@blamejs/pki 0.9.1 → 0.9.4

package/lib/cms-sign.js

@@ -205,6 +205,19 @@ function _assertAlgorithmProtectionPairs(pairs, digestAlgId, armAlgId, armTag) {
 function _resolveSignerContext(signer, opts) {
   var so = signer || intrinsic.create(null);
   var keyOnly = so.cert == null && so.spki != null;
+  /** @internal A descriptor names the digest and the padding the signature is made under, so a field
+   *  this verb does not read is a request that was never carried out: measured, a `digestAlgoritm`
+   *  typo signed under sha256 while the caller believed they had asked for sha384, and the same
+   *  misspelling one argument along in `opts` was already a refusal. The two key sets below have
+   *  described this shape since they were written, and `pkcs12-build` already holds the same
+   *  descriptors to them; this is the module that owns them doing the same. */
+  guard.identifier.assertKnownDescriptorKeys(so, keyOnly ? KNOWN_SIGNER_KEY_ONLY_KEYS : KNOWN_SIGNER_CERT_KEYS,
+    _err, "cms/bad-input", function (k) {
+      return "unknown signer field " + guard.text.showValue(k) + " for the " + (keyOnly
+        ? "key-only form; it takes { key, spki, keyIdentifier } plus the signature parameters"
+        : "certificate form; it takes { key, cert } plus the signature parameters") +
+        " (pss, digestAlgorithm, combinedRsaSig)";
+    });
   var soKey = so.key;
   var soSpki = keyOnly ? guard.bytes.snapshotSource(so.spki, CmsError, "cms/bad-input", "a key-only signer's spki") : null;
   var certDer = keyOnly ? null : _normCertDer(so.cert);
@@ -534,6 +547,14 @@ function _resolveSignerIndices(spec, n) {
 
 function _buildCountersignature(targetSigOctets, countersigner, opts) {
   var so = countersigner || intrinsic.create(null);
+  /** @internal A countersignature is a SignerInfo (RFC 5652 sec. 11.4) and its descriptor names the
+   *  same signature parameters, so a field this reader does not read is the same dropped request it
+   *  is at `sign`. This reader is its own, so the gate at the other one did not cover it. A
+   *  countersignature is always the certificate form, which is the `cert` read below. */
+  guard.identifier.assertKnownDescriptorKeys(so, KNOWN_SIGNER_CERT_KEYS, _err, "cms/bad-input", function (k) {
+    return "unknown countersigner field " + guard.text.showValue(k) +
+      "; it takes { key, cert } plus the signature parameters (pss, digestAlgorithm, combinedRsaSig)";
+  });
   var certDer = _normCertDer(so.cert);
   var cert = x509.parse(certDer);
   var scheme = signScheme.resolveSignScheme(cert, so, opts.signedAttributes === false, _signE);

package/lib/cms-verify.js

@@ -1170,10 +1170,12 @@ function _snapshotTimestampTrust(opts, allowWeakDigests) {
   };
 }
 
-/** @internal A signature over content is authorized by digitalSignature, contentCommitment or
- *  nonRepudiation alike; the shared helper carries the rest of the rule. */
+/** @internal The decoder emits the RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.3 bit name `nonRepudiation`, never the X.509
+ *  spelling `contentCommitment`, so naming the latter here asked for a name nothing defines.
+ *  A signature over content is authorized by digitalSignature or nonRepudiation alike; the shared
+ *  helper carries the rest of the rule. */
 var _permitsSigning = pkix.keyUsagePermits(pkix.makeNS("cms", CmsError, oid),
-  ["digitalSignature", "contentCommitment", "nonRepudiation"]);
+  ["digitalSignature", "nonRepudiation"]);
 
 function _keyUsagePermitsSigning(parsedCerts, der) {
   var entry = guard.list.firstMatch(parsedCerts, function (c) { return intrinsic.bufferEquals(c.der, der); });

package/lib/crl-sign.js

@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ function _verify(crl, issuer) {
   var parsed = _coerceCrl(crl);
   var resolved = _resolveIssuer(issuer);
   var issuerMaySign = resolved.cert ? _issuerMaySign(parsed, resolved.cert) : true;
-  return crlVerify.verifyCrlSignature(parsed, resolved.spki).then(function (sigOk) {
+  return intrinsic.chain(crlVerify.verifyCrlSignature(parsed, resolved.spki), function (sigOk) {
     var signatureValid = sigOk === true;
     var valid = issuerMaySign && signatureValid;
     return guard.verdict.of(

package/lib/crmf-sign.js

@@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ function _build(spec, key, opts) {
  * `Buffer`; a malformed template throws a typed `CrmfError`.
  *
  * @example
- *   var tpl = pki.crmf.buildCertTemplate({ serialNumber: 42n, issuer: "CN=CA" });
+ *   var tpl = pki.crmf.buildCertTemplate({ serialNumber: 42n, issuer: "CA" });
  *   pki.asn1.decode(tpl).tagNumber === pki.asn1.TAGS.SEQUENCE;   // the CertTemplate SEQUENCE
  */
 function buildCertTemplate(template) { return _encodeCertTemplate(template, { revocation: true }).der; }

