@bongos/core 1.19.579 → 1.19.581

package/.bongos-core.json

@@ -2,22 +2,22 @@
   "artifact": "bongos-core",
   "manifest_schema": 1,
   "generator": "scripts/gds/package-core.js",
-  "core_version": "1.19.579",
-  "core_contract": "1.19.579",
-  "source_commit": "8b206e9f473df316fc1981854a479d1ba509d76e",
+  "core_version": "1.19.581",
+  "core_contract": "1.19.581",
+  "source_commit": "03f7d02a4e669a2fa53f34e6375ebb6b7a046a27",
   "source_ref": "HEAD",
-  "built_at": "2026-09-07T17:52:17.407Z",
+  "built_at": "2026-09-07T20:15:39.494Z",
   "redaction": {
     "model": "docs-redacted+functional-verbatim",
-    "docs_redacted": 452,
+    "docs_redacted": 453,
     "agent_docs_stubbed": 24,
-    "functional_verbatim": 2047,
+    "functional_verbatim": 2053,
     "rules": 3,
     "gate_literals": 3,
     "gate": "passed"
   },
-  "file_count": 2523,
-  "tree_sha256": "bd13bef2ae141fa766ed5c8a67894be21c62263079037e763bc1533ff500afdc",
+  "file_count": 2530,
+  "tree_sha256": "5c954594f6fc90e5180384a00a4a9cb3258580a0f9df36d629dbf71731a1fd4e",
   "files": [
     {
       "path": ".claude/skills/blocker-review/SKILL.md",
@@ -367,17 +367,17 @@
     {
       "path": "bin/bongos.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "36208a41a60e3a21356ca9f81abdff9203837ff024b3d15c88a26bee9cce371c"
+      "sha256": "d585fc874c0a45f5d02d5753025d4761ca9b817ae9e5c556891b5c5c444cffde"
     },
     {
       "path": "clients/bongos-client/README.md",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "f94a07e3c135a5d6c41a2d16f722e86b990362996042dc2a5e05b2020f8cf376"
+      "sha256": "48a76d533215b8c0885fa77f59fc0e8915262db6b57029f6850692882e6e7455"
     },
     {
       "path": "clients/bongos-client/bongos-client.global.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "06d1814637fe2898f0d93a3870726d53102d02feeae4611fcca80f195e2e26e4"
+      "sha256": "c7fe87ceb18e7e1c10e629d002fb6f322ee540606c3ec9f6d38741dac7a55e0f"
     },
     {
       "path": "clients/bongos-client/examples/hello-world.mjs",
@@ -387,17 +387,17 @@
     {
       "path": "clients/bongos-client/index.cjs",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "ee0e25848a938f675e7a2e6e0a48983308117ecafe93ca219f4f1df49cf7ea51"
+      "sha256": "d80b05be7a602fa825f5f45e5b7f2bc002473a4731e2530df19fa3043f0c07fc"
     },
     {
       "path": "clients/bongos-client/index.d.ts",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "adaa20c8ce6bee76dc289f10929014382aa89d7373f94ddafc84f4c87eeb0ed4"
+      "sha256": "e5cfa78c545e60771166ae4118e18f5c7bcf911db649c115c2831a028de3562b"
     },
     {
       "path": "clients/bongos-client/index.mjs",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "6a3e4df57180f3c182fbadabe94030d06f125373c9336a7a4160015f1df5b11e"
+      "sha256": "47ae66627693378c276031754aca717ecc01e8e5038c4cf98ed844e5c03ee524"
     },
     {
       "path": "clients/bongos-client/package.json",
@@ -1814,20 +1814,25 @@
       "mode": "0000644",
       "sha256": "772b9153d882f6bbd5000ee90b83e05d550ee4f04d4f5392db36e223d9a58c59"
     },
+    {
+      "path": "docs/adr/0260-the-application-is-the-consent-and-the-echo-is-the-gate.md",
+      "mode": "0000644",
+      "sha256": "fa04f8d71fff8186ae975a949c045ca7481bd0f22f395cb8c7397bbe03ddd449"
+    },
     {
       "path": "docs/adr/README.md",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "bf52fa642d9a576a88f961b46fbb68352e3fd8dd79004440f5e4182e549039ed"
+      "sha256": "1fa7dcf1456d26896e5cec77026ace0f08db8bed65527dee563cd7fdd2d07525"
     },
     {
       "path": "docs/api-reference.md",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "0a622847ab68980279beba2e1a54813b2393107144f88dd31228fe4dfd248b90"
+      "sha256": "450613589b6b480ba2d6789731003794749c0dd972fcd8636380fa5814d68807"
     },
     {
       "path": "docs/api/openapi.json",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "60ca0b131c661df16fb993182d2085d0b04ea15a4d91bec4318c3413fb8dc311"
+      "sha256": "c3a329219460b2508d51009ff8f77bdc4733f3a17ad2776553dc7bce483555c4"
     },
     {
       "path": "docs/architecture.md",
@@ -1852,12 +1857,12 @@
     {
       "path": "docs/copy-inventory.md",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "da770863626202ff2566de7f0a152eebc086662c74d86423794d378fca2d83e6"
+      "sha256": "c4b6557f79a876b18cfc020ea4d45b8dfa419c9c37cab3fb2c629d85939bd75d"
     },
     {
       "path": "docs/copy-registry.json",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "423614f0519d1e94e605e439b53a2bac7a63c2ae8005b0021c71e6c81f38edfc"
+      "sha256": "867399ce0002d6a1f509969544ad9589db6769352597471b495c66749271bb3c"
     },
     {
