@blamejs/pki 0.7.21 → 0.7.23

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,29 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.7.23 — 2026-09-11
+
+Subject information access, subject directory attributes and the OCSP no-check marker are read and written.
+
+### Added
+
+- extensions.subjectInfoAccess takes the same { accessMethod, accessLocation } list authorityInfoAccess takes, because RFC 5280 section 4.2.2.2 gives it section 4.2.2.1's syntax. The two access methods that section defines are the registered names id-ad-caRepository and id-ad-timeStamping; the latter is a different object identifier from the extended-key-usage timeStamping, and naming the wrong one is the mistake this spelling avoids.
+- extensions.subjectDirectoryAttributes takes a list of { type, values } with each value as pre-encoded DER, which is the form its reader surfaces (RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.8). Both extensions are emitted non-critical, which those sections require of a conforming CA, and a pre-encoded instance marked critical is refused on both signers.
+- extensions.ocspNoCheck marks an OCSP responder certificate so a client does not ask about its own revocation (RFC 6960 section 4.2.2.2.1). The value is NULL, which that section requires, and the extension is emitted non-critical, which it says it should be.
+- All three join the shared certificate-extension decoders. pki.lint.certificate reads them, so a malformed value is graded lint/rfc5280/extension-undecodable instead of passing unexamined, and pki.inspect prints the access method and location, the attribute and its value, and the no-check marker, where it previously printed a hex dump. That brings the set of certificate extensions the toolkit decodes and the set it can issue to the same twenty-six.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- pki.ocsp.verify authorized a delegated responder whose ocspNoCheck extension carried something other than NULL. The extension is what lets a client stop asking whether the responder itself is revoked, and the delegation gate tested only that it was present, so a responder certificate carrying a malformed marker was accepted and could return a good verdict. The gate now decodes the extension, as it already did for the key usage and extended key usage beside it, and a responder whose marker is not the NULL RFC 6960 section 4.2.2.2.1 requires is unauthorized. A conforming responder certificate is unaffected.
+
+## v0.7.22 — 2026-09-11
+
+A CRL can name its issuer's other identities.
+
+### Added
+
+- extensions.issuerAltName on pki.crl.sign takes the same GeneralName list the certificate extension takes, because RFC 5280 section 5.2.2 defines this extension's OID and syntax by reference to section 4.2.1.7. The same names given to pki.x509.sign and pki.crl.sign encode to identical bytes. Multiple name forms and multiple instances of one form are emitted as given, and the extension is non-critical, which section 5.2.2 says a conforming CRL issuer should do.
+
 ## v0.7.21 — 2026-09-11
 
 Every certificate extension the toolkit reads, it can now also issue.

