@blamejs/pki 0.7.26 → 0.7.28

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,33 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.7.28 — 2026-09-12
+
+pki.cmp.verify names a MAC algorithm it does not compute as what it is, not as a failed signature.
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.oid resolves the RFC 9481 section 6.2 identifiers aes128-GMAC, aes192-GMAC, aes256-GMAC, kmacWithSHAKE128 and kmacWithSHAKE256.
+
+### Changed
+
+- pki.cmp.verify classifies the protectionAlg before checking it. A protectionAlg naming id-PasswordBasedMac, id-DHBasedMac, or one of the bare symmetric MACs of RFC 9481 section 6.2 (hmacWithSHA1 through hmacWithSHA512, aes128/192/256-GMAC, KMACWithSHAKE128/256) returns { valid: false, protectionType: "mac", code: "cmp/unsupported-algorithm" } with a reason naming the algorithm and its section, whatever credential the caller supplied. A symmetric MAC applied without a key derivation keys the shared secret directly, with no work factor, so one captured message is an offline oracle against a low-entropy secret; PBMAC1 exists to close that, and this verifier computes PBMAC1, KEM-based MAC and signature protection only. An identifier no table knows still reaches the signature path, which section 5.1.3.3 leaves open-ended, and still fails closed there.
+- The message pki.cmp.build raises for a mac.algorithm other than pbmac1 states the profile decision (RFC 9481 section 6.1.2) rather than calling the alternative deferred.
+
+## v0.7.27 — 2026-09-12
+
+pki lint detects a certificate, a CRL or an OCSP response and runs the matching profile.
+
+### Added
+
+- pki lint <file> detects whether the file holds a certificate, a CRL or an OCSP response, as DER or PEM, and lints it with pki.lint.certificate, pki.lint.crl or pki.lint.ocsp. --profile, --severity and --json apply to whichever verb runs, and a profile that belongs to another structure is refused with the message naming the verb that takes it. For a file holding a structure no profile covers (a certificate request, a CMS message, a key), the command reports the name the detector gives it and exits instead of linting it as a certificate.
+- lint/rfc5280/extension-criticality (error) reports a certificate extension marked critical that RFC 5280 requires a conforming CA to mark non-critical: authorityKeyIdentifier (section 4.2.1.1), subjectKeyIdentifier (4.2.1.2), subjectDirectoryAttributes (4.2.1.8), freshestCRL (4.2.1.15), authorityInfoAccess (4.2.2.1) and subjectInfoAccess (4.2.2.2). Each finding names the extension and its clause.
+
+### Changed
+
+- A certificate marking one of those six extensions critical was reported as lint/rfc5280/unknown-critical-extension, which told an operator the extension was not recognized when the defect was its criticality. The profile recognizes them, so that finding no longer fires for them; the new row does, at the same severity, so a report filtered at error is unchanged in its verdict and changed in its name.
+- The table of extensions whose criticality RFC 5280 and RFC 6962 fix now lives once, in the shared PKIX schema module, and both pki.x509.sign (which refuses to write against it) and pki.lint.certificate (which reports against it) read it from there.
+
 ## v0.7.26 — 2026-09-12
 
 An OCSP response can be linted against RFC 6960, and against the RFC 5019 lightweight profile on request.