       "path": "docs/design/apex-pass-2-direction.md",
@@ -2692,7 +2697,7 @@
     {
       "path": "docs/file-map.md",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "f43e8946ecb5c96dc7af0bcee49010245df577eee62381701d2aef1c67455662"
+      "sha256": "8b9c303b7cb35b420ff13c0a265fe2e505769c6d1625977eb85c0d077ff1ddf2"
     },
     {
       "path": "docs/handoff-template.md",
@@ -2702,7 +2707,7 @@
     {
       "path": "docs/module-api-changelog.md",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "cb7bb494b4b2ad905f1067b6f3c11e6331faa8beaad533c70d4a5009c456a807"
+      "sha256": "fad24c9257355302696388602bba42f251696c20d4e2380f668339a823a84558"
     },
     {
       "path": "docs/modules-contract.md",
@@ -4102,7 +4107,7 @@
     {
       "path": "modules/dev-box/app/src/vendor/bongos-client.cjs",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "ee0e25848a938f675e7a2e6e0a48983308117ecafe93ca219f4f1df49cf7ea51"
+      "sha256": "d80b05be7a602fa825f5f45e5b7f2bc002473a4731e2530df19fa3043f0c07fc"
     },
     {
       "path": "modules/dev-box/app/test/unit.mjs",
@@ -4992,7 +4997,7 @@
     {
       "path": "modules/hall-ui/public/oversight.css",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "9aa3fd3f662274571e049eb9931f8dd575eef527a624bc6a5d57102061f54936"
+      "sha256": "13d46f29e77ba9ca30ab52de2e0413f2fcb68bfec44de032730d4d135530e4ba"
     },
     {
       "path": "modules/hall-ui/public/pair.css",
@@ -5312,7 +5317,7 @@
     {
       "path": "modules/hall-ui/public/watch.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "66a3fc7edf59112c1126c6c1c96244ac3cae1c0aea99f946c96b202d14f2cbac"
+      "sha256": "058f25fcef75b3db5410ea7fa6b09515b0b7fddc64a7698c1a1c44e753c8a651"
     },
     {
       "path": "modules/hall-ui/public/watch.states.json",
@@ -5917,7 +5922,7 @@
     {
       "path": "modules/onboarding/routes/access-requests.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "ebebd2ce84727de2dff8411a6279aefb3792de51577a5ba04dc7d565cbce5494"
+      "sha256": "3c66a404347ef1b93edcf5c63a902c9561b0a3f9bd9bc6c17e8a2a1f1b5f6707"
     },
     {
       "path": "modules/onboarding/routes/onboarding.js",
@@ -5934,10 +5939,15 @@
       "mode": "0000644",
       "sha256": "020279ae50f2f9e7a004fe571e5ca14493ad26bd22c395cc4805f759f5560b72"
     },
+    {
+      "path": "modules/platform-identity/applicant-profile.js",
+      "mode": "0000644",
+      "sha256": "12c1d00965d2d386480bdf94673ab6f140c8ee6ba44a5995a2d1b9593c012d20"
+    },
     {
       "path": "modules/platform-identity/application-echo.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "3793f588d62eaa96a74da6bceb55043e8a9de35bc120dbe63f26bcc2b7e904da"
+      "sha256": "8217660dc23b57ba0fb54d6375aca9aec190c7abb1d70f9d44d4e290da272c64"
     },
     {
       "path": "modules/platform-identity/canonical-profile.js",
@@ -6117,7 +6127,7 @@
     {
       "path": "modules/platform-identity/recruiter-sliver.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "e1385b83ac5bb82d13ffbe5070043c2fd0ca20385b3d62e8331ef917d9fca496"
+      "sha256": "4f6854050e3c7459f698c550577fa97958a573d7f1981c9de4d29417af2669c0"
     },
     {
       "path": "modules/platform-identity/routes/connections.js",
@@ -6152,7 +6162,7 @@
     {
       "path": "modules/platform-identity/routes/sso.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "dbc8eeab6b1911b7fdc8b29e3d10871d355d2dead926a0742e9a816a72215dba"
+      "sha256": "6921323c299eee14e2db75b2c1716e35c245f7c971e6aec57c2b339b106f4d87"
     },
     {
       "path": "modules/platform-identity/scouting-authz.js",
@@ -7562,12 +7572,12 @@
     {
       "path": "package-lock.json",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "ce40726e213f4a94fd3983d81c5919e4cc435fda1d666e7cf598fc2f963b8741"
+      "sha256": "06ccc86510eed776b32a243487781c83fefcf48d33053f9f3a313e90b8364a49"
     },
     {
       "path": "package.json",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "6ce1fcd5c0378c8001b8249d8359d04ecfa5730e07dc3e21cda4952fcf1deeae"
+      "sha256": "f145cacd4b2198eb4c6f6cd07a1ac30ebe653b3aaf34c7768cf0ad8dc0561db4"
     },
     {
       "path": "public-docs/index.html",
@@ -7767,7 +7777,7 @@
     {
       "path": "scripts/gds/build-cli-package.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "4b2428615e3c81c14a3b3144eca35fcb2c4523c4debef0f7d4596e5934857a6b"
+      "sha256": "760dbc00a1d8ed5dfa2184e93f9106383bbb36c7fdd973ddfc67b7e03f3bc2f8"
     },
     {
       "path": "scripts/gds/bump-version.js",
@@ -7827,7 +7837,7 @@
     {
       "path": "scripts/gds/cli-lib.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "b08ad47b79417816a9f132e8149f78743eefb47b8824edf3380cdea23447e07f"
