256K1_HALF_N)
-            throw new Error('Malformed EVM setDocuments calldata (attestation.s is not canonical low-s)');
-        attestation = { callsHash, nonce, deadline, v, r, s };
-    }
-    if (expectedTail !== bytes.length)
-        throw new Error('Malformed EVM setDocuments calldata (unreferenced trailing bytes)');
-    reader.finish();
-    return Object.assign({ kind, appId, ops }, (attestation ? { attestation } : {}));
-}
-/**
- * Fail closed unless calldata is a byte-for-byte canonical ABI encoding of one
- * supported BoundedRuntime write. This is the defense used by direct signer
- * surfaces; the higher-level write validator below additionally binds app/ops.
- */
-function assertCanonicalBoundedRuntimeWriteCalldata(rawData) {
-    decodeRuntimeWrite(rawData);
-}
-const MAX_EVM_DOCUMENT_PATH_UTF8_BYTES = 1024;
-function canonicalUtf8ByteLength(value) {
-    let bytes = 0;
-    for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {
-        const unit = value.charCodeAt(i);
-        if (unit <= 0x7f)
-            bytes += 1;
-        else if (unit <= 0x7ff)
-            bytes += 2;
-        else if (unit >= 0xd800 && unit <= 0xdbff) {
-            const low = value.charCodeAt(++i);
-            if (!(low >= 0xdc00 && low <= 0xdfff))
-                throw new Error(`Invalid EVM write path: ${value}`);
-            bytes += 4;
-        }
-        else if (unit >= 0xdc00 && unit <= 0xdfff) {
-            throw new Error(`Invalid EVM write path: ${value}`);
-        }
-        else
-            bytes += 3;
-    }
-    return bytes;
-}
-function normalizedPathSegments(path) {
-    if (typeof path !== 'string' || path.length === 0 ||
-        canonicalUtf8ByteLength(path) > MAX_EVM_DOCUMENT_PATH_UTF8_BYTES) {
-        throw new Error(`Invalid EVM write path: ${path}`);
-    }
-    const segments = path.split('/');
-    if (segments.length < 2 || segments.length % 2 !== 0 ||
-        segments[0].startsWith('__') ||
-        segments.some((s) => !s || s === '.' || s === '..' || /[\\\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/.test(s))) {
-        throw new Error(`Invalid EVM write path: ${path}`);
-    }
-    return segments;
-}
-function bytesBigInt(bytes, signed) {
-    if (bytes.length !== 32)
-        throw new Error('EVM field value is not one ABI word');
-    let value = BIGINT_ZERO;
-    for (const b of bytes)
-        value = (value << BIGINT_EIGHT) | BigInt(b);
-    if (signed && (value & (BIGINT_ONE << BigInt(255))) !== BIGINT_ZERO)
-        value -= BIGINT_ONE << BigInt(256);
-    return value;
-}
-function decodedAbiString(bytes) {
-    const reader = new AbiReader(bytes);
-    const at = reader.offset(0, 0, 32, 'field string');
-    const value = reader.string(at, 'field string');
-    reader.finish();
-    return value;
-}
-function assertSetValue(field, expected) {
-    if (field.op !== 0)
-        throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} changes the requested SET action`);
-    if (typeof expected === 'boolean') {
-        if (field.ftype !== 3 || bytesBigInt(field.value, false) !== (expected ? BIGINT_ONE : BIGINT_ZERO))
-            throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} value mismatch`);
-        return;
-    }
-    if (typeof expected === 'number') {
-        if (!Number.isFinite(expected))
-            throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} is not finite`);
-        if (Number.isInteger(expected)) {
-            if (!Number.isSafeInteger(expected)) {
-                throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} integer must be a safe number or canonical decimal string`);
-            }
-            const actual = field.ftype === 1 ? bytesBigInt(field.value, false) : field.ftype === 2 ? bytesBigInt(field.value, true) : null;
-            if (actual === null || actual !== BigInt(expected))
-                throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} value mismatch`);
-            return;
-        }
-        if (field.ftype !== 4 || decodedAbiString(field.value) !== expected.toString())
-            throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} value mismatch`);
-        return;
-    }
-    if (typeof expected === 'bigint') {
-        const actual = field.ftype === 1 ? bytesBigInt(field.value, false) : field.ftype === 2 ? bytesBigInt(field.value, true) : null;
-        if (actual === null || actual !== expected)
-            throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} value mismatch`);
-        return;
-    }
-    if (typeof expected === 'string') {
-        if (field.ftype === 4 && decodedAbiString(field.value) === expected)
-            return;
-        if ((field.ftype === 1 || field.ftype === 2) && expected.length <= 20 && /^-?(?:0|[1-9][0-9]*)$/.test(expected)) {
