@blockrun/franklin 3.36.0 → 3.38.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/commands/config.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/mcp/codegraph.js +13 -0
- package/dist/serve/server.js +4 -2
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/client.d.ts +5 -5
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/client.js +26 -11
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/constants.d.ts +25 -26
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/constants.js +65 -31
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/creds.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/creds.js +7 -1
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/fund.js +15 -3
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/orders.js +14 -7
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/positions.js +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/redeem.d.ts +26 -0
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/redeem.js +180 -33
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/relayer.d.ts +20 -10
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/relayer.js +57 -37
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/setup.d.ts +20 -0
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/setup.js +135 -53
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/transactions.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/transactions.js +22 -0
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/withdraw.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/tools/polymarket/withdraw.js +173 -23
- package/dist/tools/read.js +5 -2
- package/dist/ui/app.js +4 -3
- package/package.json +17 -12
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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1
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-
declare const VALID_KEYS: readonly [
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declare const VALID_KEYS: readonly ['default-model', 'sonnet-model', 'opus-model', 'haiku-model', 'smart-routing', 'permission-mode', 'max-turns', 'auto-compact', 'cost-saver', 'session-save', 'debug', 'zerox-api-key', 'base-rpc-url'];
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type ConfigKey = (typeof VALID_KEYS)[number];
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export interface AppConfig {
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'default-model'?: string;
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package/dist/mcp/codegraph.js
CHANGED
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@@ -31,6 +31,19 @@ function userEnabled() {
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* isn't installed / resolvable. The shim is plain JS runnable by any node.
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*/
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export function resolveCodegraphShim() {
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// CodeGraph 1.x added an `exports` map that no longer lists ./npm-shim.js,
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// so resolving that subpath directly throws ERR_PACKAGE_PATH_NOT_EXPORTED
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// even though the file still ships (it's the package's `bin`). `./package.json`
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// stays exported, so resolve the manifest and walk to the shim beside it.
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try {
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const manifest = require.resolve('@colbymchenry/codegraph/package.json');
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const shim = path.join(path.dirname(manifest), 'npm-shim.js');
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if (fs.existsSync(shim))
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return shim;
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}
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catch {
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/* fall through to the pre-1.x subpath resolve */
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}
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try {
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const shim = require.resolve('@colbymchenry/codegraph/npm-shim.js');
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return fs.existsSync(shim) ? shim : null;
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package/dist/serve/server.js
CHANGED
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@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@
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import http from 'node:http';
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import fs from 'node:fs';
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import path from 'node:path';
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-
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// `ws` 8 moved the server class off the default export onto a named one. The
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// default import stays for the `WebSocket` type and its `OPEN` constant.
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import WebSocket, { WebSocketServer } from 'ws';
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import { loadChain, API_URLS, BLOCKRUN_DIR } from '../config.js';
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import { loadConfig, setConfigValue } from '../commands/config.js';
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import { assembleInstructions } from '../agent/context.js';
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@@ -890,7 +892,7 @@ export async function startServer(opts) {
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res.writeHead(404);
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res.end();
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});
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const wss = new
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const wss = new WebSocketServer({
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server: httpServer,
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path: '/agent',
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// Same gate as /file: refuse upgrades from non-allowlisted browser origins
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@@ -52,10 +52,10 @@ export interface GeoblockStatus {
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* routes through POLYMARKET_CLOB_HOST, i.e. the exact egress real orders use.
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*
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* We deliberately do NOT trust polymarket.com/api/geoblock's boolean: it
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* reflects FRONTEND blocking
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*
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* returns 401, not 403). The /api/geoblock call is
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* context. Cached 10 min; fail-open (unknown) on
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* blocks a call that might succeed.
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* reflects FRONTEND blocking, which can diverge from what the order API accepts
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* (e.g. Japan returns blocked=true on the frontend while its API still accepts
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* orders — POST /order there returns 401, not 403). The /api/geoblock call is
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* kept only for country/ip context. Cached 10 min; fail-open (unknown) on
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* network error so a hiccup never blocks a call that might succeed.