package/README.md

@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.csr` | PKCS#10 certification-request issuance (RFC 2986 / RFC 2985). `sign(spec, key, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificationRequest` from a `spec` of subject (which may be empty), the public key being certified, an optional `extensionRequest` carrying the requested v3 extensions a CA copies into the issued certificate (subject alternative names, key usage, extended key usage, basic constraints, certificate policies, subject key identifier, the RFC 3739 qualified-certificate statements, the Microsoft certificate template and application policies, subject information access, subject directory attributes, or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER; an extension the issuing CA assigns, such as the authority key identifier or the OCSP no-check marker, is refused by name rather than requested), and an optional `challengePassword`. `key` (or `{ key }`) is the subject's own private key: the request is self-signed to prove possession of the private half of `subjectPublicKey`, and that proof is verified before the request is returned, which is what `openssl req -verify` checks. The signature algorithm is resolved from the subject key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. Returns DER, or a PEM `CERTIFICATE REQUEST` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CsrError`. `verify(request)` asks the same question of a request someone else produced, over its exact signed `certificationRequestInfo` bytes under the `subjectPKInfo` inside them, through the one path-validation signature engine. It answers `{ verified, subject, subjectPublicKeyInfo, attributes, certificationRequestInfoBytes }`, all re-derived from the signed bytes, so a CA issues from the fields the signature covers rather than from the object it passed in. A `verified: true` says the producer held that private key and that the subject and requested extensions are the ones they signed; who they are is the enrollment protocol's question, not this one. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.csr.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
 | `pki.attrcert` | Attribute-certificate issuance (RFC 5755). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs an `AttributeCertificate` as an Attribute Authority: a `spec` of `holder` (exactly one of an entity name, a `baseCertificateID` reference, a `fromCertificate` binding, or an object digest), the validity window as GeneralizedTime, an optional serial (positive, at most 20 octets, randomly generated when omitted), the `attributes` (role, clearance, group, chargingIdentity, accessIdentity, authenticationInfo, or pre-encoded Attribute DER), and optional `extensions` (auditIdentity, targetInformation, noRevAvail, aaControls, acProxying, authorityKeyIdentifier, or pre-encoded Extension DER) each with its RFC 5755 criticality. An attribute certificate is never self-signed, so the `issuer` is the signing AA, supplied as `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the AA key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, and the signature is verified under the AA public key before the certificate is returned. Returns DER, or a PEM `ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `AttrCertError`. `verify(ac, issuer, opts)` is the receiving side, performing the RFC 5755 sec. 5 checks an attribute certificate and a named issuer can settle between them: the signature over the exact `AttributeCertificateInfo` bytes through the one path-validation signature engine, the AC naming the issuer this verifier trusts (compared as a distinguished name), the evaluation instant lying within the validity with equality at either bound succeeding as the section states, the sec. 4.3.2 targeting rule, and rejection of any critical extension this verb does not process (section 5 defines support as parsing the value AND rejecting where the value would reject, so `aaControls` and `acProxying`, whose constraints it does not evaluate, are refused when critical). It answers `{ verified, signatureValid, validityChecked, targetingChecked, holderBindingChecked, issuerPathChecked, holder, issuer, attributes, extensions, notBefore, notAfter, serialNumberHex, reason }` with the fields re-derived from the signed bytes; the holder's own certificate chain and the AC issuer's chain need certificates the verb is not given, so those slots report `false` rather than letting their absence read as a pass. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.attrcert.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
 | `pki.crmf` | Certificate-request-message issuance (RFC 4211). `build(spec, key, opts)` assembles a `CertReqMessages` from a `spec` of `certReqId` (default 0, with the RFC 9483 `-1` sentinel allowed), a `certTemplate` of the requested fields (`subject`, `publicKey` as the SPKI DER of the key being certified, `validity`, requested `extensions`, an optional `version` 2), optional `controls` and `regInfo` (regToken, authenticator, utf8Pairs, oldCertID, protocolEncrKey, or pre-encoded `AttributeTypeAndValue` DER), and an optional `pop` selector. `key` (or `{ key }`) is the requester's private key: the message carries a `POPOSigningKey` proof of possession signed with the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey` and verified before the message is returned, exactly as a PKCS#10 CSR proves possession. A complete template signs the `CertRequest`; an incomplete one signs a `POPOSigningKeyInput`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the requested public key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. `key` is optional for a `raVerified` proof. A key that cannot sign, which is where an ML-KEM enrollment sits, takes a `POPOPrivKey` proof instead (RFC 4211 sec. 4.2, sec. 4.3): `pop.type` of `keyEncipherment` or `keyAgreement` with `pop.method: 'subsequentMessage'` declares whether an encrypted certificate (`encrCert`) or a challenge (`challengeResp`) completes the proof over the enrolling protocol's next exchange, and `pop.method: 'encryptedKey'` encloses the requester's private key for the CA in a CMS `EnvelopedData` under `id-ct-encKeyWithID`, requiring `pop.privateKey`, `pop.recipients`, the `pop.identifier` sec. 4.2.1 makes mandatory, and `pop.archive: true` because RFC 9810 sec. 5.2.8.3.1 permits the method only where archival is intended. The enclosed key must be the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey`, or the proof demonstrates possession of a key the request never asked to have certified. The `thisMessage` and `dhMAC` alternatives the specification deprecates are refused with their successors named. `pop.method: 'agreeMAC'` completes the four: `pop.key` is the requester's finite-field Diffie-Hellman private key, as a PKCS#8 DER, a PEM `PRIVATE KEY` block or a `KeyObject`, and `pop.caCert` the authority's certificate it already holds; the two agree a static secret (RFC 2875 sec. 3), and the key derived from it MACs the DER `certReq` under `id-dhPop-static-HMAC-SHA1`. Either key may name its group in the PKCS#3 or the X9.42 encoding. `pop.key` must be the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey`, and the template must name both a subject and a public key. Pass an array of specs for a batch; the CA-assigned template fields are never emitted. Returns DER, or a PEM block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrmfError`. `verifyPop(messages)` is the receiving side: for each `CertReqMsg` it verifies the `POPOSigningKey` signature over the bytes RFC 4211 sec. 4.1 names — the DER of `poposkInput` when present, of `certReq` when not — through the one path-validation signature engine, and answers `{ verified, messages: [{ verified, method, cryptographicallyVerified, certReqId, subject, subjectBound, publicKey, reason }] }` with the fields re-derived from the message's own bytes. Each verdict reports only what its preimage covers: `publicKey` is the key possession was proven for, and `subject` is the requested name when the `certReq` was signed. A `poposkInput` preimage covers the key and the sender alone, so any subject beside it is unsigned and is withheld with `subjectBound: false`. A `raVerified` proof is an RA's out-of-band assertion and a `keyEncipherment` or `keyAgreement` proof completes over a later exchange, so each is reported unverified with its `method` named instead of guessed. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crmf.parse` — `build`, `verifyPop` |
-| `pki.cmp` | CMP message building, transfer, and verification (RFC 9810). `build(message, opts)` assembles a protected `PKIMessage`. `message.header` carries the `sender` and `recipient` GeneralNames (including the anonymous NULL-DN) plus optional transaction metadata; `message.body` is a single-key object naming the arm — request-side `ir`, `cr`, `kur`, `krr` (key recovery, §5.3.7), `ccr` (cross-certification, §5.3.11: a `CertReqMessages` at the normative floor, where the requesting CA keeps its private key so a private-key-transport encryptedKey proof-of-possession is refused, and the optional App. D.6 single-request cardinality is not enforced), `p10cr`, `certConf`, `pollReq`, `genm`, `rr`, responder-side `ip`, `cp`, `kup`, `ccp`, `rp`, `genp`, `error`, `pollRep`, `krp`, `pkiconf`, and the registration-authority `nested` wrapper of complete PKIMessages (RFC 9810 §5.1.3.5). Protection is exactly one of `opts.{ key, cert }`, a signature under the sender key with the algorithm resolved from the signer certificate so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 / PSS), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, `opts.mac`, a PBMAC1 shared-secret HMAC (RFC 9481 / 9579, PBKDF2-derived), or `opts.kem`, a KEM-based MAC for a client whose key can only establish secrets (RFC 9810 §5.1.3.4): the ciphertext a peer encapsulated to its ML-KEM key is decapsulated, the key is derived under HKDF-SHA256 with a context bound to the transaction identifier of the message that carried the ciphertext, and `pki.cmp.verify` checks it from the shared secret. Protection covers the exact DER of the virtual `ProtectedPart` and is self-verified before the message is returned, and `protectionAlg` is derived rather than caller-set, so the message the parser accepts is coherent by construction. A `p10cr` request's PKCS#10 proof-of-possession is verified before the message is protected, so one whose self-signature does not verify under its subject public key is refused rather than sent. `transfer(url, message, opts)` carries a built message to a CMP endpoint over `pki.transport` (RFC 9811): one POST of the DER PKIMessage, with the response classified fail-closed — 200 only for success, a non-200 2xx or an un-followed 3xx refused, a 4xx or 5xx carrying a CMP error PKIMessage forwarded as the integrity-protected verdict — and protection surfaced rather than verified. `wellKnownUrl(base, opts)` builds the §3.4 `/.well-known/cmp` request-URIs. `verify(message, opts)` checks the protection on an incoming message, either a signature through the same certification-path engine `pki.crl.verify` and `pki.ocsp.verify` use, with the EdDSA low-order-point and algorithm-confusion gates, or a PBMAC1 MAC recomputed from `opts.sharedSecret` and the message's own PBKDF2 parameters and constant-time compared, over the exact `ProtectedPart` reconstructed from the parser's raw slices. It is fail-closed on an unprotected message, a legacy or KEM MAC algorithm, an omitted keyLength, or a SHA-1 PRF, and returns a `{ valid, trusted, protectionType, signer, ... }` verdict. With `opts.trustAnchors` the signer certificate is fully path-validated (RFC 5280 §6.1 plus the RFC 9483 §3.2 `keyUsage.digitalSignature` gate) at a trusted current time, or an explicit `opts.time` for historical verification and never the message's self-asserted `messageTime`, before it is reported trusted; without one the verdict is crypto-only and the signer certificate is surfaced to anchor. `session(opts)` returns a stateful enrollment