@blamejs/pki 0.7.34 → 0.7.36

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,34 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.7.36 — 2026-09-12
+
+The attribute-certificate signer holds its extensions and attributes to the RFC 5755 issuer rules, and emits the authority key identifier by default.
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.attrcert.sign takes crlDistributionPoints and authorityInfoAccess in the list forms pki.x509.sign takes, each emitted non-critical as RFC 5755 sec. 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 require, so the sec. 6 "pointer in AC" revocation scheme needs no pre-encoded Extension DER.
+- pki.schema.attrcert.parse decodes an attribute certificate's authorityKeyIdentifier, authorityInfoAccess and cRLDistributionPoints through the RFC 5280 readers, so a relying party running the "pointer in AC" scheme reads the distribution point and the OCSP location off the parse instead of off raw bytes.
+
+### Changed
+
+- pki.attrcert.sign emits the authorityKeyIdentifier without being named (RFC 5755 sec. 4.3.3: "this extension SHOULD be included in ACs"). Its keyIdentifier is the AA certificate's subjectKeyIdentifier when issuer.cert is given, else the RFC 5280 method (1) value of the AA key; a stated keyIdentifier that differs from the AA certificate's is refused; authorityKeyIdentifier: false omits it. The pre-encoded array form of extensions emits exactly what it is given.
+- pki.attrcert.sign refuses, with attrcert/bad-input and on both extension forms, what RFC 5755 forbids an issuer to produce: an auditIdentity that is not 1 to 20 octets (sec. 4.3.1); a targetInformation carrying more than one Targets element or a targetCert (sec. 4.3.2); an id-ad-ocsp accessLocation that is not a URI carrying an HTTP URL (sec. 4.3.4); a crlDistributionPoints that does not name exactly one distribution point as a fullName holding a single directoryName or an HTTP or LDAP URL, or whose cRLIssuer does not name the CRL issuer as a directoryName (sec. 4.3.5, RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.13); and a role whose roleName is not a uniformResourceIdentifier (sec. 4.4.5), on the object form and the pre-encoded Attribute form alike.
+
+## v0.7.35 — 2026-09-12
+
+The timestamp signer refuses a TSA certificate its verifier would refuse, and keeps genTime's fraction of a second.
+
+### Changed
+
+- pki.tsp.sign refuses a TSA certificate that does not satisfy RFC 3161 sec. 2.3: exactly one extendedKeyUsage extension, marked critical, naming id-kp-timeStamping alone, and a keyUsage that, when present, allows signing. The refusal carries the code pki.tsp.verify answers for the same certificate (tsp/bad-eku, tsp/eku-not-critical, tsp/eku-not-exclusive, tsp/bad-key-usage), so a TSA operator learns at signing time what a relying party would say.
+- genTime keeps the Date's milliseconds as the sec. 2.4.2 fraction of a second, in the X.690 DER form (a point followed by the digits, trailing zeros omitted, no fraction for a whole second), which pki.schema.tsp.parseToken already read; a whole-second genTime encodes as before. pki.asn1.build.generalizedTime takes { fractional: true } for this form.
+- accuracy given as an object naming none of seconds, millis, micros is refused with tsp/bad-input: sec. 2.4.2 reads an absent field as zero, so an empty Accuracy asserted a zero deviation; omit the option to make no claim.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- pki.asn1.build.generalizedTime, pki.asn1.build.utcTime and pki.asn1.read.time read a Date's fields through the Date.prototype accessors captured when the module loaded. A getter overridden on the Date instance, or a Date.prototype method replaced after load, no longer changes the encoded time or the Date the reader returns.
+
 ## v0.7.34 — 2026-09-12
 
 The OCSP signer refuses what its own lint grades an error.

