@botiverse/porthole 0.14.18 → 0.15.1
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- package/CHANGELOG.md +82 -0
- package/dist/check/page-source.js +1 -1
- package/dist/conformance/harness-source.js +1 -1
- package/dist/isolation/served.d.ts +11 -1
- package/dist/isolation/served.js +56 -2
- package/dist/server/host.d.ts +16 -1
- package/dist/server/host.js +6 -0
- package/dist/server/pages.d.ts +39 -12
- package/dist/server/pages.js +85 -37
- package/dist/server/server.js +168 -40
- package/dist/server/types.d.ts +30 -0
- package/dist/shell/annotate.js +3 -2
- package/dist/shell/find.js +2 -1
- package/dist/shell/frame.d.ts +3 -34
- package/dist/shell/frame.js +26 -14
- package/dist/shell/runtime.d.ts +3 -2
- package/dist/shell/runtime.js +12 -6
- package/docs/ADOPTING.md +25 -4
- package/docs/DECISIONS.md +300 -2
- package/docs/DESIGN.md +4 -0
- package/docs/THREAT_MODEL.md +52 -2
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/isolation/served.ts +58 -2
- package/src/server/host.ts +26 -1
- package/src/server/pages.ts +129 -56
- package/src/server/server.ts +237 -40
- package/src/server/types.ts +30 -0
- package/src/shell/annotate.ts +3 -2
- package/src/shell/find.ts +2 -1
- package/src/shell/frame.ts +33 -14
- package/src/shell/runtime.ts +12 -6
package/CHANGELOG.md
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section); the reasons for every change are in [docs/DECISIONS.md](docs/DECISIONS.md), by the
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P-numbers below.
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## 0.15.1
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After Ferryman's audit of 0.15.0 (P145, amends P143 and P144): no P0, no escape, no new egress,
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and no way found for an embed session's `frame-ancestors *` to reach another session. Four fixes:
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- **"Byte for byte", said as it holds.** 0.15.0 said the default path (no `framedBy`, no embed) was
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0.14.16's again, byte for byte. Every header was (every CSP, `frame-ancestors` and `script-src`
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hash, every cookie and cache header), and so were the status, entry and door pages' scripts and
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the nested page's shell. The shell runtime that a served shell, an artifact page, a file set's
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pages and the MCP Apps proxy inline was not: it carries P142's changes (0.14.18) and P143's
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`hostless` branches, inert wherever a plan names a host. Nothing a browser does changed, and no
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hash covers that runtime; the claim did. DECISIONS, THREAT_MODEL and 0.15.0's lines above now say
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what holds, and a test pins the runtime's bytes, so a change to them is said in this file.
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- **The host kit never mints an embed session from `access`.** 0.15.0's `embeds` doc said "whether
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`access` may answer an embed grant", but `access` answers your readers (the issue endpoint, a
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clean address), which must never mint one. Now an `access` answer with `embed` is refused: 409
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`refused` from the issue endpoint and a clean address's resolve, and the kit's 409 page at a clean
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address's tab, with `embeds` or without. **If you answered `embed` from `access`**, mint it from a
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route of your own instead: `host.server.issue(instance, { anonymous: true, embed: true })`.
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- **What an embed page learns of where it is, documented** (THREAT_MODEL S4, ADOPTING `embeds`):
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its request's `Referer` and `document.referrer` name your outer page, and
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`location.ancestorOrigins` names every ancestor, the embedding site included (measured in
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Chromium, Firefox and WebKit), so a page with any egress can report where it is shown.
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- **Ports and hosts as a browser serializes them.** A host origin's or `framedBy`'s port is 1 to
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65535, without a leading zero, and an `http`/`https` host is as the URL parser gives it: `:0`,
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`:99999`, `:0443` and `https://0x7f.0.0.1` now throw in `createServer`, the host kit and every
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helper that takes them (each matched nothing before). A default port (`:443`) is still taken.
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- **Tests:** the `embed-origins` control could fail `[embed.unheard]` before its verdict on a loaded
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box (a weakened shell drew the hostile document before its own); the probe now waits for either
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and judges at its verdict, and its document arrives in two parts so the early words are covered
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on every run.