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*/
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export declare function checkGeoblock(): Promise<GeoblockStatus>;
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@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";
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import { polygon } from "viem/chains";
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import { ClobClient, SignatureTypeV2 } from "@polymarket/clob-client-v2";
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import { getOrCreateWalletKey } from "./wallet-key.js";
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import { assertContractConfig, CLOB_HOST, GEOBLOCK_URL, getBuilderCode, getClobProxy, getSigType, POLYGON_CHAIN_ID,
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import { assertContractConfig, CLOB_HOST, GEOBLOCK_URL, getBuilderCode, getClobProxy, getSigType, POLYGON_CHAIN_ID, POLYGON_WRITE_RPC_URL, } from "./constants.js";
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import { loadDepositWalletForSigner, loadL2Creds, saveL2Creds } from "./creds.js";
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import { deriveApiCreds } from "./l1-auth-1271.js";
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let _account = null;
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@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ let _bridgeApplied = false;
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// that silently strips POLY_ADDRESS et al. and every authed call fails with
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// "missing address header" / "Invalid L1 Request headers". Fix: also send each
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// as a hyphenated copy (POLY_ADDRESS → poly-address) which survives proxies; the
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// relay maps them back to underscores (see deploy/
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// relay maps them back to underscores (see deploy/finland-egress/Caddyfile).
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// Sending both is harmless direct — Polymarket reads the underscore header and
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// ignores the extra hyphenated one.
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const UNDERSCORE_AUTH_HEADERS = [
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@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ function buildWalletClient(reportAddress) {
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return createWalletClient({
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account,
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chain: polygon,
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transport: http(
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transport: http(POLYGON_WRITE_RPC_URL),
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});
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}
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/**
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@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ export async function getClobClient() {
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const depositWallet = loadDepositWalletForSigner(account.address);
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if (sigType === 3 && !depositWallet) {
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throw new Error(`No Polymarket deposit wallet configured for this signer yet. Run blockrun_polymarket ` +
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`action:"setup" first (
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`action:"setup" first. (POLYMARKET_SIG_TYPE=0 plain EOA mode exists as a diagnostic ` +
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`fallback; the CLOB may reject plain-EOA makers.)`);
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}
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// L2 API credentials are ALWAYS bound to the owner EOA (POLY_ADDRESS = EOA),
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// even in POLY_1271 mode. This mirrors the reference Rust client (rs-clob-
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@@ -156,7 +157,10 @@ export async function getClobClient() {
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// bind creds to the deposit wallet via an ERC-7739-wrapped L1 ClobAuth is what
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// the CLOB rejects with "Invalid L1 Request headers" — issue #65 misdiagnosed
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// the fix as wrapping L1 auth; the real path keeps L1 auth as the EOA.
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-
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// The deposit wallet is part of the key: funderAddress is baked into the
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// cached client, so a wallet change within the process lifetime (re-setup,
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// state file rewritten) must not keep building orders against the old funder.
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const cacheKey = `${sigType}:${account.address.toLowerCase()}:${(depositWallet ?? "").toLowerCase()}`;
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if (_clobClient && _clobClientKey === cacheKey)
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return _clobClient;
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let creds = loadL2Creds(account.address, 0);
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@@ -196,11 +200,11 @@ let _geoCache = null;
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* routes through POLYMARKET_CLOB_HOST, i.e. the exact egress real orders use.
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*
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* We deliberately do NOT trust polymarket.com/api/geoblock's boolean: it
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* reflects FRONTEND blocking
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*
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* returns 401, not 403). The /api/geoblock call is
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* context. Cached 10 min; fail-open (unknown) on
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* blocks a call that might succeed.
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* reflects FRONTEND blocking, which can diverge from what the order API accepts
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* (e.g. Japan returns blocked=true on the frontend while its API still accepts
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* orders — POST /order there returns 401, not 403). The /api/geoblock call is
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* kept only for country/ip context. Cached 10 min; fail-open (unknown) on
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* network error so a hiccup never blocks a call that might succeed.
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*/
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export async function checkGeoblock() {
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applyClobProxyOnce();
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@@ -209,7 +213,18 @@ export async function checkGeoblock() {
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let orderPlacement = "unknown";
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try {
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const res = await axios.post(`${CLOB_HOST}/order`, {}, { timeout: 6_000, validateStatus: () => true });
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// Treating "anything that is not 403" as permitted meant a 502/404/429 from
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// a misconfigured POLYMARKET_CLOB_HOST rendered as "✅ Region: order
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// placement permitted" + "🎯 Ready to trade", cached for 10 minutes — so the
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// user funded the wallet and only discovered the truth on the first buy.
