@bopen-io/wallet-toolbox 2.1.21-parity-fix.2 → 2.6.2-brc153.2

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,9 +4,234 @@ This document captures the history of significant changes to the wallet-toolbox
 The git commit history contains the details but is unable to draw
 attention to changes that materially alter behavior or extend functionality.
 
-## @bopen-io/wallet-toolbox 2.1.21-parity-fix.2
-
-- EntityTransaction.mergeFind: match by (userId, txid) first, fall through to (userId, reference) when txid is absent. Prevents sync from inserting duplicate transaction rows when two storages independently ingested the same txid under different locally-assigned references.
+## wallet-toolbox (unreleased)
+
+- Let Storage Server operators select an explicit listener host while retaining
+  the historical omitted-host behavior for existing callers. The official
+  Wallet Infrastructure image uses this to bind direct-mode traffic on IPv4
+  and to keep the application listener on loopback behind nginx.
+- Preserve forward-compatible Storage Server browser preflights by accepting
+  additive well-formed request headers when operators have not configured a
+  strict `WALLET_STORAGE_CORS_ALLOWED_HEADERS` list.
+- Restore completed `createAction` and `signAction` Atomic BEEF results to
+  numeric arrays at the public wallet boundary so legacy BRC-100 JSON bridges
+  preserve their historical wire shape. Typed byte arrays remain supported by
+  `AtomicBEEF` and binary Wallet Wire transports.
+- Fix credential-free Arcade/go-chaintracks bootstrap when ChainTracks bulk
+  storage is empty. A first batch is now accepted only from height zero and is
+  still checked for continuity, proof of work, file integrity, and the exact
+  configured network genesis before it becomes available.
+- Make ChainTracks credential-free by default on mainnet, testnet, and
+  TerraTestNet through the public Arcade/go-chaintracks v2 HTTP and SSE APIs.
+  Add explicit STN and Terra Scaling TestNet support, exact per-network genesis
+  headers, isolated in-memory storage, and remove silent testnet aliases.
+- Add prioritized bulk/live source failover, locally validated last-good height
+  operation, source health reporting, bounded request timeouts, browser-safe SSE
+  reconnection, network checks, and a globally rate-limited anonymous
+  WhatsOnChain fallback for mainnet/testnet. WhatsOnChain keys remain optional
+  and rejected configured keys retry header/info requests anonymously.
+- Preserve the default automatically negotiated in-memory `noSend` batching and
+  `sendWith` lifecycle introduced in #289. Expand inherited txid-only proof
+  ancestors for cold clients, preserve caller-declared known txids, report the
+  actual viable-change funding shortfall, and document aborting listed staged
+  actions by transaction ID.
+- Collapse fragmented `createAction` storage work into one atomic write
+  transaction, batch proof retrieval and compound-proof validation, overlap
+  independent proof reads with persistence, bulk-insert untagged outputs, and
+  batch canonical P2PKH verification. The retained 153-input authenticated
+  remote PXC workload is below 500 ms at p95.
+- Reuse parsed root and counterparty keys and one BRC-42 shared secret per
+  counterparty while signing managed BRC-29 inputs, keep funding selection and
+  transaction-size accounting linear, and avoid redundant BEEF validation,
+  unused process reads, and unconditional commission reads on the successful
+  path. Generated scripts, signatures, fees, input ordering, BEEF bytes, and
+  error diagnostics remain equivalence-tested.
+- Add bounded-cardinality spans for proof decode/merge, persistence, signing,
+  verification, result assembly, serialization, and server-side processing.
+  No telemetry header or protocol field is added; BRC-103/104, AuthFetch, Auth
+  Express Middleware, AuthSocket, JSON-RPC, and wallet wire behavior are unchanged.
+- Coalesce only recent timestamp-only touches for already-authenticated shared
+  Knex sessions, while immediately persisting every authentication and
+  certificate transition. This removes a synchronous replicated PXC write from