package/README.md

@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.path` | Certification-path validation (RFC 5280 §6). `validate` runs the §6.1 state machine over an ordered path and a trust anchor: signature chaining across RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and hybrid composite ML-DSA (a composite is accepted only when both its post-quantum and traditional components verify), validity windows, name chaining, basic constraints and path length, key usage, name constraints, and the certificate-policy tree. It returns a structured verdict with per-check reason codes and enforces a `pki.trust` anchor's per-purpose distrust-after dates and delegator purposes through `checkPurpose` — an anchor that carries either one with no purpose named to select by is refused as a configuration fault rather than validated as though it carried none. The verdict says what was established. `revocationChecked` takes the weakest outcome on the path: `false` with no checker supplied, `"determined"` when every certificate got an explicit good or revoked answer, `"waived"` when `softFail` turned an undetermined one into a pass, and `"undetermined"` when one could not be answered at all — which includes a checker that throws, a fault `softFail` does not waive because `softFail` opts into an undetermined answer, not into a broken checker. `anchorConstraints` names the purpose the anchor was judged under and whether each of its two constraints applied. `crlChecker` supplies CRL-based revocation, covering partitioned and sharded CRLs, whose §6.3.3 Distribution Point ↔ IDP correspondence lets corresponding shards accumulate reason coverage until all eight revocation reasons are covered, and delta CRLs, merged onto the complete CRL they may be combined with (§5.2.4) so a held certificate its delta releases reads good, while a delta that merges with nothing still reports what it lists and still withholds good. `ocspChecker` supplies OCSP-based revocation (RFC 6960: CertID binding, responder authorization, signature, currency) over the same pluggable hook. `build(leaf, opts)` is the discovering complement (RFC 4158): from a leaf, an untrusted pool of candidate CA certificates, and a trust store, it finds the ordered leaf-to-anchor path `validate` accepts, using name chaining plus the RFC 4158 §3.5 sort hints (an AKI/SKI match, an anchor-adjacent issuer, CA plus keyCertSign, validity at the check time — ordering hints, never filters), a depth-first search with backtracking so the first accepted path wins, and a bounded search (chain-length cap, candidate-expansion cap, identity-tuple visited set) so a cross-certificate cycle or Bridge-CA fan-out terminates deterministically. Every accept flows through `validate`, and its verdict is cross-checked against `openssl verify`. Opt-in AIA `caIssuers` fetching (`opts.fetchAia: true`) discovers a missing intermediate from a certificate's Authority Information Access URL (§4.2.2.1) over `pki.transport`, triggered only on a pool miss and bounded against SSRF and amplification: HTTPS only, a total fetch budget that caps fetching silently rather than throwing, a per-cert URL cap, a build-wide URL dedupe, a response-size and certificate-count cap, no redirect following, and every fault a silent skip. The TLS trust (`opts.tls`) stays distinct from the PKI `trustAnchors`, and every fetched certificate remains untrusted pool material that still flows through `validate` (never a trust anchor). It is off by default, so the default build is byte-identical offline. An `opts.direction` of `"reverse"` searches from a trust anchor toward the leaf (RFC 4158 §3.1), narrower when the anchor set is small and the leaf's issuer options fan out, and `"auto"` picks the direction by first-hop fan-out; reverse building reuses the same pool, visited set, caps, and `validate` gate, so the direction changes only search order, and the anchor is excluded from the returned path. Reverse building is pool-only and does not combine with `fetchAia`. When `opts.userInitialPolicySet` names acceptable certificate-policy OIDs and more than one path validates, build returns the accepted path whose user-constrained policy set best satisfies that set (RFC 4158 §4) rather than the first accepted path, the ranking bounded by the same candidate cap and a malformed set refused with `path/bad-input`; an `anyPolicy` entry is unconstrained and returns the first accepted path. In a mesh of cross-certified domains, where many candidates chain by name to the same place, a candidate is ranked by how many leading relative distinguished names it shares with the name the search is heading for (§3.5.16 and the §3.5.19 reverse method), so a certificate in the target's own domain is tried before one from a cross-certified domain, and forward building sorts a candidate under every candidate that can complete the path when its path length constraint cannot cover the certificates already below it (§3.5.7), an ordering that outranks the other hints rather than competing with them. No candidate is removed and an unbounded search still reaches every path the pool holds; a bounded one spends `maxCandidatesConsidered` on whichever branches the order steers it to. Pure and re-entrant — `validate`, `build`, `crlChecker`, `ocspChecker` |
 | `pki.x509` | Certificate issuance (RFC 5280 §4). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a certificate from a `spec` of subject (a common-name string, an array of RDNs, or raw Name DER), the public key being certified, the validity window, an optional serial, and an optional `extensions` object. `randomSerial()` draws the same 20-octet CSPRNG serial the signer uses when the spec names none, so a serial can be reserved or logged before the certificate is issued. The `issuer` is a key alone (self-signed: issuer equals subject, signed with that key), a name plus public key plus key, or an issuing certificate plus key. The signature algorithm is resolved from the signing key through the shared registry, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA P-256/384/521, Ed25519, Ed448, ML-DSA-44/65/87, the twelve SLH-DSA sets, and the composite arms all issue without a per-algorithm branch. It encodes basic constraints, key usage, extended key usage, subject and authority key identifiers (the SKI derived by SHA-1 of the subject key; the AKI optionally naming the issuing certificate by name and serial; both emitted without being named, the SKI on every certificate and the AKI on every certificate that is not self-signed, which is what RFC 5280 §4.2.1.1 and §4.2.1.2 place on the issuing CA, and `false` declines each only where the RFC allows the omission), subject alternative names, certificate policies with their RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.4 qualifiers (a CPS pointer and a user notice), name constraints, authority information access, CRL distribution points, the freshest CRL, issuer alternative names, the policy machinery path validation acts on (policy constraints, inhibit anyPolicy, policy mappings), the RFC 3739 qualified-certificate statements including the ETSI EN 319 412-5 set, the RFC 6962 certificate-transparency pair (the precertificate poison and the embedded SCT list), the Active Directory Certificate Services enrollment extensions (certificate template, legacy template name, CA version, previous-CA-certificate hash, application policies), subject information access, subject directory attributes, and the RFC 6960 OCSP no-check responder marker, from the spec. That is every extension the shared certificate-extension decoders read, so any certificate `pki.lint.certificate` and `pki.inspect` can read in full the toolkit can also issue; any other extension is taken as pre-encoded DER. `extensions.nameConstraints` takes `{ permitted, excluded }` lists of GeneralName-form objects, restricting what the CA being issued may itself issue; each base is held to the rule for a constraint base, and the extension is emitted critical as §4.2.1.10 requires. It derives the version from the field set and enforces the serial bounds, the UTCTime/GeneralizedTime cutover, the DER default omissions, and the CA cross-field rules; a violation throws a typed `CertificateError`. Returns DER, or a PEM `CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`. Every arm is independently verified by OpenSSL. `extension(name, value, opts)` encodes one Extension DER from the same plain value form, for the pre-encoded array form on the certificate, CSR, and CRL signers: the criticality follows what the signer emits, `opts.critical` reaches only the extensions whose criticality is the issuer's choice, and an unregistered dotted OID takes its extnValue as bytes. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.x509.parse` — `sign`, `randomSerial`, `extension` |
 | `pki.csr` | PKCS#10 certification-request issuance (RFC 2986 / RFC 2985). `sign(spec, key, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificationRequest` from a `spec` of subject (which may be empty), the public key being certified, an optional `extensionRequest` carrying the requested v3 extensions a CA copies into the issued certificate (subject alternative names, key usage, extended key usage, basic constraints, certificate policies, subject key identifier, the RFC 3739 qualified-certificate statements, the Microsoft certificate template and application policies, subject information access, subject directory attributes, or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER; an extension the issuing CA assigns, such as the authority key identifier or the OCSP no-check marker, is refused by name rather than requested), and an optional `challengePassword`. `key` (or `{ key }`) is the subject's own private key: the request is self-signed to prove possession of the private half of `subjectPublicKey`, and that proof is verified before the request is returned, which is what `openssl req -verify` checks. The signature algorithm is resolved from the subject key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. Returns DER, or a PEM `CERTIFICATE REQUEST` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CsrError`. `verify(request)` asks the same question of a request someone else produced, over its exact signed `certificationRequestInfo` bytes under the `subjectPKInfo` inside them, through the one path-validation signature engine. It answers `{ verified, subject, subjectPublicKeyInfo, attributes, certificationRequestInfoBytes }`, all re-derived from the signed bytes, so a CA issues from the fields the signature covers rather than from the object it passed in. A `verified: true` says the producer held that private key and that the subject and requested extensions are the ones they signed; who they are is the enrollment protocol's question, not this one. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.csr.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
-| `pki.attrcert` | Attribute-certificate issuance (RFC 5755). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs an `AttributeCertificate` as an Attribute Authority: a `spec` of `holder` (exactly one of an entity name, a `baseCertificateID` reference, a `fromCertificate` binding, or an object digest), the validity window as GeneralizedTime, an optional serial (positive, at most 20 octets, randomly generated when omitted), the `attributes` (role, clearance, group, chargingIdentity, accessIdentity, authenticationInfo, or pre-encoded Attribute DER), and optional `extensions` (auditIdentity, targetInformation, noRevAvail, aaControls, acProxying, authorityKeyIdentifier, or pre-encoded Extension DER) each with its RFC 5755 criticality. An attribute certificate is never self-signed, so the `issuer` is the signing AA, supplied as `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the AA key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, and the signature is verified under the AA public key before the certificate is returned. Returns DER, or a PEM `ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `AttrCertError`. `verify(ac, issuer, opts)` is the receiving side, performing the RFC 5755 sec. 5 checks an attribute certificate and a named issuer can settle between them: the signature over the exact `AttributeCertificateInfo` bytes through the one path-validation signature engine, the AC naming the issuer this verifier trusts (compared as a distinguished name), the evaluation instant lying within the validity with equality at either bound succeeding as the section states, the sec. 4.3.2 targeting rule, and rejection of any critical extension this verb does not process (section 5 defines support as parsing the value AND rejecting where the value would reject, so `aaControls` and `acProxying`, whose constraints it does not evaluate, are refused when critical). It answers `{ verified, signatureValid, validityChecked, targetingChecked, holderBindingChecked, issuerPathChecked, holder, issuer, attributes, extensions, notBefore, notAfter, serialNumberHex, reason }` with the fields re-derived from the signed bytes; the holder's own certificate chain and the AC issuer's chain need certificates the verb is not given, so those slots report `false` rather than letting their absence read as a pass. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.attrcert.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
+| `pki.attrcert` | Attribute-certificate issuance (RFC 5755). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs an `AttributeCertificate` as an Attribute Authority: a `spec` of `holder` (exactly one of an entity name, a `baseCertificateID` reference, a `fromCertificate` binding, or an object digest), the validity window as GeneralizedTime, an optional serial (positive, at most 20 octets, randomly generated when omitted), the `attributes` (role, clearance, group, chargingIdentity, accessIdentity, authenticationInfo, or pre-encoded Attribute DER), and optional `extensions` (auditIdentity, targetInformation, noRevAvail, aaControls, acProxying, authorityKeyIdentifier, crlDistributionPoints, authorityInfoAccess, or pre-encoded Extension DER) each with its RFC 5755 criticality. The authorityKeyIdentifier is emitted without being named (sec. 4.3.3) and holds the AA certificate's subject key identifier; both extension forms are held to the rules sec. 4.3 and 4.4 place on the issuer (an audit identity of 1 to 20 octets, one Targets element and no targetCert, an OCSP location that is an HTTP URL, one distribution point naming a single DN or HTTP / LDAP URL, a role name that is a URI). An attribute certificate is never self-signed, so the `issuer` is the signing AA, supplied as `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the AA key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, and the signature is verified under the AA public key before the certificate is returned. Returns DER, or a PEM `ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `AttrCertError`. `verify(ac, issuer, opts)` is the receiving side, performing the RFC 5755 sec. 5 checks an attribute certificate and a named issuer can settle between them: the signature over the exact `AttributeCertificateInfo` bytes through the one path-validation signature engine, the AC naming the issuer this verifier trusts (compared as a distinguished name), the evaluation instant lying within the validity with equality at either bound succeeding as the section states, the sec. 4.3.2 targeting rule, and rejection of any critical extension this verb does not process (section 5 defines support as parsing the value AND rejecting where the value would reject, so `aaControls` and `acProxying`, whose constraints it does not evaluate, are refused when critical). It answers `{ verified, signatureValid, validityChecked, targetingChecked, holderBindingChecked, issuerPathChecked, holder, issuer, attributes, extensions, notBefore, notAfter, serialNumberHex, reason }` with the fields re-derived from the signed bytes; the holder's own certificate chain and the AC issuer's chain need certificates the verb is not given, so those slots report `false` rather than letting their absence read as a pass. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.attrcert.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
 | `pki.crmf` | Certificate-request-message issuance (RFC 4211). `build(spec, key, opts)` assembles a `CertReqMessages` from a `spec` of `certReqId` (default 0, with the RFC 9483 `-1` sentinel allowed), a `certTemplate` of the requested fields (`subject`, `publicKey` as the SPKI DER of the key being certified, `validity`, requested `extensions`, an optional `version` 2), optional `controls` and `regInfo` (regToken, authenticator, utf8Pairs, oldCertID, protocolEncrKey, or pre-encoded `AttributeTypeAndValue` DER), and an optional `pop` selector. `key` (or `{ key }`) is the requester's private key: the message carries a `POPOSigningKey` proof of possession signed with the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey` and verified before the message is returned, exactly as a PKCS#10 CSR proves possession. A complete template signs the `CertRequest`; an incomplete one signs a `POPOSigningKeyInput`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the requested public key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. `key` is optional for a `raVerified` proof. A key that cannot sign, which is where an ML-KEM enrollment sits, takes a `POPOPrivKey` proof instead (RFC 4211 sec. 4.2, sec. 4.3): `pop.type` of `keyEncipherment` or `keyAgreement` with `pop.method: 'subsequentMessage'` declares whether an encrypted certificate (`encrCert`) or a challenge (`challengeResp`) completes the proof over the enrolling protocol's next exchange, and `pop.method: 'encryptedKey'` encloses the requester's private key for the CA in a CMS `EnvelopedData` under `id-ct-encKeyWithID`, requiring `pop.privateKey`, `pop.recipients`, the `pop.identifier` sec. 4.2.1 makes mandatory, and `pop.archive: true` because RFC 9810 sec. 5.2.8.3.1 permits the method only where archival is intended. The enclosed key must be the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey`, or the proof demonstrates possession of a key the request never asked to have certified. The `thisMessage` and `dhMAC` alternatives the specification deprecates are refused with their successors named. `pop.method: 'agreeMAC'` completes the four: `pop.key` is the requester's finite-field Diffie-Hellman private key, as a PKCS#8 DER, a PEM `PRIVATE KEY` block or a `KeyObject`, and `pop.caCert` the authority's certificate it already holds; the two agree a static secret (RFC 2875 sec. 3), and the key derived from it MACs the DER `certReq` under `id-dhPop-static-HMAC-SHA1`. Either key may name its group in the PKCS#3 or the X9.42 encoding. `pop.key` must be the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey`, and the template must name both a subject and a public key. Pass an array of specs for a batch; the CA-assigned template fields are never emitted. Returns DER, or a PEM block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrmfError`. `verifyPop(messages)` is the receiving side: for each `CertReqMsg` it verifies the `POPOSigningKey` signature over the bytes RFC 4211 sec. 4.1 names — the DER of `poposkInput` when present, of `certReq` when not — through the one path-validation signature engine, and answers `{ verified, messages: [{ verified, method, cryptographicallyVerified, certReqId, subject, subjectBound, publicKey, reason }] }` with the fields re-derived from the message's own bytes. Each verdict reports only what its preimage covers: `publicKey` is the key possession was proven for, and `subject` is the requested name when the `certReq` was signed. A `poposkInput` preimage covers the key and the sender alone, so any subject beside it is unsigned and is withheld with `subjectBound: false`. A `raVerified` proof is an RA's out-of-band assertion and a `keyEncipherment` or `keyAgreement` proof completes over a later exchange, so each is reported unverified with its `method` named instead of guessed. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crmf.parse` — `build`, `verifyPop` |
