@blamejs/pki 0.7.10 → 0.7.12

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,32 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.7.12 — 2026-09-10
+
+An issuer can draw a certificate serial number before signing with it.
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.x509.randomSerial() returns a BigInt drawn from 20 octets of the platform CSPRNG, the same draw pki.x509.sign makes when spec.serialNumber is omitted. The value meets the RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.2 profile the signer enforces: positive, and at most 20 octets. Pass it back as spec.serialNumber and the certificate carries exactly that number, so a serial can be reserved or logged before issuance.
+
+### Changed
+
+- The serial draw redraws when the leading octet comes out zero, instead of replacing it with 1. Every value the leading octet can take is now equally likely; previously 1 occurred about twice as often as any other value, because it absorbed the zero case. Serials already issued are unaffected, and the draw carries the same 20 octets it always did.
+
+## v0.7.11 — 2026-09-10
+
+A name constraint whose base is a zero-length name is read rather than rejected.
+
+### Changed
+
+- pki.path.validate still refuses a caller-supplied subtree seed whose base is empty, through opts.initialPermittedSubtrees, opts.initialExcludedSubtrees or a trust anchor's nameConstraints. A seed that permits everything is a restriction the caller believes they applied, so that door is unchanged and is separate from decoding a certificate's own extension.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- A zero-length subtree base in a certificate's nameConstraints decodes. RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6 states the prohibition for subjectAltName, that an extension with a dNSName of "" must not be used, and section 4.2.1.10 places no length floor on a constraint base. A zero-length dNSName in a subjectAltName is still refused, which is where the rule belongs.
+- For dNSName the empty base names the root of the namespace, the same as the bare-dot base already did: section 4.2.1.10 satisfies the constraint by adding zero or more labels to its left-hand side, and every name is that base plus labels. An excluded empty base therefore excludes every dNSName, and a permitted one permits every dNSName. A leaf naming no dNSName is untouched by either.
+- For rfc822Name and uniformResourceIdentifier the base decodes but the comparison reports path/name-constraint-unsupported and refuses. Section 4.2.1.10 gives a mail constraint a mailbox, a host or a leading-period domain, and a URI constraint a fully qualified domain name, so an empty base is none of the shapes either names and is not read as covering everything. The verdict now says the constraint could not be evaluated instead of saying the extension could not be parsed.
+
 ## v0.7.10 — 2026-09-10
 
 An OCSP response is no longer signed with a status window that runs backwards.

