@bnbagent/studio-cli 0.0.6-alpha.6 → 0.0.6-alpha.7

package/dist/bag.js

@@ -4284,6 +4284,7 @@ import {
 import { getNetwork as getNetwork4 } from "@bnbagent/studio-runtime/networks";
 import * as pieverseRt from "@bnbagent/studio-runtime/pieverse";
 import {
+  PieverseKeyNotFoundError,
   PieversePolicy,
   RetryPolicy,
   allocateWithSettleRetry,
@@ -4417,7 +4418,10 @@ function registerLlm(program) {
   ).option(
     "--network <name>",
     "Override [llm.pieverse].network (e.g. bsc-mainnet, bsc-testnet)."
-  ).option("--name <name>", "Key name (default: bnbagent-studio-default).").action(
+  ).option("--name <name>", "Key name (default: bnbagent-studio-default).").option(
+    "--replace",
+    "Ignore any existing key and mint a fresh one, overwriting PIEVERSE_LLM_API_KEY in .studio/.env.local. Use when the key you inherited (e.g. from a shared env file) no longer exists in Pieverse. The old key is left untouched on the Pieverse side."
+  ).action(
     act(
       (opts) => cmdActivate(opts)
     )
@@ -4626,9 +4630,20 @@ async function cmdActivate(opts) {
     return 2;
   }
   const pvCfg = loadPieverseConfig(cfg);
-  let existingHash = pvCfg.key_hash ? String(pvCfg.key_hash) : null;
-  const envFileValue = getEnvVar(envLocalPath9(root), PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY);
-  const existingEnv = envFileValue || process.env[PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY];
+  const replace = opts.replace === true;
+  let existingHash = !replace && pvCfg.key_hash ? String(pvCfg.key_hash) : null;
+  const envFileValue = replace ? null : getEnvVar(envLocalPath9(root), PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY);
+  const existingEnv = replace ? null : envFileValue || process.env[PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY];
+  if (replace) {
+    printOut(
+      `\u2192 --replace: ignoring any existing ${PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY} and minting a fresh key\u2026`
+    );
+    if (process.env[PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY]) {
+      printErr(
+        `warning: ${PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY} is also exported in this shell. The new key goes to .studio/.env.local, which \`bag\` prefers, but \`unset ${PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY}\` to keep the two from diverging.`
+      );
+    }
+  }
   if (!existingHash && existingEnv) {
     const derivedHash = pieverseKeyHash(existingEnv);
     printOut(
@@ -4637,15 +4652,24 @@ async function cmdActivate(opts) {
     try {
       await withSiweRetry(wallet, (token) => inspectKey(token, derivedHash));
     } catch (exc) {
+      if (!(exc instanceof PieverseKeyNotFoundError)) {
+        printErr(
+          `error: could not verify the existing ${PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY} against Pieverse: ${errMessage(
+            exc
+          )}
+The existing key was kept and no new key was created. This looks like a transport or login failure rather than a missing key \u2014 retry \`bag llm activate\` once Pieverse is reachable.`
+        );
+        return 2;
+      }
       const sources = [
         envFileValue ? `.studio/.env.local (a ${PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY}= line)` : "",
         process.env[PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY] ? "the shell environment" : ""
       ].filter(Boolean).join(" and ");
       printErr(
-        `error: ${PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY} already exists but its derived key_hash could not be verified: ${errMessage(
+        `error: ${PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY} already exists but Pieverse does not know its key_hash: ${errMessage(
           exc
         )}
-The existing key was kept and no new key was created. The key comes from ${sources}; \`bag\` reads both, so clear every source \u2014 remove the ${PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY}= line from .studio/.env.local AND \`unset ${PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY}\` in the shell \u2014 then re-run \`bag llm activate\` to mint a fresh key. (\`bag llm rotate\` replaces a key that is still valid in Pieverse; it cannot recover this one.)`
+The existing key was kept and no new key was created. The key comes from ${sources}. Re-run \`bag llm activate --replace\` to mint a fresh key and overwrite .studio/.env.local (then \`unset ${PIEVERSE_ENV_KEY}\` if you also exported it in this shell). (\`bag llm rotate\` replaces a key that is still valid in Pieverse; it cannot recover this one.)`
       );
       return 2;
     }
@@ -11366,6 +11390,84 @@ async function checkAwsTargetsPopulated(root, target) {
     }
   ];
 }
+var AGENTCORE_AGENT_QUOTA_CODE = "L-F4575653";
+function awsJson(stdout) {
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(stdout);
+    return parsed !== null && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+async function checkAgentcoreQuotaHeadroom(root, target) {
+  if (target !== "agentcore") {
+    return [];
+  }
+  const [, region] = readAwsTarget(root);
+  if (!region || !await whichBin("aws")) {
+    return [];
+  }
+  const quotaRes = await runCapture("aws", [
+    "service-quotas",
+    "get-service-quota",
+    "--service-code",
+    "bedrock-agentcore",
+    "--quota-code",
+    AGENTCORE_AGENT_QUOTA_CODE,
+    "--region",
+    region,
+    "--output",
+    "json"
+  ]);
+  if (quotaRes.code !== 0) {
+    return [];
+  }
+  const quota = awsJson(quotaRes.stdout)?.Quota;
+  const limit = typeof quota?.Value === "number" ? quota.Value : null;
+  if (limit === null) {
+    return [];
+  }
+  const listRes = await runCapture("aws", [
+    "bedrock-agentcore-control",
+    "list-agent-runtimes",
+    "--region",
+    region,
+    "--output",
+    "json"
+  ]);
+  if (listRes.code !== 0) {
+    return [];
+  }
+  const runtimes = awsJson(listRes.stdout)?.agentRuntimes;
+  if (!Array.isArray(runtimes)) {
+    return [];
+  }
+  const used = runtimes.length;
+  const details = {
+    used,
+    limit,
+    region,
+    quota_code: AGENTCORE_AGENT_QUOTA_CODE
+  };
+  if (used < limit) {
+    return [
+      {
+        level: Level.INFO,
+        name: "agentcore_quota_headroom",
+        message: `AgentCore runtimes: ${used}/${limit} used in ${region}.`,
+        details
+      }
+    ];
+  }
+  return [
+    {
+      level: Level.CRITICAL,
+      name: "agentcore_quota_headroom",
+      message: `AgentCore runtimes: ${used}/${limit} used in ${region} \u2014 no slots left, so the deploy would fail with \`maxAgents limit exceeded\` AFTER pushing the image and creating the secret, M2M client, and execution role (all orphans). Delete a runtime you no longer need (\`bag deploy destroy\` in its workspace) or request a quota increase for ${AGENTCORE_AGENT_QUOTA_CODE} ("Total Agents per Account") in the Service Quotas console.`,
+      details
+    }
+  ];
+}
 var allChecks = [
   checkAgentcoreJsonPresent,
   checkAgentcoreAuthorizerKeyLegacy,
@@ -11390,7 +11492,8 @@ var allChecks = [
   checkCommerceReady,
   checkDeployCliRunnable,
   checkRuntimeSecretsInjected,
-  checkAwsTargetsPopulated
+  checkAwsTargetsPopulated,
+  checkAgentcoreQuotaHeadroom
 ];
 
