@bongos/core 1.19.22 → 1.19.23

package/.bongos-core.json

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
   "artifact": "bongos-core",
   "manifest_schema": 1,
   "generator": "scripts/gds/package-core.js",
-  "core_version": "1.19.22",
-  "core_contract": "1.19.22",
-  "source_commit": "e089ef90ffdf1b4da4f4a6b7f70d0fb10426bf42",
+  "core_version": "1.19.23",
+  "core_contract": "1.19.23",
+  "source_commit": "fcdc2c0100a2b96183b34980f7c33572b67c7d1f",
   "source_ref": "HEAD",
-  "built_at": "2026-08-11T01:24:29.274Z",
+  "built_at": "2026-08-11T01:44:34.493Z",
   "redaction": {
     "model": "docs-redacted+functional-verbatim",
     "docs_redacted": 285,
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
     "gate": "passed"
   },
   "file_count": 1510,
-  "tree_sha256": "0a775991e628ae986369cd819f6b384887fa20c1095f7e7263f07f13ad0e8167",
+  "tree_sha256": "80499ca716f5acc869706f3832aba22ffa0facdf31abd6eca71baec9b273d628",
   "files": [
     {
       "path": ".claude/skills/blocker-review/SKILL.md",
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@
     {
       "path": "clients/bongos-client/index.d.ts",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "2e321ea71ad8b24a5562b97dc76bedae62e3a313fd8cbb72f415fa575bd686a1"
+      "sha256": "7e6732aedaf7aaa3c657fc05e2dfd1dcc63e0fb06586d4077248d79d6198297e"
     },
     {
       "path": "clients/bongos-client/index.mjs",
@@ -1277,12 +1277,12 @@
     {
       "path": "docs/api-reference.md",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "c2e909c0f62a643dc2ff4c705cc6ffccf279dcc588945d1b39147d09d70c5f5b"
+      "sha256": "e28575936d1cb0cce684b20723743fd0d801ccd0a7ec58fff5360e160b23b5e7"
     },
     {
       "path": "docs/api/openapi.json",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "43b270dbfaa283c2c793d8f779b497cfd0c6da4f4a4cef07f4516d1c4e582946"
+      "sha256": "b232ca69ae97842be312b76f6ac49ca66090c5c8fef392f609bb857e5f5c2979"
     },
     {
       "path": "docs/architecture.md",
@@ -2882,7 +2882,7 @@
     {
       "path": "modules/grading/grader.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "b421b3749396e14bbfa203519a0d25083f540c222deccfc755ad6ca808239859"
+      "sha256": "a08e9c017a07bffa311a9de6df007c30d9f3766c86d0ce2ec88660fed60d37aa"
     },
     {
       "path": "modules/grading/module.json",
@@ -3437,7 +3437,7 @@
     {
       "path": "modules/lifecycle/routes/done-when.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "f77651b5418d6eb99e78ecf4c864f239ba75a149444a88eae59a5c3082f48cae"
+      "sha256": "cec4dce0ab8d11b16de73dbee8adb782f47c12a32d203dd1ff726afd23caadf3"
     },
     {
       "path": "modules/lifecycle/routes/gate-approvals.js",
@@ -3457,7 +3457,7 @@
     {
       "path": "modules/lifecycle/routes/tasks.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "14320bb5a3257a422854c41362f010042ed390bdd7efcf1b4959ed72f0ee1f9f"
+      "sha256": "add6acd00adc842e90348ca789da0a473aa2dc68d949cf2b5586c68ef5eaa1be"
     },
     {
       "path": "modules/lifecycle/routes/versions.js",
@@ -4002,12 +4002,12 @@
     {
       "path": "package-lock.json",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "f85ec26a3a5cbefec1aca8407043cb2eb2886120722a79126d364736f1a67584"
+      "sha256": "969211290cee8ccee357109c325ff4741c8cce3319d520b22506126099beea7e"
     },
     {
       "path": "package.json",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "9275da3329d188788a0e69b719231cd23ae38b3499802edbcefebded17317067"
+      "sha256": "b00d5423d5019e305bb488af793202ccb4d3089da6c129851e32f85ea4219904"
     },
     {
       "path": "public-docs/index.html",
@@ -5197,7 +5197,7 @@
     {
       "path": "scripts/gds/ship.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "65af2a0d6fc54ee3dbb3c7faa44796fed2a5817fa48073cebfd9d6a15837fec7"
+      "sha256": "085a7feeff06fa7d2b833c483795161e2c4a6ee79630e2f09d7ae2f06eeb253c"
     },
     {
       "path": "scripts/gds/smoke-batch-claim.sh",
@@ -5627,7 +5627,7 @@
     {
       "path": "src/module-api.js",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "937021d749587baee02de0c83fa721b99a0e23850c5c12aa5332424673e5d6af"
+      "sha256": "0e4203ec0098beb9a54a4ea56b3c5701cfca5bb02b6676114a9257f5b353aff5"
     },
     {
       "path": "src/module-loader/loader.js",
@@ -6137,7 +6137,7 @@
     {
       "path": "tests/criterion_authoring_gate.mjs",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "23d8c31f310e7ffb840dce3850c1eb2eab59b5513489bde19edb22c5bab6eb75"
+      "sha256": "c3cafa042f7ac9715569b9c3312e27b920e88497047415cb653bb576cf5380a9"
     },
     {
       "path": "tests/criterion_progress.mjs",
@@ -6582,12 +6582,12 @@
     {
       "path": "tests/grade_server_authoritative.mjs",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "c582e967a183ac9fcff99c2059543ac34f2dd98b39f21b5053d2c463287f01e6"
+      "sha256": "c650bd3c79d469f3ffb1cdada6f23521dd09c97844affd5b9e7f340d1796daa6"
     },
     {
       "path": "tests/grade_unavailable_display.mjs",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "c6082286a017edc4369e4766b346d8ea981667a4270839868d7b846cde154782"
+      "sha256": "82746689da273a8bd9d53d80204b15147d87574d2331c3a70d736d95a6126a09"
     },
     {
       "path": "tests/grader.mjs",
@@ -6992,7 +6992,7 @@
     {
       "path": "tests/override_request_ownership.mjs",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "da77422fac6c4624315b8c51bd8974a93a5f64f0c72c1ef1a3665744e42dc15c"
+      "sha256": "dac9d9891eac706432aff97ce35e27692064a2791dc1e546215c74e68b81e8a8"
     },
     {
       "path": "tests/package_core.mjs",
@@ -7502,7 +7502,7 @@
     {
       "path": "tests/task_ownership_gate.mjs",
       "mode": "0000644",
-      "sha256": "0a0aa9bd7147256422f348567a67e206bafeefe88430195834ddebf405b59bdd"
+      "sha256": "cfb57e35ce65f991309e4de64c03f9252e19117a1ad406cf9bb04c1716f57746"
     },
     {
       "path": "tests/touches_overlap.mjs",

