@bopen-io/wallet-toolbox 2.1.21-parity-fix.1 → 2.6.2-brc153.1

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,235 @@ This document captures the history of significant changes to the wallet-toolbox
 The git commit history contains the details but is unable to draw
 attention to changes that materially alter behavior or extend functionality.
 
+## wallet-toolbox (unreleased)
+
+- Let Storage Server operators select an explicit listener host while retaining
+  the historical omitted-host behavior for existing callers. The official
+  Wallet Infrastructure image uses this to bind direct-mode traffic on IPv4
+  and to keep the application listener on loopback behind nginx.
+- Preserve forward-compatible Storage Server browser preflights by accepting
+  additive well-formed request headers when operators have not configured a
+  strict `WALLET_STORAGE_CORS_ALLOWED_HEADERS` list.
+- Restore completed `createAction` and `signAction` Atomic BEEF results to
+  numeric arrays at the public wallet boundary so legacy BRC-100 JSON bridges
+  preserve their historical wire shape. Typed byte arrays remain supported by
+  `AtomicBEEF` and binary Wallet Wire transports.
+- Fix credential-free Arcade/go-chaintracks bootstrap when ChainTracks bulk
+  storage is empty. A first batch is now accepted only from height zero and is
+  still checked for continuity, proof of work, file integrity, and the exact
+  configured network genesis before it becomes available.
+- Make ChainTracks credential-free by default on mainnet, testnet, and
+  TerraTestNet through the public Arcade/go-chaintracks v2 HTTP and SSE APIs.
+  Add explicit STN and Terra Scaling TestNet support, exact per-network genesis
+  headers, isolated in-memory storage, and remove silent testnet aliases.
+- Add prioritized bulk/live source failover, locally validated last-good height
+  operation, source health reporting, bounded request timeouts, browser-safe SSE
+  reconnection, network checks, and a globally rate-limited anonymous
+  WhatsOnChain fallback for mainnet/testnet. WhatsOnChain keys remain optional
+  and rejected configured keys retry header/info requests anonymously.
+- Preserve the default automatically negotiated in-memory `noSend` batching and
+  `sendWith` lifecycle introduced in #289. Expand inherited txid-only proof
+  ancestors for cold clients, preserve caller-declared known txids, report the
+  actual viable-change funding shortfall, and document aborting listed staged
+  actions by transaction ID.
+- Collapse fragmented `createAction` storage work into one atomic write
+  transaction, batch proof retrieval and compound-proof validation, overlap
+  independent proof reads with persistence, bulk-insert untagged outputs, and
+  batch canonical P2PKH verification. The retained 153-input authenticated
+  remote PXC workload is below 500 ms at p95.
+- Reuse parsed root and counterparty keys and one BRC-42 shared secret per
+  counterparty while signing managed BRC-29 inputs, keep funding selection and
+  transaction-size accounting linear, and avoid redundant BEEF validation,
+  unused process reads, and unconditional commission reads on the successful
+  path. Generated scripts, signatures, fees, input ordering, BEEF bytes, and
+  error diagnostics remain equivalence-tested.
+- Add bounded-cardinality spans for proof decode/merge, persistence, signing,
+  verification, result assembly, serialization, and server-side processing.
+  No telemetry header or protocol field is added; BRC-103/104, AuthFetch, Auth
+  Express Middleware, AuthSocket, JSON-RPC, and wallet wire behavior are unchanged.
+- Coalesce only recent timestamp-only touches for already-authenticated shared
+  Knex sessions, while immediately persisting every authentication and
+  certificate transition. This removes a synchronous replicated PXC write from
+  the normal RPC path; exact per-request persistence remains available with
+  `touchIntervalMs: 0`.
+- Make expired action-batch reservations non-blocking in indexed queries and
+  repair MySQL rollback support indexes. Existing databases migrate through the
+  normal Knex path, and full PXC down-to-empty/re-upgrade is regression-tested.
+- Make UMP account lookup resilient to stale SLAP advertisements and partial
+  overlay failure. One verified matching token establishes an existing account;
+  otherwise one clean empty response establishes a new account. Malformed,
+  rejected, empty, and unavailable peers cannot veto a verified token, and
+  malformed or unavailable peers cannot veto a clean empty response. Lookups
+  with no usable response remain errors; WAB existing-account continuity still
+  prevents replacement-wallet onboarding.
+- Resolve competing verified UMP tokens on on-chain proof. A candidate spent