-            const exact = BigInt(expected);
-            if (exact >= BigInt(Number.MIN_SAFE_INTEGER) && exact <= BigInt(Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER)) {
-                throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} safe integer must be supplied as a number`);
-            }
-            const inRange = field.ftype === 1
-                ? exact >= BIGINT_ZERO && exact <= ((BIGINT_ONE << BigInt(64)) - BIGINT_ONE)
-                : exact >= -(BIGINT_ONE << BigInt(63)) && exact <= ((BIGINT_ONE << BigInt(63)) - BIGINT_ONE);
-            const actual = bytesBigInt(field.value, field.ftype === 2);
-            if (inRange && actual === exact)
-                return;
-            throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} value mismatch`);
-        }
-        if (field.ftype === 5 && normalizeEvmAddress(expected)) {
-            const word = field.value;
-            if (word.length === 32 && word.slice(0, 12).every((b) => b === 0)) {
-                const actual = `0x${Array.from(word.slice(12)).map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')}`;
-                if (actual === normalizeEvmAddress(expected))
-                    return;
-            }
-        }
-        throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} value mismatch`);
-    }
-    if (expected === undefined || expected === null) {
-        throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} cannot be represented safely on EVM; use a document delete or omit the field`);
-    }
-    const json = JSON.stringify(expected);
-    if (typeof json !== 'string' || field.ftype !== 4 || decodedAbiString(field.value) !== json) {
-        throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} value mismatch`);
-    }
-}
-function assertField(field, expected) {
-    if (expected === null) {
-        if (field.op !== 2 || field.ftype < 1 || field.ftype > 5 || field.value.length !== 0) {
-            throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} deletion mismatch`);
-        }
-        return;
-    }
-    if (expected && typeof expected === 'object' && !Array.isArray(expected)) {
-        const operation = expected.operation;
-        if (operation === 'increment') {
-            const delta = expected.value;
-            const actual = field.ftype === 1 || field.ftype === 2
-                ? bytesBigInt(field.value, true)
-                : null;
-            if (!Number.isSafeInteger(delta) || field.op !== 3 || actual === null || actual !== BigInt(delta)) {
-                throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} increment mismatch`);
-            }
-            return;
-        }
-        if (operation === 'time' && expected.value === 'now') {
-            if (field.op !== 4 || (field.ftype !== 1 && field.ftype !== 2) || field.value.length !== 0) {
-                throw new Error(`EVM field ${field.name} timestamp mismatch`);
-            }
-            return;
-        }
-    }
-    assertSetValue(field, expected);
-}
-function assertOp(decoded, path, document) {
-    const expectedSegments = normalizedPathSegments(path);
-    if (decoded.pathSegments.length !== expectedSegments.length || decoded.pathSegments.some((s, i) => s !== expectedSegments[i])) {
-        throw new Error(`EVM transaction path does not match requested write: ${path}`);
-    }
-    if (decoded.isDelete !== (document === null))
-        throw new Error(`EVM transaction action does not match requested write: ${path}`);
-    if (document === null) {
-        if (decoded.fields.length !== 0)
-            throw new Error(`EVM delete unexpectedly carries fields: ${path}`);
-        return;
-    }
-    if (!document || typeof document !== 'object' || Array.isArray(document))
-        throw new Error(`EVM document must be a plain object or null: ${path}`);
-    const expectedEntries = Object.entries(document);
-    if (expectedEntries.some(([name]) => name.startsWith('_')))
-        throw new Error(`Reserved EVM field reached transaction validation: ${path}`);
-    const expected = new Map(expectedEntries);
-    const seen = new Set();
-    for (const field of decoded.fields) {
-        if (!field.name || seen.has(field.name) || !expected.has(field.name))
-            throw new Error(`EVM transaction contains unexpected or duplicate field ${field.name}`);
-        seen.add(field.name);
-        assertField(field, expected.get(field.name));
-    }
-    const missing = [...expected.keys()].filter((name) => !seen.has(name));
-    if (missing.length > 0)
-        throw new Error(`EVM transaction omits requested fields: ${missing.join(', ')}`);
-}
-function zeroWei(raw) {
-    if (raw === undefined || raw === null || raw === '')
-        return true;
-    if (typeof raw !== 'string' && typeof raw !== 'number')
