@bookedsolid/rea 0.36.0 → 0.38.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (37) hide show
  1. package/hooks/_lib/policy-reader.sh +948 -0
  2. package/hooks/_lib/shim-runtime.sh +405 -0
  3. package/hooks/architecture-review-gate.sh +11 -103
  4. package/hooks/attribution-advisory.sh +43 -155
  5. package/hooks/blocked-paths-bash-gate.sh +35 -149
  6. package/hooks/blocked-paths-enforcer.sh +35 -140
  7. package/hooks/changeset-security-gate.sh +26 -119
  8. package/hooks/dangerous-bash-interceptor.sh +46 -170
  9. package/hooks/delegation-advisory.sh +26 -144
  10. package/hooks/delegation-capture.sh +33 -139
  11. package/hooks/dependency-audit-gate.sh +29 -121
  12. package/hooks/env-file-protection.sh +30 -141
  13. package/hooks/local-review-gate.sh +191 -396
  14. package/hooks/pr-issue-link-gate.sh +16 -118
  15. package/hooks/protected-paths-bash-gate.sh +57 -160
  16. package/hooks/secret-scanner.sh +90 -213
  17. package/hooks/security-disclosure-gate.sh +32 -155
  18. package/hooks/settings-protection.sh +56 -179
  19. package/package.json +1 -1
  20. package/templates/_lib_policy-reader.dogfood-staged.sh +948 -0
  21. package/templates/_lib_shim-runtime.dogfood-staged.sh +405 -0
  22. package/templates/architecture-review-gate.dogfood-staged.sh +11 -103
  23. package/templates/attribution-advisory.dogfood-staged.sh +43 -155
  24. package/templates/blocked-paths-bash-gate.dogfood-staged.sh +35 -149
  25. package/templates/blocked-paths-enforcer.dogfood-staged.sh +35 -140
  26. package/templates/changeset-security-gate.dogfood-staged.sh +26 -119
  27. package/templates/dangerous-bash-interceptor.dogfood-staged.sh +46 -170
  28. package/templates/delegation-advisory.dogfood-staged.sh +44 -0
  29. package/templates/delegation-capture.dogfood-staged.sh +52 -0
  30. package/templates/dependency-audit-gate.dogfood-staged.sh +29 -121
  31. package/templates/env-file-protection.dogfood-staged.sh +30 -141
  32. package/templates/local-review-gate.dogfood-staged.sh +191 -396
  33. package/templates/pr-issue-link-gate.dogfood-staged.sh +16 -118
  34. package/templates/protected-paths-bash-gate.dogfood-staged.sh +57 -160
  35. package/templates/secret-scanner.dogfood-staged.sh +90 -213
  36. package/templates/security-disclosure-gate.dogfood-staged.sh +32 -155
  37. package/templates/settings-protection.dogfood-staged.sh +56 -179
@@ -1,137 +1,44 @@
1
1
  #!/bin/bash
2
2
  # PreToolUse hook: changeset-security-gate.sh
3
3
  # 0.33.0+ — Node-binary shim for `rea hook changeset-security-gate`.
4
+ # 0.38.0+ — migrated to `_lib/shim-runtime.sh` (shared runtime).
4
5
  #
5
- # Pre-0.33.0 the gate's full body lived here as bash (172 LOC, frontmatter
6
- # validation + GHSA/CVE scan + MultiEdit-aware tool handling). The
7
- # migration to the parser-backed Node binary moves all of that into
6
+ # Blocking-tier: frontmatter validation + GHSA/CVE scan over
7
+ # .changeset/ writes. Full logic in
8
8
  # `src/hooks/changeset-security-gate/index.ts`.
9
9
  #
10
- # Behavioral contract is preserved byte-for-byte: exit 0 on
11
- # pass-through / non-changeset / valid frontmatter, exit 2 on HALT /
12
- # disclosure leak / malformed frontmatter / malformed payload.
10
+ # # Relevance pre-gate
13
11
  #
14
- # # CLI-resolution trust boundary
15
- #
16
- # Realpath sandbox check + version probe. Same shape as the 0.32.0
17
- # pilots.
18
- #
19
- # # Fail-closed posture
20
- #
21
- # changeset-security-gate is BLOCKING-tier — the pre-0.33.0 bash body
22
- # refused on GHSA/CVE patterns and on malformed frontmatter. Early-exit
23
- # branches fail closed AFTER the relevance pre-gate passes.
