@blamejs/pki 0.8.28 → 0.8.30

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,48 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.8.30 — 2026-09-29
+
+The 0.8.30 tarball is the one to install for everything 0.8.29 added.
+
+### Added
+
+- Ten reports, one per format that had none: `pki.inspect.pkcs8`, `pki.inspect.pkcs12`, `pki.inspect.crmf`, `pki.inspect.cmp`, `pki.inspect.csrattrs`, `pki.inspect.trustanchor`, `pki.inspect.ocspRequest`, `pki.inspect.ocspResponse`, `pki.inspect.tsp` and `pki.inspect.attrcert`. Each takes a PEM string, a DER Buffer, or that format's own parse result, refuses a wrong-format input with its own `inspect/bad-*` code, and is best-effort in the same way the certificate report is: a valid but unusual structure renders rather than throwing.
+- Every one is reachable by name as well as by detection, and renders the same text either way. A report only `pki.inspect.any` could reach would be a feature nobody could ask for, and an operator who knows what a file is should not have to rely on detection to read it.
+- No report prints private key material, and for a PKCS#8 key that is structural rather than a check on the private key: the report gives the version, the key algorithm and its parameters, the presence and length of the private key and of a public half, and the type of each attribute, and renders no byte string from inside the file. RFC 5958 has the parser confirm that a version 2 `OneAsymmetricKey` carries a public half and well formed attributes, never that either is unrelated to the private key, so private bytes can sit in the public `BIT STRING` or in any attribute value; a report that wrote either out could be made to write the key out. The algorithm's parameters are named where the registry knows them and withheld otherwise, since the parameters of an unknown algorithm are another place the key could sit, and `pki.key.export` is the verb for the bytes themselves. A PKCS#12 report follows the same rule: the version, the integrity mode, the MAC algorithm with its iteration count and the LENGTH of its salt, and one line per safe bag naming its type, nested bags included. A salt is caller-supplied, so its value is reported as a length.
+- A PKCS#12 report says what reading the contents needs. These verbs take no password, so an encrypted safe is named and not decrypted and the report points at `pki.pkcs12.open`. A report that silently showed nothing would read as an empty store.
+- `pki.inspect.tsp` renders an RFC 3161 timestamp response: the PKI status with its status strings and failure info, and the TSTInfo inside the token with its policy, message imprint, serial, time, accuracy, ordering, nonce and TSA name. A bare timestamp token is a CMS ContentInfo rather than a response, and `pki.inspect.cms` has always rendered one of those.
+
+### Changed
+
+- `pki.inspect.any` on an X.509-1997 v1 attribute certificate now throws `attrcert/legacy-v1-not-supported`, the reason that format's own parser gives, where it previously threw `inspect/unsupported-format`. The v1 form is detected so it can be named: RFC 5755 section 1 obsoletes it and this build does not parse it, and a reader of one needs to know which form they hold rather than to go looking for a renderer that was never missing.
+- The `inspect/unsupported-format` message enumerates the formats that do render, read from the dispatch table rather than from a list written beside it, so it cannot name a set the code does not have.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- `pki.inspect.cms` on an EnvelopedData, an AuthenticatedData, a CompressedData or a DigestedData now has conformance vectors; before, every CMS report the suite exercised was a SignedData, so the arm reading the other four content types was never driven and a field named wrongly there would have rendered quietly.
+
+## v0.8.29 — 2026-09-29
+
+Every format the toolkit detects now renders a report, and a report never prints a private key.
+
+### Added
+
+- Ten reports, one per format that had none: `pki.inspect.pkcs8`, `pki.inspect.pkcs12`, `pki.inspect.crmf`, `pki.inspect.cmp`, `pki.inspect.csrattrs`, `pki.inspect.trustanchor`, `pki.inspect.ocspRequest`, `pki.inspect.ocspResponse`, `pki.inspect.tsp` and `pki.inspect.attrcert`. Each takes a PEM string, a DER Buffer, or that format's own parse result, refuses a wrong-format input with its own `inspect/bad-*` code, and is best-effort in the same way the certificate report is: a valid but unusual structure renders rather than throwing.