session whose `enroll(request)` drives a full `ir` / `cr` / `kur` / `p10cr` transaction over the shared transport, composing `build`, `transfer`, and `verify`. Every response is protection-verified, signer-trusted, and bound to the exchange (a stable `transactionID`, a fresh-`senderNonce` and echoed-`recipNonce` chain) before its body is read, with a bounded `pollReq` / `pollRep` loop for a `waiting` status and a `certConf` / `pkiConf` (or implicit) confirmation carrying an explicit `hashAlg` for a signature algorithm that does not convey its hash. It returns a terminal `{ outcome, certificate, chain, status, trusted, confirmed, implicitConfirm, transactionID, polls, transcript }`. A certification authority can take longer to answer than a process is held open, so a `poll-timeout` carries a `resumeToken` and `resumePoll(token)` continues the same transaction in a later process: the token is plain JSON naming the transaction, the nonce the next request echoes, the polled request and the arm its grant arrives on, and the key the grant must certify. It carries no secret and grants nothing, since the protection material and the endpoint come from the session built to resume with, and the resumed poll verifies, nonce-binds, and key-binds every response. Its fields are what the resumed exchange is held to, so store it where the enrollment's own state is stored: someone who can rewrite it can widen what the resumed session accepts, as far as that session's trust anchors and the authority's protection allow and no further. The same session also drives the other two RFC 9483 operations under that shell: `revoke(request)` sends an `rr` naming a certificate as `{ certificate }` or `{ certDetails }` with an optional CRLReason `reason`, and returns `revoked` / `rejected` / `poll-timeout`; `info(request)` sends a `genm` for one of the four support messages — `{ caCerts }`, `{ rootCaCert }`, `{ certReqTemplate }`, `{ crlUpdate }` — and returns `answered` with the decoded `value` and a `present` flag, since an absent response value is how each says nothing is available. A session revokes its own certificate: the signature over the request is the proof of authorization (§4.2), so the named certificate must be `opts.cert` and a PBMAC1 session is refused. The signature flavor requires `opts.trustAnchors` to authenticate the CA; a verified rejection or error and an exhausted poll budget are terminal verdicts, while a tampered, untrusted, or desynchronized response is a typed throw. Returns DER, or a PEM `CMP` block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CmpError`. `openKeyPackage(container, opts)` opens a private key the CA generated centrally and delivered in the `privateKey` field of a granted `CertifiedKeyPair` (RFC 9483 §4.1.6): a CMS `SignedData` over an RFC 5958 `AsymmetricKeyPackage`, sealed in a CMS `EnvelopedData`. `opts.key` (with `opts.cert`) opens the key transport and key agreement containers a signature-protected request selects, `opts.password` the password container a MAC-protected request selects. The authority is authorized before any key material is returned: its certificate must chain to an anchor in `opts.trustAnchors` AND assert the `id-kp-cmKGA` extended key usage, since a certificate with no `extendedKeyUsage` permits every purpose and so authorizes nothing; `opts.authorizedBySharedSecret` states §4.1.6's exemption for an entity that authorizes by the secret that protected its request. Returns `{ keys, kga, trusted }`, where each key is a PKCS#8 `PrivateKeyInfo` ready for `pki.key.import`; `keys` is the whole RFC 5958 `AsymmetricKeyPackage` (`SIZE (1..MAX)`), while a session enrollment requires the sequence of one §4.1.6 profiles it to. Both CMS layers are read as a ContentInfo or as the bare structure, told apart by what the SEQUENCE opens with. `session(opts)` drives the whole exchange under `opts.acceptCentralKeyGeneration`: the request omits `certTemplate.publicKey`, carries no proof of possession, and goes out as `cmp2021`; the session opens the delivered container with the credential it enrolled under and surfaces it as `deliveredKey`, having first checked that the issued certificate certifies the delivered key. Without the option, such a request and such a grant are both refused. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.cmp.parse` — `build`, `transfer`, `wellKnownUrl`, `verify`, `openKeyPackage`, `session` |
+| `pki.cmp` | CMP message building, transfer, and verification (RFC 9810). `build(message, opts)` assembles a protected `PKIMessage`. `message.header` carries the `sender` and `recipient` GeneralNames (including the anonymous NULL-DN) plus optional transaction metadata; `message.body` is a single-key object naming the arm — request-side `ir`, `cr`, `kur`, `krr` (key recovery, §5.3.7), `ccr` (cross-certification, §5.3.11: a `CertReqMessages` at the normative floor, where the requesting CA keeps its private key so a private-key-transport encryptedKey proof-of-possession is refused, and the optional App. D.6 single-request cardinality is not enforced), `p10cr`, `certConf`, `pollReq`, `genm`, `rr`, responder-side `ip`, `cp`, `kup`, `ccp`, `rp`, `genp`, `error`, `pollRep`, `krp`, `pkiconf`, and the registration-authority `nested` wrapper of complete PKIMessages (RFC 9810 §5.1.3.5). Protection is exactly one of `opts.{ key, cert }`, a signature under the sender key with the algorithm resolved from the signer certificate so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 / PSS), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, `opts.mac`, a PBMAC1 shared-secret HMAC (RFC 9481 / 9579, PBKDF2-derived), or `opts.kem`, a KEM-based MAC for a client whose key can only establish secrets (RFC 9810 §5.1.3.4): the ciphertext a peer encapsulated to its ML-KEM key is decapsulated, the key is derived under HKDF-SHA256 with a context bound to the transaction identifier of the message that carried the ciphertext, and `pki.cmp.verify` checks it from the shared secret. Protection covers the exact DER of the virtual `ProtectedPart` and is self-verified before the message is returned, and `protectionAlg` is derived rather than caller-set, so the message the parser accepts is coherent by construction. A `p10cr` request's PKCS#10 proof-of-possession is verified before the message is protected, so one whose self-signature does not verify under its subject public key is refused rather than sent. `transfer(url, message, opts)` carries a built message to a CMP endpoint over `pki.transport` (RFC 9811): one POST of the DER PKIMessage, with the response classified fail-closed — 200 only for success, a non-200 2xx or an un-followed 3xx refused, a 4xx or 5xx carrying a CMP error PKIMessage forwarded as the integrity-protected verdict — and protection surfaced rather than verified. `wellKnownUrl(base, opts)` builds the §3.4 `/.well-known/cmp` request-URIs. `verify(message, opts)` checks the protection on an incoming message, either a signature through the same certification-path engine `pki.crl.verify` and `pki.ocsp.verify` use, with the EdDSA low-order-point and algorithm-confusion gates, or a PBMAC1 MAC recomputed from `opts.sharedSecret` and the message's own PBKDF2 parameters and constant-time compared, over the exact `ProtectedPart` reconstructed from the parser's raw slices. It is fail-closed on an unprotected message, a MAC algorithm it does not compute (reported as MAC-protected under that algorithm, never as a failed signature), an omitted keyLength, or a SHA-1 PRF, and returns a `{ valid, trusted, protectionType, signer, ... }` verdict. With `opts.trustAnchors` the signer certificate is fully path-validated (RFC 5280 §6.1 plus the RFC 9483 §3.2 `keyUsage.digitalSignature` gate) at a trusted current time, or an explicit `opts.time` for historical verification and never the message's self-asserted `messageTime`, before it is reported trusted; without one the verdict is crypto-only and the signer certificate is surfaced to anchor. `session(opts)` returns a stateful enrollment session whose `enroll(request)` drives a full `ir` / `cr` / `kur` / `p10cr` transaction over the shared transport, composing `build`, `transfer`, and `verify`. Every response is protection-verified, signer-trusted, and bound to the exchange (a stable `transactionID`, a fresh-`senderNonce` and echoed-`recipNonce` chain) before its body is read, with a bounded `pollReq` / `pollRep` loop for a `waiting` status and a `certConf` / `pkiConf` (or implicit) confirmation carrying an explicit `hashAlg` for a signature algorithm that does not convey its hash. It returns a terminal `{ outcome, certificate, chain, status, trusted, confirmed, implicitConfirm, transactionID, polls, transcript }`. A certification authority can take longer to answer than a process is held open, so a `poll-timeout` carries a `resumeToken` and `resumePoll(token)` continues the same transaction in a later process: the token is plain JSON naming the transaction, the nonce the next request echoes, the polled request and the arm its grant arrives on, and the key the grant must certify. It carries no secret and grants nothing, since the protection material and the endpoint come from the session built to resume with, and the resumed poll verifies, nonce-binds, and key-binds every response. Its fields are what the resumed exchange is held to, so store it where the enrollment's own state is stored: someone who can rewrite it can widen what the resumed session accepts, as far as that session's trust anchors and the authority's protection allow and no further. The same session also drives the other two RFC 9483 operations under that shell: `revoke(request)` sends an `rr` naming a certificate as `{ certificate }` or `{ certDetails }` with an optional CRLReason `reason`, and returns `revoked` / `rejected` / `poll-timeout`; `info(request)` sends a `genm` for one of the four support messages — `{ caCerts }`, `{ rootCaCert }`, `{ certReqTemplate }`, `{ crlUpdate }` — and returns `answered` with the decoded `value` and a `present` flag, since an absent response value is how each says nothing is available. A session revokes its own certificate: the signature over the request is the proof of authorization (§4.2), so the named certificate must be `opts.cert` and a PBMAC1 session is refused. The signature flavor requires `opts.trustAnchors` to authenticate the CA; a verified rejection or error and an exhausted poll budget are terminal verdicts, while a tampered, untrusted, or desynchronized response is a typed throw. Returns DER, or a PEM `CMP` block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CmpError`. `openKeyPackage(container, opts)` opens a private key the CA generated centrally and delivered in the `privateKey` field of a granted `CertifiedKeyPair` (RFC 9483 §4.1.6): a CMS `SignedData` over an RFC 5958 `AsymmetricKeyPackage`, sealed in a CMS `EnvelopedData`. `opts.key` (with `opts.cert`) opens the key transport and key agreement containers a signature-protected request selects, `opts.password` the password container a MAC-protected request selects. The authority is authorized before any key material is returned: its certificate must chain to an anchor in `opts.trustAnchors` AND assert the `id-kp-cmKGA` extended key usage, since a certificate with no `extendedKeyUsage` permits every purpose and so authorizes nothing; `opts.authorizedBySharedSecret` states §4.1.6's exemption for an entity that authorizes by the secret that protected its request. Returns `{ keys, kga, trusted }`, where each key is a PKCS#8 `PrivateKeyInfo` ready for `pki.key.import`; `keys` is the whole RFC 5958 `AsymmetricKeyPackage` (`SIZE (1..MAX)`), while a session enrollment requires the sequence of one §4.1.6 profiles it to. Both CMS layers are read as a ContentInfo or as the bare structure, told apart by what the SEQUENCE opens with. `session(opts)` drives the whole exchange under `opts.acceptCentralKeyGeneration`: the request omits `certTemplate.publicKey`, carries no proof of possession, and goes out as `cmp2021`; the session opens the delivered container with the credential it enrolled under and surfaces it as `deliveredKey`, having first checked that the issued certificate certifies the delivered key. Without the option, such a request and such a grant are both refused. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.cmp.parse` — `build`, `transfer`, `wellKnownUrl`, `verify`, `openKeyPackage`, `session` |