12
+ # 2026-05-15 codex round-2 P2 fix: scan `tool_input.file_path` /
13
+ # `tool_input.notebook_path` ONLY, not the raw JSON payload, so a
14
+ # Write to README.md mentioning `.changeset/` in its content body
15
+ # doesn't trip the fail-closed branch.
24
16
 
25
17
  set -uo pipefail
26
18
 
27
- # 1. HALT check.
28
19
  # shellcheck source=_lib/halt-check.sh
29
20
  source "$(dirname "$0")/_lib/halt-check.sh"
30
21
  check_halt
31
22
  REA_ROOT=$(rea_root)
32
23
 
33
- proj="${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-$REA_ROOT}"
34
-
35
- # 2. Relevance pre-gate. This is a PreToolUse Write/Edit/MultiEdit/
36
- # NotebookEdit matcher, so the payload always has a `tool_input.
37
- # file_path` (or `notebook_path`).
38
- #
39
- # 2026-05-15 codex round-2 P2 fix: scan `tool_input.file_path` /
40
- # `tool_input.notebook_path` ONLY, NOT the raw JSON payload. Pre-fix
41
- # a Write to `README.md` whose body merely mentions `.changeset/`
42
- # (e.g. "See .changeset/example.md") tripped the fail-closed branch
43
- # when the CLI was unbuilt — the substring lived in the
44
- # tool_input.content blob, not in the target path. The Node body
45
- # correctly filters by file_path; the shim's pre-gate must match
46
- # that posture.
47
- INPUT=$(cat)
48
- RELEVANT=0
49
- PROBE=""
50
- if command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
51
- PROBE=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | jq -r '(.tool_input.file_path // .tool_input.notebook_path // "")' 2>/dev/null || true)
52
- if printf '%s' "$PROBE" | grep -qE '\.changeset/'; then
53
- RELEVANT=1
24
+ SHIM_NAME="changeset-security-gate"
25
+ SHIM_INTRODUCED_IN="0.33.0"
26
+ SHIM_FAIL_OPEN=0
27
+ SHIM_REFUSAL_NOUN="changeset disclosure refusal"
28
+
29
+ shim_is_relevant() {
30
+ local probe
31
+ if command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
32
+ probe=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | jq -r '(.tool_input.file_path // .tool_input.notebook_path // "")' 2>/dev/null || true)
33
+ else
34
+ probe="$INPUT"
54
35
  fi
55
- else
56
- if printf '%s' "$INPUT" | grep -qE '\.changeset/'; then
57
- RELEVANT=1
36
+ if printf '%s' "$probe" | grep -qE '\.changeset/'; then
37
+ return 0
58
38
  fi
59
- fi
60
- if [ "$RELEVANT" -eq 0 ]; then
61
- exit 0
62
- fi
63
-
64
- # 3. Resolve the rea CLI.
65
- REA_ARGV=()
66
- RESOLVED_CLI_PATH=""
67
- if [ -f "$proj/node_modules/@bookedsolid/rea/dist/cli/index.js" ]; then
68
- REA_ARGV=(node "$proj/node_modules/@bookedsolid/rea/dist/cli/index.js")
69
- RESOLVED_CLI_PATH="$proj/node_modules/@bookedsolid/rea/dist/cli/index.js"
70
- elif [ -f "$proj/dist/cli/index.js" ]; then
71
- REA_ARGV=(node "$proj/dist/cli/index.js")
72
- RESOLVED_CLI_PATH="$proj/dist/cli/index.js"
73
- fi
74
-
75
- if [ "${#REA_ARGV[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
76
- printf 'rea: changeset-security-gate cannot run — the rea CLI is not built.\n' >&2
77
- printf 'Run `pnpm install && pnpm build` (or `npm install` for a consumer install) to restore protection.\n' >&2
78
- exit 2
79
- fi
80
-
81
- # 4. Realpath sandbox check.