package/clients/bongos-client/index.d.ts

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ export interface PatchMeSkillPrefsResponse { prefs: unknown; effective: unknown;
 export interface PatchMeSoundPrefsResponse { prefs: unknown; effective: unknown; effective_map: unknown; volume: unknown; defaults: unknown; known_sounds: unknown }
 export interface PatchProjectsIdFeaturedRequest { featured: boolean }
 export interface PatchProjectsIdFeaturedResponse { project: unknown }
-export interface PatchTasksIdRequest { kind?: string; discipline?: string; requires_rank?: string; module_key?: string; goal_id?: number; parent_task_id?: StringifiableId; parallel_safe?: unknown; newcomer_friendly?: boolean; xenos_claimable?: boolean; security_sensitive?: boolean; automation_tag?: string }
+export interface PatchTasksIdRequest { kind?: string; discipline?: string; requires_rank?: string; module_key?: string; goal_id?: number; parent_task_id?: StringifiableId; parallel_safe?: unknown; newcomer_friendly?: boolean; xenos_claimable?: boolean; security_sensitive?: boolean; automation_tag?: string; status?: unknown }
 export interface PostAccessRequestsRequest { github_login: string; display_name?: string; note?: string }
 export interface PostAccessRequestsResponse { ok: boolean; request?: unknown; already_pending?: boolean }
 export interface PostAuthAppPairApproveRequest { pair_code: string }