package/README.md

@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.schema.cmc` | Decode CMC messages (RFC 5272 as updated by RFC 6402): a Full PKI Request (`PKIData`) or Full PKI Response (`PKIResponse`) riding inside a CMS SignedData, reached by the encapsulated content type (`id-cct-PKIData` / `id-cct-PKIResponse`). Controls are surfaced in wire order with their values raw, so an unrecognized one is data rather than a fault. Tagged requests decode across all three arms. The status verdicts (`CMCStatusInfo` v1 and `CMCStatusInfoV2`) are collected as an ordered list, and the RFC 6402 two-module `OtherStatusInfo` ambiguity — `pendInfo` and `extendedFailInfo` are both untagged SEQUENCEs in the 1988 module, told apart only by their first element — is resolved by inspection and refused when it cannot be told apart. Body-part identity is unique across the whole message rather than per sequence, 0 is reserved as the reference to the enclosing PKIData, and the `reqSequence` bytes are surfaced exactly as they appeared so an Identity Proof witness is computed over the wire bytes. A companion decoder for CMS content rather than an auto-routed format — `parse`, `parsePkiData`, `parsePkiResponse` |
 | `pki.schema.engine` | The declarative ASN.1 structure-schema engine every format parser composes — `walk`, `encode`, `embeddedDer`, and the schema combinators |
 | `pki.path` | Certification-path validation (RFC 5280 §6). `validate` runs the §6.1 state machine over an ordered path and a trust anchor: signature chaining across RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and hybrid composite ML-DSA (a composite is accepted only when both its post-quantum and traditional components verify), validity windows, name chaining, basic constraints and path length, key usage, name constraints, and the certificate-policy tree. It returns a structured verdict with per-check reason codes and enforces a `pki.trust` anchor's per-purpose distrust-after dates and delegator purposes through `checkPurpose` — an anchor that carries either one with no purpose named to select by is refused as a configuration fault rather than validated as though it carried none. The verdict says what was established. `revocationChecked` takes the weakest outcome on the path: `false` with no checker supplied, `"determined"` when every certificate got an explicit good or revoked answer, `"waived"` when `softFail` turned an undetermined one into a pass, and `"undetermined"` when one could not be answered at all — which includes a checker that throws, a fault `softFail` does not waive because `softFail` opts into an undetermined answer, not into a broken checker. `anchorConstraints` names the purpose the anchor was judged under and whether each of its two constraints applied. `crlChecker` supplies CRL-based revocation, covering partitioned and sharded CRLs, whose §6.3.3 Distribution Point ↔ IDP correspondence lets corresponding shards accumulate reason coverage until all eight revocation reasons are covered, and delta CRLs, merged onto the complete CRL they may be combined with (§5.2.4) so a held certificate its delta releases reads good, while a delta that merges with nothing still reports what it lists and still withholds good. `ocspChecker` supplies OCSP-based revocation (RFC 6960: CertID binding, responder authorization, signature, currency) over the same pluggable hook. `build(leaf, opts)` is the discovering complement (RFC 4158): from a leaf, an untrusted pool of candidate CA certificates, and a trust store, it finds the ordered leaf-to-anchor path `validate` accepts, using name chaining plus the RFC 4158 §3.5 sort hints (an AKI/SKI match, an anchor-adjacent issuer, CA plus keyCertSign, validity at the check time — ordering hints, never filters), a depth-first search with backtracking so the first accepted path wins, and a bounded search (chain-length cap, candidate-expansion cap, identity-tuple visited set) so a cross-certificate cycle or Bridge-CA fan-out terminates deterministically. Every accept flows through `validate`, and its verdict is cross-checked against `openssl verify`. Opt-in AIA `caIssuers` fetching (`opts.fetchAia: true`) discovers a missing intermediate from a certificate's Authority Information Access URL (§4.2.2.1) over `pki.transport`, triggered only on a pool miss and bounded against SSRF and amplification: HTTPS only, a total fetch budget that caps fetching silently rather than throwing, a per-cert URL cap, a build-wide URL dedupe, a response-size and certificate-count cap, no redirect following, and every fault a silent skip. The TLS trust (`opts.tls`) stays distinct from the PKI `trustAnchors`, and every fetched certificate remains untrusted pool material that still flows through `validate` (never a trust anchor). It is off by default, so the default build is byte-identical offline. An `opts.direction` of `"reverse"` searches from a trust anchor toward the leaf (RFC 4158 §3.1), narrower when the anchor set is small and the leaf's issuer options fan out, and `"auto"` picks the direction by first-hop fan-out; reverse building reuses the same pool, visited set, caps, and `validate` gate, so the direction changes only search order, and the anchor is excluded from the returned path. Reverse building is pool-only and does not combine with `fetchAia`. When `opts.userInitialPolicySet` names acceptable certificate-policy OIDs and more than one path validates, build returns the accepted path whose user-constrained policy set best satisfies that set (RFC 4158 §4) rather than the first accepted path, the ranking bounded by the same candidate cap and a malformed set refused with `path/bad-input`; an `anyPolicy` entry is unconstrained and returns the first accepted path. In a mesh of cross-certified domains, where many candidates chain by name to the same place, a candidate is ranked by how many leading relative distinguished names it shares with the name the search is heading for (§3.5.16 and the §3.5.19 reverse method), so a certificate in the target's own domain is tried before one from a cross-certified domain, and forward building sorts a candidate under every candidate that can complete the path when its path length constraint cannot cover the certificates already below it (§3.5.7), an ordering that outranks the other hints rather than competing with them. No candidate is removed and an unbounded search still reaches every path the pool holds; a bounded one spends `maxCandidatesConsidered` on whichever branches the order steers it to. Pure and re-entrant — `validate`, `build`, `crlChecker`, `ocspChecker` |