+      "sha256": "beb9d466f7623cae12788f23d0e30fbf3a520fec769e416ce3ad6458b23ceb2b"
     },
     {
       "path": "scripts/gds/client-baseurl-guard.js",
@@ -8392,7 +8402,7 @@
     {
       "path": "scripts/gds/recall.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "8bb682eebeec8738082a2988f59697da6982d7c727e82352c169abc72a623b78"
+      "sha256": "d0ad3b72fd0db0384f0d2212b50650e7e081beb62296ac3ea256047d6c3d8ec0"
     },
     {
       "path": "scripts/gds/redteam-patrol.js",
@@ -8802,7 +8812,7 @@
     {
       "path": "scripts/gds/start.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "81c60afdec1b7b05babe1eceaad38e0f27b932bef74e9dcb2cd3782c58524e30"
+      "sha256": "061a477c618ca76aba4f3abfb2d22ad89ceb0bee46bac65b139ad8ee2f30413a"
     },
     {
       "path": "scripts/gds/status.js",
@@ -8814,6 +8824,11 @@
       "mode": "0000644",
       "sha256": "072c493cc549e16c6045abf5bf74a8cfe0004b45844c6f4fe9e846d55d88bf34"
     },
+    {
+      "path": "scripts/gds/surface.js",
+      "mode": "0000644",
+      "sha256": "cc730dc2d59f5d6f06bad92e9c2b69cb7835142deefd31a8dfdd58b300c38e30"
+    },
     {
       "path": "scripts/gds/task.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
@@ -8982,7 +8997,7 @@
     {
       "path": "src/bongos/auth-admission.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "8dc4cc0ab956d387b8044c22e83fce883f2f0129ed27c03503f7348e9d4f00bb"
+      "sha256": "aaa113f476a1d8196324379f8fd78aab22f577455fa0378bac3200b98e6a887f"
     },
     {
       "path": "src/bongos/auth-config.js",
@@ -9007,7 +9022,7 @@
     {
       "path": "src/bongos/auth.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "517e25a2ca9b9adafa993725802af9e7fc1708f0a5609102ddce593e82478ca2"
+      "sha256": "eeb1831ab3d033598e0bcd57c30589cac583a1259c98b2dd49fbd9bb7725e11b"
     },
     {
       "path": "src/bongos/cascade-dispatch.js",
@@ -9272,7 +9287,7 @@
     {
       "path": "src/module-api.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "c1da85daf5425cfb3bbd7d8e29e6995e90ead6088565476973954ca366ef14f5"
+      "sha256": "b928f49545fb1adb6ce26a620a73083be9d71257e6171a533d672190e86495a6"
     },
     {
       "path": "src/module-loader/catalog.js",
@@ -9364,6 +9379,11 @@
       "mode": "0000644",
       "sha256": "125edcec8c7d7536365b9675daa1fceb9fe072a30e2a4a68ee2911cd258a8c10"
     },
+    {
+      "path": "tests/adr_renumber_integrity.mjs",
+      "mode": "0000644",
+      "sha256": "bdc9d3678e12dee3f3252785ca82e06071421762c7146cbc1591d3fc2ec72180"
+    },
     {
       "path": "tests/agents_spawn.mjs",
       "mode": "0000644",
@@ -9424,6 +9444,16 @@
       "mode": "0000644",
       "sha256": "ac84c8d8b1e2f54ef278506570ed657e68d2da4e136968b0df31b51f943af4bb"
     },
+    {
+      "path": "tests/applicant_profile_boundary.mjs",
+      "mode": "0000644",
+      "sha256": "beefe27f5f753185cf3513f6576e55ee44680760ff2d8eed4ced93d56ec92b77"
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "tests/applicant_profile_read_bounds.mjs",
+      "mode": "0000644",
+      "sha256": "185fed67d8b3e65121af637e37392c21d4bcd892bb2b305704479f42ff5987c7"
+    },
     {
       "path": "tests/application_echo.mjs",
       "mode": "0000644",
@@ -9859,6 +9889,11 @@
       "mode": "0000644",
       "sha256": "a57516ed9e904cf1c86fe99688415f834dcae1a19f01b22e986f199fa5473258"
     },
+    {
+      "path": "tests/cli_surface.mjs",
+      "mode": "0000644",
+      "sha256": "589ecc771ab18829049eabc6183939843072160e8476828e246eadd8ff6f0709"
+    },
     {
       "path": "tests/cli_token_reissue.mjs",
       "mode": "0000644",
@@ -11292,7 +11327,7 @@
     {
       "path": "tests/module_api.mjs",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "39812c560bcd88e3b3a7938ed2447fbd4ab24b0f925e9662b375910bcbe7f1da"
+      "sha256": "157d551b9a99320198f22d32ce335fa4166414dc1818d11ef23a0ea05ac80a76"
     },
     {
       "path": "tests/module_api_lazy.mjs",
@@ -11857,7 +11892,7 @@
     {
       "path": "tests/recruiter_sliver_boundary.mjs",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "cad269f556293e0caa234561f5764f90998a5d133b1e0147a5bbf22403c55e3a"
+      "sha256": "a9ad552e7060898e5c94db8af29e63d7cad568294c240c48bef78859a0558ec6"
     },
     {
       "path": "tests/redteam_followup_kind.mjs",
@@ -12592,7 +12627,7 @@
     {
       "path": "tests/watch_applications_queue.mjs",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "b1f7df5aa40b89f8737c76d94def15c539514f7f439cca79a034bf37b922158d"
+      "sha256": "52c5c056c33b0b2ee91076b29e24ea5b650a0148c603fdde5136e60d6c6e926a"
     },
     {
       "path": "tests/web_admission_status.mjs",

