@bobfrankston/mailx-types 0.1.98 → 0.1.100

package/mailx-api.d.ts

@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ export interface MailxApi {
         color: string;
         primary: boolean;
         accessRole?: string;
+        selected?: boolean;
     }>>;
     createCalendarEvent(ev: any): Promise<{
         uuid: string;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@bobfrankston/mailx-types",
-  "version": "0.1.98",
+  "version": "0.1.100",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "index.js",
   "types": "index.d.ts",

package/trust.d.ts

@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ export interface TrustFinding {
      *  viewer can offer to trust the sender when that relay signs for it
      *  (allowlist.jsonc `trustedSendersVia`). (2026-09-10) */
     senderVia?: string;
+    /** The proved sender domain whose trust would clear this finding — set
+     *  on a redirector warning when the sender is proved but not yet on the
+     *  reader's list, so the viewer can offer "Stop warning about". (2026-09-11) */
+    sender?: string;
 }
 export interface TrustInput {
     /** Every header line, in order, as mailparser's `headerLines`. Repeated

package/trust.js

@@ -847,6 +847,19 @@ function provedSenderDomain(input) {
 function redirectorLink(input) {
     const bodyHtml = input.bodyHtml || "";
     const senderDomain = provedSenderDomain(input);
+    // 5. (2026-09-11) The proved sender is one the reader trusts. The
+    //    finding's own words were "only the sender could vouch for the
+    //    link" — and the reader has vouched for the sender. A Toast receipt
+    //    (dmarc=pass toasttab.com, toasttab.com on Bob's list) links through
+    //    toasttakeout.page.link, Firebase's per-app redirector, to
+    //    toasttakeout.com: two organisations by hostname, nobody signed for
+    //    page.link, the sender is neither — rules 1 to 4 all miss, and
+    //    Bob: "I trust toasttakeout.com. There should be a trust button."
+    //    Trust counts only with proof, as everywhere else: without the
+    //    server's pass the list would be a switch a forger flips by typing a
+    //    trusted domain into From.
+    if (senderDomain && input.senderTrusted)
+        return null;
     // 3. (2026-09-08) The redirector belongs to a reader-listed intermediary
     //    that provably handled the message. Google Calendar wraps every link
     //    in an invitation as google.com/url?q=…, signs the mail d=google.com,
@@ -891,13 +904,16 @@ function redirectorLink(input) {
             // Which party, and how — or why there is no party (Bob 2026-09-08).
             const how = signer
                 ? ` ${signer} signed this message; "Trust ${signer} as an intermediary" stops this warning for links through ${signer} in mail it signs.`
-                : ` Nobody signed this message for ${url.hostname}, so there is no intermediary to trust; only the sender could vouch for the link.`;
+                : senderDomain
+                    ? ` Nobody signed this message for ${url.hostname}, so there is no intermediary to trust; ${senderDomain} proved it sent this, and "Stop warning about *@${senderDomain}" lets it vouch for its own links.`
+                    : ` Nobody signed this message for ${url.hostname}, so there is no intermediary to trust; only the sender could vouch for the link, and nothing proves who the sender is.`;
             return {
                 id: "redirector-link",
                 severity: "caution",
                 text: `A link hides where it goes: it passes through ${url.hostname} and ends at ${target.hostname}.`,
                 detail: `${url.hostname} -> ${target.hostname}.${how}`,
                 ...(signer ? { via: signer } : {}),
+                ...(senderDomain && !signer ? { sender: senderDomain } : {}),
             };
         }
     }