package/lib/csr-sign.js

@@ -338,8 +338,10 @@ function _coerceCsr(request) {
  *   var req = await pki.csr.sign({ subject: "device-42", subjectPublicKey: spki }, { key: pkcs8 });
  *   var r = await pki.csr.verify(req);
  *   // Issue from r.subject / r.subjectPublicKeyInfo / r.attributes, which are the verified fields.
+ *   // `r.subject.bytes` is the request's own Name DER, so the issued subject is the requested one
+ *   // byte for byte. `r.subject.dn` is its text form, which a builder reads as a common name.
  *   var issued = r.verified
- *     ? await pki.x509.sign({ subject: r.subject.dn, subjectPublicKey: r.subjectPublicKeyInfo.bytes,
+ *     ? await pki.x509.sign({ subject: r.subject.bytes, subjectPublicKey: r.subjectPublicKeyInfo.bytes,
  *         notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2027-01-01T00:00:00Z") },
  *       { key: pkcs8 })
  *     : null;
@@ -347,7 +349,7 @@ function _coerceCsr(request) {
 function verify(request) { return guard.async.deferred(function () { return _verify(request); }); }
 function _verify(request) {
   var parsed = _coerceCsr(request);
-  return _promiseResolve(_Promise, csrVerify.verifyCsrSignature(parsed)).then(function (ok) {
+  return intrinsic.chain(_promiseResolve(_Promise, csrVerify.verifyCsrSignature(parsed)), function (ok) {
     return guard.verdict.of({
       valid: ok === true,
       verified: ok === true,

package/lib/est.js

@@ -1513,7 +1513,7 @@ function _fullcmcResult(res, opts, wanted, sent) {
       bound: { transactionId: false, senderNonce: false, dataReturn: false, bodyPartIDs: false },
       boundToRequest: false });
   }
-  return cmcVerify.verify(der, sent).then(function (verdict) {
+  return intrinsic.chain(cmcVerify.verify(der, sent), function (verdict) {
     if (verdict.outcome !== "issued") return verdict;
     if (!wanted.length) { verdict.issuedCertificates = []; return verdict; }
     var issuedCerts = _correlateIssued(verdict.certificates, wanted, "CMC-response");
@@ -1524,12 +1524,12 @@ function _fullcmcResult(res, opts, wanted, sent) {
 }
 
 function _tryDecodeCmcFault(res, sent) {
-  return _promiseResolve(_Promise, undefined).then(function () {
+  return intrinsic.chain(intrinsic.chain(_promiseResolve(_Promise, undefined), function () {
     var pt = _partMediaType(_ciHeader(res.headers, "content-type"));
     if (pt.media !== "application/pkcs7-mime") return null;
     if (pt.ambiguous) return null;
     if (String(pt.smimeType || "").toLowerCase() !== "cmc-response") return null;
-    return cmcVerify.verify(transferDecode(res.body), sent).then(function (verdict) {
+    return intrinsic.chain(cmcVerify.verify(transferDecode(res.body), sent), function (verdict) {
       if (verdict.outcome !== "rejected") return null;
       var e = E("est/cmc-failed",
         "the EST server rejected the Full PKI Request: " + verdict.outcome +
@@ -1538,7 +1538,7 @@ function _tryDecodeCmcFault(res, sent) {
       e.httpStatus = res.status;
       return e;
     });
-  }).then(null, function () { return null; });
+  }), null, function () { return null; });
 }
 
 function _isTypedError(e) {

package/lib/guard-identifier.js

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ var _mapSet = intrinsic.mapSet;
 var _mapHas = intrinsic.mapHas;
 var _Set = intrinsic.Set;
 var _Map = intrinsic.Map;
+var _ObjectProto = intrinsic.ObjectProto;
 var _charCodeAt = intrinsic.uncurry(String.prototype.charCodeAt);
 var _strSplit = intrinsic.uncurry(String.prototype.split);
 var _fnToString = intrinsic.uncurry(Function.prototype.toString);
@@ -92,6 +93,54 @@ function assertKnownKeys(obj, known, E, code, message) {
   });
 }
 