package/bin/bongos.js

@@ -204,7 +204,16 @@ function main(argv) {
 
   if (COMPILED) return runBundled(verb, def, forwarded);
 
-  const res = spawnSync(process.execPath, [scriptPath, ...forwarded], { stdio: 'inherit' });
+  // A person typed `bongos <verb>`, so this output is for a person: no `[otb-card]` directives
+  // addressed to a model, no `/builder-*` slash commands that exist only inside Claude Code
+  // (task 1003680, scripts/gds/surface.js). The skills and the card-delivery hook run
+  // `node scripts/gds/<verb>.js` DIRECTLY and never pass through here, so the agent card shape
+  // is untouched. `bongos exec` above is deliberately left alone — it is the agent's escape
+  // hatch into a core script.
+  const res = spawnSync(process.execPath, [scriptPath, ...forwarded], {
+    stdio: 'inherit',
+    env: { ...process.env, BONGOS_SURFACE: 'terminal' },
+  });
   if (res.error) {
     process.stderr.write(`bongos: failed to run "${verb}": ${res.error.message}\n`);
     return 1;

package/clients/bongos-client/README.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ A **generated**, zero-dependency typed client for the Bongos API — produced fr
 by hand; it regenerates when the spec changes, so it can never drift from the routes.
 
 - API version: **v1** (served at `/api/bongos/v1`)
-- 358 operations across 55 resource groups
+- 359 operations across 55 resource groups
 
 ## Install
 

package/clients/bongos-client/bongos-client.global.js

@@ -793,6 +793,8 @@ function createClient(opts = {}) {
     "sso": {
       // POST /sso/activity/rollup — rank: public — POST /sso/activity/rollup
       postSsoActivityRollup: (args) => request("POST", "/sso/activity/rollup", { hasBody: true }, args),
+      // POST /sso/applicant-profile — rank: public — POST /sso/applicant-profile
+      postSsoApplicantProfile: (args) => request("POST", "/sso/applicant-profile", { hasBody: true }, args),
       // GET /sso/authorize — rank: public — GET /sso/authorize
       getSsoAuthorize: (args) => request("GET", "/sso/authorize", { hasBody: false }, args),
       // POST /sso/device/poll — rank: public — POST /sso/device/poll

package/clients/bongos-client/index.cjs

@@ -792,6 +792,8 @@ function createClient(opts = {}) {
     "sso": {
       // POST /sso/activity/rollup — rank: public — POST /sso/activity/rollup
       postSsoActivityRollup: (args) => request("POST", "/sso/activity/rollup", { hasBody: true }, args),
+      // POST /sso/applicant-profile — rank: public — POST /sso/applicant-profile
+      postSsoApplicantProfile: (args) => request("POST", "/sso/applicant-profile", { hasBody: true }, args),
       // GET /sso/authorize — rank: public — GET /sso/authorize
       getSsoAuthorize: (args) => request("GET", "/sso/authorize", { hasBody: false }, args),
       // POST /sso/device/poll — rank: public — POST /sso/device/poll

package/clients/bongos-client/index.d.ts

@@ -355,6 +355,8 @@ export interface PostSessionsRequest { session_id: string; task_ids?: number[];
 export interface PostSessionsResponse { skipped?: boolean; reason?: unknown; session?: unknown; token_reward?: unknown }
 export interface PostSsoActivityRollupRequest { client_id: string; client_secret: string; github_id: StringifiableId; credits?: number; tasks_shipped?: number; karma?: number; rank?: string; disciplines?: unknown; recent_ships?: unknown }
 export interface PostSsoActivityRollupResponse { ok: boolean }
+export interface PostSsoApplicantProfileRequest { client_id: string; client_secret: string; github_id: StringifiableId }
+export interface PostSsoApplicantProfileResponse { profile: unknown }
 export interface PostSsoDevicePollRequest { device_code: string }
 export interface PostSsoDeviceStartRequest { origin: string }
 export interface PostSsoMembershipCheckInRequest { client_id: string; client_secret: string; github_id: StringifiableId; github_login: string; display_name?: string; avatar_url?: string; membership_kind?: string; role?: string }
@@ -1119,6 +1121,8 @@ export interface BongosClient {
   "sso": {
     /** POST /sso/activity/rollup — rank: public */
     postSsoActivityRollup(args: RequestArgs & { body: PostSsoActivityRollupRequest }): Promise<PostSsoActivityRollupResponse>;
+    /** POST /sso/applicant-profile — rank: public */
+    postSsoApplicantProfile(args: RequestArgs & { body: PostSsoApplicantProfileRequest }): Promise<PostSsoApplicantProfileResponse>;
     /** GET /sso/authorize — rank: public */
     getSsoAuthorize(args?: RequestArgs): Promise<ApiResponse>;
     /** POST /sso/device/poll — rank: public */