 | `pki.crl` | CRL issuance and verification (RFC 5280 §5). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificateList` from a `spec` of `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate`, an optional `crlNumber`, a `revoked` array (each entry a `serialNumber` and `revocationDate` with an optional `reason` or `invalidityDate`), and an optional `extensions` object (authority key identifier, issuer alternative name, issuing distribution point, delta-CRL indicator, freshest CRL, authority information access, which is every extension RFC 5280 §5.2 defines) or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER, with an `issuer` of `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the issuer key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. The version is derived from the extension set (v2 when any CRL or entry extension is present, else v1), the outer `signatureAlgorithm` matches `tbsCertList.signature`, an empty revocation list omits the field rather than emitting an empty SEQUENCE, `reasonCode` is an ENUMERATED and `invalidityDate` is always GeneralizedTime, the RFC fixes per-extension criticality, and the produced signature is verified under the issuer key before return. `verify(crl, issuer)` checks a CRL signature through the one path-validation signature engine, algorithm-confusion and EdDSA low-order gates included; handed a certificate rather than a bare key it also asks what only a certificate can answer — that the certificate is the issuer the CRL names, and that its `keyUsage`, when present, asserts `cRLSign` — so a CRL minted under an end-entity certificate of the same CA does not verify as that CA's. `isRevoked(crl, serialNumber, opts)` looks a serial up, and first checks that the CRL is one a serial can be looked up in at all — it is handed a serial and nothing else, so a CRL that speaks for part of its issuer's certificates is refused rather than answered from. A delta CRL lists changes since a base, so an entry recording a release reads as a revocation when read alone; an indirect CRL carries other issuers' entries, whose serials are unrelated to yours; and any other `issuingDistributionPoint` narrows the CRL to one distribution point, one kind of certificate, or a subset of revocation reasons, none of which a serial can be matched against. A CRL speaks for a span as well as a set, so `opts.time` states the instant the question is asked at and a list that has stopped speaking for it — `nextUpdate` passed, `thisUpdate` later, or no `nextUpdate` stated at all — is refused rather than read as a clean bill of health; without `opts.time` the lookup is structural and an absent serial means only that it is not on that list. `pki.path.crlChecker` is the verb for all of them: it is handed the certificate, merges a delta with its base, performs the §6.3.3 correspondence, and decides currency against the material it fetched. Returns DER, or a PEM `X509 CRL` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrlError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crl.parse` — `sign`, `verify`, `isRevoked` |
 | `pki.key` | Key-material lifecycle (RFC 5958 / RFC 8018). `encrypt(privateKey, password, opts)` wraps a PKCS#8 private key (DER, PEM, or an extractable `CryptoKey`) into an `EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo` under PBES2 (PBKDF2 with AES-CBC-Pad), where `opts` selects the `cipher` (`aes-256-cbc` default, `aes-192-cbc`, `aes-128-cbc`), the `prf` (`hmacWithSHA256` default, SHA-384/512, SHA-1), the `iterations` (default 600000), and the `salt`. The plaintext is validated as PKCS#8 before encryption, a default `prf` and `keyLength` are omitted so the parameters are byte-exact with OpenSSL, and the output is re-parsed before return. `decrypt(encrypted, password, opts)` recovers the inner `PrivateKeyInfo`, re-validated through `pki.schema.pkcs8.parse`: only PBES2 / PBKDF2 / AES-CBC is accepted (PBES1, PBMAC1, and scrypt are refused), the salt and iteration count are bounded before any derivation (`opts.maxIterations` lowers the cap), and a malformed parameter set or wrong-length IV is a distinct typed error. Because a MAC-less PBES2-CBC decrypt must not become a padding oracle (RFC 8018 §8), a wrong password and a valid-pad-but-not-a-key both surface the one uniform `key/decrypt-failed`. `export(key, opts)` and `import(input, opts)` move a private key as PKCS#8 or a public key as SubjectPublicKeyInfo. The key may come from the platform's WebCrypto or from a separately installed copy of this toolkit, and is exported through whichever holds its material; a non-extractable key, or one whose implementation keeps its material out of reach, is refused with that as the reason. Encoding is delegated to WebCrypto, so RSA carries an explicit NULL, EC a named curve, and Ed25519/Ed448/X25519/X448 omit parameters, and an ambiguous RSA or EC import requires `opts.algorithm`. `generate(algorithm, opts)` produces a key pair over RSA, ECDSA/ECDH, the Edwards and Montgomery curves, and the FIPS post-quantum ML-DSA and ML-KEM; `publicFromPrivate(privateKey)` derives the public key. Returns DER or PEM, with a typed `KeyError` on failure. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs8.parse` — `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `export`, `import`, `generate`, `publicFromPrivate` |
 | `pki.pkcs12` | PKCS#12 (.p12/.pfx) issuance and reading (RFC 7292 / RFC 9579). `build(spec, opts)` assembles a store from the OpenSSL-style `{ key, cert, ca?, friendlyName?, localKeyId? }` or the full `{ safeContents: [...] }`, where each element is a plaintext or PBES2-encrypted `SafeContents` of key, shroudedKey, cert, crl, secret, or nested `safeContents` bags. Keys and certs are validated before wrapping, and `friendlyName` (BMPString) and `localKeyId` are single-value. Integrity is a classic Appendix B HMAC (the default, for maximum interoperability) or an RFC 9579 PBMAC1 (`opts.mac.algorithm`) over SHA-256/384/512, with shrouded keys and cert safes encrypted under RFC 8018 PBES2 (AES-128/192/256-CBC). Every password is encoded the PKCS#12 way — BMPString+NULL for the classic MAC, UTF-8 for the PBES2 bags and PBMAC1 — which is what OpenSSL and NSS consume, so a file it emits opens in both, cross-checked bidirectionally. The MAC covers the exact AuthenticatedSafe byte range, a DEFAULT-1 `MacData.iterations` is rejected up front, and the store is re-parsed before return. `verifyMac(pfx, password, opts)` recomputes a classic or PBMAC1 MAC over `macedBytes` and constant-time-compares it, throwing on a MAC-less or public-key-integrity store. Public-key integrity (`opts.integrity.mode: "public-key"`) wraps the AuthenticatedSafe in a CMS SignedData instead of a MAC, signed by any `pki.cms.sign` signer and carrying no MacData (§4); privacy stays independent, so `password` still PBES2-encrypts the bags. Public-key privacy wraps a SafeContents as a CMS EnvelopedData (AES-CBC, `id-envelopedData`, never GCM) encrypted to recipient public keys through the `pki.cms.encrypt` recipient model, via per-safe `recipients` or the `opts.recipientCerts` convenience, restricted to certificate recipients (RSA-OAEP, ECDH, X25519, X448, ML-KEM) since a password or KEK recipient could not be reopened by `open`. All four integrity-by-privacy combinations are permitted (§3.1). `open(pfx, password, opts)` reads a store back: it verifies the MAC first, so a wrong password is the MAC verdict rather than a decrypt error, then PBES2-decrypts every privacy safe and shrouded key bag and returns `{ integrityMode, macVerified, signers, keys, certs, crls, secrets }` — keys as re-validated PKCS#8 DER, certs, CRLs and secrets as raw DER, all with `friendlyName` and `localKeyId`, nested safes recursively. A MAC-less store is refused unless `opts.allowUnauthenticated`. A public-key-integrity store is verified through its CMS SignedData signature first (`pkcs12/signature-invalid` on failure), with the signer surfaced in `signers` but never trust-chained, which remains the caller's `pki.path.validate` step. A legacy-PBE store's Appendix C 3DES and RC2 bags are decrypted, RC2 through an in-tree RFC 2268 cipher, so an `openssl pkcs12 -legacy` or NSS store opens; the legacy RC4 schemes are refused. An `id-envelopedData` safe is decrypted with `opts.recipientKey` after the integrity gate (`pkcs12/no-recipient-key` when absent), every recipient-side fault and every post-integrity decrypt failure collapsing to the uniform `pkcs12/decrypt-failed`, and `opts.keys: 'crypto'` imports each key to a `CryptoKey`. It reads what OpenSSL and NSS produce. Returns DER or a PEM `PKCS12`, with a typed `Pkcs12Error` on failure. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs12.parse` — `build`, `verifyMac`, `open` |
@@ -252,10 +252,10 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.sigstore` | Offline verifier for a Sigstore bundle, the artifact `npm publish --provenance` produces and the registry serves. `verifyBundle` composes five fail-closed legs against caller-pinned trust (Fulcio CA roots and Rekor log keys, never trusted from the bundle): the DSSE signature over its PAE preimage under the Fulcio leaf key, the ephemeral Fulcio certificate chain validated as of the Rekor log time, the RFC 9162 inclusion proof folded to a Rekor-signed tree root, the log entry bound to this exact signature, and the in-toto SLSA subject digest the caller confirms against the published artifact. It reuses the X.509 parser, the RFC 5280 path validator, and the Merkle verifier; the net-new codecs are the DSSE PAE byte-builder and a fail-closed JSON reader. `verified: true` says the artifact was signed and logged, not that a party you trust signed it — Fulcio issues to anyone who completes an OIDC flow, so who signed is decided only by `opts.identity`, and `identityChecked` reports which of its fields were compared. An identity policy naming no field, or a field name that is not one of the three, is refused rather than satisfied — either would accept every signer while reading as a policy in force. A sixth leg is opt-in: pinning the certificate-transparency logs in `opts.ctLogs` checks the receipt Fulcio embeds in the certificate it issues (RFC 6962 §3.2), verified over the certificate as it stood before the receipt was added and under the key of the log that issued it, so the verdict says the signing certificate was public when it was issued rather than handed out quietly. At least one receipt must verify against a pinned log, the verdict reports `sctChecked` and `validScts`, and an empty log set is refused rather than read as a policy that checks nothing. Both content arms are read: a DSSE-wrapped in-toto attestation, and a message signature over an artifact's own bytes, which `cosign sign-blob` produces. For that arm `opts.artifact` supplies the bytes, and they are held to the hash the Rekor `hashedrekord` entry records before the signature is checked over them; the `messageDigest` the bundle carries is covered by no signature, so it is compared against the computed digest and never used in its place. `contentType` names the arm and the verdict has one shape for both — `pae`, `parseBundle`, `verifyBundle` |