+  the normal RPC path; exact per-request persistence remains available with
+  `touchIntervalMs: 0`.
+- Make expired action-batch reservations non-blocking in indexed queries and
+  repair MySQL rollback support indexes. Existing databases migrate through the
+  normal Knex path, and full PXC down-to-empty/re-upgrade is regression-tested.
+- Make UMP account lookup resilient to stale SLAP advertisements and partial
+  overlay failure. One verified matching token establishes an existing account;
+  otherwise one clean empty response establishes a new account. Malformed,
+  rejected, empty, and unavailable peers cannot veto a verified token, and
+  malformed or unavailable peers cannot veto a clean empty response. Lookups
+  with no usable response remain errors; WAB existing-account continuity still
+  prevents replacement-wallet onboarding.
+- Resolve competing verified UMP tokens on on-chain proof. A candidate spent
+  anywhere in another candidate's BEEF ancestry is superseded (evidence merged
+  across hosts serving different depths; ancestry walked iteratively so deep
+  update chains cannot exhaust the stack). Forked candidates resolve only when
+  exactly one provably consumed a same-identity predecessor token, which
+  requires the account's keys; anything less decisive stays an error so a
+  wrong token can never be chosen silently. Resolved conflicts report a
+  `supersededTokens` count in lookup telemetry.
+- Plan legacy `createAction` funding against the exact unreserved managed-change
+  set before persistence, claim the selected inputs atomically in one storage
+  transaction, and fail economically impossible fragmented wallets before
+  inserting a transaction row. Add targeted Knex and IndexedDB indexes and
+  remove IndexedDB's per-output transaction-status lookup.
+- Avoid building full known-txid indexes on the common single-proof path and
+  report privacy-safe createAction candidate, funding, proof-fetch, BEEF merge,
+  trim, serialization, and known-history timings. BRC-103/104, AuthFetch, Auth
+  Express Middleware, AuthSocket, JSON-RPC, and wallet wire behavior are unchanged.
+- Keep remote-storage trace correlation inside the telemetry sink instead of
+  adding unsupported headers to AuthFetch requests. BRC-103/104, AuthFetch,
+  Auth Express Middleware, AuthSocket, JSON-RPC, and storage wire behavior are
+  unchanged.
+- Point Wallet Toolbox contributors and AI agents to the canonical stack-level
+  contribution and quality policy; keep client and mobile candidate versions
+  in release lockstep without changing runtime behavior.
+- Harden storage, action-batch, remoting, WAB, authentication, chaintracker,
+  and monitor implementation paths while preserving persisted schemas,
+  positional call compatibility, and public wallet/storage contracts.
+- Refresh compatible rate-limit, MySQL, and React Native build dependencies;
+  consolidate entropy, Merkle-path, and action-batch iteration without
+  changing persisted data, generated paths, or public wallet contracts.
+- Remove generated SQLite test databases before and after every Jest run so
+  repeated local validation cannot silently consume unbounded disk space.
+- Ship the Express declaration dependency required by the public storage
+  server, edge-policy, and rate-limit declarations. Validate authenticated
+  storage identities explicitly and normalize multi-value Express 5 headers
+  instead of relying on implicit request augmentation or scalar headers.
+- Add capability-negotiated action-batch manifest format 2 without changing
+  BRC-100. It derives source/output scripts from the authenticated transaction
+  graph, retains only the external proof frontier, bulk-loads shared storage
+  rows, and commits an already prepared manifest by semantic digest. Version-1
+  providers and clients retain their existing behavior.
+- Add authenticated `ABP1` multi-blob uploads with bounded gzip/Brotli/identity
+  negotiation, decompression limits, prepared-manifest authorization, per-item
+  content verification, bounded concurrency, and one-transaction bulk storage.
+  The physical request limit chunks unbounded logical transactions; it is not
+  a script or consensus limit.