package/docs/api/openapi.json

@@ -12008,7 +12008,7 @@
           "versions"
         ],
         "summary": "POST /versions/:id/done-when",
-        "description": "Auth (Metic+, then the goal's own authority): create a done-when criterion at RUNTIME. ADR 0105 moved scope-truth seeds (versions/goals/criteria) out of the normal migration path, so a brand-new criterion on a RUNNING instance can no longer be added by a plain migration (migrations/instance/ applies only under the owner opt-in GDS_APPLY_INSTANCE_SEEDS=1, a DR step). This is the vector a planning session uses to add a criterion to a live version WITHOUT a droplet migrate. ADR 0154 — authority over a GOAL's criteria follows GOAL OWNERSHIP, not global rank. A Metic who may create the goal (POST /goals) and author the tasks under it (POST /tasks, ADR 0090) may now write the criteria those tasks gate — but only inside a goal they own or manage. Deliberately NOT a flat re-rank: - An unsatisfied criterion permanently blocks version close (version-close.js counts satisfied === total per VERSION, regardless of goal) and goal auto-achieve (db.achieveGoalIfComplete). There is NO delete route, so it cannot be undone via the API — the same backward ratchet as unsatisfy, which stays Archon. - So a non-Archon must name a goal_id (version-level criteria stay Archon), must be that goal's OWNER or MANAGER (isGoalOwnerOrManager — the same predicate behind visibility/invite/role management), and the goal must be open on a planning/building version. That bounds the blast radius to a workspace they already hold. An unauthorized caller is masked behind bad_goal_id so the route is not an existence oracle (ADR 0112). Pinned in route-rank-check.MODULE_EXPECTED_RANKS. rank: metic+archon — criterion create, walled by goal ownership (ADR 0154).\n\n**Rank:** `metic+archon` — Metic or Archon rank (review/triage powers).\n\n**Permissions:** `criterion.create` (all required).",
+        "description": "Auth (Metic+, then the goal's own authority): create a done-when criterion at RUNTIME. ADR 0105 moved scope-truth seeds (versions/goals/criteria) out of the normal migration path, so a brand-new criterion on a RUNNING instance can no longer be added by a plain migration (migrations/instance/ applies only under the owner opt-in GDS_APPLY_INSTANCE_SEEDS=1, a DR step). This is the vector a planning session uses to add a criterion to a live version WITHOUT a droplet migrate. ADR 0154 — authority over a GOAL's criteria follows GOAL OWNERSHIP, not global rank. A Metic who may create the goal (POST /goals) and author the tasks under it (POST /tasks, ADR 0090) may now write the criteria those tasks gate — but only inside a goal they own or manage. Deliberately NOT a flat re-rank: - An unsatisfied criterion permanently blocks version close (version-close.js counts satisfied === total per VERSION, regardless of goal) and goal auto-achieve (db.achieveGoalIfComplete). There is NO delete route, so it cannot be undone via the API — the same backward ratchet as unsatisfy, which stays Archon. - So a non-Archon must name a goal_id (version-level criteria stay Archon), must be that goal's OWNER or MANAGER (isGoalOwnerOrManager — the same predicate behind visibility/invite/role management), and the goal must be open on a planning/building version. That bounds the blast radius to a workspace they already hold. An unauthorized caller gets an honest 403 goal_not_yours (task 1002614 — goal reads are open to any builder, so there is no existence oracle for a mask to protect). Pinned in route-rank-check.MODULE_EXPECTED_RANKS. rank: metic+archon — criterion create, walled by goal ownership (ADR 0154).\n\n**Rank:** `metic+archon` — Metic or Archon rank (review/triage powers).\n\n**Permissions:** `criterion.create` (all required).",
         "x-rank": "metic+archon",
         "x-source": "modules/lifecycle/routes/done-when.js",
         "x-permissions": [
@@ -13788,7 +13788,8 @@
           "automation_tag": {
             "type": "string",
             "maxLength": 64
-          }
+          },
+          "status": {}
         },
         "additionalProperties": false
       },

package/docs/api-reference.md

@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ Base path: `/api/bongos`. Ranks (enforced server-side, [ADR 0016](adr/<redacted>
 | GET | `/api/bongos/tasks` | `any-builder` | — | reads (filtered task list); preserved per CRITICAL §4. |
 | POST | `/api/bongos/tasks` | `metic+archon` | `version_id`, `title`, `description`, `status`, `touches`, `est_minutes`, `est_cost_usd`, `manual_degree`, `priority`, `automation_tag`, `credits_reward`, `source`, `source_ref`, `value_summary`, `kind`, `discipline`, `parallel_safe`, `newcomer_friendly`, `security_sensitive`, `requires_rank`, `auto_detect_touches`, `criterion_ids`, `module_key`, `goal_id` | Task create/promote/edit (plan/scope mutation) is Metic+ as of ADR 0090 (owner decision 2026-06-26): a Metic who can run idea-triage may … |
 | GET | `/api/bongos/tasks/:id` | `any-builder` | — | single-task read; preserved per CRITICAL §4 (supervisor hot path). |
-| PATCH | `/api/bongos/tasks/:id` | `metic+archon` | `kind`, `discipline`, `requires_rank`, `module_key`, `goal_id`, `parent_task_id`, `parallel_safe`, `newcomer_friendly`, `xenos_claimable`, `security_sensitive`, `automation_tag` | PATCH /tasks/:id — supports body.parent_task_id (V2 C2), body.kind (V2 B1), body.discipline (mig 014), body.parallel_safe (mig 028), and … |
+| PATCH | `/api/bongos/tasks/:id` | `metic+archon` | `kind`, `discipline`, `requires_rank`, `module_key`, `goal_id`, `parent_task_id`, `parallel_safe`, `newcomer_friendly`, `xenos_claimable`, `security_sensitive`, `automation_tag`, `status` | PATCH /tasks/:id — supports body.parent_task_id (V2 C2), body.kind (V2 B1), body.discipline (mig 014), body.parallel_safe (mig 028), and … |
 | POST | `/api/bongos/tasks/:id/abandon` | `metic+archon` | `reason` | POST /tasks/:id/abandon — terminal "retire this task" transition (task 987). |
 | POST | `/api/bongos/tasks/:id/attest-gate` | `any-builder` | `head_sha` | POST /tasks/:id/attest-gate — body: { head_sha }. |
 | POST | `/api/bongos/tasks/:id/confirm` | `any-builder` | `verified` |  |

package/modules/grading/grader.js

@@ -734,6 +734,12 @@ function serverSideGuards(gradeResult, { committedFiles, builderRank, diffStats,
         downgraded_to: downgradeTo,
         client_passed: clientPassed,
         tripped: guardsTripped,
+        // task 1002614 (map P-2): a permission_path trip is an AUTHORIZATION
+        // refusal of the builder's rank over protected paths — not a verdict on
+        // the code. Named here so clients render it as a wall, not a quality
+        // FAIL the builder should fix-and-retry (the envelope used to teach
+        // exactly that wrong lesson). route_rank stays a code finding.
+        authorization_refusal: guardsTripped.some((g) => g.guard === 'permission_path'),
       },
     },
     notes_md: `${base.notes_md || ''}${guardNote}`,

