@blamejs/pki 0.6.45 → 0.6.47

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,29 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.6.47 — 2026-09-06
+
+A CMP enrollment left waiting can be picked up by a later process instead of started again.
+
+### Added
+
+- A pki.cmp.session poll-timeout verdict carries resumeToken, and session.resumePoll(token) continues that transaction in a later process. The authority's polling interval is waited out before the first resumed request, while the resuming session's own maxTotalWait still bounds it: a remainder longer than that budget times out immediately and hands the same due time on. A further timeout returns another token, so a wait can span any number of processes, and the polls each one spent accumulate across them. Each timeout reports the waiting status, whether or not that process read a certificate response of its own, so a wait split across processes reads the same as one held in a single process. The authority's own statusString and failInfo are not reproduced from the token, so a verdict never presents text as the authority's that it did not send in that exchange. A session that has already run a transaction refuses to resume one, since RFC 9810 section 5.1.1 gives each transaction its own identifier.
+- The token is plain JSON, so it survives being written to disk and read back. It names the transaction identifier the exchange is keyed by, the nonce the next request must echo (RFC 9810 section 5.1.1), which request is being polled as a decimal string so an identifier of any width survives, the response arm its grant arrives on, whether the request that opened the transaction asked for implicit confirmation, the polls already spent, the public key the granted certificate must certify, the signer identity the first process authenticated and, separately, the certificate it currently verifies a response with when that response omits its extraCerts, the certificates the authority had already sent including any it delivered only on a waiting leg, and the instant its own checkAfter allows the next poll. It carries no secret, because the protection material, the trust anchors and the endpoint come from the session the caller builds to resume with.
+- A resumed poll grants nothing the first process would not have accepted. It protection-verifies and nonce-binds every response before reading it, holds every response to the signer identity the token names, refuses a granted certificate that certifies a different key, and confirms the grant with the same certConf handshake. Those fields are what the resumed session holds the exchange to, so a token is integrity-sensitive and belongs in storage the caller controls: someone who can rewrite it can widen what the resumed session accepts, up to the limit of that session's own trust anchors and the authority's protection, which a rewritten token cannot reach past. Store it where the enrollment's own state is stored, and read it back into a session configured the way the first one was. The token carries what the transaction established and the session supplies the rest, so the protection material, the trust anchors, the endpoint and a sender pinned with opts.expectedSender are all given again: a resumed poll accepts and refuses exactly what an uninterrupted one in the same session would, which means it also refuses a response that session has no way to authenticate.
+- A token that cannot carry the transaction is refused with cmp/bad-input before any request is sent, so stored state that cannot be used never spends the nonce the token is the only copy of. That covers a value that is not an object, one that names no transaction, a non-hex transaction identifier or non-canonical base64 nonce, a transaction identifier that is not the 128 bits a first message opens one with or a nonce shorter than the 128 bits a response must carry (RFC 9483 section 3.1 and 3.5), both of which name state no exchange could have produced, a request identifier written in any spelling other than the decimal one a session writes, a response arm that is not an enrollment arm, an unknown field, a key that is not a SubjectPublicKeyInfo, a field that names a certificate and is not one, and more certificates than the list it restores can hold. The two fields that bind the transaction are required rather than optional, since a token lives in storage where it can be edited and dropping a field must not drop the check it feeds: the key the grant is held to, and, for a signature session, the identity every response is held to. A shared-secret session pins no certificate, and its secret is the binding instead. The token also names how the transaction authenticates, and a session that authenticates the other way is refused: a signature transaction is bound by the pinned signer identity and a shared-secret one by the secret, so neither resumes the other's. A token trimmed of that field is read from its own contents, never from the session reading it, since a signature transaction pins the signer it authenticated and a shared-secret one has none to pin. How the grant is confirmed comes from the token rather than from the resuming session's own opts.implicitConfirm, since it was negotiated in the request the token continues: a session that never set the option still confirms an implicitly confirmed grant without a certConf, and one that sets it cannot make a transaction whose request never asked for it accept an implicit-confirm indication. A token that omits the field resumes as though the request asked for nothing. A token that asked for it is refused by a session carrying opts.acceptCert, the same pairing the constructor refuses, since an implicitly confirmed grant leaves no certConf leg for a policy to reject on.
+
+### Changed
+
+- pki.cmp.session refuses an opts.maxResponseBytes that is not a whole number of bytes between 1 and the 24 MiB transport ceiling, at construction, with cmp/bad-input. It is the bound the response reads and the restored certificate pools are measured against, and pki.acme.client already held the option to the same range. A session that passed a fractional or out-of-range value previously carried it as far as the first read.
+
+## v0.6.46 — 2026-09-06
+
+A Sigstore bundle can be checked against the certificate-transparency logs that recorded the signing certificate.
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.sigstore.verifyBundle accepts opts.ctLogs, an array of { keyId, spki, validFor? } in the same shape it takes for the Rekor keys, so an operator builds both from the one trusted-root document. When supplied, the certificate-transparency receipt Fulcio embeds in the signing certificate (RFC 6962 section 3.2) is verified: the logged entry is reconstructed from the certificate as it stood before the receipt was added, bound to the key hash of the certificate that issued it, and checked under the key of the pinned log the receipt names. At least one receipt must verify against a pinned log, which is the RFC 6962 section 3.3 floor. A log's validFor window is read at the instant the receipt was signed, since that is when the key was the log's rather than when the artifact was later logged, and a receipt dated after the instant being validated at is not counted (section 5.2); with no opts.time that instant is the end of the Rekor entry's own second, which allows for the entry recording whole seconds while a receipt carries milliseconds and accepts nothing beyond it. The verdict gains sctChecked, saying whether the check ran, and validScts, counting the receipts that verified. A receipt that verifies against no pinned log, and a certificate carrying no receipt at all, are each refused with sigstore/sct-unverified or sigstore/sct-missing rather than passing quietly. The check is opt-in: a caller that supplies no ctLogs verifies exactly as before and reads sctChecked false, while an empty array is refused with sigstore/bad-input rather than read as a policy that checks nothing.