 | `pki.inspect` | Human-readable inspection, the pure-JS equivalent of `openssl x509/crl/req/cms -text`. `certificate(pem \| der \| parsed)` renders an OpenSSL-style report: version, serial, signature algorithm, issuer and subject distinguished names, validity, public-key details (curve or modulus size plus the raw point or modulus), every decoded extension with its critical flag, and the signature. `crl`, `csr`, and `cms` render the other formats the same way — a CRL like `openssl crl -text`, a CSR like `openssl req -text`, and a CMS message like `openssl cms -cmsout -print`, with a stable summary for a non-SignedData ContentInfo — and `any(input)` detects the format and routes to the right report. Built over the strict parsers and the two-way OID registry with one set of field renderers, it names extension and algorithm OIDs an OpenSSL build shows only as raw bytes. No OpenSSL dependency, and the format is stable and OpenSSL-familiar rather than pinned to one OpenSSL version. A certificate policy's user notice renders as text, both its explicit text and a notice reference with the notice numbers that identify it, rather than hex, and a malformed part falls back to a hex dump rather than throwing — `certificate`, `crl`, `csr`, `cms`, `any` |
 | `pki.webauthn` | WebAuthn and passkey verification, both halves: offline trust evaluation of a W3C WebAuthn (Level 3) registration, and signature verification of the assertion every login returns. `parseAttestationObject(bytes)` decodes the CBOR attestation object, authenticatorData, and COSE credential key over the strict `pki.cbor` codec; `parseAuthenticatorData(bytes)` reads the bare form an assertion carries through the same parser; `parseClientData(bytes, opts)` decodes the `clientDataJSON` no signature check looks inside, through the shared JSON guard since these are attacker-chosen bytes, returning the challenge decoded so a caller compares bytes rather than spellings, and checking the ceremony type, challenge, and origin when the relying party supplies what it issued. `verifyAssertion(input)` verifies an assertion signature over `authenticatorData \|\| SHA-256(clientDataJSON)` — raw bytes, no COSE_Sign1, an ES256 signature in ASN.1 DER — and applies the §7.2 step 21 counter rule when a stored `previousSignCount` is given, so a counter that fails to advance is refused as a cloned authenticator. `verify(attestationObject, clientDataHash, opts)` checks the attestation-statement signature and each format's structural bindings for packed, tpm, android-key, apple, fido-u2f, and none: the x5c leaf key, the apple nonce, the tpm `certInfo` Name and `extraData` over the `pubArea`, the android `KeyDescription`, and the fido-u2f `verificationData`. It binds the credential public key to each attestation, through the signed authenticatorData for packed and fido-u2f or a cert or `pubArea`-key equality check for android-key, apple, and tpm, and enforces each leaf's certificate requirements. The credential-key check covers the full WebAuthn COSE algorithm set — ES256/384/512, RS256/384/512, PS256/384/512, EdDSA (Ed25519), and the RFC 9864 fully-specified identifiers ESP256/384/512, Ed25519, and Ed448 — validating the public-key point on its curve, rejecting the compressed EC point form, and enforcing a minimally encoded DER ECDSA signature. The verdict field is `attestationVerified`, and `signatureVerified` for an assertion, rather than a bare `verified`, because a sound statement is a different claim from an acceptable ceremony: an attestation naming another origin's RP ID with user presence clear is perfectly sound and must not be registered. Pass `expectedRpId`, `requireUserPresence`, `requireUserVerification`, or `allowedAlgorithms` and those are checked, with `bindingChecked` reporting which ran, so a check that passed can be told from one that never happened. Pass `opts.clientDataJSON` instead of the digest and the client data is read here too: the ceremony type is checked unconditionally, since a login response replayed into a registration is what that rule stops, and the challenge, origin, and top-level origin are checked against what the relying party issued, with `clientData.checked` reporting which comparisons ran. A registration verdict also carries the `credentialId`, `credentialPublicKey`, and initial `signCount` a later login needs. A credential key declaring COSE algorithm `-65535` (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-1) is refused unless `allowedAlgorithms` names it, since every signature that credential ever makes would use SHA-1. Anchoring the trust path has two routes: `opts.metadata` resolves the roots the authenticator's own model registered, and `opts.rootCertificates` pins roots directly, which is what anchors the formats FIDO MDS does not cover, Apple's authenticators and the Google hardware-attestation roots among them. `metadata` governs when both are given, and `anchoredTo` names every route that anchored the path, joined with `+` when more than one did: `"metadata"`, `"rootCertificates"`, and `"safetyNetRoots"` for the android-safetynet chain, which anchors through the roots that format requires whether or not either other route was asked for. It is `null` only when nothing anchored the path. `verifyMetadataBlob(blob, opts)` reads a FIDO Metadata Service (MDS v3) BLOB, the signed catalogue of registered authenticator models, verifying its JWS and chaining its signer to an operator-supplied FIDO root before the payload is parsed, with sequence-number rollback and `nextUpdate` freshness checks. Passing the result as `opts.metadata` to `verify` resolves the authenticator's registered attestation roots from its identifier and requires the trust path to fully validate to one of them, refusing an unlisted or revoked model. `metadataAnchors(entry, opts)` applies the same status gate for a caller anchoring the path themselves: a model the catalogue has disqualified registers no anchors. Both of the catalogue's key spaces are covered: an aaguid, and the attestation-certificate key identifiers a U2F authenticator is listed under instead. No FIDO root is bundled, there is no trust-on-first-use, and retrieving the BLOB is out of scope. Fail-closed with typed `webauthn/*` errors — `parseAttestationObject`, `verify`, `verifyMetadataBlob`, `metadataFor`, `metadataAnchors` |
-| `pki.lint` | Certificate linting, the zlint or pkilint of JavaScript. `certificate(pem \| der \| parsed, opts)` walks a parsed certificate and emits graded advisory findings, each with a stable id, a severity (`fatal`, `error`, `warn`, `notice`), a source, a spec-clause citation, and a message, against the RFC 5280 profile, the post-quantum certificate profiles, and a representative CA/Browser Forum TLS BR subset: serial sign and size, validity ordering and the SC081v3 reducing validity schedule, keyCertSign coherence, extension criticality (basicConstraints, nameConstraints, policyConstraints and inhibitAnyPolicy must be critical, and keyUsage should be), nameConstraints CA-scope, unknown critical extensions, empty-subject SAN, SKI and AKI presence including the end-entity subjectKeyIdentifier, SAN required and CN-in-SAN, dNSName syntax, serverAuth EKU, weak keys, the post-quantum key-usage rules binding a certificate's keyUsage bits to its subject key type (ML-KEM under RFC 9935 §5, ML-DSA under RFC 9881 §5, and SLH-DSA under RFC 9909 §6 across both its pure and prehash identifiers) together with the ML-KEM encapsulation-key encoding and size, and the §4.2.1.4 certificate-policy user-notice rules (a VisibleString or BMPString explicitText, a notice past 200 characters, an empty notice, control characters, and a non-NFC UTF8String notice, each at the strength the clause states). Alone among these entries the data path never throws: hostile bytes return a `fatal` `lint/unparseable` finding carrying the strict parser's code, so a whole directory lints without a try/catch, and only config-time misuse throws a typed `LintError` — `certificate`, `crl` (the RFC 5280 §5 revocation-list profile: nextUpdate presence, update ordering, cRLNumber presence and its 20-octet ceiling, authorityKeyIdentifier presence, the criticality each profiled CRL and entry extension must carry, freshestCRL in a delta CRL, and unrecognized critical extensions), `ocsp` (the RFC 6960 response profile: an empty signature, each SingleResponse's update ordering and its relation to producedAt, an empty `certs` field, the extended revoked definition and the fixed shape of a revoked answer for a non-issued certificate, the list each extension belongs in, the criticality and value syntax of the CRL entry extensions a SingleResponse may carry, unrecognized critical extensions, the reasons unspecified and removeFromCRL, and two answers for one CertID; the RFC 5019 lightweight rows run on request), `rules`, `profiles` |
+| `pki.lint` | Certificate linting, the zlint or pkilint of JavaScript. `certificate(pem \| der \| parsed, opts)` walks a parsed certificate and emits graded advisory findings, each with a stable id, a severity (`fatal`, `error`, `warn`, `notice`), a source, a spec-clause citation, and a message, against the RFC 5280 profile, the post-quantum certificate profiles, and a representative CA/Browser Forum TLS BR subset: serial sign and size, validity ordering and the SC081v3 reducing validity schedule, keyCertSign coherence, extension criticality (basicConstraints, nameConstraints, policyConstraints and inhibitAnyPolicy must be critical, and keyUsage should be), nameConstraints CA-scope, unknown critical extensions, empty-subject SAN, SKI and AKI presence including the end-entity subjectKeyIdentifier, the six extensions a conforming CA must mark non-critical (reported by clause rather than as unrecognized), SAN required and CN-in-SAN, dNSName syntax, serverAuth EKU, weak keys, the post-quantum key-usage rules binding a certificate's keyUsage bits to its subject key type (ML-KEM under RFC 9935 §5, ML-DSA under RFC 9881 §5, and SLH-DSA under RFC 9909 §6 across both its pure and prehash identifiers) together with the ML-KEM encapsulation-key encoding and size, and the §4.2.1.4 certificate-policy user-notice rules (a VisibleString or BMPString explicitText, a notice past 200 characters, an empty notice, control characters, and a non-NFC UTF8String notice, each at the strength the clause states). Alone among these entries the data path never throws: hostile bytes return a `fatal` `lint/unparseable` finding carrying the strict parser's code, so a whole directory lints without a try/catch, and only config-time misuse throws a typed `LintError` — `certificate`, `crl` (the RFC 5280 §5 revocation-list profile: nextUpdate presence, update ordering, cRLNumber presence and its 20-octet ceiling, authorityKeyIdentifier presence, the criticality each profiled CRL and entry extension must carry, freshestCRL in a delta CRL, and unrecognized critical extensions), `ocsp` (the RFC 6960 response profile: an empty signature, each SingleResponse's update ordering and its relation to producedAt, an empty `certs` field, the extended revoked definition and the fixed shape of a revoked answer for a non-issued certificate, the list each extension belongs in, the criticality and value syntax of the CRL entry extensions a SingleResponse may carry, unrecognized critical extensions, the reasons unspecified and removeFromCRL, and two answers for one CertID; the RFC 5019 lightweight rows run on request), `rules`, `profiles` |
 | `pki.C` / `pki.constants` | Version-stable constants: the functional scale helpers `C.TIME.*` and `C.BYTES.*`, the codec `LIMITS`, and `version` |
 | `pki.errors` | The `PkiError` taxonomy — `defineClass` plus `ConstantsError`, `Asn1Error`, `OidError`, `PemError`, `CertificateError`, `CrlError`, `CsrError`, `Pkcs8Error`, `CmsError`, `OcspError`, `TspError`, `AttrCertError`, `CrmfError`, `Pkcs12Error`, `CmpError`, `PathError`, `CtError`, `JoseError`, `AcmeError`, `WebauthnError`, and `LintError`, each carrying a stable `code` in `domain/reason` form |
-| `pki` CLI | `pki version`, `pki oid <dotted\|name>`, `pki parse <cert>`, `pki inspect <cert>`, `pki lint <cert>`, `pki convert <file> --to der\|pem`, `pki verify <cert>... --anchor <cert>`, `pki sign <file> --cert <c> --key <k>` |
+| `pki` CLI | `pki version`, `pki oid <dotted\|name>`, `pki parse <cert>`, `pki inspect <cert>`, `pki lint <cert\|crl\|ocsp-response>`, `pki convert <file> --to der\|pem`, `pki verify <cert>... --anchor <cert>`, `pki sign <file> --cert <c> --key <k>` |
 