package/modules/lifecycle/routes/done-when.js

@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ const { validateOrRespond, parseId, asyncHandler, LIMITS } = api;
 // pinned by a DB-free unit test (the authorizeGoalTaskCreate precedent in
 // routes/goals.js). The route resolves goal/version first — their absence is a
 // 404/400 there — so this gate only decides AUTHORITY, in this order:
-//   archon → allow · goal named? · owner|manager? (MASKED) · goal open? · version open?
-// Authority sits ahead of both state checks on purpose — see the no-leak note below.
-// An Archon short-circuits: version-level (goal-less) criteria and any goal in any
-// state stay theirs. Returns { ok:true }, { ok:false, status, body }, or
-// { ok:false, maskAsBadGoalId:true } (the route renders the identical 400).
+//   archon → allow · goal named? · owner|manager? (403) · goal open? · version open?
+// Authority sits ahead of both state checks on purpose — an outsider never learns
+// goal state from the 409s below. An Archon short-circuits: version-level
+// (goal-less) criteria and any goal in any state stay theirs. Returns
+// { ok:true } or { ok:false, status, body }.
 //
 // "Version open" = `planning` or `building`. NOT just `building`: a planning session
 // scopes a version at status='planning', which is the main moment criteria get
@@ -47,16 +47,18 @@ function authorizeCriterionCreate({ goal, version, actorId, actorRank, actorMemb
       message: 'Name the goal this criterion belongs to — a version-level criterion is Archon-only (ADR 0154).',
     } };
   }
-  // NO-LEAK ORDERING — authority BEFORE state, and the refusal is MASKED.
-  // Before ADR 0154 this route was Archon-only, and an Archon can already read
-  // every goal, so no probe existed. Now a Metic may call it, and distinguishable
-  // refusals (400 "no such goal" vs 403 "not yours" vs 409 "not open") would turn
-  // it into an oracle for which goal ids exist on a version — including PRIVATE
-  // goals (ADR 0112). So a caller who is not the owner/manager gets byte-identical
-  // `bad_goal_id` to a caller naming a goal that does not exist. Only someone who
-  // already holds the goal learns anything further about it.
+  // Authority BEFORE state (an outsider still never sees goal state via the 409
+  // below). Until task 1002614 the refusal here was MASKED behind the same
+  // `bad_goal_id` 400 as an absent goal, as an anti-oracle for goal ids (ADR
+  // 0112). The mask asserted a falsehood about a goal that exists and bought no
+  // secrecy: ADR 0112 privacy is join-gating, not read-hiding — GET /goals/:id
+  // serves any authenticated builder the goal, its members, criteria and state
+  // (choke-point map D-3). So the refusal now names its wall.
   if (!isGoalOwnerOrManager({ goal, actorId, actorRank, actorMembership })) {
-    return { ok: false, maskAsBadGoalId: true };
+    return { ok: false, status: 403, body: {
+      error: 'goal_not_yours',
+      message: `Criteria on goal ${goal.id} can be authored only by the goal's owner or a manager (ADR 0154). Ask them to add it — or to grant you the manager role.`,
+    } };
   }
   if (goal.status !== 'open') {
     return { ok: false, status: 409, body: {
@@ -112,8 +114,9 @@ module.exports = function buildDoneWhenRouter() {
   //     must be that goal's OWNER or MANAGER (isGoalOwnerOrManager — the same
   //     predicate behind visibility/invite/role management), and the goal must be
   //     open on a planning/building version. That bounds the blast radius to a
-  //     workspace they already hold. An unauthorized caller is masked behind
-  //     bad_goal_id so the route is not an existence oracle (ADR 0112).
+  //     workspace they already hold. An unauthorized caller gets an honest 403
+  //     goal_not_yours (task 1002614 — goal reads are open to any builder, so
+  //     there is no existence oracle for a mask to protect).
   // Pinned in route-rank-check.MODULE_EXPECTED_RANKS.
   // rank: metic+archon — criterion create, walled by goal ownership (ADR 0154).
   router.post('/versions/:id/done-when', auth.requireBuilder, auth.requirePermission('criterion.create'), asyncHandler('POST /versions/:id/done-when', async (req, res) => {
@@ -127,9 +130,9 @@ module.exports = function buildDoneWhenRouter() {
     })) return;
     const version = await db.getVersion(versionId);
     if (!version) return res.fail('version_not_found', { status: 404, message: `No version '${versionId}'.` });
-    // The ONE bad_goal_id refusal, used both for a genuinely absent/foreign goal
-    // and for the masked unauthorized case below — same code, same message, same
-    // envelope, so the two are indistinguishable on the wire.
+    // bad_goal_id now means exactly what it says: the goal is absent or belongs
+    // to another version. (The unauthorized case rendered through this same
+    // helper until task 1002614 — see the mask note in authorizeCriterionCreate.)
     const badGoalId = () => res.fail('bad_goal_id', { status: 400, message: `goal_id ${req.body.goal_id} does not exist on version '${versionId}'.` });
     // A goal_id, if given, must exist AND belong to this version.
     let goal = null;
@@ -148,7 +151,6 @@ module.exports = function buildDoneWhenRouter() {
       goal, version, actorId: req.builder.id, actorRank: req.builder.rank, actorMembership,
     });
     if (!decision.ok) {
-      if (decision.maskAsBadGoalId) return badGoalId();
       return res.status(decision.status).json(decision.body);
     }
     try {