 | `pki.cmp` | CMP message building, transfer, and verification (RFC 9810). `build(message, opts)` assembles a protected `PKIMessage`. `message.header` carries the `sender` and `recipient` GeneralNames (including the anonymous NULL-DN) plus optional transaction metadata; `message.body` is a single-key object naming the arm — request-side `ir`, `cr`, `kur`, `krr` (key recovery, §5.3.7), `ccr` (cross-certification, §5.3.11: a `CertReqMessages` at the normative floor, where the requesting CA keeps its private key so a private-key-transport encryptedKey proof-of-possession is refused, and the optional App. D.6 single-request cardinality is not enforced), `p10cr`, `certConf`, `pollReq`, `genm`, `rr`, responder-side `ip`, `cp`, `kup`, `ccp`, `rp`, `genp`, `error`, `pollRep`, `krp`, `pkiconf`, and the registration-authority `nested` wrapper of complete PKIMessages (RFC 9810 §5.1.3.5). Protection is exactly one of `opts.{ key, cert }`, a signature under the sender key with the algorithm resolved from the signer certificate so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 / PSS), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, `opts.mac`, a PBMAC1 shared-secret HMAC (RFC 9481 / 9579, PBKDF2-derived), or `opts.kem`, a KEM-based MAC for a client whose key can only establish secrets (RFC 9810 §5.1.3.4): the ciphertext a peer encapsulated to its ML-KEM key is decapsulated, the key is derived under HKDF-SHA256 with a context bound to the transaction identifier of the message that carried the ciphertext, and `pki.cmp.verify` checks it from the shared secret. Protection covers the exact DER of the virtual `ProtectedPart` and is self-verified before the message is returned, and `protectionAlg` is derived rather than caller-set, so the message the parser accepts is coherent by construction. A `p10cr` request's PKCS#10 proof-of-possession is verified before the message is protected, so one whose self-signature does not verify under its subject public key is refused rather than sent. `transfer(url, message, opts)` carries a built message to a CMP endpoint over `pki.transport` (RFC 9811): one POST of the DER PKIMessage, with the response classified fail-closed — 200 only for success, a non-200 2xx or an un-followed 3xx refused, a 4xx or 5xx carrying a CMP error PKIMessage forwarded as the integrity-protected verdict — and protection surfaced rather than verified. `wellKnownUrl(base, opts)` builds the §3.4 `/.well-known/cmp` request-URIs. `verify(message, opts)` checks the protection on an incoming message, either a signature through the same certification-path engine `pki.crl.verify` and `pki.ocsp.verify` use, with the EdDSA low-order-point and algorithm-confusion gates, or a PBMAC1 MAC recomputed from `opts.sharedSecret` and the message's own PBKDF2 parameters and constant-time compared, over the exact `ProtectedPart` reconstructed from the parser's raw slices. It is fail-closed on an unprotected message, a MAC algorithm it does not compute (reported as MAC-protected under that algorithm, never as a failed signature), an omitted keyLength, or a SHA-1 PRF, and returns a `{ valid, trusted, protectionType, signer, ... }` verdict. With `opts.trustAnchors` the signer certificate is fully path-validated (RFC 5280 §6.1 plus the RFC 9483 §3.2 `keyUsage.digitalSignature` gate) at a trusted current time, or an explicit `opts.time` for historical verification and never the message's self-asserted `messageTime`, before it is reported trusted; without one the verdict is crypto-only and the signer certificate is surfaced to anchor. `session(opts)` returns a stateful enrollment session whose `enroll(request)` drives a full `ir` / `cr` / `kur` / `p10cr` transaction over the shared transport, composing `build`, `transfer`, and `verify`. Every response is protection-verified, signer-trusted, and bound to the exchange (a stable `transactionID`, a fresh-`senderNonce` and echoed-`recipNonce` chain) before its body is read, with a bounded `pollReq` / `pollRep` loop for a `waiting` status and a `certConf` / `pkiConf` (or implicit) confirmation carrying an explicit `hashAlg` for a signature algorithm that does not convey its hash. It returns a terminal `{ outcome, certificate, chain, status, trusted, confirmed, implicitConfirm, transactionID, polls, transcript }`. A certification authority can take longer to answer than a process is held open, so a `poll-timeout` carries a `resumeToken` and `resumePoll(token)` continues the same transaction in a later process: the token is plain JSON naming the transaction, the nonce the next request echoes, the polled request and the arm its grant arrives on, and the key the grant must certify. It carries no secret and grants nothing, since the protection material and the endpoint come from the session built to resume with, and the resumed poll verifies, nonce-binds, and key-binds every response. Its fields are what the resumed exchange is held to, so store it where the enrollment's own state is stored: someone who can rewrite it can widen what the resumed session accepts, as far as that session's trust anchors and the authority's protection allow and no further. The same session also drives the other two RFC 9483 operations under that shell: `revoke(request)` sends an `rr` naming a certificate as `{ certificate }` or `{ certDetails }` with an optional CRLReason `reason`, and returns `revoked` / `rejected` / `poll-timeout`; `info(request)` sends a `genm` for one of the four support messages — `{ caCerts }`, `{ rootCaCert }`, `{ certReqTemplate }`, `{ crlUpdate }` — and returns `answered` with the decoded `value` and a `present` flag, since an absent response value is how each says nothing is available. A session revokes its own certificate: the signature over the request is the proof of authorization (§4.2), so the named certificate must be `opts.cert` and a PBMAC1 session is refused. The signature flavor requires `opts.trustAnchors` to authenticate the CA; a verified rejection or error and an exhausted poll budget are terminal verdicts, while a tampered, untrusted, or desynchronized response is a typed throw. Returns DER, or a PEM `CMP` block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CmpError`. `openKeyPackage(container, opts)` opens a private key the CA generated centrally and delivered in the `privateKey` field of a granted `CertifiedKeyPair` (RFC 9483 §4.1.6): a CMS `SignedData` over an RFC 5958 `AsymmetricKeyPackage`, sealed in a CMS `EnvelopedData`. `opts.key` (with `opts.cert`) opens the key transport and key agreement containers a signature-protected request selects, `opts.password` the password container a MAC-protected request selects. The authority is authorized before any key material is returned: its certificate must chain to an anchor in `opts.trustAnchors` AND assert the `id-kp-cmKGA` extended key usage, since a certificate with no `extendedKeyUsage` permits every purpose and so authorizes nothing; `opts.authorizedBySharedSecret` states §4.1.6's exemption for an entity that authorizes by the secret that protected its request. Returns `{ keys, kga, trusted }`, where each key is a PKCS#8 `PrivateKeyInfo` ready for `pki.key.import`; `keys` is the whole RFC 5958 `AsymmetricKeyPackage` (`SIZE (1..MAX)`), while a session enrollment requires the sequence of one §4.1.6 profiles it to. Both CMS layers are read as a ContentInfo or as the bare structure, told apart by what the SEQUENCE opens with. `session(opts)` drives the whole exchange under `opts.acceptCentralKeyGeneration`: the request omits `certTemplate.publicKey`, carries no proof of possession, and goes out as `cmp2021`; the session opens the delivered container with the credential it enrolled under and surfaces it as `deliveredKey`, having first checked that the issued certificate certifies the delivered key. Without the option, such a request and such a grant are both refused. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.cmp.parse` — `build`, `transfer`, `wellKnownUrl`, `verify`, `openKeyPackage`, `session` |
 | `pki.crl` | CRL issuance and verification (RFC 5280 §5). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificateList` from a `spec` of `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate`, an optional `crlNumber`, a `revoked` array (each entry a `serialNumber` and `revocationDate` with an optional `reason` or `invalidityDate`), and an optional `extensions` object (authority key identifier, issuer alternative name, issuing distribution point, delta-CRL indicator, freshest CRL, authority information access, which is every extension RFC 5280 §5.2 defines) or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER, with an `issuer` of `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The authority key identifier is emitted on every CRL whether or not it is named, as §5.2.1 places it on every conforming issuer, from the issuer certificate's SKI or the issuer key. The signature algorithm is resolved from the issuer key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. The version is derived from the extension set (v2 when any CRL or entry extension is present, else v1), the outer `signatureAlgorithm` matches `tbsCertList.signature`, an empty revocation list omits the field rather than emitting an empty SEQUENCE, `reasonCode` is an ENUMERATED and `invalidityDate` is always GeneralizedTime, the RFC fixes per-extension criticality, and the produced signature is verified under the issuer key before return. `verify(crl, issuer)` checks a CRL signature through the one path-validation signature engine, algorithm-confusion and EdDSA low-order gates included; handed a certificate rather than a bare key it also asks what only a certificate can answer — that the certificate is the issuer the CRL names, and that its `keyUsage`, when present, asserts `cRLSign` — so a CRL minted under an end-entity certificate of the same CA does not verify as that CA's. `isRevoked(crl, serialNumber, opts)` looks a serial up, and first checks that the CRL is one a serial can be looked up in at all — it is handed a serial and nothing else, so a CRL that speaks for part of its issuer's certificates is refused rather than answered from. A delta CRL lists changes since a base, so an entry recording a release reads as a revocation when read alone; an indirect CRL carries other issuers' entries, whose serials are unrelated to yours; and any other `issuingDistributionPoint` narrows the CRL to one distribution point, one kind of certificate, or a subset of revocation reasons, none of which a serial can be matched against. A CRL speaks for a span as well as a set, so `opts.time` states the instant the question is asked at and a list that has stopped speaking for it — `nextUpdate` passed, `thisUpdate` later, or no `nextUpdate` stated at all — is refused rather than read as a clean bill of health; without `opts.time` the lookup is structural and an absent serial means only that it is not on that list. `pki.path.crlChecker` is the verb for all of them: it is handed the certificate, merges a delta with its base, performs the §6.3.3 correspondence, and decides currency against the material it fetched. Returns DER, or a PEM `X509 CRL` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrlError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crl.parse` — `sign`, `verify`, `isRevoked` |
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.pkcs12` | PKCS#12 (.p12/.pfx) issuance and reading (RFC 7292 / RFC 9579). `build(spec, opts)` assembles a store from the OpenSSL-style `{ key, cert, ca?, friendlyName?, localKeyId? }` or the full `{ safeContents: [...] }`, where each element is a plaintext or PBES2-encrypted `SafeContents` of key, shroudedKey, cert, crl, secret, or nested `safeContents` bags. Keys and certs are validated before wrapping, and `friendlyName` (BMPString) and `localKeyId` are single-value. Integrity is a classic Appendix B HMAC (the default, for maximum interoperability) or an RFC 9579 PBMAC1 (`opts.mac.algorithm`) over SHA-256/384/512, with shrouded keys and cert safes encrypted under RFC 8018 PBES2 (AES-128/192/256-CBC). Every password is encoded the PKCS#12 way — BMPString+NULL for the classic MAC, UTF-8 for the PBES2 bags and PBMAC1 — which is what OpenSSL and NSS consume, so a file it emits opens in both, cross-checked bidirectionally. The MAC covers the exact AuthenticatedSafe byte range, a DEFAULT-1 `MacData.iterations` is rejected up front, and the store is re-parsed before return. `verifyMac(pfx, password, opts)` recomputes a classic or PBMAC1 MAC over `macedBytes` and constant-time-compares it, throwing on a MAC-less or public-key-integrity store. Public-key integrity (`opts.integrity.mode: "public-key"`) wraps the AuthenticatedSafe in a CMS SignedData instead of a MAC, signed by any `pki.cms.sign` signer and carrying no MacData (§4); privacy stays independent, so `password` still PBES2-encrypts the bags. Public-key privacy wraps a SafeContents as a CMS EnvelopedData (AES-CBC, `id-envelopedData`, never GCM) encrypted to recipient public keys through the `pki.cms.encrypt` recipient model, via per-safe `recipients` or the `opts.recipientCerts` convenience, restricted to certificate recipients (RSA-OAEP, ECDH, X25519, X448, ML-KEM) since a password or KEK recipient could not be reopened by `open`. All four integrity-by-privacy combinations are permitted (§3.1). `open(pfx, password, opts)` reads a store back: it verifies the MAC first, so a wrong password is the MAC verdict rather than a decrypt error, then PBES2-decrypts every privacy safe and shrouded key bag and returns `{ integrityMode, macVerified, signers, keys, certs, crls, secrets }` — keys as re-validated PKCS#8 DER, certs, CRLs and secrets as raw DER, all with `friendlyName` and `localKeyId`, nested safes recursively. A MAC-less store is refused unless `opts.allowUnauthenticated`. A public-key-integrity store is verified through its CMS SignedData signature first (`pkcs12/signature-invalid` on failure), with the signer surfaced in `signers` but never trust-chained, which remains the caller's `pki.path.validate` step. A legacy-PBE store's Appendix C 3DES and RC2 bags are decrypted, RC2 through an in-tree RFC 2268 cipher, so an `openssl pkcs12 -legacy` or NSS store opens; the legacy RC4 schemes are refused. An `id-envelopedData` safe is decrypted with `opts.recipientKey` after the integrity gate (`pkcs12/no-recipient-key` when absent), every recipient-side fault and every post-integrity decrypt failure collapsing to the uniform `pkcs12/decrypt-failed`, and `opts.keys: 'crypto'` imports each key to a `CryptoKey`. It reads what OpenSSL and NSS produce. Returns DER or a PEM `PKCS12`, with a typed `Pkcs12Error` on failure. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs12.parse` — `build`, `verifyMac`, `open` |
 | `pki.cms` | CMS signing, verification, encryption, and compression (RFC 5652). `sign(content, signers, opts)` produces a SignedData (§5), attached or detached, with one or many signers over RSA, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, EdDSA, the post-quantum ML-DSA-44/65/87 (RFC 9882) and SLH-DSA (all twelve FIPS 205 sets, RFC 9814), and composite ML-DSA pairing ML-DSA with a traditional RSA, ECDSA, or EdDSA key (accepted only when both components verify, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs). It builds the signed attributes (content-type, message-digest, signing-time) as canonical DER, signs the exact §5.4 preimage, and emits a DER `Buffer` or PEM. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, which signs a large detached payload without holding it in memory: the payload is hashed incrementally under every signer's digest algorithm in one pass, and `verify` accepts the same streamed form as its `content` option. A signer may also be key-only — `{ key, spki, keyIdentifier }` with no certificate — which RFC 5272 §3.2 requires when a Full PKI Request's signer is the key of a certification request that request carries: the signer identifier takes the subjectKeyIdentifier form carrying the identifier the request declares, the signature scheme resolves from the request's own public key, and no certificate is embedded. `verify(input, opts)` parses a SignedData over the strict `pki.schema.cms` codec, locates each SignerInfo's signer certificate by its issuerAndSerialNumber or subjectKeyIdentifier, and checks the signature over the exact §5.4 preimage: with signed attributes present it confirms the message-digest attribute equals the content digest and verifies over the DER re-encoding of the SignedAttributes (the on-wire `[0]` tag replaced by a universal SET OF), and otherwise directly over the content. It returns a per-signer verdict with the matched signer certificate. `valid` and `trusted` are separate claims and neither implies the other: a SignedData carries its own certificates, so `valid` says the signature is sound under one of them and nothing about who signed, while `trusted` says every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`, validated through the same RFC 5280 path engine `pki.path.validate` uses. Without anchors there is nothing to chain to and `trusted` is `false`; anchors that cannot be read throw, rather than reading as untrusted. An unrecognized option is refused rather than ignored. `countersign(cms, signers, opts)` adds a countersignature (§11.4) — a `SignerInfo` over the countersigned SignerInfo's signature value, any signer algorithm, nestable, with the primary bytes preserved so it still verifies — attached as the id-countersignature unsigned attribute; `verify` returns each countersignature's verdict under `signers[i].countersignatures` and every unsigned attribute — including an RFC 3161 timestamp token, attachable via `sign`'s `unsignedAttributes` — under `signers[i].unsignedAttrs`, surfaced unauthenticated. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` produces an EnvelopedData, AuthEnvelopedData (AES-GCM, the authenticated default), or EncryptedData, with recipients auto-dispatched off the certificate key to key transport (RSAES-OAEP; v1.5 is never emitted), key agreement (ephemeral-static ECDH over P-256/384/521 with the X9.63 KDF, and X25519/X448 with HKDF), symmetric key wrap, password (PBKDF2 with RFC 3211 PWRI-KEK), or the post-quantum ML-KEM (and composite ML-KEM, draft-lamps-pq-composite-kem) KEMRecipientInfo (RFC 9629/9936), wrapping one fresh content key for every recipient. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, streamed through the AES-GCM or AES-CBC content cipher so a large plaintext is encrypted without being buffered whole; the ciphertext is assembled before the definite-length encryptedContent is emitted, byte-for-byte the buffered form. `decrypt(input, keyMaterial, opts)` recovers the content through the matching arm and returns it with an `authenticated` flag; every secret-dependent failure collapses to one uniform `cms/decrypt-failed` verdict (Bleichenbacher, EFAIL, and password-oracle freedom), and PKCS#1 v1.5 is decrypt-only under the RFC 3218 implicit-rejection countermeasure. With `opts.stream: true` the recovered `content` is an async iterable of plaintext chunks instead of a single Buffer, for a payload too large to hold whole; the authenticated modes (AuthEnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, AES-GCM) verify integrity before the iterable yields, so a forged message throws before any plaintext is exposed, while a CBC EnvelopedData or EncryptedData yields the plaintext as the cipher produces it. Every key-establishment secret the toolkit allocates is wiped once used, on the failing path as well as the succeeding one: the KEM shared secret and its derived key-encryption key, the raw ECDH / X25519 / X448 agreement secret, a password-derived key-encryption key, and the content-encryption key itself, cleared once the message is complete since all recipients share it. Caller-supplied key material is never written to (best-effort; NIST SP 800-227 §4.2, RFC 9629 §7). `authenticate(content, recipients, opts)` produces an `id-ct-authData` (§9): cleartext content plus an HMAC-SHA-256/384/512 MAC, authenticated but not encrypted, with the fresh MAC key wrapped for every recipient through the same RecipientInfo model. The MAC covers the authenticated attributes (content-type and message-digest) re-tagged to the EXPLICIT SET OF (§9.2), or the content octets directly; `decrypt` recovers the MAC key, recomputes the MAC and independently the message-digest (§9.3), and releases the content only after both pass, with every secret-dependent failure collapsing to the uniform `cms/decrypt-failed`. `compress(content, opts)` and `decompress(input, opts)` produce and consume a CompressedData (RFC 3274; ZLIB, version 0, id-alg-zlibCompress); decompress bounds the uncompressed output at 16 MiB and stops before it is materialized, so a decompression bomb fails closed as `cms/decompress-too-large`. Compression is a size transform with no integrity or confidentiality (RFC 8551 §2.4.5). `certsOnly(certs, opts?)` builds a certs-only certificate-management message (RFC 8551 §3.8): a degenerate SignedData with an empty signerInfos and no eContent that conveys certificates and CRLs without signing anything, `parseCertsOnly(input, opts?)` reads one back to its raw certificate and CRL DER (a CRL-only message is valid here, unlike the cert-required RFC 5272 form that `pki.est.parseCertsOnly` reads), and `isCertsOnly(input)` recognizes one structurally. Fail-closed with typed `cms/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `countersign`, `encrypt`, `authenticate`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress`, `certsOnly`, `parseCertsOnly`, `isCertsOnly` |
 | `pki.smime` | S/MIME message assembly, verification, encryption, and compression over the CMS layer (RFC 8551). `sign(content, signers, opts)` wraps a MIME entity in either form: `multipart/signed`, where the content stays readable in any MUA and a detached CMS SignedData rides alongside as `application/pkcs7-signature` with a matching `micalg`, or `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=signed-data`, where the whole entity is a base64 CMS SignedData. The signed bytes are the entity's §3.1.1 canonical form with CRLF line endings, and `verify(message, opts)` unwraps both forms and recomputes over the same canonicalizer, so a transport that re-wraps line endings still verifies while a tampered part fails. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` envelopes a MIME entity as an opaque `application/pkcs7-mime` message and `decrypt(message, keyMaterial, opts)` opens one, as `smime-type=authEnveloped-data` (AES-GCM, confidentiality and integrity, the default) or `smime-type=enveloped-data` (AES-CBC, confidentiality only, so `decrypt` reports `authenticated: false`, the §3.3 no-integrity caveat). The `smime-type` is derived from the CMS body rather than the header, and decryption is fail-closed and oracle-free. The crypto is entirely `pki.cms.sign` / `verify` / `encrypt` / `decrypt`, so it is algorithm-agnostic: any RSA / RSASSA-PSS / ECDSA / EdDSA / ML-DSA / SLH-DSA signer and any RSA-OAEP / ECDH / X25519 / X448 / AES-KW / PBKDF2 / ML-KEM recipient carries through. As with `cms.verify`, `verify` returns the per-signer verdict plus the recovered content, and `valid` and `trusted` are separate claims: `valid` says the signature is sound under a certificate the message carried, `trusted` says every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`. Anchoring here is validated for email at both ends of the chain — the signer certificate must carry `emailProtection` (RFC 8551 §4.4.4) and the anchor's own trust metadata must permit that purpose, since a root can be distrusted for email while remaining a good TLS root. Override either with `requiredEku` / `checkPurpose`. `compress(content, opts)` and `decompress(message, opts)` add the opaque `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=compressed-data; name=smime.p7z` frame (§3.6, RFC 3274), a size transform with no integrity or confidentiality (§2.4.5), bounded against a bomb; the recovered content, which may itself be signed or enveloped, is returned for the caller to re-verify. Header protection (RFC 9788): `sign` and `encrypt` take `opts.protectHeaders`, which inlines the caller's `opts.headers` on the Cryptographic Payload root (its Content-Type gaining `hp="clear"` when signed or `hp="cipher"` when encrypted) so the CMS signature or encryption covers them, defeating a transport that rewrites or reads Subject, From, and the rest. `verify` and `decrypt` surface the authenticated inner set as `protectedHeaders` plus `headerProtection { present, mode, fromMismatch, confidential, legacy }`, so a tampered outer header cannot alter it and `fromMismatch` flags an outer From that disagrees. Encryption applies a Header Confidentiality Policy: the default `hcp_baseline` obscures the outer Subject to `[...]` and removes Comments and Keywords, so the real values live only in the ciphertext, and `decrypt` recovers them. Every emitted header routes through a fail-closed injection guard that rejects a CR, LF, or NUL value and a non-ftext name, and a malformed or contradictory `hp` wrap fails closed as `smime/bad-header-protection` rather than silently downgrading. The CMS crypto is unchanged. Inbound legacy RFC 8551 header protection is recognized opt-in: `verify` and `decrypt` with `opts.legacyHeaderProtection` detect a legacy `message/rfc822`-wrapped payload by the RFC 9788 §4.10.1 four-condition identification and surface the inner headers under `headerProtection.legacy = { headers, mode, fromMismatch, confidential }`, where `headers` is an ordered `[{ name, value }]` array retaining legally repeated fields such as `Received`. Those never appear in `protectedHeaders` and never set `present: true`. Because a legacy message is structurally indistinguishable from an ordinary forwarded `message/rfc822`, this is an explicit heuristic (§4.10.2, "no strong end-to-end guarantees"): a caller keying trust off `present` or `protectedHeaders` is never misled, and only one that explicitly reads `headerProtection.legacy.headers` and cross-checks `legacy.fromMismatch` consumes it. It is off by default, and a nested crypto layer, an inner `hp=`, a non-`message/rfc822` payload, or a duplicate Content-Type reports `legacy: null`. Bidirectionally interoperable with `openssl smime` and `openssl cms`. `buildCertsOnly(certs, opts?)` wraps a `pki.cms.certsOnly` certificate-management message in one `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=certs-only; name=smime.p7c` entity, read back by OpenSSL's `pkcs7 -print_certs`. Fail-closed with typed `smime/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress`, `buildCertsOnly` |
-| `pki.tsp` | Time-Stamp Protocol (RFC 3161). `sign(messageImprint, tsa, opts)` produces a TimeStampToken: a CMS SignedData over `pki.cms.sign` whose content is a `TSTInfo` carrying the timestamped message imprint, the TSA policy, a serial number, and `genTime` with optional accuracy, nonce, and ordering, plus the §2.4.2 signing-certificate attribute binding the token to the TSA certificate (SHA-2 imprints, any `pki.cms.sign` TSA key). `request` and `parseRequest` build and parse the TimeStampReq a client sends (imprint, requested policy, nonce, certReq); `response` and `parseResponse` handle the TimeStampResp a TSA returns, either a granted status wrapping a token or a rejection with PKIStatus and failure info, with the §2.4.2 status-to-token coupling enforced in both directions. `verify(token, data, opts)` verifies a token fail-closed: the CMS signature over the exact signed bytes, the message imprint recomputed from the data, the TSTInfo content type, the ESSCertID(V2) binding to the TSA certificate, the §2.3 critical timeStamping-only extendedKeyUsage, the request nonce when used, and, with a trust anchor supplied, full certification-path validation of the TSA certificate at the token's `genTime` — judged under the `timeStamping` purpose, so an anchor's own per-purpose trust metadata reaches the decision rather than sitting inert. It returns `{ valid, trusted, genTime, serialNumber, tstInfo, ... }`, where `trusted` is the separate claim that the authority chained to an anchor you named: without one there is nothing to chain to and it is `false`, which is the distinction a timestamp re-read years later turns on — `sign`, `request`, `parseRequest`, `response`, `parseResponse`, `verify` |
+| `pki.tsp` | Time-Stamp Protocol (RFC 3161). `sign(messageImprint, tsa, opts)` produces a TimeStampToken: a CMS SignedData over `pki.cms.sign` whose content is a `TSTInfo` carrying the timestamped message imprint, the TSA policy, a serial number, and `genTime` with optional accuracy, nonce, and ordering, plus the §2.4.2 signing-certificate attribute binding the token to the TSA certificate (SHA-2 imprints, any `pki.cms.sign` TSA key). The TSA certificate is held to §2.3 before signing (one critical extendedKeyUsage naming timeStamping alone) with the codes `verify` answers, `genTime` keeps its milliseconds as the §2.4.2 fraction of a second, and an accuracy naming no field is refused. `request` and `parseRequest` build and parse the TimeStampReq a client sends (imprint, requested policy, nonce, certReq); `response` and `parseResponse` handle the TimeStampResp a TSA returns, either a granted status wrapping a token or a rejection with PKIStatus and failure info, with the §2.4.2 status-to-token coupling enforced in both directions. `verify(token, data, opts)` verifies a token fail-closed: the CMS signature over the exact signed bytes, the message imprint recomputed from the data, the TSTInfo content type, the ESSCertID(V2) binding to the TSA certificate, the §2.3 critical timeStamping-only extendedKeyUsage, the request nonce when used, and, with a trust anchor supplied, full certification-path validation of the TSA certificate at the token's `genTime` — judged under the `timeStamping` purpose, so an anchor's own per-purpose trust metadata reaches the decision rather than sitting inert. It returns `{ valid, trusted, genTime, serialNumber, tstInfo, ... }`, where `trusted` is the separate claim that the authority chained to an anchor you named: without one there is nothing to chain to and it is `false`, which is the distinction a timestamp re-read years later turns on — `sign`, `request`, `parseRequest`, `response`, `parseResponse`, `verify` |
 | `pki.ocsp` | Online Certificate Status Protocol (RFC 6960), both the responder and relying-party surface. `buildRequest(query, opts)` builds an OCSPRequest for one or more `{ cert, issuer }` pairs, with the CertID hashed under SHA-1 by default per the RFC 5019 lightweight profile or under SHA-2, plus an optional RFC 9654 nonce and an optional requestor signature. `sign(responseData, responder, opts)` produces a signed BasicOCSPResponse over the exact `ResponseData` DER, from the issuing CA directly or a delegated responder, under any `pki.cms.sign` key including the post-quantum ML-DSA and SLH-DSA sets, with `good`, `revoked` (reason and time), or `unknown` per-certificate status, and per-response `singleExtensions` naming the §4.4.4 archive cutoff and the §4.4.2 CRL reference as fields, each read back by name by the parser. The signer refuses what its own lint would grade an error: a pre-encoded singleExtension that RFC 6960 places in requests or in responseExtensions, a CRL entry extension carried at the wrong criticality, and CRL references or entry extensions on a non-issued response, which itself places the §4.4.8 extended revoked definition in responseExtensions without being asked. `buildErrorResponse(status)` produces the unsigned §2.3 error (`tryLater`, `unauthorized`, and the rest). `verify(response, opts)` verifies a response fail-closed against the same hardened gates `pki.path.ocspChecker` runs: the CertID binding, responder authorization (the issuing CA, or a CA-issued delegate bearing id-kp-OCSPSigning and id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck and passing the full out-of-path certificate gates), the signature over `tbsResponseDataBytes`, currency against `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate`, and the request-nonce echo. It returns `{ status: "good" / "revoked" / "unknown", ... }` and never silently accepts. `verifyRequest(request, opts)` is the responder-side inverse of `buildRequest`: it verifies a client's signed request (RFC 6960 §4.1.1) under the requestor certificate the request carries, trying each embedded certificate since the field is unordered, and reports `signed`, `signatureValid`, every certificate whose key verified (`signerCerts`, so a key carried under an expired certificate beside its renewal is not hidden behind ordering) with the first one's decoded subject, the full embedded certificate bag (`certs`, including intermediates for path building), and the request's CertIDs; an unsigned request is reported with `signed: false` rather than refused. Transport-free — `buildRequest`, `sign`, `buildErrorResponse`, `verify`, `verifyRequest` |
 | `pki.ct` | Certificate Transparency (RFC 6962). `parseSctList` decodes the `SignedCertificateTimestampList` a certificate or OCSP response carries, a TLS-presentation-language payload inside the §3.3 double DER wrap, into per-SCT log id, exact `timestamp` (BigInt), named signature algorithm, and raw signature. `reconstructSignedData` rebuilds the exact `digitally-signed` preimage, and `verifySct` verifies an SCT signature against a log's public key, routing an ECDSA signature through the strict DER-conformance gate and verifying through the crypto engine, resolving true or false and throwing a typed error on a structural fault. On the producing side, `encodeSctList` builds the extension value byte for byte as the exact inverse of `parseSctList`, and `signSct` performs a log's signing step. For trust, `parseLogList` ingests the CT log-list JSON into constraint-carrying trusted logs, recomputing each log's id as SHA-256 of its key and refusing a disagreeing id (a swapped key, §3.2) and decoding the state and temporal-interval constraints; `verifySctWithLogList` resolves the log key from an SCT's log id, enforces the state (usable, qualified, and readonly trusted; retired only before retirement; pending and rejected refused) and the temporal-interval window, then delegates the signature check to `verifySct`. `verifyLogListSignature(json, signature, publicKey)` verifies the detached `log_list.sig` over the raw log-list bytes against a caller-pinned signer key (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5/SHA-256 and an EC P-256 arm, with forgeable-key defenses failing closed), cross-checked against `openssl dgst`. `fetchLogList(opts)` turns that chain into a live client: it GETs the `log_list.json` and its detached `log_list.sig` over `pki.transport`, verifies the detached signature over the raw fetched bytes against a caller-pinned distributor key before parsing, so an unverified document is never parsed, read, cached, or surfaced, then ingests the same bytes through `parseLogList` and returns the trusted-log set plus the surfaced `version` and `timestamp`. Above the per-SCT layer, `verifySctList` renders a certificate-level verdict over every SCT a certificate carries (§3.3), reporting how many distinct trusted logs verified an SCT (so a duplicated SCT cannot inflate the count) and from how many distinct trusted operators against a caller's CT policy (`minScts` and `minOperators`, both defaulting to the RFC floor of one), where a policy shortfall is a verdict and a per-SCT failure is a recorded row rather than a thrown call; `x509CertEntry` reconstructs the precertificate log entry from a final certificate by removing the SCT-list extension from its TBSCertificate as byte surgery, so its embedded SCTs verify end to end (§3.2). The toolkit bakes in no vendor URL or key, TLS trust is explicit with `rejectUnauthorized` always on, each response is size-capped before the trust chain, and the transport is injectable so the whole path is testable offline — `parseSctList`, `reconstructSignedData`, `verifySct`, `encodeSctList`, `signSct`, `parseLogList`, `verifySctWithLogList`, `verifySctList`, `x509CertEntry`, `verifyLogListSignature`, `fetchLogList` |
 | `pki.merkle` | Merkle-tree proof verification (RFC 6962 / RFC 9162). `leafHash`, `nodeHash`, and `emptyRootHash` build the domain-separated (0x00 leaf, 0x01 node) SHA-256 tree hashes. `verifyInclusion` folds an audit proof back to a root, and `verifyConsistency` reconstructs both the old and new root, which is the append-only guarantee; each is constant-time-compared to a trusted checkpoint root. Fail-closed on bad geometry, sync hashing, transport-free — `leafHash`, `nodeHash`, `emptyRootHash`, `verifyInclusion`, `verifyConsistency` |