 // src/cli/_deploy/secrets.ts
@@ -11674,6 +11777,12 @@ function cognitoPackageJson() {
 function readme() {
   return `# Cognito M2M client for the AgentCore A2A inbound OAuth2 authorizer
 
+> **DEPRECATED.** \`bag deploy --provider aws\` now provisions its own user pool
+> and M2M client, and overwrites the values wired from this stack. Deploying
+> this app leaves a second, unused pool behind that you have to clean up
+> yourself. Keep it only if you need to own the pool out of band; otherwise run
+> \`bag deploy --provider aws\` and hand buyers the credentials it prints.
+
 AgentCore A2A endpoints REQUIRE inbound auth (there is no anonymous mode). This
 seller uses **OAuth2 via Cognito** \u2014 NOT SigV4, because external buyers cannot
 obtain your AWS IAM credentials. Cognito has no public machine-to-machine
@@ -11714,12 +11823,11 @@ This reads the local \`cdk-outputs.json\` and patches:
 | \`Scope\`        | \`agentcore.json\` \u2192 \`envVars[] OAUTH_SCOPE\` (+ \`.studio/.env.local\` for local dev) |
 
 \`OAUTH_TOKEN_URL\` / \`OAUTH_SCOPE\` are read by the emitted agent card from
-the environment, so the published A2A agent card advertises the OAuth2 security
-scheme buyers must use. They go into \`agentcore.json\` \`envVars[]\` (non-secret)
-because \`.studio/.env.local\` lives outside the deploy CodeZip \u2014 so envVars[]
-is the channel that actually reaches the runtime; the \`.env.local\` copy only
-serves local \`bag dev\`. (\`bag deploy provision-cognito --wire <file>\` accepts a
-custom outputs path.)
+the environment, so the agent card advertises the OAuth2 security scheme buyers
+must use. **A \`bag deploy\` run replaces both values (and the authorizer) with
+the pool it provisions itself**, so this wiring only takes effect for local
+\`bag dev\`. (\`bag deploy provision-cognito --wire <file>\` accepts a custom
+outputs path.)
 