package/modules/lifecycle/routes/tasks.js

@@ -129,6 +129,15 @@ async function gateTaskOwnership(req, res, taskId, { allowSupervisor = false } =
   if (allowSupervisor && rank === 'metic') return true;
   const holder = await db.getLastClaimHolder(taskId);
   if (holder && String(holder.builder_id) === String(req.builder.id)) return true;
+  // task 1002614 (map N-2): a mistyped id used to earn the same not_your_task
+  // 403 as someone else's work — a misattribution that sent builders debugging
+  // ownership. An ABSENT task is the clean 404 an Archon already saw (they pass
+  // above and hit the handler's own lookup). A never-claimed task that EXISTS
+  // still fails closed with the 403 below (the L2 credit-theft block).
+  if (!holder && !(await db.getTask(taskId))) {
+    res.fail('task_not_found', 404);
+    return false;
+  }
   res.fail('not_your_task', { status: 403, message: 'Only the task\'s claim holder (or an Archon) may grade/confirm/ship it.' });
   return false;
 }
@@ -764,6 +773,11 @@ module.exports = function buildTasksRouter() {
       xenos_claimable: { type: 'boolean' },              // pre-rename alias for newcomer_friendly
       security_sensitive: { type: 'boolean' },           // task 990 — Archon-only ship broadcast
       automation_tag: { type: 'string', maxLength: 64 },
+      // task 1002614 (map D-18): DECLARED so strict-mode admits the request far
+      // enough to reach the deliberate status_not_patchable hint below (#514) —
+      // the hint had been unreachable dead code behind unknown_field since the
+      // R11 strict-validation sweep landed after it.
+      status: {},
     })) return;
     const id = parseId(req, res, { code: 'bad_task_id', positiveInt: true });
     if (id === null) return;

package/package-lock.json

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "@bongos/core",
-  "version": "1.19.22",
+  "version": "1.19.23",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "@bongos/core",
-      "version": "1.19.22",
+      "version": "1.19.23",
       "license": "AGPL-3.0-or-later",
       "dependencies": {
         "express": "^4.21.2",

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@bongos/core",
-  "version": "1.19.22",
+  "version": "1.19.23",
   "description": "Cloud Bongos — the AI-first build platform core (GDS + platform surfaces + module system), installed as a versioned dependency (ADR 0108).",
   "license": "AGPL-3.0-or-later",
   "main": "src/platform-server.js",

package/scripts/gds/ship.js

@@ -2776,6 +2776,36 @@ function formatGradeOutcome(g, taskId) {
     return out.join('\n');
   }
 
+  // task 1002614 (map P-2): a protected-path refusal used to render as an
+  // ordinary quality FAIL — "fix the issues and --regrade" — although no rank of
+  // the builder's can land that diff. Present it as the authorization wall it is
+  // (the #943 grader-unavailable branch is the precedent for a distinct shape).
+  // Keyed off the guard name so it also reads grades from servers predating the
+  // authorization_refusal marker.
+  const guardTripped = g.signals?.server_guard?.tripped || [];
+  const permRefusal = g.signals?.server_guard?.authorization_refusal === true
+    || guardTripped.some((t) => t.guard === 'permission_path');
+  if (!g.passed && permRefusal) {
+    out.push('');
+    out.push('Subagent grade: REFUSED (authorization)  ·  not a quality verdict — your work was not judged and rejected');
+    out.push('');
+    out.push('The committed diff touches PROTECTED surfaces above your rank, so the server');
+    out.push('refused to accept it — no re-attempt at your rank can land this diff as-is.');
+    if ((g.issues || []).length > 0) {
+      out.push('');
+      out.push('What was refused (file · rule):');
+      for (const it of g.issues.filter((i) => String(i.worker || '').includes('permission-path'))) {
+        out.push(`  ${it.file || '?'} — ${it.summary || ''}`);
+      }
+    }
+    out.push('');
+    out.push('Ways forward:');
+    out.push('  - Split the protected files out of your diff and re-ship the rest, or');
+    out.push('  - hand this task to a builder at/above the floor the refusal names.');
+    out.push(`(--regrade re-runs the same server check and will refuse again unless the diff changes.)`);
+    return out.join('\n');
+  }
+
   const verdict = g.passed ? 'PASS' : 'FAIL';
   out.push('');
   out.push(`Subagent grade: ${verdict}  ·  blended ${g.score}/10  ·  threshold ${g.threshold} (both axes)`);

package/src/module-api.js

@@ -471,8 +471,10 @@ const { validateOrRespond, LIMITS, parseId, asyncHandler, corsPublicGet, parsePa
 //         landed since 1.19.20 with no explicit bump. run 31446766597. (task 1002620)
 //   1.19.22 — CI auto-patch (publish-on-merge, ADR 0161): carrier for merges
 //         landed since 1.19.21 with no explicit bump. run 31449168428. (task 1002620)
+//   1.19.23 — CI auto-patch (publish-on-merge, ADR 0161): carrier for merges
+//         landed since 1.19.22 with no explicit bump. run 31450197816. (task 1002620)
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-const CORE_VERSION = '1.19.22'; // CI auto-patch carrier (ADR 0161); see changelog above
+const CORE_VERSION = '1.19.23'; // CI auto-patch carrier (ADR 0161); see changelog above
 
