@bookedsolid/rea 0.49.1 → 0.50.0

package/dist/cli/global-cli.js

@@ -0,0 +1,709 @@
+/**
+ * Shared resolution + safety module for the opt-in GLOBAL rea CLI tier.
+ *
+ * WHY THIS EXISTS
+ * ---------------
+ * Phase 1b landed the bash shim's global resolver in `hooks/_lib/shim-runtime.sh`
+ * (`shim_global_entry_gate`, `shim_sandbox_check_global`): it resolves a
+ * per-user rea CLI from `<pw_dir>/.rea/cli`, gated by a per-user allow-list
+ * `<pw_dir>/.rea/trusted-projects`, and derives `pw_dir` from the PASSWORD
+ * DATABASE (`os.userInfo().homedir`), NEVER from `$HOME`/`$XDG_*` — an agent can
+ * set those in-process, so an env-derived root is the N3 redirect surface the
+ * tier closes. A trust root an agent can move is not a trust root.
+ *
+ * This module is the TypeScript MIRROR of that bash logic, consumed by the
+ * writer-side CLIs (`rea trust` / `rea untrust` / `rea install --global`) and by
+ * `rea doctor` (Phase 3b). The bash shim is the pre-CLI authority; a parity test
+ * binds this mirror to it (Phase 3b F1).
+ *
+ * TEST-ISOLATION CONTRACT
+ * -----------------------
+ * `pw_dir` is `os.userInfo().homedir` — passwd-derived and therefore ENV-IMMUNE
+ * by design, so tests CANNOT redirect it with `$HOME`/`$XDG`. Every function that
+ * touches the per-user root instead takes the home dir as a parameter that
+ * DEFAULTS to `os.userInfo().homedir` at the call site. Production entrypoints
+ * pass the default; tests inject a temp dir and stay hermetic without ever
+ * mutating the real `~/.rea/`. NO CLI FLAG exposes this parameter — that would
+ * re-introduce the env-redirect threat we are closing.
+ */
+import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import os from 'node:os';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { err } from './utils.js';
+/**
+ * The passwd-derived home directory. Isolated in one helper so every default
+ * parameter reads from the same source. Reads the password database via libuv
+ * `getpwuid_r`, NOT the environment. Throws on a squashed/absent passwd entry —
+ * the caller decides whether that is fatal (writer CLIs) or a silent
+ * tier-unavailable (the shim already handles that side in bash).
+ */
+export function passwdHome() {
+    return os.userInfo().homedir;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Path derivation — passwd-rooted, never env-rooted
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/** `<home>/.rea` — the per-user rea config root. */
+export function reaDir(home = passwdHome()) {
+    return path.join(home, '.rea');
+}
+/** `<home>/.rea/cli` — where `npm install --prefix` drops the global CLI tree. */
+export function globalRoot(home = passwdHome()) {
+    return path.join(reaDir(home), 'cli');
+}
+/** `<home>/.rea/trusted-projects` — the per-user global-CLI allow-list. */
+export function registryPath(home = passwdHome()) {
+    return path.join(reaDir(home), 'trusted-projects');
+}
+/**
+ * Default process reader: Linux `/proc/<pid>/comm` + `/proc/<pid>/status`
+ * (PPid), else macOS/BSD `ps -o ppid=,comm= -p <pid>`. Best-effort — any
+ * failure returns `null` (which stops the walk fail-safe, never throwing).
+ * Mirrors `hooks/_lib/shim-cache.sh`'s session-token ancestry walk.
+ */
+export function defaultProcReader(pid) {
+    // Linux /proc fast path.
+    try {
+        const comm = fs.readFileSync(`/proc/${pid}/comm`, 'utf8').trim();
+        const status = fs.readFileSync(`/proc/${pid}/status`, 'utf8');
+        const m = status.match(/^PPid:\s*(\d+)/m);
+        if (comm.length > 0)
+            return { ppid: m ? Number(m[1]) : 0, comm };
+    }
+    catch {
+        /* not Linux, or /proc unreadable — fall through to ps */
+    }
+    // macOS / BSD via ps.