package/clients/bongos-client/index.mjs

@@ -789,6 +789,8 @@ export function createClient(opts = {}) {
     "sso": {
       // POST /sso/activity/rollup — rank: public — POST /sso/activity/rollup
       postSsoActivityRollup: (args) => request("POST", "/sso/activity/rollup", { hasBody: true }, args),
+      // POST /sso/applicant-profile — rank: public — POST /sso/applicant-profile
+      postSsoApplicantProfile: (args) => request("POST", "/sso/applicant-profile", { hasBody: true }, args),
       // GET /sso/authorize — rank: public — GET /sso/authorize
       getSsoAuthorize: (args) => request("GET", "/sso/authorize", { hasBody: false }, args),
       // POST /sso/device/poll — rank: public — POST /sso/device/poll

package/docs/adr/0260-the-application-is-the-consent-and-the-echo-is-the-gate.md

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+# ADR 0260 — An application IS the consent, and the hub's own echo is the gate: the D7 applicant view
+
+- **Status:** accepted
+- **Date:** 2026-09-03
+- **Task:** [task 1002972](https://cloudbongos.com/builders#/task/1002972) (PV7, goal 1000045 — criterion C4)
+- **Relates to:** `docs/specs/<redacted>.md` **D7** (owner-signed 2026-08-16), [ADR 0215](<redacted>.md) (the D3 sliver this reuses), [ADR 0205](<redacted>.md) + security report 1000027 (client credentials name a project, never a person), [ADR 0201](<redacted>.md) D1.2/D1.3 (the vouch mark and the statusless echo), [ADR 0171](<redacted>.md) D4/D5 (indistinguishable nulls, no-store), [ADR 0016](<redacted>.md) (descriptive, never authority), [ADR 0083](<redacted>.md) (the doorway)
+
+## Context
+
+Spec D7 asks for one thing in one sentence: a reviewer looking at an application
+sees **what the applicant's own profile rules would already show them**, plus the
+applicant's note, **evaluated live at review time**. Public account → the public
+profile view. Private account → the D3 sliver. No new disclosure class.
+
+Two halves of that already existed when this task opened. The applicant's note
+reaches the project's queue through the join relay (task 1002330,
+`relayApplicationNote`). The D3 projection exists and is proved
+([ADR 0215](<redacted>.md)). What did not
+exist was the **rule** — which of the two views an applicant gets — and the
+**path** by which a project's reviewer queue could ask the hub for it.
+
+Three things about that path are not obvious, and each could have been got wrong
+in a way that looked like a simplification.
+
+## Decision
+
+### D1 — The rule is one port composing the two EXISTING views, never a third shape
+
+`modules/platform-identity/applicant-profile.js` answers
+`null | { view:'public', account, cross_project } | { view:'sliver', sliver }`.
+
+The public branch's rollup half is `getPublicProfileExtras` — the very port the
+canonical `/u/<handle>` page calls. The private branch's projection is
+`sliverShapeFor`, exported from `recruiter-sliver.js` — the very function the
+recruiting route serializes. **Neither branch builds its own object**, because a
+third five-key lookalike *is* the new disclosure class D7 forbids: free to drift
+from the original field by field, and uncovered by the whitelist proof over it.
+
+`tests/applicant_profile_boundary.mjs` asserts both key sets against the
+**modules' own exported lists**, never against copies kept in the test.
+
+### D2 — The APPLICATION is the consent, not the recruiting opt-in
+
+This is the one place the applicant view differs from the recruiter sliver, and
+it is the decision most likely to be "tidied" away later.
+
+`getRecruiterSliver` floors on `recruiterSliverVisibleSql` = consent **and
+recruiting reach**, because a recruiter browsing a directory was invited by
+nobody. An applicant has done something a browsing recruiter has not — spec D7
+says it in those words: **"applying is an explicit act"**.
+
+So routing this port through `getRecruiterSliver` would be wrong *in the
+direction that looks safe*. `recruiter_discoverable` defaults to **false** for a
+private account, so a private builder who deliberately applied would show their
+reviewer **nothing at all**, and criterion C4 would be satisfied by an empty box.
+The reach opt-out governs the *recruiting surface* — `account-visibility.js` says
+exactly that of `scoutingListableSql` — and was never a gate on a door the
+account itself knocked on.
+
+**What the swap does NOT relax**, and this is what keeps it from meaning
+"applying opts you into everything":
+
+- `accountActiveSql` still floors it — `profile_state='active'` **and**
+  `terms_accepted_at IS NOT NULL`. A provisional account and one that never
+  accepted the platform terms disclose nothing, applying or not.
+- `hide_stats` is untouched in both branches. Applying is consent to be **seen**,
+  never consent to be **counted**.
+- The existence axis stays off, for ADR 0215 D1's reason: the private account is
+  precisely this rule's subject.
+
+The proof asserts the swap **in both directions on the same account** — `PRIVOUT`
+gets an applicant view and gets `null` from `getRecruiterSliver` — so the
+tempting refactor cannot pass quietly.
+
+### D3 — The gate is the hub's own echo, because client credentials name a project and not a person
+
+`POST /sso/applicant-profile` is authenticated by `client_id` + `client_secret`,
+like its two siblings. **That authentication is not sufficient on its own**, and