82
- if ! command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1; then
83
- printf 'rea: changeset-security-gate cannot run — `node` is not on PATH.\n' >&2
84
- exit 2
85
- fi
86
-
87
- sandbox_check=$(node -e '
88
- const fs = require("fs");
89
- const path = require("path");
90
- const cli = process.argv[1];
91
- const projDir = process.argv[2];
92
- let real, realProj;
93
- try { real = fs.realpathSync(cli); } catch (e) {
94
- process.stdout.write("bad:realpath"); process.exit(1);
95
- }
96
- try { realProj = fs.realpathSync(projDir); } catch (e) {
97
- process.stdout.write("bad:realpath-proj"); process.exit(1);
98
- }
99
- const sep = path.sep;
100
- const projWithSep = realProj.endsWith(sep) ? realProj : realProj + sep;
101
- if (!(real === realProj || real.startsWith(projWithSep))) {
102
- process.stdout.write("bad:cli-escapes-project"); process.exit(1);
103
- }
104
- let cur = path.dirname(path.dirname(path.dirname(real)));
105
- let found = false;
106
- for (let i = 0; i < 20 && cur && cur !== path.dirname(cur); i += 1) {
107
- const pj = path.join(cur, "package.json");
108
- if (fs.existsSync(pj)) {
109
- try {
110
- const data = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pj, "utf8"));
111
- if (data && data.name === "@bookedsolid/rea") { found = true; break; }
112
- } catch (e) { /* keep walking */ }
113
- }
114
- cur = path.dirname(cur);
115
- }
116
- if (!found) { process.stdout.write("bad:no-rea-pkg-json"); process.exit(1); }
117
- process.stdout.write("ok");
118
- ' -- "$RESOLVED_CLI_PATH" "$proj" 2>/dev/null)
119
-
120
- if [ "$sandbox_check" != "ok" ]; then
121
- printf 'rea: changeset-security-gate FAILED sandbox check (%s) — refusing.\n' "$sandbox_check" >&2
122
- exit 2
123
- fi
124
-
125
- # 5. Version-probe.
126
- probe_out=$("${REA_ARGV[@]}" hook changeset-security-gate --help 2>&1)
127
- probe_status=$?
128
- if [ "$probe_status" -ne 0 ] || ! printf '%s' "$probe_out" | grep -q -e 'changeset-security-gate'; then
129
- printf 'rea: this shim requires the `rea hook changeset-security-gate` subcommand (introduced in 0.33.0).\n' >&2
130
- printf 'The resolved CLI at %s does not implement it.\n' "$RESOLVED_CLI_PATH" >&2
131
- printf 'Run `pnpm install` (or `npm install`) to sync the CLI; refusing in the meantime to preserve enforcement.\n' >&2
132
- exit 2
133
- fi
39
+ return 1
40
+ }
134
41
 
135
- # 6. Forward stdin.
136
- printf '%s' "$INPUT" | "${REA_ARGV[@]}" hook changeset-security-gate
137
- exit $?
42
+ # shellcheck source=_lib/shim-runtime.sh
43
+ source "$(dirname "$0")/_lib/shim-runtime.sh"
44
+ shim_run
@@ -1,196 +1,72 @@
1
1
  #!/bin/bash
2
2
  # PreToolUse hook: dangerous-bash-interceptor.sh
3
3
  # 0.34.0+ — Node-binary shim for `rea hook dangerous-bash-interceptor`.
4
+ # 0.38.0+ — migrated to `_lib/shim-runtime.sh` (shared runtime).
4
5
  #
5
- # Pre-0.34.0 the gate's full body lived here as bash (414 LOC, every
6
- # refusal class H1-H17 + M1 plus their bypass-corpus regressions). The
7
- # migration to the parser-backed Node binary moves all of that into
8
- # `src/hooks/dangerous-bash-interceptor/index.ts`. This shim is the
9
- # Claude Code dispatcher's view of the hook it forwards stdin to
10
- # the CLI and exits with whatever the CLI returns.
6
+ # Pre-0.34.0 the gate's full body lived here as bash (414 LOC: refusal
7
+ # classes H1-H17 + M1 plus their bypass-corpus regressions). Migration
8
+ # in `src/hooks/dangerous-bash-interceptor/index.ts`. Behavioral
9
+ # contract preserved byte-for-byte: exit 0 on pass-through / MEDIUM-only
10
+ # advisory, exit 2 on HALT / HIGH match / malformed payload.
11
11
  #
12
- # Behavioral contract is preserved byte-for-byte: exit 0 on
13
- # pass-through / MEDIUM-only advisory, exit 2 on HALT / HIGH rule
14
- # match / malformed payload (fail-closed).
12
+ # # Relevance pre-gate (CLI-missing only)
15
13
  #
16
- # # CLI-resolution trust boundary
14
+ # 0.34.0 round-7 P1 fix: substring scan over the EXTRACTED command for
15
+ # destructive-catalog keywords. When CLI is missing AND no keyword
16
+ # matches, exit 0 (the pre-port bash body would have done the same —
17
+ # no rule to match). When CLI is missing AND a keyword DOES match,
18
+ # fail closed.