+
 ## v0.6.45 — 2026-09-06
 
 A certification path reaching a certificate signed with a stateful hash-based key validates without a separate call.

package/README.md

@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.csr` | PKCS#10 certification-request issuance (RFC 2986 / RFC 2985). `sign(spec, key, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificationRequest` from a `spec` of subject (which may be empty), the public key being certified, an optional `extensionRequest` carrying the requested v3 extensions a CA copies into the issued certificate (subject alternative names, key usage, extended key usage, basic constraints, certificate policies, subject key identifier, or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER), and an optional `challengePassword`. `key` (or `{ key }`) is the subject's own private key: the request is self-signed to prove possession of the private half of `subjectPublicKey`, and that proof is verified before the request is returned, which is what `openssl req -verify` checks. The signature algorithm is resolved from the subject key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. Returns DER, or a PEM `CERTIFICATE REQUEST` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CsrError`. `verify(request)` asks the same question of a request someone else produced, over its exact signed `certificationRequestInfo` bytes under the `subjectPKInfo` inside them, through the one path-validation signature engine. It answers `{ verified, subject, subjectPublicKeyInfo, attributes, certificationRequestInfoBytes }`, all re-derived from the signed bytes, so a CA issues from the fields the signature covers rather than from the object it passed in. A `verified: true` says the producer held that private key and that the subject and requested extensions are the ones they signed; who they are is the enrollment protocol's question, not this one. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.csr.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
 | `pki.attrcert` | Attribute-certificate issuance (RFC 5755). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs an `AttributeCertificate` as an Attribute Authority: a `spec` of `holder` (exactly one of an entity name, a `baseCertificateID` reference, a `fromCertificate` binding, or an object digest), the validity window as GeneralizedTime, an optional serial (positive, at most 20 octets, randomly generated when omitted), the `attributes` (role, clearance, group, chargingIdentity, accessIdentity, authenticationInfo, or pre-encoded Attribute DER), and optional `extensions` (auditIdentity, targetInformation, noRevAvail, aaControls, acProxying, authorityKeyIdentifier, or pre-encoded Extension DER) each with its RFC 5755 criticality. An attribute certificate is never self-signed, so the `issuer` is the signing AA, supplied as `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the AA key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, and the signature is verified under the AA public key before the certificate is returned. Returns DER, or a PEM `ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `AttrCertError`. `verify(ac, issuer, opts)` is the receiving side, performing the RFC 5755 sec. 5 checks an attribute certificate and a named issuer can settle between them: the signature over the exact `AttributeCertificateInfo` bytes through the one path-validation signature engine, the AC naming the issuer this verifier trusts (compared as a distinguished name), the evaluation instant lying within the validity with equality at either bound succeeding as the section states, the sec. 4.3.2 targeting rule, and rejection of any critical extension this verb does not process (section 5 defines support as parsing the value AND rejecting where the value would reject, so `aaControls` and `acProxying`, whose constraints it does not evaluate, are refused when critical). It answers `{ verified, signatureValid, validityChecked, targetingChecked, holderBindingChecked, issuerPathChecked, holder, issuer, attributes, extensions, notBefore, notAfter, serialNumberHex, reason }` with the fields re-derived from the signed bytes; the holder's own certificate chain and the AC issuer's chain need certificates the verb is not given, so those slots report `false` rather than letting their absence read as a pass. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.attrcert.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
 | `pki.crmf` | Certificate-request-message issuance (RFC 4211). `build(spec, key, opts)` assembles a `CertReqMessages` from a `spec` of `certReqId` (default 0, with the RFC 9483 `-1` sentinel allowed), a `certTemplate` of the requested fields (`subject`, `publicKey` as the SPKI DER of the key being certified, `validity`, requested `extensions`, an optional `version` 2), optional `controls` and `regInfo` (regToken, authenticator, utf8Pairs, oldCertID, protocolEncrKey, or pre-encoded `AttributeTypeAndValue` DER), and an optional `pop` selector. `key` (or `{ key }`) is the requester's private key: the message carries a `POPOSigningKey` proof of possession signed with the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey` and verified before the message is returned, exactly as a PKCS#10 CSR proves possession. A complete template signs the `CertRequest`; an incomplete one signs a `POPOSigningKeyInput`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the requested public key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. `key` is optional for a `raVerified` proof. A key that cannot sign, which is where an ML-KEM enrollment sits, takes a `POPOPrivKey` proof instead (RFC 4211 sec. 4.2, sec. 4.3): `pop.type` of `keyEncipherment` or `keyAgreement` with `pop.method: 'subsequentMessage'` declares whether an encrypted certificate (`encrCert`) or a challenge (`challengeResp`) completes the proof over the enrolling protocol's next exchange, and `pop.method: 'encryptedKey'` encloses the requester's private key for the CA in a CMS `EnvelopedData` under `id-ct-encKeyWithID`, requiring `pop.privateKey`, `pop.recipients`, the `pop.identifier` sec. 4.2.1 makes mandatory, and `pop.archive: true` because RFC 9810 sec. 5.2.8.3.1 permits the method only where archival is intended. The enclosed key must be the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey`, or the proof demonstrates possession of a key the request never asked to have certified. The `thisMessage` and `dhMAC` alternatives the specification deprecates are refused with their successors