 ### CLI
 
@@ -267,6 +267,8 @@ pki parse cert.pem                       # structured JSON summary of a certific
 pki inspect cert.pem                     # openssl x509 -text style report (pki.inspect)
 pki lint cert.pem                        # graded conformance findings; exit 1 on an error
 pki lint cert.pem --json --profile cabf-tls
+pki lint list.crl                        # detects a CRL or an OCSP response and runs its profile
+pki lint status.ors --profile rfc5019    # the RFC 5019 lightweight rows for an OCSP response
 pki convert cert.pem --to der > cert.der # transcode between PEM and DER (round-trips)
 pki verify leaf.pem --anchor root.pem --time 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z   # RFC 5280 path validation
 pki sign msg.txt --cert signer.pem --key signer-key.pem --out msg.p7s   # CMS SignedData (pki.cms.sign)

package/bin/pki.js

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
  *   pki oid <dotted|name>                resolve an OID <-> name
  *   pki parse <cert>                      parse an X.509 certificate to JSON
  *   pki inspect <cert>                    render a certificate as text (openssl x509 -text style)
- *   pki lint <cert> [--profile P]         lint a certificate; exit non-zero on an error finding
+ *   pki lint <file> [--profile P]         lint a certificate, CRL or OCSP response; exit non-zero on an error finding
  *              [--severity S] [--json]
  *   pki convert <file> --to der|pem       transcode a DER/PEM file between the two encodings
  *              [--label LABEL]
@@ -135,15 +135,31 @@ function cmdInspect(file) {
 