+this is the whole security argument for the route.
+
+[ADR 0205](<redacted>.md) / security
+report 1000027 is the lesson `/sso/membership/check-in` and `/sso/activity/rollup`
+both had to learn: credentials prove *which project* is calling and say **nothing
+about who the `github_id` in the body is**. Without a per-subject witness, this
+route is a **bulk disclosure oracle** over every account on the platform —
+private ones included, since D7's private branch is exactly the disclosure the
+existence axis normally withholds. That is strictly worse than the rollup hole it
+would mirror.
+
+The witness is `platform_identity_application_echoes` — the statusless
+"you applied to this project on this date" row from
+[ADR 0201](<redacted>.md) D1.3. It is
+the right witness because **the hub writes it itself**, in its own join relay,
+only after the project answered the relayed application with a success. A client
+cannot assert itself into that table. `applicationBacksProfileRead` is the exact
+analogue of `membershipBacksRollup`: a boolean, and the narrowest cross-account
+read the table has — the caller must already name both the account and the
+project, and there is no listing by `client_id`, so a project learns nothing
+about who applied that it was not already told at its own door.
+
+It reuses the **same 30-day window**, and that is load-bearing rather than tidy:
+when the echo stops matching, the view stops rendering, because the platform has
+stopped vouching for the link between that queue row and that account.
+
+Refusal is **404, never 403** — a 403 would confirm the `github_id` names a real
+account. And the gate runs **before any account is read**: the proof asserts that
+on the statement log, not on the response, because a gate that refuses *after*
+reading has already done the disclosure work.
+
+### D4 — LIVE means nothing is stored, at either end
+
+Nothing about the applicant is written to the `access_requests` row and nothing is
+cached on the project. The profile is resolved on **every render**
+(`attachApplicantProfiles`), so an applicant who hides their stats, goes private,
+or loses their account between applying and being reviewed is answered by the next
+read of the queue — criterion C2's "immediately". A snapshot taken at apply time
+would keep publishing a consent that had since been withdrawn, for as long as the
+request sat in the queue. The hub sends `Cache-Control: no-store`; the project
+keeps nothing.
+
+### D5 — The queue keys on the VOUCH, never on `github_login`
+
+`attachApplicantProfiles` resolves only rows carrying `applicant_github_id` — the
+hub's own assertion about who filed the request (`core_230`). `POST /access-requests`
+is the one **public unauthenticated write** on the GDS, so `github_login` is a
+string anybody may type. Resolving a cross-project record against an unvouched
+login is precisely the impersonation surface the vouch exists to close: file a
+request naming a well-known builder, let the owner read that builder's excellent
+record, and walk in. An unvouched row gets `profile: null`, always.
+
+### D6 — The credential stays in core; the module gets a narrow port
+
+The hub call lives in `src/bongos/auth-admission.js` beside the two other calls
+that hold the hub client secret, and `loadIdpConfig` stays **off** the doorway —
+putting it there would hand every module the credential that speaks for the whole
+project. `<redacted>(githubId)` is published instead: one
+`github_id` in, one already-bounded view out. The module can neither widen the
+request nor re-address it.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- **The path is complete but DORMANT until R09 ([task 1002285](https://cloudbongos.com/builders#/task/1002285)) ships the vouch writer.** Nothing in the tree writes `applicant_github_id` today, so every queue row currently resolves `profile: null` and renders exactly as it did before. This is stated rather than glossed: the feature is wired end to end and proved, and it lights up on the day R09 lands its writer — the sequencing R08's own migration comment predicted. 1002972's declared dependency was PV3 alone; **the real dependency on R09 was missing from the graph.**
+- The reviewer queue degrades rather than breaks: a hub outage, a self-hosted instance with no hub, and an applicant with no echo all render a row with its login, note and vouch pill and no profile block.
+- `MAX_LIVE_PROFILE_READS = 25` caps per-render hub round-trips against a 200-row queue. It bites on vouched rows in list order, so the rows a reviewer acts on carry the profile. Raising it buys detail and costs latency; it changes nothing about what may be disclosed.
+- `recruiter-sliver.js` now has a second first-party reader. The sole-reader guard in `tests/recruiter_sliver_boundary.mjs` was widened with a stated reason **and strengthened**: every listed reader is now checked to not *branch* on a sliver field, so the property the guard protects — descriptive data is never consulted as authority — is enforced rather than trusted.
+- **Still not built:** the apply UI's *"your application shares: …"* disclosure line D7 names. There is no apply UI anywhere — `POST /my-projects/join` has no browser caller — so the sentence has no page to live on. It belongs with whichever task builds that surface, and is filed rather than silently dropped.