 // A namespaced logger so a module's log lines are attributable + consistent.
 // Usage: const log = api.logger('dev-box'); log.info('mounted');

package/tests/criterion_authoring_gate.mjs

@@ -84,13 +84,15 @@ await test('a non-Archon with NO goal_id is refused — version-level criteria s
 await test('a plain MEMBER may not author — membership is not management', () => {
   const d = ask({ goal: G_OPEN, actorId: MEMBER, actorMembership: PLAIN });
   assert.equal(d.ok, false);
-  assert.equal(d.maskAsBadGoalId, true);
+  assert.equal(d.status, 403);
+  assert.equal(d.body.error, 'goal_not_yours');
 });
 
 await test('a STRANGER (no membership at all) may not author', () => {
   const d = ask({ goal: G_OPEN, actorId: STRANGER, actorMembership: null });
   assert.equal(d.ok, false);
-  assert.equal(d.maskAsBadGoalId, true);
+  assert.equal(d.status, 403);
+  assert.equal(d.body.error, 'goal_not_yours');
 });
 
 await test('an ACHIEVED goal is closed to new criteria (409) — no reopening settled scope', () => {
@@ -107,38 +109,43 @@ await test('an ARCHIVED goal is closed to new criteria (409)', () => {
   assert.equal(d.body.error, 'goal_not_open');
 });
 
-// ---- NO-LEAK: the route must not become a goal-existence oracle (ADR 0112) ----
-// Before ADR 0154 this route was Archon-only and Archons read every goal, so no
-// probe existed. Now a Metic may call it — so an unauthorized caller must not be
-// able to tell "this goal id exists but isn't mine" from "no such goal".
+// ---- the refusal is HONEST (task 1002614, map D-3) ----
+// Until task 1002614 an unauthorized caller was MASKED behind the same
+// bad_goal_id 400 as an absent goal, as an anti-oracle for goal ids (ADR 0112).
+// The mask asserted a falsehood about a goal that exists and protected nothing:
+// ADR 0112 privacy is join-gating, not read-hiding — GET /goals/:id serves any
+// authenticated builder the goal, members, criteria and state. So the refusal
+// now names its wall, and these pins hold it honest.
 
-await test('an unauthorized caller is MASKED — no status/body of its own to compare', () => {
+await test('an unauthorized caller gets an honest 403 naming the wall — not a false bad_goal_id', () => {
   const d = ask({ goal: G_OPEN, actorId: STRANGER, actorMembership: null });
-  assert.equal(d.maskAsBadGoalId, true);
-  assert.equal(d.status, undefined, 'the gate must not pick a distinguishable status');
-  assert.equal(d.body, undefined, 'the route renders the identical bad_goal_id 400');
+  assert.equal(d.status, 403);
+  assert.equal(d.body.error, 'goal_not_yours');
+  assert.match(d.body.message, /owner or a manager/, 'the refusal names who CAN author');
+  assert.match(d.body.message, /ADR 0154/, 'and where the rule comes from');
 });
 
-await test('the mask is IDENTICAL across every unauthorized shape — open, achieved, archived, private-ish', () => {
+await test('the refusal is uniform across goal states — authority still precedes state', () => {
+  // A stranger probing open/achieved/archived/system goals sees the SAME 403 —
+  // goal state stays behind the authority wall on this route (it is readable via
+  // GET /goals/:id, but this write route does not volunteer it).
   const probes = [G_OPEN, G_ACHIEVED, G_ARCHIVED, G_SYSTEM].map((goal) =>
     ask({ goal, actorId: STRANGER, actorMembership: null }));
-  for (const d of probes) assert.deepEqual(d, { ok: false, maskAsBadGoalId: true });
-  // A goal's STATE must not leak either: an outsider cannot learn that a goal id
-  // exists-but-is-archived, which `goal_not_open` would have told them.
-  assert.equal(new Set(probes.map((d) => JSON.stringify(d))).size, 1);
+  for (const d of probes) {
+    assert.equal(d.status, 403);
+    assert.equal(d.body.error, 'goal_not_yours');
+  }
 });
 