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// An empty body reaching a WORKING CLOB is rejected as a bad request, so
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// those codes are the positive signal; everything else is genuinely unknown.
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if (res.status === 403)
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orderPlacement = "blocked";
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else if (res.status === 400 || res.status === 401 || res.status === 422)
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orderPlacement = "permitted";
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else
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orderPlacement = "unknown";
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}
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catch { /* network error → unknown */ }
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// Country/ip context — route it through the SAME egress as orders so the
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@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@ export declare const NEG_RISK_CTF_EXCHANGE_V2 = "0xe2222d279d744050d28e005200105
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export declare const NEG_RISK_ADAPTER = "0xd91E80cF2E7be2e162c6513ceD06f1dD0dA35296";
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export declare const CONDITIONAL_TOKENS = "0x4D97DCd97eC945f40cF65F87097ACe5EA0476045";
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export declare const PUSD_COLLATERAL = "0xC011a7E12a19f7B1f670d46F03B03f3342E82DFB";
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export declare const CTF_COLLATERAL_ADAPTER = "0xAdA100Db00Ca00073811820692005400218FcE1f";
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export declare const NEG_RISK_CTF_COLLATERAL_ADAPTER = "0xadA2005600Dec949baf300f4C6120000bDB6eAab";
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export declare const COLLATERAL_ONRAMP = "0x93070a847efEf7F70739046A929D47a521F5B8ee";
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export declare const USDCE_COLLATERAL = "0x2791Bca1f2de4661ED88A30C99A7a9449Aa84174";
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export declare const DEPOSIT_WALLET_FACTORY = "0x00000000000Fb5C9ADea0298D729A0CB3823Cc07";
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/**
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* Cross-check our address copies against the SDK's canonical config. Called
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@@ -21,7 +24,28 @@ export declare const BASE_CHAIN_ID = 8453;
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export declare const BASE_USDC = "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913";
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export declare const GEOBLOCK_URL: string;
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export declare const BRIDGE_UI_URL = "https://polymarket.com";
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export declare const
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export declare const POLYGON_READ_RPC_URLS: string[];
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/**
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* WRITES. Separate on purpose.
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*
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* There used to be one list, and entry 0 doubled as the sole un-fallbacked
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* transport for every SIGNING wallet client (withdraw, redeem, relayer, setup).
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* So reordering what looked like a read-only fallback list silently changed
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* which endpoint broadcasts every money transaction — a write-path change
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* disguised as a comment tweak, and one nobody would review as such.
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* (Splitting these was @KillerQueen-Z's idea in #66; the default below is not.)
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*
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* publicnode, not 1rpc: 1rpc answers once and then returns
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* -32001 "usage limit" (measured 2026-07-21), which is the last thing you want
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* broadcasting a withdrawal. Override per-deployment with POLYMARKET_WRITE_RPC_URL.
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*
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* Deliberately a single endpoint rather than a fallback list: viem's fallback()
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* would re-send a signed transaction to the next provider on a timeout, and a
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* transaction that was actually mined by the first provider must not be
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* broadcast again. Failing loudly on one endpoint is correct here; silently
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* retrying a money movement is not.
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*/
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export declare const POLYGON_WRITE_RPC_URL: string;
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/** Hard per-order notional cap in pUSD dollars (default $25; 0/invalid blocks). */
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export declare function getMaxBetUsd(): number;
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/** Optional cumulative per-process cap; null = uncapped (unset); 0 = freeze. */
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@@ -45,18 +69,6 @@ export declare function getSigType(): 0 | 3;
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export declare function getBuilderCode(): string | undefined;
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/** Egress proxy for CLOB order traffic (see README: geoblock). */
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export declare function getClobProxy(): string | undefined;
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/**
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* Relayer API credentials — required for the deposit-wallet path (Phase 1:
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* user-provided from polymarket.com → Settings → API Keys; Phase 2 moves these
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* behind the BlockRun gateway). The relayer only ever receives pre-signed
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* payloads; these creds authenticate use of its gas-sponsoring service and
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* grant no control over funds.