 ## Issue buyer credentials
 
@@ -11770,7 +11878,8 @@ function wireSummary(r) {
       allowedClients = [${r.clientId}]
   - ${path26.basename(r.agentcoreJson)}: envVars[] OAUTH_TOKEN_URL + OAUTH_SCOPE (reach the runtime so the agent card advertises oauth2)
   - ${r.envLocal}: same pair, for local \`bag dev\`
-  \u2192 \`bag deploy prepare\` W9 will now pass; deploy when ready.`;
+  \u2192 NOTE: a \`bag deploy\` run provisions its own pool and overwrites these
+    values with the ones it issued. This wiring only feeds local \`bag dev\`.`;
 }
 function flattenCdkOutputs(raw) {
   const flat = {};
@@ -11798,6 +11907,49 @@ function upsertDescriptorEnvvars(cfg, values) {
     }
   }
 }
+function syncDescriptorOauthFacts(workspaceRoot, facts) {
+  const acj = path26.join(workspaceRoot, "agentcore", "agentcore.json");
+  let cfg;
+  try {
+    cfg = JSON.parse(fs27.readFileSync(acj, "utf-8"));
+  } catch {
+    return;
+  }
+  const envValues = {};
+  if (facts.tokenUrl) {
+    envValues.OAUTH_TOKEN_URL = facts.tokenUrl;
+  }
+  if (facts.scope) {
+    envValues.OAUTH_SCOPE = facts.scope;
+  }
+  const authorizer = facts.discoveryUrl && facts.clientId ? {
+    customJwtAuthorizer: {
+      discoveryUrl: facts.discoveryUrl,
+      allowedClients: [facts.clientId]
+    }
+  } : null;
+  if (Object.keys(envValues).length === 0 && authorizer === null) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (Object.keys(envValues).length > 0) {
+    upsertDescriptorEnvvars(cfg, envValues);
+  }
+  if (authorizer !== null && Array.isArray(cfg.runtimes)) {
+    for (const rt of cfg.runtimes) {
+      if (rt !== null && typeof rt === "object") {
+        const r = rt;
+        r.authorizerType = "CUSTOM_JWT";
+        r.authorizerConfiguration = authorizer;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  try {
+    fs27.writeFileSync(acj, `${JSON.stringify(cfg, null, 2)}
+`, "utf-8");
+  } catch {
+    return;
+  }
+}
 function upsertEnv(envLocal, values) {
   let lines = [];
   try {
@@ -12725,59 +12877,6 @@ async function checkInstalledRecipesUnchanged(root, _target) {
   }
   return [];
 }
-function agentcoreAuthorizer(root) {
-  const descriptor = path32.join(root, "agentcore", "agentcore.json");
-  let data;
-  try {
-    data = JSON.parse(fs33.readFileSync(descriptor, "utf-8"));
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-  if (data === null || typeof data !== "object" || Array.isArray(data)) {
-    return null;
-  }
-  const runtimes = data.runtimes;
-  if (!Array.isArray(runtimes)) {
-    return null;
-  }
-  for (const rt of runtimes) {
-    if (rt === null || typeof rt !== "object") {
-      continue;
-    }
-    const auth = rt.authorizerConfiguration;
-    if (auth !== null && typeof auth === "object" && !Array.isArray(auth)) {
-      const jwt = auth.customJwtAuthorizer ?? auth.customJWTAuthorizer;
-      if (jwt !== null && typeof jwt === "object" && !Array.isArray(jwt)) {
-        return jwt;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return null;
-}
-async function checkCognitoAuthorizerConfigured(root, target) {
-  if (target !== "agentcore") {
-    return [];
-  }
-  const jwt = agentcoreAuthorizer(root);
-  const discovery = jwt?.discoveryUrl;
-  const clients = jwt?.allowedClients;
-  const configured = Boolean(discovery) && Array.isArray(clients) && clients.length > 0;
-  if (configured) {
-    return [];
-  }
-  return [
-    {
-      level: Level.WARNING,
-      name: "cognito_authorizer_configured",
-      message: "no Cognito authorizer configured in agentcore.json (authorizerConfiguration.customJwtAuthorizer.discoveryUrl/allowedClients) \u2192 the A2A endpoint will require SigV4/AWS creds; external buyers can't reach it. Run `bag deploy provision-cognito`, then paste the CDK outputs into the authorizer.",
-      fixCmd: "bag deploy provision-cognito",
-      details: {
-        discovery_url_set: Boolean(discovery),
-        allowed_clients: Array.isArray(clients) ? clients : []
-      }
-    }
-  ];
-}
 async function checkStorageLocalNotDeployable(root, _target) {
   const storage = loadAgentToml(root).storage;
   if (storage === null || typeof storage !== "object" || Array.isArray(storage) || String(storage.kind ?? "").toLowerCase() !== "local") {
@@ -12802,7 +12901,6 @@ var allChecks4 = [
   checkRpcUrlSetForRuntime,
   checkRuntimeRpcReachable,
   checkInstalledRecipesUnchanged,
-  checkCognitoAuthorizerConfigured,
   checkStorageLocalNotDeployable
 ];
 