+  anywhere in another candidate's BEEF ancestry is superseded (evidence merged
+  across hosts serving different depths; ancestry walked iteratively so deep
+  update chains cannot exhaust the stack). Forked candidates resolve only when
+  exactly one provably consumed a same-identity predecessor token, which
+  requires the account's keys; anything less decisive stays an error so a
+  wrong token can never be chosen silently. Resolved conflicts report a
+  `supersededTokens` count in lookup telemetry.
+- Plan legacy `createAction` funding against the exact unreserved managed-change
+  set before persistence, claim the selected inputs atomically in one storage
+  transaction, and fail economically impossible fragmented wallets before
+  inserting a transaction row. Add targeted Knex and IndexedDB indexes and
+  remove IndexedDB's per-output transaction-status lookup.
+- Avoid building full known-txid indexes on the common single-proof path and
+  report privacy-safe createAction candidate, funding, proof-fetch, BEEF merge,
+  trim, serialization, and known-history timings. BRC-103/104, AuthFetch, Auth
+  Express Middleware, AuthSocket, JSON-RPC, and wallet wire behavior are unchanged.
+- Keep remote-storage trace correlation inside the telemetry sink instead of
+  adding unsupported headers to AuthFetch requests. BRC-103/104, AuthFetch,
+  Auth Express Middleware, AuthSocket, JSON-RPC, and storage wire behavior are
+  unchanged.
+- Point Wallet Toolbox contributors and AI agents to the canonical stack-level
+  contribution and quality policy; keep client and mobile candidate versions
+  in release lockstep without changing runtime behavior.
+- Harden storage, action-batch, remoting, WAB, authentication, chaintracker,
+  and monitor implementation paths while preserving persisted schemas,
+  positional call compatibility, and public wallet/storage contracts.
+- Refresh compatible rate-limit, MySQL, and React Native build dependencies;
+  consolidate entropy, Merkle-path, and action-batch iteration without
+  changing persisted data, generated paths, or public wallet contracts.
+- Remove generated SQLite test databases before and after every Jest run so
+  repeated local validation cannot silently consume unbounded disk space.
+- Ship the Express declaration dependency required by the public storage
+  server, edge-policy, and rate-limit declarations. Validate authenticated
+  storage identities explicitly and normalize multi-value Express 5 headers
+  instead of relying on implicit request augmentation or scalar headers.
+- Add capability-negotiated action-batch manifest format 2 without changing
+  BRC-100. It derives source/output scripts from the authenticated transaction
+  graph, retains only the external proof frontier, bulk-loads shared storage
+  rows, and commits an already prepared manifest by semantic digest. Version-1
+  providers and clients retain their existing behavior.
+- Add authenticated `ABP1` multi-blob uploads with bounded gzip/Brotli/identity
+  negotiation, decompression limits, prepared-manifest authorization, per-item
+  content verification, bounded concurrency, and one-transaction bulk storage.
+  The physical request limit chunks unbounded logical transactions; it is not
+  a script or consensus limit.
+- Add optional script-verifier injection to Wallet, setup helpers, and local
+  storage providers. Internal checks use explicit consensus context, distinguish
+  resource exhaustion from invalid scripts, and continue verifying resolvable
+  inputs when another source transaction is intentionally omitted.
+- Retain typed bytes through action-batch planning, hashing, validation, and
+  chunk assembly; preload external inputs and shared metadata once per atomic
+  manifest; and convert Atomic BEEF only at the historical public `number[]`
+  boundary without changing BRC-100 or storage protocol contracts.
+- Make StorageServer, AdminServer, and the reusable ChaintracksService
+  credential-free public-CORS compatible by default, with opt-in exact origin
+  lists and configurable CSP/browser response headers. Add bounded parsers,
+  in-flight work and Node connection limits, stable non-sensitive errors, and
+  metadata-only request logging. Storage RPC work remains protected by
+  BRC-103 identity, per-IP/per-identity limits, method allowlisting, and
+  optional payment policy.
+- Bound StorageServer work per source IP before BRC-103 authentication and per
+  identity before payment/RPC handling. Both stages support shared stores, and
+  proxy trust now requires an explicit hop/subnet/predicate configuration.
+- Harden CWI/WAB account continuity so overlay failures, malformed or ambiguous
+  UMP results, and snapshot-load failures cannot silently enter new-user