-        return false;
-    try {
-        return BigInt(raw) === BIGINT_ZERO;
-    }
-    catch (_a) {
-        return false;
-    }
-}
-/** Verify the untrusted 202 payload is exactly the governed write the app asked for. */
-function assertEvmTransactionMatchesWrite(transaction, context) {
-    var _a, _b;
-    if (!transaction || !Number.isSafeInteger(transaction.chainId) || transaction.chainId <= 0) {
-        throw new Error('EVM transaction chainId is required');
-    }
-    const chainId = transaction.chainId;
-    const policy = context.policy;
-    if (!policy)
-        throw new Error('EVM transaction signing requires an explicit runtime/chain policy');
-    if (policy.chainId !== undefined && policy.chainId !== chainId)
-        throw new Error(`EVM transaction chain ${chainId} does not match configured chain ${policy.chainId}`);
-    const expectedRuntime = (_b = (_a = policy.runtimeAddresses) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a[String(chainId)]) !== null && _b !== void 0 ? _b : (policy.chainId === chainId ? policy.runtimeAddress : undefined);
-    const normalizedRuntime = normalizeEvmAddress(expectedRuntime);
-    if (!normalizedRuntime)
-        throw new Error(`No trusted BoundedRuntime address configured for EVM chain ${chainId}`);
-    if (normalizeEvmAddress(transaction.to) !== normalizedRuntime)
-        throw new Error('EVM transaction target is not the configured BoundedRuntime');
-    if (!zeroWei(transaction.value))
-        throw new Error('BoundedRuntime.setDocuments must not transfer native value');
-    if (transaction.nonce !== undefined)
-        throw new Error('Server-supplied EVM nonce is not accepted');
-    const decoded = decodeRuntimeWrite(transaction.data);
-    if (decoded.appId !== context.appId)
-        throw new Error('EVM transaction appId does not match configured appId');
-    if (decoded.ops.length !== context.documents.length)
-        throw new Error('EVM transaction operation count does not match requested writes');
-    // The worker's contract ABI groups upserts first and document deletes second.
-    const expectedOps = [
-        ...context.documents.filter((entry) => entry.document !== null),
-        ...context.documents.filter((entry) => entry.document === null),
-    ];
-    const paths = new Set();
-    for (let i = 0; i < expectedOps.length; i++) {
-        const expected = expectedOps[i];
-        const canonicalPath = normalizedPathSegments(expected.destinationPath).join('/');
-        if (paths.has(canonicalPath))
-            throw new Error(`Duplicate EVM write path is not allowed: ${canonicalPath}`);
-        paths.add(canonicalPath);
-        assertOp(decoded.ops[i], canonicalPath, expected.document);
-    }
-}
-
 /**
  * Thrown when a user's wallet doesn't have enough SOL to cover the transaction.
  * Apps can catch this to trigger an onramp/funding flow.
@@ -8564,12 +8155,12 @@ async function set(path, document, options) {
  * state appears only under `observation`/`mirrorSync` once actually observed.
  */
 async function setMany(many, options) {
-    var _a, _b, _c, _d, _e, _f, _g, _h, _j, _k, _l, _m, _o, _p;
+    var _a, _b, _c, _d, _e, _f, _g, _h, _j, _k, _l;
     // Returns the data that was set, or undefined if the document was already set.
     try {
         // A server WalletClient threads its immutable config snapshot; the default
         // path reads the mutable process-global init() config. This keeps the app-id
-        // bound into an on-chain 202 write (EVM/Solana/offchain) on the wallet
+        // bound into an on-chain 202 write (Solana/offchain) on the wallet
         // client's original app after a later global init() (CTA-05).
         const config = (_b = (_a = options === null || options === void 0 ? void 0 : options._overrides) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a._config) !== null && _b !== void 0 ? _b : await getConfig();
         const authProvider = (_d = (_c = options === null || options === void 0 ? void 0 : options._overrides) === null || _c === void 0 ? void 0 : _c.authProvider) !== null && _d !== void 0 ? _d : config.authProvider;
@@ -8638,13 +8229,18 @@ async function setMany(many, options) {
                 throw new Error(`Expected exactly one on-chain transaction, received ${Array.isArray(transactions) ? transactions.length : 0}`);
             }
             const curTx = transactions[0];
-            const hasEvmTarget = (curTx === null || curTx === void 0 ? void 0 : curTx.evmTransaction) != null;
+            // The EVM onchain data plane is retired: no worker mints an EVM 202 any
+            // more. A payload that still carries one is an unexpected response and
+            // fails loudly BEFORE anything is signed - never silently ignored.