@@ -13256,6 +13354,7 @@ function baseResult(endpoint, runtime, overrides) {
     studioTomlUpdated: false,
     runtime,
     note: null,
+    warning: null,
     error: null,
     exitCode: 0,
     ...overrides
@@ -13311,6 +13410,7 @@ async function runVerify(opts) {
   let action = "none";
   let registerError = null;
   let postWriteError = null;
+  let postWriteWarning = null;
   let registerNote = null;
   let identityPendingReason = null;
   let registerExitCode = 0;
@@ -13343,9 +13443,8 @@ async function runVerify(opts) {
             const cause = e.cause !== null && typeof e.cause === "object" ? e.cause : null;
             const relayTxHash = typeof cause?.txHash === "string" ? cause.txHash : e.txHash;
             action = "register_partial";
-            postWriteError = relayTxHash ? `ERC-8004 register created agent_id=${e.agentId}, but setAgentURI relay tx_hash=${relayTxHash} was not observed by the chain RPC. Run \`bag erc8004 clear-pending\` to reconcile, then retry \`bag erc8004 update-endpoint\`.` : `ERC-8004 register created agent_id=${e.agentId}, but the setAgentURI relay submission was not observed by the chain RPC. Run \`bag erc8004 clear-pending\` to reconcile, then retry \`bag erc8004 update-endpoint\`.`;
+            postWriteWarning = relayTxHash ? `ERC-8004 register created agent_id=${e.agentId}, but setAgentURI relay tx_hash=${relayTxHash} was not observed by the chain RPC. Run \`bag erc8004 clear-pending\` to reconcile, then retry \`bag erc8004 update-endpoint\`.` : `ERC-8004 register created agent_id=${e.agentId}, but the setAgentURI relay submission was not observed by the chain RPC. Run \`bag erc8004 clear-pending\` to reconcile, then retry \`bag erc8004 update-endpoint\`.`;
             identityPendingReason = "setAgentURI relay submission unverified; run bag erc8004 clear-pending before retrying";
-            registerExitCode = 1;
           } else if (e.txHash) {
             action = "register_pending";
             registerNote = `ERC-8004 register created agent_id=${e.agentId}; setAgentURI tx pending (${e.txHash}). Check the tx before retrying \`bag erc8004 update-endpoint\`.`;
@@ -13439,6 +13538,7 @@ async function runVerify(opts) {
     action,
     studioTomlUpdated,
     note: notes.length > 0 ? notes.join(" | ") : null,
+    warning: postWriteWarning,
     error: postWriteError,
     exitCode: registerExitCode
   });
@@ -14548,8 +14648,8 @@ function registerDeploy(program) {
   p.command("fix-gitignore").description(
     "Ensure the workspace .gitignore excludes .studio/ (the agent's .env.local + keystore)."
   ).option("--project-root <path>", "Override project root.").action(act((opts) => cmdFixGitignore(opts)));
-  p.command("provision-cognito").description(
-    "Emit an AWS CDK app under agentcore/cognito/ that provisions a Cognito M2M client for the AgentCore A2A inbound OAuth2 authorizer (studio writes IaC + prints steps; you run `cdk deploy`)."
+  p.command("provision-cognito", { hidden: true }).description(
+    "DEPRECATED \u2014 `bag deploy` provisions inbound OAuth by itself. Emit an AWS CDK app under agentcore/cognito/ that provisions a Cognito M2M client for the AgentCore inbound OAuth2 authorizer (studio writes IaC + prints steps; you run `cdk deploy`)."
   ).option("--project-root <path>", "Override project root.").option(
     "--wire [outputsFile]",
     "After you `cdk deploy --outputs-file <file>`, wire those outputs into agentcore.json + .studio/.env.local (default file: agentcore/cognito/cdk-outputs.json). Pure local file I/O \u2014 studio never calls AWS."
@@ -14608,12 +14708,17 @@ function agentDeployDestination(root) {
 }
 function resolveTarget(opts, root, destination = agentDeployDestination(root)) {
   const explicit = opts.runtime ?? opts.target;
-  if (explicit) {
-    return explicit;
-  }
   if (destination === "platform") {
+    if (explicit && explicit !== "platform") {