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*/
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export interface RelayerCreds {
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key: string;
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keyAddress: string;
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}
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export declare function getRelayerCreds(): RelayerCreds | null;
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export declare const ERC20_ABI: readonly [{
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readonly name: "allowance";
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readonly type: "function";
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@@ -176,17 +188,4 @@ export declare const ERC1155_ABI: readonly [{
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}];
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readonly outputs: readonly [];
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}];
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export declare const NEG_RISK_ADAPTER_ABI: readonly [{
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readonly name: "redeemPositions";
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readonly type: "function";
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readonly stateMutability: "nonpayable";
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readonly inputs: readonly [{
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readonly name: "conditionId";
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readonly type: "bytes32";
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}, {
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readonly name: "amounts";
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readonly type: "uint256[]";
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}];
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readonly outputs: readonly [];
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}];
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export declare const PUSD_DECIMALS = 6;
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@@ -19,7 +19,25 @@ export const NEG_RISK_ADAPTER = "0xd91E80cF2E7be2e162c6513ceD06f1dD0dA35296";
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export const CONDITIONAL_TOKENS = "0x4D97DCd97eC945f40cF65F87097ACe5EA0476045";
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// pUSD — Polymarket's 1:1 collateral wrapper (labelled CollateralToken proxy).
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export const PUSD_COLLATERAL = "0xC011a7E12a19f7B1f670d46F03B03f3342E82DFB";
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// pUSD collateral adapters — the ONLY correct redeem targets in the pUSD era.
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// CTF positions (the CLOB token_ids) are still keyed to USDC.e (standard) or
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// the legacy NegRiskAdapter's wrapped collateral (neg-risk); calling the CTF /
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// legacy adapter with pUSD burns a positionId nobody holds, which SUCCEEDS
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// redeeming 0 (CTF redeemPositions never reverts on zero balance). These
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// adapters pull the caller's outcome tokens (need a one-time CTF operator
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// approval), redeem through the right underlying path, wrap the USDC.e payout
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// into pUSD, and return it to the caller. Verified on-chain 2026-07-13:
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// Sourcify exact_match; COLLATERAL_TOKEN/CONDITIONAL_TOKENS/USDCE (and
|
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// NEG_RISK_ADAPTER/WRAPPED_COLLATERAL) all point at the addresses above.
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export const CTF_COLLATERAL_ADAPTER = "0xAdA100Db00Ca00073811820692005400218FcE1f";
|
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export const NEG_RISK_CTF_COLLATERAL_ADAPTER = "0xadA2005600Dec949baf300f4C6120000bDB6eAab";
|
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export const COLLATERAL_ONRAMP = "0x93070a847efEf7F70739046A929D47a521F5B8ee";
|
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+
// USDC.e — the legacy collateral CTF position ids are keyed to. Withdrawals
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// sweep any residue of it (historic direct-CTF redemptions paid out USDC.e)
|
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// through the onramp's wrap(asset, to, amount) — signature verified against the
|
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// Sourcify exact-match source of COLLATERAL_ONRAMP, 2026-07-21 — since the
|
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// bridge only accepts pUSD.
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export const USDCE_COLLATERAL = "0x2791Bca1f2de4661ED88A30C99A7a9449Aa84174";
|
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export const DEPOSIT_WALLET_FACTORY = "0x00000000000Fb5C9ADea0298D729A0CB3823Cc07";
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|
/**
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* Cross-check our address copies against the SDK's canonical config. Called
|
|
@@ -46,12 +64,15 @@ export function assertContractConfig() {
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}
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// --- Hosts (env-overridable so Phase 2 can point them at the BlockRun gateway) ---
|
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// CLOB order placement is geoblocked by IP (US/UK/EU and many regions). We
|
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-
// DEFAULT to BlockRun's hosted
|
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//
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//
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//
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//
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-
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// DEFAULT to BlockRun's hosted Finland egress (europe-north1) so trading works
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// out of the box with zero config — Finland is FULLY unrestricted under
|
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// Polymarket's geographic policy (frontend + API), a more durable choice than
|
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// Japan (close-only on the frontend). The relay only forwards to Polymarket's
|
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// CLOB (it can't see or move funds; every order is still signed locally by the
|
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// user's key). Override with POLYMARKET_CLOB_HOST to hit Polymarket directly
|
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// (from a permitted region) or run your own egress (see deploy/finland-egress).
|
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// Direct Polymarket host: https://clob.polymarket.com
|
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|
+
export const CLOB_HOST = process.env.POLYMARKET_CLOB_HOST || "https://pm-egress-1092497648280.europe-north1.run.app/clob";
|
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|
export const RELAYER_URL = process.env.POLYMARKET_RELAYER_URL || "https://relayer-v2.polymarket.com";
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export const DATA_API_HOST = process.env.POLYMARKET_DATA_API_HOST || "https://data-api.polymarket.com";
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export const BRIDGE_API_HOST = process.env.POLYMARKET_BRIDGE_HOST || "https://bridge.polymarket.com";
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@@ -61,19 +82,50 @@ export const BRIDGE_API_HOST = process.env.POLYMARKET_BRIDGE_HOST || "https://br
|
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// USDC_ADDRESS in ../constants.ts.)