+            if ((curTx === null || curTx === void 0 ? void 0 : curTx.evmTransaction) != null) {
+                throw new Error('Unsupported 202 transaction shape: the write response carried an evmTransaction, ' +
+                    'but EVM onchain writes are no longer supported. Nothing was signed or submitted.');
+            }
             const hasSerializedSolanaTarget = (curTx === null || curTx === void 0 ? void 0 : curTx.serializedTransaction) != null;
             const hasBuiltSolanaTarget = (curTx === null || curTx === void 0 ? void 0 : curTx.transactionArgs) != null || (curTx === null || curTx === void 0 ? void 0 : curTx.remainingAccounts) != null ||
                 (curTx === null || curTx === void 0 ? void 0 : curTx.idl) != null || (curTx === null || curTx === void 0 ? void 0 : curTx.txData) != null || (curTx === null || curTx === void 0 ? void 0 : curTx.preInstructions) != null;
-            if ((hasEvmTarget && (hasSerializedSolanaTarget || hasBuiltSolanaTarget)) ||
-                (hasSerializedSolanaTarget && hasBuiltSolanaTarget)) {
-                throw new Error('Ambiguous on-chain write response mixes EVM and/or Solana transaction target formats');
+            if (hasSerializedSolanaTarget && hasBuiltSolanaTarget) {
+                throw new Error('Ambiguous on-chain write response mixes Solana transaction target formats');
             }
             const expectedWritePaths = documents.map(d => d.destinationPath);
             const requestedDocuments = buildRequestedDocuments(documents);
@@ -8657,67 +8253,13 @@ async function setMany(many, options) {
                 throw new Error('The write response carried no execution-chain tag, so this receipt could not state where the write ran. ' +
                     'Nothing was signed or submitted.');
             }
-            // EVM onchain write: the worker returns a PRE-BUILT EIP-1559 tx on
-            // `transactions[0].evmTransaction` (the EVM twin of Solana's pre-built
-            // `serializedTransaction`). WORKER 202 CONTRACT (field name + shape the
-            // worker side must emit to match):
-            //   { transactions: [ { evmTransaction: {
-            //       to, data, value?, chainId, gas?, maxFeePerGas?, maxPriorityFeePerGas?, nonce?
-            //   } } ] }
-            // We hand it to the EVM auth provider's runTransaction(evmTx, undefined, options)
-            // (eth_sendTransaction — the wallet signs + submits). syncItems below is
-            // identical to the Solana path.
-            if (curTx.evmTransaction) {
-                assertEvmTransactionMatchesWrite(curTx.evmTransaction, {
-                    appId: config.appId,
-                    documents,
-                    policy: (_o = (_m = (_l = options === null || options === void 0 ? void 0 : options._overrides) === null || _l === void 0 ? void 0 : _l._evmTransactionPolicy) !== null && _m !== void 0 ? _m : config.evmWalletConfig) !== null && _o !== void 0 ? _o : null,
-                });
-                const evmChain = workerChain;
-                const evmOutcome = await handleEvmTransaction(curTx.evmTransaction, authProvider, options);
-                // CAPTURE THE RECEIPT FIRST. Mirror synchronization comes after, and its
-                // failure can never turn a landed transaction into a thrown error that
-                // invites the caller to submit the same write twice.
-                if (evmOutcome.outcome === 'confirmed') {
-                    const mirrorSync = await attemptMirrorSync(expectedWritePaths, options);
-                    return {
-                        status: 'confirmed', appId, requestedDocuments, chain: evmChain,
-                        transactionId: evmOutcome.transactionSignature,
-                        blockNumber: evmOutcome.blockNumber,
-                        mirrorSync,
-                    };
-                }
-                // An unknown confirmation outcome is NOT a mirror question: nothing is
-                // known to have landed, so no synchronization is attempted.
-                if (evmOutcome.transactionSignature === null) {
-                    return {
-                        status: 'submitted', appId, requestedDocuments, chain: evmChain,
-                        transactionId: null,
-                        confirmation: { state: 'unknown', reason: evmOutcome.reason, reconcilable: false },
-                    };
-                }
-                if ('fence' in evmOutcome && evmOutcome.fence) {
-                    return {
-                        status: 'submitted', appId, requestedDocuments, chain: evmChain,
-                        transactionId: evmOutcome.transactionSignature,
-                        fence: evmOutcome.fence,
-                        confirmation: { state: 'unknown', reason: evmOutcome.reason },
-                    };
-                }
-                return {
-                    status: 'submitted', appId, requestedDocuments, chain: evmChain,
-                    transactionId: evmOutcome.transactionSignature,
-                    rebroadcastable: false,
-                    confirmation: { state: 'unknown', reason: evmOutcome.reason },
-                };
-            }
-            else if (curTx.serializedTransaction) {
+            if (curTx.serializedTransaction) {
                 if (!SOLANA_CHAIN_TAGS.has(workerChain)) {
                     throw new Error(`The write response reported execution chain "${workerChain}" for a Solana transaction. ` +
                         'Nothing was signed or submitted.');
                 }
                 const solanaChain = workerChain;
-                const { handlePreBuiltTransaction } = await import('./solana-operations-B0Q9UOHR.mjs');
+                const { handlePreBuiltTransaction } = await import('./solana-operations-ByMDnjog.mjs');
                 const solanaOutcome = await handlePreBuiltTransaction(curTx, authProvider, options, expectedWritePaths);
                 // `shouldSubmitTx: false` signed WITHOUT sending — no signature exists,
                 // and there is nothing to mirror, so no synchronization is attempted.