+/**
+ * @internal
+ * Whether `k` is `v`'s function machinery, owned or reached from its prototype chain. A check that
+ * walks the chain asks this; a reader that copies one LEVEL at a time asks `isOwnMachineryName`.
+ *
+ * Which of the two a given name is depends on the function and the engine. A STRICT function, which
+ * is every function in an ES module or a `"use strict"` file, owns neither `arguments` nor `caller`,
+ * and `Function.prototype` carries both as the restricted accessors, so a chain walk finds them
+ * there. On the Node 24.21.0 floor a non-strict function owns both outright. Measured before this
+ * covered the inherited side: a plain strict callable descriptor was refused for `arguments` by
+ * `pki.cms.sign` and `pki.cms.countersign`, while the minted floor shape passed, which is the shape
+ * the vectors were written on.
+ */
+// @enforced-by behavioral -- the vectors that drive a PLAIN callable and a floor-shaped one through
+// @enforced-by behavioral -- each door are the guard; the name set has no rename-proof code shape
+function isMachineryName(v, k) {
+  if (v === null || v === undefined) return false;
+  if (isOwnMachineryName(v, k)) return true;
+  if (typeof v !== "function" || !_CALLABLE_MACHINERY.has(k)) return false;
+  /** @internal Not owned, so `readableNames` reached it through the prototype chain. A caller's own
+   *  property of that name is theirs and stays refused by name, which `isOwnMachineryName` above
+   *  decides; making one takes `defineProperty`, since assigning `fn.arguments` reaches the
+   *  restricted setter and throws. */
+  return _getOwnPropertyDescriptor(v, k) === undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @internal
+ * `assertKnownKeys` for a bag a verb documents as acceptably CALLABLE, where the names a function
+ * carries by construction are not fields the caller named. The exemption belongs at the door that
+ * refuses, not only at a reader that copies: `pki.smime.sign` snapshots a descriptor before handing
+ * it on, so excluding the machinery there left a caller going straight to `pki.cms.sign` with the
+ * same callable refused for `length`.
+ *
+ * It is not `assertKnownKeys`'s own rule, because a bare function handed in where an OPTIONS BAG
+ * belongs is refused for exactly those names, which is a contract of its own.
+ */
+// @enforced-by behavioral -- the vectors that drive a callable descriptor through each door are the
+// @enforced-by behavioral -- guard; the exemption has no rename-proof code shape
+function assertKnownDescriptorKeys(obj, known, E, code, message) {
+  _refuseUnenumerable(obj, E, code, "the options");
+  var describe = typeof message === "function" ? message : function (k) { return message + _stringify(k); };
+  _forEach(_readableNames(obj), function (k) {
+    if (_hasOwn(known, k) || isMachineryName(obj, k)) return;
+    throw E(code, describe(typeof k === "symbol" ? _String(k) : k));
+  });
+}
+
 // @enforced-by behavioral -- reading a property twice has no rename-proof code shape; the RED
 // @enforced-by behavioral -- vectors that drive an accessor-backed option are the guard
 function snapshotOptions(obj, known) {
@@ -320,6 +369,64 @@ function _kindMembers(v) {
   return [];
 }
 
+/** @internal The names a callable carries before a caller assigns a field, asked of the engine
+ *  rather than listed here: a function's own names, plus `Function.prototype`'s, which is where the
+ *  restricted `arguments` and `caller` accessors live. Which of them a given function makes OWN
+ *  depends on the engine. Measured: on Node 24.21.0, the version `engines.node` floors at, every
+ *  non-strict function carries own `arguments` and `caller`; on 26.9.0 none does, for a declaration
+ *  and for `new Function` alike. A list written against one of those refuses a legitimate callable
+ *  descriptor on the other, and a caller's non-strict CommonJS module is where the shape comes
+ *  from. */
+var _CALLABLE_MACHINERY = (function () {
+  var names = _create(null), symbols = new _Set();
+  /** @internal One pristine probe per callable KIND, because the kinds do not share a prototype: an
+   *  async function, a generator and an async generator each sit on their own intrinsic prototype
+   *  carrying `Symbol.toStringTag`, which an ordinary function's chain never reaches. Measured
+   *  before the probes were per-kind: `pki.cms.sign` refused all three for
+   *  `Symbol(Symbol.toStringTag)` while an ordinary function passed. Symbol keys are collected too,
+   *  since that is the name that was missing. */
+  /** @internal Every kind, not the subset that happens to suffice: the four intrinsic prototypes
+   *  carry the SAME well-known `Symbol.toStringTag` under different values, so dropping the async
+   *  generator still passes today and would not if a kind ever carried a key of its own. */
+  var probes = [function () {}, function* () {}, async function () {}, async function* () {}, class {}];
+  _forEach(probes, function (p) {
+    for (var o = p; o !== null && o !== _ObjectProto; o = _getPrototypeOf(o)) {
+      _forEach(_ownKeys(o), function (k) {
+        if (typeof k === "symbol") _setAdd(symbols, k); else names[k] = true;
+      });
+    }
+  });
+  return {
+    has: function (k) { return typeof k === "symbol" ? _setHas(symbols, k) : names[k] === true; },
+  };
+})();
+
+/**
+ * @internal
+ * Whether `k` is part of `v`'s own machinery rather than a field a caller named: a RegExp's
+ * `lastIndex`, the non-thenable mask's `then`, and a callable's own function machinery, which is
+ * non-enumerable where a field a caller assigned is enumerable.
+ *
+ * A reader that COPIES a descriptor's own keys asks this, so it copies what the caller wrote and
+ * nothing else. The name checks do not: a bare function handed in where an options bag belongs is
+ * refused for the names it carries, which is a contract of its own, so the callable rule lives here
+ * rather than in `_isOwnStructuralName`.
+ */
+// @enforced-by behavioral -- a per-kind name set has no rename-proof code shape; the vectors
+// @enforced-by behavioral -- that drive a callable descriptor through a copying door are the guard
+function isOwnMachineryName(v, k) {
+  if (v === null || v === undefined) return false;
+  var d = _getOwnPropertyDescriptor(v, k);
+  /** @internal A DATA property, because that is what the machinery is: measured on both Node
+   *  24.21.0 and 26.9.0, every one of these names a function owns is a non-enumerable data
+   *  property. An accessor a caller installed under one of those names is therefore theirs, and it
+   *  reaches the unknown-field refusal by its name rather than being exempted and ignored. Asking
+   *  the descriptor rather than reading the property leaves the getter uninvoked either way. */
+  if (typeof v === "function" && !!d && d.enumerable === false && _hasOwn(d, "value") &&
+      _CALLABLE_MACHINERY.has(k)) return true;
+  return _isOwnStructuralName(v, k, d, false);
+}
+
 function _isOwnStructuralName(v, k, d, inherited) {
   if (util.types.isRegExp(v) && k === "lastIndex") return true;
   /** @internal The non-thenable mask `guard.verdict.shield` leaves on a value the toolkit hands back:
@@ -680,6 +787,9 @@ module.exports = intrinsic.freeze({
   snapshotOptions: snapshotOptions,
   snapshotPresentOptions: snapshotPresentOptions,
   optionNames: optionNames,
+  isOwnMachineryName: isOwnMachineryName,
+  isMachineryName: isMachineryName,
+  assertKnownDescriptorKeys: assertKnownDescriptorKeys,
   ownOptions: ownOptions,
   pickSettings: pickSettings,
   readableNames: readableNames,