package/README.md

@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.webcrypto` | A W3C `SubtleCrypto` engine over `node:crypto` — `sign`/`verify`/`encrypt`/`decrypt`/`deriveBits`/`digest`/`generateKey`/`importKey`/`exportKey` across RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, Ed25519/Ed448, AES, HMAC, HKDF, PBKDF2 and SHA, plus post-quantum ML-DSA-44/65/87, SLH-DSA, and ML-KEM-512/768/1024 key generation with certificate and PKCS#8 import. The RFC 9935 seed / expandedKey / both private-key CHOICE is validated fail-closed, so an OpenSSL-legacy bare seed or an internally inconsistent key is rejected with a typed error. `encapsulateBits` and `decapsulateBits` are the ML-KEM key-establishment pair the CMS `KEMRecipientInfo` arm rides on, with the FIPS 203 §7.3 ciphertext-length check enforced here so a direct caller inherits it. Cross-implementation use is undefined in the specification, so a `CryptoKey` from a different WebCrypto implementation is refused here with a typed fault naming its origin; the `pki.*` verbs adopt such a key instead, whether it came from the platform or from a separately installed copy of this toolkit |
 | `pki.tls` | RFC 8879 certificate compression and the RFC 8446 §4.4.2 Certificate message it carries, which is the handshake's largest payload. `decompressCertificate` decodes a `CompressedCertificate` and returns the algorithm, the declared uncompressed length, the recovered message raw, and its per-entry certificate DER. Decompression carries the two-sided bound §5 requires: capped at the message's own declared length so a bomb is refused mid-stream, then compared to that declaration exactly, which catches the under-length direction a cap alone cannot see. An algorithm outside the RFC 8879 registry, one the runtime cannot decompress, or one the receiver never advertised is refused before any decompressor is handed the bytes; an empty compressed body is a framing violation (`tls/bad-framing`); and trailing bytes, after the message or after the compressed frame, are refused (`tls/trailing-data`), so one chain has exactly one encoding. `compressCertificate` is the inverse and round-trips its own output before returning. `parseCertificateMessage` decodes the RFC 8446 §4.4.2 message on its own, surfacing each entry's certificate DER ready for `pki.schema.x509.parse` alongside its raw extensions; a separate extension negotiates `certificate_type`, so it is declared, never guessed. All three registered algorithms (zlib, brotli, zstd) are implemented, each offered only where the running Node decompresses it safely — one whose decompressor answers a truncated frame with a short result instead of a fault is dropped at startup rather than advertised with a truncation it cannot detect. Structure only: no handshake is spoken and no certificate verified — `decompressCertificate`, `compressCertificate`, `parseCertificateMessage` |
 | `pki.schema` | The schema family. `parse` detects which PKI format a DER or PEM input encodes and routes it to the right parser; `all` enumerates the registered formats; the engine and per-format members are grouped here |
-| `pki.schema.x509` | Certificates (RFC 5280) parsed into structured, validated fields with named and partly decoded extensions, including the RFC 3739 / ETSI EN 319 412-5 qualified-certificate `qcStatements` (EU-qualified declaration, reliance limit, QSCD flag, certificate type, retention, PDS URLs, country of qualification) and the Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services enrollment extensions (certificate template, CA version, previous-CA-certificate hash, application policies). Unknown statements stay opaque, fail-closed Fail-closed — `parse`, `pemDecode`, `pemEncode` |
+| `pki.schema.x509` | Certificates (RFC 5280) parsed into structured, validated fields. Each extension is surfaced by name with its `extnValue` bytes; the shared extension decoders that read those bytes are what `pki.lint.certificate`, `pki.inspect` and `pki.path.validate` consume, and they cover the RFC 3739 / ETSI EN 319 412-5 qualified-certificate `qcStatements` (EU-qualified declaration, reliance limit, QSCD flag, certificate type, retention, PDS URLs, country of qualification), the Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services enrollment extensions (certificate template, CA version, previous-CA-certificate hash, application policies), subject information access, subject directory attributes, and the RFC 6960 OCSP no-check responder marker. Unknown statements stay opaque, fail-closed Fail-closed — `parse`, `pemDecode`, `pemEncode` |
 | `pki.schema.c509` | C509 certificates (draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert), the compact CBOR profile of X.509, decoded fail-closed under deterministic CBOR. `encode` is the byte-exact inverse: a DER X.509 v3 certificate forward-transforms to a compact type-3 C509 whose reconstruction reproduces the original DER byte for byte, so the original signature still verifies. A `parse` result re-emits its native array in canonical deterministic CBOR, with the registry integer shorthands, the C509 compressions, and the compact draft-20 per-extension value forms: the scalar extensions (keyUsage, basicConstraints, extended key usage, subject key identifier, inhibitAnyPolicy, OCSP No Check, TLS Feature), the general-name-bearing extensions (subjectAltName, issuer alternative name, name constraints, CRL distribution points, freshest CRL, authority and subject information access, and the full authority key identifier) over one shared GeneralNames codec, certificate policies with their CPS-URI and UserNotice qualifiers, policy mappings and policy constraints, subject directory attributes, and the RFC 3779 resource-delegation extensions (IP address blocks and AS identifiers) with their RFC 8360 v2 twins, whose addresses ride either the delta-coded integer form or the byte-string form the specification mandates once an address exceeds eight octets. A value the compact form cannot carry exactly falls back to the byte-string form with its bytes intact; a certificate outside the invertible set throws a typed `C509Error`. Called explicitly, since it is CBOR rather than DER and so is not auto-routed |
 | `pki.schema.crl` | X.509 CRLs (RFC 5280 §5): revoked serials with real-`Date` revocation times, named and partly decoded extensions Fail-closed — `parse`, `pemDecode`, `pemEncode` |
 | `pki.schema.csr` | PKCS#10 certification requests (RFC 2986): subject DN, public key, requested attributes, signature Fail-closed — `parse`, `pemDecode`, `pemEncode` |
@@ -231,12 +231,12 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.schema.cmc` | Decode CMC messages (RFC 5272 as updated by RFC 6402): a Full PKI Request (`PKIData`) or Full PKI Response (`PKIResponse`) riding inside a CMS SignedData, reached by the encapsulated content type (`id-cct-PKIData` / `id-cct-PKIResponse`). Controls are surfaced in wire order with their values raw, so an unrecognized one is data rather than a fault. Tagged requests decode across all three arms. The status verdicts (`CMCStatusInfo` v1 and `CMCStatusInfoV2`) are collected as an ordered list, and the RFC 6402 two-module `OtherStatusInfo` ambiguity — `pendInfo` and `extendedFailInfo` are both untagged SEQUENCEs in the 1988 module, told apart only by their first element — is resolved by inspection and refused when it cannot be told apart. Body-part identity is unique across the whole message rather than per sequence, 0 is reserved as the reference to the enclosing PKIData, and the `reqSequence` bytes are surfaced exactly as they appeared so an Identity Proof witness is computed over the wire bytes. A companion decoder for CMS content rather than an auto-routed format — `parse`, `parsePkiData`, `parsePkiResponse` |
 | `pki.schema.engine` | The declarative ASN.1 structure-schema engine every format parser composes — `walk`, `encode`, `embeddedDer`, and the schema combinators |
 | `pki.path` | Certification-path validation (RFC 5280 §6). `validate` runs the §6.1 state machine over an ordered path and a trust anchor: signature chaining across RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and hybrid composite ML-DSA (a composite is accepted only when both its post-quantum and traditional components verify), validity windows, name chaining, basic constraints and path length, key usage, name constraints, and the certificate-policy tree. It returns a structured verdict with per-check reason codes and enforces a `pki.trust` anchor's per-purpose distrust-after dates and delegator purposes through `checkPurpose` — an anchor that carries either one with no purpose named to select by is refused as a configuration fault rather than validated as though it carried none. The verdict says what was established. `revocationChecked` takes the weakest outcome on the path: `false` with no checker supplied, `"determined"` when every certificate got an explicit good or revoked answer, `"waived"` when `softFail` turned an undetermined one into a pass, and `"undetermined"` when one could not be answered at all — which includes a checker that throws, a fault `softFail` does not waive because `softFail` opts into an undetermined answer, not into a broken checker. `anchorConstraints` names the purpose the anchor was judged under and whether each of its two constraints applied. `crlChecker` supplies CRL-based revocation, covering partitioned and sharded CRLs, whose §6.3.3 Distribution Point ↔ IDP correspondence lets corresponding shards accumulate reason coverage until all eight revocation reasons are covered, and delta CRLs, merged onto the complete CRL they may be combined with (§5.2.4) so a held certificate its delta releases reads good, while a delta that merges with nothing still reports what it lists and still withholds good. `ocspChecker` supplies OCSP-based revocation (RFC 6960: CertID binding, responder authorization, signature, currency) over the same pluggable hook. `build(leaf, opts)` is the discovering complement (RFC 4158): from a leaf, an untrusted pool of candidate CA certificates, and a trust store, it finds the ordered leaf-to-anchor path `validate` accepts, using name chaining plus the RFC 4158 §3.5 sort hints (an AKI/SKI match, an anchor-adjacent issuer, CA plus keyCertSign, validity at the check time — ordering hints, never filters), a depth-first search with backtracking so the first accepted path wins, and a bounded search (chain-length cap, candidate-expansion cap, identity-tuple visited set) so a cross-certificate cycle or Bridge-CA fan-out terminates deterministically. Every accept flows through `validate`, and its verdict is cross-checked against `openssl verify`. Opt-in AIA `caIssuers` fetching (`opts.fetchAia: true`) discovers a missing intermediate from a certificate's Authority Information Access URL (§4.2.2.1) over `pki.transport`, triggered only on a pool miss and bounded against SSRF and amplification: HTTPS only, a total fetch budget that caps fetching silently rather than throwing, a per-cert URL cap, a build-wide URL dedupe, a response-size and certificate-count cap, no redirect following, and every fault a silent skip. The TLS trust (`opts.tls`) stays distinct from the PKI `trustAnchors`, and every fetched certificate remains untrusted pool material that still flows through `validate` (never a trust anchor). It is off by default, so the default build is byte-identical offline. An `opts.direction` of `"reverse"` searches from a trust anchor toward the leaf (RFC 4158 §3.1), narrower when the anchor set is small and the leaf's issuer options fan out, and `"auto"` picks the direction by first-hop fan-out; reverse building reuses the same pool, visited set, caps, and `validate` gate, so the direction changes only search order, and the anchor is excluded from the returned path. Reverse building is pool-only and does not combine with `fetchAia`. When `opts.userInitialPolicySet` names acceptable certificate-policy OIDs and more than one path validates, build returns the accepted path whose user-constrained policy set best satisfies that set (RFC 4158 §4) rather than the first accepted path, the ranking bounded by the same candidate cap and a malformed set refused with `path/bad-input`; an `anyPolicy` entry is unconstrained and returns the first accepted path. In a mesh of cross-certified domains, where many candidates chain by name to the same place, a candidate is ranked by how many leading relative distinguished names it shares with the name the search is heading for (§3.5.16 and the §3.5.19 reverse method), so a certificate in the target's own domain is tried before one from a cross-certified domain, and forward building sorts a candidate under every candidate that can complete the path when its path length constraint cannot cover the certificates already below it (§3.5.7), an ordering that outranks the other hints rather than competing with them. No candidate is removed and an unbounded search still reaches every path the pool holds; a bounded one spends `maxCandidatesConsidered` on whichever branches the order steers it to. Pure and re-entrant — `validate`, `build`, `crlChecker`, `ocspChecker` |