+    try {
+        const r = spawnSync('ps', ['-o', 'ppid=,comm=', '-p', String(pid)], {
+            encoding: 'utf8',
+            timeout: 5_000,
+        });
+        if (r.status === 0 && typeof r.stdout === 'string') {
+            const line = r.stdout.trim();
+            const mm = line.match(/^(\d+)\s+(.*)$/);
+            if (mm)
+                return { ppid: Number(mm[1]), comm: (mm[2] ?? '').trim() };
+            if (/^\d+$/.test(line))
+                return { ppid: Number(line), comm: '' };
+        }
+    }
+    catch {
+        /* ps missing / error — undeterminable */
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+/**
+ * Walk the parent-PID chain (bounded depth) looking for a `claude` /
+ * `claude-code` ancestor. Returns `true` only on a POSITIVE match; `false` on
+ * not-found OR any undeterminable step (fail-safe — an undeterminable walk
+ * degrades the guard to the `CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR` signal alone, it never weakens
+ * to "allow" when ancestry says claude). A plain human terminal is not a claude
+ * descendant → no false positive; a human using Claude Code's `!` shell IS a
+ * descendant → correctly detected (trust is out-of-band).
+ */
+export function isClaudeAncestor(reader = defaultProcReader, startPid = typeof process.ppid === 'number' ? process.ppid : 0, maxHops = 12) {
+    let cur = startPid;
+    for (let hops = 0; hops < maxHops && cur > 1; hops += 1) {
+        let info;
+        try {
+            info = reader(cur);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return false; // fail-safe
+        }
+        if (info === null)
+            return false;
+        const base = path.basename(info.comm);
+        if (base === 'claude' || base === 'claude-code')
+            return true;
+        const next = info.ppid;
+        if (!Number.isInteger(next) || next <= 1 || next === cur)
+            break;
+        cur = next;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+/**
+ * Refuse a `~/.rea`-MUTATING command when running under a Claude Code agent
+ * session. TWO independent signals, either of which triggers a refusal:
+ *   1. `CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR` is set + non-empty (rea's established "running under
+ *      Claude Code" signal — the reaRoot source in `src/cli/hook.ts`, set for
+ *      every agent Bash call).
+ *   2. A `claude` / `claude-code` process is an ancestor (codex P1: signal (1)
+ *      alone is bypassable — `CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR= rea trust`,
+ *      `env -u CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR rea trust` clear the var in the child, which a
+ *      subprocess CANNOT do for its own parent chain).
+ *
+ * The three mutating commands (`trust`, `untrust`, `install --global`) call this
+ * FIRST. Trust must be established by a HUMAN in a plain shell OUTSIDE the agent
+ * loop — the real dual-consent. The Write-tier scanner protects literal
+ * `~/.rea` writes; this closes the INDIRECT `rea trust`-writes-there path the
+ * scanner cannot see statically, AND which a bash command-string matcher cannot
+ * catch either (`node <path>/dist/cli/index.js trust`, `npx --no-install …
+ * trust`, wrapped shells all bypass a string matcher — the CLI is the only real
+ * chokepoint).
+ *
+ * NO override env — the strictness IS the dual-consent. Read-only commands
+ * (`trust --list`) are NOT guarded. Fail-safe: an undeterminable ancestry walk
+ * falls back to the `CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR` signal alone (never weakens).
+ *
+ * Returns the refusal exit code (`1`) after emitting to stderr when governed;
+ * returns `null` when allowed. The `procReader` is injectable so tests stay
+ * hermetic + cross-platform.
+ */
+export function assertNotGovernedSession(cmdLabel, home = passwdHome(), deps = {}) {
+    const cpd = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;
+    const cpdSet = cpd !== undefined && cpd.length > 0;
+    const ancestor = isClaudeAncestor(deps.procReader ?? defaultProcReader);
+    if (cpdSet || ancestor) {
+        const via = cpdSet
+            ? 'CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR is set'
+            : 'a Claude Code process is an ancestor of this one';
+        err(`rea ${cmdLabel} mutates your per-user trust root (${reaDir(home)}). ` +
+            `This is a human action — run it in a plain shell OUTSIDE the agent session ` +
+            `(detected an agent session: ${via}). Refusing.`);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Registry file contract (design §6)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Fixed advisory header (design §6): the first line is bound verbatim; the two
+ * following `#` lines are advisory. Fixed content keeps the file byte-idempotent
+ * (devex F3). The header is `grep -Fxq`-immune: realpath queries start with `/`
+ * and never match a `#` line.