package/lib/guard-name.js

@@ -65,7 +65,51 @@ function assertPrintableIa5(buf, E, code, label) {
 }
 
 function _isSpace(c) { return c === 0x20 || c === 0x09 || c === 0x0a || c === 0x0d; }
-function _canonAttrValue(v, E, code, label) {
+/** @internal The attribute types whose EQUALITY rule is not case-ignoring, resolved once to their
+ *  object identifiers. An equality rule belongs to the attribute, and folding case on one whose rule
+ *  is case-exact makes two distinct names compare as one name: measured through `pki.x509.parseDn`,
+ *  `challengePassword=Secret` and `challengePassword=secret` encode differently and compared EQUAL,
+ *  as did `localKeyId=AB` against `ab` and a `role` URI against its lowercase form.
+ *
+ *  Only the exceptions are listed. caseIgnoreMatch under the RFC 4518 preparation is the correct
+ *  rule for every attribute RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.4 requires support for, so a conforming PKIX name
+ *  compares as it did and an attribute the registry does not name keeps that default rather than
+ *  being given a rule nothing states.
+ *
+ *  The identifiers are resolved rather than written, since a dotted-decimal literal is never the
+ *  identity a module carries. */
+/** @internal RFC 2985 sec. 5.4.1 gives challengePassword caseExactMatch, sec. 5.5.2 gives localKeyId
+ *  octetStringMatch, and RFC 5755 sec. 4.4.5 makes a role a URI. */
+var _CASE_EXACT_NAMES = ["challengePassword", "localKeyId", "role"];
+var _caseExactOids = null;
+function _isCaseExactType(type) {
+  if (typeof type !== "string") return false;
+  if (_caseExactOids === null) {
+    var oid = require("./oid");   // allow:inline-require -- circular load: oid -> guard-all -> this module
+    _caseExactOids = _create(null);
+    for (var i = 0; i < _CASE_EXACT_NAMES.length; i++) {
+      var o = oid.byName(_CASE_EXACT_NAMES[i]);
+      if (typeof o === "string") _caseExactOids[o] = true;
+    }
+  }
+  return _caseExactOids[type] === true;
+}
+
+/** @internal The registry's own reading of a dotted-decimal object identifier, taken from there
+ *  rather than re-derived: `numericoid` is RFC 4512's production and one definition of it decides
+ *  both what the registry resolves and what opens a distinguished name. */
+var _isDottedOid = null;
+function _opensAsNumericOid(run) {
+  if (_isDottedOid === null) {
+    var oid = require("./oid");   // allow:inline-require -- circular load: oid -> guard-all -> this module
+    _isDottedOid = oid.isDottedDecimal;
+  }
+  return _isDottedOid(run) === true;
+}
+
+/** @internal The RFC 4518 insignificant-space preparation, which every equality rule here applies.
+ *  The case fold is the caller's to add, because that step is the one the attribute's rule decides. */
+function _prepAttrValue(v, E, code, label) {
   if (typeof v !== "string") return v;
   assertNoControlBytes(v, E, code, label);
   var out = "", lastWasSpace = true;
@@ -75,8 +119,9 @@ function _canonAttrValue(v, E, code, label) {
     lastWasSpace = false;
     out += _charAt(v, i);
   }
-  return _toLowerCase(out);
+  return out;
 }
+
 /** @internal Both lengths are NARROWED where they are taken, and every test and walk below asks the
  * local. `Array.isArray` is true for a Proxy whose target is an array and a `get` trap answers `length`
  * afresh on each read, so the equality test and the walk that follows it could see two different counts:
@@ -114,14 +159,25 @@ function rdnEqual(a, b, E, code, label) {
      *  comparison's one unacceptable answer, since it is what chains a certificate to its issuer. */
     var ea = a[i];
     var typeA = ea == null ? undefined : ea.type;
-    var valueA = _canonAttrValue(ea == null ? undefined : ea.value, E, code, label);
+    /** @internal Prepared once without the fold, and folded once, so the attribute's own rule picks
+     *  between them without reading the element again. */
+    var prepA = _prepAttrValue(ea == null ? undefined : ea.value, E, code, label);
+    var foldedA = typeof prepA === "string" ? _toLowerCase(prepA) : prepA;
+    var exactA = _isCaseExactType(typeA);
     var found = false;
     for (var j = 0; j < n.b; j++) {
       if (used[j]) continue;
       var eb = b[j];
       var typeB = eb == null ? undefined : eb.type;
       if (typeA !== typeB) continue;
-      if (valueA === _canonAttrValue(eb == null ? undefined : eb.value, E, code, label)) {
+      var prepB = _prepAttrValue(eb == null ? undefined : eb.value, E, code, label);
+      /** @internal Either side naming a case-exact attribute decides it. The types already matched,
+       *  so the two can disagree only through an object answering differently per read, and the
+       *  exact comparison is the one that cannot make two distinct names equal. */
+      var same = exactA || _isCaseExactType(typeB)
+        ? prepA === prepB
+        : foldedA === (typeof prepB === "string" ? _toLowerCase(prepB) : prepB);
+      if (same) {
         used[j] = true; found = true; break;
       }
     }
@@ -213,6 +269,36 @@ function isAttributeDescriptor(name) {
   return true;
 }
 