-| `pki.x509` | Certificate issuance (RFC 5280 §4). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a certificate from a `spec` of subject (a common-name string, an array of RDNs, or raw Name DER), the public key being certified, the validity window, an optional serial, and an optional `extensions` object. `randomSerial()` draws the same 20-octet CSPRNG serial the signer uses when the spec names none, so a serial can be reserved or logged before the certificate is issued. The `issuer` is a key alone (self-signed: issuer equals subject, signed with that key), a name plus public key plus key, or an issuing certificate plus key. The signature algorithm is resolved from the signing key through the shared registry, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA P-256/384/521, Ed25519, Ed448, ML-DSA-44/65/87, the twelve SLH-DSA sets, and the composite arms all issue without a per-algorithm branch. It encodes basic constraints, key usage, extended key usage, subject and authority key identifiers (the SKI derived by SHA-1 of the subject key; the AKI optionally naming the issuing certificate by name and serial), subject alternative names, certificate policies with their RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.4 qualifiers (a CPS pointer and a user notice), name constraints, authority information access, CRL distribution points, the freshest CRL, issuer alternative names, the policy machinery path validation acts on (policy constraints, inhibit anyPolicy, policy mappings), the RFC 3739 qualified-certificate statements including the ETSI EN 319 412-5 set, the RFC 6962 certificate-transparency pair (the precertificate poison and the embedded SCT list), and the Active Directory Certificate Services enrollment extensions (certificate template, legacy template name, CA version, previous-CA-certificate hash, application policies), from the spec. That is every extension `pki.schema.x509.parse` decodes, so any certificate the toolkit reads back in full it can also issue; any other extension is taken as pre-encoded DER. `extensions.nameConstraints` takes `{ permitted, excluded }` lists of GeneralName-form objects, restricting what the CA being issued may itself issue; each base is held to the rule for a constraint base, and the extension is emitted critical as §4.2.1.10 requires. It derives the version from the field set and enforces the serial bounds, the UTCTime/GeneralizedTime cutover, the DER default omissions, and the CA cross-field rules; a violation throws a typed `CertificateError`. Returns DER, or a PEM `CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`. Every arm is independently verified by OpenSSL. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.x509.parse` — `sign` |
+| `pki.x509` | Certificate issuance (RFC 5280 §4). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a certificate from a `spec` of subject (a common-name string, an array of RDNs, or raw Name DER), the public key being certified, the validity window, an optional serial, and an optional `extensions` object. `randomSerial()` draws the same 20-octet CSPRNG serial the signer uses when the spec names none, so a serial can be reserved or logged before the certificate is issued. The `issuer` is a key alone (self-signed: issuer equals subject, signed with that key), a name plus public key plus key, or an issuing certificate plus key. The signature algorithm is resolved from the signing key through the shared registry, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA P-256/384/521, Ed25519, Ed448, ML-DSA-44/65/87, the twelve SLH-DSA sets, and the composite arms all issue without a per-algorithm branch. It encodes basic constraints, key usage, extended key usage, subject and authority key identifiers (the SKI derived by SHA-1 of the subject key; the AKI optionally naming the issuing certificate by name and serial), subject alternative names, certificate policies with their RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.4 qualifiers (a CPS pointer and a user notice), name constraints, authority information access, CRL distribution points, the freshest CRL, issuer alternative names, the policy machinery path validation acts on (policy constraints, inhibit anyPolicy, policy mappings), the RFC 3739 qualified-certificate statements including the ETSI EN 319 412-5 set, the RFC 6962 certificate-transparency pair (the precertificate poison and the embedded SCT list), the Active Directory Certificate Services enrollment extensions (certificate template, legacy template name, CA version, previous-CA-certificate hash, application policies), subject information access, subject directory attributes, and the RFC 6960 OCSP no-check responder marker, from the spec. That is every extension the shared certificate-extension decoders read, so any certificate `pki.lint.certificate` and `pki.inspect` can read in full the toolkit can also issue; any other extension is taken as pre-encoded DER. `extensions.nameConstraints` takes `{ permitted, excluded }` lists of GeneralName-form objects, restricting what the CA being issued may itself issue; each base is held to the rule for a constraint base, and the extension is emitted critical as §4.2.1.10 requires. It derives the version from the field set and enforces the serial bounds, the UTCTime/GeneralizedTime cutover, the DER default omissions, and the CA cross-field rules; a violation throws a typed `CertificateError`. Returns DER, or a PEM `CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`. Every arm is independently verified by OpenSSL. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.x509.parse` — `sign` |
 | `pki.csr` | PKCS#10 certification-request issuance (RFC 2986 / RFC 2985). `sign(spec, key, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificationRequest` from a `spec` of subject (which may be empty), the public key being certified, an optional `extensionRequest` carrying the requested v3 extensions a CA copies into the issued certificate (subject alternative names, key usage, extended key usage, basic constraints, certificate policies, subject key identifier, the RFC 3739 qualified-certificate statements, or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER), and an optional `challengePassword`. `key` (or `{ key }`) is the subject's own private key: the request is self-signed to prove possession of the private half of `subjectPublicKey`, and that proof is verified before the request is returned, which is what `openssl req -verify` checks. The signature algorithm is resolved from the subject key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. Returns DER, or a PEM `CERTIFICATE REQUEST` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CsrError`. `verify(request)` asks the same question of a request someone else produced, over its exact signed `certificationRequestInfo` bytes under the `subjectPKInfo` inside them, through the one path-validation signature engine. It answers `{ verified, subject, subjectPublicKeyInfo, attributes, certificationRequestInfoBytes }`, all re-derived from the signed bytes, so a CA issues from the fields the signature covers rather than from the object it passed in. A `verified: true` says the producer held that private key and that the subject and requested extensions are the ones they signed; who they are is the enrollment protocol's question, not this one. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.csr.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
 | `pki.attrcert` | Attribute-certificate issuance (RFC 5755). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs an `AttributeCertificate` as an Attribute Authority: a `spec` of `holder` (exactly one of an entity name, a `baseCertificateID` reference, a `fromCertificate` binding, or an object digest), the validity window as GeneralizedTime, an optional serial (positive, at most 20 octets, randomly generated when omitted), the `attributes` (role, clearance, group, chargingIdentity, accessIdentity, authenticationInfo, or pre-encoded Attribute DER), and optional `extensions` (auditIdentity, targetInformation, noRevAvail, aaControls, acProxying, authorityKeyIdentifier, or pre-encoded Extension DER) each with its RFC 5755 criticality. An attribute certificate is never self-signed, so the `issuer` is the signing AA, supplied as `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the AA key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, and the signature is verified under the AA public key before the certificate is returned. Returns DER, or a PEM `ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `AttrCertError`. `verify(ac, issuer, opts)` is the receiving side, performing the RFC 5755 sec. 5 checks an attribute certificate and a named issuer can settle between them: the signature over the exact `AttributeCertificateInfo` bytes through the one path-validation signature engine, the AC naming the issuer this verifier trusts (compared as a distinguished name), the evaluation instant lying within the validity with equality at either bound succeeding as the section states, the sec. 4.3.2 targeting rule, and rejection of any critical extension this verb does not process (section 5 defines support as parsing the value AND rejecting where the value would reject, so `aaControls` and `acProxying`, whose constraints it does not evaluate, are refused when critical). It answers `{ verified, signatureValid, validityChecked, targetingChecked, holderBindingChecked, issuerPathChecked, holder, issuer, attributes, extensions, notBefore, notAfter, serialNumberHex, reason }` with the fields re-derived from the signed bytes; the holder's own certificate chain and the AC issuer's chain need certificates the verb is not given, so those slots report `false` rather than letting their absence read as a pass. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.attrcert.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
 | `pki.crmf` | Certificate-request-message issuance (RFC 4211). `build(spec, key, opts)` assembles a `CertReqMessages` from a `spec` of `certReqId` (default 0, with the RFC 9483 `-1` sentinel allowed), a `certTemplate` of the requested fields (`subject`, `publicKey` as the SPKI DER of the key being certified, `validity`, requested `extensions`, an optional `version` 2), optional `controls` and `regInfo` (regToken, authenticator, utf8Pairs, oldCertID, protocolEncrKey, or pre-encoded `AttributeTypeAndValue` DER), and an optional `pop` selector. `key` (or `{ key }`) is the requester's private key: the message carries a `POPOSigningKey` proof of possession signed with the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey` and verified before the message is returned, exactly as a PKCS#10 CSR proves possession. A complete template signs the `CertRequest`; an incomplete one signs a `POPOSigningKeyInput`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the requested public key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. `key` is optional for a `raVerified` proof. A key that cannot sign, which is where an ML-KEM enrollment sits, takes a `POPOPrivKey` proof instead (RFC 4211 sec. 4.2, sec. 4.3): `pop.type` of `keyEncipherment` or `keyAgreement` with `pop.method: 'subsequentMessage'` declares whether an encrypted certificate (`encrCert`) or a challenge (`challengeResp`) completes the proof over the enrolling protocol's next exchange, and `pop.method: 'encryptedKey'` encloses the requester's private key for the CA in a CMS `EnvelopedData` under `id-ct-encKeyWithID`, requiring `pop.privateKey`, `pop.recipients`, the `pop.identifier` sec. 4.2.1 makes mandatory, and `pop.archive: true` because RFC 9810 sec. 5.2.8.3.1 permits the method only where archival is intended. The enclosed key must be the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey`, or the proof demonstrates possession of a key the request never asked to have certified. The `thisMessage` and `dhMAC` alternatives the specification deprecates are refused with their successors named. `pop.method: 'agreeMAC'` completes the four: `pop.key` is the requester's finite-field Diffie-Hellman private key, as a PKCS#8 DER, a PEM `PRIVATE KEY` block or a `KeyObject`, and `pop.caCert` the authority's certificate it already holds; the two agree a static secret (RFC 2875 sec. 3), and the key derived from it MACs the DER `certReq` under `id-dhPop-static-HMAC-SHA1`. Either key may name its group in the PKCS#3 or the X9.42 encoding. `pop.key` must be the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey`, and the template must name both a subject and a public key. Pass an array of specs for a batch; the CA-assigned template fields are never emitted. Returns DER, or a PEM block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrmfError`. `verifyPop(messages)` is the receiving side: for each `CertReqMsg` it verifies the `POPOSigningKey` signature over the bytes RFC 4211 sec. 4.1 names — the DER of `poposkInput` when present, of `certReq` when not — through the one path-validation signature engine, and answers `{ verified, messages: [{ verified, method, cryptographicallyVerified, certReqId, subject, subjectBound, publicKey, reason }] }` with the fields re-derived from the message's own bytes. Each verdict reports only what its preimage covers: `publicKey` is the key possession was proven for, and `subject` is the requested name when the `certReq` was signed. A `poposkInput` preimage covers the key and the sender alone, so any subject beside it is unsigned and is withheld with `subjectBound: false`. A `raVerified` proof is an RA's out-of-band assertion and a `keyEncipherment` or `keyAgreement` proof completes over a later exchange, so each is reported unverified with its `method` named instead of guessed. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crmf.parse` — `build`, `verifyPop` |