+      printErr(
+        `warning: --runtime=${explicit} ignored \u2014 studio.toml has [deploy].destination = 'platform', which selects the managed deploy path and its own checks. Use --provider bnb|aws to pick where this agent deploys.`
+      );
+    }
     return "platform";
   }
+  if (explicit) {
+    return explicit;
+  }
   return readStackRuntime(root) ?? "agentcore";
 }
 function validateRuntimeAgainstStack(target, force, root) {
@@ -14820,6 +14925,12 @@ function writeAgentDeployState(workspaceRoot, arn, record = {}, destination = "s
     if (scope) {
       setEnvVar(envLocalPath16(agentRoot2), "OAUTH_SCOPE", scope);
     }
+    syncDescriptorOauthFacts(workspaceRoot, {
+      tokenUrl,
+      scope,
+      discoveryUrl,
+      clientId
+    });
     if (persistedPackaging(agentRoot2) === null) {
       patchTomlKv(
         tomlPath,
@@ -15085,6 +15196,17 @@ async function refreshLocalDeployDependencies(root) {
     return 1;
   }
 }
+function partialDeployCleanupNote(workspaceRoot) {
+  const project = projectName(workspaceRoot);
+  return [
+    "note: a deploy that fails partway can leave these behind (they are reused by a successful retry, so clean up only if you are giving up):",
+    `  - ECR image            bnbagent/${project}`,
+    `  - Secrets Manager      bnbagent/${project}/runtime`,
+    `  - Cognito M2M client   bnbagent-${project}`,
+    `  - IAM role             bnbagent-${project}-runtime`,
+    "  `bag deploy destroy --provider aws --execute` removes the runtime, secret, and M2M client; add --purge for the ECR repository and log groups. The IAM role is deleted with the runtime it was created for."
+  ].join("\n");
+}
 async function cmdAgent(opts, agentcoreArgs) {
   let rc = applyProjectRoot(opts.projectRoot);
   if (rc !== null) {
@@ -15296,6 +15418,7 @@ async function cmdAgent(opts, agentcoreArgs) {
     printErr(
       "note: the pinned bnbagent-deploy adapter automatically restores an owned runtime secret that is inside its recovery window. If AWS denies that operation, update the deployer policy to include secretsmanager:RestoreSecret."
     );
+    printErr(partialDeployCleanupNote(workspaceRoot));
     return code;
   }
   const record = recordOf2(data);
@@ -15638,6 +15761,7 @@ function verifyToJson(r) {
     studio_toml_updated: r.studioTomlUpdated,
     runtime: r.runtime,
     note: r.note,
+    warning: r.warning,
     error: r.error,
     exit_code: r.exitCode
   };
@@ -15679,6 +15803,9 @@ function renderVerifyHuman(r, deployment, liveStatus) {
   if (r.note) {
     printOut(`note: ${r.note}`);
   }
+  if (r.warning) {
+    printOut(`warning: ${r.warning}`);
+  }
   if (r.error) {
     printOut(`error: ${r.error}`);
   }
@@ -16026,6 +16153,7 @@ async function cmdFixGitignore(opts) {
   printOut(`${marker} ${result.name}: ${result.message}`);
   return 0;
 }
+var PROVISION_COGNITO_DEPRECATION = "warning: `bag deploy provision-cognito` is deprecated and will be removed.\n  `bag deploy` provisions the inbound OAuth user pool and M2M client on its\n  own; the pool this CDK app stands up is never used by a deploy, and both\n  the stack and its client are billable orphans you have to clean up.\n  Run `bag deploy --provider aws` directly instead.";
 async function cmdProvisionCognito(opts) {
   const rc = applyProjectRoot(opts.projectRoot, false);
   if (rc !== null) {
@@ -16033,6 +16161,7 @@ async function cmdProvisionCognito(opts) {
   }
   const root = resolveProjectRoot2(opts.projectRoot);
   const workspaceRoot = deployWorkspaceRoot2(root);
+  printOut(PROVISION_COGNITO_DEPRECATION);
   if (opts.wire !== void 0 && opts.wire !== false) {
     const outputsFile = typeof opts.wire === "string" && opts.wire ? opts.wire : null;
     try {
@@ -20254,7 +20383,7 @@ function buildProgram() {
   return program;
 }
 function cliVersion() {
-  return "0.0.6-alpha.6";
+  return "0.0.6-alpha.7";
 }
 
