@blamejs/pki 0.7.12 → 0.7.13

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,18 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.7.13 — 2026-09-10
+
+The certificate signer refuses a pre-encoded extension whose criticality RFC 5280 fixes.
+
+### Changed
+
+- A call that supplied one of the nine fixed-criticality extensions with the wrong flag now throws where it previously produced a certificate or a request. Set the flag the clause requires: omit the critical BOOLEAN for the non-critical set, and encode it TRUE for the critical set. The extensions and extensionRequest object forms already emitted the correct flag and are unaffected, as are the CRL and attribute-certificate signers, which enforce the criticality their own profiles fix.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- pki.x509.sign and pki.csr.sign now refuse a pre-encoded extension carrying a criticality RFC 5280 does not permit, throwing x509/bad-input or csr/bad-input with the governing clause in the message. Nine extensions leave the issuer no choice. authorityKeyIdentifier (section 4.2.1.1), subjectKeyIdentifier (section 4.2.1.2), subjectDirectoryAttributes (section 4.2.1.8), freshestCRL (section 4.2.1.15), authorityInfoAccess (section 4.2.2.1) and subjectInfoAccess (section 4.2.2.2) must be non-critical. nameConstraints (section 4.2.1.10), policyConstraints (section 4.2.1.11) and inhibitAnyPolicy (section 4.2.1.14) must be critical. The check covers the pre-encoded array form on both verbs, which is the only way to supply these six extensions.
+
 ## v0.7.12 — 2026-09-10
 
 An issuer can draw a certificate serial number before signing with it.

package/lib/pki-build.js

@@ -273,6 +273,17 @@ function reqDenseArrayImpl(list, what, E, code) {
   return out;
 }
 
+/** @internal RFC 5280 sec. 4.2 fixes the criticality of these certificate extensions. Each entry maps
+ *  the extension OID to the flag the RFC requires and the clause that sets it. */
+var CERT_FIXED_CRITICALITY = intrinsic.create(null);
+[["authorityKeyIdentifier", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.1"], ["subjectKeyIdentifier", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.2"],
+  ["subjectDirectoryAttributes", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.8"], ["nameConstraints", true, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.10"],
+  ["policyConstraints", true, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.11"], ["inhibitAnyPolicy", true, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.14"],
+  ["freshestCRL", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.15"], ["authorityInfoAccess", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.1"],
+  ["subjectInfoAccess", false, "RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.2"]].forEach(function (r) {
+  CERT_FIXED_CRITICALITY[oid.byName(r[0])] = { critical: r[1], citation: r[2] };
+});
+
 function makeBuilder(ctx) {
   var ErrorClass = ctx.ErrorClass, O = ctx.O, NS = ctx.NS;
   var NAME_SCHEMA = ctx.NAME_SCHEMA, SPKI_SCHEMA = ctx.SPKI_SCHEMA;
@@ -498,6 +509,15 @@ function makeBuilder(ctx) {
     var last = n.children[n.children.length - 1];
     if (last.tagNumber !== asn1.TAGS.OCTET_STRING || last.tagClass !== "universal") throw E("bad-input", "pre-encoded extension [" + idx + "] extnValue must be an OCTET STRING");
   }
+  /** @internal Applies the certificate profile's fixed-criticality table. The CRL, CRL-entry and
+   *  attribute-certificate profiles set their own criticality in their own signers. */
+  function assertCertCriticality(extnId, isCritical, label) {
+    if (!intrinsic.hasOwn(CERT_FIXED_CRITICALITY, extnId)) return;
+    var req = CERT_FIXED_CRITICALITY[extnId];
+    if (isCritical === req.critical) return;
+    throw E("bad-input", label + " " + (oid.name(extnId) || extnId) + " extension must be marked " +
+      (req.critical ? "critical" : "non-critical") + " (" + req.citation + ")");
+  }
   var BC_KEYS = { cA: 1, pathLen: 1, critical: 1 };
   var REQ_EXT_KEYS = {
     subjectAltName: 1, keyUsage: 1, keyUsageCritical: 1, extendedKeyUsage: 1, extendedKeyUsageCritical: 1,
@@ -515,6 +535,7 @@ function makeBuilder(ctx) {
         var extnId = asn1.read.oid(n.children[0]);
         if (seen[extnId]) throw E("bad-input", "duplicate requested extension " + extnId + " (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2)");
         seen[extnId] = true;
+        assertCertCriticality(extnId, n.children.length === 3, "requested");
         var dec = EXT_DECODERS && EXT_DECODERS[extnId];
         if (dec) {
           try { dec(asn1.read.octetString(n.children[n.children.length - 1])); }
@@ -607,6 +628,7 @@ function makeBuilder(ctx) {
     extSan: extSan, extCertPolicies: extCertPolicies, ext: ext,
     spkiKeyId: spkiKeyId, skiKeyId: skiKeyId,
     reqDer: reqDer, reqDenseArray: reqDenseArray, reqDerSequence: reqDerSequence, assertValidSpki: assertValidSpki, assertValidExtension: assertValidExtension,
+    assertCertCriticality: assertCertCriticality,
     certLikeFromSpki: certLikeFromSpki, assertSignatureVerifies: assertSignatureVerifies,
     samePublicKey: samePublicKey,
   };

package/lib/x509-sign.js

@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ var KNOWN_EXT_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
 var _b = pkiBuild.makeBuilder({ ErrorClass: CertificateError, prefix: "x509", O: O, NS: NS, NAME_SCHEMA: NAME_SCHEMA, SPKI_SCHEMA: SPKI_SCHEMA, EXT_DECODERS: EXT_DECODERS });
 var _encodeName = _b.encodeName, _isEmptyName = _b.isEmptyName, _reqDer = _b.reqDer,
   _assertValidSpki = _b.assertValidSpki, _assertValidExtension = _b.assertValidExtension,
+  _assertCertCriticality = _b.assertCertCriticality,
   _certLikeFromSpki = _b.certLikeFromSpki, _assertCertVerifies = _b.assertSignatureVerifies,
   _ext = _b.ext, _extBasicConstraints = _b.extBasicConstraints, _validateBcSpec = _b.validateBcSpec,
   _extKeyUsage = _b.extKeyUsage, _extExtKeyUsage = _b.extExtKeyUsage, _extSki = _b.extSki,
@@ -89,6 +90,7 @@ function _buildExtensions(extSpec, ctx) {
       var extnId = asn1.read.oid(n.children[0]);
       if (seenExt[extnId]) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "duplicate extension " + extnId + " in the extensions array (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2 -- at most one instance of an extension)");
       seenExt[extnId] = true;
+      _assertCertCriticality(extnId, n.children.length === 3, "pre-encoded");
       var dec = EXT_DECODERS[extnId];
       if (dec) {
         var decoded;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.7.12",
+  "version": "0.7.13",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:4cd44552-2dd6-48c5-b89d-d0f03d957e45",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:32a9603e-875f-4326-b00f-f40f8927e720",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-09-11T00:21:46.779Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-09-11T01:36:27.751Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.12",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.13",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.7.12",
+      "version": "0.7.13",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.7.12",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.7.13",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.12",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.13",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]