 | `pki.cmp` | CMP message building, transfer, and verification (RFC 9810). `build(message, opts)` assembles a protected `PKIMessage`. `message.header` carries the `sender` and `recipient` GeneralNames (including the anonymous NULL-DN) plus optional transaction metadata; `message.body` is a single-key object naming the arm — request-side `ir`, `cr`, `kur`, `krr` (key recovery, §5.3.7), `ccr` (cross-certification, §5.3.11: a `CertReqMessages` at the normative floor, where the requesting CA keeps its private key so a private-key-transport encryptedKey proof-of-possession is refused, and the optional App. D.6 single-request cardinality is not enforced), `p10cr`, `certConf`, `pollReq`, `genm`, `rr`, responder-side `ip`, `cp`, `kup`, `ccp`, `rp`, `genp`, `error`, `pollRep`, `krp`, `pkiconf`, and the registration-authority `nested` wrapper of complete PKIMessages (RFC 9810 §5.1.3.5). Protection is exactly one of `opts.{ key, cert }`, a signature under the sender key with the algorithm resolved from the signer certificate so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 / PSS), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, `opts.mac`, a PBMAC1 shared-secret HMAC (RFC 9481 / 9579, PBKDF2-derived), or `opts.kem`, a KEM-based MAC for a client whose key can only establish secrets (RFC 9810 §5.1.3.4): the ciphertext a peer encapsulated to its ML-KEM key is decapsulated, the key is derived under HKDF-SHA256 with a context bound to the transaction identifier of the message that carried the ciphertext, and `pki.cmp.verify` checks it from the shared secret. Protection covers the exact DER of the virtual `ProtectedPart` and is self-verified before the message is returned, and `protectionAlg` is derived rather than caller-set, so the message the parser accepts is coherent by construction. A `p10cr` request's PKCS#10 proof-of-possession is verified before the message is protected, so one whose self-signature does not verify under its subject public key is refused rather than sent. `transfer(url, message, opts)` carries a built message to a CMP endpoint over `pki.transport` (RFC 9811): one POST of the DER PKIMessage, with the response classified fail-closed — 200 only for success, a non-200 2xx or an un-followed 3xx refused, a 4xx or 5xx carrying a CMP error PKIMessage forwarded as the integrity-protected verdict — and protection surfaced rather than verified. `wellKnownUrl(base, opts)` builds the §3.4 `/.well-known/cmp` request-URIs. `verify(message, opts)` checks the protection on an incoming message, either a signature through the same certification-path engine `pki.crl.verify` and `pki.ocsp.verify` use, with the EdDSA low-order-point and algorithm-confusion gates, or a PBMAC1 MAC recomputed from `opts.sharedSecret` and the message's own PBKDF2 parameters and constant-time compared, over the exact `ProtectedPart` reconstructed from the parser's raw slices. It is fail-closed on an unprotected message, a legacy or KEM MAC algorithm, an omitted keyLength, or a SHA-1 PRF, and returns a `{ valid, trusted, protectionType, signer, ... }` verdict. With `opts.trustAnchors` the signer certificate is fully path-validated (RFC 5280 §6.1 plus the RFC 9483 §3.2 `keyUsage.digitalSignature` gate) at a trusted current time, or an explicit `opts.time` for historical verification and never the message's self-asserted `messageTime`, before it is reported trusted; without one the verdict is crypto-only and the signer certificate is surfaced to anchor. `session(opts)` returns a stateful enrollment session whose `enroll(request)` drives a full `ir` / `cr` / `kur` / `p10cr` transaction over the shared transport, composing `build`, `transfer`, and `verify`. Every response is protection-verified, signer-trusted, and bound to the exchange (a stable `transactionID`, a fresh-`senderNonce` and echoed-`recipNonce` chain) before its body is read, with a bounded `pollReq` / `pollRep` loop for a `waiting` status and a `certConf` / `pkiConf` (or implicit) confirmation carrying an explicit `hashAlg` for a signature algorithm that does not convey its hash. It returns a terminal `{ outcome, certificate, chain, status, trusted, confirmed, implicitConfirm, transactionID, polls, transcript }`. A certification authority can take longer to answer than a process is held open, so a `poll-timeout` carries a `resumeToken` and `resumePoll(token)` continues the same transaction in a later process: the token is plain JSON naming the transaction, the nonce the next request echoes, the polled request and the arm its grant arrives on, and the key the grant must certify. It carries no secret and grants nothing, since the protection material and the endpoint come from the session built to resume with, and the resumed poll verifies, nonce-binds, and key-binds every response. Its fields are what the resumed exchange is held to, so store it where the enrollment's own state is stored: someone who can rewrite it can widen what the resumed session accepts, as far as that session's trust anchors and the authority's protection allow and no further. The same session also drives the other two RFC 9483 operations under that shell: `revoke(request)` sends an `rr` naming a certificate as `{ certificate }` or `{ certDetails }` with an optional CRLReason `reason`, and returns `revoked` / `rejected` / `poll-timeout`; `info(request)` sends a `genm` for one of the four support messages — `{ caCerts }`, `{ rootCaCert }`, `{ certReqTemplate }`, `{ crlUpdate }` — and returns `answered` with the decoded `value` and a `present` flag, since an absent response value is how each says nothing is available. A session revokes its own certificate: the signature over the request is the proof of authorization (§4.2), so the named certificate must be `opts.cert` and a PBMAC1 session is refused. The signature flavor requires `opts.trustAnchors` to authenticate the CA; a verified rejection or error and an exhausted poll budget are terminal verdicts, while a tampered, untrusted, or desynchronized response is a typed throw. Returns DER, or a PEM `CMP` block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CmpError`. `openKeyPackage(container, opts)` opens a private key the CA generated centrally and delivered in the `privateKey` field of a granted `CertifiedKeyPair` (RFC 9483 §4.1.6): a CMS `SignedData` over an RFC 5958 `AsymmetricKeyPackage`, sealed in a CMS `EnvelopedData`. `opts.key` (with `opts.cert`) opens the key transport and key agreement containers a signature-protected request selects, `opts.password` the password container a MAC-protected request selects. The authority is authorized before any key material is returned: its certificate must chain to an anchor in `opts.trustAnchors` AND assert the `id-kp-cmKGA` extended key usage, since a certificate with no `extendedKeyUsage` permits every purpose and so authorizes nothing; `opts.authorizedBySharedSecret` states §4.1.6's exemption for an entity that authorizes by the secret that protected its request. Returns `{ keys, kga, trusted }`, where each key is a PKCS#8 `PrivateKeyInfo` ready for `pki.key.import`; `keys` is the whole RFC 5958 `AsymmetricKeyPackage` (`SIZE (1..MAX)`), while a session enrollment requires the sequence of one §4.1.6 profiles it to. Both CMS layers are read as a ContentInfo or as the bare structure, told apart by what the SEQUENCE opens with. `session(opts)` drives the whole exchange under `opts.acceptCentralKeyGeneration`: the request omits `certTemplate.publicKey`, carries no proof of possession, and goes out as `cmp2021`; the session opens the delivered container with the credential it enrolled under and surfaces it as `deliveredKey`, having first checked that the issued certificate certifies the delivered key. Without the option, such a request and such a grant are both refused. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.cmp.parse` — `build`, `transfer`, `wellKnownUrl`, `verify`, `openKeyPackage`, `session` |
-| `pki.crl` | CRL issuance and verification (RFC 5280 §5). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificateList` from a `spec` of `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate`, an optional `crlNumber`, a `revoked` array (each entry a `serialNumber` and `revocationDate` with an optional `reason` or `invalidityDate`), and an optional `extensions` object (authority key identifier, issuing distribution point, delta-CRL indicator, freshest CRL, authority information access) or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER, with an `issuer` of `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the issuer key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. The version is derived from the extension set (v2 when any CRL or entry extension is present, else v1), the outer `signatureAlgorithm` matches `tbsCertList.signature`, an empty revocation list omits the field rather than emitting an empty SEQUENCE, `reasonCode` is an ENUMERATED and `invalidityDate` is always GeneralizedTime, the RFC fixes per-extension criticality, and the produced signature is verified under the issuer key before return. `verify(crl, issuer)` checks a CRL signature through the one path-validation signature engine, algorithm-confusion and EdDSA low-order gates included; handed a certificate rather than a bare key it also asks what only a certificate can answer — that the certificate is the issuer the CRL names, and that its `keyUsage`, when present, asserts `cRLSign` — so a CRL minted under an end-entity certificate of the same CA does not verify as that CA's. `isRevoked(crl, serialNumber, opts)` looks a serial up, and first checks that the CRL is one a serial can be looked up in at all — it is handed a serial and nothing else, so a CRL that speaks for part of its issuer's certificates is refused rather than answered from. A delta CRL lists changes since a base, so an entry recording a release reads as a revocation when read alone; an indirect CRL carries other issuers' entries, whose serials are unrelated to yours; and any other `issuingDistributionPoint` narrows the CRL to one distribution point, one kind of certificate, or a subset of revocation reasons, none of which a serial can be matched against. A CRL speaks for a span as well as a set, so `opts.time` states the instant the question is asked at and a list that has stopped speaking for it — `nextUpdate` passed, `thisUpdate` later, or no `nextUpdate` stated at all — is refused rather than read as a clean bill of health; without `opts.time` the lookup is structural and an absent serial means only that it is not on that list. `pki.path.crlChecker` is the verb for all of them: it is handed the certificate, merges a delta with its base, performs the §6.3.3 correspondence, and decides currency against the material it fetched. Returns DER, or a PEM `X509 CRL` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrlError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crl.parse` — `sign`, `verify`, `isRevoked` |
+| `pki.crl` | CRL issuance and verification (RFC 5280 §5). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificateList` from a `spec` of `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate`, an optional `crlNumber`, a `revoked` array (each entry a `serialNumber` and `revocationDate` with an optional `reason` or `invalidityDate`), and an optional `extensions` object (authority key identifier, issuer alternative name, issuing distribution point, delta-CRL indicator, freshest CRL, authority information access, which is every extension RFC 5280 §5.2 defines) or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER, with an `issuer` of `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the issuer key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. The version is derived from the extension set (v2 when any CRL or entry extension is present, else v1), the outer `signatureAlgorithm` matches `tbsCertList.signature`, an empty revocation list omits the field rather than emitting an empty SEQUENCE, `reasonCode` is an ENUMERATED and `invalidityDate` is always GeneralizedTime, the RFC fixes per-extension criticality, and the produced signature is verified under the issuer key before return. `verify(crl, issuer)` checks a CRL signature through the one path-validation signature engine, algorithm-confusion and EdDSA low-order gates included; handed a certificate rather than a bare key it also asks what only a certificate can answer — that the certificate is the issuer the CRL names, and that its `keyUsage`, when present, asserts `cRLSign` — so a CRL minted under an end-entity certificate of the same CA does not verify as that CA's. `isRevoked(crl, serialNumber, opts)` looks a serial up, and first checks that the CRL is one a serial can be looked up in at all — it is handed a serial and nothing else, so a CRL that speaks for part of its issuer's certificates is refused rather than answered from. A delta CRL lists changes since a base, so an entry recording a release reads as a revocation when read alone; an indirect CRL carries other issuers' entries, whose serials are unrelated to yours; and any other `issuingDistributionPoint` narrows the CRL to one distribution point, one kind of certificate, or a subset of revocation reasons, none of which a serial can be matched against. A CRL speaks for a span as well as a set, so `opts.time` states the instant the question is asked at and a list that has stopped speaking for it — `nextUpdate` passed, `thisUpdate` later, or no `nextUpdate` stated at all — is refused rather than read as a clean bill of health; without `opts.time` the lookup is structural and an absent serial means only that it is not on that list. `pki.path.crlChecker` is the verb for all of them: it is handed the certificate, merges a delta with its base, performs the §6.3.3 correspondence, and decides currency against the material it fetched. Returns DER, or a PEM `X509 CRL` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrlError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crl.parse` — `sign`, `verify`, `isRevoked` |
