@blamejs/pki 0.8.26 → 0.8.28

package/lib/rfc3339.js

@@ -6,11 +6,18 @@
  * lib/rfc3339.js: RFC 3339 date-time parsing + validation, a fail-closed engine primitive shared by
  * pki.acme (a boolean field-validator over server-supplied JSON) and pki.ct (parse a CT log-list
  * timestamp / temporal-interval bound to a comparable Date). Beyond the grammar it enforces CALENDAR
- * validity: a syntactically well-formed but impossible instant (month 13, February 30, hour 25, a
- * :60 leap second, a +25:00 offset) is rejected, so a downstream expiry / window comparison never runs
- * on a value JS `Date` would silently roll over or `Date.parse` would NaN. Like the byte-reader / guard
- * family, `parse` takes the caller's `(code, message) -> error` factory so every consumer keeps its own
- * domain fault code.
+ * validity: a syntactically well-formed but impossible instant is rejected, so a downstream expiry or
+ * window comparison never runs on a value JS `Date` reads as a different instant.
+ * `2026-02-30T00:00:00Z` is the case that earns the check its keep: `new Date` reads it as
+ * `2026-03-02T00:00:00.000Z`, two days forward, and returns that instant without complaint. The
+ * runtime refuses month 13, hour 25 and a `+25:00` offset on its own, so the check agrees with it
+ * there and adds nothing.
+ * A `:60` second is well-formed: RFC 3339 sec. 5.7 permits `time-second` to be 60 at the end of a
+ * month in which a leap second occurs. Refusing it here is a decision, taken because JS cannot
+ * represent a leap second, so a caller that accepted one would hold either an invalid Date or an
+ * instant one second off; a typed error says so instead. Like the byte-reader / guard family, `parse`
+ * takes the caller's `(code, message) -> error` factory so every consumer keeps its own domain fault
+ * code.
  */
 
 function _digitsAt(v, start, count) {

package/lib/schema-crl.js

@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ var CERTIFICATE_LIST = pkix.signedEnvelope(NS, TBS_CERTLIST, {
  *   var caCert = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "Issuing CA", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
  *     notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2036-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
  *     extensions: { basicConstraints: { cA: true }, keyUsage: ["keyCertSign", "cRLSign"] } }, { key: key });
- *   var der = await pki.crl.sign({ thisUpdate: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), crlNumber: 1n,
+ *   var der = await pki.crl.sign({ thisUpdate: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
+ *     nextUpdate: new Date("2026-02-01T00:00:00Z"), crlNumber: 1n,
  *     revoked: [{ serialNumber: 0x0a3fn, revocationDate: new Date("2026-01-15T00:00:00Z") }] },
  *     { cert: caCert, key: key });
  *   var crl = pki.schema.crl.parse(der);
@@ -197,8 +198,9 @@ var parse = pkix.makeRecordingParser({ pemLabel: "X509 CRL", PemError: PemError,
  *   var key = await pki.key.export(pair.privateKey);
  *   var caCert = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "Issuing CA", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
  *     notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2036-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
- *     extensions: { basicConstraints: { cA: true }, keyUsage: ["cRLSign"] } }, { key: key });
- *   var pemText = await pki.crl.sign({ thisUpdate: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), crlNumber: 1n, revoked: [] },
+ *     extensions: { basicConstraints: { cA: true }, keyUsage: ["keyCertSign", "cRLSign"] } }, { key: key });
+ *   var pemText = await pki.crl.sign({ thisUpdate: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
+ *     nextUpdate: new Date("2026-02-01T00:00:00Z"), crlNumber: 1n, revoked: [] },
  *     { cert: caCert, key: key }, { pem: true });
  *   var der = pki.schema.crl.pemDecode(pemText);
  */
@@ -220,8 +222,9 @@ function pemDecode(text, label) { return pkix.pemDecode(text, label || "X509 CRL
  *   var key = await pki.key.export(pair.privateKey);
  *   var caCert = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "Issuing CA", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
  *     notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2036-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
- *     extensions: { basicConstraints: { cA: true }, keyUsage: ["cRLSign"] } }, { key: key });
- *   var der = await pki.crl.sign({ thisUpdate: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), crlNumber: 1n, revoked: [] },
+ *     extensions: { basicConstraints: { cA: true }, keyUsage: ["keyCertSign", "cRLSign"] } }, { key: key });
+ *   var der = await pki.crl.sign({ thisUpdate: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
+ *     nextUpdate: new Date("2026-02-01T00:00:00Z"), crlNumber: 1n, revoked: [] },
  *     { cert: caCert, key: key });
  *   var pem = pki.schema.crl.pemEncode(der);
  */
@@ -329,7 +332,8 @@ var DOOR = pkix.extensionDoor({
  *   var caCert = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "Issuing CA", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
  *     notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2036-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
  *     extensions: { basicConstraints: { cA: true }, keyUsage: ["keyCertSign", "cRLSign"] } }, { key: key });
- *   var crlDer = await pki.crl.sign({ thisUpdate: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), crlNumber: 7n,
+ *   var crlDer = await pki.crl.sign({ thisUpdate: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
+ *     nextUpdate: new Date("2026-02-01T00:00:00Z"), crlNumber: 7n,
  *     revoked: [{ serialNumber: 0x0a3fn, revocationDate: new Date("2026-01-15T00:00:00Z"), reason: "keyCompromise" }] },
  *     { cert: caCert, key: key });
  *   var rows = pki.schema.crl.decodeExtensions(crlDer);
@@ -362,7 +366,8 @@ var decodeExtensions = DOOR.decodeExtensions;
  *   var caCert = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "Issuing CA", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
  *     notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2036-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
  *     extensions: { basicConstraints: { cA: true }, keyUsage: ["keyCertSign", "cRLSign"] } }, { key: key });
- *   var crlDer = await pki.crl.sign({ thisUpdate: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), crlNumber: 7n,
+ *   var crlDer = await pki.crl.sign({ thisUpdate: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
+ *     nextUpdate: new Date("2026-02-01T00:00:00Z"), crlNumber: 7n,
  *     revoked: [{ serialNumber: 0x0a3fn, revocationDate: new Date("2026-01-15T00:00:00Z"), reason: "keyCompromise" }] },
  *     { cert: caCert, key: key });
  *   var e = pki.schema.crl.parse(crlDer).revokedCertificates[0].crlEntryExtensions[0];