+- Every one is reachable by name as well as by detection, and renders the same text either way. A report only `pki.inspect.any` could reach would be a feature nobody could ask for, and an operator who knows what a file is should not have to rely on detection to read it.
+- No report prints private key material, and for a PKCS#8 key that is structural rather than a check on the private key: the report gives the version, the key algorithm and its parameters, the presence and length of the private key and of a public half, and the type of each attribute, and renders no byte string from inside the file. RFC 5958 has the parser confirm that a version 2 `OneAsymmetricKey` carries a public half and well formed attributes, never that either is unrelated to the private key, so private bytes can sit in the public `BIT STRING` or in any attribute value; a report that wrote either out could be made to write the key out. The algorithm's parameters are named where the registry knows them and withheld otherwise, since the parameters of an unknown algorithm are another place the key could sit, and `pki.key.export` is the verb for the bytes themselves. A PKCS#12 report follows the same rule: the version, the integrity mode, the MAC algorithm with its iteration count and the LENGTH of its salt, and one line per safe bag naming its type, nested bags included. A salt is caller-supplied, so its value is reported as a length.
+- A PKCS#12 report says what reading the contents needs. These verbs take no password, so an encrypted safe is named and not decrypted and the report points at `pki.pkcs12.open`. A report that silently showed nothing would read as an empty store.
+- `pki.inspect.tsp` renders an RFC 3161 timestamp response: the PKI status with its status strings and failure info, and the TSTInfo inside the token with its policy, message imprint, serial, time, accuracy, ordering, nonce and TSA name. A bare timestamp token is a CMS ContentInfo rather than a response, and `pki.inspect.cms` has always rendered one of those.
+
+### Changed
+
+- `pki.inspect.any` on an X.509-1997 v1 attribute certificate now throws `attrcert/legacy-v1-not-supported`, the reason that format's own parser gives, where it previously threw `inspect/unsupported-format`. The v1 form is detected so it can be named: RFC 5755 section 1 obsoletes it and this build does not parse it, and a reader of one needs to know which form they hold rather than to go looking for a renderer that was never missing.
+- The `inspect/unsupported-format` message enumerates the formats that do render, read from the dispatch table rather than from a list written beside it, so it cannot name a set the code does not have.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- `pki.inspect.cms` on an EnvelopedData, an AuthenticatedData, a CompressedData or a DigestedData now has conformance vectors; before, every CMS report the suite exercised was a SignedData, so the arm reading the other four content types was never driven and a field named wrongly there would have rendered quietly.
+
 ## v0.8.28 — 2026-09-28
 
 The three signing verbs lint what they are about to emit, and refuse it before the key is used.

package/README.md

@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.hpke` | Hybrid Public Key Encryption (RFC 9180), the encrypt-to-a-public-key primitive behind TLS ECH, MLS, and OHTTP. `setupS` and `setupR` establish a sender or recipient context (KEM encapsulation plus the HKDF key schedule); the context's `seal` and `open` AEAD-encrypt with a sequence-counter nonce, and `export` derives further secrets; the module-level `seal` and `open` are single-shot wrappers. DHKEM (P-256, P-521, X25519, X448) in all four modes, proven against the RFC 9180 Appendix A vectors, and the post-quantum ML-KEM-512/768/1024 KEMs (IANA 0x0040 to 0x0042) in the base and psk modes, proven against the draft-ietf-hpke-pq Appendix A vectors; HKDF-SHA256/SHA384/SHA512 by AES-GCM / ChaCha20Poly1305 / export-only. DHKEM(P-384) has no vector under an HKDF key schedule and fails closed. Pure composition over `node:crypto`; the PQ/T hybrid KEMs are a registry data-row extension once the CFRG combiner draft stabilizes — `suites`, `setupS`, `setupR`, `seal`, `open` |