+ */
+export const REGISTRY_HEADER_LINES = [
+    '# rea trusted-projects (v1) — managed by rea trust/untrust',
+    '# One absolute project realpath per line; membership is an exact whole-line match.',
+    '# Managed automatically — edit via `rea trust` / `rea untrust`, not by hand.',
+];
+const REGISTRY_HEADER = `${REGISTRY_HEADER_LINES.join('\n')}\n`;
+/**
+ * Reject a project path that would corrupt the one-realpath-per-line registry
+ * format or be silently dropped by {@link writeRegistry}. Any C0 control
+ * character (`\x00`–`\x1f`: NUL, tab, LF, **CR**, …) breaks the whole-line
+ * contract — a `\r` in particular is treated as malformed by
+ * {@link isWellFormedMemberLine}, so a writer that skipped this check would
+ * report success and then silently drop the entry.
+ *
+ * This is the SHARED rejection point every registry-writing entrypoint
+ * (`rea trust`, `rea install --global --trust`) MUST consult BEFORE reporting
+ * success. Returns a short human-readable reason on rejection, or `null` when
+ * the path is safe to store.
+ */
+export function projectPathControlCharReason(realpath) {
+    // C0 control range \x00–\x1f (NUL, tab, LF, CR, …) — exactly what we reject.
+    if (/[\x00-\x1f]/.test(realpath))
+        return 'contains control characters';
+    return null;
+}
+/**
+ * Is `line` a well-formed member line? A member = a bare absolute path with no
+ * control characters (NUL / tab / LF / CR / …) and no surrounding whitespace (a
+ * leading-space line would never `grep -Fxq`-match a trimmed query, so we treat
+ * it as malformed). Comment/blank lines are NOT members (inert to the reader).
+ * The control-character test is the shared {@link projectPathControlCharReason}
+ * so the reader and the writer-side validators can never drift.
+ */
+export function isWellFormedMemberLine(line) {
+    if (typeof line !== 'string')
+        return false;
+    if (line.length === 0)
+        return false;
+    if (line.charAt(0) !== '/')
+        return false; // absolute only; also excludes `#`
+    if (projectPathControlCharReason(line) !== null)
+        return false; // NUL/LF/CR/tab/…
+    if (line.trim() !== line)
+        return false; // no surrounding whitespace
+    return true;
+}
+/**
+ * Read the registry's MEMBER lines (design §6 reader). Skips `#`-prefixed and
+ * blank lines; returns every remaining non-blank line verbatim (no trimming —
+ * whole-line semantics mirror `grep -Fxq`). Absent/unreadable file → `[]`.
+ *
+ * This is a lenient read: it returns candidate lines as-stored (including any
+ * malformed content a hand-edit introduced) so the writer can normalize + drop
+ * them on the next rewrite. Use {@link isProjectTrusted} for a membership test.
+ */
+export function readRegistry(home = passwdHome()) {
+    let content;
+    try {
+        content = fs.readFileSync(registryPath(home), 'utf8');
+    }
+    catch {
+        return [];
+    }
+    const out = [];
+    for (const line of content.split('\n')) {
+        if (line.length === 0)
+            continue; // blank
+        if (line.charAt(0) === '#')
+            continue; // comment
+        out.push(line);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+/**
+ * Exact whole-line membership test (mirrors the shim's `grep -Fxq -- "$p"`).
+ * `projRealpath` is expected to be an absolute realpath. A comment line can
+ * never match because queries start with `/`.
+ */
+export function isProjectTrusted(projRealpath, home = passwdHome()) {
+    if (typeof projRealpath !== 'string' || projRealpath.length === 0)
+        return false;
+    let content;
+    try {
+        content = fs.readFileSync(registryPath(home), 'utf8');
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+    for (const line of content.split('\n')) {
+        if (line === projRealpath)
+            return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+/**
+ * Full-rewrite the registry (design §6 writer). NEVER appends. Normalizes the
+ * given paths: drops malformed lines (with a single one-line stderr notice),
+ * then dedups + sorts + joins with a single trailing LF after the fixed header.