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export const BASE_CHAIN_ID = 8453;
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export const BASE_USDC = "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913";
|
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-
// Overridable so a demo routing orders through
|
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+
// Overridable so a demo routing orders through the egress relay can report the
|
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86
|
// SAME egress's region (a permitted ✅) instead of the local IP's status.
|
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|
export const GEOBLOCK_URL = process.env.POLYMARKET_GEOBLOCK_URL || "https://polymarket.com/api/geoblock";
|
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|
export const BRIDGE_UI_URL = "https://polymarket.com"; // deposits happen via the Polymarket bridge UI/API
|
|
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|
// Public Polygon RPCs with fallback, mirroring BASE_RPC_URLS in ../constants.ts.
|
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|
-
//
|
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|
-
//
|
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|
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//
|
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|
-
|
|
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|
+
// Probed 2026-07-21 with a real eth_call (not just eth_blockNumber):
|
|
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|
+
// polygon-bor-rpc.publicnode.com 200 OK
|
|
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|
+
// polygon.drpc.org 200 OK
|
|
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|
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// 1rpc.io/matic 200 OK once, then -32001 "usage limit" — rate-limited
|
|
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|
+
// polygon.llamarpc.com DNS/fetch failure
|
|
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|
+
// polygon-rpc.com 401 "tenant disabled"
|
|
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|
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// rpc.ankr.com/polygon -32000 "Unauthorized: you must authenticate"
|
|
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|
+
// Two of the three entries here were dead, so fallback() depth was effectively 1
|
|
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|
+
// while ~9 reads x 4 retries piled onto a single rate-limited endpoint. Dead
|
|
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|
+
// entries are not free: each costs retryCount x timeout before the chain moves on.
|
|
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|
+
//
|
|
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|
+
// READS ONLY. Used by the viem public client, which fans out across all of them
|
|
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|
+
// via fallback().
|
|
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|
+
export const POLYGON_READ_RPC_URLS = [
|
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|
+
"https://polygon-bor-rpc.publicnode.com",
|
|
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|
+
"https://polygon.drpc.org",
|
|
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|
"https://1rpc.io/matic",
|
|
74
|
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"https://polygon.llamarpc.com",
|
|
75
|
-
"https://polygon-rpc.com",
|
|
76
107
|
];
|
|
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|
+
/**
|
|
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|
+
* WRITES. Separate on purpose.
|
|
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|
+
*
|
|
111
|
+
* There used to be one list, and entry 0 doubled as the sole un-fallbacked
|
|
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|
+
* transport for every SIGNING wallet client (withdraw, redeem, relayer, setup).
|
|
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|
+
* So reordering what looked like a read-only fallback list silently changed
|
|
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|
+
* which endpoint broadcasts every money transaction — a write-path change
|
|
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|
+
* disguised as a comment tweak, and one nobody would review as such.
|
|
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|
+
* (Splitting these was @KillerQueen-Z's idea in #66; the default below is not.)
|
|
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|
+
*
|
|
118
|
+
* publicnode, not 1rpc: 1rpc answers once and then returns
|
|
119
|
+
* -32001 "usage limit" (measured 2026-07-21), which is the last thing you want
|
|
120
|
+
* broadcasting a withdrawal. Override per-deployment with POLYMARKET_WRITE_RPC_URL.
|
|
121
|
+
*
|
|
122
|
+
* Deliberately a single endpoint rather than a fallback list: viem's fallback()
|
|
123
|
+
* would re-send a signed transaction to the next provider on a timeout, and a
|
|
124
|
+
* transaction that was actually mined by the first provider must not be
|
|
125
|
+
* broadcast again. Failing loudly on one endpoint is correct here; silently
|
|
126
|
+
* retrying a money movement is not.