 function pad(s, n) { while (s.length < n) s += " "; return s; }
 
-// pki lint <cert> -- lint against pki.lint's profiles. Prints one line per finding and
-// exits non-zero when any error/fatal finding is present (0 when the worst is advisory).
+// The lint verb for each structure `pki lint` detects. A file holding anything else (a request, a
+// CMS message, a key) has no lint profile and is refused by the name the detector gives it.
+var LINT_VERB_FOR = { "x509": "certificate", "crl": "crl", "ocsp-response": "ocsp" };
+
+// pki lint <file> -- detect whether the file holds a certificate, a CRL or an OCSP response and
+// lint it against that structure's profiles. Prints one line per finding and exits non-zero
+// when any error/fatal finding is present (0 when the worst is advisory).
 function cmdLint(args) {
   var file = args._[0];
-  if (!file) fail("usage: pki lint <cert> [--profile <name>] [--severity <floor>] [--json]");
+  if (!file) fail("usage: pki lint <cert|crl|ocsp-response> [--profile <name>] [--severity <floor>] [--json]");
+  var input = readForLib(file);
+  // Bytes no detector recognizes (garbage, or a structure outside the detector's set) fall
+  // through to the certificate verb, whose never-throw data path reports them as a fatal
+  // lint/unparseable finding; a structure the detector DOES name but no profile covers is a
+  // config-time refusal naming it, so a request is not silently linted as a certificate.
+  var verb = "certificate", format;
+  try { format = pki.schema.detectFormat(input); } catch (_e) { format = null; }
+  if (format !== null) {
+    verb = LINT_VERB_FOR[format];
+    if (verb === undefined) return fail(file + ": holds a " + format + " structure, and pki lint covers a certificate, CRL, or OCSP response");
+  }
   var report;
   // Config-time misuse (unknown profile / bad severity) throws a typed LintError; the data
   // path never throws (malformed bytes become a fatal lint/unparseable finding).
-  try { report = pki.lint.certificate(readForLib(file), { profile: args.profile, severity: args.severity }); }
+  try { report = pki.lint[verb](input, { profile: args.profile, severity: args.severity }); }
   catch (e) { return fail(e.code + ": " + e.message); }
   if (args.json) {
     process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(report, null, 2) + "\n");

package/lib/cmp-build.js

@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ function _resolveProtection(opts, message) {
   var m = opts.mac;
   if (!m || typeof m !== "object" || Buffer.isBuffer(m)) throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "opts.mac must be an object { secret, salt?, iterationCount?, prf?, keyLength? }");
   guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(m, KNOWN_MAC_KEYS, _err, "cmp/bad-input", "unknown opts.mac field ");
-  if (m.algorithm != null && m.algorithm !== "pbmac1") throw _err("cmp/unsupported-algorithm", "opts.mac.algorithm " + guard.text.showValue(m.algorithm) + " is not supported (v1 ships pbmac1; passwordBasedMac is deferred)");
+  if (m.algorithm != null && m.algorithm !== "pbmac1") throw _err("cmp/unsupported-algorithm", "opts.mac.algorithm " + guard.text.showValue(m.algorithm) + " is not supported; MAC protection is computed under pbmac1 (RFC 9481 sec. 6.1.2), the one password-based MAC in the RFC 9481 profile");
   var secret = m.secret;
   if (typeof secret !== "string" || !secret) {
     if (!Buffer.isBuffer(secret) || !secret.length) throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "opts.mac.secret must be a non-empty string or Buffer");

package/lib/cmp-verify.js

@@ -74,10 +74,30 @@ var PBMAC1_KEYLEN_MIN = 20;
 var PBMAC1_KEYLEN_MAX = 1024;
 var PRF_HLEN = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { "SHA-256": 32, "SHA-384": 48, "SHA-512": 64 });
 
+/** @internal The MAC protection identifiers RFC 9810 sec. 5.1.3 and RFC 9481 sec. 6 name that this
+ * verifier does NOT compute, keyed by OID, each with the reason its verdict carries. A message
+ * carrying one is MAC-protected under a flavor that is not verified here, and its verdict says so:
+ * it is never the signature case, which sec. 5.1.3.3 leaves open-ended and which an OID absent from
+ * this table falls through to. The two legacy identifiers sit outside the RFC 9481 profile. A bare
+ * symmetric MAC keys the shared secret directly, with no derivation and no work factor, so one
+ * captured message is an offline oracle against a low-entropy secret; PBMAC1 exists to close that,
+ * and RFC 9481 sec. 6.2.2 forbids AES-GMAC beside PBKDF2 outright. */
 var UNSUPPORTED_MAC_OIDS = _create(null);
-["passwordBasedMac", "dhBasedMac"].forEach(function (n) {
-  var o = oid.byName(n);
-  if (o) UNSUPPORTED_MAC_OIDS[o] = n;
+function _unsupportedMacs(why, bySection) {
+  intrinsic.forEach(intrinsic.keys(bySection), function (section) {
+    intrinsic.forEach(bySection[section], function (name) {
+      UNSUPPORTED_MAC_OIDS[oid.byName(name)] = { name: name, why: why + " (" + section + ")" };
+    });
+  });
+}
+_unsupportedMacs("is not in the RFC 9481 algorithm profile", {
+  "RFC 9481 sec. 6.1.1": ["passwordBasedMac"],
+  "RFC 9810 sec. 5.1.3.2": ["dhBasedMac"],
+});
+_unsupportedMacs("is a symmetric-key MAC applied without a key derivation", {
+  "RFC 9481 sec. 6.2.1": ["hmacWithSHA1", "hmacWithSHA224", "hmacWithSHA256", "hmacWithSHA384", "hmacWithSHA512"],
+  "RFC 9481 sec. 6.2.2": ["aes128-GMAC", "aes192-GMAC", "aes256-GMAC"],
+  "RFC 9481 sec. 6.2.3": ["kmacWithSHAKE128", "kmacWithSHAKE256"],
 });
 
 var _engine = null;
@@ -823,8 +843,9 @@ async function _verify(message, opts) {
 
   var protectedPart = b.sequence([b.raw(m.headerBytes), b.raw(m.bodyBytes)]);
 
-  if (UNSUPPORTED_MAC_OIDS[protectionAlg.oid]) {
-    return _fail(m, "mac", protectionAlg, "cmp/unsupported-algorithm", "the " + UNSUPPORTED_MAC_OIDS[protectionAlg.oid] + " protection algorithm is not supported (v1 verifies PBMAC1 and signature protection; RFC 9481 sec. 6.1.1)");
+  var unsupportedMac = UNSUPPORTED_MAC_OIDS[protectionAlg.oid];
+  if (unsupportedMac !== undefined) {
+    return _fail(m, "mac", protectionAlg, "cmp/unsupported-algorithm", "the " + unsupportedMac.name + " protection algorithm " + unsupportedMac.why + "; this verifier computes PBMAC1, KEM-based MAC and signature protection");
   }
 
   var isMac = protectionAlg.oid === oid.byName("pbmac1");
@@ -1171,8 +1192,11 @@ function openKeyPackage(container, opts) {
  * `pki.schema.cmp.parse` result (the protection is always recomputed from the parser-surfaced raw
  * `headerBytes` / `bodyBytes`, so a mutated display field on a parsed object cannot desync the crypto).
  * The protection flavor is read from the header `protectionAlg` alone: `id-PBMAC1` selects the MAC path,
- * a signature `AlgorithmIdentifier` the signature path; an unprotected message, or a recognized legacy /
- * KEM MAC algorithm (`id-PasswordBasedMac` / `id-DHBasedMac` / `id-KemBasedMac`), fails closed. On the
+ * `id-KemBasedMac` the KEM path, and a signature `AlgorithmIdentifier` the signature path. An
+ * unprotected message fails closed, and so does a MAC identifier this verifier does not compute
+ * (`id-PasswordBasedMac`, `id-DHBasedMac`, and the bare symmetric MACs of RFC 9481 sec. 6.2: the SHA-2
+ * HMACs, AES-GMAC and KMAC), each reported as `protectionType: "mac"` with `cmp/unsupported-algorithm`
+ * rather than as a failed signature. On the
  * signature path the authenticated header `sender` field MUST match the signer certificate subject (RFC 9483
  * sec. 3.1), so a certificate the anchor trusts cannot sign under another party's sender name.
  *