17
19
  #
18
- # Mirrors the 0.32.0 final shim shape (round-8 of the codex iteration
19
- # on the three Phase 1 pilots). The resolved CLI MUST live INSIDE
20
- # realpath(CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR) AND have an ancestor `package.json`
21
- # whose `name` is `@bookedsolid/rea`. Defends against symlink-out and
22
- # tarball-replacement attacks on the resolved CLI.
23
- #
24
- # # Fail-closed posture
25
- #
26
- # dangerous-bash-interceptor is the agent-runaway gate — the pre-0.34.0
27
- # bash body refused destructive commands without any compiled CLI. The
28
- # early-exit branches (CLI missing, node missing, sandbox failed,
29
- # version skew) fail closed AFTER the relevance pre-gate passes.
30
- # Irrelevant Bash calls exit 0 regardless of CLI state.
31
- #
32
- # # Relevance pre-gate
33
- #
34
- # 0.34.0 round-7 P1 fix: the pre-0.34.0 bash body refused destructive
35
- # commands without any compiled CLI. The round-0 shim preserved that
36
- # fail-closed-on-CLI-missing posture for ALL Bash, but that's stricter
37
- # than the pre-0.34.0 body which only refused commands matching the
38
- # destructive catalog. On a fresh / unbuilt install (`npx rea init`,
39
- # pre-`pnpm build` checkout) the shim blocked benign Bash like `ls`,
40
- # `mkdir`, `pnpm install` — defeating the install path itself.
41
- #
42
- # Fix: substring pre-gate over the EXTRACTED command (not raw payload —
43
- # the local-review-gate round-2 lesson). When CLI is missing AND no
44
- # destructive-keyword appears in the extracted command, exit 0 (the
45
- # pre-0.34.0 bash body would have done the same — there's no rule to
46
- # match). When CLI is missing AND a destructive-keyword DOES appear,
47
- # preserve the original fail-closed posture (we'd rather refuse than
48
- # silently allow a destructive command).
49
- #
50
- # The keyword list is coarse — it over-triggers (e.g. `git status` hits
51
- # `git` substring) but that's fine: the CLI does the real evaluation
52
- # and lets benign forms through. Over-trigger costs one node-spawn;
53
- # under-trigger is the bypass we MUST avoid. Same posture as the
54
- # 0.32.0 secret-scanner `gh issue create` substring fix.
20
+ # Keywords cover every rule head H1-H17 + M1. Coarse by design — the
21
+ # CLI does the real per-rule evaluation when reachable; over-trigger
22
+ # costs one node-spawn, under-trigger is the bypass we MUST avoid.
55
23
 
56
24
  set -uo pipefail
57
25
 
58
- # 1. HALT check.
59
26
  # shellcheck source=_lib/halt-check.sh
60
27
  source "$(dirname "$0")/_lib/halt-check.sh"
61
28
  check_halt
62
29
  REA_ROOT=$(rea_root)
63
30
 
64
- proj="${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-$REA_ROOT}"
65
-
66
- # 2. Capture stdin once. The CLI consumes it via stdin pipe below.
67
- INPUT=$(cat)
31
+ SHIM_NAME="dangerous-bash-interceptor"
32
+ SHIM_INTRODUCED_IN="0.34.0"
33
+ SHIM_FAIL_OPEN=0
34
+ SHIM_REFUSAL_NOUN="destructive-command refusal"
68
35
 
69
- # 3. Resolve the rea CLI through the fixed 2-tier sandboxed order.
70
- REA_ARGV=()
71
- RESOLVED_CLI_PATH=""
72
- if [ -f "$proj/node_modules/@bookedsolid/rea/dist/cli/index.js" ]; then
73
- REA_ARGV=(node "$proj/node_modules/@bookedsolid/rea/dist/cli/index.js")
74
- RESOLVED_CLI_PATH="$proj/node_modules/@bookedsolid/rea/dist/cli/index.js"
75
- elif [ -f "$proj/dist/cli/index.js" ]; then
76
- REA_ARGV=(node "$proj/dist/cli/index.js")
77
- RESOLVED_CLI_PATH="$proj/dist/cli/index.js"
78
- fi
79
-
80
- # 3b. Relevance pre-gate (round-7 P1). Only used when the CLI is
81
- # missing — when present, every Bash call goes through the CLI.
82
- # Extract the command string from the payload, then substring-scan
83
- # it for destructive-catalog keywords. Mirrors the H1-H17 + M1
84
- # rule heads.