-| `pki.x509` | Certificate issuance (RFC 5280 §4). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a certificate from a `spec` of subject (a common-name string, an array of RDNs, or raw Name DER), the public key being certified, the validity window, an optional serial, and an optional `extensions` object. The `issuer` is a key alone (self-signed: issuer equals subject, signed with that key), a name plus public key plus key, or an issuing certificate plus key. The signature algorithm is resolved from the signing key through the shared registry, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA P-256/384/521, Ed25519, Ed448, ML-DSA-44/65/87, the twelve SLH-DSA sets, and the composite arms all issue without a per-algorithm branch. It encodes basic constraints, key usage, extended key usage, subject and authority key identifiers (the SKI derived by SHA-1 of the subject key), subject alternative names, and certificate policies from the spec, taking any other extension as pre-encoded DER. It derives the version from the field set and enforces the serial bounds, the UTCTime/GeneralizedTime cutover, the DER default omissions, and the CA cross-field rules; a violation throws a typed `CertificateError`. Returns DER, or a PEM `CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`. Every arm is independently verified by OpenSSL. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.x509.parse` — `sign` |
+| `pki.x509` | Certificate issuance (RFC 5280 §4). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a certificate from a `spec` of subject (a common-name string, an array of RDNs, or raw Name DER), the public key being certified, the validity window, an optional serial, and an optional `extensions` object. `randomSerial()` draws the same 20-octet CSPRNG serial the signer uses when the spec names none, so a serial can be reserved or logged before the certificate is issued. The `issuer` is a key alone (self-signed: issuer equals subject, signed with that key), a name plus public key plus key, or an issuing certificate plus key. The signature algorithm is resolved from the signing key through the shared registry, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA P-256/384/521, Ed25519, Ed448, ML-DSA-44/65/87, the twelve SLH-DSA sets, and the composite arms all issue without a per-algorithm branch. It encodes basic constraints, key usage, extended key usage, subject and authority key identifiers (the SKI derived by SHA-1 of the subject key), subject alternative names, and certificate policies from the spec, taking any other extension as pre-encoded DER. It derives the version from the field set and enforces the serial bounds, the UTCTime/GeneralizedTime cutover, the DER default omissions, and the CA cross-field rules; a violation throws a typed `CertificateError`. Returns DER, or a PEM `CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`. Every arm is independently verified by OpenSSL. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.x509.parse` — `sign` |
 | `pki.csr` | PKCS#10 certification-request issuance (RFC 2986 / RFC 2985). `sign(spec, key, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificationRequest` from a `spec` of subject (which may be empty), the public key being certified, an optional `extensionRequest` carrying the requested v3 extensions a CA copies into the issued certificate (subject alternative names, key usage, extended key usage, basic constraints, certificate policies, subject key identifier, or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER), and an optional `challengePassword`. `key` (or `{ key }`) is the subject's own private key: the request is self-signed to prove possession of the private half of `subjectPublicKey`, and that proof is verified before the request is returned, which is what `openssl req -verify` checks. The signature algorithm is resolved from the subject key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. Returns DER, or a PEM `CERTIFICATE REQUEST` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CsrError`. `verify(request)` asks the same question of a request someone else produced, over its exact signed `certificationRequestInfo` bytes under the `subjectPKInfo` inside them, through the one path-validation signature engine. It answers `{ verified, subject, subjectPublicKeyInfo, attributes, certificationRequestInfoBytes }`, all re-derived from the signed bytes, so a CA issues from the fields the signature covers rather than from the object it passed in. A `verified: true` says the producer held that private key and that the subject and requested extensions are the ones they signed; who they are is the enrollment protocol's question, not this one. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.csr.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