+/**
+ * @internal
+ * Whether a string opens with the prefix RFC 4514 sec. 3 requires of a distinguished name: an
+ * attribute type, a descriptor or a dotted-decimal OID, immediately followed by `=`. It answers one
+ * question, whether a caller who passed a bare string meant a distinguished name rather than the
+ * single value the shorthand reads it as, and it is deliberately narrower than parsing: a value that
+ * CONTAINS an `=` further along, `Example CA (v=2)`, opens with no attribute type and is not
+ * a distinguished name.
+ *
+ * `attributeType` is `descr / numericoid`, and a `numericoid` carries at least one dot, so a numeric
+ * run without one is not an attribute type: `1=1` is a value no reader reads as a distinguished
+ * name, and refusing it would name a remedy that does not apply. The leading whitespace sec. 3
+ * admits nowhere is the same case from the other side: ` CN=Example` opens with no attribute type
+ * and is the value it says it is.
+ */
+// @enforced-by behavioral -- an opening-prefix test has no rename-proof shape distinct from
+function opensAsDnString(str) {
+  if (typeof str !== "string" || str.length === 0) return false;
+  var i = 0, n = str.length, first = _charCodeAt(str, 0);
+  if (_isDigit(first)) {
+    while (i < n && (_isDigit(_charCodeAt(str, i)) || _charCodeAt(str, i) === 0x2e)) i++;
+    if (!_opensAsNumericOid(_strSlice(str, 0, i))) return false;
+  } else if (_isAttrTypeStart(first)) {
+    while (i < n && _isAttrTypeChar(_charCodeAt(str, i))) i++;
+  } else {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return i > 0 && i < n && _charCodeAt(str, i) === 0x3d;
+}
+
 // @enforced-by behavioral -- the inverse of escapeDnValue has no rename-proof shape distinct
 function parseDnString(str, E, code, label) {
   if (typeof str !== "string") throw E(code, label + " must be a string");
@@ -1058,6 +1144,7 @@ module.exports = intrinsic.freeze({
   assertNoControlBytes: assertNoControlBytes, assertPrintableIa5: assertPrintableIa5,
   dnEqual: dnEqual, rdnEqual: rdnEqual, emailEqual: emailEqual, dpnCorresponds: dpnCorresponds,
   escapeControlBytes: escapeControlBytes, escapeDnValue: escapeDnValue, parseDnString: parseDnString,
+  opensAsDnString: opensAsDnString,
   isAttributeDescriptor: isAttributeDescriptor,
   lowerAscii: lowerAscii, uriSchemeIs: uriSchemeIs,
   stripTrailingDot: stripTrailingDot, isFqdnHost: isFqdnHost, splitMailbox: splitMailbox,

package/lib/inspect.js

@@ -1531,8 +1531,8 @@ function crmfReport(input) {
  *   var key = await pki.key.export(pair.privateKey);
  *   var cert = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "cmp.example", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
  *     notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2036-01-01T00:00:00Z") }, { key: key });
- *   var der = await pki.cmp.build({ header: { sender: { directoryName: "CN=cmp.example" },
- *     recipient: { directoryName: "CN=A CA" } },
+ *   var der = await pki.cmp.build({ header: { sender: { directoryName: "cmp.example" },
+ *     recipient: { directoryName: "A CA" } },
  *     body: { ir: { certTemplate: { subject: [{ commonName: "cmp.example" }], publicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey) } } } },
  *     { cert: cert, key: key });
  *   pki.inspect.cmp(der).split("\n")[0];  // "CMP Message:"
@@ -1937,10 +1937,10 @@ function tspReport(input) {
  *
  * @example
  *   var pair = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
- *   var der = await pki.attrcert.sign({ holder: { entityName: { directoryName: "CN=Alice" } },
+ *   var der = await pki.attrcert.sign({ holder: { entityName: { directoryName: "Alice" } },
  *     notBeforeTime: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfterTime: new Date("2027-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
  *     attributes: { role: { roleName: { uniformResourceIdentifier: "urn:role:admin" } } } },
- *     { name: "CN=An AA", publicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey), key: await pki.key.export(pair.privateKey) });
+ *     { name: "An AA", publicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey), key: await pki.key.export(pair.privateKey) });
  *   pki.inspect.attrcert(der).split("\n")[0];  // "Attribute Certificate:"
  */
 function attrCertReport(input) {