 | `pki.key` | Key-material lifecycle (RFC 5958 / RFC 8018). `encrypt(privateKey, password, opts)` wraps a PKCS#8 private key (DER, PEM, or an extractable `CryptoKey`) into an `EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo` under PBES2 (PBKDF2 with AES-CBC-Pad), where `opts` selects the `cipher` (`aes-256-cbc` default, `aes-192-cbc`, `aes-128-cbc`), the `prf` (`hmacWithSHA256` default, SHA-384/512, SHA-1), the `iterations` (default 600000), and the `salt`. The plaintext is validated as PKCS#8 before encryption, a default `prf` and `keyLength` are omitted so the parameters are byte-exact with OpenSSL, and the output is re-parsed before return. `decrypt(encrypted, password, opts)` recovers the inner `PrivateKeyInfo`, re-validated through `pki.schema.pkcs8.parse`: only PBES2 / PBKDF2 / AES-CBC is accepted (PBES1, PBMAC1, and scrypt are refused), the salt and iteration count are bounded before any derivation (`opts.maxIterations` lowers the cap), and a malformed parameter set or wrong-length IV is a distinct typed error. Because a MAC-less PBES2-CBC decrypt must not become a padding oracle (RFC 8018 §8), a wrong password and a valid-pad-but-not-a-key both surface the one uniform `key/decrypt-failed`. `export(key, opts)` and `import(input, opts)` move a private key as PKCS#8 or a public key as SubjectPublicKeyInfo. The key may come from the platform's WebCrypto or from a separately installed copy of this toolkit, and is exported through whichever holds its material; a non-extractable key, or one whose implementation keeps its material out of reach, is refused with that as the reason. Encoding is delegated to WebCrypto, so RSA carries an explicit NULL, EC a named curve, and Ed25519/Ed448/X25519/X448 omit parameters, and an ambiguous RSA or EC import requires `opts.algorithm`. `generate(algorithm, opts)` produces a key pair over RSA, ECDSA/ECDH, the Edwards and Montgomery curves, and the FIPS post-quantum ML-DSA and ML-KEM; `publicFromPrivate(privateKey)` derives the public key. Returns DER or PEM, with a typed `KeyError` on failure. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs8.parse` — `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `export`, `import`, `generate`, `publicFromPrivate` |
 | `pki.pkcs12` | PKCS#12 (.p12/.pfx) issuance and reading (RFC 7292 / RFC 9579). `build(spec, opts)` assembles a store from the OpenSSL-style `{ key, cert, ca?, friendlyName?, localKeyId? }` or the full `{ safeContents: [...] }`, where each element is a plaintext or PBES2-encrypted `SafeContents` of key, shroudedKey, cert, crl, secret, or nested `safeContents` bags. Keys and certs are validated before wrapping, and `friendlyName` (BMPString) and `localKeyId` are single-value. Integrity is a classic Appendix B HMAC (the default, for maximum interoperability) or an RFC 9579 PBMAC1 (`opts.mac.algorithm`) over SHA-256/384/512, with shrouded keys and cert safes encrypted under RFC 8018 PBES2 (AES-128/192/256-CBC). Every password is encoded the PKCS#12 way — BMPString+NULL for the classic MAC, UTF-8 for the PBES2 bags and PBMAC1 — which is what OpenSSL and NSS consume, so a file it emits opens in both, cross-checked bidirectionally. The MAC covers the exact AuthenticatedSafe byte range, a DEFAULT-1 `MacData.iterations` is rejected up front, and the store is re-parsed before return. `verifyMac(pfx, password, opts)` recomputes a classic or PBMAC1 MAC over `macedBytes` and constant-time-compares it, throwing on a MAC-less or public-key-integrity store. Public-key integrity (`opts.integrity.mode: "public-key"`) wraps the AuthenticatedSafe in a CMS SignedData instead of a MAC, signed by any `pki.cms.sign` signer and carrying no MacData (§4); privacy stays independent, so `password` still PBES2-encrypts the bags. Public-key privacy wraps a SafeContents as a CMS EnvelopedData (AES-CBC, `id-envelopedData`, never GCM) encrypted to recipient public keys through the `pki.cms.encrypt` recipient model, via per-safe `recipients` or the `opts.recipientCerts` convenience, restricted to certificate recipients (RSA-OAEP, ECDH, X25519, X448, ML-KEM) since a password or KEK recipient could not be reopened by `open`. All four integrity-by-privacy combinations are permitted (§3.1). `open(pfx, password, opts)` reads a store back: it verifies the MAC first, so a wrong password is the MAC verdict rather than a decrypt error, then PBES2-decrypts every privacy safe and shrouded key bag and returns `{ integrityMode, macVerified, signers, keys, certs, crls, secrets }` — keys as re-validated PKCS#8 DER, certs, CRLs and secrets as raw DER, all with `friendlyName` and `localKeyId`, nested safes recursively. A MAC-less store is refused unless `opts.allowUnauthenticated`. A public-key-integrity store is verified through its CMS SignedData signature first (`pkcs12/signature-invalid` on failure), with the signer surfaced in `signers` but never trust-chained, which remains the caller's `pki.path.validate` step. A legacy-PBE store's Appendix C 3DES and RC2 bags are decrypted, RC2 through an in-tree RFC 2268 cipher, so an `openssl pkcs12 -legacy` or NSS store opens; the legacy RC4 schemes are refused. An `id-envelopedData` safe is decrypted with `opts.recipientKey` after the integrity gate (`pkcs12/no-recipient-key` when absent), every recipient-side fault and every post-integrity decrypt failure collapsing to the uniform `pkcs12/decrypt-failed`, and `opts.keys: 'crypto'` imports each key to a `CryptoKey`. It reads what OpenSSL and NSS produce. Returns DER or a PEM `PKCS12`, with a typed `Pkcs12Error` on failure. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs12.parse` — `build`, `verifyMac`, `open` |
 | `pki.cms` | CMS signing, verification, encryption, and compression (RFC 5652). `sign(content, signers, opts)` produces a SignedData (§5), attached or detached, with one or many signers over RSA, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, EdDSA, the post-quantum ML-DSA-44/65/87 (RFC 9882) and SLH-DSA (all twelve FIPS 205 sets, RFC 9814), and composite ML-DSA pairing ML-DSA with a traditional RSA, ECDSA, or EdDSA key (accepted only when both components verify, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs). It builds the signed attributes (content-type, message-digest, signing-time) as canonical DER, signs the exact §5.4 preimage, and emits a DER `Buffer` or PEM. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, which signs a large detached payload without holding it in memory: the payload is hashed incrementally under every signer's digest algorithm in one pass, and `verify` accepts the same streamed form as its `content` option. A signer may also be key-only — `{ key, spki, keyIdentifier }` with no certificate — which RFC 5272 §3.2 requires when a Full PKI Request's signer is the key of a certification request that request carries: the signer identifier takes the subjectKeyIdentifier form carrying the identifier the request declares, the signature scheme resolves from the request's own public key, and no certificate is embedded. `verify(input, opts)` parses a SignedData over the strict `pki.schema.cms` codec, locates each SignerInfo's signer certificate by its issuerAndSerialNumber or subjectKeyIdentifier, and checks the signature over the exact §5.4 preimage: with signed attributes present it confirms the message-digest attribute equals the content digest and verifies over the DER re-encoding of the SignedAttributes (the on-wire `[0]` tag replaced by a universal SET OF), and otherwise directly over the content. It returns a per-signer verdict with the matched signer certificate. `valid` and `trusted` are separate claims and neither implies the other: a SignedData carries its own certificates, so `valid` says the signature is sound under one of them and nothing about who signed, while `trusted` says every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`, validated through the same RFC 5280 path engine `pki.path.validate` uses. Without anchors there is nothing to chain to and `trusted` is `false`; anchors that cannot be read throw, rather than reading as untrusted. An unrecognized option is refused rather than ignored. `countersign(cms, signers, opts)` adds a countersignature (§11.4) — a `SignerInfo` over the countersigned SignerInfo's signature value, any signer algorithm, nestable, with the primary bytes preserved so it still verifies — attached as the id-countersignature unsigned attribute; `verify` returns each countersignature's verdict under `signers[i].countersignatures` and every unsigned attribute — including an RFC 3161 timestamp token, attachable via `sign`'s `unsignedAttributes` — under `signers[i].unsignedAttrs`, surfaced unauthenticated. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` produces an EnvelopedData, AuthEnvelopedData (AES-GCM, the authenticated default), or EncryptedData, with recipients auto-dispatched off the certificate key to key transport (RSAES-OAEP; v1.5 is never emitted), key agreement (ephemeral-static ECDH over P-256/384/521 with the X9.63 KDF, and X25519/X448 with HKDF), symmetric key wrap, password (PBKDF2 with RFC 3211 PWRI-KEK), or the post-quantum ML-KEM (and composite ML-KEM, draft-lamps-pq-composite-kem) KEMRecipientInfo (RFC 9629/9936), wrapping one fresh content key for every recipient. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, streamed through the AES-GCM or AES-CBC content cipher so a large plaintext is encrypted without being buffered whole; the ciphertext is assembled before the definite-length encryptedContent is emitted, byte-for-byte the buffered form. `decrypt(input, keyMaterial, opts)` recovers the content through the matching arm and returns it with an `authenticated` flag; every secret-dependent failure collapses to one uniform `cms/decrypt-failed` verdict (Bleichenbacher, EFAIL, and password-oracle freedom), and PKCS#1 v1.5 is decrypt-only under the RFC 3218 implicit-rejection countermeasure. With `opts.stream: true` the recovered `content` is an async iterable of plaintext chunks instead of a single Buffer, for a payload too large to hold whole; the authenticated modes (AuthEnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, AES-GCM) verify integrity before the iterable yields, so a forged message throws before any plaintext is exposed, while a CBC EnvelopedData or EncryptedData yields the plaintext as the cipher produces it. Every key-establishment secret the toolkit allocates is wiped once used, on the failing path as well as the succeeding one: the KEM shared secret and its derived key-encryption key, the raw ECDH / X25519 / X448 agreement secret, a password-derived key-encryption key, and the content-encryption key itself, cleared once the message is complete since all recipients share it. Caller-supplied key material is never written to (best-effort; NIST SP 800-227 §4.2, RFC 9629 §7). `authenticate(content, recipients, opts)` produces an `id-ct-authData` (§9): cleartext content plus an HMAC-SHA-256/384/512 MAC, authenticated but not encrypted, with the fresh MAC key wrapped for every recipient through the same RecipientInfo model. The MAC covers the authenticated attributes (content-type and message-digest) re-tagged to the EXPLICIT SET OF (§9.2), or the content octets directly; `decrypt` recovers the MAC key, recomputes the MAC and independently the message-digest (§9.3), and releases the content only after both pass, with every secret-dependent failure collapsing to the uniform `cms/decrypt-failed`. `compress(content, opts)` and `decompress(input, opts)` produce and consume a CompressedData (RFC 3274; ZLIB, version 0, id-alg-zlibCompress); decompress bounds the uncompressed output at 16 MiB and stops before it is materialized, so a decompression bomb fails closed as `cms/decompress-too-large`. Compression is a size transform with no integrity or confidentiality (RFC 8551 §2.4.5). `certsOnly(certs, opts?)` builds a certs-only certificate-management message (RFC 8551 §3.8): a degenerate SignedData with an empty signerInfos and no eContent that conveys certificates and CRLs without signing anything, `parseCertsOnly(input, opts?)` reads one back to its raw certificate and CRL DER (a CRL-only message is valid here, unlike the cert-required RFC 5272 form that `pki.est.parseCertsOnly` reads), and `isCertsOnly(input)` recognizes one structurally. Fail-closed with typed `cms/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `countersign`, `encrypt`, `authenticate`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress`, `certsOnly`, `parseCertsOnly`, `isCertsOnly` |