|
|
127
|
+
*/
|
|
128
|
+
export const POLYGON_WRITE_RPC_URL = process.env.POLYMARKET_WRITE_RPC_URL || "https://polygon-bor-rpc.publicnode.com";
|
|
77
129
|
// --- Safety knobs ---
|
|
78
130
|
/**
|
|
79
131
|
* Parse a money-cap env var with FAIL-CLOSED semantics for safety controls:
|
|
@@ -134,13 +186,6 @@ export function getClobProxy() {
|
|
|
134
186
|
const v = process.env.POLYMARKET_CLOB_PROXY?.trim();
|
|
135
187
|
return v ? v : undefined;
|
|
136
188
|
}
|
|
137
|
-
export function getRelayerCreds() {
|
|
138
|
-
const key = process.env.POLYMARKET_RELAYER_API_KEY?.trim();
|
|
139
|
-
const keyAddress = process.env.POLYMARKET_RELAYER_API_KEY_ADDRESS?.trim();
|
|
140
|
-
if (key && keyAddress)
|
|
141
|
-
return { key, keyAddress };
|
|
142
|
-
return null;
|
|
143
|
-
}
|
|
144
189
|
// ERC-20/1155 minimal ABIs for approval + balance reads and approval calldata.
|
|
145
190
|
export const ERC20_ABI = [
|
|
146
191
|
{
|
|
@@ -191,15 +236,4 @@ export const ERC1155_ABI = [
|
|
|
191
236
|
outputs: [],
|
|
192
237
|
},
|
|
193
238
|
];
|
|
194
|
-
// NegRisk adapter redeem takes explicit YES/NO amounts instead of index sets.
|
|
195
|
-
export const NEG_RISK_ADAPTER_ABI = [
|
|
196
|
-
{
|
|
197
|
-
name: "redeemPositions", type: "function", stateMutability: "nonpayable",
|
|
198
|
-
inputs: [
|
|
199
|
-
{ name: "conditionId", type: "bytes32" },
|
|
200
|
-
{ name: "amounts", type: "uint256[]" },
|
|
201
|
-
],
|
|
202
|
-
outputs: [],
|
|
203
|
-
},
|
|
204
|
-
];
|
|
205
239
|
export const PUSD_DECIMALS = 6;
|
|
@@ -15,6 +15,16 @@ export interface PolymarketState {
|
|
|
15
15
|
signer?: string;
|
|
16
16
|
deployed?: boolean;
|
|
17
17
|
approvalsDone?: boolean;
|
|
18
|
+
/**
|
|
19
|
+
* A withdrawal batch whose relayer confirmation timed out. Its EIP-712
|
|
20
|
+
* signature stays executable until `deadline` (unix seconds), so a fresh
|
|
21
|
+
* withdrawal signed before then can DOUBLE-SEND — withdraw refuses to sign
|
|
22
|
+
* while this is set and unresolved. Cleared on confirm/failure.
|
|
23
|
+
*/
|
|
24
|
+
pendingWithdraw?: {
|
|
25
|
+
transactionID: string;
|
|
26
|
+
deadline: number;
|
|
27
|
+
};
|
|
18
28
|
}
|
|
19
29
|
export declare function loadL2Creds(address: string, sigType: number): L2Creds | null;
|
|
20
30
|
export declare function saveL2Creds(address: string, sigType: number, creds: Omit<L2Creds, "derivedAt">): void;
|
|
@@ -36,7 +36,13 @@ function readJsonFile(file) {
|
|
|
36
36
|
}
|
|
37
37
|
function writeJsonFile(file, value) {
|
|
38
38
|
fs.mkdirSync(BLOCKRUN_DIR, { recursive: true });
|
|
39
|
-
|
|
39
|
+
// tmp + rename: a crash mid-write must never leave a half-written creds or
|
|
40
|
+
// state file — reads swallow parse errors to null, so corruption would
|
|
41
|
+
// silently drop credentials (and the deposit-wallet mapping) instead of
|
|
42
|
+
// failing loudly. rename(2) on the same filesystem is atomic.