85
- if [ "${#REA_ARGV[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
86
- CLI_MISSING_CMD=""
36
+ shim_cli_missing_relevant() {
37
+ local cli_missing_cmd=""
87
38
  if command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
88
- # Match the CLI's payload schema: tool_input.command. tostring so
89
- # a non-string value (object/number) doesn't blow up jq.
90
- CLI_MISSING_CMD=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | jq -r '
39
+ cli_missing_cmd=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | jq -r '
91
40
  (.tool_input.command // "") | tostring
92
41
  ' 2>/dev/null || true)
93
42
  else
94
43
  # jq missing — fall back to scanning the raw payload. Over-trigger
95
44
  # by design (the CLI is the source of truth; this is fail-closed
96
- # only when keywords match). Substring scan still catches the
97
- # destructive forms in JSON-string-encoded payloads.
98
- CLI_MISSING_CMD="$INPUT"
45
+ # only when keywords match).
46
+ cli_missing_cmd="$INPUT"
99
47
  fi
100
- # If we couldn't extract a command, treat as relevant (fail closed).
101
- CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT=0
102
- if [ -z "$CLI_MISSING_CMD" ]; then
103
- # Empty command (or non-Bash payload). The pre-0.34.0 bash body
104
- # would have exited 0 here — no command, no rule match.
105
- exit 0
48
+ if [ -z "$cli_missing_cmd" ]; then
49
+ # Empty/non-Bash payload → pre-port body would have exit 0'd.
50
+ return 1
106
51
  fi
107
- # Substring scan. Keywords cover every rule head H1-H17 + M1. Coarse
108
- # by design we're a safety net, not the source of truth. The CLI
109
- # does the precise per-rule evaluation when reachable.
110
- case "$CLI_MISSING_CMD" in
111
- *"git "*) CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT=1 ;;
112
- *"git "*) CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT=1 ;; # tab after git
113
- *"rm "*|*"rm "*) CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT=1 ;;
114
- *"psql"*|*"pgcli"*) CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT=1 ;;
115
- *"DROP "*|*"DROP "*) CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT=1 ;;
116
- *"kill "*|*"kill "*|*"killall"*) CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT=1 ;;
117
- *"HUSKY="*) CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT=1 ;;
118
- *"curl"*|*"wget"*) CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT=1 ;;
119
- *"REA_BYPASS"*) CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT=1 ;;
120
- *"alias "*|*"function "*) CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT=1 ;;
121
- *"core.hooksPath"*|*"core.hookspath"*) CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT=1 ;;
122
- *"npm "*|*"pnpm "*|*"yarn "*) CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT=1 ;;
123
- *"--no-verify"*|*"--force"*) CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT=1 ;;
52
+ case "$cli_missing_cmd" in
53
+ *"git "*) return 0 ;;
54
+ *"git "*) return 0 ;;
55
+ *"rm "*|*"rm "*) return 0 ;;
56
+ *"psql"*|*"pgcli"*) return 0 ;;
57
+ *"DROP "*|*"DROP "*) return 0 ;;
58
+ *"kill "*|*"kill "*|*"killall"*) return 0 ;;
59
+ *"HUSKY="*) return 0 ;;
60
+ *"curl"*|*"wget"*) return 0 ;;
61
+ *"REA_BYPASS"*) return 0 ;;
62
+ *"alias "*|*"function "*) return 0 ;;
63
+ *"core.hooksPath"*|*"core.hookspath"*) return 0 ;;
64
+ *"npm "*|*"pnpm "*|*"yarn "*) return 0 ;;
65
+ *"--no-verify"*|*"--force"*) return 0 ;;
124
66
  esac
125
- if [ "$CLI_MISSING_RELEVANT" -eq 0 ]; then
126
- # No destructive-keyword in the extracted command. The pre-0.34.0
127
- # bash body would have allowed this — exit 0 to preserve install-
128
- # path / unbuilt-checkout workflows.
129
- exit 0
130
- fi
131
- # Keyword matched. Preserve fail-closed posture — the pre-0.34.0
132
- # bash body would have evaluated this command and potentially refused.
133
- printf 'rea: dangerous-bash-interceptor cannot run — the rea CLI is not built.\n' >&2
134
- printf 'Run `pnpm install && pnpm build` (or `npm install` for a consumer install) to restore protection.\n' >&2
135
- printf 'This shim fails closed because the pre-0.34.0 bash body enforced destructive-command refusal without a CLI.\n' >&2
136
- exit 2
137
- fi
138
-
139
- # 4. Realpath sandbox check.