package/docs/adr/README.md

@@ -351,3 +351,4 @@ This keeps the decision history honest and traceable.
 | 0257 | [**Auth resolves before the hall mounts anything, and a widget's boot read may never navigate** ([task 1003673](https://cloudbongos.com/builders#/task/1003673) · goal 1000063 — *The front door*). An invite-only instance could not admit its FIRST builder, and the symptom lied about where the fault was: an owner saw an empty Access-requests queue and no approve button, because **signing in does not file a request** — only the landing's *Request access* form does, and that form was unreachable. A signed-out visitor to `/builders` was bounced to GitHub, refused as a first-timer ("request access first"), and pointed back at `/builders` to be bounced again. Reproduced against `main`, not just an old pin. `builders.js` was already careful — `/me` is read `softAuth` and a 401 there renders the landing — but `DOMContentLoaded` called `mountHallWidgets()` FIRST, synchronously, and `goals.js`'s mount-time read of `/goals` goes through a `getJSON` with no `softAuth`, which answers 401 by NAVIGATING. The widget's read raced `renderLanding()` and won. **Decision: the front door settles which page this is before anything else runs** — `boot()` reads `/me` (soft), then either renders the landing and stops (nothing mounts, nothing else fetches) or mounts the hall, handing the resolved payload to `loadAll()` so the page still asks once. Widgets are member surfaces (`renderLanding` hid them all after the fact anyway), so not mounting them while signed out removes the CLASS rather than the one instance of it that was found; **a widget's own boot read may never navigate** is the belt beside it (`goals.js` reads soft and renders nothing without a session). A 401 during boot is not an instruction to go and sign in — only a user action is. `tests/hall_landing_boot.mjs` executes the real `builders.js` in a DOM stub and was confirmed to FAIL against the pre-fix file. Rejected: patching `goals.js` alone (it was merely first); making the 401 redirect soft everywhere (an expired session mid-visit SHOULD be sent to sign in — the line is boot vs user action); open enrollment as the cure (removes the gate [ADR 0050](<redacted>.md) chose deliberately instead of repairing the door).](<redacted>.md) | hall-ui / admission / front door |
 | 0258 | [**The public CLI is a generated client-only package, and its file list is proven by running it** ([task 1003679](https://cloudbongos.com/builders#/task/1003679) · goal 1000054 — *A newcomer can build without the UI*). The core ships private as `@bongos/core` ([ADR 0108](<redacted>.md)), so a newcomer with no credential can install NOTHING and the web hall is the only way in — the owner's words: "how am I supposed to easily take on tasks as a new builder? I should be able to do everything without the UI." Open task 1002025 proposed publishing the core, which ships the SERVER and bypasses [ADR 0099](<redacted>.md)'s redaction pipeline (dormant until ~2026-11). **Decision: generate a separate public `@cloudbongos/cli` from the core and do not publish the core.** Four load-bearing parts. (1) SCOPED NAME, because npm shares one namespace between org names and unscoped packages — the bare `cloudbongos` is unpublishable *precisely because the owner owns that org*, which npm reports as "invalid" and reads like the name is taken; and a package name cannot be created on the npm website at all (it exists on first publish, which is why "Add Existing Package" answered `Forbidden`). (2) THE FILE LIST IS DECLARED AND PROVEN BY BEHAVIOUR, never computed — a static require-closure CANNOT answer this, because `src/module-api.js` is the doorway a module may only import ([ADR 0083](<redacted>.md)) and it *names* every kernel capability, so a static walk sees 33 `src/` files from `start.js` alone where runtime resolves **one** (`api-prefix.js`, which imports nothing) — the same trap as task 1003677's unsatisfiable done-when. So the test packs the tarball, installs it into an empty dir with NO repo, and runs every verb: it may fail for want of a session, never for a missing file. That caught two real holes on its first strengthened run — `clients/bongos-client/index.mjs`, reached by a dynamic `import()` no `require()` walk can see, and a hand-listed `files` array that dropped `clients/` and produced a tarball which installed cleanly then died on first use; both are now build-time refusals, and the `files` array is derived from the manifest. (3) `claim`/`ship`/`dev`/`serve`/`module`/`upgrade`/`onboard`/`doctor`/`exec`/`package-core` are ABSENT and the CLI says WHY plus the next step (`bongos shell` → a cloud box with the full CLI) — a bare `unknown command` teaches nothing, which is the exact failure being fixed. The supported journey is `login` → `start` → `shell`. (4) A REDACTION GATE fails the build closed on non-loopback IPv4 (RFC 5737 doc ranges exempt), token/key shapes, and every domain + owner login readable from the instance's own `config/branding.json` — needles come from host config so the core carries no instance identity ([ADR 0062 §7](<redacted>.md)); `cloudbongos.com` is allowlisted as public by design. No `repository` field while the core repo is private (it would 404 for every user and publish the owner's login for nothing). 31 files, one dependency (`undici`), version independent of the core's ([ADR 0161](<redacted>.md)). `@bongos/client` is VENDORED, not depended on — a public package depending on a private one is uninstallable. **The owner runs `npm publish`; a builder must not.** Task 1002025 is superseded. Rejected: publishing the core; deriving from a static closure (structurally impossible past the doorway); waiting for the mirror (dormant, and this is a build product not a source release); an unscoped name; depending on `@bongos/client`; a degraded `claim`; shipping all of `src/` to make lazy getters safe.](<redacted>.md) | cli / distribution / public surface |