package/lib/asn1-der.js

@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@
  *   is canonical, each value the `build.*` helpers emit has exactly one
  *   valid encoding, byte-identical to any other conformant DER encoder's
  *   output, and decoding it reproduces the value it was built from.
+ *   `build.generalizedTime(date)` emits whole seconds, the RFC 5280 form;
+ *   `build.generalizedTime(date, { fractional: true })` keeps the Date's
+ *   milliseconds in the X.690 DER fraction (no trailing zeros, no empty
+ *   fraction), the form RFC 3161 allows a timestamp's genTime, which
+ *   `read.time(node, { allowFractional: true })` reads back.
  *
  * @card
  *   Strict, fail-closed DER decode / encode with a navigable node tree
@@ -37,6 +42,18 @@ var guard = require("./guard-all");
 var intrinsic = require("./guard-intrinsic");
 var _isArray = intrinsic.isArray;
 var _charCodeAt = intrinsic.uncurry(String.prototype.charCodeAt);
+/** @internal A Date's fields are read through the prototype's own getters, captured at load, so
+ * a getter the instance carries or one replaced later cannot change what a time encodes to or
+ * what the reader's own Date reports back. */
+var _dateGetUTCFullYear = intrinsic.uncurry(Date.prototype.getUTCFullYear);
+var _dateGetUTCMonth = intrinsic.uncurry(Date.prototype.getUTCMonth);
+var _dateGetUTCDate = intrinsic.uncurry(Date.prototype.getUTCDate);
+var _dateGetUTCHours = intrinsic.uncurry(Date.prototype.getUTCHours);
+var _dateGetUTCMinutes = intrinsic.uncurry(Date.prototype.getUTCMinutes);
+var _dateGetUTCSeconds = intrinsic.uncurry(Date.prototype.getUTCSeconds);
+var _dateGetUTCMilliseconds = intrinsic.uncurry(Date.prototype.getUTCMilliseconds);
+var _dateSetUTCFullYear = intrinsic.uncurry(Date.prototype.setUTCFullYear);
+var _dateSetUTCHours = intrinsic.uncurry(Date.prototype.setUTCHours);
 
 var Asn1Error = frameworkError.Asn1Error;
 var OidError = frameworkError.OidError;
@@ -649,11 +666,11 @@ function readTime(node, opts) {
   var sec   = t.sec;
   var ms = (node.tagNumber === TAGS.GENERALIZED_TIME && t.hasFrac) ? t.ms : 0;
   var d = new Date(0);
-  d.setUTCFullYear(year, month - 1, day);
-  d.setUTCHours(hour, min, sec, ms);
+  _dateSetUTCFullYear(d, year, month - 1, day);
+  _dateSetUTCHours(d, hour, min, sec, ms);
   if (isNaN(guard.time.instantOf(d))) throw new Asn1Error("asn1/bad-time", "unparseable time " + JSON.stringify(s));
-  if (d.getUTCFullYear() !== year || d.getUTCMonth() !== month - 1 || d.getUTCDate() !== day ||
-      d.getUTCHours() !== hour || d.getUTCMinutes() !== min || d.getUTCSeconds() !== sec) {
+  if (_dateGetUTCFullYear(d) !== year || _dateGetUTCMonth(d) !== month - 1 || _dateGetUTCDate(d) !== day ||
+      _dateGetUTCHours(d) !== hour || _dateGetUTCMinutes(d) !== min || _dateGetUTCSeconds(d) !== sec) {
     throw new Asn1Error("asn1/bad-time", "time component out of range " + JSON.stringify(s));
   }
   return d;
@@ -800,22 +817,46 @@ function _isNumericString(s) {
 
 function _fmtTwo(n) { return (n < 10 ? "0" : "") + n; }
 
-function _generalizedTimeString(date) {
-  var y = date.getUTCFullYear();
+function _generalizedTimeString(date, fractional) {
+  var y = _dateGetUTCFullYear(date);
   if (y < 0 || y > 9999) throw new Asn1Error("asn1/bad-generalizedtime", "GeneralizedTime year " + y + " outside 0000..9999");
   var yyyy = ("000" + y).slice(-4);
   return yyyy +
-    _fmtTwo(date.getUTCMonth() + 1) + _fmtTwo(date.getUTCDate()) +
-    _fmtTwo(date.getUTCHours()) + _fmtTwo(date.getUTCMinutes()) + _fmtTwo(date.getUTCSeconds()) + "Z";
+    _fmtTwo(_dateGetUTCMonth(date) + 1) + _fmtTwo(_dateGetUTCDate(date)) +
+    _fmtTwo(_dateGetUTCHours(date)) + _fmtTwo(_dateGetUTCMinutes(date)) + _fmtTwo(_dateGetUTCSeconds(date)) +
+    (fractional ? _fractionString(_dateGetUTCMilliseconds(date)) : "") + "Z";
+}
+/** @internal X.690 sec. 11.7 as RFC 3161 sec. 2.4.2 restates it for a DER GeneralizedTime: the
+ * fraction, when present, follows a point and carries no trailing zeros; a zero fraction and its
+ * point are omitted. A Date resolves to milliseconds, so the fraction is at most three digits. */
+function _fractionString(ms) {
+  if (ms === 0) return "";
+  var digits = (ms < 10 ? "00" : ms < 100 ? "0" : "") + ms;
+  var end = digits.length;
+  while (end > 0 && _charCodeAt(digits, end - 1) === 0x30) end--;
+  var out = ".";
+  for (var i = 0; i < end; i++) out += digits[i];
+  return out;
+}
+var _GENERALIZED_TIME_OPTS = intrinsic.create(null);
+_GENERALIZED_TIME_OPTS.fractional = 1;
+function _generalizedTimeOptions(opts) {
+  if (opts === undefined || opts === null) return false;
+  if (typeof opts !== "object") throw new Asn1Error("asn1/bad-generalizedtime", "build.generalizedTime options must be an object");
+  guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(opts, _GENERALIZED_TIME_OPTS, function (code, message) { return new Asn1Error(code, message); },
+    "asn1/bad-generalizedtime", "build.generalizedTime has an unknown option ");
+  var fractional = opts.fractional;
+  if (fractional !== undefined && typeof fractional !== "boolean") throw new Asn1Error("asn1/bad-generalizedtime", "build.generalizedTime fractional must be a boolean");
+  return fractional === true;
 }
 
 function _utcTimeString(date) {
-  var y = date.getUTCFullYear();
+  var y = _dateGetUTCFullYear(date);
   if (y < 1950 || y > 2049) throw new Asn1Error("asn1/bad-utctime", "UTCTime year " + y + " outside 1950..2049; use GeneralizedTime");
   var yy = y % 100;
   return _fmtTwo(yy) +
-    _fmtTwo(date.getUTCMonth() + 1) + _fmtTwo(date.getUTCDate()) +
-    _fmtTwo(date.getUTCHours()) + _fmtTwo(date.getUTCMinutes()) + _fmtTwo(date.getUTCSeconds()) + "Z";
+    _fmtTwo(_dateGetUTCMonth(date) + 1) + _fmtTwo(_dateGetUTCDate(date)) +
+    _fmtTwo(_dateGetUTCHours(date)) + _fmtTwo(_dateGetUTCMinutes(date)) + _fmtTwo(_dateGetUTCSeconds(date)) + "Z";
 }
 
 /**
@@ -891,7 +932,7 @@ var build = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
     return _universal(TAGS.BMP_STRING, false, out);
   },
   utcTime:  function (date) { return _universal(TAGS.UTC_TIME, false, Buffer.from(_utcTimeString(date), "latin1")); },
-  generalizedTime: function (date) { return _universal(TAGS.GENERALIZED_TIME, false, Buffer.from(_generalizedTimeString(date), "latin1")); },
+  generalizedTime: function (date, opts) { return _universal(TAGS.GENERALIZED_TIME, false, Buffer.from(_generalizedTimeString(date, _generalizedTimeOptions(opts)), "latin1")); },
   sequence: function (children) {
     return encodeConstructed(CLASS_UNIVERSAL, TAGS.SEQUENCE, _asBufferArray(children, "build.sequence"));
   },

