@blamejs/pki 0.7.24 → 0.7.26

package/lib/ocsp.js

@@ -222,6 +222,14 @@ function _normCertDer(cert, what) {
  * DER (RFC 6960 sec. 4.2.1: no CMS wrapper, no signed attributes). The responder certificate is
  * embedded in `certs [0]` so a relying party can find it. Returns the response DER, or PEM.
  *
+ * Each response may carry `singleExtensions`, as an object or as an array of pre-encoded Extension
+ * DER. The object form takes `archiveCutoff`, the Date before which the responder no longer holds
+ * status (RFC 6960 sec. 4.4.4), and `crlReferences`, a `{ crlUrl, crlNum, crlTime }` naming the CRL
+ * the status was drawn from (sec. 4.4.2), any subset of the three. A pre-encoded entry is read with
+ * the parser's own singleExtensions reader before it is emitted, so a response this verb signs is
+ * one `pki.schema.ocsp.parseResponse` reads back, and a malformed archiveCutoff or CrlID is refused
+ * here with the code the parser would have raised.
+ *
  * @opts
  *   nonce           a request nonce Buffer to echo back in responseExtensions (RFC 9654).
  *   extendedRevoke  emit the id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke extension (RFC 6960 sec. 4.4.8).
@@ -280,7 +288,7 @@ function _signResponse(responseData, responder, respCert, respCertDer, responder
 