@@ -8751,7 +8293,7 @@ async function setMany(many, options) {
                 };
             }
             else {
-                throw new Error('Unsupported 202 transaction shape: expected serializedTransaction or evmTransaction');
+                throw new Error('Unsupported 202 transaction shape: expected serializedTransaction');
             }
         }
         else if (setResponse.status === 200) {
@@ -8772,7 +8314,7 @@ async function setMany(many, options) {
                 observation: observationFromDirectCommit(documents.map(d => d.destinationPath), receipt === null || receipt === void 0 ? void 0 : receipt.observation),
                 // A worker predating the batch receipt reports no lane. Say so rather
                 // than inventing one — and never discard a committed write's receipt.
-                chain: ((_p = readWorkerChainTag(receipt)) !== null && _p !== void 0 ? _p : 'unknown'),
+                chain: ((_l = readWorkerChainTag(receipt)) !== null && _l !== void 0 ? _l : 'unknown'),
                 transactionId: typeof rawTransactionId === 'string' && rawTransactionId.length > 0 ? rawTransactionId : null,
             };
         }
@@ -8783,18 +8325,6 @@ async function setMany(many, options) {
     catch (error) {
         throw error;
     }
-    // EVM onchain write: hand the worker's pre-built EIP-1559 tx to the EVM auth
-    // provider, which eth_sendTransaction-s it (the wallet signs + submits in one
-    // step). Mirrors handlePreBuiltTransaction's shape but routes through the EVM
-    // slot of runTransaction (Solana slot undefined). shouldSubmitTx is honored by
-    // the provider itself.
-    async function handleEvmTransaction(evmTransaction, authProvider, options) {
-        const result = await authProvider.runTransaction(evmTransaction, undefined, options);
-        if ((result === null || result === void 0 ? void 0 : result.lane) !== 'evm') {
-            throw new Error('The EVM auth provider returned a non-EVM transaction outcome');
-        }
-        return result;
-    }
 }
 /**
  * Extract the document/collection path from a cache key. Keys are
@@ -9048,7 +8578,6 @@ var operations = /*#__PURE__*/Object.freeze({
 const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 60000;
 const DEFAULT_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 20;
 const DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 3000;
-const DEFAULT_MIN_REBROADCAST_INTERVAL_MS = 15000;
 /** Mirror read after a late confirmation. No settle delay: the tx already landed. */
 const RECONCILE_MIRROR_SETTLE_MS = 0;
 function errorText(error) {
@@ -9058,12 +8587,6 @@ function errorText(error) {
 function isSolanaSubmitted(receipt) {
     return receipt.status === 'submitted' && 'signedTransaction' in receipt;
 }
-function isEvmFencedSubmitted(receipt) {
-    return receipt.status === 'submitted' && 'fence' in receipt && !('signedTransaction' in receipt);
-}
-function isEvmHashKnownSubmitted(receipt) {
-    return receipt.status === 'submitted' && receipt.rebroadcastable === false;
-}
 /**
  * The Solana execution lane a client config REQUIRES, or `null` when the config
  * carries no constraint. Only a positive contradiction rejects a receipt — an
@@ -9088,7 +8611,6 @@ function requiredSolanaChain(config) {
  * a global re-`init()` could otherwise poll the wrong app's endpoints entirely.