+ * Byte-idempotent: `writeRegistry(home, readRegistry(home))` reproduces the file
+ * byte-for-byte for well-formed input.
+ *
+ * Atomicity: ensures `<home>/.rea` exists `0700`, writes the normalized content
+ * to `<home>/.rea/.trusted-projects.tmp.<pid>` under `umask 077` + explicit
+ * `chmod 0600`, then `rename()`s over the target. On failure the tmp file is
+ * unlinked and the original is left intact.
+ *
+ * SAFETY: this helper does NOT gate on ownership/symlink/permissions — callers
+ * MUST run {@link checkReaDirSafety} first and surface the remediation string.
+ * It ensures the dir exists but refuses nothing.
+ */
+export function writeRegistry(paths, home = passwdHome()) {
+    const dir = reaDir(home);
+    const target = registryPath(home);
+    // Normalize: drop malformed, dedup, sort. One aggregate stderr notice.
+    const wellFormed = [];
+    let dropped = 0;
+    for (const p of paths) {
+        if (isWellFormedMemberLine(p))
+            wellFormed.push(p);
+        else
+            dropped += 1;
+    }
+    if (dropped > 0) {
+        process.stderr.write(`[rea] WARN: dropped ${dropped} malformed line(s) while rewriting the trusted-projects registry\n`);
+    }
+    const normalized = [...new Set(wellFormed)].sort();
+    const content = normalized.length > 0 ? `${REGISTRY_HEADER}${normalized.join('\n')}\n` : REGISTRY_HEADER;
+    // Ensure the config root exists as a real 0700 dir. mkdir mode is masked by
+    // the process umask on some platforms, so chmod explicitly (best-effort).
+    fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    try {
+        fs.chmodSync(dir, 0o700);
+    }
+    catch {
+        /* best-effort: some filesystems reject chmod; the 0600 file is the gate */
+    }
+    const tmp = path.join(dir, `.trusted-projects.tmp.${process.pid}`);
+    const prevUmask = process.umask(0o077);
+    try {
+        fs.writeFileSync(tmp, content, { mode: 0o600 });
+        // writeFileSync's `mode` only applies on CREATE and is umask-masked; an
+        // explicit chmod makes the file deterministically 0600.
+        try {
+            fs.chmodSync(tmp, 0o600);
+        }
+        catch {
+            /* best-effort */
+        }
+        // rename replaces the destination PATH atomically (not a symlink target).
+        fs.renameSync(tmp, target);
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        try {
+            fs.rmSync(tmp, { force: true });
+        }
+        catch {
+            /* best-effort cleanup */
+        }
+        throw e;
+    }
+    finally {
+        process.umask(prevUmask);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Delete the registry file (used when `trust`/`untrust` empties it). Missing
+ * file is not an error. Does NOT touch the `<home>/.rea` dir.
+ */
+export function deleteRegistry(home = passwdHome()) {
+    fs.rmSync(registryPath(home), { force: true });
+}
+/** POSIX uid check availability. On Windows `process.getuid` is undefined. */
+function currentUid() {
+    return typeof process.getuid === 'function' ? process.getuid() : undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * Validate `<home>/.rea` (mirrors shim A5.3a). Rejects a symlink, a non-dir, a
+ * foreign owner, or a group/other-writable dir (`mode & 0o022`). An ABSENT dir
+ * is safe (`{ ok: true, absent: true }`) — the writer creates it 0700. Never
+ * lstats `<home>` or above (firmlinks / BSD `/home` symlinks legitimately live
+ * there).