|
|
43
|
+
const tmp = `${file}.${process.pid}.tmp`;
|
|
44
|
+
fs.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(value, null, 2), { mode: 0o600 });
|
|
45
|
+
fs.renameSync(tmp, file);
|
|
40
46
|
}
|
|
41
47
|
function credsKey(address, sigType) {
|
|
42
48
|
return `${address.toLowerCase()}:${sigType}`;
|
|
@@ -60,13 +60,25 @@ export async function fundVault(input) {
|
|
|
60
60
|
if (!code || code === "0x") {
|
|
61
61
|
return {
|
|
62
62
|
text: `Your deposit wallet ${vault} is not deployed yet — deploy it FIRST with ` +
|
|
63
|
-
`action:"setup" confirm:true (
|
|
64
|
-
`vault strands your USDC at the bridge (it can't deliver pUSD to a vault that doesn't exist).`,
|
|
63
|
+
`action:"setup" confirm:true (gasless, credentials bootstrapped automatically), then fund. ` +
|
|
64
|
+
`Funding an undeployed vault strands your USDC at the bridge (it can't deliver pUSD to a vault that doesn't exist).`,
|
|
65
65
|
isError: true,
|
|
66
66
|
};
|
|
67
67
|
}
|
|
68
68
|
}
|
|
69
|
-
|
|
69
|
+
// getChainBalance returns null specifically to distinguish "could not read"
|
|
70
|
+
// from "holds nothing". Coercing that to 0 printed "holds $0.00 USDC — top up
|
|
71
|
+
// first" as a statement of fact to a user holding $200, on nothing more than
|
|
72
|
+
// an RPC blip, and sent them off to fund a wallet that was already funded.
|
|
73
|
+
const baseBalanceRaw = await getChainBalance("base", agent);
|
|
74
|
+
if (baseBalanceRaw === null) {
|
|
75
|
+
return {
|
|
76
|
+
text: `Could not read the USDC balance of your Base wallet ${agent} (RPC unavailable). ` +
|
|
77
|
+
`Not funding blind — re-run in a moment. Your funds are untouched.`,
|
|
78
|
+
isError: true,
|
|
79
|
+
};
|
|
80
|
+
}
|
|
81
|
+
const baseBalance = baseBalanceRaw;
|
|
70
82
|
const needed = amountUsd + FUND_FEE_USD;
|
|
71
83
|
if (baseBalance < needed) {
|
|
72
84
|
return {
|
|
@@ -54,7 +54,13 @@ function commitBet() {
|
|
|
54
54
|
export function roundToTick(price, tickSize, side = "buy") {
|
|
55
55
|
const tick = parseFloat(tickSize);
|
|
56
56
|
const decimals = Math.max(0, (tickSize.split(".")[1] ?? "").length);
|
|
57
|
-
|
|
57
|
+
// The epsilon absorbs float-division noise on prices ALREADY on the grid:
|
|
58
|
+
// 0.58/0.001 is 579.9999…, which floor alone turns into 0.579 (a buy signed
|
|
59
|
+
// one tick below the stated limit), and 0.42/0.01 is 42.000…01, which ceil
|
|
60
|
+
// alone turns into 0.43 (a sell one tick above). 1e-9 is far below half a
|
|
61
|
+
// tick for every real tick size, so genuine off-grid prices still round in
|
|
62
|
+
// the conservative direction (issue #72 finding 7).
