@blamejs/pki 0.8.60 → 0.9.0

package/lib/ct.js

@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@
  *   bounded TLS-struct decode, fail-closed.
  */
 
-var nodeCrypto = require("crypto");
 var asn1 = require("./asn1-der.js");
+var _create = require("./guard-intrinsic").create;
 var constants = require("./constants.js");
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error.js");
 var guard = require("./guard-all.js");
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ function _u24Bytes(n) {
 var _X509_ENTRY_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { entryType: 1, leafCert: 1 });
 var _PRECERT_ENTRY_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { entryType: 1, tbsCertificate: 1, issuerKeyHash: 1 });
 function reconstructSignedData(entry, sct) {
-  entry = entry || {};
+  entry = entry || _create(null);
   if (typeof entry !== "object") throw new CtError("ct/bad-input", "the log entry must be an object { entryType, ... } (RFC 6962 sec. 3.1)");
   var entryType = entry.entryType;
   if (entryType !== 0 && entryType !== 1) {
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ async function verifySct(entry, sct, logPublicKey) {
       throw new CtError("ct/log-id-mismatch", "the SCT logId does not match SHA-256 of the provided log key (RFC 6962 sec. 3.2)");
     }
   }
-  var sigInfo = rec.signatureAlgorithm || {};
+  var sigInfo = rec.signatureAlgorithm || _create(null);
   var hashName = CT_HASH[sigInfo.hashName];
   if (!hashName) throw new CtError("ct/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported SCT hash algorithm " + JSON.stringify(sigInfo.hashName) + " (RFC 6962 sec. 2.1.4 mandates sha256)");
   var alg = _spkiAlg(spki);
@@ -605,11 +605,14 @@ function encodeSctList(scts) {
 function _logKeyMaterial(logKey) {
   try {
     var keyObj;
-    if (logKey && typeof logKey === "object" && logKey.asymmetricKeyType) keyObj = logKey;
-    else if (Buffer.isBuffer(logKey)) keyObj = nodeCrypto.createPrivateKey({ key: logKey, format: "der", type: "pkcs8" });
-    else keyObj = nodeCrypto.createPrivateKey(logKey);
-    if (keyObj.type !== "private") throw new CtError("ct/bad-input", "signSct requires the CT log PRIVATE key");
-    return { pkcs8: keyObj.export({ type: "pkcs8", format: "der" }), spki: nodeCrypto.createPublicKey(keyObj).export({ type: "spki", format: "der" }) };
+    if (guard.crypto.keyTypeOf(logKey)) keyObj = logKey;
+    else if (Buffer.isBuffer(logKey)) keyObj = guard.crypto.privateKey({ key: logKey, format: "der", type: "pkcs8" });
+    else keyObj = guard.crypto.privateKey(logKey);
+    if (guard.crypto.keyKind(keyObj) !== "private") throw new CtError("ct/bad-input", "signSct requires the CT log PRIVATE key");
+    return {
+      pkcs8: guard.crypto.exportKey(keyObj, { type: "pkcs8", format: "der" }),
+      spki: guard.crypto.exportKey(guard.crypto.publicKey(keyObj), { type: "spki", format: "der" }),
+    };
   } catch (e) {
     if (e instanceof CtError) throw e;
     throw new CtError("ct/bad-input", "the CT log private key could not be loaded", e);
@@ -725,7 +728,7 @@ function _parseLog(log, operatorName) {
   var statedId = guard.encoding.base64(log.log_id, 64, _ctErr, "ct/bad-log-list", "the CT log id");
   if (statedId.length !== 32) throw _ctErr("ct/bad-log-list", "a CT log_id must be 32 bytes (SHA-256), got " + statedId.length);
   _spkiAlg(spki);
-  var logId = nodeCrypto.createHash("sha256").update(spki).digest();
+  var logId = guard.crypto.digest("sha256", spki);
   if (!logId.equals(statedId)) throw _ctErr("ct/log-id-mismatch", "the CT log_id does not match SHA-256 of the log key (RFC 6962 sec. 3.2)");
   return guard.verdict.of({
     logId: logId, logIdHex: logId.toString("hex"), key: spki,
@@ -897,7 +900,7 @@ function _classifyLog(sct, logList, entry, opts) {
 }
 
 async function verifySctWithLogList(entry, sct, logList, opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
+  opts = opts || _create(null);
   var c = _classifyLog(sct, logList, entry, opts);
   if (c.status !== "ok") throw _ctErr(c.code, c.message);
   /** @internal Read before the verify, so the timestamp the verdict states is the one the signature covered.
@@ -1111,7 +1114,7 @@ function x509CertEntry(cert, issuer) {
     if (k !== wrapIdx) { intrinsic.append(tbsChildren, tbs.children[k].bytes); continue; }
     if (kept.length > 0) intrinsic.append(tbsChildren, asn1.build.explicit(3, asn1.build.sequence(kept)));
   }
-  var issuerKeyHash = nodeCrypto.createHash("sha256").update(issSpki).digest();
+  var issuerKeyHash = guard.crypto.digest("sha256", issSpki);
   return { entryType: 1, tbsCertificate: asn1.build.sequence(tbsChildren), issuerKeyHash: issuerKeyHash };
 }
 