 // src/cli/updateCheck.ts

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@bnbagent/studio-cli",
-  "version": "0.0.6-alpha.6",
+  "version": "0.0.6-alpha.7",
   "description": "The `bag` CLI: scaffold, run, deploy, and monetize a single seller agent on BNB Chain (ERC-8004 identity, ERC-8183 commerce, x402 payments).",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "repository": {
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
     "tar": "^7.4.0",
     "viem": "^2.54.0",
     "yaml": "^2.9.0",
-    "@bnbagent/studio-runtime": "0.0.6-alpha.6"
+    "@bnbagent/studio-runtime": "0.0.6-alpha.7"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@a2a-js/sdk": "^0.3.14",

package/skills/bnbagent-studio.md

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ prices retain the paid merchant flow.
 
 ## CLI groups at a glance
 
-`init`, `scan`, `recipe`, `skills`, `wallet`, `erc8004`, `erc8183`, `x402`, `agents`, `config`, `env`, `dev`, `doctor`, `audit`, `deploy`, `platform`, `llm`, `bundle`, `budget` — see `bag --help` for details. `bag deploy [--provider bnb\|aws]` is the primary deploy command; `prepare`, `verify`, `status`, `info`, `destroy`, `logs`, `fix-gitignore`, and `provision-cognito` remain lifecycle subcommands (`deploy agent` is a deprecated compatibility alias). Provider deploy/status/logs/destroy and deploy-time credential validation are delegated to pinned `@bnbagent/deploy-cli@0.4.14`.
+`init`, `scan`, `recipe`, `skills`, `wallet`, `erc8004`, `erc8183`, `x402`, `agents`, `config`, `env`, `dev`, `doctor`, `audit`, `deploy`, `platform`, `llm`, `bundle`, `budget` — see `bag --help` for details. `bag deploy [--provider bnb\|aws]` is the primary deploy command; `prepare`, `verify`, `status`, `info`, `destroy`, `logs`, and `fix-gitignore` remain lifecycle subcommands (`deploy agent` is a deprecated compatibility alias). Provider deploy/status/logs/destroy and deploy-time credential validation are delegated to pinned `@bnbagent/deploy-cli@0.4.14`.
 
 ## Tool surface
 

package/skills/references/bnbagent-studio-adding-to-project.md

@@ -189,16 +189,16 @@ ERC-8004/8183 **last** with the deployed AgentCore endpoint:
 
 ```bash
 bag deploy prepare                 # readiness sweep
-bag deploy provision-cognito       # emits the Cognito CDK app you run (cdk deploy); wires discoveryUrl/clientId
 bag deploy --provider aws          # ship the Agent to AgentCore
 bag deploy verify --provider aws   # delegated status + reconcile ERC-8004 identity
 ```
 
-Gotcha: to serve external buyers, configure the Cognito authorizer
-(`provision-cognito` → `cdk deploy --outputs-file` → `provision-cognito --wire`);
-`bag deploy prepare` warns (W9) if unset but does NOT block. With no authorizer
-the runtime is IAM/SigV4 owner-only (never anonymous) — external buyers without
-AWS creds just can't reach it.
+Gotcha: `bag deploy --provider aws` provisions the Cognito user pool and the
+buyer M2M client itself and prints the token URL, client id, and scope — hand
+those to each buyer (Cognito has no public M2M self-registration; retrieve the
+client secret read-only from the AWS Console). Do not run
+`bag deploy provision-cognito`: it is deprecated and its CDK pool is never used
+by a deploy.
 
 Gotcha: `dispute_window` is read from the on-chain policy contract (24h on
 testnet). Buyers can dispute within that window after submit — the Agent can't