 | `pki.kem` | Composite ML-KEM key establishment (draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem), a post-quantum ML-KEM hybridized with a traditional RSA-OAEP, ECDH, X25519, or X448 so the established secret holds if either component is later broken. `encapsulate` turns a recipient's composite `SubjectPublicKeyInfo` into a 256-bit shared secret and a ciphertext; `decapsulate` recovers the same secret from the ciphertext and the composite PKCS#8 private key. Each component KEM runs independently and the two secrets are mixed through a SHA3-256 combiner that binds the traditional ciphertext, the traditional public key, and a per-algorithm label. The twelve algorithms pair ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 with RSA-OAEP 2048/3072/4096, ECDH over P-256/P-384/P-521 and brainpoolP256r1/P384r1, X25519, and X448, each verified against the draft Appendix G known-answer vectors; a malformed key or ciphertext, an unsupported algorithm, or a component decapsulation failure throws a typed `KemError` — `encapsulate`, `decapsulate` |
 | `pki.sigstore` | Offline verifier for a Sigstore bundle, the artifact `npm publish --provenance` produces and the registry serves. `verifyBundle` composes five fail-closed legs against caller-pinned trust (Fulcio CA roots and Rekor log keys, never trusted from the bundle): the DSSE signature over its PAE preimage under the Fulcio leaf key, the ephemeral Fulcio certificate chain validated as of the Rekor log time, the RFC 9162 inclusion proof folded to a Rekor-signed tree root, the log entry bound to this exact signature, and the in-toto SLSA subject digest the caller confirms against the published artifact. It reuses the X.509 parser, the RFC 5280 path validator, and the Merkle verifier; the net-new codecs are the DSSE PAE byte-builder and a fail-closed JSON reader. `verified: true` says the artifact was signed and logged, not that a party you trust signed it — Fulcio issues to anyone who completes an OIDC flow, so who signed is decided only by `opts.identity`, and `identityChecked` reports which of its fields were compared. An identity policy naming no field, or a field name that is not one of the three, is refused rather than satisfied — either would accept every signer while reading as a policy in force. A sixth leg is opt-in: pinning the certificate-transparency logs in `opts.ctLogs` checks the receipt Fulcio embeds in the certificate it issues (RFC 6962 §3.2), verified over the certificate as it stood before the receipt was added and under the key of the log that issued it, so the verdict says the signing certificate was public when it was issued rather than handed out quietly. At least one receipt must verify against a pinned log, the verdict reports `sctChecked` and `validScts`, and an empty log set is refused rather than read as a policy that checks nothing. Both content arms are read: a DSSE-wrapped in-toto attestation, and a message signature over an artifact's own bytes, which `cosign sign-blob` produces. For that arm `opts.artifact` supplies the bytes, and they are held to the hash the Rekor `hashedrekord` entry records before the signature is checked over them; the `messageDigest` the bundle carries is covered by no signature, so it is compared against the computed digest and never used in its place. `contentType` names the arm and the verdict has one shape for both — `pae`, `parseBundle`, `verifyBundle` |
-| `pki.inspect` | Human-readable inspection, the pure-JS equivalent of `openssl x509/crl/req/cms -text`. `certificate(pem \| der \| parsed)` renders an OpenSSL-style report: version, serial, signature algorithm, issuer and subject distinguished names, validity, public-key details (curve or modulus size plus the raw point or modulus), every decoded extension with its critical flag, and the signature. `crl`, `csr`, and `cms` render the other formats the same way — a CRL like `openssl crl -text`, a CSR like `openssl req -text`, and a CMS message like `openssl cms -cmsout -print`, with a stable summary for a non-SignedData ContentInfo — and `any(input)` detects the format and routes to the right report. Built over the strict parsers and the two-way OID registry with one set of field renderers, it names extension and algorithm OIDs an OpenSSL build shows only as raw bytes. No OpenSSL dependency, and the format is stable and OpenSSL-familiar rather than pinned to one OpenSSL version. A certificate policy's user notice renders as text, both its explicit text and a notice reference with the notice numbers that identify it, rather than hex, and a malformed part falls back to a hex dump rather than throwing — `certificate`, `crl`, `csr`, `cms`, `any` |