 | `pki.attrcert` | Attribute-certificate issuance (RFC 5755). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs an `AttributeCertificate` as an Attribute Authority: a `spec` of `holder` (exactly one of an entity name, a `baseCertificateID` reference, a `fromCertificate` binding, or an object digest), the validity window as GeneralizedTime, an optional serial (positive, at most 20 octets, randomly generated when omitted), the `attributes` (role, clearance, group, chargingIdentity, accessIdentity, authenticationInfo, or pre-encoded Attribute DER), and optional `extensions` (auditIdentity, targetInformation, noRevAvail, aaControls, acProxying, authorityKeyIdentifier, or pre-encoded Extension DER) each with its RFC 5755 criticality. An attribute certificate is never self-signed, so the `issuer` is the signing AA, supplied as `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the AA key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, and the signature is verified under the AA public key before the certificate is returned. Returns DER, or a PEM `ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `AttrCertError`. `verify(ac, issuer, opts)` is the receiving side, performing the RFC 5755 sec. 5 checks an attribute certificate and a named issuer can settle between them: the signature over the exact `AttributeCertificateInfo` bytes through the one path-validation signature engine, the AC naming the issuer this verifier trusts (compared as a distinguished name), the evaluation instant lying within the validity with equality at either bound succeeding as the section states, the sec. 4.3.2 targeting rule, and rejection of any critical extension this verb does not process (section 5 defines support as parsing the value AND rejecting where the value would reject, so `aaControls` and `acProxying`, whose constraints it does not evaluate, are refused when critical). It answers `{ verified, signatureValid, validityChecked, targetingChecked, holderBindingChecked, issuerPathChecked, holder, issuer, attributes, extensions, notBefore, notAfter, serialNumberHex, reason }` with the fields re-derived from the signed bytes; the holder's own certificate chain and the AC issuer's chain need certificates the verb is not given, so those slots report `false` rather than letting their absence read as a pass. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.attrcert.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
 | `pki.crmf` | Certificate-request-message issuance (RFC 4211). `build(spec, key, opts)` assembles a `CertReqMessages` from a `spec` of `certReqId` (default 0, with the RFC 9483 `-1` sentinel allowed), a `certTemplate` of the requested fields (`subject`, `publicKey` as the SPKI DER of the key being certified, `validity`, requested `extensions`, an optional `version` 2), optional `controls` and `regInfo` (regToken, authenticator, utf8Pairs, oldCertID, protocolEncrKey, or pre-encoded `AttributeTypeAndValue` DER), and an optional `pop` selector. `key` (or `{ key }`) is the requester's private key: the message carries a `POPOSigningKey` proof of possession signed with the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey` and verified before the message is returned, exactly as a PKCS#10 CSR proves possession. A complete template signs the `CertRequest`; an incomplete one signs a `POPOSigningKeyInput`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the requested public key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. `key` is optional for a `raVerified` proof. A key that cannot sign, which is where an ML-KEM enrollment sits, takes a `POPOPrivKey` proof instead (RFC 4211 sec. 4.2, sec. 4.3): `pop.type` of `keyEncipherment` or `keyAgreement` with `pop.method: 'subsequentMessage'` declares whether an encrypted certificate (`encrCert`) or a challenge (`challengeResp`) completes the proof over the enrolling protocol's next exchange, and `pop.method: 'encryptedKey'` encloses the requester's private key for the CA in a CMS `EnvelopedData` under `id-ct-encKeyWithID`, requiring `pop.privateKey`, `pop.recipients`, the `pop.identifier` sec. 4.2.1 makes mandatory, and `pop.archive: true` because RFC 9810 sec. 5.2.8.3.1 permits the method only where archival is intended. The enclosed key must be the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey`, or the proof demonstrates possession of a key the request never asked to have certified. The `thisMessage` and `dhMAC` alternatives the specification deprecates are refused with their successors named. `pop.method: 'agreeMAC'` completes the four: `pop.key` is the requester's finite-field Diffie-Hellman private key, as a PKCS#8 DER, a PEM `PRIVATE KEY` block or a `KeyObject`, and `pop.caCert` the authority's certificate it already holds; the two agree a static secret (RFC 2875 sec. 3), and the key derived from it MACs the DER `certReq` under `id-dhPop-static-HMAC-SHA1`. Either key may name its group in the PKCS#3 or the X9.42 encoding. `pop.key` must be the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey`, and the template must name both a subject and a public key. Pass an array of specs for a batch; the CA-assigned template fields are never emitted. Returns DER, or a PEM block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrmfError`. `verifyPop(messages)` is the receiving side: for each `CertReqMsg` it verifies the `POPOSigningKey` signature over the bytes RFC 4211 sec. 4.1 names — the DER of `poposkInput` when present, of `certReq` when not — through the one path-validation signature engine, and answers `{ verified, messages: [{ verified, method, cryptographicallyVerified, certReqId, subject, subjectBound, publicKey, reason }] }` with the fields re-derived from the message's own bytes. Each verdict reports only what its preimage covers: `publicKey` is the key possession was proven for, and `subject` is the requested name when the `certReq` was signed. A `poposkInput` preimage covers the key and the sender alone, so any subject beside it is unsigned and is withheld with `subjectBound: false`. A `raVerified` proof is an RA's out-of-band assertion and a `keyEncipherment` or `keyAgreement` proof completes over a later exchange, so each is reported unverified with its `method` named instead of guessed. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crmf.parse` — `build`, `verifyPop` |