package/skills/references/bnbagent-studio-operating.md

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ wallet/LLM/budget ops.
 directory (Claude Code: `~/.claude/skills/bnbagent-studio/references/`; Cursor:
 `bnbagent-studio/references/` beside the `.mdc` rules). READ
 the file when the topic comes up — don't answer from memory:
-- `bnbagent-studio-use-aws-agentcore.md` — the delegated AgentCore lifecycle (`bag deploy --provider aws` / `status` / `logs` / `verify` / `destroy`, `provision-cognito`) + AWS prerequisites
+- `bnbagent-studio-use-aws-agentcore.md` — the delegated AgentCore lifecycle (`bag deploy --provider aws` / `status` / `logs` / `verify` / `destroy`) + AWS prerequisites
 - `bnbagent-studio-use-bnb-trial.md` — GitHub device login, 48h eligibility, staging verification, and the delegated BNB trial lifecycle
 - `bnbagent-studio-using-twak-wallet.md` — `[wallet].kind = "twak"` create / fund / SIWE-bind / container deploy / limitations
 - `bnbagent-studio-extending-signing.md` — `PolicyViolation` / `X402PolicyError` diagnosis + extending the EIP-712 allowlist
@@ -136,7 +136,6 @@ Returns a rich table of checks across the `app/agent/` sub-project:
 | Wallet tBNB balance | 0 tBNB | Faucet: testnet.bnbchain.org/faucet-smart |
 | Wallet U balance | 0 U | Transfer from holder, or ask for sponsor U |
 | 8004 registered | Not registered | Normally registered automatically at `bag deploy verify`. Manual: `bag erc8004 register --endpoint <url>` (only if you need an on-chain identity before deploy). WARN-only in `bag doctor` — it doesn't block local dev. |
-| Cognito authorizer (W9) | External-buyer readiness: `agentcore.json` carries no `authorizerConfiguration` / protocol metadata has placeholder `OAUTH_*` values | WARN-only (does NOT block) — needed to serve **external** buyers, not to deploy. With no authorizer the runtime is IAM/SigV4 owner-only (never anonymous). To open it to buyers: `bag deploy provision-cognito` → `cdk deploy --outputs-file cdk-outputs.json` → `bag deploy provision-cognito --wire`. |
 
 WARN-only items don't block; FAIL items do (exit 1).
 

package/skills/references/bnbagent-studio-scaffolding-agent.md

@@ -490,10 +490,10 @@ Local dev (from workspace root <name>/):
                                      # seller's skills). For MCP, use an MCP client.
 
 When ready to deploy:
-  bag deploy provision-cognito       # emit the Cognito CDK app — you run `cdk deploy`,
-                                     # then its discoveryUrl/clientId wire into the OAuth2 authorizer
   bag deploy prepare                 # readiness sweep
   bag deploy --provider aws          # ship the Agent to AgentCore (selected faces);
+                                     # provisions the Cognito pool + buyer M2M client and
+                                     # prints the token URL / client id / scope;
                                      # keystore injected via Secrets Manager (never in the CodeZip)
   bag deploy verify --provider aws --endpoint <url> # delegated status + reconcile ERC-8004
 
@@ -529,13 +529,12 @@ Edit (from workspace root):
   `TWAK_WALLET_PASSWORD` for twak — reconstructed at cold start, never in the
   package; the testnet-only `--secrets-mode envvars` fallback is refused on
   mainnet.
-- **AgentCore seller endpoints are never anonymous.** With no authorizer the runtime defaults
-  to IAM/SigV4 (owner-only, NOT open); to serve **external** buyers configure the
-  Cognito OAuth2 authorizer — `bag deploy provision-cognito` emits a CDK app the
-  user `cdk deploy --outputs-file`s, then `provision-cognito --wire` patches
-  `agentcore.json` + the card env. `bag deploy prepare` warns (W9) if unset but
-  does NOT block. Locally, `bag dev` runs without Cognito env, so the card omits
-  the scheme and is reachable without a token.
+- **AgentCore seller endpoints are never anonymous.** `bag deploy --provider aws`
+  provisions the Cognito OAuth2 pool + buyer M2M client itself and prints the
+  token URL / client id / scope to hand to buyers (`bag deploy provision-cognito`
+  is deprecated — a deploy uses its own pool regardless). Locally, `bag dev` runs
+  without Cognito env, so the card omits the scheme and is reachable without a
+  token.
 - **ERC-8183 does NOT require ERC-8004** at the protocol level (commerce contract
   doesn't check the identity registry). Local two-agent dev can run end-to-end
   without ever touching 8004. Use 8004 only when you actually want discoverable

package/skills/references/bnbagent-studio-selling-via-8183.md

@@ -160,12 +160,11 @@ Full Pieverse credit decisions live in `funding-pieverse-llm` (project-scope ski
 
 ERC-8183 / ERC-8004 registration is a **deploy-time** concern: the public
 AgentCore endpoint must exist before you register, so register **last**. The
-agent endpoint has no anonymous mode, so you must provision the Cognito OAuth2
-authorizer first.
+agent endpoint has no anonymous mode; `bag deploy` provisions the Cognito
+OAuth2 authorizer as part of the deploy.
 
 ```bash
 bag deploy prepare                  # readiness sweep
-bag deploy provision-cognito        # emit the Cognito CDK app; run `cdk deploy`, wire discoveryUrl/clientId
 bag deploy --provider aws           # ship the agent to AgentCore (selected protocol)
 bag deploy verify --provider aws    # delegated status + reconcile ERC-8004 identity
 ```
@@ -178,7 +177,7 @@ asks bnbagent-deploy for live status first, then performs the reconcile.
 