named, and `agreeMAC` is not built, since it needs the RFC 2875 static Diffie-Hellman secret against a CA certificate the requester already holds. Pass an array of specs for a batch; the CA-assigned template fields are never emitted. Returns DER, or a PEM block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrmfError`. `verifyPop(messages)` is the receiving side: for each `CertReqMsg` it verifies the `POPOSigningKey` signature over the bytes RFC 4211 sec. 4.1 names — the DER of `poposkInput` when present, of `certReq` when not — through the one path-validation signature engine, and answers `{ verified, messages: [{ verified, method, cryptographicallyVerified, certReqId, subject, subjectBound, publicKey, reason }] }` with the fields re-derived from the message's own bytes. Each verdict reports only what its preimage covers: `publicKey` is the key possession was proven for, and `subject` is the requested name when the `certReq` was signed. A `poposkInput` preimage covers the key and the sender alone, so any subject beside it is unsigned and is withheld with `subjectBound: false`. A `raVerified` proof is an RA's out-of-band assertion and a `keyEncipherment` or `keyAgreement` proof completes over a later exchange, so each is reported unverified with its `method` named instead of guessed. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crmf.parse` — `build`, `verifyPop` |
-| `pki.cmp` | CMP message building, transfer, and verification (RFC 9810). `build(message, opts)` assembles a protected `PKIMessage`. `message.header` carries the `sender` and `recipient` GeneralNames (including the anonymous NULL-DN) plus optional transaction metadata; `message.body` is a single-key object naming the arm — request-side `ir`, `cr`, `kur`, `krr` (key recovery, §5.3.7), `ccr` (cross-certification, §5.3.11: a `CertReqMessages` at the normative floor, where the requesting CA keeps its private key so a private-key-transport encryptedKey proof-of-possession is refused, and the optional App. D.6 single-request cardinality is not enforced), `p10cr`, `certConf`, `pollReq`, `genm`, `rr`, responder-side `ip`, `cp`, `kup`, `ccp`, `rp`, `genp`, `error`, `pollRep`, `krp`, `pkiconf`, and the registration-authority `nested` wrapper of complete PKIMessages (RFC 9810 §5.1.3.5). Protection is exactly one of `opts.{ key, cert }`, a signature under the sender key with the algorithm resolved from the signer certificate so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 / PSS), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, or `opts.mac`, a PBMAC1 shared-secret HMAC (RFC 9481 / 9579, PBKDF2-derived). Protection covers the exact DER of the virtual `ProtectedPart` and is self-verified before the message is returned, and `protectionAlg` is derived rather than caller-set, so the message the parser accepts is coherent by construction. A `p10cr` request's PKCS#10 proof-of-possession is verified before the message is protected, so one whose self-signature does not verify under its subject public key is refused rather than sent. `transfer(url, message, opts)` carries a built message to a CMP endpoint over `pki.transport` (RFC 9811): one POST of the DER PKIMessage, with the response classified fail-closed — 200 only for success, a non-200 2xx or an un-followed 3xx refused, a 4xx or 5xx carrying a CMP error PKIMessage forwarded as the integrity-protected verdict — and protection surfaced rather than verified. `wellKnownUrl(base, opts)` builds the §3.4 `/.well-known/cmp` request-URIs. `verify(message, opts)` checks the protection on an incoming message, either a signature through the same certification-path engine `pki.crl.verify` and `pki.ocsp.verify` use, with the EdDSA low-order-point and algorithm-confusion gates, or a PBMAC1 MAC recomputed from `opts.sharedSecret` and the message's own PBKDF2 parameters and constant-time compared, over the exact `ProtectedPart` reconstructed from the parser's raw slices. It is fail-closed on an unprotected message, a legacy or KEM MAC algorithm, an omitted keyLength, or a SHA-1 PRF, and returns a `{ valid, trusted, protectionType, signer, ... }` verdict. With `opts.trustAnchors` the signer certificate is fully path-validated (RFC 5280 §6.1 plus the RFC 9483 §3.2 `keyUsage.digitalSignature` gate) at a trusted current time, or an explicit `opts.time` for historical verification and never the message's self-asserted `messageTime`, before it is reported trusted; without one the verdict is crypto-only and the signer certificate is surfaced to anchor. `session(opts)` returns a stateful enrollment session whose `enroll(request)` drives a full `ir` / `cr` / `kur` / `p10cr` transaction over the shared transport, composing `build`, `transfer`, and `verify`. Every response is protection-verified, signer-trusted, and bound to the exchange (a stable `transactionID`, a fresh-`senderNonce` and echoed-`recipNonce` chain) before its body is read, with a bounded `pollReq` / `pollRep` loop for a `waiting` status and a `certConf` / `pkiConf` (or implicit) confirmation carrying an explicit `hashAlg` for a signature algorithm that does not convey its hash. It returns a terminal `{ outcome, certificate, chain, status, trusted, confirmed, implicitConfirm, transactionID, polls, transcript }`. The same session also drives the other two RFC 9483 operations under that shell: `revoke(request)` sends an `rr` naming a certificate as `{ certificate }` or `{ certDetails }` with an optional CRLReason `reason`, and returns `revoked` / `rejected` / `poll-timeout`; `info(request)` sends a `genm` for one of the four support messages — `{ caCerts }`, `{ rootCaCert }`, `{ certReqTemplate }`, `{ crlUpdate }` — and returns `answered` with the decoded `value` and a `present` flag, since an absent response value is how each says nothing is available. A session revokes its own certificate: the signature over the request is the proof of authorization (§4.2), so the named certificate must be `opts.cert` and a PBMAC1 session is refused. The signature flavor requires `opts.trustAnchors` to authenticate the CA; a verified rejection or error and an exhausted poll budget are terminal verdicts, while a tampered, untrusted, or desynchronized response is a typed throw. Returns DER, or a PEM `CMP` block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CmpError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.cmp.parse` — `build`, `transfer`, `wellKnownUrl`, `verify`, `session` |