   return _responderID(responseData.responderID, respCert).then(function (ridNode) {
     return Promise.all(responses.map(function (r) { return _buildSingleResponse(r, opts); })).then(function (srNodes) {
-      var rdChildren = [ridNode, b.generalizedTime(_asDate(responseData.producedAt) || new Date()), b.sequence(srNodes)];
+      var rdChildren = [ridNode, b.generalizedTime(_asEncodableDate(responseData.producedAt, "producedAt") || new Date()), b.sequence(srNodes)];
       var respExts = [];
       if (opts.nonce != null) { _assertNonce(opts.nonce); respExts.push(_nonceExt(opts.nonce)); }
       if (opts.extendedRevoke) respExts.push(b.sequence([b.oid(OID_EXTENDED_REVOKE), b.octetString(b.nullValue())]));
@@ -303,6 +311,13 @@ function _asDate(d) {
   if (isNaN(guard.time.instantOf(dt))) throw _err("ocsp/bad-input", "an invalid date value " + guard.text.showValue(d));
   return dt;
 }
+/** @internal `_asDate` for a Date this verb WRITES as a GeneralizedTime (producedAt, thisUpdate,
+ *  nextUpdate, a revocation time): the encodable year range is held here so the fault stays in this
+ *  verb's domain. The verify clock is only compared and stays on `_asDate`. */
+function _asEncodableDate(d, which) {
+  var dt = _asDate(d);
+  return dt === null ? null : guard.time.assertEncodable(dt, _err, "ocsp/bad-input", which);
+}
 function _snapshotSignerKey(key, owned) {
   if (Buffer.isBuffer(key) || key instanceof Uint8Array) {   // allow:byte-source-narrow -- responder private key on the key-ownership contract (Buffer / Uint8Array / PEM / CryptoKey); widening keys is a separate root decision
     var copy = guard.bytes.snapshot(key, OcspError, "ocsp/bad-input", "the responder key");
@@ -331,8 +346,8 @@ function _buildSingleResponse(r, opts) {
    * attached handlers, and an earlier entry's rejection would be orphaned: the caller catches
    * sign()'s failure and the process still sees an unhandled rejection. */
   return certIdP.then(function (certID) {
-    var thisUpdate = _asDate(r.thisUpdate) || new Date();
-    var nextUpdate = r.nextUpdate === null ? null : (_asDate(r.nextUpdate) || _defaultNextUpdate());
+    var thisUpdate = _asEncodableDate(r.thisUpdate, "thisUpdate") || new Date();
+    var nextUpdate = r.nextUpdate === null ? null : (_asEncodableDate(r.nextUpdate, "nextUpdate") || _defaultNextUpdate());
     /** @internal RFC 6960 sec. 4.2.2.1 makes thisUpdate and nextUpdate a validity interval, and says
      * it corresponds to the {thisUpdate, nextUpdate} interval in CRLs. An interval whose end
      * precedes its start states a status window that closed before it opened, and pki.ocsp.verify
@@ -353,16 +368,76 @@ function _buildSingleResponse(r, opts) {
     var statusNode = _certStatusNode(r.status, opts);
     var srChildren = [certID, statusNode, b.generalizedTime(thisUpdate)];
     if (nextUpdate !== null) srChildren.push(b.explicit(0, b.generalizedTime(nextUpdate)));
-    if (r.singleExtensions && r.singleExtensions.length) srChildren.push(b.explicit(1, b.sequence(r.singleExtensions)));
+    if (r.singleExtensions != null) {
+      var singleDer = _singleExtensionsDer(r.singleExtensions);
+      if (singleDer.length) srChildren.push(b.explicit(1, b.sequence(singleDer)));
+    }
     return b.sequence(srChildren);
   });
 }
 function _defaultNextUpdate() { return new Date(Date.now() + constants.TIME.days(7)); }
+var _SINGLE_EXT_KEYS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { archiveCutoff: 1, crlReferences: 1 });
+var _CRL_ID_KEYS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { crlUrl: 1, crlNum: 1, crlTime: 1 });
+
+/** @internal RFC 6960 sec. 4.4.2 and sec. 4.4.4 put archiveCutoff and the CRL references in a
+ *  SingleResponse's singleExtensions. The object form names them as fields; the array form carries
+ *  pre-encoded Extension DER, and each entry is run through the parser's own singleExtensions reader
+ *  first, so this verb never emits an entry pki.schema.ocsp.parseResponse would refuse. */
+function _singleExtensionsDer(spec) {
+  if (Array.isArray(spec)) {
+    var dense = pkiBuild.reqDenseArray(spec, "singleExtensions", _err, "ocsp/bad-input");
+    var ders = dense.map(function (d, i) {
+      return guard.bytes.snapshotSource(d, OcspError, "ocsp/bad-input", "singleExtensions[" + i + "]");
+    });
+    if (ders.length) ocspSchema.readSingleExtensionsDer(ders);
+    return ders;
+  }
+  if (!spec || typeof spec !== "object" || Buffer.isBuffer(spec)) {
+    throw _err("ocsp/bad-input", "singleExtensions must be an object { archiveCutoff?, crlReferences? } or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER");
+  }
+  guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(spec, _SINGLE_EXT_KEYS, _err, "ocsp/bad-input", function (k) {
+    return "unknown singleExtensions field " + guard.text.showValue(k) + " (accepted: archiveCutoff, crlReferences)";
+  });
+  var out = [];
+  if (spec.archiveCutoff != null) {
+    guard.time.assertEncodable(spec.archiveCutoff, _err, "ocsp/bad-input", "singleExtensions archiveCutoff");
+    out.push(b.sequence([b.oid(oid.byName("ocspArchiveCutoff")), b.octetString(b.generalizedTime(spec.archiveCutoff))]));
+  }
+  if (spec.crlReferences != null) {
+    var c = spec.crlReferences;
+    if (!c || typeof c !== "object" || Array.isArray(c) || Buffer.isBuffer(c)) {
+      throw _err("ocsp/bad-input", "singleExtensions crlReferences must be an object { crlUrl?, crlNum?, crlTime? }");
+    }
+    guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(c, _CRL_ID_KEYS, _err, "ocsp/bad-input", function (k) {
+      return "unknown crlReferences field " + guard.text.showValue(k) + " (accepted: crlUrl, crlNum, crlTime)";
+    });
+    var fields = [];
+    if (c.crlUrl != null) {
+      if (typeof c.crlUrl !== "string" || !c.crlUrl.length) throw _err("ocsp/bad-input", "crlReferences crlUrl must be a non-empty string");
+      for (var j = 0; j < c.crlUrl.length; j++) {
+        if (c.crlUrl.charCodeAt(j) > 0x7f) throw _err("ocsp/bad-input", "crlReferences crlUrl must be 7-bit ASCII (an IA5String, RFC 6960 sec. 4.4.2)");
+      }
+      fields.push(b.explicit(0, b.ia5(c.crlUrl)));
+    }
+    if (c.crlNum != null) {
+      var num = guard.range.authoredInteger(c.crlNum, _err, "ocsp/bad-input", "crlReferences crlNum");
+      if (num < 0n) throw _err("ocsp/bad-input", "crlReferences crlNum must be non-negative (it is a cRLNumber, RFC 5280 sec. 5.2.3)");
+      fields.push(b.explicit(1, b.integer(num)));
+    }
+    if (c.crlTime != null) {
+      guard.time.assertEncodable(c.crlTime, _err, "ocsp/bad-input", "crlReferences crlTime");
+      fields.push(b.explicit(2, b.generalizedTime(c.crlTime)));
+    }
+    out.push(b.sequence([b.oid(oid.byName("ocspCrl")), b.octetString(b.sequence(fields))]));
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
 function _certStatusNode(status, opts) {
   if (status == null || status === "good") return b.contextPrimitive(0, Buffer.alloc(0));
   if (status === "unknown") return b.contextPrimitive(2, Buffer.alloc(0));
   if (typeof status === "object" && status.revoked != null) {
-    var ri = [b.generalizedTime(_asDate(status.revoked))];
+    var ri = [b.generalizedTime(_asEncodableDate(status.revoked, "the revocation time"))];
     if (status.revocationReason != null) {
       var code = typeof status.revocationReason === "number" ? status.revocationReason : REASON_CODE[guard.text.keyOf(status.revocationReason)];
       if (code == null) throw _err("ocsp/bad-input", "unknown revocationReason " + guard.text.showValue(status.revocationReason));