 | 0259 | [**A project’s departure from the public list is public, and the copy says so** ([task 1003672](https://cloudbongos.com/builders#/task/1003672) · goal 1000046 — *Project creation*). Decides the leak [ADR 0255](<redacted>.md) §6.2 deliberately filed rather than implied fixed. The public projects feed publishes a named list plus a count of anonymous rows, so when a project flips to stealth its named row LEAVES the identified block while the count RISES BY ONE — *“Mercury is gone, and there is one more black hole”* names it, and the moment, from a single diff of two snapshots. **Everything [ADR 0182](<redacted>.md) D2a does is defeated by it**, because the identity was never carried ON the anonymous row (`STEALTH_ANONYMOUS_KEEPS` is an allow-list precisely so a column added next year is anonymous by default) — it is carried by the ABSENCE of the named row that used to sit beside it. **Larger than the channel 0255 closed**, which needed repeated sampling and correlation; this one is exact and needs two reads. No `ORDER BY` change touches it: it is inherent in publishing a named list at all, so every fix is a product decision with a visible cost and the owner’s call, not a builder’s. **Decision: accept it, and make the copy say so.** Two reasons it is the right end of the trade and not merely the cheapest — (1) it is ALREADY the honest reading of the existing promise, since D2a made existence and count public *by design*, and a count that is public and truthful is a count whose CHANGES are public; (2) both alternatives damage the control they defend. A **delay window** means the owner clicks the privacy setting and is not private yet *without knowing it*, converting an information leak into a false belief — strictly worse, and the wrong direction for a privacy control. **Decoys** spend the count’s truthfulness (it is truthful today) on a guarantee that is still only probabilistic, and a decoy scheme needs some way to tell padding from real rows — the exact stable per-project key D2a forbids. The promise stealth actually keeps is about the project’s CONTENTS, not the TRANSITION: an anonymous row stays anonymous (no name, tagline, art, origin, or key surviving to the next snapshot); what is not private is stepping off a published list readers may keep copies of. So the copy — which read *“its name, and everything else about it, stay yours”*, every clause true and the paragraph as a whole overselling, because a reader takes it to cover the switch — now names the boundary in BOTH places an owner meets the setting (the choice’s blurb and the what-changes fold), in the plain register 0182’s interview fixed for this card. **A privacy control that oversells is worse than one that admits a limit**, the same standard 0255 §6 set for itself. **No behaviour changes** in `projects-feed.js` — the feed, the redaction allow-list and the keyed rotating permutation are decided FINISHED, not insufficient. `tests/projects_hub.mjs` pins the sentence in both surfaces (the copy IS the fix, so a future edit tightening the blurb must not quietly drop it) and re-applies the no-space-metaphor ban to it. Carries 0255 §6.3’s smaller residual so both live in one place: within one 24h epoch the permutation is stable, so same-day snapshots tell black holes apart (not name them) — accepted on the same reasoning, since the fix is a per-request permutation, which breaks pagination exactly as `ORDER BY random()` was rejected for. Guards recorded for any future attempt: no stable per-project key on an anonymous row, and no anonymous ordering an observer can predict or correlate. Rejected: the delay; decoys; dropping the named list (protects a privacy nobody asked for at the cost of the feature); and saying nothing, which is the failure mode this closes.](<redacted>.md) | platform-identity / privacy boundary / copy honesty |
+| 0260 | [**An application IS the consent, and the hub’s own echo is the gate** ([task 1002972](https://cloudbongos.com/builders#/task/1002972) · goal 1000045, criterion C4). Privacy spec **D7** asks that a reviewer see what the applicant’s OWN profile rules would already show, evaluated LIVE at review time. The rule is ONE port composing the two EXISTING views — `getPublicProfileExtras` for a public account, `recruiter-sliver`’s own `sliverShapeFor` for a private one — because a third five-key lookalike **is** the new disclosure class D7 forbids. **The one deliberate difference from the D3 sliver:** `getRecruiterSliver` floors on recruiting REACH, and reusing it verbatim would be wrong in the direction that looks safe — `recruiter_discoverable` defaults to FALSE for a private account, so a private builder who deliberately applied would show their reviewer NOTHING and C4 would be satisfied by an empty box. D7 settles it: *“applying is an explicit act”*. The swap relaxes REACH only; `accountActiveSql` (active **and** terms accepted) and `hide_stats` still floor it, and the proof asserts both directions on the same account so the tempting refactor cannot pass quietly. **The federated route’s gate is the whole security story** ([ADR 0205](<redacted>.md) / security report 1000027): client credentials name a PROJECT and never a person, so `POST /sso/applicant-profile` authenticated alone is a bulk disclosure oracle over every account on the platform, private ones included. `applicationBacksProfileRead` demands a HUB-WRITTEN echo for exactly (this account, this client) inside the same 30-day window — a row only the hub’s own join relay creates — refusing **404, never 403**, and BEFORE any account is read (asserted on the statement log, because a gate that refuses after reading has already done the disclosure work). LIVE means nothing is stored at either end; the queue keys on the VOUCH and never on `github_login` (the one PUBLIC unauthenticated write makes an unvouched login an impersonation surface); and the hub client secret stays in core behind a narrow doorway port. **The path is complete but DORMANT until R09 ([task 1002285](https://cloudbongos.com/builders#/task/1002285)) ships the vouch writer** — nothing writes `applicant_github_id` today, and that dependency was missing from 1002972’s graph. Rejected: routing the port through `getRecruiterSliver`, a snapshot at apply time, resolving by `github_login`, and putting `loadIdpConfig` on the doorway.](<redacted>.md) | platform identity / privacy |