140
- if ! command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1; then
141
- printf 'rea: dangerous-bash-interceptor cannot run — `node` is not on PATH.\n' >&2
142
- printf 'Install Node 22+ (engines.node) to restore destructive-command refusal.\n' >&2
143
- exit 2
144
- fi
145
-
146
- sandbox_check=$(node -e '
147
- const fs = require("fs");
148
- const path = require("path");
149
- const cli = process.argv[1];
150
- const projDir = process.argv[2];
151
- let real, realProj;
152
- try { real = fs.realpathSync(cli); } catch (e) {
153
- process.stdout.write("bad:realpath"); process.exit(1);
154
- }
155
- try { realProj = fs.realpathSync(projDir); } catch (e) {
156
- process.stdout.write("bad:realpath-proj"); process.exit(1);
157
- }
158
- const sep = path.sep;
159
- const projWithSep = realProj.endsWith(sep) ? realProj : realProj + sep;
160
- if (!(real === realProj || real.startsWith(projWithSep))) {
161
- process.stdout.write("bad:cli-escapes-project"); process.exit(1);
162
- }
163
- let cur = path.dirname(path.dirname(path.dirname(real)));
164
- let found = false;
165
- for (let i = 0; i < 20 && cur && cur !== path.dirname(cur); i += 1) {
166
- const pj = path.join(cur, "package.json");
167
- if (fs.existsSync(pj)) {
168
- try {
169
- const data = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pj, "utf8"));
170
- if (data && data.name === "@bookedsolid/rea") { found = true; break; }
171
- } catch (e) { /* keep walking */ }
172
- }
173
- cur = path.dirname(cur);
174
- }
175
- if (!found) { process.stdout.write("bad:no-rea-pkg-json"); process.exit(1); }
176
- process.stdout.write("ok");
177
- ' -- "$RESOLVED_CLI_PATH" "$proj" 2>/dev/null)
178
-
179
- if [ "$sandbox_check" != "ok" ]; then
180
- printf 'rea: dangerous-bash-interceptor FAILED sandbox check (%s) — refusing.\n' "$sandbox_check" >&2
181
- exit 2
182
- fi
183
-
184
- # 5. Version-probe.
185
- probe_out=$("${REA_ARGV[@]}" hook dangerous-bash-interceptor --help 2>&1)
186
- probe_status=$?
187
- if [ "$probe_status" -ne 0 ] || ! printf '%s' "$probe_out" | grep -q -e 'dangerous-bash-interceptor'; then
188
- printf 'rea: this shim requires the `rea hook dangerous-bash-interceptor` subcommand (introduced in 0.34.0).\n' >&2
189
- printf 'The resolved CLI at %s does not implement it.\n' "$RESOLVED_CLI_PATH" >&2
190
- printf 'Run `pnpm install` (or `npm install`) to sync the CLI; refusing in the meantime to preserve enforcement.\n' >&2
191
- exit 2
192
- fi
67
+ return 1
68
+ }
193
69
 
194
- # 6. Forward stdin (already captured up-front).
195
- printf '%s' "$INPUT" | "${REA_ARGV[@]}" hook dangerous-bash-interceptor
196
- exit $?
70
+ # shellcheck source=_lib/shim-runtime.sh
71
+ source "$(dirname "$0")/_lib/shim-runtime.sh"
72
+ shim_run
@@ -1,162 +1,44 @@
1
1
  #!/bin/bash
2
2
  # PostToolUse hook: delegation-advisory.sh
3
3
  # 0.31.0+ — delegation-telemetry completion (the *nudge*).
4
+ # 0.38.0+ — migrated to `_lib/shim-runtime.sh` (shared runtime).
4
5
  #
5
- # Fires AFTER every write-class tool call. The settings.json matcher is
6
- # `Bash|Edit|Write|MultiEdit|NotebookEdit`. Reads the Claude Code hook
7
- # payload from stdin, pipes it to `rea hook delegation-advisory`, and
8
- # exits 0.
9
- #
10
- # 0.29.0 shipped the delegation-telemetry *observability* layer
11
- # (`delegation-capture.sh` + `rea audit specialists`). 0.31.0 closes the
12
- # loop with the *nudge*: `rea hook delegation-advisory` maintains a
13
- # per-session write-class counter and, the FIRST time that counter
14
- # crosses `policy.delegation_advisory.threshold` while the session has
15
- # recorded zero real delegation signals, prints a one-time stderr
16
- # advisory ("this session has done a lot of work without delegating to
17
- # a specialist").