package/lib/lint.js

@@ -195,9 +195,18 @@ function _subjectCNs(cert) {
   return out;
 }
 
+/** @internal The criticality RFC 5280 fixes for a certificate extension, read from the shared table
+ * the certificate signer refuses to write against. The profile has its own row for each extension
+ * the table holds CRITICAL (basicConstraints, nameConstraints, policyConstraints, inhibitAnyPolicy),
+ * so only the NON-critical direction is graded through this table, under one id, the way the CRL
+ * profile grades its criticality rows. */
+var CERT_FIXED_CRITICALITY = pkix.certFixedCriticality(oid);
 var _CRITICAL_LEGIT = Object.create(null);
 _CRITICAL_LEGIT[oid.byName("precertificatePoison")] = true;
+/** @internal An extension whose criticality the profile fixes is one it recognizes: marked against
+ * the table it is a criticality fault with its own row, never an unrecognized extension. */
 function _isUnknownExtension(extOid) {
+  if (CERT_FIXED_CRITICALITY[extOid] !== undefined) return false;
   if (path.PROCESSED_EXTENSIONS[extOid] !== true) return _CRITICAL_LEGIT[extOid] !== true;
   return path.TARGET_UNPROCESSED_IF_CRITICAL[extOid] === true;
 }
@@ -270,6 +279,22 @@ var RFC5280_RULES = [
     message: "the signatureValue contains no signature",
     check: function (cert) { return cert.signatureValue.bytes.length === 0 ? true : null; },
   },
+  {
+    id: "lint/rfc5280/extension-criticality", severity: "error", source: "rfc5280", citation: "RFC 5280 4.2.1.1 / 4.2.1.2 / 4.2.1.8 / 4.2.1.15 / 4.2.2.1 / 4.2.2.2",
+    message: "an extension a conforming CA must mark non-critical is marked critical",
+    /** @internal Keyed by the extension's OID throughout. The display name the parser attaches can
+     * be re-pointed through the registry, so a lookup by name would answer for a different
+     * extension, or for none. */
+    check: function (cert) {
+      var rows = [];
+      (cert.extensions || []).forEach(function (e) {
+        var fixed = CERT_FIXED_CRITICALITY[e.oid];
+        if (fixed === undefined || fixed.critical !== false || e.critical !== true) return;
+        rows.push({ context: { extension: e.name || e.oid, oid: e.oid, required: "non-critical", was: "critical", scope: "extensions", citation: fixed.citation } });
+      });
+      return rows.length ? rows : null;
+    },
+  },
   {
     id: "lint/rfc5280/serial-not-positive", severity: "error", source: "rfc5280", citation: "RFC 5280 4.1.2.2",
     message: "the certificate serialNumber must be a positive integer",

package/lib/oid.js

@@ -303,12 +303,13 @@ var FAMILIES = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
     "id-TA-RSA-PSS-SHA-256": 4, "id-TA-RSA-v1-5-SHA-512": 5, "id-TA-RSA-PSS-SHA-512": 6 } },
 
   nistAes: { base: [2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 1], of: {
-    "aes128-CBC": 2, "aes128-wrap": 5, "aes128-GCM": 6, "aes128-CCM": 7,
-    "aes192-CBC": 22, "aes192-wrap": 25, "aes192-GCM": 26, "aes192-CCM": 27,
-    "aes256-CBC": 42, "aes256-wrap": 45, "aes256-GCM": 46, "aes256-CCM": 47 } },
+    "aes128-CBC": 2, "aes128-wrap": 5, "aes128-GCM": 6, "aes128-CCM": 7, "aes128-GMAC": 9,
+    "aes192-CBC": 22, "aes192-wrap": 25, "aes192-GCM": 26, "aes192-CCM": 27, "aes192-GMAC": 29,
+    "aes256-CBC": 42, "aes256-wrap": 45, "aes256-GCM": 46, "aes256-CCM": 47, "aes256-GMAC": 49 } },
 
   nistHash: { base: [2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2], of: {
-    sha256: 1, sha384: 2, sha512: 3, "sha3-256": 8, "sha3-512": 10, shake128: 11, shake256: 12 } },
+    sha256: 1, sha384: 2, sha512: 3, "sha3-256": 8, "sha3-512": 10, shake128: 11, shake256: 12,
+    kmacWithSHAKE128: 19, kmacWithSHAKE256: 20 } },
 
   nistSig: { base: [2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 3], of: {
     "id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-224": 13, "id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-256": 14,

package/lib/pki-build.js

@@ -317,17 +317,9 @@ function reqDenseArrayImpl(list, what, E, code) {
   return out;
 }
 
-/** @internal RFC 5280 sec. 4.2 fixes the criticality of these certificate extensions. Each entry maps
- *  the extension OID to the flag the RFC requires and the clause that sets it. */
-var CERT_FIXED_CRITICALITY = intrinsic.create(null);
-[["authorityKeyIdentifier", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.1"], ["subjectKeyIdentifier", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.2"],
-  ["subjectDirectoryAttributes", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.8"], ["nameConstraints", true, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.10"],
-  ["policyConstraints", true, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.11"], ["inhibitAnyPolicy", true, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.14"],
-  ["freshestCRL", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.15"], ["authorityInfoAccess", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.1"],
-  ["subjectInfoAccess", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.2"],
-  ["precertificatePoison", true, "RFC 6962 sec. 3.1"]].forEach(function (r) {
-  CERT_FIXED_CRITICALITY[oid.byName(r[0])] = { critical: r[1], citation: r[2] };
-});
+/** @internal The criticality RFC 5280 sec. 4.2 fixes for a certificate extension, by OID, read from
+ *  the shared table the certificate lint profile reports from, so the two cannot disagree. */
+var CERT_FIXED_CRITICALITY = pkix.certFixedCriticality(oid);
 
 var NC_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { permitted: 1, excluded: 1 });
 var NC_FORM_TAG = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {

package/lib/schema-pkix.js

@@ -458,6 +458,29 @@ function rawNonEmptySequence(ns, opts) {
 
 var CRL_REASON_NAMES = constants.NAMES.CRL_REASON;
 
+/** @internal The criticality RFC 5280 (and RFC 6962 for the poison) fixes for a certificate
+ *  extension, by extension name, each with its clause. One table for the two consumers that state
+ *  the rule: the certificate signer refuses to write an extension against it, and the certificate
+ *  lint profile reports one that arrived against it. Extensions whose criticality the CA chooses
+ *  (basicConstraints, keyUsage, the alternative names) are absent. */
+var CERT_FIXED_CRITICALITY_ROWS = [
+  ["authorityKeyIdentifier", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.1"], ["subjectKeyIdentifier", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.2"],
+  ["subjectDirectoryAttributes", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.8"], ["nameConstraints", true, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.10"],
+  ["policyConstraints", true, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.11"], ["inhibitAnyPolicy", true, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.14"],
+  ["freshestCRL", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.15"], ["authorityInfoAccess", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.1"],
+  ["subjectInfoAccess", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.2"],
+  ["precertificatePoison", true, "RFC 6962 sec. 3.1"],
+];
+/** @internal The table keyed by dotted OID through the registry the caller passes, since this
+ *  module takes its registry as a parameter rather than requiring it. */
+function certFixedCriticality(oidRegistry) {
+  var table = _create(null);
+  _forEach(CERT_FIXED_CRITICALITY_ROWS, function (r) {
+    table[oidRegistry.byName(r[0])] = { critical: r[1], citation: r[2] };
+  });
+  return table;
+}
+
 var GN_CONSTRUCTED = _assign(_create(null), { 0: 1, 3: 1, 4: 1, 5: 1 });
 var GN_IA5 = _assign(_create(null), { 1: 1, 2: 1, 6: 1 });
 /** @internal DirectoryString ::= CHOICE { teletexString, printableString, universalString,
@@ -1439,6 +1462,7 @@ module.exports = {
   utf8Text: utf8Text,
   rawNonEmptySequence: rawNonEmptySequence,
   CRL_REASON_NAMES: CRL_REASON_NAMES,
+  certFixedCriticality: certFixedCriticality,
   certExtensionDecoders: certExtensionDecoders,
   _decodeHelpers: _decodeHelpers,
   attribute: attribute,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.7.26",
+  "version": "0.7.28",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:4d386905-4bf6-44a7-b504-c8e9fe74646d",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:369c5f21-643b-4e6e-9bbe-caa64491393d",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-09-12T03:45:28.477Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-09-12T04:58:41.118Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.26",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.28",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.7.26",
+      "version": "0.7.28",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.7.26",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.7.28",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.26",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.28",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]