package/lib/constants.js

@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ var NAMES = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
     issuingDistributionPoint: "X509v3 Issuing Distribution Point", cRLReason: "X509v3 CRL Reason Code",
     invalidityDate: "Invalidity Date", certificateIssuer: "X509v3 Certificate Issuer",
     signedCertificateTimestampList: "CT Precertificate SCTs", precertificatePoison: "CT Precertificate Poison",
+    subjectDirectoryAttributes: "X509v3 Subject Directory Attributes", ocspNoCheck: "OCSP No Check",
   },
   KEY_USAGE: {
     digitalSignature: "Digital Signature", nonRepudiation: "Non Repudiation", keyEncipherment: "Key Encipherment",

package/lib/crl-sign.js

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ var CRL_REASON = constants.NAMES.CRL_REASON;
 var REASON_BY_NAME = intrinsic.create(null);
 Object.keys(CRL_REASON).forEach(function (v) { REASON_BY_NAME[CRL_REASON[v]] = Number(v); });
 
-var KNOWN_CRL_EXT_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { authorityKeyIdentifier: 1, issuingDistributionPoint: 1, deltaCRLIndicator: 1, freshestCRL: 1, authorityInfoAccess: 1 });
+var KNOWN_CRL_EXT_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { authorityKeyIdentifier: 1, issuerAltName: 1, issuingDistributionPoint: 1, deltaCRLIndicator: 1, freshestCRL: 1, authorityInfoAccess: 1 });
 var KNOWN_SPEC_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   issuer: 1, thisUpdate: 1, nextUpdate: 1, revoked: 1, crlNumber: 1, extensions: 1,
 });
@@ -259,6 +259,9 @@ function _buildCrlExtensions(spec, ctx) {
   });
   isDelta = ext.deltaCRLIndicator != null;
   if (ext.authorityKeyIdentifier != null) push("authorityKeyIdentifier", false, _extAki(_akiKeyId(ext.authorityKeyIdentifier, ctx)));
+  /** @internal Sec. 5.2.2 takes the OID and syntax from sec. 4.2.1.7, so this is the certificate's
+   *  own GeneralNames encoder, and states a SHOULD for non-critical, which is the form emitted. */
+  if (ext.issuerAltName != null) push("issuerAltName", false, _b.encodeGeneralNames(_b.reqDenseArray(ext.issuerAltName, "issuerAltName")));
   if (ext.issuingDistributionPoint != null) push("issuingDistributionPoint", true, _idpValue(ext.issuingDistributionPoint));
   if (ext.deltaCRLIndicator != null) {
     var base = _boundedInteger(ext.deltaCRLIndicator, "deltaCRLIndicator baseCRLNumber");
@@ -438,8 +441,11 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
  * Build, sign, and DER-encode an X.509 certificate revocation list. `spec` describes the CRL:
  * `thisUpdate` / `nextUpdate` (`Date`s), an optional `crlNumber`, a `revoked` array (each entry a
  * `serialNumber` + `revocationDate` with an optional `reason` or `invalidityDate`),
- * and an optional `extensions` object (`authorityKeyIdentifier`, `issuingDistributionPoint`,
- * `deltaCRLIndicator`, `freshestCRL`, `authorityInfoAccess`) or an array of pre-encoded `Extension` DER.
+ * and an optional `extensions` object (`authorityKeyIdentifier`, `issuerAltName`,
+ * `issuingDistributionPoint`, `deltaCRLIndicator`, `freshestCRL`, `authorityInfoAccess`) or an array
+ * of pre-encoded `Extension` DER. `issuerAltName` takes the same GeneralName list the certificate
+ * extension takes, since RFC 5280 sec. 5.2.2 defines its OID and syntax by reference to sec. 4.2.1.7,
+ * and is emitted non-critical as that section says a conforming CRL issuer should.
  * `issuer` is the signing side: `{ cert, key }` takes the issuer DN + SPKI from a CA certificate;
  * `{ name, publicKey, key }` (or `spec.issuer` + `{ publicKey, key }`) supplies them explicitly. The
  * signature algorithm is resolved from the signing key, so every algorithm the toolkit signs with (RSA