 **Hard rules**:
 - The endpoint must be **reachable** when registered. For A2A, smoke test the normalized card URL directly, for example `curl <agentcore-invocations-url>/.well-known/agent-card.json` (or `curl <already-registered-card-url>` if the endpoint already includes `/.well-known/agent-card.json`). For MCP, connect an MCP client to the deployed `/mcp` URL. Chain doesn't verify reachability, but buyers will see failures.
-- To serve external buyers, configure the Cognito authorizer (`provision-cognito` → `cdk deploy --outputs-file` → `provision-cognito --wire`); `bag deploy prepare` warns (W9) if unset but does NOT block. With no authorizer the runtime is IAM/SigV4 owner-only (never anonymous) — buyers without AWS creds just can't reach it.
+- `bag deploy --provider aws` provisions the Cognito user pool + buyer M2M client and prints the token URL, client id, and scope. Hand those to each buyer (the client secret is retrieved read-only from the AWS Console — studio never stores it). `bag deploy provision-cognito` is deprecated; its CDK pool is never used by a deploy.
 - Price bounds (`min_price`/`max_price`) live with the Agent — it clamps + signs the quote.
 
 ## Stage 5 — How a SUBMITTED job happens

package/skills/references/bnbagent-studio-use-aws-agentcore.md

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ flags); cloud execution is the pinned bnbagent-deploy's job.
 | `bag deploy status [--provider aws]` | List every recorded deployment and delegated live state (read-only); `--no-probe` is local-only. |
 | `bag deploy logs [--provider aws] [--follow] [--since 10m]` | Delegate runtime logs to bnbagent-deploy. |
 | `bag deploy destroy [--provider aws]` | Dry-run teardown plan; `--execute` delegates `destroy --yes`; `--purge` also deletes retained ECR/log resources. |
-| `bag deploy provision-cognito [--wire]` | Emit (then wire) the optional Cognito CDK app for operator-managed buyer credentials. |
+| `bag deploy provision-cognito [--wire]` | **Deprecated** (hidden from `--help`). Emits a Cognito CDK app whose pool a deploy never uses. |
 
 ## Typical workflows
 
@@ -129,21 +129,19 @@ plus a container engine.
 > without asking the user first.
 
 > 🔒 **Inbound auth is auto-provisioned.** An AgentCore seller endpoint is
-> **never anonymous**. When `agentcore.json` carries no authorizer of its own,
-> the delegated deploy auto-provisions a Cognito inbound OAuth (account pool +
-> per-agent M2M client) so the runtime is token-gated. To mint buyer
-> credentials the operator manages directly, use the optional CDK path:
+> **never anonymous**. The delegated deploy provisions a Cognito inbound OAuth
+> (account pool + per-agent M2M client) so the runtime is token-gated, then
+> writes the live token URL, scope, client id, and discovery URL back into
+> `studio.toml`, `agentcore.json`, and the printed buyer block. Hand those to
+> each buyer; the client secret is retrieved read-only in the AWS Console
+> (Cognito → User pools → App clients → "Show client secret") — never
+> persisted by studio.
 >
-> 1. `bag deploy provision-cognito` emits a self-contained Cognito CDK app
->    (UserPool + M2M app client) — the user runs `cdk deploy --outputs-file
->    cdk-outputs.json` themselves.
-> 2. `bag deploy provision-cognito --wire` reads that local outputs file and
->    patches `agentcore.json`'s `authorizerConfiguration.customJwtAuthorizer` +
->    the card's `OAUTH_TOKEN_URL` / `OAUTH_SCOPE` (no AWS call). The client
->    secret is retrieved read-only in the AWS Console (Cognito → User pools →
->    App clients → "Show client secret") — never persisted by studio.
+> `bag deploy provision-cognito` (the CDK path) is **deprecated**: a deploy
+> provisions and uses its own pool regardless, so the CDK stack is a billable
+> orphan and anything wired from it gets overwritten.
 >
-> Buyers then reach the agent over plain HTTPS + an OAuth2 Bearer (the
+> Buyers reach the agent over plain HTTPS + an OAuth2 Bearer (the
 > client-credentials grant) — **no AWS SigV4 / IAM credentials**. Locally,
 > `bag dev` runs without Cognito env, so the card omits the scheme.