+| `pki.cmp` | CMP message building, transfer, and verification (RFC 9810). `build(message, opts)` assembles a protected `PKIMessage`. `message.header` carries the `sender` and `recipient` GeneralNames (including the anonymous NULL-DN) plus optional transaction metadata; `message.body` is a single-key object naming the arm — request-side `ir`, `cr`, `kur`, `krr` (key recovery, §5.3.7), `ccr` (cross-certification, §5.3.11: a `CertReqMessages` at the normative floor, where the requesting CA keeps its private key so a private-key-transport encryptedKey proof-of-possession is refused, and the optional App. D.6 single-request cardinality is not enforced), `p10cr`, `certConf`, `pollReq`, `genm`, `rr`, responder-side `ip`, `cp`, `kup`, `ccp`, `rp`, `genp`, `error`, `pollRep`, `krp`, `pkiconf`, and the registration-authority `nested` wrapper of complete PKIMessages (RFC 9810 §5.1.3.5). Protection is exactly one of `opts.{ key, cert }`, a signature under the sender key with the algorithm resolved from the signer certificate so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 / PSS), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, or `opts.mac`, a PBMAC1 shared-secret HMAC (RFC 9481 / 9579, PBKDF2-derived). Protection covers the exact DER of the virtual `ProtectedPart` and is self-verified before the message is returned, and `protectionAlg` is derived rather than caller-set, so the message the parser accepts is coherent by construction. A `p10cr` request's PKCS#10 proof-of-possession is verified before the message is protected, so one whose self-signature does not verify under its subject public key is refused rather than sent. `transfer(url, message, opts)` carries a built message to a CMP endpoint over `pki.transport` (RFC 9811): one POST of the DER PKIMessage, with the response classified fail-closed — 200 only for success, a non-200 2xx or an un-followed 3xx refused, a 4xx or 5xx carrying a CMP error PKIMessage forwarded as the integrity-protected verdict — and protection surfaced rather than verified. `wellKnownUrl(base, opts)` builds the §3.4 `/.well-known/cmp` request-URIs. `verify(message, opts)` checks the protection on an incoming message, either a signature through the same certification-path engine `pki.crl.verify` and `pki.ocsp.verify` use, with the EdDSA low-order-point and algorithm-confusion gates, or a PBMAC1 MAC recomputed from `opts.sharedSecret` and the message's own PBKDF2 parameters and constant-time compared, over the exact `ProtectedPart` reconstructed from the parser's raw slices. It is fail-closed on an unprotected message, a legacy or KEM MAC algorithm, an omitted keyLength, or a SHA-1 PRF, and returns a `{ valid, trusted, protectionType, signer, ... }` verdict. With `opts.trustAnchors` the signer certificate is fully path-validated (RFC 5280 §6.1 plus the RFC 9483 §3.2 `keyUsage.digitalSignature` gate) at a trusted current time, or an explicit `opts.time` for historical verification and never the message's self-asserted `messageTime`, before it is reported trusted; without one the verdict is crypto-only and the signer certificate is surfaced to anchor. `session(opts)` returns a stateful enrollment session whose `enroll(request)` drives a full `ir` / `cr` / `kur` / `p10cr` transaction over the shared transport, composing `build`, `transfer`, and `verify`. Every response is protection-verified, signer-trusted, and bound to the exchange (a stable `transactionID`, a fresh-`senderNonce` and echoed-`recipNonce` chain) before its body is read, with a bounded `pollReq` / `pollRep` loop for a `waiting` status and a `certConf` / `pkiConf` (or implicit) confirmation carrying an explicit `hashAlg` for a signature algorithm that does not convey its hash. It returns a terminal `{ outcome, certificate, chain, status, trusted, confirmed, implicitConfirm, transactionID, polls, transcript }`. A certification authority can take longer to answer than a process is held open, so a `poll-timeout` carries a `resumeToken` and `resumePoll(token)` continues the same transaction in a later process: the token is plain JSON naming the transaction, the nonce the next request echoes, the polled request and the arm its grant arrives on, and the key the grant must certify. It carries no secret and grants nothing, since the protection material and the endpoint come from the session built to resume with, and the resumed poll verifies, nonce-binds, and key-binds every response. Its fields are what the resumed exchange is held to, so store it where the enrollment's own state is stored: someone who can rewrite it can widen what the resumed session accepts, as far as that session's trust anchors and the authority's protection allow and no further. The same session also drives the other two RFC 9483 operations under that shell: `revoke(request)` sends an `rr` naming a certificate as `{ certificate }` or `{ certDetails }` with an optional CRLReason `reason`, and returns `revoked` / `rejected` / `poll-timeout`; `info(request)` sends a `genm` for one of the four support messages — `{ caCerts }`, `{ rootCaCert }`, `{ certReqTemplate }`, `{ crlUpdate }` — and returns `answered` with the decoded `value` and a `present` flag, since an absent response value is how each says nothing is available. A session revokes its own certificate: the signature over the request is the proof of authorization (§4.2), so the named certificate must be `opts.cert` and a PBMAC1 session is refused. The signature flavor requires `opts.trustAnchors` to authenticate the CA; a verified rejection or error and an exhausted poll budget are terminal verdicts, while a tampered, untrusted, or desynchronized response is a typed throw. Returns DER, or a PEM `CMP` block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CmpError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.cmp.parse` — `build`, `transfer`, `wellKnownUrl`, `verify`, `session` |