package/lib/inspect.js

@@ -301,7 +301,10 @@ var EXT_RENDERERS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
   cRLDistributionPoints: _renderCrlDp,
   freshestCRL: _renderCrlDp,
   authorityInfoAccess: function (decoded, inner) {
-    var LABEL = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { caIssuers: "CA Issuers", ocsp: "OCSP" });
+    var LABEL = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
+      caIssuers: "CA Issuers", ocsp: "OCSP",
+      "id-ad-caRepository": "CA Repository", "id-ad-timeStamping": "Time Stamping",
+    });
     return (decoded || []).map(function (ad) {
       var m = null;
       try { m = oid.name(ad.accessMethod); } catch (_e) { /* allow:swallow-unverified display best-effort: an unregistered accessMethod OID falls back to the raw dotted OID below (inspection is best-effort, never a verdict) */ }
@@ -352,6 +355,22 @@ var EXT_RENDERERS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
   precertificatePoison: function (decoded, inner) {
     return inner + "Precertificate Poison (this is a precertificate, not a certificate)";
   },
+  /** @internal RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.2 gives subjectInfoAccess sec. 4.2.2.1's AccessDescription
+   *  syntax, so it renders through the same rows; only the access methods it names differ. */
+  subjectInfoAccess: function (decoded, inner) {
+    return EXT_RENDERERS.authorityInfoAccess(decoded, inner);
+  },
+  /** @internal Each Attribute value is raw DER, so it renders through the same best-effort value
+   *  fallback every other opaque value uses rather than a second reading of the same bytes. */
+  subjectDirectoryAttributes: function (decoded, inner) {
+    return (decoded || []).map(function (a) {
+      var lines = (a.values || []).map(function (v) { return _fallback(v, inner + "    "); });
+      return inner + (a.name || a.type) + ":" + (lines.length ? "\n" + lines.join("\n") : "");
+    }).join("\n");
+  },
+  ocspNoCheck: function (decoded, inner) {
+    return inner + "OCSP No Check (this is an OCSP responder certificate; do not check its revocation)";
+  },
   subjectKeyIdentifier: function (decoded, inner) {
     return inner + _hexColon(Buffer.isBuffer(decoded) ? decoded : (decoded.bytes || Buffer.alloc(0)), { upper: true });
   },

package/lib/ocsp-verify.js

@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ function ocspKeyValue(spkiDer) {
 function makeOcspVerify(deps) {
   var verifyWithSpki = deps.verifyWithSpki;
   var decodeExt = deps.decodeExt;
-  var findExt = deps.findExt;
   var unrecognizedCriticalExtension = deps.unrecognizedCriticalExtension;
   var validateCriticalExtensionStructure = deps.validateCriticalExtensionStructure;
   var compositeKeyUsageCheck = deps.compositeKeyUsageCheck;
@@ -112,7 +111,14 @@ function makeOcspVerify(deps) {
       if (ku && ku.value.digitalSignature !== true) continue;
       if (unrecognizedCriticalExtension(rc, false)) continue;
       if (validateCriticalExtensionStructure(rc)) continue;
-      if (!findExt(rc, OID_OCSP_NOCHECK)) continue;
+      /** @internal RFC 6960 sec. 4.2.2.2.1 gives this extension a value that SHALL be NULL, and its
+       *  presence is what lets a client stop asking whether the responder itself is revoked. A
+       *  malformed value is not that marker, so this decodes the extension, as the key usage and
+       *  extended key usage checks above do. */
+      var noCheck;
+      try { noCheck = decodeExt(rc, OID_OCSP_NOCHECK); }
+      catch (_e) { continue; }
+      if (!noCheck) continue;
       if (compositeSig.COMPOSITE_ALGS[rc.subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.oid] && !compositeKeyUsageCheck(rc).ok) continue;
       return ocspResponderSpki(rc, issuer);
     }

package/lib/pki-build.js

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ var _isArray = intrinsic.isArray;
 var _bufferFrom = intrinsic.bufferFrom;
 var _bufferEquals = intrinsic.bufferEquals;
 var oid = require("./oid");
+var C = require("./constants");
 var pkix = require("./schema-pkix");
 var ipUtils = require("./ip-utils");
 var _packIpLiteral = ipUtils.packIpLiteral;
@@ -274,6 +275,7 @@ var AKI_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { keyIdentifier: 1, auth
  *  are proprietary, so the toolkit's own readers in schema-pkix define the shape the builder emits. */
 var MS_TEMPLATE_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { templateID: 1, templateMajorVersion: 1, templateMinorVersion: 1 });
 var MS_CA_VERSION_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { caKeyIndex: 1, certIndex: 1 });
+var SDA_ATTR_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { type: 1, values: 1 });
 /** @internal The fields each typed statementInfo defines, by statement id. A key outside its
  *  statement's set is refused rather than ignored: a misspelled field would otherwise be dropped and
  *  the certificate would carry a statement the caller did not write. */
@@ -735,13 +737,16 @@ function makeBuilder(ctx) {
   }
   /** @internal AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.1): SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
    *  AccessDescription { accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER, accessLocation GeneralName }. */
-  function extAuthorityInfoAccess(list) {
+  /** @internal Sec. 4.2.2.1 and sec. 4.2.2.2 define the same SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
+   *  AccessDescription, so one encoder serves both and is told which structure it is writing: a fault
+   *  in a subjectInfoAccess must not be reported against authorityInfoAccess. */
+  function extAccessDescriptions(list, label, clause) {
     if (!_isArray(list) || !list.length) {
-      throw E("bad-input", "authorityInfoAccess must name at least one { accessMethod, accessLocation } (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.1)");
+      throw E("bad-input", label + " must name at least one { accessMethod, accessLocation } (" + clause + ")");
     }
-    var dense = reqDenseArray(list, "authorityInfoAccess");
+    var dense = reqDenseArray(list, label);
     return b.sequence(_mapIntrinsic(dense, function (d, i) {
-      var who = "authorityInfoAccess entry " + i;
+      var who = label + " entry " + i;
       if (!d || typeof d !== "object" || _isArray(d) || _isBufferChk(d)) {
         throw E("bad-input", who + " must be an object { accessMethod, accessLocation }");
       }
@@ -758,6 +763,41 @@ function makeBuilder(ctx) {
       return b.sequence([b.oid(_resolveOid(d.accessMethod, who + " accessMethod")), encodeGeneralName(d.accessLocation)]);
     }));
   }
+  function extAuthorityInfoAccess(list) {
+    return extAccessDescriptions(list, "authorityInfoAccess", "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.1");
+  }
+  function extSubjectInfoAccess(list) {
+    return extAccessDescriptions(list, "subjectInfoAccess", "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.2");
+  }
+  /** @internal SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute (RFC 5280
+   *  sec. 4.2.1.8). The reader surfaces each value as its raw DER, so the spec supplies it the same
+   *  way and the two directions describe one structure. */
+  function extSubjectDirectoryAttributes(list) {
+    if (!_isArray(list) || !list.length) {
+      throw E("bad-input", "subjectDirectoryAttributes must name at least one { type, values } (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.8)");
+    }
+    var dense = reqDenseArray(list, "subjectDirectoryAttributes");
+    return b.sequence(_mapIntrinsic(dense, function (a, i) {
+      var who = "subjectDirectoryAttributes entry " + i;
+      if (!a || typeof a !== "object" || _isArray(a) || _isBufferChk(a)) {
+        throw E("bad-input", who + " must be an object { type, values }");
+      }
+      guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(a, SDA_ATTR_KEYS, E, "bad-input", function (k) {
+        return "unknown " + who + " field " + _stringify(k) + " (accepted: type, values)";
+      });
+      if (!_isArray(a.values) || !a.values.length) throw E("bad-input", who + " requires a non-empty values array of pre-encoded DER");
+      /** @internal The reader caps an Attribute's values, so the writer is held to the same ceiling
+       *  and cannot emit an attribute this toolkit's own decoder refuses. */
+      if (a.values.length > C.LIMITS.ATTRIBUTE_MAX_VALUES) {
+        throw E("bad-input", who + " carries " + a.values.length + " values, exceeding the " + C.LIMITS.ATTRIBUTE_MAX_VALUES + " an Attribute may hold");
+      }
+      var vals = _mapIntrinsic(reqDenseArray(a.values, who + " values"), function (v, j) {
+        return b.raw(guard.der.tlv(guard.bytes.source(v, ErrorClass, ctx.prefix + "/bad-input", who + " value " + j),
+          rawErr, ctx.prefix + "/bad-input", who + " value " + j));
+      });
+      return b.sequence([b.oid(_resolveOid(a.type, who + " type")), b.set(vals)]);
+    }));
+  }
   /** @internal One DistributionPoint (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.13). distributionPoint [0] wraps a
    *  DistributionPointName whose fullName is [0] IMPLICIT GeneralNames; reasons is [1] IMPLICIT
    *  ReasonFlags; cRLIssuer is [2] IMPLICIT GeneralNames. A DistributionPoint must not consist of
@@ -1206,6 +1246,7 @@ function makeBuilder(ctx) {
     extKeyUsage: extKeyUsage, extExtKeyUsage: extExtKeyUsage, validateBcSpec: validateBcSpec,
     extBasicConstraints: extBasicConstraints, pathLen: pathLen, extSki: extSki, extAki: extAki, AKI_KEYS: AKI_KEYS,
     extSan: extSan, extCertPolicies: extCertPolicies, ext: ext,
+    extSubjectInfoAccess: extSubjectInfoAccess, extSubjectDirectoryAttributes: extSubjectDirectoryAttributes,
     extMsCertificateTemplate: extMsCertificateTemplate, extMsCaVersion: extMsCaVersion,
     extMsPreviousCertHash: extMsPreviousCertHash, extMsEnrollCertType: extMsEnrollCertType,
     spkiKeyId: spkiKeyId, skiKeyId: skiKeyId,

package/lib/schema-pkix.js

@@ -942,14 +942,17 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     return schema.walk(generalNames(ns, { decodeValue: true, code: C }), n, ns).result;
   }
 