  */
 function assertReceiptMatchesContext(receipt, config) {
-    var _a;
     if (!receipt.appId || typeof receipt.appId !== 'string') {
         throw new Error('This write receipt carries no appId and cannot be reconciled.');
     }
@@ -9101,22 +8623,6 @@ function assertReceiptMatchesContext(receipt, config) {
         if (required && required !== receipt.chain) {
             throw new Error(`This write receipt ran on "${receipt.chain}" but the bound client targets "${required}".`);
         }
-        return;
-    }
-    const fence = receipt.fence;
-    if (fence && typeof fence.chainId === 'number') {
-        const evm = config.evmWalletConfig;
-        const configured = new Set();
-        if (evm && typeof evm.chainId === 'number')
-            configured.add(evm.chainId);
-        for (const id of Object.keys((_a = evm === null || evm === void 0 ? void 0 : evm.runtimeAddresses) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : {})) {
-            const parsed = Number(id);
-            if (Number.isSafeInteger(parsed))
-                configured.add(parsed);
-        }
-        if (configured.size > 0 && !configured.has(fence.chainId)) {
-            throw new Error(`This write receipt ran on EVM chain ${fence.chainId}, which the bound client does not configure.`);
-        }
     }
 }
 function stillSubmitted(receipt, reason) {
@@ -9233,67 +8739,18 @@ async function reconcileSolana(receipt, config, options) {
     };
 }
 /**
- * EVM reconciliation runs through the provider's own transport, so a wallet
- * client reconciles with its own identity and RPC. There is deliberately NO
- * EVM retry-safe terminal state: nonce advancement is not proof the write did
- * not execute, and plain JSON-RPC offers no transaction-by-sender-and-nonce
- * lookup, so a `submitted` EVM receipt either confirms or stays `submitted`.
- */
-async function reconcileEvm(receipt, provider, options) {
-    if (!provider || typeof provider.reconcileEvmTransaction !== 'function') {
-        return stillSubmitted(receipt, 'no EVM reconciliation transport is available on the bound auth provider');
-    }
-    const fenced = isEvmFencedSubmitted(receipt) ? receipt.fence : undefined;
-    const allowRebroadcast = Boolean(fenced) && (options === null || options === void 0 ? void 0 : options.allowRebroadcast) !== false;
-    let outcome;
-    try {
-        outcome = await provider.reconcileEvmTransaction({
-            transactionHash: receipt.transactionId,
-            fence: fenced,
-            allowRebroadcast,
-        });
-    }
-    catch (error) {
-        return stillSubmitted(receipt, `EVM reconciliation failed: ${errorText(error)}`);
-    }
-    if (outcome.state === 'failed') {
-        // Landed and reverted: a genuine failure, never `submitted`.
-        throw new Error(outcome.reason);
-    }
-    if (outcome.state === 'confirmed') {
-        if (typeof outcome.blockNumber !== 'number') {
-            return stillSubmitted(receipt, 'the EVM receipt reported success without a block number, so confirmation could not be stated');
-        }
-        const confirmed = {
-            status: 'confirmed',
-            appId: receipt.appId,
-            requestedDocuments: receipt.requestedDocuments,
-            chain: receipt.chain,
-            transactionId: receipt.transactionId,
-            blockNumber: outcome.blockNumber,
-            mirrorSync: await mirrorFor(receipt, options),
-        };
-        return confirmed;
-    }
-    if (outcome.state === 'absent_after_expiry') {
-        // Defensive: no EVM lane may report a retry-safe terminal state.
-        return stillSubmitted(receipt, 'the EVM transport reported absence, which is not proof an EVM write did not execute');
-    }
-    return stillSubmitted(receipt, outcome.reason);
-}
-/**
- * Poll the SAME signature/hash a `submitted` receipt carries and return the
+ * Poll the SAME signature a `submitted` receipt carries and return the
  * resulting `SetResult`.
  *
  * - Terminal receipts (`committed`, `confirmed`, `expired_not_landed`,
  *   `signed`) are returned unchanged; nothing was left open.
- * - An irreconcilable injected-wallet receipt (`transactionId: null`) is
- *   rejected immediately: no identifier exists to poll.
+ * - A `submitted` receipt with no transaction identifier (`transactionId:
+ *   null`) is rejected immediately: no identifier exists to poll.
  * - A transaction that landed and FAILED throws, exactly as it would have on
  *   the original write.