 | `pki.crl` | CRL issuance and verification (RFC 5280 §5). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificateList` from a `spec` of `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate`, an optional `crlNumber`, a `revoked` array (each entry a `serialNumber` and `revocationDate` with an optional `reason` or `invalidityDate`), and an optional `extensions` object (authority key identifier, issuing distribution point, delta-CRL indicator, freshest CRL, authority information access) or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER, with an `issuer` of `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the issuer key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. The version is derived from the extension set (v2 when any CRL or entry extension is present, else v1), the outer `signatureAlgorithm` matches `tbsCertList.signature`, an empty revocation list omits the field rather than emitting an empty SEQUENCE, `reasonCode` is an ENUMERATED and `invalidityDate` is always GeneralizedTime, the RFC fixes per-extension criticality, and the produced signature is verified under the issuer key before return. `verify(crl, issuer)` checks a CRL signature through the one path-validation signature engine, algorithm-confusion and EdDSA low-order gates included; handed a certificate rather than a bare key it also asks what only a certificate can answer — that the certificate is the issuer the CRL names, and that its `keyUsage`, when present, asserts `cRLSign` — so a CRL minted under an end-entity certificate of the same CA does not verify as that CA's. `isRevoked(crl, serialNumber, opts)` looks a serial up, and first checks that the CRL is one a serial can be looked up in at all — it is handed a serial and nothing else, so a CRL that speaks for part of its issuer's certificates is refused rather than answered from. A delta CRL lists changes since a base, so an entry recording a release reads as a revocation when read alone; an indirect CRL carries other issuers' entries, whose serials are unrelated to yours; and any other `issuingDistributionPoint` narrows the CRL to one distribution point, one kind of certificate, or a subset of revocation reasons, none of which a serial can be matched against. A CRL speaks for a span as well as a set, so `opts.time` states the instant the question is asked at and a list that has stopped speaking for it — `nextUpdate` passed, `thisUpdate` later, or no `nextUpdate` stated at all — is refused rather than read as a clean bill of health; without `opts.time` the lookup is structural and an absent serial means only that it is not on that list. `pki.path.crlChecker` is the verb for all of them: it is handed the certificate, merges a delta with its base, performs the §6.3.3 correspondence, and decides currency against the material it fetched. Returns DER, or a PEM `X509 CRL` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrlError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crl.parse` — `sign`, `verify`, `isRevoked` |
 | `pki.key` | Key-material lifecycle (RFC 5958 / RFC 8018). `encrypt(privateKey, password, opts)` wraps a PKCS#8 private key (DER, PEM, or an extractable `CryptoKey`) into an `EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo` under PBES2 (PBKDF2 with AES-CBC-Pad), where `opts` selects the `cipher` (`aes-256-cbc` default, `aes-192-cbc`, `aes-128-cbc`), the `prf` (`hmacWithSHA256` default, SHA-384/512, SHA-1), the `iterations` (default 600000), and the `salt`. The plaintext is validated as PKCS#8 before encryption, a default `prf` and `keyLength` are omitted so the parameters are byte-exact with OpenSSL, and the output is re-parsed before return. `decrypt(encrypted, password, opts)` recovers the inner `PrivateKeyInfo`, re-validated through `pki.schema.pkcs8.parse`: only PBES2 / PBKDF2 / AES-CBC is accepted (PBES1, PBMAC1, and scrypt are refused), the salt and iteration count are bounded before any derivation (`opts.maxIterations` lowers the cap), and a malformed parameter set or wrong-length IV is a distinct typed error. Because a MAC-less PBES2-CBC decrypt must not become a padding oracle (RFC 8018 §8), a wrong password and a valid-pad-but-not-a-key both surface the one uniform `key/decrypt-failed`. `export(key, opts)` and `import(input, opts)` move a private key as PKCS#8 or a public key as SubjectPublicKeyInfo. The key may come from the platform's WebCrypto or from a separately installed copy of this toolkit, and is exported through whichever holds its material; a non-extractable key, or one whose implementation keeps its material out of reach, is refused with that as the reason. Encoding is delegated to WebCrypto, so RSA carries an explicit NULL, EC a named curve, and Ed25519/Ed448/X25519/X448 omit parameters, and an ambiguous RSA or EC import requires `opts.algorithm`. `generate(algorithm, opts)` produces a key pair over RSA, ECDSA/ECDH, the Edwards and Montgomery curves, and the FIPS post-quantum ML-DSA and ML-KEM; `publicFromPrivate(privateKey)` derives the public key. Returns DER or PEM, with a typed `KeyError` on failure. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs8.parse` — `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `export`, `import`, `generate`, `publicFromPrivate` |
 | `pki.pkcs12` | PKCS#12 (.p12/.pfx) issuance and reading (RFC 7292 / RFC 9579). `build(spec, opts)` assembles a store from the OpenSSL-style `{ key, cert, ca?, friendlyName?, localKeyId? }` or the full `{ safeContents: [...] }`, where each element is a plaintext or PBES2-encrypted `SafeContents` of key, shroudedKey, cert, crl, secret, or nested `safeContents` bags. Keys and certs are validated before wrapping, and `friendlyName` (BMPString) and `localKeyId` are single-value. Integrity is a classic Appendix B HMAC (the default, for maximum interoperability) or an RFC 9579 PBMAC1 (`opts.mac.algorithm`) over SHA-256/384/512, with shrouded keys and cert safes encrypted under RFC 8018 PBES2 (AES-128/192/256-CBC). Every password is encoded the PKCS#12 way — BMPString+NULL for the classic MAC, UTF-8 for the PBES2 bags and PBMAC1 — which is what OpenSSL and NSS consume, so a file it emits opens in both, cross-checked bidirectionally. The MAC covers the exact AuthenticatedSafe byte range, a DEFAULT-1 `MacData.iterations` is rejected up front, and the store is re-parsed before return. `verifyMac(pfx, password, opts)` recomputes a classic or PBMAC1 MAC over `macedBytes` and constant-time-compares it, throwing on a MAC-less or public-key-integrity store. Public-key integrity (`opts.integrity.mode: "public-key"`) wraps the AuthenticatedSafe in a CMS SignedData instead of a MAC, signed by any `pki.cms.sign` signer and carrying no MacData (§4); privacy stays independent, so `password` still PBES2-encrypts the bags. Public-key privacy wraps a SafeContents as a CMS EnvelopedData (AES-CBC, `id-envelopedData`, never GCM) encrypted to recipient public keys through the `pki.cms.encrypt` recipient model, via per-safe `recipients` or the `opts.recipientCerts` convenience, restricted to certificate recipients (RSA-OAEP, ECDH, X25519, X448, ML-KEM) since a password or KEK recipient could not be reopened by `open`. All four integrity-by-privacy combinations are permitted (§3.1). `open(pfx, password, opts)` reads a store back: it verifies the MAC first, so a wrong password is the MAC verdict rather than a decrypt error, then PBES2-decrypts every privacy safe and shrouded key bag and returns `{ integrityMode, macVerified, signers, keys, certs, crls, secrets }` — keys as re-validated PKCS#8 DER, certs, CRLs and secrets as raw DER, all with `friendlyName` and `localKeyId`, nested safes recursively. A MAC-less store is refused unless `opts.allowUnauthenticated`. A public-key-integrity store is verified through its CMS SignedData signature first (`pkcs12/signature-invalid` on failure), with the signer surfaced in `signers` but never trust-chained, which remains the caller's `pki.path.validate` step. A legacy-PBE store's Appendix C 3DES and RC2 bags are decrypted, RC2 through an in-tree RFC 2268 cipher, so an `openssl pkcs12 -legacy` or NSS store opens; the legacy RC4 schemes are refused. An `id-envelopedData` safe is decrypted with `opts.recipientKey` after the integrity gate (`pkcs12/no-recipient-key` when absent), every recipient-side fault and every post-integrity decrypt failure collapsing to the uniform `pkcs12/decrypt-failed`, and `opts.keys: 'crypto'` imports each key to a `CryptoKey`. It reads what OpenSSL and NSS produce. Returns DER or a PEM `PKCS12`, with a typed `Pkcs12Error` on failure. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs12.parse` — `build`, `verifyMac`, `open` |
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.shbs` | Stateful hash-based signature verification: HSS/LMS (RFC 8554), carried in X.509 by RFC 9802 and in CMS by RFC 9708, profiled by NIST SP 800-208 for CNSA 2.0 firmware signing. `verify` checks an HSS signature, where every level must pass, and `verifyLms` a single-tree LMS, over the raw public-key and signature blobs the parsers already surface. Pure public-input SHA-256 and SHAKE256 hashing, a data-driven typecode registry, and bounds-before-slice reads; a malformed blob throws a typed `ShbsError` while a well-formed but wrong signature returns `false`. Verification only by design, since stateful signing needs atomic one-time-key state that belongs in an HSM. `pki.path.validate` verifies an HSS-signed certificate on its own, so a chain reaching one needs no separate call: the signature covers the whole tbsCertificate rather than a digest of it (RFC 9802 §7.1), and a CertificateList naming the algorithm takes the same route. It is proven against the self-signed certificate RFC 9802 Appendix A publishes — `verify`, `verifyLms` |
 | `pki.hpke` | Hybrid Public Key Encryption (RFC 9180), the encrypt-to-a-public-key primitive behind TLS ECH, MLS, and OHTTP. `setupS` and `setupR` establish a sender or recipient context (KEM encapsulation plus the HKDF key schedule); the context's `seal` and `open` AEAD-encrypt with a sequence-counter nonce, and `export` derives further secrets; the module-level `seal` and `open` are single-shot wrappers. DHKEM (P-256, P-521, X25519, X448) by HKDF-SHA256/SHA512 by AES-GCM / ChaCha20Poly1305 / export-only, across all four modes, proven against the RFC 9180 Appendix A vectors. DHKEM(P-384) and HKDF-SHA384 are RFC-registered but Appendix A ships no vector for them, so they fail closed until an authoritative KAT exists. Pure composition over `node:crypto`; ML-KEM and X-Wing are a registry data-row extension pending stable drafts — `suites`, `setupS`, `setupR`, `seal`, `open` |
 | `pki.kem` | Composite ML-KEM key establishment (draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem), a post-quantum ML-KEM hybridized with a traditional RSA-OAEP, ECDH, X25519, or X448 so the established secret holds if either component is later broken. `encapsulate` turns a recipient's composite `SubjectPublicKeyInfo` into a 256-bit shared secret and a ciphertext; `decapsulate` recovers the same secret from the ciphertext and the composite PKCS#8 private key. Each component KEM runs independently and the two secrets are mixed through a SHA3-256 combiner that binds the traditional ciphertext, the traditional public key, and a per-algorithm label. The twelve algorithms pair ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 with RSA-OAEP 2048/3072/4096, ECDH over P-256/P-384/P-521 and brainpoolP256r1/P384r1, X25519, and X448, each verified against the draft Appendix G known-answer vectors; a malformed key or ciphertext, an unsupported algorithm, or a component decapsulation failure throws a typed `KemError` — `encapsulate`, `decapsulate` |
-| `pki.sigstore` | Offline verifier for a Sigstore bundle, the artifact `npm publish --provenance` produces and the registry serves. `verifyBundle` composes five fail-closed legs against caller-pinned trust (Fulcio CA roots and Rekor log keys, never trusted from the bundle): the DSSE signature over its PAE preimage under the Fulcio leaf key, the ephemeral Fulcio certificate chain validated as of the Rekor log time, the RFC 9162 inclusion proof folded to a Rekor-signed tree root, the log entry bound to this exact signature, and the in-toto SLSA subject digest the caller confirms against the published artifact. It reuses the X.509 parser, the RFC 5280 path validator, and the Merkle verifier; the net-new codecs are the DSSE PAE byte-builder and a fail-closed JSON reader. `verified: true` says the artifact was signed and logged, not that a party you trust signed it — Fulcio issues to anyone who completes an OIDC flow, so who signed is decided only by `opts.identity`, and `identityChecked` reports which of its fields were compared. An identity policy naming no field, or a field name that is not one of the three, is refused rather than satisfied — either would accept every signer while reading as a policy in force — `pae`, `parseBundle`, `verifyBundle` |