package/lib/lint.js

@@ -3901,6 +3901,43 @@ function _isMlKem(cert) {
   var spki = cert.subjectPublicKeyInfo;
   return !!(spki && spki.algorithm && ML_KEM_EK_LEN[spki.algorithm.name] !== undefined);
 }
+/** @internal RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.3 states no per-algorithm bit set of its own: "appropriate values
+ *  for keyUsage extensions for particular algorithms are specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055], and
+ *  [RFC4491]". RFC 5480 updates RFC 3279 for elliptic curve, and RFC 8813 sec. 3 adds the
+ *  prohibition: for a certificate indicating id-ecPublicKey, keyEncipherment and dataEncipherment
+ *  MUST NOT be present. The row runs in the rfc5280 profile because that is the profile whose own
+ *  clause delegates the question, and the profile every authoring call is held to.
+ *
+ *  Only the id-ecPublicKey arm is here. Sec. 3's other two arms govern id-ecDH and id-ecMQV, which
+ *  this registry does not name, so a row keyed on them could never fire; registering them as
+ *  subject-key algorithms is adding surface rather than closing this. There is no RSA row: RFC 3279
+ *  sec. 2.3.1 states a MAY list and no prohibition, so an error-severity finding there would promote
+ *  a MAY-list omission to a MUST NOT and stop the signer emitting a certificate a caller may want. */
+var EC_FORBIDDEN_KU_BITS = ["keyEncipherment", "dataEncipherment"];
+var RFC5480_RULES = [
+  {
+    id: "lint/rfc5480/ec-key-usage-forbidden", severity: "error", source: "rfc5480",
+    citation: "RFC 8813 3 (updating RFC 5480 3)",
+    message: "an elliptic curve certificate's keyUsage must not assert keyEncipherment or dataEncipherment",
+    /** @internal The same classifier the CABF key-usage tables select on, so one answer to "is this
+     *  an ECC key" serves both and they cannot diverge on a subject key. */
+    appliesTo: _isEccKey,
+    check: function (cert, ctx) {
+      var ku = ctx.decode("keyUsage");
+      if (!ku || !ku.value) return null;
+      var set = [];
+      for (var i = 0; i < EC_FORBIDDEN_KU_BITS.length; i++) {
+        if (ku.value[EC_FORBIDDEN_KU_BITS[i]] === true) _push(set, EC_FORBIDDEN_KU_BITS[i]);
+      }
+      /** @internal One finding naming both bits rather than one each: the fault is the pair the
+       *  clause forbids, and an operator clearing them clears them together. The join is the
+       *  captured one, since this file is mid-conversion and a live `Array.prototype.join` is a
+       *  read a replacement decides. */
+      return set.length ? { context: { bits: intrinsic.join(set, ", ") } } : null;
+    },
+  },
+];
+
 var RFC9935_RULES = [
   {
     id: "lint/rfc9935/kem-key-usage", severity: "error", source: "rfc9935", citation: "RFC 9935 5",
@@ -6650,7 +6687,12 @@ var RFC5280_EXTENSION_SYNTAX_RULES = RFC5280_RULES.filter(function (r) {
   return r.id === "lint/rfc5280/extension-undecodable";
 });
 var PROFILES = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
-  "rfc5280": RFC5280_RULES,
+  /** @internal The elliptic curve rows ride with rfc5280 rather than only under their own name,
+   *  because sec. 4.2.1.3 of that document delegates the per-algorithm key usage values and RFC 8813
+   *  is where the delegate's answer now is. Under their own name as well, so a caller can ask for
+   *  them alone and `pki.lint.profiles()` names the document that states the rule. */
+  "rfc5280": intrinsic.concatList(RFC5280_RULES, RFC5480_RULES),
+  "rfc5480": intrinsic.concatList(RFC5480_RULES, RFC5280_EXTENSION_SYNTAX_RULES),
   "rfc9881": RFC9881_RULES.concat(RFC5280_EXTENSION_SYNTAX_RULES),
   "rfc9909": RFC9909_RULES.concat(RFC5280_EXTENSION_SYNTAX_RULES),
   "rfc9935": RFC9935_RULES.concat(RFC5280_EXTENSION_SYNTAX_RULES),
@@ -6685,6 +6727,11 @@ var ALL_RULES = RFC5280_RULES.concat(RFC9881_RULES).concat(RFC9909_RULES).concat
    * inert under the default set because each one asks whether the caller named the profile. */
   .concat(MOZILLA_RULES).concat(CHROME_RULES).concat(MICROSOFT_RULES).concat(APPLE_RULES)
   .concat(NIST_TRANSITION_RULES).concat(CNSA2_RULES);
+/** @internal Appended through the capture rather than a fourth `.concat`: this file is
+ *  mid-conversion and the live `Array.prototype.concat` reads `Symbol.isConcatSpreadable` off each
+ *  operand and builds through ArraySpeciesCreate, so a replacement decides which rows the default
+ *  set holds. The pre-existing chain above is counted in the conversion budget. */
+ALL_RULES = intrinsic.concatList(ALL_RULES, RFC5480_RULES);
 