18
- #
19
- # # Advisory, never gating
20
- #
21
- # This hook ALWAYS exits 0 (under normal operation). The advisory is a
22
- # nudge — it never blocks a tool call. The ONLY non-zero exit is 2
23
- # under HALT, to keep the kill-switch contract uniform with the rest of
24
- # the hook tree.
6
+ # Fires AFTER every write-class tool call. ALWAYS exits 0 except under
7
+ # HALT. The CLI maintains a per-session write-class counter; first
8
+ # crossing of `policy.delegation_advisory.threshold` with zero recorded
9
+ # delegation signals prints a one-time stderr advisory.
25
10
  #
26
11
  # # Synchronous, NOT detached
27
12
  #
28
- # Unlike `delegation-capture.sh` (which backgrounds `rea hook
29
- # delegation-signal` with `& disown` because the audit write must not
30
- # block tool dispatch), this hook runs the CLI SYNCHRONOUSLY. The
31
- # advisory text must reach the operator's stderr before the hook
32
- # returns — backgrounding it would race the hook's own exit and the
33
- # message could be lost or interleaved with the next tool call's
34
- # output. The CLI is cheap on the hot path: below the threshold it
35
- # only bumps an integer counter file and exits, no audit scan, no
36
- # roster discovery.
13
+ # Unlike delegation-capture.sh, this hook runs the CLI synchronously
14
+ # so the advisory text reaches stderr BEFORE the hook returns. The
15
+ # default `shim_default_forward` already does this no override needed.
37
16
  #
38
- # # CLI-resolution trust boundary
17
+ # # No version probe (codex round-1 P2)
39
18
  #
40
- # Same 2-tier sandboxed resolution `delegation-capture.sh`,
41
- # `protected-paths-bash-gate.sh`, and `blocked-paths-bash-gate.sh` use:
42
- # 1. node_modules/@bookedsolid/rea/dist/cli/index.js (consumer-side
43
- # published artifact)
44
- # 2. dist/cli/index.js under CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR (the rea repo's own
45
- # dogfood install)
46
- # PATH lookup is INTENTIONALLY OMITTED agent-controlled $PATH would
47
- # let a forged `rea` binary intercept this hook on every write-class
48
- # tool call. A realpath sandbox check ensures the resolved CLI lives
49
- # INSIDE realpath(CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR) with an ancestor package.json
50
- # declaring `@bookedsolid/rea`.
51
- #
52
- # Exit codes:
53
- # 0 — always (under normal operation). Disabled-by-policy,
54
- # below-threshold, already-fired, just-fired — all exit 0.
55
- # 2 — HALT active.
19
+ # SHIM_SKIP_VERSION_PROBE=1: this hook runs on EVERY write-class
20
+ # PostToolUse (matcher `Bash|Edit|Write|MultiEdit|NotebookEdit`), so
21
+ # the hot path is hot. The pre-port body had NO version probe — it
22
+ # went straight from sandbox check to forward. Adding a probe doubles
23
+ # Node startups on every tool call (`--help` invocation + the real
24
+ # forward), which noticeably regresses interactive latency during
25
+ # long sessions. Skip the probe; a stale CLI without the subcommand
26
+ # will still fail at forward time, which is fine for an advisory-tier
27
+ # nudge (the operator will run `pnpm install` to fix it).
56
28
 
57
29
  set -uo pipefail
58
30
 
59
- # 1. HALT check. Even though this hook is advisory, refusing to run
60
- # while frozen matches the rest of the hook tree and keeps the
61
- # kill-switch contract uniform.
62
31
  # shellcheck source=_lib/halt-check.sh
63
32
  source "$(dirname "$0")/_lib/halt-check.sh"
64
33
  check_halt
65
34
  REA_ROOT=$(rea_root)
66
35
 
67
- proj="${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-$REA_ROOT}"
68
-
69
- # 2. Resolve the rea CLI through the fixed 2-tier sandboxed order.
70
- # PATH lookup is omitted on purpose (see header). Other install
71
- # shapes silently drop the advisory — matching the bash-gate
72
- # posture; the nudge is a convenience, not a security claim.
73
- REA_ARGV=()
74
- RESOLVED_CLI_PATH=""
75
- if [ -f "$proj/node_modules/@bookedsolid/rea/dist/cli/index.js" ]; then
76
- REA_ARGV=(node "$proj/node_modules/@bookedsolid/rea/dist/cli/index.js")
77
- RESOLVED_CLI_PATH="$proj/node_modules/@bookedsolid/rea/dist/cli/index.js"
78
- elif [ -f "$proj/dist/cli/index.js" ]; then
79
- # rea repo dogfood: the project IS @bookedsolid/rea.