+| `pki.inspect` | Human-readable inspection, the pure-JS equivalent of `openssl x509/crl/req/cms -text`. `certificate(pem \| der \| parsed)` renders an OpenSSL-style report: version, serial, signature algorithm, issuer and subject distinguished names, validity, public-key details (curve or modulus size plus the raw point or modulus), every decoded extension with its critical flag, and the signature. `crl`, `csr`, and `cms` render the other formats the same way — a CRL like `openssl crl -text`, a CSR like `openssl req -text`, and a CMS message like `openssl cms -cmsout -print`, with a stable summary for a non-SignedData ContentInfo — and `any(input)` detects the format and routes to the right report. Built over the strict parsers and the two-way OID registry with one set of field renderers, it names extension and algorithm OIDs an OpenSSL build shows only as raw bytes. No OpenSSL dependency, and the format is stable and OpenSSL-familiar rather than pinned to one OpenSSL version. A certificate policy's user notice renders as text, both its explicit text and a notice reference with the notice numbers that identify it, rather than hex, and a malformed part falls back to a hex dump rather than throwing. Every format `pki.schema.all()` detects has a report and its own named verb, so a PKCS#8 key, a PKCS#12 store, a CRMF request, a CMP message, an EST CSR-attributes response, an RFC 5914 trust anchor list, an OCSP request or response, an RFC 3161 timestamp response and an RFC 5755 attribute certificate each read the same way a certificate does. No report prints private key material: a PKCS#8 and a PKCS#12 name the algorithm and say a private key is present, never its bytes, and a PKCS#12's encrypted safes are named rather than decrypted since these verbs take no password — `certificate`, `crl`, `csr`, `cms`, `pkcs8`, `pkcs12`, `crmf`, `cmp`, `csrattrs`, `trustanchor`, `ocspRequest`, `ocspResponse`, `tsp`, `attrcert`, `any` |
 | `pki.webauthn` | WebAuthn and passkey verification, both halves: offline trust evaluation of a W3C WebAuthn (Level 3) registration, and signature verification of the assertion every login returns. `parseAttestationObject(bytes)` decodes the CBOR attestation object, authenticatorData, and COSE credential key over the strict `pki.cbor` codec; `parseAuthenticatorData(bytes)` reads the bare form an assertion carries through the same parser; `parseClientData(bytes, opts)` decodes the `clientDataJSON` no signature check looks inside, through the shared JSON guard since these are attacker-chosen bytes, returning the challenge decoded so a caller compares bytes rather than spellings, and checking the ceremony type, challenge, and origin when the relying party supplies what it issued. `verifyAssertion(input)` verifies an assertion signature over `authenticatorData \|\| SHA-256(clientDataJSON)` — raw bytes, no COSE_Sign1, an ES256 signature in ASN.1 DER — and applies the §7.2 step 21 counter rule when a stored `previousSignCount` is given, so a counter that fails to advance is refused as a cloned authenticator. `verify(attestationObject, clientDataHash, opts)` checks the attestation-statement signature and each format's structural bindings for packed, tpm, android-key, apple, fido-u2f, and none: the x5c leaf key, the apple nonce, the tpm `certInfo` Name and `extraData` over the `pubArea`, the android `KeyDescription`, and the fido-u2f `verificationData`. It binds the credential public key to each attestation, through the signed authenticatorData for packed and fido-u2f or a cert or `pubArea`-key equality check for android-key, apple, and tpm, and enforces each leaf's certificate requirements. The credential-key check covers the full WebAuthn COSE algorithm set — ES256/384/512, RS256/384/512, PS256/384/512, EdDSA (Ed25519), and the RFC 9864 fully-specified identifiers ESP256/384/512, Ed25519, and Ed448 — validating the public-key point on its curve, rejecting the compressed EC point form, and enforcing a minimally encoded DER ECDSA signature. The verdict field is `attestationVerified`, and `signatureVerified` for an assertion, rather than a bare `verified`, because a sound statement is a different claim from an acceptable ceremony: an attestation naming another origin's RP ID with user presence clear is perfectly sound and must not be registered. Pass `expectedRpId`, `requireUserPresence`, `requireUserVerification`, or `allowedAlgorithms` and those are checked, with `bindingChecked` reporting which ran, so a check that passed can be told from one that never happened. Pass `opts.clientDataJSON` instead of the digest and the client data is read here too: the ceremony type is checked unconditionally, since a login response replayed into a registration is what that rule stops, and the challenge, origin, and