package/lib/pki-build.js

@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ function makeBuilder(ctx) {
   function rawErr(fullCode, message, cause) { return new ErrorClass(fullCode, message, cause); }
 
   function timeDer(date, which) {
-    guard.time.assertValid(date, rawErr, code("bad-input"), which);
+    guard.time.assertEncodable(date, rawErr, code("bad-input"), which);
     var y = date.getUTCFullYear();
     return (y >= 1950 && y <= 2049) ? b.utcTime(date) : b.generalizedTime(date);
   }

package/lib/schema-crl.js

@@ -239,4 +239,9 @@ module.exports = {
   pemDecode: pemDecode,
   pemEncode: pemEncode,
   matches: matches,
+  /** @internal The reader this parser applies to a CRL entry extension (reasonCode, invalidityDate),
+   *  for a consumer that meets the same extension elsewhere: RFC 6960 sec. 4.4.5 carries every CRL
+   *  entry extension into an OCSP SingleResponse, and the linter reads it with this rather than a
+   *  second one. Not on the curated `pki.schema.crl` surface. */
+  decodeExtension: decodeExt,
 };

package/lib/schema-ocsp.js

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ var constants = require("./constants");
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
 var intrinsic = require("./guard-intrinsic");
 var _hasOwn = intrinsic.hasOwn;
+var _String = intrinsic.String;
 
 var OcspError = frameworkError.OcspError;
 var PemError = frameworkError.PemError;
@@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ var VERSION = pkix.versionReader(NS, {});
 var OID_OCSP_BASIC = oid.byName("ocspBasic");
 
 var OID_OCSP_NONCE = oid.byName("ocspNonce");
+var OID_OCSP_ARCHIVE_CUTOFF = oid.byName("ocspArchiveCutoff");
+var OID_OCSP_CRL = oid.byName("ocspCrl");
 
 var STATUS_NAMES = constants.NAMES.OCSP_STATUS;
 
@@ -92,10 +95,69 @@ function _rawSignature(field) {
 
 var CERTS = schema.seqOf(certificateBytes(), { assert: "sequence", code: "ocsp/bad-certs", what: "certs", max: constants.LIMITS.OCSP_MAX_CERTS, maxCode: "ocsp/too-many-certs" });
 