+- Add optional script-verifier injection to Wallet, setup helpers, and local
+  storage providers. Internal checks use explicit consensus context, distinguish
+  resource exhaustion from invalid scripts, and continue verifying resolvable
+  inputs when another source transaction is intentionally omitted.
+- Retain typed bytes through action-batch planning, hashing, validation, and
+  chunk assembly; preload external inputs and shared metadata once per atomic
+  manifest; and convert Atomic BEEF only at the historical public `number[]`
+  boundary without changing BRC-100 or storage protocol contracts.
+- Make StorageServer, AdminServer, and the reusable ChaintracksService
+  credential-free public-CORS compatible by default, with opt-in exact origin
+  lists and configurable CSP/browser response headers. Add bounded parsers,
+  in-flight work and Node connection limits, stable non-sensitive errors, and
+  metadata-only request logging. Storage RPC work remains protected by
+  BRC-103 identity, per-IP/per-identity limits, method allowlisting, and
+  optional payment policy.
+- Bound StorageServer work per source IP before BRC-103 authentication and per
+  identity before payment/RPC handling. Both stages support shared stores, and
+  proxy trust now requires an explicit hop/subnet/predicate configuration.
+- Harden CWI/WAB account continuity so overlay failures, malformed or ambiguous
+  UMP results, and snapshot-load failures cannot silently enter new-user
+  onboarding. Add an expiring WAB auth session, legacy-compatible WAB account
+  status inference, canonical E.164 phone identity, bounded KDF/snapshot
+  parsing, and fail-closed UMP renewal/broadcast behavior.
+- Replace WAB's endpoint-by-endpoint raw `fetch` calls with one typed transport
+  enforcing HTTPS (localhost excepted), timeouts, request/response limits,
+  redirect and ambient-credential protection, correlation IDs, and privacy-safe errors.
+  Wallet authentication, UMP, WAB, and snapshot events now support the SDK's
+  opt-in generic telemetry sink without reporting keys, snapshots, payloads,
+  OTPs, or Shamir shares.
+- Add automatically negotiated, in-memory planning for dependent `noSend` workloads. Capable
+  storage providers reserve funding once, perform middle action planning and signing without
+  persistence round trips, and atomically commit the complete workspace on `sendWith`. Existing
+  BRC-100 arguments and results are unchanged, and providers without `actionBatch: 1` retain the
+  legacy path. SQLite, MySQL/Knex, IndexedDB, authenticated remote clients, browser, and mobile
+  builds share the same capability contract.
+- Add leased per-output batch reservations, expiry cleanup, adaptive pool extension, idempotent
+  manifest commits, inline content-addressed blobs up to 4 MiB, and authenticated binary uploads
+  in provider-sized chunks with four-way bounded concurrency for larger batches. Broadcast remains
+  outside the atomic persistence transaction.
+- Make batch funding converge on fragmented wallets at production fee rates. Reservation targets
+  include the fee and viable-change overhead of an added input, reactive extensions request only
+  the remaining shortfall, and EWMA runway extensions subtract unconsumed reserved funding without
+  compounding after empty or partial responses. The regression runs 16 independent actions through
+  both the in-process and authenticated remote-storage paths and commits the complete batch.
+- Bind remote batch authorization exclusively to the BRC-103 authenticated identity and its active
+  storage provider, ignoring caller-supplied user IDs and active-state claims. Restrict JSON-RPC
+  dispatch to the public remote-storage protocol so authenticated callers cannot invoke low-level
+  provider methods, and rate-limit authenticated RPCs per identity key without limiting workspace
+  length. Unauthenticated and cross-user batch-management regressions cover the boundary.
+- Replace the cumulative 64-output reservation ceiling with repeatable extensions bounded to 64
+  outputs per storage call. Workspaces and spend chains no longer have an action-count or confirmed
+  funding-input ceiling; an 80-action independent batch crosses the old boundary and commits.