+  onboarding. Add an expiring WAB auth session, legacy-compatible WAB account
+  status inference, canonical E.164 phone identity, bounded KDF/snapshot
+  parsing, and fail-closed UMP renewal/broadcast behavior.
+- Replace WAB's endpoint-by-endpoint raw `fetch` calls with one typed transport
+  enforcing HTTPS (localhost excepted), timeouts, request/response limits,
+  redirect and ambient-credential protection, correlation IDs, and privacy-safe errors.
+  Wallet authentication, UMP, WAB, and snapshot events now support the SDK's
+  opt-in generic telemetry sink without reporting keys, snapshots, payloads,
+  OTPs, or Shamir shares.
+- Add automatically negotiated, in-memory planning for dependent `noSend` workloads. Capable
+  storage providers reserve funding once, perform middle action planning and signing without
+  persistence round trips, and atomically commit the complete workspace on `sendWith`. Existing
+  BRC-100 arguments and results are unchanged, and providers without `actionBatch: 1` retain the
+  legacy path. SQLite, MySQL/Knex, IndexedDB, authenticated remote clients, browser, and mobile
+  builds share the same capability contract.
+- Add leased per-output batch reservations, expiry cleanup, adaptive pool extension, idempotent
+  manifest commits, inline content-addressed blobs up to 4 MiB, and authenticated binary uploads
+  in provider-sized chunks with four-way bounded concurrency for larger batches. Broadcast remains
+  outside the atomic persistence transaction.
+- Make batch funding converge on fragmented wallets at production fee rates. Reservation targets
+  include the fee and viable-change overhead of an added input, reactive extensions request only
+  the remaining shortfall, and EWMA runway extensions subtract unconsumed reserved funding without
+  compounding after empty or partial responses. The regression runs 16 independent actions through
+  both the in-process and authenticated remote-storage paths and commits the complete batch.
+- Bind remote batch authorization exclusively to the BRC-103 authenticated identity and its active
+  storage provider, ignoring caller-supplied user IDs and active-state claims. Restrict JSON-RPC
+  dispatch to the public remote-storage protocol so authenticated callers cannot invoke low-level
+  provider methods, and rate-limit authenticated RPCs per identity key without limiting workspace
+  length. Unauthenticated and cross-user batch-management regressions cover the boundary.
+- Replace the cumulative 64-output reservation ceiling with repeatable extensions bounded to 64
+  outputs per storage call. Workspaces and spend chains no longer have an action-count or confirmed
+  funding-input ceiling; an 80-action independent batch crosses the old boundary and commits.
+- Add a retained workload benchmark covering 1, 10, 50, and 250 actions across dependent,
+  independent, mixed-input, and two-step signing models, four script sizes, and 25/100/250 ms
+  storage latency. Run it with `pnpm --filter @bsv/wallet-toolbox bench:action-batch`.
+- Release prep for `2.4.2`: transaction-pipeline, BEEF fetching, and binary transport
+  performance improvements described below, published in lockstep for Node, browser, and mobile.
+- Transaction pipeline performance: reuse parsed BEEF through `createAction`/`signAction`, retain
+  typed bytes internally until persistence compatibility boundaries, and avoid reparsing Atomic
+  BEEF during internalization and broadcast preparation.
+- Fetch independent BEEF ancestor frontiers and allocated-change proofs with bounded concurrency,
+  deterministic merge order, Set-based deduplication, and configurable `maxConcurrency`.
+- Negotiate compact base64 JSON-RPC binary values across Node, browser, and mobile clients while
+  preserving numeric-array requests and responses for old servers and clients. A 1 MiB payload is
+  62.7% smaller on the wire than legacy byte-array JSON.
+- Treat non-finite ancestor-fetch concurrency values as the safe default instead of silently
+  returning incomplete BEEF, reject malformed binary JSON base64, and decode deeply nested JSON
+  iteratively so hostile input cannot overflow the JavaScript call stack.
+- Keep binary JSON-RPC requests in the legacy numeric-array format by default so rolling deployments
+  cannot route a negotiated request to an older server instance. Homogeneous endpoints can opt in to
+  compact requests with `StorageClientOptions.binaryRequests`; compact responses remain negotiated.
+
+- Release prep for `2.4.2`: add a Knex-backed async BRC-103 session manager,
+  the shared-session schema migration, and `StorageServer.sessionManager`
+  injection so authenticated requests can move safely between replicas without
+  sticky routing. Session writes reject stale cross-replica state, expire after