+/** @internal RFC 6960 sec. 4.4.4: ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime, carried as a singleExtension. */
+function _readArchiveCutoff(ext) {
+  var node;
+  try { node = asn1.decode(ext.value); }
+  catch (e) { throw NS.E("ocsp/bad-archive-cutoff", "the archiveCutoff extension value did not decode: " + ((e && e.message) || _String(e)), e); }
+  if (!(node.tagClass === "universal" && node.tagNumber === asn1.TAGS.GENERALIZED_TIME)) {
+    throw NS.E("ocsp/bad-archive-cutoff", "the archiveCutoff extension value must be a GeneralizedTime (RFC 6960 sec. 4.4.4)");
+  }
+  try { return asn1.read.time(node); }
+  catch (e) { throw NS.E("ocsp/bad-archive-cutoff", "the archiveCutoff GeneralizedTime is malformed", e); }
+}
+
+/** @internal RFC 6960 sec. 4.4.2: CrlID ::= SEQUENCE { crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
+ *  crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }. Every
+ *  field is optional and each may appear at most once, in tag order. */
+function _readCrlId(ext) {
+  var C = "ocsp/bad-crl-id";
+  var node;
+  try { node = asn1.decode(ext.value); }
+  catch (e) { throw NS.E(C, "the CRL references extension value did not decode: " + ((e && e.message) || _String(e)), e); }
+  if (!(node.tagClass === "universal" && node.tagNumber === asn1.TAGS.SEQUENCE && node.children)) {
+    throw NS.E(C, "CrlID must be a SEQUENCE (RFC 6960 sec. 4.4.2)");
+  }
+  var out = { crlUrl: null, crlNum: null, crlTime: null }, last = -1;
+  for (var i = 0; i < node.children.length; i++) {
+    var k = node.children[i];
+    if (k.tagClass !== "context" || !k.constructed || !k.children || k.children.length !== 1) {
+      throw NS.E(C, "each CrlID member must be one EXPLICIT [0], [1] or [2] tag (RFC 6960 sec. 4.4.2)");
+    }
+    if (k.tagNumber <= last) throw NS.E(C, "CrlID members must appear at most once, in tag order");
+    last = k.tagNumber;
+    var inner = k.children[0];
+    try {
+      if (k.tagNumber === 0) {
+        if (inner.tagClass !== "universal" || inner.tagNumber !== asn1.TAGS.IA5_STRING) throw NS.E(C, "crlUrl must be an IA5String");
+        out.crlUrl = asn1.read.string(inner);
+      } else if (k.tagNumber === 1) {
+        if (inner.tagClass !== "universal" || inner.tagNumber !== asn1.TAGS.INTEGER) throw NS.E(C, "crlNum must be an INTEGER");
+        out.crlNum = asn1.read.integer(inner);
+        if (out.crlNum < 0n) throw NS.E(C, "crlNum must be non-negative (it is a cRLNumber, RFC 5280 sec. 5.2.3)");
+      } else if (k.tagNumber === 2) {
+        if (inner.tagClass !== "universal" || inner.tagNumber !== asn1.TAGS.GENERALIZED_TIME) throw NS.E(C, "crlTime must be a GeneralizedTime");
+        out.crlTime = asn1.read.time(inner);
+      } else {
+        throw NS.E(C, "CrlID has no member tagged [" + k.tagNumber + "] (RFC 6960 sec. 4.4.2)");
+      }
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (e && e.code === C) throw e;
+      throw NS.E(C, "CrlID member [" + k.tagNumber + "] is malformed", e);
+    }
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** @internal The extensions this profile reads are decoded onto their entry beside the raw value,
+ *  so a consumer gets the value by name and a malformed one is refused here rather than passed
+ *  through as opaque bytes. The nonce is RFC 9654; the other two are RFC 6960 sec. 4.4. */
 function _validateOcspExtensions(list) {
   if (!list) return list;
   for (var i = 0; i < list.length; i++) {
     var ext = list[i];
+    if (ext.oid === OID_OCSP_ARCHIVE_CUTOFF) { ext.archiveCutoff = _readArchiveCutoff(ext); continue; }
+    if (ext.oid === OID_OCSP_CRL) { ext.crlReferences = _readCrlId(ext); continue; }
     if (ext.oid !== OID_OCSP_NONCE) continue;
     var node;
     try { node = asn1.decode(ext.value); }
@@ -235,6 +297,7 @@ var BASIC_OCSP_RESPONSE = schema.seq([
       signatureAlgorithm: m.fields.signatureAlgorithm.value.result,
       signature: _rawSignature(m.fields.signature),
       certs: m.fields.certs.present ? m.fields.certs.value.items.map(function (it) { return it.value; }) : [],
+      certsPresent: m.fields.certs.present,
     };
   },
 });
@@ -397,8 +460,10 @@ var parseRequest = pkix.makeParser({ pemLabel: "OCSP REQUEST", PemError: PemErro
  * Parse a DER `Buffer` or a PEM (`OCSP RESPONSE`) string into a structured
  * OCSPResponse: `{ responseStatus, responseBytes, basicResponse }`. For a successful
  * basic response, `basicResponse` carries `{ tbsResponseDataBytes, responderID,
- * producedAt, responses, signatureAlgorithm, signature, certs }`; each
- * `responses[i].certStatus` is `{ type: "good" | "revoked" | "unknown" }`. A
+ * producedAt, responses, signatureAlgorithm, signature, certs, certsPresent }`; each
+ * `responses[i].certStatus` is `{ type: "good" | "revoked" | "unknown" }`. `certs` is the
+ * embedded certificate list, empty when the field is absent, and `certsPresent` says
+ * whether the response carried the field at all. A
  * non-successful status carries no `responseBytes`. A malformed structure throws a
  * typed `OcspError` (`ocsp/*`); an unsupported `responseType` throws
  * `ocsp/unsupported-response-type`.
@@ -500,4 +565,13 @@ module.exports = {
   pemEncode: pemEncode,
   matchesRequest: matchesRequest,
   matchesResponse: matchesResponse,
+  /** @internal Reads a list of pre-encoded Extension DER the way this parser reads a SingleResponse's
+   *  singleExtensions, shared with pki.ocsp.sign so an entry the signer emits is one the parser
+   *  reads. Throws the parser's own ocsp/* code for a malformed entry. */
+  readSingleExtensionsDer: function (derList) {
+    var node;
+    try { node = asn1.decode(asn1.build.sequence(intrinsic.map(derList, function (d) { return asn1.build.raw(d); }))); }
+    catch (e) { throw NS.E("ocsp/bad-single-response", "a pre-encoded singleExtension is not DER", e); }
+    return _validateOcspExtensions(schema.walk(EXTENSIONS, node, NS).result);
+  },
 };