+- Add a retained workload benchmark covering 1, 10, 50, and 250 actions across dependent,
+  independent, mixed-input, and two-step signing models, four script sizes, and 25/100/250 ms
+  storage latency. Run it with `pnpm --filter @bsv/wallet-toolbox bench:action-batch`.
+- Release prep for `2.4.2`: transaction-pipeline, BEEF fetching, and binary transport
+  performance improvements described below, published in lockstep for Node, browser, and mobile.
+- Transaction pipeline performance: reuse parsed BEEF through `createAction`/`signAction`, retain
+  typed bytes internally until persistence compatibility boundaries, and avoid reparsing Atomic
+  BEEF during internalization and broadcast preparation.
+- Fetch independent BEEF ancestor frontiers and allocated-change proofs with bounded concurrency,
+  deterministic merge order, Set-based deduplication, and configurable `maxConcurrency`.
+- Negotiate compact base64 JSON-RPC binary values across Node, browser, and mobile clients while
+  preserving numeric-array requests and responses for old servers and clients. A 1 MiB payload is
+  62.7% smaller on the wire than legacy byte-array JSON.
+- Treat non-finite ancestor-fetch concurrency values as the safe default instead of silently
+  returning incomplete BEEF, reject malformed binary JSON base64, and decode deeply nested JSON
+  iteratively so hostile input cannot overflow the JavaScript call stack.
+- Keep binary JSON-RPC requests in the legacy numeric-array format by default so rolling deployments
+  cannot route a negotiated request to an older server instance. Homogeneous endpoints can opt in to
+  compact requests with `StorageClientOptions.binaryRequests`; compact responses remain negotiated.
+
+- Release prep for `2.4.2`: add a Knex-backed async BRC-103 session manager,
+  the shared-session schema migration, and `StorageServer.sessionManager`
+  injection so authenticated requests can move safely between replicas without
+  sticky routing. Session writes reject stale cross-replica state, expire after
+  a configurable TTL, and support explicit pruning. Also add an opt-out that
+  skips both per-RPC logging and request-parameter serialization, and add a
+  `monitor_events.created_at` index for production proof-latency correlation.
+  Declare the runtime `body-parser` and `dotenv` imports explicitly;
+  `auth-express-middleware@2.1.1` likewise declares its `mime-types` runtime
+  import so strict package managers do not fail when loading the built packages.
+
+- Release prep for `2.4.2`: proof completion now discovers every local
+  transaction row sharing the proven txid, repairs notification-set drift from
+  concurrent multi-user `internalizeAction` calls, and idempotently completes
+  any local copy omitted by a last-writer-wins notification update.
+
+- Release prep for `2.4.1`: define one managed-change policy across Knex and IndexedDB allocation,
+  counting, default balance reporting, `balanceAndUtxos`, and `noSendChange`.
+  Only complete BRC-29 signer metadata is eligible; custom rows remain visible
+  through raw default-basket listing for recovery. `internalizeAction` now
+  rejects basket insertion into `default`, prevents managed change from being
+  reclassified, promotes verified legacy BRC-29 rows through `wallet payment`,
+  and permits incompatible custom rows to be swept to non-default baskets
+  without changing wallet balance.
+
+- Release prep for `2.4.0`: security fix for `GHSA-36f9-7rg5-cpf8`. `buildSignableTransaction` now verifies that storage-returned outputs match the caller's requested `args.outputs` before signing (rejects substituted/altered/reclassified/missing outputs), and rejects any unrequested output that isn't client-derived change or a single commission output bounded by `MAX_STORAGE_COMMISSION_SATOSHIS`. `WalletPermissionsManager.createAction` independently verifies requested outputs are present in the signable transaction before authorizing, as defense-in-depth. Protects against a malicious or compromised `StorageClient` operator substituting or injecting outputs that would be signed and broadcast without the caller's knowledge.
+