  */
 async function reconcileSetResult(receipt, options) {
-    var _a, _b, _c, _d, _e;
+    var _a, _b;
     if (!receipt || typeof receipt !== 'object' || typeof receipt.status !== 'string') {
         throw new Error('reconcileSetResult requires a write receipt returned by set/setMany.');
     }
@@ -9309,23 +8766,21 @@ async function reconcileSetResult(receipt, options) {
     if (isSolanaSubmitted(receipt)) {
         return reconcileSolana(receipt, config, options);
     }
-    const provider = (_e = (_d = (_c = options === null || options === void 0 ? void 0 : options._overrides) === null || _c === void 0 ? void 0 : _c.authProvider) !== null && _d !== void 0 ? _d : config.authProvider) !== null && _e !== void 0 ? _e : null;
-    if (isEvmFencedSubmitted(receipt) || isEvmHashKnownSubmitted(receipt)) {
-        return reconcileEvm(receipt, provider, options);
-    }
+    // Anything else (e.g. a legacy serialized receipt from a retired lane) has no
+    // reconciliation transport any more; say so rather than guessing.
     return stillSubmitted(receipt, 'this receipt shape has no reconciliation lane');
 }
 /**
  * Reconcile repeatedly until the receipt leaves `submitted` or the bound is hit.
  *
  * The bound is mandatory, because some states are permanently non-terminal by
- * design: an unidentified nonce consumer or a permanently underpriced EVM
- * transaction never resolves. On exhaustion (or abort) this returns the LATEST
- * `submitted` receipt with its identifier intact rather than hanging or
- * throwing the identifier away.
+ * design: an RPC that can never observe the signature or the expiry never
+ * resolves. On exhaustion (or abort) this returns the LATEST `submitted`
+ * receipt with its identifier intact rather than hanging or throwing the
+ * identifier away.
  */
 async function waitForSetResult(receipt, options) {
-    var _a, _b, _c, _d, _e;
+    var _a, _b, _c, _d;
     if (receipt && typeof receipt === 'object' && receipt.status === 'submitted' && receipt.transactionId === null) {
         // Rejected immediately rather than polled: there is nothing to poll.
         return reconcileSetResult(receipt, options);
@@ -9333,21 +8788,14 @@ async function waitForSetResult(receipt, options) {
     const timeoutMs = (_a = options === null || options === void 0 ? void 0 : options.timeoutMs) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS;
     const maxAttempts = (_b = options === null || options === void 0 ? void 0 : options.maxAttempts) !== null && _b !== void 0 ? _b : DEFAULT_MAX_ATTEMPTS;
     const pollIntervalMs = (_c = options === null || options === void 0 ? void 0 : options.pollIntervalMs) !== null && _c !== void 0 ? _c : DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS;
-    const minRebroadcastIntervalMs = (_d = options === null || options === void 0 ? void 0 : options.minRebroadcastIntervalMs) !== null && _d !== void 0 ? _d : DEFAULT_MIN_REBROADCAST_INTERVAL_MS;
-    const rebroadcastPermitted = (options === null || options === void 0 ? void 0 : options.allowRebroadcast) !== false;
     const startedAt = Date.now();
     let current = receipt;
     let attempts = 0;
-    let lastRebroadcastAt = -Infinity;
     while (attempts < maxAttempts && Date.now() - startedAt < timeoutMs) {
-        if ((_e = options === null || options === void 0 ? void 0 : options.signal) === null || _e === void 0 ? void 0 : _e.aborted)
+        if ((_d = options === null || options === void 0 ? void 0 : options.signal) === null || _d === void 0 ? void 0 : _d.aborted)
             return current;
-        const now = Date.now();
-        const allowRebroadcast = rebroadcastPermitted && (now - lastRebroadcastAt >= minRebroadcastIntervalMs);
-        if (allowRebroadcast)
-            lastRebroadcastAt = now;
         attempts++;
-        current = await reconcileSetResult(current, Object.assign(Object.assign({}, options), { allowRebroadcast }));
+        current = await reconcileSetResult(current, options);
         if (current.status !== 'submitted')
             return current;
         if (attempts >= maxAttempts)
@@ -10252,7 +9700,7 @@ function toMillis(seconds) {
 
 /** SIWS message creation is async already, so its onchain module can be lazy. */
 async function genSolanaMessage(address, nonce) {
-    const implementation = await import('./solana-message-ngQQt80s.mjs');
