@blockrun/franklin 3.29.12 → 3.29.13
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- package/dist/agent/bash-guard.js +66 -16
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/agent/bash-guard.js
CHANGED
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@@ -139,19 +139,24 @@ export function classifyBashRisk(command) {
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139
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return { level: 'normal' };
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}
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function isSegmentSafe(segment) {
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// The shell strips quotes and backslash-escapes BEFORE opening a path, so a
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// sensitive filename can be spliced to dodge a literal regex: `.block''run`,
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// `.block"run"`, `'.blockrun'`, `.\blockrun` all resolve to `.blockrun` at the
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// OS but read as non-contiguous text to a regex. Match the DENY patterns below
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// against a normalized copy that mimics the shell's quote/escape removal, so no
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// quoting arrangement of a wallet/secret path can reach 'safe'. (Over-matching
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// here only ever prompts — it never blocks.)
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const norm = segment.replace(/\\(.)/g, '$1').replace(/['"]/g, '');
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// Never auto-approve a command that touches the wallet key store. Matching the
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// FILENAME is hopeless — it's trivially obfuscated
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//
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//
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-
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// canonicalized guard; this is the best-effort net for the shell. Over-
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// prompting on a stray `.blockrun` path is fine — it prompts, never blocks.)
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if (/\.blockrun/i.test(segment)) {
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// FILENAME is hopeless — it's trivially obfuscated. So match the DIRECTORY: any
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// reference to ~/.blockrun forces a prompt. (The file Read/Write/Edit tools
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// have a separate canonicalized guard; this is the best-effort net for the shell.)
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if (/\.blockrun/i.test(norm)) {
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return false;
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}
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// Relative reads with no `.blockrun` in the text (e.g. the cwd is the wallet
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// dir): match the known key/secret basenames broadly (any *wallet*.json/.key).
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if (/(?<![\w-])(?:\.solana-session(?:-key2)?|\.session|[\w-]*wallet[\w-]*\.(?:json|key))(?![\w-])/i.test(
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if (/(?<![\w-])(?:\.solana-session(?:-key2)?|\.session|[\w-]*wallet[\w-]*\.(?:json|key))(?![\w-])/i.test(norm)) {
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return false;
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}
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// Command/process substitution runs an arbitrary INNER command the classifier
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@@ -159,6 +164,14 @@ function isSegmentSafe(segment) {
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if (/\$\(|`|<\(|>\(/.test(segment)) {
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return false;
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}
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// ANSI-C (`$'\x6e'`) and locale (`$"..."`) quoting decode/expand to text the
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// classifier can't resolve — and which the dequote pass above can't statically
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// evaluate (`~/.blockru$'\x6e'/.session` → `~/.blockrun/.session`). Match it as
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// an OPENING quote (at a token boundary) or by its tell-tale escape (`$'\`), so
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// a `grep 'foo$'` regex anchor — a `$` before a CLOSING quote — is left safe.
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if (/(?:^|[\s=(:,])\$['"]|\$['"]\\/.test(segment)) {
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return false;
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}
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// Parameter expansion (`$VAR`, `${VAR}`) expands to text the classifier also
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// can't see, so a bare `$HOME` glob can reach the wallet store exactly like
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// `$(...)` — `cat $HOME/.bl*/.s*` evaded the rooted-glob guard below because it
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@@ -171,7 +184,7 @@ function isSegmentSafe(segment) {
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// A glob/brace in an explicit PATH (a token rooted at ~, ., or /) expands AFTER
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// this guard and can reach the wallet store (`cat ~/.b*/.s*`) or a sensitive
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// file. Bare cwd globs (`*.md`, `src/*.ts`) have no such prefix and stay safe.
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if (/(?:^|\s)(?:~|\.|\/)\S*[*?[{]/.test(
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if (/(?:^|\s)(?:~|\.|\/)\S*[*?[{]/.test(norm)) {
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return false;
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}
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// Output redirection to a FILE target is a write — block it for EVERY segment,
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@@ -186,13 +199,27 @@ function isSegmentSafe(segment) {
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// dangerous-path block so `cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `cat ~/.aws/credentials`,
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// `cat ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg`, gcloud tokens, `.npmrc`/`.pgpass`/`.netrc`, and
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// docker registry creds don't auto-approve secrets into model context.