+- Release prep for `2.3.3`: add Arcade-first wallet service wiring, go-chaintracks
+  live client/SSE support, resilient ARC/Arcade status handling, monitor
+  rebroadcast safeguards, and callback-token redaction for Arcade SSE logs.
+
+- **Public API change**: `AbortActionResult.aborted` is now typed `boolean` (was the literal `true`). The wallet returns `aborted: false` when it positively confirms the underlying transaction is already on chain (mined or known to mempool) and the abort therefore should not proceed. Callers branching on `result.aborted` should treat `false` as "refused due to on-chain confirmation" and typically follow up with `internalizeAction`. Service-unreachable conditions return `aborted: true` (with an `abortAction-offline-fallback` history note) — refusal is reserved for positive on-chain confirmation, per BRC-100.
+
+- Fix: close the nosend orphan-output failure mode. A `nosend` transaction (created via `createAction({noSend:true})`) could be externally broadcast and confirmed on chain before any `internalizeAction` or `Monitor.TaskCheckNoSends` cycle retired its `nosend` status. Before this change, two paths could then destroy the wallet's bookkeeping for the chain-confirmed tx: `StorageProvider.abortAction` unconditionally promoted `transactions.status` to `'failed'` and `proven_tx_reqs.status` to terminal `'invalid'`, hiding every output the tx produced (including the wallet's own auto-fund change) from the `listOutputsKnex` `txStatusAllowed` filter; and `specOpNoSendActions.postProcess` (bulk-abort path) blanket-set `tx.status = 'failed'` regardless of per-row outcome. Additionally `mergedInternalize` never advanced `transactions.status` or `proven_tx_reqs.status` out of `nosend`, so even a correctly-issued post-broadcast `internalizeAction` silently no-op'd on the lifecycle. Four fixes in defense-in-depth: (1) `mergedInternalize` retires the nosend lifecycle (transition to `unproven` + req `unmined`, or all the way to `completed` if the BEEF carries a BUMP); (2) `Monitor.processNewBlockHeader` now nudges `TaskCheckNoSends.checkNow` alongside the existing `TaskCheckForProofs.checkNow` nudge, wiring up the documented-but-orphaned per-block trigger; (3) `StorageProvider.abortAction` chain-checks signed `nosend` txs via `services.getStatusForTxids` and returns `aborted: false` for `mined` or `known` (mempool-aware) txs without throwing; (4) `specOpNoSendActions.postProcess` pre-filters chain-known rows before bulk-abort and honors per-row `aborted: false` returns so race-window rows that became chain-known mid-page leave their status as `nosend` rather than being blanket-set to `failed`. Service-unreachable handling proceeds with the abort and writes an `abortAction-offline-fallback` history note for forensic audit — abort must remain possible when network confirmation is impossible. One residual edge case (backend returns success+`unknown` for a tx that is actually on chain) is documented in the PR; mitigations include the per-block `TaskCheckNoSends` nudge eventually self-healing and caller-side multi-source chain verification.
+
+- Optimization: `TaskCheckNoSends` aging schedule on the block-triggered `checkNow` path. The unfiltered per-block scan would do an unbounded number of external `getMerklePath` lookups per block as a wallet's `nosend` set grows (escrow, un-aborted tests, abandoned batches). The new schedule keys on row age: rows fresher than 5 min are skipped entirely (protecting in-flight batched-tx workflows that chain `createAction({noSend:true, sendWith:[...]})` builds); 5 min – 1 hr rows check on every trigger; older rows progress to `~hourly` (block-height % 6), `~daily` (% 144), and `~weekly` (% 1008) cadences. Each row's modulo offset is keyed by its `provenTxReqId` so same-tier rows are staggered across the cycle (`(blockHeight + provenTxReqId) % tierInterval === 0`) rather than all firing on the same block. The scheduled daily (no-`checkNow`) cadence is unchanged and still scans every row, providing a safety net for externally-broadcast unmined `nosend` txs regardless of age.
+
+## wallet-toolbox 2.1.27
+