@@ -1247,7 +1250,7 @@ function _assertTransport(opts) {
  *  `Symbol.split` is part of that operation. The token decides which parser a log's response body is
  *  handed to. */
 function _fetchCtypeToken(headers) {
-  var raw = intrinsic.String((headers || {})["content-type"] || "");
+  var raw = intrinsic.String((headers || _create(null))["content-type"] || "");
   var parts = intrinsic.splitChar(raw, 59);
   return _toLowerCase(_ctTrim(parts.length ? parts[0] : ""));
 }
@@ -1277,7 +1280,7 @@ function _fetchBody(transport, url, req, label) {
     if (req.body !== undefined) request.body = req.body;
     return transport(request);
   }).then(function (res) {
-    res = res || {};
+    res = res || _create(null);
     var h = intrinsic.create(null);
     guard.identifier.optionNames(res.headers).forEach(function (k) { h[k.toLowerCase()] = res.headers[k]; });
     var body = guard.bytes.isByteSource(res.body)
@@ -1579,7 +1582,7 @@ function _uintField(obj, name, code, label) {
 var _STH_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null),
   { timestamp: 1, treeSize: 1, rootHash: 1, signature: 1, raw: 1, then: 1 });
 function sthSignedData(sth) {
-  sth = sth || {};
+  sth = sth || _create(null);
   guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(sth, _STH_KEYS, _ctErr, "ct/bad-input", "unknown sth field ");
   var ts = guard.range.uint64(sth.timestamp, _ctErr, "ct/bad-input", "sth.timestamp");
   var size = guard.range.uint64(sth.treeSize, _ctErr, "ct/bad-input", "sth.treeSize");
@@ -1625,7 +1628,7 @@ function sthSignedData(sth) {
  *   // -> true
  */
 async function verifySth(sth, logKey) {
-  sth = sth || {};
+  sth = sth || _create(null);
   var signature = _toBuffer(sth.signature, "sth.signature");
   var signedData = sthSignedData({ timestamp: sth.timestamp, treeSize: sth.treeSize, rootHash: sth.rootHash });
   return await _verifyDigitallySigned(signedData, signature, logKey, "the signed tree head");
@@ -1666,7 +1669,7 @@ async function verifySth(sth, logKey) {
  *   sth.treeSize;   // -> 3n
  */
 async function getSth(opts) {
-  var door = _clientDoor(opts || {}, "logKey");
+  var door = _clientDoor(opts || _create(null), "logKey");
   opts = door.o;
   /** @internal ONE read of the option, and the presence check and the copy both decide from it. Reading
    *  it twice let an accessor answer the two separately: a non-null value for the check and an
@@ -1725,7 +1728,7 @@ async function getSth(opts) {
  *   p.verified;   // -> true
  */
 async function getProofByHash(opts) {
-  var door = _clientDoor(opts || {}, null);
+  var door = _clientDoor(opts || _create(null), null);
   opts = door.o;
   var sth = _assertSth(opts.sth, "opts.sth");
   /** @internal Copied for the reason the tree head is: it is sent on the wire and then folded against the
@@ -1781,7 +1784,7 @@ async function getProofByHash(opts) {
  *   c.verified;   // -> true
  */
 async function getSthConsistency(opts) {
-  var door = _clientDoor(opts || {}, null);
+  var door = _clientDoor(opts || _create(null), null);
   opts = door.o;
   var oldSth = _assertSth(opts.oldSth, "opts.oldSth");
   var newSth = _assertSth(opts.newSth, "opts.newSth");
@@ -1839,7 +1842,7 @@ async function getSthConsistency(opts) {
  *   e.entries[0].leafInput;   // -> <Buffer ...>
  */
 async function getEntries(opts) {
-  var door = _clientDoor(opts || {}, null);
+  var door = _clientDoor(opts || _create(null), null);
   opts = door.o;
   var start = guard.range.uint64(opts.start, _ctErr, "ct/bad-input", "opts.start");
   var end = guard.range.uint64(opts.end, _ctErr, "ct/bad-input", "opts.end");
@@ -1897,7 +1900,7 @@ async function getEntries(opts) {
  */
 async function getRoots(opts) {
   /** @internal This message carries no options of its own, so the door's record is all that is used. */
-  var door = _clientDoor(opts || {}, null);
+  var door = _clientDoor(opts || _create(null), null);
   var doc = await _clientJson(door, "get-roots", "roots");
   return guard.verdict.of({ certificates: _b64Array(doc, "certificates", "ct/bad-roots", "roots", undefined, C.LIMITS.CT_MAX_ROOTS) });
 }
@@ -1980,7 +1983,7 @@ async function addPreChain(opts) {
  *  The chain encoding, the response shape, and the refusal when the receipt does not verify are one
  *  rule stated once. */
 async function _addChain(opts, message, entryType) {
-  var door = _clientDoor(opts || {}, "logKey");
+  var door = _clientDoor(opts || _create(null), "logKey");
   opts = door.o;
   /** @internal ONE read of the option, used by the presence check here and by the copy below. Reading it
    *  twice let an accessor answer the two separately, presenting a non-null value to the check and an
@@ -2028,7 +2031,7 @@ async function _addChain(opts, message, entryType) {
       ? _bufferAlloc(0) : _b64Field(doc, "extensions", "ct/bad-sct", "sct"),
     signature: _b64Field(doc, "signature", "ct/bad-sct", "sct"),
   };
-  var pinnedId = nodeCrypto.createHash("sha256").update(pinnedKey).digest();
+  var pinnedId = guard.crypto.digest("sha256", pinnedKey);
   if (_bufferCompare(sct.logId, pinnedId) !== 0) {
     throw _ctErr("ct/sct-untrusted", "the SCT names log id " + _bufToString(sct.logId, "hex") +
       " where the pinned key's id is " + _bufToString(pinnedId, "hex") + " -- it is not this log's receipt");