+ */
+export function checkReaDirSafety(home = passwdHome()) {
+    const dir = reaDir(home);
+    let st;
+    try {
+        st = fs.lstatSync(dir);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { ok: true, absent: true };
+    }
+    if (st.isSymbolicLink()) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            code: 'symlink',
+            reason: `${dir} is a symlink — refusing (a symlink could redirect the global CLI outside the private root)`,
+            remediation: `rm ${dir}`,
+        };
+    }
+    if (!st.isDirectory()) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            code: 'not-dir',
+            reason: `${dir} exists but is not a directory`,
+            remediation: `rm ${dir}`,
+        };
+    }
+    const uid = currentUid();
+    if (uid !== undefined && st.uid !== uid) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            code: 'foreign-owner',
+            reason: `${dir} is not owned by the current user (owner uid=${st.uid}) — refusing`,
+            remediation: `chown ${uid} ${dir}`,
+        };
+    }
+    if (uid !== undefined && (st.mode & 0o022) !== 0) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            code: 'world-writable',
+            reason: `${dir} is group/other-writable (mode ${(st.mode & 0o777).toString(8)}) — refusing`,
+            remediation: `chmod 700 ${dir}`,
+        };
+    }
+    return { ok: true, absent: false };
+}
+/**
+ * Validate `<home>/.rea/trusted-projects` (mirrors shim A5.3b). Rejects a
+ * symlink, a non-regular file, a foreign owner, a group/other-ACCESSIBLE file
+ * (`mode & 0o077`, the strict 0600 mask — NOT the 0o022 dir mask), or a
+ * hardlinked file (`nlink !== 1`; a pre-existing in-project hardlink is a
+ * same-uid mutation primitive — codex P2-7). An ABSENT registry is safe
+ * (`{ ok: true, absent: true }`) — nothing is trusted yet.
+ */
+export function checkRegistrySafety(home = passwdHome()) {
+    const reg = registryPath(home);
+    let st;
+    try {
+        st = fs.lstatSync(reg);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { ok: true, absent: true };
+    }
+    if (st.isSymbolicLink()) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            code: 'symlink',
+            reason: `${reg} is a symlink — refusing (a symlink could redirect the trust read)`,
+            remediation: `rm ${reg}`,
+        };
+    }
+    if (!st.isFile()) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            code: 'not-file',
+            reason: `${reg} is not a regular file`,
+            remediation: `rm ${reg}`,
+        };
+    }
+    const uid = currentUid();
+    if (uid !== undefined && st.uid !== uid) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            code: 'foreign-owner',
+            reason: `${reg} is not owned by the current user (owner uid=${st.uid}) — refusing`,
+            remediation: `chown ${uid} ${reg}`,
+        };
+    }
+    if (uid !== undefined && (st.mode & 0o077) !== 0) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            code: 'bad-mode',
+            reason: `${reg} is group/other-accessible (mode ${(st.mode & 0o777).toString(8)}) — refusing`,
+            remediation: `chmod 600 ${reg}`,
+        };
+    }
+    if (st.nlink !== 1) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            code: 'bad-nlink',
+            reason: `${reg} has ${st.nlink} hard links — refusing (a hardlinked registry is a same-uid mutation primitive)`,
+            remediation: `rm ${reg} (then re-run \`rea trust\`)`,
+        };
+    }
+    return { ok: true, absent: false };
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Resolver — probe the two global CLI shapes (design §1)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Probe the global CLI under `<home>/.rea/cli`: (1) the `npm install --prefix`
+ * shape `node_modules/@bookedsolid/rea/dist/cli/index.js`, then (2) the
+ * bare-drop fallback `dist/cli/index.js`. Returns the first existing candidate
+ * path, or `null` when neither exists (not installed). Pure existence probe —
+ * pair it with {@link checkGlobalCandidateSafety} to reproduce the shim's
+ * A1–A4 sandbox before treating the candidate as the active tier.
+ */
+export function resolveGlobalCli(home = passwdHome()) {
+    const root = globalRoot(home);
+    const c1 = path.join(root, 'node_modules', '@bookedsolid', 'rea', 'dist', 'cli', 'index.js');
+    if (fs.existsSync(c1))
+        return c1;
+    const c2 = path.join(root, 'dist', 'cli', 'index.js');
+    if (fs.existsSync(c2))
+        return c2;
+    return null;
+}
+/**
+ * Read the `version` of the currently-installed global CLI from the
+ * `package.json` beside whichever install shape {@link resolveGlobalCli}
+ * matched: (1) `node_modules/@bookedsolid/rea/package.json` (npm-prefix shape),
+ * then (2) `<gRoot>/package.json` (bare-drop). Best-effort (BOM-tolerant); a
+ * leading UTF-8 BOM is stripped. Returns `null` when neither shape carries a
+ * readable non-empty `version`. Used by `rea install --global` to decide
+ * whether a requested `--version` differs from what is already on disk.