-await test('authority is checked BEFORE goal state — the ordering that makes the mask total', () => {
-  // An owner on an archived goal DOES get goal_not_open (useful, and they already
-  // know the goal exists). A stranger on the same goal gets the mask instead.
+await test('authority is checked BEFORE goal state — an owner sees goal_not_open, a stranger never does', () => {
   assert.equal(ask({ goal: G_ARCHIVED, actorId: OWNER, actorMembership: LEAD }).body.error, 'goal_not_open');
-  assert.equal(ask({ goal: G_ARCHIVED, actorId: STRANGER, actorMembership: null }).maskAsBadGoalId, true);
+  assert.equal(ask({ goal: G_ARCHIVED, actorId: STRANGER, actorMembership: null }).body.error, 'goal_not_yours');
 });
 
-await test('the route renders the mask through the SAME bad_goal_id helper as a truly absent goal', () => {
-  assert.match(doneWhenSrc, /const badGoalId = \(\) => res\.fail\('bad_goal_id'/, 'one helper builds the refusal');
+await test('bad_goal_id now means exactly what it says — the mask branch is gone from the route', () => {
+  assert.match(doneWhenSrc, /const badGoalId = \(\) => res\.fail\('bad_goal_id'/, 'one helper builds the absent/foreign refusal');
   assert.match(doneWhenSrc, /if \(!goal \|\| String\(goal\.version_id\) !== String\(versionId\)\) return badGoalId\(\);/, 'absent/foreign goal path');
-  assert.match(doneWhenSrc, /if \(decision\.maskAsBadGoalId\) return badGoalId\(\);/, 'masked path — same helper, so same code+message+envelope');
+  assert.doesNotMatch(doneWhenSrc, /maskAsBadGoalId/, 'no code path renders an authorization refusal as bad_goal_id');
 });
 
 await test('a SHIPPED version is refused (409) — closed scope', () => {
@@ -171,7 +178,7 @@ await test('a PLANNING version is ALLOWED — that is when criteria get written'
 await test('a system goal (created_by NULL) has no owner — a Metic cannot claim it', () => {
   const d = ask({ goal: G_SYSTEM, actorId: OWNER, actorMembership: null });
   assert.equal(d.ok, false);
-  assert.equal(d.maskAsBadGoalId, true);
+  assert.equal(d.body.error, 'goal_not_yours');
   // ...but a manager row still admits, and an Archon always does (below).
   assert.equal(ask({ goal: G_SYSTEM, actorId: OWNER, actorMembership: LEAD }).ok, true);
 });
@@ -215,7 +222,7 @@ await test('ordering: goal_id_required precedes the version check', () => {
 
 await test('ordering: an unauthorized caller never reaches the goal-state branch', () => {
   const d = ask({ goal: G_ARCHIVED, actorId: STRANGER, actorMembership: null });
-  assert.equal(d.maskAsBadGoalId, true, 'goal_not_open would confirm the goal exists');
+  assert.equal(d.body.error, 'goal_not_yours', 'the refusal is the authority wall, never goal_not_open');
 });
 
 // ---- the wall is the SAME one the sibling goal routes use ----

package/tests/grade_server_authoritative.mjs

@@ -106,6 +106,11 @@ await test('sub-Metic forged PASS touching protected path → hard FAIL', () =>
   assert.equal(g.signals.confidence, 0, 'fail forwards confidence 0 so the server gate also fails');
   assert.ok(g.signals.server_guard.tripped.some((t) => t.guard === 'permission_path'));
   assert.ok(g.issues.some((i) => i.worker === 'server-permission-path'));
+  // task 1002614 (map P-2): this FAIL is an AUTHORIZATION refusal, and the
+  // envelope must say so — a quality-verdict shape taught builders to
+  // fix-and-retry a diff no rank of theirs can land.
+  assert.equal(g.signals.server_guard.authorization_refusal, true,
+    'a permission_path trip is named an authorization refusal, not a quality verdict');
 });
 
 await test('xenos forged PASS touching migrations/ → hard FAIL', () => {
@@ -129,6 +134,8 @@ await test('route-rank hard-fail (forged routes dir) flips a client PASS to FAIL
     assert.equal(g.passed, false, 'an ungated write route in the audited routes hard-fails the grade');
     assert.equal(g.signals.server_guard.downgraded_to, 'fail');
     assert.ok(g.signals.server_guard.tripped.some((t) => t.guard === 'route_rank'));
+    assert.equal(g.signals.server_guard.authorization_refusal, false,
+      'route_rank is a CODE finding — only permission_path is an authorization refusal (task 1002614)');
   } finally {
     fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
   }

package/tests/grade_unavailable_display.mjs

@@ -50,6 +50,34 @@ test('a real FAIL still prints the FAIL block + fix-the-issues guidance (#943 re
   assert.doesNotMatch(out, /GRADER UNAVAILABLE/);
 });
 