+- Add optional `contactSource` (and exported `ContactSource` / `ContactRecord` interfaces) on `WalletArgs` and the `Wallet` class. When provided, `Wallet.discoverByIdentityKey` consults the local contacts source **before** the in-process `_overlayCache` and before any network call; on a hit, the overlay is not queried at all. `Wallet.discoverByAttributes` consults the contact source's optional `findByAttributes` when present. Contact-source failures are swallowed and fall through to the existing network path so the network is never gated on a flaky contact store.
+- `Wallet.discoverByIdentityKey` and `Wallet.discoverByAttributes` accept `forceRefresh?: boolean`. When `true`, both the contacts short-circuit and the 2-minute `_overlayCache` are bypassed so the network is consulted fresh — useful for a manual refresh action.
+- `identityUtils.parseResults` now yields to the host runtime between certificates on UI runtimes (browser / React Native, detected at call time). On Node the yield is skipped to avoid timer overhead. Same total work; the JS thread no longer owns the frame for the duration of the loop, so menu taps and scroll keep working while a large identity result is parsed.
+- `identityUtils.parseResults$` — new async-iterable form that emits each successfully parsed `VerifiableCertificate` as soon as it's ready, for callers that want progressive rendering.
+- `queryOverlay` widens the per-call grace window for `ls_identity` queries to 300 ms via the new `LookupQueryOptions.graceMs`, so more in-sync identity hosts contribute outputs before the query resolves.
+- `@bsv/sdk` dependency switched to the local workspace via `workspace:^2.1.1` so SDK changes flow through without an intermediate publish. Publish-time tooling rewrites `workspace:` ranges to concrete versions.
+
+## wallet-toolbox 2.1.26
+
+- Fix: auto-evict confirmed-stale inputs after any failed broadcast, regardless of how the broadcaster classifies the failure. When a tx is marked failed, `updateTransactionStatus(failed)` previously restored ALL consumed inputs to `spendable: true` to support transient retry. That's correct for fee/script/malformed failures where inputs are still UTXOs, but wrong for cases where the input has been spent on chain by a different tx — the wallet then picks the same already-spent UTXO on the next createAction → infinite missing-inputs broadcast loop. The new `markStaleInputsAsSpent` helper runs after `updateTransactionsStatus(failed)` and queries `services.isUtxo` per consumed input (concurrently across inputs via `Promise.all`), overriding `spendable: false` only for inputs the chain authoritatively confirms are spent. Inputs still on chain (transient/false-positive failures) keep the existing retry semantics. Service errors leave inputs untouched (eviction is opt-in based on positive evidence). Helper is broadcaster-agnostic — applies to ARC's `doubleSpend` (`SEEN_IN_ORPHAN_MEMPOOL`) and to WhatsOnChain/Bitails `invalidTx` (`missing-inputs`) classifications alike. Pre-broadcast races where concurrent createActions reach the same UTXO across separate app processes remain out of scope; that's a separate class of double-spend with its own design space (TaskReviewUtxos enqueue, locked-input semantics).
 
 ## wallet-toolbox 2.1.21
 
@@ -15,7 +240,8 @@ attention to changes that materially alter behavior or extend functionality.
 ## wallet-toolbox 2.1.20
 
 - Update cdn.projectbabbage.com valid blockheaders file hash.
-- 
+-
+
 ## wallet-toolbox 2.1.19
 
 - Merge PR#146. GenerateChange change to better handle dust situations. Redundant trimInputBeef knownTxids safety check.
@@ -38,7 +264,7 @@ attention to changes that materially alter behavior or extend functionality.
 ## wallet-toolbox 2.1.15
 
 - audit fix
- 
+
 ## wallet-toolbox 2.1.14
 
 - fix update timestamp on all updated currencies
@@ -75,7 +301,7 @@ attention to changes that materially alter behavior or extend functionality.
 
 ## wallet-toolbox 2.1.9
 
-- Fix batch sending bug in TaskSendWaiting 
+- Fix batch sending bug in TaskSendWaiting
 
 ## wallet-toolbox 2.1.8
 

package/LICENSE.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
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+"You", "User" or "Licensee").
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