+  a configurable TTL, and support explicit pruning. Also add an opt-out that
+  skips both per-RPC logging and request-parameter serialization, and add a
+  `monitor_events.created_at` index for production proof-latency correlation.
+  Declare the runtime `body-parser` and `dotenv` imports explicitly;
+  `auth-express-middleware@2.1.1` likewise declares its `mime-types` runtime
+  import so strict package managers do not fail when loading the built packages.
+
+- Release prep for `2.4.2`: proof completion now discovers every local
+  transaction row sharing the proven txid, repairs notification-set drift from
+  concurrent multi-user `internalizeAction` calls, and idempotently completes
+  any local copy omitted by a last-writer-wins notification update.
+
+- Release prep for `2.4.1`: define one managed-change policy across Knex and IndexedDB allocation,
+  counting, default balance reporting, `balanceAndUtxos`, and `noSendChange`.
+  Only complete BRC-29 signer metadata is eligible; custom rows remain visible
+  through raw default-basket listing for recovery. `internalizeAction` now
+  rejects basket insertion into `default`, prevents managed change from being
+  reclassified, promotes verified legacy BRC-29 rows through `wallet payment`,
+  and permits incompatible custom rows to be swept to non-default baskets
+  without changing wallet balance.
+
+- Release prep for `2.4.0`: security fix for `GHSA-36f9-7rg5-cpf8`. `buildSignableTransaction` now verifies that storage-returned outputs match the caller's requested `args.outputs` before signing (rejects substituted/altered/reclassified/missing outputs), and rejects any unrequested output that isn't client-derived change or a single commission output bounded by `MAX_STORAGE_COMMISSION_SATOSHIS`. `WalletPermissionsManager.createAction` independently verifies requested outputs are present in the signable transaction before authorizing, as defense-in-depth. Protects against a malicious or compromised `StorageClient` operator substituting or injecting outputs that would be signed and broadcast without the caller's knowledge.
+
+- Release prep for `2.3.3`: add Arcade-first wallet service wiring, go-chaintracks
+  live client/SSE support, resilient ARC/Arcade status handling, monitor
+  rebroadcast safeguards, and callback-token redaction for Arcade SSE logs.
+
+- **Public API change**: `AbortActionResult.aborted` is now typed `boolean` (was the literal `true`). The wallet returns `aborted: false` when it positively confirms the underlying transaction is already on chain (mined or known to mempool) and the abort therefore should not proceed. Callers branching on `result.aborted` should treat `false` as "refused due to on-chain confirmation" and typically follow up with `internalizeAction`. Service-unreachable conditions return `aborted: true` (with an `abortAction-offline-fallback` history note) — refusal is reserved for positive on-chain confirmation, per BRC-100.
+
+- Fix: close the nosend orphan-output failure mode. A `nosend` transaction (created via `createAction({noSend:true})`) could be externally broadcast and confirmed on chain before any `internalizeAction` or `Monitor.TaskCheckNoSends` cycle retired its `nosend` status. Before this change, two paths could then destroy the wallet's bookkeeping for the chain-confirmed tx: `StorageProvider.abortAction` unconditionally promoted `transactions.status` to `'failed'` and `proven_tx_reqs.status` to terminal `'invalid'`, hiding every output the tx produced (including the wallet's own auto-fund change) from the `listOutputsKnex` `txStatusAllowed` filter; and `specOpNoSendActions.postProcess` (bulk-abort path) blanket-set `tx.status = 'failed'` regardless of per-row outcome. Additionally `mergedInternalize` never advanced `transactions.status` or `proven_tx_reqs.status` out of `nosend`, so even a correctly-issued post-broadcast `internalizeAction` silently no-op'd on the lifecycle. Four fixes in defense-in-depth: (1) `mergedInternalize` retires the nosend lifecycle (transition to `unproven` + req `unmined`, or all the way to `completed` if the BEEF carries a BUMP); (2) `Monitor.processNewBlockHeader` now nudges `TaskCheckNoSends.checkNow` alongside the existing `TaskCheckForProofs.checkNow` nudge, wiring up the documented-but-orphaned per-block trigger; (3) `StorageProvider.abortAction` chain-checks signed `nosend` txs via `services.getStatusForTxids` and returns `aborted: false` for `mined` or `known` (mempool-aware) txs without throwing; (4) `specOpNoSendActions.postProcess` pre-filters chain-known rows before bulk-abort and honors per-row `aborted: false` returns so race-window rows that became chain-known mid-page leave their status as `nosend` rather than being blanket-set to `failed`. Service-unreachable handling proceeds with the abort and writes an `abortAction-offline-fallback` history note for forensic audit — abort must remain possible when network confirmation is impossible. One residual edge case (backend returns success+`unknown` for a tx that is actually on chain) is documented in the PR; mitigations include the per-block `TaskCheckNoSends` nudge eventually self-healing and caller-side multi-source chain verification.