80
- REA_ARGV=(node "$proj/dist/cli/index.js")
81
- RESOLVED_CLI_PATH="$proj/dist/cli/index.js"
82
- fi
83
-
84
- if [ "${#REA_ARGV[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
85
- # No rea CLI in scope — drop the advisory silently. This is the
86
- # expected state during bootstrap (consumer ran `rea init` but
87
- # hasn't installed the npm package yet) or in non-rea repos. A
88
- # noisy stderr warning here would fire on every write-class tool
89
- # call and drown legitimate output.
90
- exit 0
91
- fi
92
-
93
- # 3. Realpath sandbox check — mirrors delegation-capture.sh §3 and
94
- # protected-paths-bash-gate.sh §6. The resolved CLI MUST live inside
95
- # realpath(CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR) AND have an ancestor package.json
96
- # declaring `@bookedsolid/rea` as its `name`. Catches symlink-out
97
- # attacks where an attacker writes
98
- # node_modules/@bookedsolid/rea → /tmp/forged-tree.
99
- if ! command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1; then
100
- # Node not on PATH — we can't verify the CLI shape. Fail safe by
101
- # dropping the advisory (it is not a security claim; the rest of
102
- # the Bash gate suite refuses on this path).
103
- exit 0
104
- fi
105
-
106
- sandbox_check=$(node -e '
107
- const fs = require("fs");
108
- const path = require("path");
109
- const cli = process.argv[1];
110
- const projDir = process.argv[2];
111
- let real, realProj;
112
- try { real = fs.realpathSync(cli); } catch (e) {
113
- process.stdout.write("bad:realpath");
114
- process.exit(1);
115
- }
116
- try { realProj = fs.realpathSync(projDir); } catch (e) {
117
- process.stdout.write("bad:realpath-proj");
118
- process.exit(1);
119
- }
120
- const sep = path.sep;
121
- const projWithSep = realProj.endsWith(sep) ? realProj : realProj + sep;
122
- if (!(real === realProj || real.startsWith(projWithSep))) {
123
- process.stdout.write("bad:cli-escapes-project");
124
- process.exit(1);
125
- }
126
- // Walk up looking for package.json with the protected name.
127
- let cur = path.dirname(path.dirname(path.dirname(real))); // pkg root
128
- let found = false;
129
- for (let i = 0; i < 20 && cur && cur !== path.dirname(cur); i += 1) {
130
- const pj = path.join(cur, "package.json");
131
- if (fs.existsSync(pj)) {
132
- try {
133
- const data = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pj, "utf8"));
134
- if (data && data.name === "@bookedsolid/rea") { found = true; break; }
135
- } catch (e) { /* keep walking */ }
136
- }
137
- cur = path.dirname(cur);
138
- }
139
- if (!found) {
140
- process.stdout.write("bad:no-rea-pkg-json");
141
- process.exit(1);
142
- }
143
- process.stdout.write("ok");
144
- ' -- "$RESOLVED_CLI_PATH" "$proj" 2>/dev/null)
145
-
146
- if [ "$sandbox_check" != "ok" ]; then
147
- # CLI failed the sandbox check — silent drop. The forensic
148
- # breadcrumb in stderr is intentional but trimmed so this doesn't
149
- # become spammy on every tool call.
150
- printf 'rea: delegation-advisory skipped (sandbox check: %s)\n' "$sandbox_check" >&2
151
- exit 0
152
- fi
36
+ SHIM_NAME="delegation-advisory"
37
+ SHIM_INTRODUCED_IN="0.31.0"
38
+ SHIM_FAIL_OPEN=1
39
+ SHIM_SKIP_VERSION_PROBE=1
40
+ SHIM_REFUSAL_NOUN="the delegation-advisory nudge"
153
41
 
154
- # 4. Read stdin and pipe to the CLI SYNCHRONOUSLY. The advisory must
155
- # print before this hook returns — see the "Synchronous" note in
156
- # the header. We pass CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR through explicitly so the
157
- # CLI resolves the same REA_ROOT this shim did. The CLI's own exit
158
- # code is the hook's exit code: 0 normally, 2 under HALT (the CLI
159
- # re-checks HALT itself for defense-in-depth).
160
- INPUT=$(cat)
161
- printf '%s' "$INPUT" | "${REA_ARGV[@]}" hook delegation-advisory
162
- exit $?
42
+ # shellcheck source=_lib/shim-runtime.sh
43
+ source "$(dirname "$0")/_lib/shim-runtime.sh"
44
+ shim_run