package/lib/pki-build.js

@@ -247,6 +247,19 @@ var KU_BIT = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   dataEncipherment: 3, keyAgreement: 4, keyCertSign: 5, cRLSign: 6, encipherOnly: 7, decipherOnly: 8,
 });
 
+/** @internal The serial a certificate gets when the caller names none: 20 CSPRNG octets read as a
+ * positive integer, the top of the range RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.2 allows. The top bit is cleared so the
+ * DER INTEGER carries no sign octet. A zero leading octet is drawn again. Substituting a fixed value
+ * for it would fold the zero case onto that value and leave one leading octet twice as likely as the
+ * others, so the loop keeps the leading octet uniform over 1 to 127. */
+function randomSerial() {
+  for (;;) {
+    var rnd = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(20);
+    rnd[0] &= 0x7f;
+    if (rnd[0] !== 0) return BigInt("0x" + rnd.toString("hex"));
+  }
+}
+
 function reqDenseArrayImpl(list, what, E, code) {
   if (!_isArray(list)) throw E(code, what + " must be an array");
   var n = list.length;
@@ -531,10 +544,7 @@ function makeBuilder(ctx) {
   function serialInteger(serial) {
     var v;
     if (serial == null) {
-      var rnd = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(20);
-      rnd[0] &= 0x7f;
-      if (rnd[0] === 0) rnd[0] = 0x01;
-      v = BigInt("0x" + rnd.toString("hex"));
+      v = randomSerial();
     } else if (typeof serial === "bigint") { v = serial; }
     else if (typeof serial === "number") { if (!Number.isSafeInteger(serial)) throw E("bad-serial", "serialNumber number must be a safe integer (pass a BigInt, hex string, or Buffer for a value above 2^53-1)"); v = BigInt(serial); }
     else if (typeof serial === "string") { try { v = BigInt(serial); } catch (e) { throw E("bad-serial", "serialNumber string must be a decimal or 0x-hex integer", e); } }
@@ -614,4 +624,4 @@ function tbsSerialNumber(cert) {
   return asn1.read.integer(tbs.children[hasVersion ? 1 : 0]);
 }
 
-module.exports = intrinsic.freeze({ makeBuilder: makeBuilder, reqDenseArray: reqDenseArrayImpl, KU_BIT: KU_BIT, tbsNameField: tbsNameField, tbsSerialNumber: tbsSerialNumber });
+module.exports = intrinsic.freeze({ makeBuilder: makeBuilder, reqDenseArray: reqDenseArrayImpl, KU_BIT: KU_BIT, tbsNameField: tbsNameField, tbsSerialNumber: tbsSerialNumber, randomSerial: randomSerial });

package/lib/schema-pkix.js

@@ -531,7 +531,13 @@ function generalName(ns, opts) {
     } else {
       if (constructed) throw ctx.E(code, "GeneralName [" + t + "] must be primitive (X.690 sec. 10.2)");
       if (GN_IA5[t]) {
-        if (n.content.length === 0) throw ctx.E(code, "GeneralName [" + t + "] must be a non-empty IA5String");
+        /** @internal RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.6 forbids a zero-length IA5String where a GeneralName names
+         * something: "subjectAltName extensions with a dNSName of ' ' MUST NOT be used". Sec.
+         * 4.2.1.10 places no length floor on a subtree BASE, where an empty one names every name of
+         * that form, which is how a technically-constrained sub-CA excludes a whole form. Scoped on
+         * subtreeBase the same way the iPAddress rule below it is, so the prohibition keeps holding
+         * everywhere a GeneralName is a name. */
+        if (!subtreeBase && n.content.length === 0) throw ctx.E(code, "GeneralName [" + t + "] must be a non-empty IA5String");
         guard.name.assertPrintableIa5(n.content, ctx.E, code, "GeneralName [" + t + "]");
         if (decodeValue) value = _bufToString(n.content, "latin1");
       } else if (t === 7) {

package/lib/x509-sign.js

@@ -327,4 +327,33 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
   });
 }
 
-module.exports = { sign: sign };
+/**
+ * @primitive pki.x509.randomSerial
+ * @signature pki.x509.randomSerial() -> BigInt
+ * @since 0.7.12
+ * @status stable
+ * @spec RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.2
+ * @related pki.x509.sign
+ *
+ * Draw a certificate serial number: 20 octets from the platform CSPRNG read as a positive integer.
+ * This is the same draw `pki.x509.sign` makes when `spec.serialNumber` is omitted, so an issuer that
+ * has to record a serial before the certificate exists gets it without re-implementing the draw and
+ * without signing first. The value satisfies the section 4.1.2.2 profile a signer enforces: positive,
+ * and at most 20 octets.
+ *
+ * The top bit is cleared so the DER INTEGER carries no sign octet, and a zero top byte is redrawn, so
+ * every value the top byte can take is equally likely.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var serial = pki.x509.randomSerial();            // record this before the certificate exists
+ *   var pair = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
+ *   var der = await pki.x509.sign(
+ *     { subject: "leaf.example", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
+ *       notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2027-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
+ *       serialNumber: serial },
+ *     { key: pair.privateKey });
+ *   pki.schema.x509.parse(der).serialNumber === serial;   // true: the issued serial is the drawn one
+ */
+function randomSerial() { return pkiBuild.randomSerial(); }
+
+module.exports = { sign: sign, randomSerial: randomSerial };

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.7.10",
+  "version": "0.7.12",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:34b0c9f8-e610-4b07-817f-7e260dc2355a",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:4cd44552-2dd6-48c5-b89d-d0f03d957e45",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-09-10T21:28:40.246Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-09-11T00:21:46.779Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.10",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.12",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.7.10",
+      "version": "0.7.12",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.7.10",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.7.12",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.10",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.7.12",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]