package/lib/attrcert-sign.js

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ var x509 = require("./schema-x509");
 var signScheme = require("./sign-scheme");
 var guard = require("./guard-all");
 var intrinsic = require("./guard-intrinsic");
-var _hasOwn = intrinsic.hasOwn;
+var _hasOwn = intrinsic.hasOwn, _bufferEquals = intrinsic.bufferEquals;
 var pkix = require("./schema-pkix");
 var schema = require("./schema-engine");
 require("./path-validate");
@@ -58,9 +58,85 @@ var EXT_META = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   aaControls:             { name: "aaControls",            critical: true },
   acProxying:             { name: "acProxying",            critical: true },
   authorityKeyIdentifier: { name: "authorityKeyIdentifier", critical: false },
+  crlDistributionPoints:  { name: "cRLDistributionPoints", critical: false },
+  authorityInfoAccess:    { name: "authorityInfoAccess",   critical: false },
 });
 var REQUIRED_CRITICALITY = intrinsic.create(null);
 Object.keys(EXT_META).forEach(function (k) { REQUIRED_CRITICALITY[O(EXT_META[k].name)] = EXT_META[k].critical; });
+var OID_AKI = O("authorityKeyIdentifier"), OID_OCSP = O("ocsp");
+
+/** @internal RFC 5755 sets rules on the issuer that its parser reads past and its verifier does
+ *  not grade: an audit identity is 1..20 octets (sec. 4.3.1), a conforming issuer produces one
+ *  Targets element (sec. 4.3.2), a stated authority key identifier is the AA certificate's subject
+ *  key identifier (sec. 4.3.3), an OCSP access location is a URI carrying an HTTP URL (sec. 4.3.4),
+ *  and a CRL distribution point is one point naming a fullName of a single distinguished name or
+ *  HTTP / LDAP URL (sec. 4.3.5). Each rule reads the DECODED value, so the object form and the
+ *  pre-encoded form are held to one definition. */
+var EXT_PROFILE = intrinsic.create(null);
+EXT_PROFILE[O("acAuditIdentity")] = function (id) {
+  if (id.length < 1 || id.length > 20) throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "auditIdentity must be 1 to 20 octets, got " + id.length + " (RFC 5755 sec. 4.3.1)");
+};
+EXT_PROFILE[O("targetInformation")] = function (groups) {
+  if (groups.length !== 1) throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "targetInformation must carry exactly one Targets element, got " + groups.length + "; a conforming issuer lists every target in one (RFC 5755 sec. 4.3.2)");
+  for (var i = 0; i < groups[0].length; i++) {
+    if (groups[0][i].kind === "targetCert") throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "targetInformation target " + i + " is a targetCert, which RFC 5755 sec. 4.3.2 says MUST NOT be used; name the target as a targetName or a targetGroup");
+  }
+};
+EXT_PROFILE[OID_AKI] = function (aki, ctx) {
+  if (aki.keyIdentifier !== null && ctx.aaSki !== null && !_bufferEquals(aki.keyIdentifier, ctx.aaSki)) {
+    throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "the authorityKeyIdentifier keyIdentifier must equal the AA certificate's subjectKeyIdentifier (RFC 5755 sec. 4.3.3, RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.1); omit it to take that value");
+  }
+};
+EXT_PROFILE[O("authorityInfoAccess")] = function (descs) {
+  for (var i = 0; i < descs.length; i++) {
+    var d = descs[i];
+    if (d.accessMethod !== OID_OCSP) continue;
+    if (d.accessLocation.tag !== 6 || !pkiBuild.isHttpUrl(d.accessLocation.value)) {
+      throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "authorityInfoAccess entry " + i + ": an id-ad-ocsp accessLocation must be a uniformResourceIdentifier carrying an HTTP URL (RFC 5755 sec. 4.3.4, RFC 2585)");
+    }
+  }
+};
+EXT_PROFILE[O("cRLDistributionPoints")] = function (points) {
+  if (points.length !== 1) throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "crlDistributionPoints must carry exactly one distribution point, got " + points.length + " (RFC 5755 sec. 4.3.5)");
+  var dp = points[0].distributionPoint;
+  if (dp === null || dp.kind !== "fullName") throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "the crlDistributionPoints entry must name its point as a fullName (RFC 5755 sec. 4.3.5)");
+  if (dp.names.length !== 1) throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "the crlDistributionPoints fullName must contain a single name, got " + dp.names.length + " (RFC 5755 sec. 4.3.5)");
+  var gn = attrcert.readGeneralName(dp.names[0], "attrcert/bad-input");
+  if (gn.tagNumber !== 4 && (gn.tagNumber !== 6 || !(pkiBuild.isHttpUrl(gn.value) || pkiBuild.isLdapUrl(gn.value)))) {
+    throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "the crlDistributionPoints name must be a directoryName or a uniformResourceIdentifier carrying an HTTP or LDAP URL (RFC 5755 sec. 4.3.5, RFC 2585, RFC 4516)");
+  }
+  /** @internal Sec. 4.3.5 profiles the RFC 5280 extension, whose sec. 4.2.1.13 has cRLIssuer carry
+   *  the CRL issuer's Name; a GeneralNames holding no non-empty directoryName names no issuer. */
+  var issuer = points[0].cRLIssuer;
+  if (issuer !== null && !_namesAnIssuer(issuer.names)) {
+    throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "the crlDistributionPoints cRLIssuer must name the CRL issuer as a non-empty directoryName (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.13)");
+  }
+};
+function _namesAnIssuer(names) {
+  for (var i = 0; i < names.length; i++) {
+    if (names[i].tagNumber === 4 && names[i].value.rdns.length > 0) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/** @internal Sec. 4.4.5: "roleName MUST use the uniformResourceIdentifier CHOICE of the
+ *  GeneralName", read off the decoded attribute value on both routes. */
+var ATTR_PROFILE = intrinsic.create(null);
+ATTR_PROFILE[O("role")] = function (role) {
+  if (role.roleName.tagNumber !== 6) throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "role.roleName must be a uniformResourceIdentifier (RFC 5755 sec. 4.4.5)");
+};
+
+function _decodeExtensionValue(extnId, valueDer) {
+  return EXT_DECODERS[extnId] ? EXT_DECODERS[extnId](valueDer) : attrcert.validateExtensionValue(extnId, valueDer);
+}
+function _assertExtensionProfile(extnId, decoded, ctx) {
+  var rule = EXT_PROFILE[extnId];
+  if (rule !== undefined) rule(decoded, ctx);
+}
+function _assertAttributeProfile(type, decoded) {
+  var rule = ATTR_PROFILE[type];
+  if (rule !== undefined) rule(decoded);
+}
 var CLASSLIST_BIT = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { unmarked: 0, unclassified: 1, restricted: 2, confidential: 3, secret: 4, topSecret: 5 });
 
 var _tbsNameBytes = pkiBuild.tbsNameField;
@@ -236,7 +312,15 @@ function _encodeAAControls(aac) {
   else if (aac.permitUnSpecified != null && aac.permitUnSpecified !== true) throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "aaControls.permitUnSpecified must be a boolean");
   return b.sequence(parts);
 }
-function _extensionValue(key, val, aaSpki) {
+/** @internal Sec. 4.3.3 reads RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.1 with "CA" as "AC issuer": the keyIdentifier is
+ *  the AA certificate's subjectKeyIdentifier when that certificate is at hand, else the method (1)
+ *  value of the AA key. A stated one is held to the certificate's by the profile rule. */
+function _akiKeyId(val, ctx) {
+  if (guard.bytes.isByteSource(val)) return guard.bytes.snapshotSource(val, AttrCertError, "attrcert/bad-input", "the authorityKeyIdentifier keyIdentifier");
+  if (val === true) return ctx.aaSki !== null ? ctx.aaSki : _b.spkiKeyId(ctx.aaSpki);
+  throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "authorityKeyIdentifier must be true (derive from the AA), false (omit), or a Buffer key id");
+}
+function _extensionValue(key, val, ctx) {
   switch (key) {
     case "auditIdentity":
       if (!Buffer.isBuffer(val)) throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "auditIdentity must be a Buffer (an OCTET STRING audit tag)");
@@ -245,7 +329,9 @@ function _extensionValue(key, val, aaSpki) {
     case "acProxying": return _encodeSeqOfTargets(val);
     case "noRevAvail": return b.nullValue();
     case "aaControls": return _encodeAAControls(val);
-    case "authorityKeyIdentifier": return _b.extAki(_b.skiKeyId(val, aaSpki));
+    case "authorityKeyIdentifier": return _b.extAki(_akiKeyId(val, ctx));
+    case "crlDistributionPoints": return _b.extCrlDistributionPoints(val, "crlDistributionPoints");
+    case "authorityInfoAccess": return _b.extAuthorityInfoAccess(val);
     default: throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "unknown extension " + JSON.stringify(key));
   }
 }
@@ -256,6 +342,7 @@ function _buildAttributes(attrSpec) {
   function add(type, valueTlv) {
     if (seen[type]) throw _err("attrcert/duplicate-attribute", "duplicate " + (oid.name(type) || type) + " attribute (RFC 5755 sec. 4.2.7)");
     seen[type] = true;
+    _assertAttributeProfile(type, attrcert.validateAttributeValue(type, valueTlv));
     attrs.push(b.sequence([b.oid(type), b.set([valueTlv])]));
   }
   if (Array.isArray(attrSpec)) {
@@ -270,8 +357,10 @@ function _buildAttributes(attrSpec) {
       if (seen[at]) throw _err("attrcert/duplicate-attribute", "duplicate " + (oid.name(at) || at) + " attribute (RFC 5755 sec. 4.2.7)");
       seen[at] = true;
       n.children[1].children.forEach(function (valNode) {
-        try { attrcert.validateAttributeValue(at, valNode.bytes); }
+        var decoded;
+        try { decoded = attrcert.validateAttributeValue(at, valNode.bytes); }
         catch (err) { if (err instanceof AttrCertError) throw err; throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "pre-encoded " + (oid.name(at) || at) + " attribute value is malformed", err); }
+        _assertAttributeProfile(at, decoded);
       });
       attrs.push(b.raw(der));
     });
@@ -300,8 +389,16 @@ function _assertRevocationSchemesExclusive(seen) {
   }
 }
 
-function _buildExtensions(extSpec, aaSpki) {
-  if (extSpec == null) return null;
+function _emitNamedExtension(out, seen, k, val, ctx) {
+  var meta = EXT_META[k], eOid = O(meta.name);
+  if (seen[eOid]) throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "duplicate extension " + JSON.stringify(k) + " (RFC 5755 sec. 4.2.9)");
+  seen[eOid] = true;
+  var valueDer = _extensionValue(k, val, ctx);
+  _assertExtensionProfile(eOid, _decodeExtensionValue(eOid, valueDer), ctx);
+  out.push(_b.ext(eOid, meta.critical, valueDer));
+}
+function _buildExtensions(extSpec, ctx) {
+  if (extSpec == null) extSpec = {};
   if (Array.isArray(extSpec)) {
     if (!extSpec.length) return null;
     var seenA = intrinsic.create(null);
@@ -317,10 +414,10 @@ function _buildExtensions(extSpec, aaSpki) {
         throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "pre-encoded " + (oid.name(extnId) || extnId) + " extension must be marked " + (required ? "critical" : "non-critical") + " (RFC 5755)");
       }
       var extnValue = asn1.read.octetString(n.children[n.children.length - 1]);
-      try {
-        if (EXT_DECODERS[extnId]) EXT_DECODERS[extnId](extnValue);
-        else attrcert.validateExtensionValue(extnId, extnValue);
-      } catch (err) { if (err instanceof AttrCertError) throw err; throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "pre-encoded " + (oid.name(extnId) || extnId) + " extension value is malformed", err); }
+      var decoded;
+      try { decoded = _decodeExtensionValue(extnId, extnValue); }
+      catch (err) { if (err instanceof AttrCertError) throw err; throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "pre-encoded " + (oid.name(extnId) || extnId) + " extension value is malformed", err); }
+      _assertExtensionProfile(extnId, decoded, ctx);
       return b.raw(der);
     });
     _assertRevocationSchemesExclusive(seenA);
@@ -331,13 +428,16 @@ function _buildExtensions(extSpec, aaSpki) {
     return "unknown extension " + JSON.stringify(k) + "; pass a pre-encoded Extension DER via the array form for a custom extension";
   });
   var out = [], seen = intrinsic.create(null);
+  var akiDeclined = false;
   Object.keys(extSpec).forEach(function (k) {
-    if (extSpec[k] == null) return;
-    var meta = EXT_META[k], eOid = O(meta.name);
-    if (seen[eOid]) throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "duplicate extension " + JSON.stringify(k) + " (RFC 5755 sec. 4.2.9)");
-    seen[eOid] = true;
-    out.push(_b.ext(eOid, meta.critical, _extensionValue(k, extSpec[k], aaSpki)));
+    var val = extSpec[k];
+    if (val == null) return;
+    if (k === "authorityKeyIdentifier" && val === false) { akiDeclined = true; return; }
+    _emitNamedExtension(out, seen, k, val, ctx);
   });
+  /** @internal Sec. 4.3.3: "As with PKCs, this extension SHOULD be included in ACs", so it is
+   *  emitted without being named and `false` declines it, which a SHOULD allows. */
+  if (!seen[OID_AKI] && !akiDeclined) _emitNamedExtension(out, seen, "authorityKeyIdentifier", true, ctx);
   _assertRevocationSchemesExclusive(seen);
   if (!out.length) return null;
   return b.sequence(out);
@@ -359,13 +459,27 @@ function _buildExtensions(extSpec, aaSpki) {
  * a random 20-octet serial is generated when omitted), `attributes` (an object of the sec. 4.4 privilege
  * syntaxes (role / clearance / group / chargingIdentity / accessIdentity / authenticationInfo), or an
  * array of pre-encoded Attribute DER), and optional `extensions` (an object of auditIdentity /
- * targetInformation / noRevAvail / aaControls / acProxying / authorityKeyIdentifier, or an array of
- * pre-encoded Extension DER). `issuer` is the signing AA: `{ cert, key }` (the AA certificate DER/PEM
- * and its private key) or `{ name, publicKey, key }` (an explicit issuer DN, AA SPKI DER, and key); an
- * attribute certificate is never self-signed. RFC 5755 section 6 defines two revocation schemes and
- * makes them exclusive ("An AC MUST NOT contain both a noRevAvail extension and a 'pointer in AC'"),
- * so `noRevAvail` beside a `crlDistributionPoints` or `authorityInfoAccess` extension is refused,
- * in the named form and the pre-encoded form alike. The signature algorithm is resolved from the AA key (RSA
+ * targetInformation / noRevAvail / aaControls / acProxying / authorityKeyIdentifier /
+ * crlDistributionPoints / authorityInfoAccess, the last two in the list forms `pki.x509.sign`
+ * takes, or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER). `issuer` is the signing AA: `{ cert, key }` (the AA
+ * certificate DER/PEM and its private key) or `{ name, publicKey, key }` (an explicit issuer DN, AA
+ * SPKI DER, and key); an attribute certificate is never self-signed. RFC 5755 section 6 defines two
+ * revocation schemes and makes them exclusive ("An AC MUST NOT contain both a noRevAvail extension
+ * and a 'pointer in AC'"), so `noRevAvail` beside a `crlDistributionPoints` or `authorityInfoAccess`
+ * extension is refused, in the named form and the pre-encoded form alike.
+ *
+ * The `authorityKeyIdentifier` is emitted without being named (section 4.3.3: "this extension
+ * SHOULD be included in ACs"); its keyIdentifier is the AA certificate's subjectKeyIdentifier when
+ * `issuer.cert` is given, else the RFC 5280 method (1) value of the AA key, and a stated one is held
+ * to the certificate's. `authorityKeyIdentifier: false` omits it. The pre-encoded array form emits
+ * exactly what it is given. Both forms are held to the rules section 4.3 and 4.4 place on the
+ * issuer, read off the decoded value: an auditIdentity is 1 to 20 octets (4.3.1); a
+ * targetInformation carries one Targets element and never a targetCert (4.3.2); an id-ad-ocsp
+ * accessLocation is a URI carrying an HTTP URL (4.3.4); a crlDistributionPoints names one
+ * distribution point as a fullName holding a single directoryName or an HTTP or LDAP URL, and a
+ * cRLIssuer beside it names the CRL issuer as a directoryName (4.3.5, RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.13);
+ * and a role's roleName is a uniformResourceIdentifier (4.4.5). A violation is refused with
+ * `attrcert/bad-input`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the AA key (RSA
  * PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS, ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, or a composite arm), and the signature is verified
  * under the AA public key before the certificate is returned. Returns DER, or a PEM `ATTRIBUTE
  * CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`. Malformed input throws a typed `AttrCertError`; where the spec carries
@@ -404,11 +518,12 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
   issuer = issuer || {};
   if (issuer.key == null) throw _err("attrcert/bad-input", "a signing key (issuer.key, the AA's WebCrypto CryptoKey or PKCS#8 private key DER/PEM) is required");
 