top-level origin are checked against what the relying party issued, with `clientData.checked` reporting which comparisons ran. A registration verdict also carries the `credentialId`, `credentialPublicKey`, and initial `signCount` a later login needs. A credential key declaring COSE algorithm `-65535` (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-1) is refused unless `allowedAlgorithms` names it, since every signature that credential ever makes would use SHA-1. Anchoring the trust path has two routes: `opts.metadata` resolves the roots the authenticator's own model registered, and `opts.rootCertificates` pins roots directly, which is what anchors the formats FIDO MDS does not cover, Apple's authenticators and the Google hardware-attestation roots among them. `metadata` governs when both are given, and `anchoredTo` names every route that anchored the path, joined with `+` when more than one did: `"metadata"`, `"rootCertificates"`, and `"safetyNetRoots"` for the android-safetynet chain, which anchors through the roots that format requires whether or not either other route was asked for. It is `null` only when nothing anchored the path. `verifyMetadataBlob(blob, opts)` reads a FIDO Metadata Service (MDS v3) BLOB, the signed catalogue of registered authenticator models, verifying its JWS and chaining its signer to an operator-supplied FIDO root before the payload is parsed, with sequence-number rollback and `nextUpdate` freshness checks. Passing the result as `opts.metadata` to `verify` resolves the authenticator's registered attestation roots from its identifier and requires the trust path to fully validate to one of them, refusing an unlisted or revoked model. `metadataAnchors(entry, opts)` applies the same status gate for a caller anchoring the path themselves: a model the catalogue has disqualified registers no anchors. Both of the catalogue's key spaces are covered: an aaguid, and the attestation-certificate key identifiers a U2F authenticator is listed under instead. No FIDO root is bundled, there is no trust-on-first-use, and retrieving the BLOB is out of scope. Fail-closed with typed `webauthn/*` errors — `parseAttestationObject`, `verify`, `verifyMetadataBlob`, `metadataFor`, `metadataAnchors` |
 | `pki.lint` | Certificate linting, the zlint or pkilint of JavaScript. `certificate(pem \| der \| parsed, opts)` walks a parsed certificate and emits graded advisory findings, each with a stable id, a severity (`fatal`, `error`, `warn`, `notice`), a source, a spec-clause citation, and a message, against the RFC 5280 profile, the post-quantum certificate profiles, and a representative CA/Browser Forum TLS BR subset: serial sign and size, validity ordering and the SC081v3 reducing validity schedule, keyCertSign coherence, extension criticality (basicConstraints, nameConstraints, policyConstraints and inhibitAnyPolicy must be critical, and keyUsage should be), nameConstraints CA-scope, unknown critical extensions, empty-subject SAN, SKI and AKI presence including the end-entity subjectKeyIdentifier, the six extensions a conforming CA must mark non-critical (reported by clause rather than as unrecognized) and the two it should (issuerAltName, cRLDistributionPoints), a policy mapping to or from anyPolicy, a unique identifier a conforming CA must not generate, a critical subjectAltName beside a non-empty subject, a critical extKeyUsage naming anyExtendedKeyUsage, a userNotice noticeRef, SAN required and CN-in-SAN, dNSName syntax, serverAuth EKU, weak keys, the CA/Browser Forum subscriber certificate profile of §7.1.2.7 (the extension presence and criticality table, the authorityInformationAccess accessMethod and accessLocation tables, basicConstraints cA and pathLenConstraint, certificatePolicies against anyPolicy and the exactly-one reserved identifier rule and the permitted-qualifier table, the forbidden extended key purposes, the two Key Usage tables that differ by key type, and the subjectAltName GeneralName table with its criticality rule in both directions), the CA/Browser Forum S/MIME BR subscriber profile of §7.1.2.3 (a) through (n) as `cabf-smime`, whose requirements follow the generation a certificate declares through its reserved policy identifier (the distribution-point and accessMethod URI scheme rules, the policy qualifier rules for an id-qt-cps URL and an id-qt-unotice explicitText and noticeRef, the key-usage table for the certificate's own key algorithm including a bit set past the nine named positions, the extended key purposes forbidden at every generation and the ones Strict alone