package/lib/x509-sign.js

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ var schema = require("./schema-engine");
 var pkix = require("./schema-pkix");
 var pkiBuild = require("./pki-build");
 var ct = require("./ct");
+var lint = require("./lint");
 
 var CertificateError = frameworkError.CertificateError;
 var NS = pkix.makeNS("x509", CertificateError, oid);
@@ -47,7 +48,12 @@ var KNOWN_SPEC_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
 });
 var KNOWN_ISSUER_CERT_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { key: 1, cert: 1 });
 var KNOWN_ISSUER_EXPLICIT_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { key: 1, name: 1, publicKey: 1 });
-var KNOWN_SIGN_OPTS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { digestAlgorithm: 1, pem: 1, pss: 1 });
+var KNOWN_SIGN_OPTS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { digestAlgorithm: 1, pem: 1, pss: 1, profile: 1 });
+
+/** @internal The signature the build-time gate lints against, standing in for one that does not exist
+ * until the key is used. It is non-empty so the gate is not answering a rule about its own placeholder,
+ * and the rules that read the signature VALUE are exempt in lint.js for the same reason. */
+var GATE_PLACEHOLDER_SIG = intrinsic.bufferAlloc(64, 0xff);
 
 var KNOWN_EXT_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   subjectKeyIdentifier: 1, authorityKeyIdentifier: 1, keyUsage: 1, keyUsageCritical: 1,
@@ -493,10 +499,19 @@ function _hasCriticalSan(extSpec) {
  * marks it critical. The two name opposite ends of one exchange, so a spec naming both is refused. A
  * client recovers the signed entry from the issued certificate with `pki.ct.x509CertEntry`.
  *
+ * Before the key is used, the certificate the spec describes is linted against the RFC 5280 profile
+ * and refused with `x509/profile-violation` if any rule grades it `error`, naming the rule and its
+ * clause. Two rules are passed over: one reading the not-yet-written signature, and
+ * `lint/rfc5280/unknown-critical-extension`, whose requirement RFC 5280 sec. 4.2 places on a
+ * certificate-using system rather than on the issuer.
+ *
  * @opts
  *   - `pem` (boolean) -- return a PEM `CERTIFICATE` string instead of DER.
  *   - `pss` (boolean) -- sign an RSA key with RSASSA-PSS instead of PKCS#1 v1.5.
  *   - `digestAlgorithm` (string) -- override the message digest where the algorithm permits a choice.
+ *   - `profile` (string) -- a second lint profile to hold the certificate to beside RFC 5280, named
+ *     from `pki.lint.profiles()`. `"none"` runs no rules at all and emits what the spec describes,
+ *     which is how a deliberately non-conforming certificate is produced.
  * @example
  *   var pair = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
  *   var signerSpki = await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey);
@@ -530,6 +545,7 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
         : "explicit form; the issuer takes { key, name, publicKey }, or { key, cert } to take both from a certificate");
     });
   guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(opts, KNOWN_SIGN_OPTS, _err, "x509/bad-input", "pki.x509.sign has an unknown option ");
+  lint.assertKnownBuildProfile("certificate", opts.profile, _err, "x509/bad-input");
   if (issuer.key == null) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "a signing key (issuer.key, a WebCrypto CryptoKey or a PKCS#8 private key DER/PEM) is required");
 
   var spki = _reqDer(spec.subjectPublicKey, "spec.subjectPublicKey (the SPKI DER of the certified key)");
@@ -596,6 +612,9 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
   tbsChildren.push(b.raw(spki));
   if (exts.length) tbsChildren.push(b.explicit(3, b.sequence(exts)));
   var tbsDer = b.sequence(tbsChildren);
+  lint.assertBuildClean("certificate",
+    b.sequence([tbsDer, scheme.sigAlgId, b.bitString(GATE_PLACEHOLDER_SIG, 0)]),
+    opts.profile, _err, "x509/profile-violation");
 
   return signScheme.signOverTbs(scheme, issuer.key, tbsDer, _signE).then(function (sig) {
     return Promise.resolve(_assertCertVerifies(tbsDer, sig, issuerSpki, scheme)).then(function () {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.8.26",
+  "version": "0.8.28",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",
@@ -86,6 +86,6 @@
   "devDependencies": {
     "c8": "12.0.0",
     "esbuild": "0.28.2",
-    "eslint": "10.10.0"
+    "eslint": "10.11.0"
   }
 }

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:cbd1318b-e7fc-430e-9a9c-ec7c99161ac6",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:3eb9063d-93f7-4a44-bdff-52a992c9a1e7",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-09-28T05:44:25.737Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-09-28T21:19:37.849Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.8.26",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.8.28",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.8.26",
+      "version": "0.8.28",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.8.26",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.8.28",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.8.26",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.8.28",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]