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- **Security (P145):** a narrowing: the kit refuses what it used to pass on, and malformed origins
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throw. No CSP, sandbox, egress or gate changes.
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## 0.15.0
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- **Embedded documents (P143): `Grant.embed`.** A public artifact page any site may frame, with no
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host: the host's own outer page (no host itself) frames it, and any site frames that page.
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`createServer({ embeds: true })` and `createContentHost({ embeds: true })` opt in (default off);
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then `issue` takes `{ anonymous: true, embed: true }`, for an artifact's page that isn't nested,
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with no `level` or `user` (anything else throws, as do `enterBy` and `doorAnswer` with it). The
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flag is signed into the session (and the sealed files' address), its cookie has a name of its own
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(`__Host-porthole-e-<key>`), and `authorize.check` is told `embed: true`. Every answer of such a
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session says `frame-ancestors *`; its plan names no host, so the shell asks no host, ends its
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handshake at once (`data-porthole-host="none"`), says nothing to any parent and hears no one; no
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door is minted and `issue` says `reports: false`. `statusPage` and `doorStatusResponse` take
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`embed: true` for a content Worker's own answers before such a session exists. With `embeds` off,
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an embed ticket, cookie or address opens nothing.
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- **Security (P143):** a loosening, bounded: `*` for an embed session's answers alone, a session
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the host minted on purpose, with no viewer, no level, no host function and no channel to any
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parent. Every other session's answers are, byte for byte, what the same server without `embeds`
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answers, while an embed session of the same artifact exists (not 0.14.18's: the shell runtime
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they inline carries P143's inert `hostless` branches; said so in 0.15.1, P145); cookies stay
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host-only (`__Host-`, never `Domain=`).
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Negative controls `embed-ancestors`, `embed-handshake`, `embed-origins`.
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- **`framedBy` after Ferryman's audit of 0.14.17 and 0.14.18 (P144, amends P141).** No P0 and no
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new egress; four fixes:
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- *Without `framedBy`, 0.14.16's scripts again, byte for byte.* 0.14.17 kept every
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`frame-ancestors` and behaviour without `framedBy`, but the status, entry and door pages'
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scripts and the nested page's shell carried its strict check on every path, so their bytes and
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`script-src` hashes changed, against 0.14.17's "every response is as before". Now without
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`framedBy` (and without an embed) they are 0.14.16's, and a test pins their hashes to 0.14.16's.
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A page whose parent may be an outer page loads `/__porthole/status-strict.js` or
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`/__porthole/enter-strict.js` (0.14.17's scripts); a door and a nested shell carry the strict
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script inline as before.
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- *The nesting `framedBy` is for, documented.* With the outer page above your app's page above
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content, content can `postMessage` the outer page and every frame in its tree and learn the
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outer page's origin (Chromium, Firefox). **If an outer page frames your app**, its authors must
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check `event.source` and `event.origin` in every message listener, on the outer page and in
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its frames; THREAT_MODEL's S7 egress rule (a page's egress is the union of its frames') now
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covers the outer page's frames too.
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- *Origins compared as browsers serialize them.* A host origin given again as `framedBy` with
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or without its default port (`https://app.example.com:443`) now throws ("a host origin
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already"), in `createServer`, the host kit and every helper that takes `framedBy`; an outer page
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named twice so is named once.
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- *ADOPTING's nested-page rows* (the page, its files, an ended token) name `<framedBy>` in
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`frame-ancestors`: a content Worker copied from them showed a blank frame below the outer page.
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- **Security (P144):** nothing is loosened. On the default path every header and the four scripts
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are 0.14.16's again (the shell runtime that served documents inline is not: P142's and P143's
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changes, inert there; said so in 0.15.1, P145); with `framedBy`, the scripts and rules are
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0.14.17's, and a host origin is now refused as `framedBy` under a second spelling.
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## 0.14.18
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- **A set's pages without the Navigation API, and links within a page (P142).** In Safari before 26
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