+ */
+export function installedGlobalCliVersion(home = passwdHome()) {
+    const root = globalRoot(home);
+    const candidates = [
+        path.join(root, 'node_modules', '@bookedsolid', 'rea', 'package.json'),
+        path.join(root, 'package.json'),
+    ];
+    for (const p of candidates) {
+        let raw;
+        try {
+            raw = fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8');
+        }
+        catch {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (raw.charCodeAt(0) === 0xfeff)
+            raw = raw.slice(1); // strip UTF-8 BOM
+        let parsed;
+        try {
+            parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+        }
+        catch {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (parsed !== null && typeof parsed === 'object' && !Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+            const v = parsed['version'];
+            if (typeof v === 'string' && v.length > 0)
+                return v;
+        }
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+/**
+ * Prove a resolved global CLI implements `rea hook policy-get` — the subcommand
+ * the global-tier shim invokes for the `allow_global_cli` veto read
+ * (`shim_run` step 4-global-veto). Spawns `node <cliPath> hook policy-get
+ * --help`; a non-zero exit means the CLI predates the `hook policy-get`
+ * subcommand (~0.26.0) and the shim would fall back to no-CLI at the veto step.
+ *
+ * This is the ONE shared implementation consumed by both `rea install --global`
+ * (as the post-install backstop) and `rea doctor` (the global-tier floor), so
+ * the two surfaces never drift. Signature-compatible with install's injectable
+ * `probeCapability` dep — tests inject a fake to stay hermetic; NO CLI flag
+ * exposes it.
+ */
+export function probeGlobalCliCapability(cliPath) {
+    const r = spawnSync('node', [cliPath, 'hook', 'policy-get', '--help'], {
+        encoding: 'utf8',
+        timeout: 30_000,
+    });
+    if (r.status === 0)
+        return { ok: true };
+    return { ok: false, stderr: (r.stderr ?? '').toString().trim() };
+}
+/**
+ * Reproduce the bash shim's A1–A4 candidate sandbox (`shim_sandbox_check_global`
+ * in `hooks/_lib/shim-runtime.sh`) over a resolved global CLI candidate. This is
+ * the missing half of {@link resolveGlobalCli}: existence alone is NOT enough to
+ * treat a candidate as runnable — the shim ALSO refuses a hostile/malformed tree
+ * (blessed-but-hostile), and `rea doctor` must refuse identically or it would
+ * claim `global` for a candidate the shim falls back from.
+ *
+ * Evaluation order mirrors the shim (cheapest/most-decisive first):
+ *   - A2  per-component `lstat` walk from the candidate UP TO AND INCLUDING
+ *         `<home>/.rea` (= `dirname(gRoot)`; STOP there — never lstat the home
+ *         dir or above, where firmlinks / BSD `/home` symlinks legitimately
+ *         live). Reject ANY symlink component, foreign owner, group/other-write
+ *         (`mode & 0o022`), or a device-number change vs `gRoot` (mount/bind
+ *         aliasing). The candidate `index.js` itself must have `nlink === 1`.
+ *   - A1  `realpath(candidate)` contained in `realpath(gRoot)`.
+ *   - A4  realpath ends in `dist/cli/index.js` (ALWAYS-on for the global tier).
+ *   - A3  an ancestor `package.json` (≤20 hops) has `name === "@bookedsolid/rea"`
+ *         AND that `package.json` has `nlink === 1`.
+ *
+ * `unavailable` (an `lstat`/`realpath` that threw — ENOENT / automount) is
+ * surfaced as a fail here because doctor treats "sandbox did not confirm safe"
+ * the same as "not the active tier": the shim likewise does NOT set the global
+ * CLI in that case. Callers map ANY `ok:false` to "global tier NOT active".
+ */
+export function checkGlobalCandidateSafety(candidate, gRoot, home = passwdHome()) {
+    const uid = currentUid();
+    // Walk stops at <home>/.rea (= dirname(gRoot)); never lstat home or above.
+    const stopDir = reaDir(home);
+    const sep = path.sep;
+    // Capture gRoot's device number for the mount/bind aliasing check (A2).