package/lib/est.js

@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ function _partMediaType(contentType) {
 }
 
 function parseServerKeygenResponse(body, contentType, opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
+  opts = opts || intrinsic.create(null);
   opts = _knownOpts(opts, PARSE_SERVERKEYGEN_OPTS, "parseServerKeygenResponse");
   var parts = splitMultipartMixed(body, contentType);
   if (parts.length !== 2) throw E("est/bad-multipart", "a serverkeygen response must have exactly two parts (RFC 7030 sec. 4.4.2)");
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ function classifyResponse(status, headers, body, opts) {
 }
 
 function _classifyResponse(status, headers, body, opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
+  opts = opts || intrinsic.create(null);
   opts = _knownOpts(opts, CLASSIFY_OPTS, "classifyResponse");
   var op = opts.op;
   if (op !== undefined && op !== null && CLASSIFIABLE_OPS.indexOf(op) === -1) throw E("est/unsupported-operation", "unrecognized EST operation " + guard.text.showValue(op));
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ function _classifyResponse(status, headers, body, opts) {
  *   // -> "https://ca.example/.well-known/est/cacerts"
  */
 function paths(baseUrl, opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
+  opts = opts || intrinsic.create(null);
   opts = _knownOpts(opts, PATHS_OPTS, "paths");
   var base = String(baseUrl);
   var prefix = base.slice(0, _stripTrailingSlashEnd(base)) + "/.well-known/est";
@@ -957,7 +957,7 @@ function _drive(method, url, body, headers, opts, transport, budgets) {
   function step() {
     var hopBody = (typeof body === "function" && budgets.onAttempt) ? budgets.onAttempt() : body;
     return guard.async.invoked(transport, [{ method: method, url: _urlHref(url), headers: _headersFor(url), body: hopBody, tls: _tlsFor(url), proxy: budgets.proxy, timeout: budgets.timeout, maxResponseBytes: budgets.maxResponseBytes }], E, "est/bad-input", "opts.transport").then(function (res) {
-      res = res || {};
+      res = res || intrinsic.create(null);
       var blen = _bodyLen(res);
       if (blen > budgets.maxResponseBytes) throw E("est/response-too-large", "the response body (" + blen + " bytes) exceeds the " + budgets.maxResponseBytes + "-byte cap (RFC 7030 sec. 6)");
       var h = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
@@ -1159,7 +1159,7 @@ function _certsResult(op, res, opts, csrSpki) {
  *   r.retry && r.retryAfterSeconds;   // 60
  */
 function fullcmc(baseUrl, request, opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
+  opts = opts || intrinsic.create(null);
   var der, wanted, sent;
   try {
     if (typeof opts !== "object" || Buffer.isBuffer(opts)) throw E("est/bad-input", "pki.est.fullcmc options must be an object");
@@ -1588,7 +1588,7 @@ function _enroll(op, baseUrl, csrInput, opts, proxySnap) {
  *   r.certificates;   // -> [Buffer, ...] raw, unordered
  */
 function cacerts(baseUrl, opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
+  opts = opts || intrinsic.create(null);
   var proxySnap; try { proxySnap = _snapProxy(opts); } catch (_pe) { return _rej(E("est/bad-input", "the options object could not be read", _pe)); }
   return _promiseResolve(_Promise, undefined).then(function () {
     opts = _knownOpts(opts, CACERTS_OPTS, "cacerts");
@@ -1654,7 +1654,7 @@ function cacerts(baseUrl, opts) {
  *   bound.retry;   // true
  */
 function simpleenroll(baseUrl, csrInput, opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
+  opts = opts || intrinsic.create(null);
   var proxySnap; try { proxySnap = _snapProxy(opts); } catch (_pe) { return _rej(E("est/bad-input", "the options object could not be read", _pe)); }
   return _promiseResolve(_Promise, undefined).then(function () {
     opts = _knownOpts(opts, SIMPLEENROLL_OPTS, "simpleenroll");
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ function simpleenroll(baseUrl, csrInput, opts) {
  *   r.retry;   // true
  */
 function simplereenroll(baseUrl, csrInput, opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
+  opts = opts || intrinsic.create(null);
   var proxySnap; try { proxySnap = _snapProxy(opts); } catch (_pe) { return _rej(E("est/bad-input", "the options object could not be read", _pe)); }
   return _promiseResolve(_Promise, undefined).then(function () {
     opts = _knownOpts(opts, SIMPLEREENROLL_OPTS, "simplereenroll");
@@ -1751,7 +1751,7 @@ function _assertConfidentialCipher(res) {
 }
 