+    const implementation = await import('./solana-message-BFqre_Oi.mjs');
     return implementation.genSolanaMessage(address, nonce);
 }
 
@@ -10727,5 +10175,5 @@ function defineLiveModule(mod) {
     return mod;
 }
 
-export { getSessionGeneration as $, closeAllSubscriptions as A, clearCache as B, getCachedData as C, reconnectWithNewAuth as D, createClient as E, subscribeQuery as F, closeAllQuerySubscriptions as G, canonicalizeArgs as H, InsufficientBalanceError as I, canonicalizeResult as J, DEFAULT_QUERY_POLL_INTERVAL_MS as K, BoundedDeclineError as L, MIN_QUERY_POLL_INTERVAL_MS as M, deriveDecline as N, dispatchDeclineEvent as O, DECLINE_EVENT_NAME as P, dispatchRateLimitEvent as Q, RATE_LIMIT_EVENT_NAME as R, ScopedClientReadOnlyError as S, hasActiveConnection as T, increment as U, serverTimestamp as V, now as W, toSeconds as X, toMillis as Y, getIdToken as Z, deriveUserIdentityFromIdToken as _, getWebhookKeysUrl as a, WebSessionManager as a0, ReactNativeSessionManager as a1, getActiveSessionManager as a2, onSessionCleared as a3, SessionEnvironmentError as a4, UNSUPPORTED_ENVIRONMENT_CODE as a5, AUTH_CHANGED_CODE as a6, AUTH_EXPIRED_CODE as a7, isAuthExpiredError as a8, getFreshAuthToken as a9, ServerSessionManager as aa, createSessionWithSignature as ab, refreshSession as ac, revokeSession as ad, signSessionCreateMessage as ae, genAuthNonce as af, genSolanaMessage as ag, genSiweMessage as ah, normalizeEvmAddress as ai, toLowerEvmAddress as aj, assertCanonicalBoundedRuntimeWriteCalldata as ak, assertEvmTransactionMatchesWrite as al, BOUNDED_RUNTIME_SET_DOCUMENTS_SELECTOR as am, BOUNDED_RUNTIME_SET_DOCUMENTS_ATTESTED_SELECTOR as an, functions as ao, invoke as ap, FunctionInvokeError as aq, live as ar, intent as as, status as at, subscribeView as au, LiveIntentError as av, withEffects as aw, isEffectResult as ax, defineLiveModule as ay, EFFECT_INTENT_ADDRESS as az, bufferExports as b, getConfiguredAppId as c, get as d, getMany as e, docId as f, getConfig as g, setMany as h, init as i, setFile as j, getFiles as k, search as l, runQueryMany as m, runExpression as n, runExpressionMany as o, signMessage as p, queryAggregate as q, runQuery as r, set as s, signTransaction as t, signAndSubmitTransaction as u, count as v, aggregate as w, reconcileSetResult as x, waitForSetResult as y, subscribe as z };
-//# sourceMappingURL=index-C9h-Bnjk.mjs.map
+export { getSessionGeneration as $, closeAllSubscriptions as A, clearCache as B, getCachedData as C, reconnectWithNewAuth as D, createClient as E, subscribeQuery as F, closeAllQuerySubscriptions as G, canonicalizeArgs as H, InsufficientBalanceError as I, canonicalizeResult as J, DEFAULT_QUERY_POLL_INTERVAL_MS as K, BoundedDeclineError as L, MIN_QUERY_POLL_INTERVAL_MS as M, deriveDecline as N, dispatchDeclineEvent as O, DECLINE_EVENT_NAME as P, dispatchRateLimitEvent as Q, RATE_LIMIT_EVENT_NAME as R, ScopedClientReadOnlyError as S, hasActiveConnection as T, increment as U, serverTimestamp as V, now as W, toSeconds as X, toMillis as Y, getIdToken as Z, deriveUserIdentityFromIdToken as _, getWebhookKeysUrl as a, WebSessionManager as a0, ReactNativeSessionManager as a1, getActiveSessionManager as a2, onSessionCleared as a3, SessionEnvironmentError as a4, UNSUPPORTED_ENVIRONMENT_CODE as a5, AUTH_CHANGED_CODE as a6, AUTH_EXPIRED_CODE as a7, isAuthExpiredError as a8, getFreshAuthToken as a9, ServerSessionManager as aa, createSessionWithSignature as ab, refreshSession as ac, revokeSession as ad, signSessionCreateMessage as ae, genAuthNonce as af, genSolanaMessage as ag, genSiweMessage as ah, normalizeEvmAddress as ai, toLowerEvmAddress as aj, functions as ak, invoke as al, FunctionInvokeError as am, live as an, intent as ao, status as ap, subscribeView as aq, LiveIntentError as ar, withEffects as as, isEffectResult as at, defineLiveModule as au, EFFECT_INTENT_ADDRESS as av, bufferExports as b, getConfiguredAppId as c, get as d, getMany as e, docId as f, getConfig as g, setMany as h, init as i, setFile as j, getFiles as k, search as l, runQueryMany as m, runExpression as n, runExpressionMany as o, signMessage as p, queryAggregate as q, runQuery as r, set as s, signTransaction as t, signAndSubmitTransaction as u, count as v, aggregate as w, reconcileSetResult as x, waitForSetResult as y, subscribe as z };
+//# sourceMappingURL=index-Csf_2uZF.mjs.map