|
|
63
|
+
const steps = side === "buy" ? Math.floor(price / tick + 1e-9) : Math.ceil(price / tick - 1e-9);
|
|
58
64
|
return Number((steps * tick).toFixed(decimals));
|
|
59
65
|
}
|
|
60
66
|
async function resolveToken(clob, input) {
|
|
@@ -139,19 +145,20 @@ export async function mapClobError(err) {
|
|
|
139
145
|
const where = geo.country ? ` (egress country: ${geo.country})` : "";
|
|
140
146
|
return `Order rejected with 403 — Polymarket geoblocks order placement from this egress${where} ` +
|
|
141
147
|
`(US/UK/EU and many regions are restricted; automated trading is allowed from unrestricted egress). ` +
|
|
142
|
-
`Fix:
|
|
143
|
-
`
|
|
148
|
+
`Fix: point POLYMARKET_CLOB_HOST + POLYMARKET_RELAYER_URL at a permitted-region relay ` +
|
|
149
|
+
`(deploy/finland-egress) or restore the default. A proxy alone (POLYMARKET_CLOB_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY) ` +
|
|
150
|
+
`does not change the Polymarket-facing egress. Raw: ${message}`;
|
|
144
151
|
}
|
|
145
152
|
if (m.includes("maker address not allowed") || m.includes("deposit wallet flow")) {
|
|
146
153
|
return `Polymarket rejected this maker address — CLOB V2 requires the deposit-wallet flow to place ` +
|
|
147
154
|
`orders (a plain EOA maker is not accepted). Use the default deposit-wallet mode: unset ` +
|
|
148
|
-
`POLYMARKET_SIG_TYPE (=3) and
|
|
149
|
-
`
|
|
155
|
+
`POLYMARKET_SIG_TYPE (=3) and run action:"setup" to create your deposit wallet ` +
|
|
156
|
+
`(credentials are bootstrapped automatically — no API keys needed). Raw: ${message}`;
|
|
150
157
|
}
|
|
151
158
|
if (isCredsMismatchError(e)) {
|
|
152
159
|
return `CLOB rejected the API credentials (${message}). Credentials were re-derived automatically; ` +
|
|
153
|
-
`if this persists, run action:"setup", or set POLYMARKET_SIG_TYPE=0
|
|
154
|
-
`(see clob-client-v2 issue #65).`;
|
|
160
|
+
`if this persists, run action:"setup", or as a last resort set POLYMARKET_SIG_TYPE=0 for plain ` +
|
|
161
|
+
`EOA mode (see clob-client-v2 issue #65; note the CLOB may reject plain-EOA makers).`;
|
|
155
162
|
}
|
|
156
163
|
if (m.includes("not enough balance") || m.includes("insufficient") || m.includes("allowance")) {
|
|
157
164
|
return `Not enough balance/allowance (${message}). The funds wallet needs pUSD and exchange approvals — ` +
|
|
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ export async function listPositions() {
|
|
|
81
81
|
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
82
82
|
return {
|
|
83
83
|
text: `Could not fetch positions from Polymarket's Data-API (${msg}). ` +
|
|
84
|
-
`Fallback: blockrun_markets path:"polymarket/positions" params:{user:"${user}"} ($0.
|
|
84
|
+
`Fallback: blockrun_markets path:"polymarket/positions" params:{user:"${user}"} ($0.0075).`,
|
|
85
85
|
isError: true,
|
|
86
86
|
};
|
|
87
87
|
}
|
|
@@ -1,4 +1,30 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { type Hex } from "viem";
|
|
1
2
|
import type { ToolResult } from "./orders.js";
|
|
3
|
+
/**
|
|
4
|
+
* Redeem call for the pUSD collateral adapter (standard or neg-risk). Exported
|
|
5
|
+
* for unit tests — the target/calldata pair is the money-critical part of this
|
|
6
|
+
* file. The CTF-mirror arguments besides conditionId are ignored by the
|
|
7
|
+
* adapter; we pass the canonical values anyway so the calldata reads sanely on
|
|
8
|
+
* a block explorer.
|
|
9
|
+
*/
|
|
10
|
+
export declare function buildRedeemCall(negRisk: boolean, conditionId: Hex): {
|
|
11
|
+
target: Hex;
|
|
12
|
+
data: Hex;
|
|
13
|
+
};
|
|
14
|
+
/**
|
|
15
|
+
* Did the redeem actually consume something we held?
|
|
16
|
+
*
|
|
17
|
+
* A transaction hash is not proof: redeeming through the wrong collateral path
|
|
18
|
+
* burns a positionId nobody holds, which SUCCEEDS on-chain having done nothing
|
|
19
|
+
* (CTF redeemPositions never reverts on a zero balance). Only a DECREASE in a
|
|
20
|
+
* balance that was non-zero before proves the position was consumed.
|
|
21
|
+
*
|
|
22
|
+
* Conservative on length mismatch: a missing `after` entry reads as unchanged,
|
|
23
|
+
* i.e. "not redeemed", so a truncated read can never fake success.
|
|
24
|
+
*
|
|
25
|
+
* Pure and exported for tests. Design from @KillerQueen-Z's #66.
|
|
26
|
+
*/
|
|
27
|
+
export declare function didRedeemAnyHeldPosition(before: readonly bigint[], after: readonly bigint[]): boolean;
|
|
2
28
|
export declare function redeemPosition(input: {
|
|
3
29
|
condition_id?: string;
|
|
4
30
|
confirm?: boolean;
|