forbids, the authorityKeyIdentifier field rules, a required mailbox in the subjectAltName as an rfc822Name or an id-on-SmtpUTF8Mailbox otherName, the criticality each extension must carry, the subjectDirectoryAttributes and Adobe extensions the Strict generation prohibits, the Legal Entity Identifier extensions keyed on the certificate type rather than the generation, and the Legacy generation retired on 15 July 2025), the CA/Browser Forum Code Signing BR subscriber profile of §7.1.2.3 as `cabf-cs`, whose rows follow the kind a certificate declares through one of the three reserved identifiers of §7.1.6.1 (the extension presence and criticality rules at the strengths this document states them, a HTTP URL required in the distribution points and in each accessMethod location, a critical keyUsage asserting digitalSignature with `keyCertSign` and `cRLSign` forbidden and every other bit discouraged, the extended key purpose each kind must carry with the critical extKeyUsage a timestamp certificate needs, the §7.1.6.4 exactly-one-identifier rule gated to 15 September 2026, the §6.3.2 ceilings of 39 months, 460 days and 135 months, and the §6.1.5.2 floors of a 3072-bit RSA modulus, NIST P-256, P-384 or P-521, or DSA parameters of 2048 bits with a 224- or 256-bit modulus length, and the §7.1.4.2 subject distinguished name rows: a required commonName, a prohibited domainComponent, a subject attribute made only of the metadata characters the clause names, a required organizationName and two-letter countryName, one of localityName and stateOrProvinceName, and on an EV certificate a businessCategory from the four strings the clause names, a jurisdictionCountryName and a serialNumber), the ETSI qualified-certificate profile of EN 319 412-5 as `etsi-qc` (a non-critical qcStatements extension, a QcType naming one and only one of the three purposes the clause defines, a QcPDS providing an https URL and, on an EU qualified certificate, a document in English and no more than one per language, plus the EN 319 412-1 semantics identifiers holding a subject serialNumber or organizationIdentifier to a three-character identity type reference, a two-character country code, a hyphen-minus and an identifier, with XG required of an LEI value and a name registration authority URI required of a locally defined reference), the Mozilla Root Store Policy as `mozilla-root`, which is named rather than detected because a root program's requirements apply by virtue of the store a certificate chains to (the §5.1 AlgorithmIdentifier encodings compared as DER, an RSA modulus of at least 2048 bits and a whole number of octets, a public exponent above 1, an EdDSA key only beside id-kp-emailProtection, the §5.1.3 SHA-1 prohibitions on their own dates, a serial greater than zero with a short magnitude reported as a warning, an extKeyUsage on every end entity without anyExtendedKeyUsage, and the §5.3 intermediate rules from 2019, which pass over a certificate issued in its own name), the Chrome Root Program Policy v1.8 as `chrome-root`, named on the same grounds (the §1.3.2 dedicated-hierarchy rules holding a subordinate CA certificate's extKeyUsage to id-kp-serverAuth with id-kp-clientAuth reported as a warning, scoped to the unexpired certificates the clause names by passing over a notAfter before 15 June 2026, the same rules over a subscriber certificate issued on or after 15 March 2027 where id-kp-serverAuth stands alone and an extKeyUsage naming id-kp-OCSPSigning and nothing else is a delegated OCSP responder rather than a subscriber, the §1.3.1.3 three-year subordinate CA validity ceiling, and the §1.3.1.2 root term limit, which reports a self-signed CA certificate whose validity runs past the removal date its own notBefore fixes and passes over a CA reissued in its own name whose authorityKeyIdentifier names a key other than its own subjectKeyIdentifier), the Microsoft Trusted Root Program requirements as `microsoft-root`, named on the same grounds (the §3.A.1 root commonName and the keyUsage that must be present, critical and set keyCertSign and cRLSign, the §3.A.3 term of eight to 25 years, the §3.A.5 revocation pointer and §3.A.8 separation of uses on an issuing CA, the §3.A.10 seventeen reserved policy identifiers on an end entity, the §3.A.14 exclusivity of id-kp-OCSPSigning, the §3.B signature and key table including its code signing column, and the §3.E.2 extended key usages the program enables on a root), the Apple Root Program Policy as `apple-root`, named on the same grounds (its Appendix A trust purposes read as extended key