@bobfrankston/rmfmail 1.2.287 → 1.2.288
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.commitmsg +24 -28
- package/client/android-bootstrap.bundle.js +21 -5
- package/client/android-bootstrap.bundle.js.map +2 -2
- package/client/app.bundle.js.map +1 -1
- package/client/compose/compose.bundle.js +63 -1
- package/client/compose/compose.bundle.js.map +3 -3
- package/client/lib/rmf-tiny.js +85 -0
- package/npmchanges.md +36 -0
- package/package.json +3 -3
- package/packages/mailx-imap/package-lock.json +2 -2
- package/packages/mailx-imap/package.json +1 -1
- package/packages/mailx-settings/package.json +1 -1
- package/packages/mailx-store/package.json +1 -1
- package/packages/mailx-store-web/package.json +1 -1
- package/packages/mailx-types/package.json +1 -1
- package/packages/mailx-types/trust.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/packages/mailx-types/trust.js +43 -4
- package/packages/mailx-types/trust.js.map +1 -1
- package/packages/mailx-types/trust.ts +50 -5
- /package/packages/mailx-imap/{node_modules.npmglobalize-stash-38644 → node_modules.npmglobalize-stash-39836}/.package-lock.json +0 -0
package/.commitmsg
CHANGED
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@@ -1,33 +1,29 @@
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Trust: a message that never crossed a trust boundary proves itself
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Bob 2026-08-27, on his own reply to John Levine about spam handling: "why is
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my own mail spam". It carried no Authentication-Results at all — his own
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authenticated submission never left his systems, so nothing added one — and
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`proved` therefore came back false, dropping it to a caution banner that told
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him not to open the links in prose he had just written. What flagged it was
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`URIBL_DBL_SPAM` 8.0 on blueorchestra.org: the domain he was QUOTING, in a
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discussion about spam. Guilt by association at its purest.
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came back as an error suggesting a word he did not write. Disabled in the
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daemon next to AvoidCurses — same objection as that one: the tool
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proofreads, it does not get a vote on word choice. Its siblings (MergeWords,
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MakeupCompoundNoun, OvertimeCompoundNoun, ThereAfterCompound,
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EasyGoingCompoundAdjective) are named in a comment there, one line each to
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turn off if they start nagging.
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SpamAssassin states two proofs in its own rule list that such mail carries
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instead of an AR header:
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the first word of the next: "…of the network" + "To: x@y.com" reached Harper
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as "networkTo", and it reported — correctly, for the string it was given —
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that the word should be split. The span then covered a junction that on
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screen is two empty lines, and getClientRects painted a full-width underline
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over the whitespace. Verified both halves against the real engine: gluing
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produces `networkTo` and `FrankstonSubject` lints that vanish once the
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breaks are there. blockText now emits "\n" at every line-breaking element,
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and spanToRange refuses any span whose ends sit in different line boxes, so
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no squiggle can ever be drawn across a paragraph boundary again.
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ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP
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DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain
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DKIM_VALID_AU is the same evidence DMARC alignment rests on — the author
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domain signed it and the signature verified — so it proves the From line on
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its own. ALL_TRUSTED says nothing untrusted handled the message in transit.
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`proved` now comes from any of the three, and `provedBy` names which, so the
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banner says WHICH proof rather than asserting DMARC that isn't there. His
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message is now a grey note: "…but bob.ma proved it sent this. Valid signature
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from bob.ma, the sending domain itself (DKIM_VALID_AU)."
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Forgery still outranks proof — across the store the danger count is unchanged
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at 294 of 1,131 flagged; caution 599, quiet 238.
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Also: the Insert menu gains Blockquote and Quoted text (paste) — rmf-tiny
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0.1.53, see its .commitmsg.
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@@ -2309,6 +2309,9 @@ function analyzeServerSpam(input) {
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const scored = (r) => !(r.score <= 0);
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const present = (cls) => rules.some((r) => r.cls === cls && scored(r));
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const kind = dmarc.authFailures.length || present("forgery") ? "forgery" : present("association") ? "association" : present("other") ? "unclassified" : rules.length ? "bulk" : "unclassified";
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const has = (name) => rules.some((r) => r.name === name);
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const provedBy = dmarc.pass ? "dmarc" : has("DKIM_VALID_AU") ? "dkim" : has("ALL_TRUSTED") ? "trusted" : "";
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const fromDomain = (bare(input.fromAddress).split("@")[1] || "").toLowerCase();
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const reasons = rules.filter((r) => r.cls !== "neutral" && scored(r)).sort((a, b) => (b.score || 0) - (a.score || 0)).slice(0, 3).map((r) => {
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const num = Number.isFinite(r.score) ? `${r.score.toFixed(1)} ` : "";
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return r.description ? `${num}${r.name} (${r.description})` : `${num}${r.name}`;
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@@ -2319,14 +2322,27 @@ function analyzeServerSpam(input) {
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flagged,
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rules,
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kind,
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proved:
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proved: !!provedBy,
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provedBy,
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provedDomain: dmarc.domain || fromDomain,
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provedPolicy: dmarc.policy,
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bayesHam: rules.some((r) => r.name === "BAYES_00" || r.name === "BAYES_01"),
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authFailures: dmarc.authFailures,
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reasons
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};
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}
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function provedNote(a) {
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switch (a.provedBy) {
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case "dmarc":
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return `DMARC pass, aligned${a.provedPolicy ? `, policy ${a.provedPolicy}` : ""}.`;
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case "dkim":
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return `Valid signature from ${a.provedDomain}, the sending domain itself (DKIM_VALID_AU).`;
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case "trusted":
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return "It passed through trusted hosts only (ALL_TRUSTED) \u2014 nothing untrusted handled it.";
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default:
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return "";
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}
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}
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function serverSpamVerdict(input) {
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const a = analyzeServerSpam(input);
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if (!a || !a.flagged)
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@@ -2345,8 +2361,8 @@ function serverSpamVerdict(input) {
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return {
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id: "server-spam-verdict",
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severity: "info",
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text: `Your mail server scored this as spam, but ${a.provedDomain} proved it sent this.`,
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detail:
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text: a.provedBy === "trusted" ? "Your mail server scored this as spam, but it reached you without leaving your own systems." : `Your mail server scored this as spam, but ${a.provedDomain} proved it sent this.`,
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detail: `${provedNote(a)} ${numbers}${why}${bayes}`
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};
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if (a.kind === "bulk")
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return {
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text: "Your mail server rates this bulk mail \u2014 nothing that scored tests who sent it.",
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detail: `${numbers}${why}${bayes}`
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};
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const proof = a.proved ? `${a
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const proof = a.proved ? `${provedNote(a)} ` : "";
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return {
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id: "server-spam-verdict",
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severity: "caution",
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