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if (/(?:^|[\s
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if (/(?:^|[\s/~=])\.(?:ssh|aws|gnupg|kube)(?:\/|$|\s)/i.test(norm))
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return false;
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if (/\bid_(?:rsa|dsa|ecdsa|ed25519)\b/i.test(norm))
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return false;
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if (/(?:^|[\s/~=])\.(?:npmrc|pgpass|netrc)(?:$|\s)/i.test(norm))
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return false;
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if (
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if (/gcloud\/(?:credentials|access_tokens|application_default)|\.docker\/config/i.test(norm))
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return false;
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-
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// Other plaintext credential / key stores a bare `cat` would dump into context.
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// Denylists lag the real set of secret files, so be generous — over-prompting
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// is safe. Includes the Solana CLI default keypair (`~/.config/solana/id.json`),
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// a SPENDABLE wallet that lives outside Franklin's own ~/.blockrun store.
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if (/(?:^|[\s/~=])\.git-credentials(?:$|\s)/i.test(norm))
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return false;
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-
if (/
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if (/(?:^|[\s/~=])\.(?:bash|zsh|sh|python|node_repl|mysql|psql|irb)_history(?:$|\s)/i.test(norm))
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return false;
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if (/(?:git|gh)\/(?:credentials|hosts\.ya?ml|hosts\.json)\b/i.test(norm))
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return false;
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if (/\.cargo\/credentials|rclone\/rclone\.conf|(?:^|[\s/~=])\.config\/solana(?:\/|\b)|solana\/id\.json/i.test(norm))
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return false;
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if (/(?:keychain(?:-db)?|\.keychain)\b|\bKeychains\/|\blogins\.json\b/i.test(norm))
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return false;
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// Parse into words. An env-assignment PREFIX (`FOO=bar cmd …`) is a real
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// assignment only in the LEADING run before the command word — a later `x=y`
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@@ -247,6 +274,16 @@ function isSegmentSafe(segment) {
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if (subCmd === 'remote' && /(?:^|\s)(?:add|set-url|set-head|set-branches|remove|rm|rename|prune|update)\b/.test(segment)) {
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return false;
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}
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// `branch`/`tag` read by default, but their delete/rename/copy/force flags
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// silently mutate refs (lose local commits). `branch -D` is already a
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// dangerous-pattern; gate the rest (incl. lowercase `-d`, `-m`, `-f`) here.
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// Creating a branch/tag (a bare positional) stays safe — only ref destruction prompts.
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if (subCmd === 'branch' && /(?:^|\s)-(?:d|D|m|M|c|C|f)\b|(?:^|\s)--(?:delete|move|copy|force|unset-upstream)\b/.test(segment)) {
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return false;
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}
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if (subCmd === 'tag' && /(?:^|\s)-(?:d|f)\b|(?:^|\s)--(?:delete|force)\b/.test(segment)) {
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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// npm / yarn / pnpm / bun / npx
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@@ -260,9 +297,22 @@ function isSegmentSafe(segment) {
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if (baseName === 'cargo') {
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return SAFE_CARGO_SUBCOMMANDS.has(subCmd);
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}
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-
// rtk
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-
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-
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// rtk is a command REWRITER/executor, not a leaf command: `rtk <cmd>` runs
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// <cmd> (e.g. `rtk git status`), and `rtk proxy <cmd>` runs it unfiltered. So
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// its safety equals the WRAPPED command's — a blanket allow turned it into a
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// wildcard exec hole (`rtk node evil.js` auto-approved RCE). Strip the `rtk`
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// token (and a `proxy` passthrough) and recurse, like the time/nice prefix.
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// Read-only meta-subcommands (gain/discover/version) stay safe.
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if (baseName === 'rtk') {
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const next = words[argIdx] || '';
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if (next === '' || next === 'gain' || next === 'discover' || /^-/.test(next))
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return true;
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const restWords = words.slice(next === 'proxy' ? argIdx + 1 : argIdx);
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const rest = restWords.join(' ').trim();
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if (!rest)
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return true;
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return isSegmentSafe(rest);
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}
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// `find` is read-only EXCEPT its action predicates, which execute arbitrary
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// commands or delete files (`find / -name id_rsa -exec cat {} +`, `find . -delete`).
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// Same arbitrary-exec hazard that excludes xargs — force a prompt.
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package/package.json
CHANGED