-  function authorityInfoAccess(buf) {
+  /** @internal Sec. 4.2.2.1 and sec. 4.2.2.2 define the same SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
+   *  AccessDescription, so one reader serves both and takes the structure's own name and clause: a
+   *  fault in a SubjectInfoAccess must not be reported against AuthorityInfoAccess. */
+  function accessDescriptions(buf, what, clause) {
     var C = ns.prefix + "/bad-extension-value";
-    var descs = seqChildren(buf, C, "AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax");
-    if (descs.length < 1) throw ns.E(C, "AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax must contain at least one AccessDescription (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.1, SIZE(1..MAX))");
+    var descs = seqChildren(buf, C, what);
+    if (descs.length < 1) throw ns.E(C, what + " must contain at least one AccessDescription (" + clause + ", SIZE(1..MAX))");
     var GN = generalName(ns, { decodeValue: true, code: C });
     return _map(descs, function (d) {
       if (d.tagClass !== "universal" || d.tagNumber !== _T.SEQUENCE || !d.children || d.children.length !== 2) {
-        throw ns.E(C, "AccessDescription must be a SEQUENCE { accessMethod, accessLocation } (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.1)");
+        throw ns.E(C, "AccessDescription must be a SEQUENCE { accessMethod, accessLocation } (" + clause + ")");
       }
       var method;
       try { method = asn1.read.oid(d.children[0]); }
@@ -958,6 +961,36 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
       return { accessMethod: method, accessLocation: { tag: loc.tagNumber, value: loc.value } };
     });
   }
+  function authorityInfoAccess(buf) {
+    return accessDescriptions(buf, "AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax", "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.1");
+  }
+  function subjectInfoAccess(buf) {
+    return accessDescriptions(buf, "SubjectInfoAccessSyntax", "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.2");
+  }
+
+  /** @internal SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
+   *  (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.8), read through the shared Attribute sub-schema. */
+  function subjectDirectoryAttributes(buf) {
+    var C = ns.prefix + "/bad-extension-value";
+    var kids = seqChildren(buf, C, "SubjectDirectoryAttributes");
+    if (kids.length < 1) throw ns.E(C, "SubjectDirectoryAttributes must contain at least one Attribute (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.8, SIZE(1..MAX))");
+    var A = attribute(ns);
+    return _map(kids, function (k) {
+      try { return schema.walk(A, k, ns).result; }
+      catch (e) { throw ns.E(C, "SubjectDirectoryAttributes member must be an Attribute SEQUENCE { type, values } (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.8)", e); }
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** @internal RFC 6960 sec. 4.2.2.2.1: "The value of the extension SHALL be NULL." The extension is
+   *  a marker, so a successful read carries no value and anything other than a bare NULL is refused. */
+  function ocspNoCheck(buf) {
+    var C = ns.prefix + "/bad-extension-value";
+    var n = decodeTop(buf, C, "OCSPNoCheck");
+    if (n.tagClass !== "universal" || n.tagNumber !== _T.NULL || n.length !== 0) {
+      throw ns.E(C, "the ocspNoCheck extension value SHALL be NULL (RFC 6960 sec. 4.2.2.2.1)");
+    }
+    return null;
+  }
 
   function extKeyUsage(buf) {
     var C = ns.prefix + "/bad-extension-value";
@@ -1203,6 +1236,9 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
   byOid[O("cRLDistributionPoints")] = crlDistributionPoints;
   byOid[O("freshestCRL")] = crlDistributionPoints;
   byOid[O("authorityInfoAccess")] = authorityInfoAccess;
+  byOid[O("subjectInfoAccess")] = subjectInfoAccess;
+  byOid[O("subjectDirectoryAttributes")] = subjectDirectoryAttributes;
+  byOid[O("ocspNoCheck")] = ocspNoCheck;
   byOid[O("msCertificateTemplate")] = msCertificateTemplate;
   byOid[O("msEnrollCertType")] = msEnrollCertType;
   byOid[O("msCaVersion")] = msCaVersion;

package/lib/x509-sign.js

@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ var KNOWN_EXT_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   precertificatePoison: 1, signedCertificateTimestampList: 1,
   msCertificateTemplate: 1, msEnrollCertType: 1, msCaVersion: 1, msPreviousCertHash: 1,
   msApplicationPolicies: 1,
+  subjectInfoAccess: 1, subjectDirectoryAttributes: 1, ocspNoCheck: 1,
 });
 
 var _b = pkiBuild.makeBuilder({ ErrorClass: CertificateError, prefix: "x509", O: O, NS: NS, NAME_SCHEMA: NAME_SCHEMA, SPKI_SCHEMA: SPKI_SCHEMA, EXT_DECODERS: EXT_DECODERS });
@@ -232,6 +233,16 @@ function _buildExtensions(extSpec, ctx) {
   if (extSpec.msCaVersion != null) guard.list.append(out, _ext(O("msCaVersion"), false, _b.extMsCaVersion(extSpec.msCaVersion)));
   if (extSpec.msPreviousCertHash != null) guard.list.append(out, _ext(O("msPreviousCertHash"), false, _b.extMsPreviousCertHash(extSpec.msPreviousCertHash)));
   if (extSpec.msApplicationPolicies != null) guard.list.append(out, _ext(O("msApplicationPolicies"), false, _extCertPolicies(extSpec.msApplicationPolicies)));
+  /** @internal Sections 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.1.8 both require a conforming CA to mark these non-critical,
+   *  which `assertCertCriticality` also holds the pre-encoded form to. */
+  if (extSpec.subjectInfoAccess != null) guard.list.append(out, _ext(O("subjectInfoAccess"), false, _b.extSubjectInfoAccess(extSpec.subjectInfoAccess)));
+  if (extSpec.subjectDirectoryAttributes != null) guard.list.append(out, _ext(O("subjectDirectoryAttributes"), false, _b.extSubjectDirectoryAttributes(extSpec.subjectDirectoryAttributes)));
+  /** @internal RFC 6960 sec. 4.2.2.2.1 marks an OCSP responder certificate so a client does not ask
+   *  about its revocation: the value SHALL be NULL, and the section says it should be non-critical. */
+  if (extSpec.ocspNoCheck != null) {
+    if (extSpec.ocspNoCheck !== true) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "ocspNoCheck is a flag, so it is true or omitted");
+    guard.list.append(out, _ext(O("ocspNoCheck"), false, asn1.build.nullValue()));
+  }
   return out;
 }
 
@@ -400,6 +411,16 @@ function _hasCriticalSan(extSpec) {
  * know an unknown syntax. `pki.path.validate` does not process this extension, so it is emitted
  * non-critical unless `qcStatementsCritical` is set.
  *
+ * `extensions.subjectInfoAccess` takes the same `{ accessMethod, accessLocation }` list
+ * `authorityInfoAccess` takes, since RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.2 gives it sec. 4.2.2.1's syntax; the two
+ * access methods that section defines are the registered names `id-ad-caRepository` and
+ * `id-ad-timeStamping`, the latter being a different OID from the extended-key-usage `timeStamping`.
+ * `extensions.subjectDirectoryAttributes` takes a list of `{ type, values }` with each value as
+ * pre-encoded DER, the form its reader surfaces (sec. 4.2.1.8). Both are emitted non-critical, which
+ * those sections require. `extensions.ocspNoCheck: true` marks an OCSP responder certificate so a
+ * client does not ask about its revocation (RFC 6960 sec. 4.2.2.2.1): the value is NULL, as that
+ * section requires, and it is emitted non-critical, which the section says it should be.
+ *
  * The Active Directory Certificate Services enrollment extensions are written from the same spec.
  * `extensions.msCertificateTemplate` takes `{ templateID, templateMajorVersion, templateMinorVersion }`,
  * the versions optional and each a DWORD, a minor version requiring a major one;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.7.21",
+  "version": "0.7.23",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:8e02ed72-83e4-47e8-a838-add75caacb27",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:d0937d40-1cca-4e77-9a29-1835e7a8ae04",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-09-11T18:14:13.702Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-09-12T00:20:25.960Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.21",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.23",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.7.21",
+      "version": "0.7.23",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.7.21",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.7.23",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.21",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.23",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]