+test('an authorization refusal (permission_path guard) → REFUSED, not a quality FAIL (task 1002614 / P-2)', () => {
+  // The server guard refused a sub-Metic diff over protected paths. The old
+  // rendering was a plain FAIL + "fix the issues" — teaching a re-attempt no
+  // rank of the builder's could ever land.
+  const g = {
+    passed: false, score: 0, threshold: 6, notes_md: '',
+    issues: [{ severity: 'blocker', file: 'migrations/099_x.sql',
+      summary: '[server permission-path] protected surface — an Archon must own it', worker: 'server-permission-path' }],
+    signals: { server_guard: { downgraded_to: 'fail', authorization_refusal: true,
+      tripped: [{ guard: 'permission_path', severity: 'blocker', summary: 'protected machinery' }] } },
+  };
+  const out = formatGradeOutcome(g, 1002614);
+  assert.match(out, /REFUSED \(authorization\)/, 'must label the outcome as an authorization refusal');
+  assert.match(out, /not a quality verdict/, 'must say the work was not judged and rejected');
+  assert.match(out, /migrations\/099_x\.sql/, 'names the refused file');
+  assert.doesNotMatch(out, /Fix the issues above/, 'must NOT teach fix-and-retry against a wall');
+  assert.doesNotMatch(out, /blended .*\/10/, 'a refusal is not a score');
+});
+
+test('the guard-name fallback also triggers the refusal shape (grades from pre-marker servers)', () => {
+  const g = {
+    passed: false, score: 0, threshold: 6, issues: [],
+    signals: { server_guard: { tripped: [{ guard: 'permission_path' }] } },
+  };
+  const out = formatGradeOutcome(g, 1);
+  assert.match(out, /REFUSED \(authorization\)/);
+});
+
 test('a PASS prints the PASS block, no failure guidance (#943 regression guard)', () => {
   const g = {
     passed: true, score: 9, threshold: 6,

package/tests/override_request_ownership.mjs

@@ -71,8 +71,12 @@ const TASK = { id: 996, title: 'fixture task', credits_reward: 15, kind: 'featur
 // ===========================================================================
 
 const savedGetLastClaimHolder = db.getLastClaimHolder;
-function stubHolder(holderId) {
+const savedGetTask = db.getTask;
+// taskExists backs the N-2 absent-task 404 (task 1002614): the gate consults
+// db.getTask only when no claim holder exists.
+function stubHolder(holderId, { taskExists = true } = {}) {
   db.getLastClaimHolder = async () => (holderId == null ? null : { builder_id: holderId });
+  db.getTask = async () => (taskExists ? { id: TASK.id } : undefined);
 }
 function mkReq(id, rank) {
   return { builder: { id, rank, github_login: `b${id}` } };
@@ -133,9 +137,10 @@ await test('gate (L2): an Archon may still file an override-request on a never-c
   assert.equal(res.statusCode, null);
 });
 
-// Restore the real lookup before the attribution layer (which uses the deps.pool
-// seam and never touches getLastClaimHolder).
+// Restore the real lookups before the attribution layer (which uses the deps.pool
+// seam and never touches getLastClaimHolder/getTask).
 db.getLastClaimHolder = savedGetLastClaimHolder;
+db.getTask = savedGetTask;
 
 // ===========================================================================
 // Layer 2 — on approval, credit + tasks.shipped_by go to the CLAIM HOLDER.

package/tests/task_ownership_gate.mjs

@@ -41,8 +41,12 @@ const WORKER = 25;   // the claim holder who did the work
 const OTHER = 99;    // an unrelated builder
 
 // Stub the claim-holder lookup. holderId === null → no claim on record.
-function stubHolder(holderId) {
+// taskExists backs the N-2 absent-task 404 (task 1002614): the gate consults
+// db.getTask only when no claim holder exists, to tell a mistyped id from a
+// never-claimed task.
+function stubHolder(holderId, { taskExists = true } = {}) {
   db.getLastClaimHolder = async () => (holderId == null ? null : { builder_id: holderId });
+  db.getTask = async () => (taskExists ? { id: 123 } : undefined);
 }
 
 function mkReq(id, rank) {
@@ -108,6 +112,27 @@ await test('L2: a never-claimed task FAILS CLOSED for a non-Archon (the bypass-c
   assert.equal(res.body.error.code, 'not_your_task');
 });
 
+await test('N-2 (task 1002614): a NONEXISTENT task id is a clean 404, not not_your_task', async () => {
+  // A sub-Metic who mistypes an id used to be told the task was not theirs —
+  // the same 403 as someone else's task — while an Archon saw a clean 404.
+  stubHolder(null, { taskExists: false });
+  const res = mkRes();
+  assert.equal(await gateTaskOwnership(mkReq(OTHER, 'thetes'), res, 999999), false);
+  assert.equal(res.statusCode, 404);
+  assert.equal(res.body.error.code, 'task_not_found');
+});
+
+await test('N-2: the 404 never overrides ownership — someone ELSE\'s task stays 403 even if getTask errs', async () => {
+  // The existence lookup runs ONLY when no claim holder exists: with a holder
+  // on record the gate must answer not_your_task without consulting getTask.
+  db.getLastClaimHolder = async () => ({ builder_id: WORKER });
+  db.getTask = async () => { throw new Error('must not be called when a holder exists'); };
+  const res = mkRes();
+  assert.equal(await gateTaskOwnership(mkReq(OTHER, 'thetes'), res, 123), false);
+  assert.equal(res.statusCode, 403);
+  assert.equal(res.body.error.code, 'not_your_task');
+});
+
 await test('L2: a never-claimed task is still landable by an Archon (legit /confirm /grade path)', async () => {
   stubHolder(null);
   const res = mkRes();