-  var issuerDnSpec, aaSpki;
+  var issuerDnSpec, aaSpki, aaSki = null;
   if (issuer.cert != null) {
     var aaCert = _parseCert(issuer.cert, "issuer.cert");
     issuerDnSpec = _tbsNameBytes(aaCert, "subject");
     aaSpki = aaCert.subjectPublicKeyInfo.bytes;
+    aaSki = pkiBuild.skiValueOf(aaCert);
   } else if (issuer.name != null && issuer.publicKey != null) {
     issuerDnSpec = issuer.name;
     aaSpki = _b.reqDer(issuer.publicKey, "issuer.publicKey (the AA SPKI DER)");
@@ -421,7 +536,7 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
   var holderDer = _encodeHolder(spec.holder);
   var validityDer = _encodeValidity(spec.notBeforeTime, spec.notAfterTime);
   var attributesDer = _buildAttributes(spec.attributes);
-  var extsDer = _buildExtensions(spec.extensions, aaSpki);
+  var extsDer = _buildExtensions(spec.extensions, { aaSpki: aaSpki, aaSki: aaSki });
 
   var scheme = signScheme.resolveSignScheme(_b.certLikeFromSpki(aaSpki), { combinedRsaSig: true, pss: opts.pss, digestAlgorithm: opts.digestAlgorithm }, true, _signE);
 
@@ -634,7 +749,8 @@ function _unsupportedCritical(ac) {
  * AC carrying `noRevAvail` verifies with `revocationChecked: true` and `noRevAvail: true`, and one
  * without it is refused unless the caller supplies `opts.revocationStatus`. A caller running the
  * section's "pointer in AC" scheme reads the certificate's own `crlDistributionPoints` /
- * `authorityInfoAccess` from the verdict's `extensions`, establishes the status, and passes it back.
+ * `authorityInfoAccess` from the verdict's `extensions` (each carried decoded, as the RFC 5280
+ * readers return them), establishes the status, and passes it back.
  *
  * Items 1 and 3, and the issuer path in item 2, need certificates this verb is not given: the
  * holder's own public-key certificate and its chain, the AC issuer's chain, and the section 4.5

package/lib/cmp-verify.js

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ var guard = require("./guard-all");
 var constants = require("./constants");
 var ipUtils = require("./ip-utils");
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
+var pkiBuild = require("./pki-build");
 
 var CmpError = frameworkError.CmpError;
 var b = asn1.build;
@@ -146,15 +147,7 @@ function _certDer(cert, what) {
   throw _err("cmp/bad-input", what + " must be a certificate DER BufferSource or PEM string");
 }
 
-function _certSki(parsed) {
-  var skiOid = oid.byName("subjectKeyIdentifier");
-  var exts = parsed.extensions;
-  for (var i = 0; i < exts.length; i++) {
-    if (exts[i].oid !== skiOid) continue;
-    try { return asn1.read.octetString(asn1.decode(exts[i].value)); } catch (_e) { return null; }   // allow:swallow-unverified -- fail-closed: a malformed subjectKeyIdentifier yields null, so no SKI is used to match
-  }
-  return null;
-}
+var _certSki = pkiBuild.skiValueOf;
 function _subjectDn(parsed) { return parsed.subject.dn || null; }
 
 function _sanGeneralNames(parsed) {

package/lib/crl-sign.js

@@ -72,8 +72,6 @@ function _assertExtensionValueDecodes(node, extnId, what) {
   }
 }
 
-var OID_SKI = O("subjectKeyIdentifier");
-
 var CRL_REASON = constants.NAMES.CRL_REASON;
 var REASON_BY_NAME = intrinsic.create(null);
 Object.keys(CRL_REASON).forEach(function (v) { REASON_BY_NAME[CRL_REASON[v]] = Number(v); });
@@ -146,14 +144,8 @@ function _resolveReason(reason, isDelta) {
   return codeNum;
 }
 
-function _issuerSkiOf(ctx) {
-  if (!ctx.issuerCert) return null;
-  var ski = (ctx.issuerCert.extensions || []).filter(function (e) { return e.oid === OID_SKI; })[0];
-  if (ski) { try { return asn1.read.octetString(asn1.decode(ski.value)); } catch (_e) { } }   // allow:swallow-unverified -- a malformed issuer SKI is read as absent; the authorityKeyIdentifier keyIdentifier is then derived from the issuer public key
-  return null;
-}
 function _akiKeyId(val, ctx) {
-  var issuerSki = _issuerSkiOf(ctx);
+  var issuerSki = ctx.issuerCert ? _b.skiValueOf(ctx.issuerCert) : null;
   if (guard.bytes.isByteSource(val)) {
     var given = guard.bytes.snapshotSource(val, CrlError, "crl/bad-input", "the authorityKeyIdentifier keyIdentifier");
     /** @internal Sec. 5.2.1 names the CRL signer certificate's subject key identifier as the value,

package/lib/guard-name.js

@@ -218,6 +218,15 @@ function _allCharsIn(s, table) {
 
 function stripTrailingDot(s) { return _charAt(s, s.length - 1) === "." ? _strSlice(s, 0, -1) : s; }
 
+/** @internal Whether `s` opens with `scheme` followed by a colon, the scheme compared without
+ * regard to ASCII case (RFC 3986 sec. 3.1). `scheme` is given in lower case. */
+// @enforced-by behavioral -- a scheme comparison has no rename-proof code shape; the vectors refusing a location under the wrong scheme are the guard
+function uriSchemeIs(s, scheme) {
+  if (typeof s !== "string" || s.length <= scheme.length) return false;
+  if (_charCodeAt(s, scheme.length) !== 0x3a) return false;
+  return lowerAscii(_strSlice(s, 0, scheme.length)) === scheme;
+}
+
 /** @internal A host name of two or more labels that is not an address, which is the form a URI
  * name constraint is compared by (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.10). */
 function isFqdnHost(host) {
@@ -527,7 +536,7 @@ module.exports = intrinsic.freeze({
   assertNoControlBytes: assertNoControlBytes, assertPrintableIa5: assertPrintableIa5,
   dnEqual: dnEqual, rdnEqual: rdnEqual, emailEqual: emailEqual, dpnCorresponds: dpnCorresponds,
   escapeControlBytes: escapeControlBytes, escapeDnValue: escapeDnValue,
-  lowerAscii: lowerAscii,
+  lowerAscii: lowerAscii, uriSchemeIs: uriSchemeIs,
   stripTrailingDot: stripTrailingDot, isFqdnHost: isFqdnHost, splitMailbox: splitMailbox,
   constraintBaseRefusal: constraintBaseRefusal,
   constraintBaseUnreadable: constraintBaseUnreadable,

package/lib/lint.js

@@ -749,18 +749,6 @@ function _crlDecodedExtension(crl, name) {
   }
 }
 
-/** @internal Whether a string opens with the given URI scheme followed by a colon, compared
- * without regard to case by scanning character codes. */
-function _uriSchemeIs(s, scheme) {
-  if (typeof s !== "string" || s.length <= scheme.length) return false;
-  for (var i = 0; i < scheme.length; i++) {
-    var c = s.charCodeAt(i);
-    if (c >= 65 && c <= 90) c += 32;
-    if (c !== scheme.charCodeAt(i)) return false;
-  }
-  return s.charCodeAt(scheme.length) === 58;
-}
-
 /** @internal The schemes that satisfy the section 5.2.7 recommendation. The secured forms count:
  * warning about an https or ldaps location would report the more protected spelling of the two the
  * clause names. */
@@ -1201,7 +1189,7 @@ var RFC5280_CRL_RULES = [
       var reachable = descs.some(function (d) {
         var loc = d.accessLocation;
         if (!loc || loc.tag !== 6) return false;
-        return AIA_RECOMMENDED_SCHEMES.some(function (s) { return _uriSchemeIs(loc.value, s); });
+        return AIA_RECOMMENDED_SCHEMES.some(function (s) { return guard.name.uriSchemeIs(loc.value, s); });
       });
       return reachable ? null : true;
     },

package/lib/pki-build.js

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ var _isBufferChk = intrinsic.isBuffer;
 var _stringify = intrinsic.stringify;
 var _mapIntrinsic = intrinsic.map;
 var _bufferConcatIntrinsic = intrinsic.bufferConcat;
+var OID_SKI = oid.byName("subjectKeyIdentifier");
 
 function _isAlphaCode(c) { return (c >= 65 && c <= 90) || (c >= 97 && c <= 122); }
 function _isDigitCode(c) { return c >= 48 && c <= 57; }
@@ -81,14 +82,14 @@ function _componentBytesOk(s, from, to, byteOk) {
   return true;
 }
 
-function _validUriHost(s, from, to) {
+function _validUriHost(s, from, to, singleLabel) {
   if (to <= from) return false;
   var host = _sliceStr(s, from, to), len = host.length;
   if (_looksLikeIPv4Shape(host)) return _packIpLiteral(host) !== null;
   var end = _charCodeAt(host, len - 1) === 46 ? len - 1 : len;
   if (end > 253) return false;
   var firstDot = _stringIndexOf(host, ".", 0);
-  if (firstDot === -1 || firstDot >= end) return false;
+  if (!singleLabel && (firstDot === -1 || firstDot >= end)) return false;
   return _labelsValid(host, 0, len, _isHostLabelRange, true);
 }
 
@@ -98,11 +99,11 @@ function _validUriIp6Host(s, from, to) {
   return packed !== null && intrinsic.sizeOf(packed) === 16;
 }
 
-function _validUriAuthority(s, from, to) {
+function _validUriAuthority(s, from, to, shape) {
   var i, c, at = -1;
   for (i = from; i < to; i += 1) {
     c = _charCodeAt(s, i);
-    if (c === 64) { if (at !== -1) return false; at = i; }
+    if (c === 64) { if (at !== -1 || !shape.userinfo) return false; at = i; }
   }
   var hostStart = at === -1 ? from : at + 1;
   if (at !== -1 && !_componentBytesOk(s, from, at, _isUserinfoByte)) return false;
@@ -120,14 +121,31 @@ function _validUriAuthority(s, from, to) {
   var colon = -1;
   for (i = hostStart; i < to; i += 1) { if (_charCodeAt(s, i) === 58) { colon = i; break; } }
   var hostEnd = colon === -1 ? to : colon;
-  if (!_validUriHost(s, hostStart, hostEnd)) return false;
+  var portAlone = hostEnd === hostStart && colon !== -1 && shape.emptyHost;
+  if (!portAlone && !_validUriHost(s, hostStart, hostEnd, shape.singleLabel)) return false;
   if (colon !== -1) {
     for (i = colon + 1; i < to; i += 1) { if (!_isDigitCode(_charCodeAt(s, i))) return false; }
   }
   return true;
 }
 