+| `pki.sigstore` | Offline verifier for a Sigstore bundle, the artifact `npm publish --provenance` produces and the registry serves. `verifyBundle` composes five fail-closed legs against caller-pinned trust (Fulcio CA roots and Rekor log keys, never trusted from the bundle): the DSSE signature over its PAE preimage under the Fulcio leaf key, the ephemeral Fulcio certificate chain validated as of the Rekor log time, the RFC 9162 inclusion proof folded to a Rekor-signed tree root, the log entry bound to this exact signature, and the in-toto SLSA subject digest the caller confirms against the published artifact. It reuses the X.509 parser, the RFC 5280 path validator, and the Merkle verifier; the net-new codecs are the DSSE PAE byte-builder and a fail-closed JSON reader. `verified: true` says the artifact was signed and logged, not that a party you trust signed it — Fulcio issues to anyone who completes an OIDC flow, so who signed is decided only by `opts.identity`, and `identityChecked` reports which of its fields were compared. An identity policy naming no field, or a field name that is not one of the three, is refused rather than satisfied — either would accept every signer while reading as a policy in force. A sixth leg is opt-in: pinning the certificate-transparency logs in `opts.ctLogs` checks the receipt Fulcio embeds in the certificate it issues (RFC 6962 §3.2), verified over the certificate as it stood before the receipt was added and under the key of the log that issued it, so the verdict says the signing certificate was public when it was issued rather than handed out quietly. At least one receipt must verify against a pinned log, the verdict reports `sctChecked` and `validScts`, and an empty log set is refused rather than read as a policy that checks nothing — `pae`, `parseBundle`, `verifyBundle` |
 | `pki.inspect` | Human-readable inspection, the pure-JS equivalent of `openssl x509/crl/req/cms -text`. `certificate(pem \| der \| parsed)` renders an OpenSSL-style report: version, serial, signature algorithm, issuer and subject distinguished names, validity, public-key details (curve or modulus size plus the raw point or modulus), every decoded extension with its critical flag, and the signature. `crl`, `csr`, and `cms` render the other formats the same way — a CRL like `openssl crl -text`, a CSR like `openssl req -text`, and a CMS message like `openssl cms -cmsout -print`, with a stable summary for a non-SignedData ContentInfo — and `any(input)` detects the format and routes to the right report. Built over the strict parsers and the two-way OID registry with one set of field renderers, it names extension and algorithm OIDs an OpenSSL build shows only as raw bytes. No OpenSSL dependency, and the format is stable and OpenSSL-familiar rather than pinned to one OpenSSL version. A certificate policy's user notice renders as text, both its explicit text and a notice reference with the notice numbers that identify it, rather than hex, and a malformed part falls back to a hex dump rather than throwing — `certificate`, `crl`, `csr`, `cms`, `any` |
 | `pki.webauthn` | WebAuthn and passkey verification, both halves: offline trust evaluation of a W3C WebAuthn (Level 3) registration, and signature verification of the assertion every login returns. `parseAttestationObject(bytes)` decodes the CBOR attestation object, authenticatorData, and COSE credential key over the strict `pki.cbor` codec; `parseAuthenticatorData(bytes)` reads the bare form an assertion carries through the same parser; `parseClientData(bytes, opts)` decodes the `clientDataJSON` no signature check looks inside, through the shared JSON guard since these are attacker-chosen bytes, returning the challenge decoded so a caller compares bytes rather than spellings, and checking the ceremony type, challenge, and origin when the relying party supplies what it issued. `verifyAssertion(input)` verifies an assertion signature over `authenticatorData \|\| SHA-256(clientDataJSON)` — raw bytes, no COSE_Sign1, an ES256 signature in ASN.1 DER — and applies the §7.2 step 21 counter rule when a stored `previousSignCount` is given, so a counter that fails to advance is refused as a cloned authenticator. `verify(attestationObject, clientDataHash, opts)` checks the attestation-statement signature and each format's structural bindings for packed, tpm, android-key, apple, fido-u2f, and none: the x5c leaf key, the apple nonce, the tpm `certInfo` Name and `extraData` over the `pubArea`, the android `KeyDescription`, and the fido-u2f `verificationData`. It binds the credential public key to each attestation, through the signed authenticatorData for packed and fido-u2f or a cert or `pubArea`-key equality check for android-key, apple, and tpm, and enforces each leaf's certificate requirements. The credential-key check covers the full WebAuthn COSE algorithm set — ES256/384/512, RS256/384/512, PS256/384/512, EdDSA (Ed25519), and the RFC 9864 fully-specified identifiers ESP256/384/512, Ed25519, and Ed448 — validating the public-key point on its curve, rejecting the compressed EC point form, and enforcing a minimally encoded DER ECDSA signature. The verdict field is `attestationVerified`, and `signatureVerified` for an assertion, rather than a bare `verified`, because a sound statement is a different claim from an acceptable ceremony: an attestation naming another origin's RP ID with user presence clear is perfectly sound and must not be registered. Pass `expectedRpId`, `requireUserPresence`, `requireUserVerification`, or `allowedAlgorithms` and those are checked, with `bindingChecked` reporting which ran, so a check that passed can be told from one that never happened. Pass `opts.clientDataJSON` instead of the digest and the client data is read here too: the ceremony type is checked unconditionally, since a login response replayed into a registration is what that rule stops, and the challenge, origin, and top-level origin are checked against what the relying party issued, with `clientData.checked` reporting which comparisons ran. A registration verdict also carries the `credentialId`, `credentialPublicKey`, and initial `signCount` a later login needs. A credential key declaring COSE algorithm `-65535` (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-1) is refused unless `allowedAlgorithms` names it, since every signature that credential ever makes would use SHA-1. Anchoring the trust path has two routes: `opts.metadata` resolves the roots the authenticator's own model registered, and `opts.rootCertificates` pins roots directly, which is what anchors the formats FIDO MDS does not cover, Apple's authenticators and the Google hardware-attestation roots among them. `metadata` governs when both are given, and `anchoredTo` names every route that anchored the path, joined with `+` when more than one did: `"metadata"`, `"rootCertificates"`, and `"safetyNetRoots"` for the android-safetynet chain, which anchors through the roots that format requires whether or not either other route was asked for. It is `null` only when nothing anchored the path. `verifyMetadataBlob(blob, opts)` reads a FIDO Metadata Service (MDS v3) BLOB, the signed catalogue of registered authenticator models, verifying its JWS and chaining its signer to an operator-supplied FIDO root before the payload is parsed, with sequence-number rollback and `nextUpdate` freshness checks. Passing the result as `opts.metadata` to `verify` resolves the authenticator's registered attestation roots from its identifier and requires the trust path to fully validate to one of them, refusing an unlisted or revoked model. `metadataAnchors(entry, opts)` applies the same status gate for a caller anchoring the path themselves: a model the catalogue has disqualified registers no anchors. Both of the catalogue's key spaces are covered: an aaguid, and the attestation-certificate key identifiers a U2F authenticator is listed under instead. No FIDO root is bundled, there is no trust-on-first-use, and retrieving the BLOB is out of scope. Fail-closed with typed `webauthn/*` errors — `parseAttestationObject`, `verify`, `verifyMetadataBlob`, `metadataFor`, `metadataAnchors` |