+
+- Optimization: `TaskCheckNoSends` aging schedule on the block-triggered `checkNow` path. The unfiltered per-block scan would do an unbounded number of external `getMerklePath` lookups per block as a wallet's `nosend` set grows (escrow, un-aborted tests, abandoned batches). The new schedule keys on row age: rows fresher than 5 min are skipped entirely (protecting in-flight batched-tx workflows that chain `createAction({noSend:true, sendWith:[...]})` builds); 5 min – 1 hr rows check on every trigger; older rows progress to `~hourly` (block-height % 6), `~daily` (% 144), and `~weekly` (% 1008) cadences. Each row's modulo offset is keyed by its `provenTxReqId` so same-tier rows are staggered across the cycle (`(blockHeight + provenTxReqId) % tierInterval === 0`) rather than all firing on the same block. The scheduled daily (no-`checkNow`) cadence is unchanged and still scans every row, providing a safety net for externally-broadcast unmined `nosend` txs regardless of age.
+
+## wallet-toolbox 2.1.27
+
+- Add optional `contactSource` (and exported `ContactSource` / `ContactRecord` interfaces) on `WalletArgs` and the `Wallet` class. When provided, `Wallet.discoverByIdentityKey` consults the local contacts source **before** the in-process `_overlayCache` and before any network call; on a hit, the overlay is not queried at all. `Wallet.discoverByAttributes` consults the contact source's optional `findByAttributes` when present. Contact-source failures are swallowed and fall through to the existing network path so the network is never gated on a flaky contact store.
+- `Wallet.discoverByIdentityKey` and `Wallet.discoverByAttributes` accept `forceRefresh?: boolean`. When `true`, both the contacts short-circuit and the 2-minute `_overlayCache` are bypassed so the network is consulted fresh — useful for a manual refresh action.
+- `identityUtils.parseResults` now yields to the host runtime between certificates on UI runtimes (browser / React Native, detected at call time). On Node the yield is skipped to avoid timer overhead. Same total work; the JS thread no longer owns the frame for the duration of the loop, so menu taps and scroll keep working while a large identity result is parsed.
+- `identityUtils.parseResults$` — new async-iterable form that emits each successfully parsed `VerifiableCertificate` as soon as it's ready, for callers that want progressive rendering.
+- `queryOverlay` widens the per-call grace window for `ls_identity` queries to 300 ms via the new `LookupQueryOptions.graceMs`, so more in-sync identity hosts contribute outputs before the query resolves.
+- `@bsv/sdk` dependency switched to the local workspace via `workspace:^2.1.1` so SDK changes flow through without an intermediate publish. Publish-time tooling rewrites `workspace:` ranges to concrete versions.
+
+## wallet-toolbox 2.1.26
+
+- Fix: auto-evict confirmed-stale inputs after any failed broadcast, regardless of how the broadcaster classifies the failure. When a tx is marked failed, `updateTransactionStatus(failed)` previously restored ALL consumed inputs to `spendable: true` to support transient retry. That's correct for fee/script/malformed failures where inputs are still UTXOs, but wrong for cases where the input has been spent on chain by a different tx — the wallet then picks the same already-spent UTXO on the next createAction → infinite missing-inputs broadcast loop. The new `markStaleInputsAsSpent` helper runs after `updateTransactionsStatus(failed)` and queries `services.isUtxo` per consumed input (concurrently across inputs via `Promise.all`), overriding `spendable: false` only for inputs the chain authoritatively confirms are spent. Inputs still on chain (transient/false-positive failures) keep the existing retry semantics. Service errors leave inputs untouched (eviction is opt-in based on positive evidence). Helper is broadcaster-agnostic — applies to ARC's `doubleSpend` (`SEEN_IN_ORPHAN_MEMPOOL`) and to WhatsOnChain/Bitails `invalidTx` (`missing-inputs`) classifications alike. Pre-broadcast races where concurrent createActions reach the same UTXO across separate app processes remain out of scope; that's a separate class of double-spend with its own design space (TaskReviewUtxos enqueue, locked-input semantics).
+
 ## wallet-toolbox 2.1.21
 