usage sets, the §1.5 root key floor of RSA 4096 or NIST P-384, the §1.7 subordinate CA rules gated to 1 August 2026 and 1 July 2027, the §2.3 rfc822Name an S/MIME subscriber needs from 1 February 2027, and the subscriber purpose scoping that binds when its permission expires on 1 July 2027), the two algorithm-policy profiles, named for the same reason a root program's are (which policy a certificate is held to is the caller's assertion): `nist-pqc-transition` carries NIST IR 8547's two transitions, an error for a classical subject key or signature algorithm in a certificate issued from 2036 and a warning for a subject key at or below the 112-bit security strength issued from 2031, with the strength read off SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev 5 Table 2 and a composite signature passed over as the dual-algorithm operation the guidance endorses; and `cnsa-2.0` carries the suite profile of `draft-jenkins-cnsa2-pkix-profile-05` (ML-DSA-87 or ML-KEM-1024 as the subject public key, ML-DSA-87 as the signature, and the extension, criticality and key-usage rules each of the three certificate kinds carries, where the key-usage set follows the kind the subject key declares), the same signature rule reaching `crl` and `ocsp` under that name because the document states it once for all three, the post-quantum key-usage rules binding a certificate's keyUsage bits to its subject key type (ML-KEM under RFC 9935 §5, ML-DSA under RFC 9881 §5, and SLH-DSA under RFC 9909 §6 across both its pure and prehash identifiers) together with the ML-KEM encapsulation-key encoding and size, and the §4.2.1.4 certificate-policy user-notice rules (a VisibleString or BMPString explicitText, a notice past 200 characters, an empty notice, control characters, and a non-NFC UTF8String notice, each at the strength the clause states). Alone among these entries the data path never throws: hostile bytes return a `fatal` `lint/unparseable` finding carrying the strict parser's code, so a whole directory lints without a try/catch, and only config-time misuse throws a typed `LintError` — `certificate`, `crl` (the RFC 5280 §5 revocation-list profile: nextUpdate presence, update ordering, cRLNumber presence and its 20-octet ceiling, authorityKeyIdentifier presence, the criticality each profiled CRL and entry extension must carry, freshestCRL in a delta CRL, and unrecognized critical extensions), `ocsp` (the RFC 6960 response profile: an empty signature, each SingleResponse's update ordering and its relation to producedAt, an empty `certs` field, the extended revoked definition and the fixed shape of a revoked answer for a non-issued certificate, the list each extension belongs in, the criticality and value syntax of the CRL entry extensions a SingleResponse may carry, unrecognized critical extensions, the reasons unspecified and removeFromCRL, and two answers for one CertID; the RFC 5019 lightweight rows run on request), `csr` (the artifact a CA reads before it issues: an empty subject naming no identity, an empty subject whose subjectAltName is not critical, a request for an extension the issuer determines, a request asking for a CA certificate, a broken signing digest, and a challengePassword traveling with the request; `opts.profile: "cabf-tls"` adds the certificate profile's own commonName-in-SAN, dNSName syntax, SAN-required and key-strength rows, applied to what the request asks for, and they run only when named because a request carries no extKeyUsage. It does not check the request's signature, which is a cryptographic operation `pki.csr.verify` owns), `cms` (the RFC 5652 profile: a signing-time naming a year from 1950 to 2049 encoded as GeneralizedTime where §11.3 requires UTCTime, a signer digest the digestAlgorithms set does not list, a version 1 attribute certificate, and notices for a SignedData with no signers and for a detached signature), `tsp` (the RFC 3161 profile: a tsa hint naming a subject the token's own certificate does not carry, a serial wider than 160 bits, and a token stating no accuracy), `attrcert` (the RFC 5755 profile: the §4.3 criticality table, a critical extension the profile does not define, a Holder naming more than one option, and an issuerUniqueID), each short because the strict parser behind it already refuses most of what its document requires and those clauses arrive as `lint/unparseable` carrying the parser's own code, `rules`, `profiles` |
 | `pki.C` / `pki.constants` | Version-stable constants: the functional scale helpers `C.TIME.*` and `C.BYTES.*`, the codec `LIMITS`, and `version` |