 var CABF_TLS_CSR_RULES = CABF_TLS_RULES.filter(function (r) {
   return CABF_TLS_CSR_RULE_IDS.indexOf(r.id) !== -1;
@@ -7556,10 +7603,10 @@ function _ingestAttrCert(input) {
  * @example
  *   var pair = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
  *   var key = await pki.key.export(pair.privateKey);
- *   var der = await pki.attrcert.sign({ holder: { entityName: { directoryName: "CN=Alice" } },
+ *   var der = await pki.attrcert.sign({ holder: { entityName: { directoryName: "Alice" } },
  *     notBeforeTime: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfterTime: new Date("2027-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
  *     attributes: { role: { roleName: { uniformResourceIdentifier: "urn:role:admin" } } } },
- *     { name: "CN=Example AA", publicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey), key: key });
+ *     { name: "Example AA", publicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey), key: key });
  *   pki.lint.attrcert(der).findings.length;       // -> 0 for a conforming attribute certificate
  */
 function attrcert(input, opts) {
@@ -7701,11 +7748,11 @@ function rules(profile, artifact) {
  * and `"default"`, are not among them.
  * @example
  *   pki.lint.profiles();
- *   // -> ["rfc5280", "rfc9881", "rfc9909", "rfc9935", "rfc9763", "rfc7633", "x509-altsig",
- *   //     "cabf-tls", "cabf-smime", "cabf-cs", "etsi-qc", "mozilla-root", "chrome-root",
- *   //     "microsoft-root", "apple-root", "nist-pqc-transition", "cnsa-2.0", "rfc2986",
- *   //     "rfc9883", "rfc5280-crl", "rfc6960", "rfc5019", "rfc5652", "rfc8933", "rfc3161",
- *   //     "rfc5755"]
+ *   // -> ["rfc5280", "rfc5480", "rfc9881", "rfc9909", "rfc9935", "rfc9763", "rfc7633",
+ *   //     "x509-altsig", "cabf-tls", "cabf-smime", "cabf-cs", "etsi-qc", "mozilla-root",
+ *   //     "chrome-root", "microsoft-root", "apple-root", "nist-pqc-transition", "cnsa-2.0",
+ *   //     "rfc2986", "rfc9883", "rfc5280-crl", "rfc6960", "rfc5019", "rfc5652", "rfc8933",
+ *   //     "rfc3161", "rfc5755"]
  */
 /** @internal `cabf-tls` names the certificate profile in this list and is not repeated for the
  *  request form: `pki.lint.csr` takes the same name and runs those rows against what a request

package/lib/ocsp-verify.js

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ var OID_OCSP_NOCHECK = oid.byName("ocspNoCheck");
 var OID_EKU = oid.byName("extKeyUsage");
 var OID_KEY_USAGE = oid.byName("keyUsage");
 
-function ocspDigest(alg, buf) { return subtle.digest(alg, buf).then(function (h) { return _bufferFrom(h); }); }
+function ocspDigest(alg, buf) { return intrinsic.chain(subtle.digest(alg, buf), function (h) { return _bufferFrom(h); }); }
 
 function ocspKeyValue(spkiDer) {
   return asn1.read.bitString(asn1.decode(spkiDer).children[1]).bytes;

package/lib/pki-build.js

@@ -522,6 +522,20 @@ function makeBuilder(ctx) {
   }
   function encodeName(spec) {
     if (guard.bytes.isByteSource(spec)) { var _nd = guard.bytes.snapshotSource(spec, ErrorClass, ctx.prefix + "/bad-name", "raw Name DER"); assertValidNameDer(_nd); return _nd; }
+    /** @internal A bare string is the common-name shorthand, and a caller who writes a distinguished
+     *  name here gets one commonName holding the whole text: measured, `"CN=Example CA, O=Example"`
+     *  certified the single RDN `CN=CN=Example CA\, O=Example`, the doubled `CN=` being the caller's
+     *  own attribute type read as part of the value. Only one of the two readings can be what was
+     *  meant, so the distinguished-name one is refused rather than certified as a name nobody asked
+     *  for, and the caller says which by passing `pki.x509.parseDn(s).bytes` or the RDN array. A
+     *  common name that contains an `=` further along does not open as a distinguished name
+     *  and is untouched. OpenSSL refuses the same string for the same reason, naming the form it
+     *  wants; Go has no string form and .NET reads a string as the distinguished name. */
+    if (typeof spec === "string" && guard.name.opensAsDnString(spec)) {
+      throw E("bad-name", "a bare name string is a common name, and " + guard.text.showValue(spec) +
+        " opens as a distinguished name. Pass pki.x509.parseDn(s).bytes for the distinguished name, " +
+        "or [{ commonName: s }] to certify it as one common name");
+    }
     if (typeof spec === "string") spec = [{ commonName: spec }];
     if (!_isArray(spec)) throw E("bad-name", "a name must be a string, an array of RDNs, or raw Name DER");
     /** @internal Held to the same density every other authoring list is held to. Mapping over a