-function _looksLikeUri(s) {
+/** @internal The shape a bare string must have to be read as a URI GeneralName without being told:
+ *  a scheme, "//", an authority naming a multi-label host (a single label reads as a dNSName), and
+ *  a well-formed remainder, a fragment included. */
+var _URI_SHAPE = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { singleLabel: false, userinfo: true, emptyAuthority: false, emptyHost: false, queryNeedsPath: false, fragment: true });
+/** @internal An HTTP URL (RFC 2616 sec. 3.2.2: "http:" "//" host [ ":" port ] [ abs_path [ "?" query ]]):
+ *  no userinfo, a host of one label or many, a query only after an absolute path, no fragment. */
+var _HTTP_URL_SHAPE = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { singleLabel: true, userinfo: false, emptyAuthority: false, emptyHost: false, queryNeedsPath: true, fragment: false });
+/** @internal An LDAP URL (RFC 4516 sec. 2: scheme "://" [host [":" port]] ["/" dn ...]): no
+ *  userinfo, a host of any label count that may be left out, with or without a port, and no
+ *  fragment. The dn, attributes, scope and filter after the "/" are not parsed. */
+var _LDAP_URL_SHAPE = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { singleLabel: true, userinfo: false, emptyAuthority: true, emptyHost: true, queryNeedsPath: false, fragment: false });
+
+function _looksLikeUri(s) { return _uriShape(s, _URI_SHAPE); }
+function isHttpUrl(s) { return typeof s === "string" && guard.name.uriSchemeIs(s, "http") && _uriShape(s, _HTTP_URL_SHAPE); }
+function isLdapUrl(s) { return typeof s === "string" && guard.name.uriSchemeIs(s, "ldap") && _uriShape(s, _LDAP_URL_SHAPE); }
+
+function _uriShape(s, shape) {
   var n = s.length, i, c;
   if (n === 0 || !_isAlphaCode(_charCodeAt(s, 0))) return false;
   i = 1;
@@ -140,8 +158,9 @@ function _looksLikeUri(s) {
   i += 3;
   var authStart = i, authEnd = n;
   for (; i < n; i += 1) { c = _charCodeAt(s, i); if (c === 47 || c === 63 || c === 35) { authEnd = i; break; } }
-  if (authEnd === authStart) return false;
-  if (!_validUriAuthority(s, authStart, authEnd)) return false;
+  if (authEnd === authStart) { if (!shape.emptyAuthority) return false; }
+  else if (!_validUriAuthority(s, authStart, authEnd, shape)) return false;
+  if (authEnd < n && shape.queryNeedsPath && _charCodeAt(s, authEnd) === 63) return false;
   var sawHash = false;
   i = authEnd;
   while (i < n) {
@@ -151,7 +170,7 @@ function _looksLikeUri(s) {
       i += 3;
       continue;
     }
-    if (c === 35) { if (sawHash) return false; sawHash = true; }
+    if (c === 35) { if (sawHash || !shape.fragment) return false; sawHash = true; }
     if (!_isUriByte(c)) return false;
     i += 1;
   }
@@ -1268,7 +1287,7 @@ function makeBuilder(ctx) {
     extSubjectInfoAccess: extSubjectInfoAccess, extSubjectDirectoryAttributes: extSubjectDirectoryAttributes,
     extMsCertificateTemplate: extMsCertificateTemplate, extMsCaVersion: extMsCaVersion,
     extMsPreviousCertHash: extMsPreviousCertHash, extMsEnrollCertType: extMsEnrollCertType,
-    spkiKeyId: spkiKeyId, skiKeyId: skiKeyId,
+    spkiKeyId: spkiKeyId, skiKeyId: skiKeyId, skiValueOf: skiValueOf,
     reqDer: reqDer, reqDenseArray: reqDenseArray, reqDerSequence: reqDerSequence, assertValidSpki: assertValidSpki, assertValidExtension: assertValidExtension,
     assertExtnValueIsDer: assertExtnValueIsDer,
     assertCertCriticality: assertCertCriticality,
@@ -1289,4 +1308,15 @@ function tbsSerialNumber(cert) {
   return asn1.read.integer(tbs.children[hasVersion ? 1 : 0]);
 }
 
-module.exports = intrinsic.freeze({ makeBuilder: makeBuilder, reqDenseArray: reqDenseArrayImpl, KU_BIT: KU_BIT, tbsNameField: tbsNameField, tbsSerialNumber: tbsSerialNumber, randomSerial: randomSerial });
+/** @internal The subjectKeyIdentifier a parsed certificate carries, or null without one. RFC 5280
+ *  sec. 4.2.1.1 names it as the authorityKeyIdentifier keyIdentifier of everything issued under
+ *  that certificate, so a signer reads it here before deriving one from the key, and a verifier
+ *  matches a signer by it. */
+function skiValueOf(parsedCert) {
+  var exts = intrinsic.filter(parsedCert.extensions, function (e) { return e.oid === OID_SKI; });
+  if (!exts.length) return null;
+  try { return asn1.read.octetString(asn1.decode(exts[0].value)); }
+  catch (_e) { return null; }   // allow:swallow-unverified -- a malformed SKI is read as absent; a signer then derives the authorityKeyIdentifier keyIdentifier from the public key, and a verifier matches on nothing
+}
+
+module.exports = intrinsic.freeze({ makeBuilder: makeBuilder, reqDenseArray: reqDenseArrayImpl, KU_BIT: KU_BIT, tbsNameField: tbsNameField, tbsSerialNumber: tbsSerialNumber, randomSerial: randomSerial, skiValueOf: skiValueOf, isHttpUrl: isHttpUrl, isLdapUrl: isLdapUrl });

package/lib/schema-attrcert.js

@@ -577,6 +577,13 @@ _AC_EXT_DECODERS[_Oav("targetInformation")] = _targetInformation;
 _AC_EXT_DECODERS[_Oav("noRevAvail")] = _noRevAvail;
 _AC_EXT_DECODERS[_Oav("aaControls")] = _aaControls;
 _AC_EXT_DECODERS[_Oav("acProxying")] = _acProxying;
+/** @internal The three RFC 5280 extensions RFC 5755 sec. 4.3.3 to 4.3.5 profile for an AC are read
+ *  through the certificate decoders, so a relying party running the sec. 6 "pointer in AC" scheme
+ *  reads the distribution point and the OCSP location off the parse rather than off raw bytes. */
+var _CERT_EXT_DECODERS = pkix.certExtensionDecoders(NS).byOid;
+_AC_EXT_DECODERS[_Oav("authorityKeyIdentifier")] = _CERT_EXT_DECODERS[_Oav("authorityKeyIdentifier")];
+_AC_EXT_DECODERS[_Oav("authorityInfoAccess")] = _CERT_EXT_DECODERS[_Oav("authorityInfoAccess")];
+_AC_EXT_DECODERS[_Oav("cRLDistributionPoints")] = _CERT_EXT_DECODERS[_Oav("cRLDistributionPoints")];
 
 // @internal
 function validateAttributeValue(type, valueDer) {

package/lib/tsp-sign.js

@@ -101,13 +101,19 @@ function _signingCertV2(certDer, hashName) {
  * timestamp authority's `{ cert, key }` (as `pki.cms.sign` takes them). The token is a CMS
  * SignedData whose content is a `TSTInfo` carrying the imprint, the TSA policy, a serial
  * number, and `genTime`; the RFC 3161 sec. 2.4.2 signing-certificate attribute binding the
- * token to the TSA certificate is attached automatically.
+ * token to the TSA certificate is attached automatically. The TSA certificate is held to
+ * sec. 2.3 before anything is signed: one critical extendedKeyUsage naming id-kp-timeStamping
+ * alone, and a keyUsage, when present, that allows signing; a certificate that fails is refused
+ * with the code `pki.tsp.verify` would answer (`tsp/bad-eku`, `tsp/eku-not-critical`,
+ * `tsp/eku-not-exclusive`, `tsp/bad-key-usage`).
  *
  * @opts  policy        REQUIRED -- the TSA policy identifier (an OID name or dotted string).
  * @opts  serialNumber  REQUIRED -- a unique token serial number (a number or BigInt).
- * @opts  genTime       The trusted time (a `Date`). Default: now.
+ * @opts  genTime       The trusted time (a `Date`). Default: now. Milliseconds are kept as the
+ *                      sec. 2.4.2 fraction of a second, which `pki.schema.tsp.parseToken` reads back.
  * @opts  nonce         The request nonce to echo (a number or BigInt), for replay protection.
- * @opts  accuracy      The genTime +/- accuracy, as `{ seconds?, millis?, micros? }`.
+ * @opts  accuracy      The genTime +/- accuracy, as `{ seconds?, millis?, micros? }`, naming at
+ *                      least one field; omit it to make no accuracy claim.
  * @opts  ordering      Whether tokens from this TSA are strictly ordered in time (boolean).
  * @opts  certHashAlgorithm  The ESSCertIDv2 hash algorithm name. Default `sha256`.
  * @opts  digestAlgorithm / pss  Passed through to `pki.cms.sign` (the signer digest algorithm, RSA-PSS padding).
@@ -163,6 +169,12 @@ function _sign(messageImprint, tsa, opts) {
   if (opts.serialNumber == null) throw _err("tsp/bad-input", "a timestamp token requires a serialNumber (opts.serialNumber)");
 
   var certDer = _certDer(tsa && tsa.cert);
+  /** @internal Sec. 2.3 binds the TSA: its certificate carries one critical extendedKeyUsage naming
+   *  id-kp-timeStamping alone, and a keyUsage, when present, that allows signing. The verifier
+   *  refuses a token under any other certificate, so the same check runs here, with the same
+   *  codes, before a token no relying party would accept is signed. */
+  var certFault = _checkTsaCertUsage(certDer);
+  if (certFault !== true) throw _err(certFault, "the TSA certificate does not satisfy RFC 3161 sec. 2.3 (" + certFault + "): a relying party would refuse every token signed under it");
   var certHashAlg = opts.certHashAlgorithm || "sha256";
   if (!NODE_DIGEST[guard.text.keyOf(certHashAlg)]) throw _err("tsp/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported certHashAlgorithm " + guard.text.showValue(certHashAlg));
 
@@ -170,7 +182,9 @@ function _sign(messageImprint, tsa, opts) {
   if (opts.genTime != null) guard.time.assertEncodable(opts.genTime, _err, "tsp/bad-input", "genTime");
   var genTime = guard.time.isDate(opts.genTime) ? opts.genTime : new Date();
   var serial = guard.range.authoredInteger(opts.serialNumber, _err, "tsp/bad-input", "serialNumber");
-  var fields = [b.integer(1n), _policy(opts.policy), imprint, b.integer(serial), b.generalizedTime(genTime)];
+  /** @internal Sec. 2.4.2 lets genTime carry a fraction of a second, which the parser reads, so a
+   *  Date's milliseconds reach the token rather than being dropped at the encoder. */
+  var fields = [b.integer(1n), _policy(opts.policy), imprint, b.integer(serial), b.generalizedTime(genTime, { fractional: true })];
   if (opts.accuracy) guard.list.append(fields,_accuracy(opts.accuracy));
   if (opts.ordering === true) guard.list.append(fields,b.boolean(true));
   if (opts.nonce != null) guard.list.append(fields,b.integer(guard.range.authoredInteger(opts.nonce, _err, "tsp/bad-input", "nonce")));
@@ -203,6 +217,9 @@ function _accuracy(a) {
   }
   if (mil != null) guard.list.append(f,b.contextPrimitive(0, _subMilliBytes(mil, "millis")));
   if (mic != null) guard.list.append(f,b.contextPrimitive(1, _subMilliBytes(mic, "micros")));
+  /** @internal Sec. 2.4.2 reads an absent field as zero, so an Accuracy naming none asserts a zero
+   *  deviation; a caller with no accuracy to state omits the option instead. */
+  if (!f.length) throw _err("tsp/bad-input", "accuracy must name at least one of seconds, millis, micros; omit it to make no accuracy claim (RFC 3161 sec. 2.4.2)");
   return b.sequence(f);
 }
 function _subMilliBytes(n, label) {

package/lib/x509-sign.js

@@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ function _err(code, message, cause) { return new CertificateError(code, message,
 function _signE(kind, message, cause) { return new CertificateError("x509/" + kind, message, cause); }
 function O(n) { return oid.byName(n); }
 
-var OID_SKI = O("subjectKeyIdentifier");
-
 var KNOWN_SPEC_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   subject: 1, subjectPublicKey: 1, notBefore: 1, notAfter: 1, serialNumber: 1, extensions: 1,
 });
@@ -77,13 +75,8 @@ var _encodeName = _b.encodeName, _isEmptyName = _b.isEmptyName, _reqDer = _b.req
   _skiKeyId = _b.skiKeyId, _spkiKeyId = _b.spkiKeyId, _serialInteger = _b.serialInteger;
 
 
-function _skiValueOf(caCert) {
-  var ext = (caCert.extensions || []).filter(function (e) { return e.oid === OID_SKI; })[0];
-  if (ext) { try { return asn1.read.octetString(asn1.decode(ext.value)); } catch (_e) { } }   // allow:swallow-unverified -- a malformed CA SKI is read as absent; _akiKeyId then derives the authorityKeyIdentifier keyIdentifier from the issuer public key
-  return null;
-}
 function _akiKeyId(val, ctx) {
-  var issuerSki = ctx.issuerCert ? _skiValueOf(ctx.issuerCert) : null;
+  var issuerSki = ctx.issuerCert ? _b.skiValueOf(ctx.issuerCert) : null;
   if (guard.bytes.isByteSource(val)) {
     var given = guard.bytes.snapshotSource(val, CertificateError, "x509/bad-input", "the authorityKeyIdentifier keyIdentifier");
     /** @internal Sec. 4.2.1.2: the issuer certificate's subjectKeyIdentifier MUST be the value

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.7.34",
+  "version": "0.7.36",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:0278421d-1579-47eb-90cb-53f880acc978",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:df652731-5ac1-4b9c-9b5f-05814b6a2cf7",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-09-12T09:51:26.213Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-09-12T12:10:54.820Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.34",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.36",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.7.34",
+      "version": "0.7.36",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.7.34",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.7.36",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.34",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.36",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]