package/lib/tsp-sign.js

@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ function _sign(messageImprint, tsa, opts) {
   if (!NODE_DIGEST[guard.text.keyOf(certHashAlg)]) throw _err("tsp/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported certHashAlgorithm " + guard.text.showValue(certHashAlg));
 
   var imprint = b.sequence([_hashAlgId(mi.hashAlgorithm), b.octetString(guard.bytes.source(mi.hashedMessage, TspError, "tsp/bad-input", "messageImprint.hashedMessage"))]);
-  if (opts.genTime != null) guard.time.assertValid(opts.genTime, _err, "tsp/bad-input", "genTime");
+  if (opts.genTime != null) guard.time.assertEncodable(opts.genTime, _err, "tsp/bad-input", "genTime");
   var genTime = guard.time.isDate(opts.genTime) ? opts.genTime : new Date();
   var serial = guard.range.authoredInteger(opts.serialNumber, _err, "tsp/bad-input", "serialNumber");
   var fields = [b.integer(1n), _policy(opts.policy), imprint, b.integer(serial), b.generalizedTime(genTime)];

package/lib/x509-sign.js

@@ -504,9 +504,9 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
   var scheme = signScheme.resolveSignScheme(_certLikeFromSpki(issuerSpki), { combinedRsaSig: true, pss: opts.pss, digestAlgorithm: opts.digestAlgorithm }, true, _signE);
 
   var serialTlv = _serialInteger(spec.serialNumber);
-  guard.time.assertValid(spec.notBefore, _err, "x509/bad-input", "notBefore");
-  guard.time.assertValid(spec.notAfter, _err, "x509/bad-input", "notAfter");
-  // allow:nan-date-comparison-unguarded -- both operands are guard.time.assertValid'd on the two lines above (an Invalid Date throws before this comparison).
+  guard.time.assertEncodable(spec.notBefore, _err, "x509/bad-input", "notBefore");
+  guard.time.assertEncodable(spec.notAfter, _err, "x509/bad-input", "notAfter");
+  // allow:nan-date-comparison-unguarded -- both operands are guard.time.assertEncodable'd on the two lines above (an Invalid Date throws before this comparison).
   if (guard.time.instantOf(spec.notBefore) > guard.time.instantOf(spec.notAfter)) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "notBefore must not be after notAfter (RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.5)");
   var validityDer = b.sequence([_timeDer(spec.notBefore, "notBefore"), _timeDer(spec.notAfter, "notAfter")]);
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.7.24",
+  "version": "0.7.26",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:afc45867-a237-46a4-91ea-4cb590b54d06",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:4d386905-4bf6-44a7-b504-c8e9fe74646d",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-09-12T00:45:51.621Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-09-12T03:45:28.477Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.24",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.26",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.7.24",
+      "version": "0.7.26",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.7.24",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.7.26",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.24",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.26",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]