package/lib/possession.js

@@ -160,12 +160,12 @@ function _namesCertificate(signer, certParsed) {
  *   var kemSpki = await pki.key.export(kem.publicKey, { format: "der" });
  *   var sigSpki = await pki.key.export(sig.publicKey, { format: "der" });
  *   var sigCert = await pki.x509.sign({
- *     subject: "CN=kem.example", subjectPublicKey: sigSpki, serialNumber: 34n,
+ *     subject: "kem.example", subjectPublicKey: sigSpki, serialNumber: 34n,
  *     notBefore: new Date("2027-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2028-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
  *   }, { key: sig.privateKey });
  *   var parsedCert = pki.schema.x509.parse(sigCert);
  *   var csr = await pki.csr.sign({
- *     subject: "CN=kem.example", subjectPublicKey: kemSpki,
+ *     subject: "kem.example", subjectPublicKey: kemSpki,
  *     privateKeyPossessionStatement: {
  *       signer: { issuer: parsedCert.issuer.bytes, serialNumber: parsedCert.serialNumber },
  *       certificate: sigCert,
@@ -354,18 +354,18 @@ var _isSignatureOnlyKey = pkix.signatureOnlyKeyOid(NS);
  *   var ca = await pki.key.generate({ name: "ECDSA", namedCurve: "P-256" });
  *   var caSpki = await pki.key.export(ca.publicKey, { format: "der" });
  *   var caCert = await pki.x509.sign({
- *     subject: "CN=Possession CA", subjectPublicKey: caSpki, serialNumber: 1n,
+ *     subject: "Possession CA", subjectPublicKey: caSpki, serialNumber: 1n,
  *     notBefore: new Date("2027-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2028-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
  *     extensions: { basicConstraints: { cA: true }, keyUsage: ["keyCertSign"] },
  *   }, { key: ca.privateKey });
  *   var sigCert = await pki.x509.sign({
- *     subject: "CN=kem.example", subjectPublicKey: sigSpki, serialNumber: 34n,
+ *     subject: "kem.example", subjectPublicKey: sigSpki, serialNumber: 34n,
  *     notBefore: new Date("2027-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2028-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
  *     extensions: { keyUsage: ["digitalSignature"] },
  *   }, { cert: caCert, key: ca.privateKey });
  *   var p = pki.schema.x509.parse(sigCert);
  *   var csr = await pki.csr.sign({
- *     subject: "CN=kem.example", subjectPublicKey: kemSpki,
+ *     subject: "kem.example", subjectPublicKey: kemSpki,
  *     privateKeyPossessionStatement: {
  *       signer: { issuer: p.issuer.bytes, serialNumber: p.serialNumber }, certificate: sigCert,
  *     },
@@ -522,13 +522,15 @@ function _verifyRequest(request, opts) {
       "authorize a certification request (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.3)");
   }
 
-  return _promiseResolve(_Promise, _validatePath(chain, { trustAnchors: o.trustAnchors, time: at }))
-    .then(function (pathResult) {
+  return intrinsic.chain(
+    _promiseResolve(_Promise, _validatePath(chain, { trustAnchors: o.trustAnchors, time: at })),
+    function (pathResult) {
       var pathValidated = pathResult.valid === true;
       if (!pathValidated) _push(reasons, "the signature certificate's certification path is not valid, and RFC 9883 sec. 4 makes that a MUST");
-      return _seam.verify(parsed.signatureAlgorithm, parsed.signatureValue,
-        sigCert.subjectPublicKeyInfo.bytes, parsed.certificationRequestInfoBytes)
-        .then(function (verified) {
+      return intrinsic.chain(
+        _seam.verify(parsed.signatureAlgorithm, parsed.signatureValue,
+          sigCert.subjectPublicKeyInfo.bytes, parsed.certificationRequestInfoBytes),
+        function (verified) {
           if (verified !== true) _push(reasons, "the request signature does not verify under the signature certificate's public key, and RFC 9883 sec. 4 makes that a MUST");
           return guard.verdict.of({}, {
             valid: verified === true && pathValidated && signerMaySign && !requestsSignatureCertificate &&
@@ -543,15 +545,19 @@ function _verifyRequest(request, opts) {
             requestsSignatureCertificate: requestsSignatureCertificate,
             reason: reasons.length ? _join(reasons, "; ") : undefined,
           });
-        });
-    });
+        }
+      );
+    }
+  );
 }
 
 /** @internal Whether the signature certificate's key may make this signature at all. A certificate confined
  *  to `keyAgreement` does not authorize a signature over a certification request, and accepting one lets a
  *  key never issued for signing authorize issuance. The accepted set is `pki.cms`'s: a signature over
- *  content is authorized by digitalSignature, contentCommitment or nonRepudiation alike. */
-var _maySign = pkix.keyUsagePermits(NS, ["digitalSignature", "contentCommitment", "nonRepudiation"]);
+ *  content is authorized by digitalSignature or nonRepudiation alike. The decoder emits the
+ *  RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.3 bit name `nonRepudiation`, never the X.509 spelling `contentCommitment`,
+ *  so naming the latter here asked for a name nothing defines. */
+var _maySign = pkix.keyUsagePermits(NS, ["digitalSignature", "nonRepudiation"]);
 
 /** @internal The subjectAltName a request asks for, or null when it asks for none. */
 function _requestedSan(parsedCsr) {