+    let gRootDev;
+    try {
+        gRootDev = fs.lstatSync(gRoot).dev;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { ok: false, code: 'unavailable', reason: `${gRoot} is not accessible` };
+    }
+    // A2 — per-component lstat walk: candidate UP TO AND INCLUDING stopDir.
+    let comp = candidate;
+    let first = true;
+    let guard = 0;
+    for (;;) {
+        guard += 1;
+        if (guard > 128) {
+            return { ok: false, code: 'perm', reason: `pathological path depth resolving ${candidate}` };
+        }
+        let st;
+        try {
+            st = fs.lstatSync(comp);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return { ok: false, code: 'unavailable', reason: `${comp} is not accessible` };
+        }
+        if (st.isSymbolicLink()) {
+            return {
+                ok: false,
+                code: 'symlink',
+                reason: `${comp} is a symlink — refusing (a symlink component could redirect the global CLI)`,
+            };
+        }
+        if (uid !== undefined && st.uid !== uid) {
+            return {
+                ok: false,
+                code: 'perm',
+                reason: `${comp} is not owned by the current user (owner uid=${st.uid})`,
+            };
+        }
+        if (uid !== undefined && (st.mode & 0o022) !== 0) {
+            return {
+                ok: false,
+                code: 'perm',
+                reason: `${comp} is group/other-writable (mode ${(st.mode & 0o777).toString(8)})`,
+            };
+        }
+        if (st.dev !== gRootDev) {
+            return {
+                ok: false,
+                code: 'perm',
+                reason: `${comp} is on a different filesystem than ${gRoot} (mount/bind aliasing)`,
+            };
+        }
+        if (first) {
+            if (st.nlink !== 1) {
+                return {
+                    ok: false,
+                    code: 'hardlink',
+                    reason: `${candidate} has ${st.nlink} hard links — refusing`,
+                };
+            }
+            first = false;
+        }
+        if (comp === stopDir)
+            break;
+        const parent = path.dirname(comp);
+        if (parent === comp)
+            break; // reached fs root without hitting stopDir
+        comp = parent;
+    }
+    // A1 — realpath containment.
+    let real;
+    let realRoot;
+    try {
+        real = fs.realpathSync(candidate);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { ok: false, code: 'unavailable', reason: `realpath failed for ${candidate}` };
+    }
+    try {
+        realRoot = fs.realpathSync(gRoot);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { ok: false, code: 'unavailable', reason: `realpath failed for ${gRoot}` };
+    }
+    const rootSep = realRoot.endsWith(sep) ? realRoot : realRoot + sep;
+    if (!(real === realRoot || real.startsWith(rootSep))) {
+        return { ok: false, code: 'escapes-root', reason: `${real} escapes ${realRoot}` };
+    }
+    // A4 — dist/cli/index.js shape (ALWAYS-on for the global tier).
+    const endWith = path.join('dist', 'cli', 'index.js');
+    if (!(real.endsWith(sep + endWith) || real === sep + endWith)) {
+        return { ok: false, code: 'shape', reason: `${real} does not end in ${endWith}` };
+    }
+    // A3 — ancestor package.json name @bookedsolid/rea + nlink === 1.
+    let cur = path.dirname(path.dirname(path.dirname(real)));
+    let pkg = '';
+    for (let i = 0; i < 20 && cur && cur !== path.dirname(cur); i += 1) {
+        const pj = path.join(cur, 'package.json');
+        if (fs.existsSync(pj)) {
+            try {
+                const data = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pj, 'utf8'));
+                if (data && data.name === '@bookedsolid/rea') {
+                    pkg = pj;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            catch {
+                // keep walking — a malformed package.json on the path is not fatal
+            }
+        }
+        cur = path.dirname(cur);
+    }
+    if (pkg === '') {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            code: 'no-rea-pkg',
+            reason: `no ancestor package.json declaring @bookedsolid/rea above ${real}`,
+        };
+    }
+    let ps;
+    try {
+        ps = fs.lstatSync(pkg);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { ok: false, code: 'no-rea-pkg', reason: `${pkg} is not accessible` };
+    }
+    if (ps.nlink !== 1) {
+        return { ok: false, code: 'hardlink', reason: `${pkg} has ${ps.nlink} hard links — refusing` };
+    }
+    return { ok: true, realpath: real };
+}