 function _ciHeaderList(headers, name) {
-  headers = headers || {};
+  headers = headers || intrinsic.create(null);
   /** @internal The header NAME a value is selected under is folded through the captured conversion on
    *  both sides of the comparison: the match decides which header this response is read from. */
   var lname = _toLowerCase(name), keys = guard.identifier.optionNames(headers), parts = [];
@@ -1765,7 +1765,7 @@ function _ciHeaderList(headers, name) {
 }
 
 function _ciHeader(headers, name) {
-  headers = headers || {};
+  headers = headers || intrinsic.create(null);
   var lname = _toLowerCase(name), keys = guard.identifier.optionNames(headers), found = null, n = 0;
   for (var i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) {
     if (_toLowerCase(keys[i]) !== lname) continue;
@@ -1854,7 +1854,7 @@ async function _serverkeygenResult(res, opts, derived) {
  *   r.retry;   // true -- a 202 is surfaced, never slept
  */
 function serverkeygen(baseUrl, csrInput, opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
+  opts = opts || intrinsic.create(null);
   var proxySnap; try { proxySnap = _snapProxy(opts); } catch (_pe) { return _rej(E("est/bad-input", "the options object could not be read", _pe)); }
   return _promiseResolve(_Promise, undefined).then(function () {
     opts = _knownOpts(opts, SERVERKEYGEN_OPTS, "serverkeygen");
@@ -1916,7 +1916,7 @@ function _csrattrsResult(res, opts) {
  *   r.available;   // false -- a 404 is "no CSR-attributes policy available"
  */
 function csrattrs(baseUrl, opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
+  opts = opts || intrinsic.create(null);
   var proxySnap; try { proxySnap = _snapProxy(opts); } catch (_pe) { return _rej(E("est/bad-input", "the options object could not be read", _pe)); }
   return _promiseResolve(_Promise, undefined).then(function () {
     opts = _knownOpts(opts, CSRATTRS_OPTS, "csrattrs");

package/lib/framework-error.js

@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ function defineClass(name, opts) {
   if (typeof name !== "string" || name.length === 0) {
     throw new TypeError("defineClass: name must be a non-empty string");
   }
-  opts = opts || {};
+  opts = opts || intrinsic.create(null);
   var withCause = !!opts.withCause;
   var flagKey = "is" + name;
 

package/lib/guard-bytes.js

@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ function snapshotSource(input, ErrorClass, code, label) {
  *  the budget rather than the shape of the input. The figure is far above any real caller value: an
  *  options bag or a JWK is tens of nodes, and a certificate chain passed as an anchor list is thousands. */
 function snapshotDeep(value, ErrorClass, code, label, opts) {
-  var o = opts || {};
+  var o = opts || _create(null);
   var cap = o.maxDepth == null ? 64 : o.maxDepth;
   var maxNodes = o.maxNodes == null ? constants.LIMITS.DEEP_COPY_MAX_NODES : o.maxNodes;
   return _deep(value, ErrorClass, code, label, cap, 0, o.collect || null, { n: 0, max: maxNodes });