 - Fix spending authorization bypass in querySpentSince, PR#150
@@ -11,7 +240,8 @@ attention to changes that materially alter behavior or extend functionality.
 ## wallet-toolbox 2.1.20
 
 - Update cdn.projectbabbage.com valid blockheaders file hash.
-- 
+-
+
 ## wallet-toolbox 2.1.19
 
 - Merge PR#146. GenerateChange change to better handle dust situations. Redundant trimInputBeef knownTxids safety check.
@@ -34,7 +264,7 @@ attention to changes that materially alter behavior or extend functionality.
 ## wallet-toolbox 2.1.15
 
 - audit fix
- 
+
 ## wallet-toolbox 2.1.14
 
 - fix update timestamp on all updated currencies
@@ -71,7 +301,7 @@ attention to changes that materially alter behavior or extend functionality.
 
 ## wallet-toolbox 2.1.9
 
-- Fix batch sending bug in TaskSendWaiting 
+- Fix batch sending bug in TaskSendWaiting
 
 ## wallet-toolbox 2.1.8
 

package/LICENSE.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+Open BSV License Version 6 – granted by BSV Association, Alpenstrasse 15, 6300
+Zug, Switzerland (CHE-427.008.338) ("Licensor"), to you as a user (henceforth
+"You", "User" or "Licensee").
+
+For the purposes of this license, the definitions below have the following
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+
+"Bitcoin Protocol" means the protocol implementation, cryptographic rules,
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+"Bitcoin White Paper" means the paper entitled 'Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer
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+"BSV Blockchain" means:
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+  (a) the Bitcoin blockchain containing block height #556767 with the hash
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