 | `pki.lint` | Certificate linting, the zlint or pkilint of JavaScript. `certificate(pem \| der \| parsed, opts)` walks a parsed certificate and emits graded advisory findings, each with a stable id, a severity (`fatal`, `error`, `warn`, `notice`), a source, a spec-clause citation, and a message, against the RFC 5280 profile plus a representative CA/Browser Forum TLS BR subset: serial sign and size, validity ordering and the SC081v3 reducing validity schedule, keyCertSign coherence, extension criticality (basicConstraints, nameConstraints, policyConstraints and inhibitAnyPolicy must be critical, and keyUsage should be), nameConstraints CA-scope, unknown critical extensions, empty-subject SAN, SKI and AKI presence including the end-entity subjectKeyIdentifier, SAN required and CN-in-SAN, dNSName syntax, serverAuth EKU, weak keys, and the §4.2.1.4 certificate-policy user-notice rules (a VisibleString or BMPString explicitText, a notice past 200 characters, an empty notice, control characters, and a non-NFC UTF8String notice, each at the strength the clause states). Alone among these entries the data path never throws: hostile bytes return a `fatal` `lint/unparseable` finding carrying the strict parser's code, so a whole directory lints without a try/catch, and only config-time misuse throws a typed `LintError` — `certificate`, `rules`, `profiles` |

package/lib/cmp-session.js

@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ var OID_KEY_USAGE = oid.byName("keyUsage");
 var HASH_OID_TO_DIGEST = Object.create(null);
 [["sha256", "SHA-256"], ["sha384", "SHA-384"], ["sha512", "SHA-512"]].forEach(function (row) { var o = oid.byName(row[0]); if (o) HASH_OID_TO_DIGEST[o] = row[1]; });
 var COMPOSITE_PH_HASHALG = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { "SHA-256": "sha256", "SHA-384": "sha384", "SHA-512": "sha512" });
+var RESUMABLE_ARMS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { ip: 1, cp: 1, kup: 1 });
+var RESUME_TOKEN_KEYS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
+  transactionId: 1, recipNonce: 1, certReqId: 1, arm: 1, polls: 1, requestedSpki: 1,
+  signer: 1, signerCache: 1, chain: 1, caPubs: 1, nextPollAt: 1, implicitConfirm: 1, protection: 1,
+});
+var RESUMABLE_PROTECTION = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { signature: 1, mac: 1 });
 
 var KNOWN_SESSION_OPTS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
   url: 1, key: 1, cert: 1, mac: 1, trustAnchors: 1, intermediates: 1, recipient: 1, sender: 1,
@@ -98,6 +104,16 @@ Object.keys(constants.NAMES.CRL_REASON).forEach(function (v) { CRL_REASON_NAMES[
 
 function _isGranted(code) { return code === 0 || code === 1; }
 var PKI_STATUS_NAMES = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { 0: "accepted", 1: "grantedWithMods", 2: "rejection", 3: "waiting" });
+var PKI_STATUS_WAITING = 3;
+/** @internal The status a transaction a token can continue is in, by construction: a token exists only
+ * because a response said waiting, and a poll that times out is still waiting. A process that read no
+ * CertResponse of its own reports this, so a wait split across processes reads the same as one held in a
+ * single process. The authority's own diagnostic strings are not reproduced from stored state, since a
+ * verdict must not present text the authority did not sign in this exchange as though it had. */
+function _waitingStatus() {
+  return { status: { code: PKI_STATUS_WAITING, name: PKI_STATUS_NAMES[PKI_STATUS_WAITING] },
+    statusString: null, failInfo: null };
+}
 
 function _certReqIdEq(a, b) { return a != null && b != null && BigInt(a) === BigInt(b); }
 
@@ -125,8 +141,12 @@ function _certIdentity(cert) {
 
 function _spkiKeyIdentity(spkiDer) {
   var node = asn1.decode(spkiDer);
+  _expectSeq(node, 2, 2);
   var algId = node.children[0];
+  _expectSeq(algId, 1, 2);
   var algOid = asn1.read.oid(algId.children[0]);
+  var key = guard.crypto.assertOctetAligned(asn1.read.bitString(node.children[1]), _err,
+    "cmp/bad-input", "a SubjectPublicKeyInfo subjectPublicKey");
   var pn = algId.children[1];
   var params;
   if (algOid === OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION) {
@@ -134,10 +154,40 @@ function _spkiKeyIdentity(spkiDer) {
   } else {
     params = pn ? pn.bytes.toString("latin1") : "";
   }
-  return algOid + "|" + params + "|" + node.children[1].bytes.toString("latin1");
+  return algOid + "|" + params + "|" + key.bytes.toString("latin1");
+}
+/** @internal A SubjectPublicKeyInfo and the AlgorithmIdentifier inside it are SEQUENCEs of a known
+ * width. Reading a child without asking for the shape reads whatever sits in that position, which is
+ * how DER that is not a public key at all is fingerprinted as one. */
+function _expectSeq(node, min, max) {
+  if (node.tagClass !== "universal" || node.tagNumber !== 16 || !node.children ||
+      node.children.length < min || node.children.length > max) {
+    throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "a SubjectPublicKeyInfo is a SEQUENCE of an AlgorithmIdentifier and a BIT STRING (RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.7)");
+  }
 }
 function _isDerNull(pn) { return pn.tagClass === "universal" && pn.tagNumber === 5 && pn.content.length === 0; }
 
+var CERT_MAX_BYTES = constants.LIMITS.DER_MAX_BYTES;
+/** @internal The spelling `String(BigInt)` produces, and only that one: an optional leading minus
+ * (0x2d), then ASCII digits (0x30 to 0x39), with a leading zero only when the value is zero itself, so
+ * `007` and `-0` are refused along with every non-digit. */
+function _isCanonicalDecimal(s) {
+  var i = s.charCodeAt(0) === CH_MINUS ? 1 : 0;
+  if (i >= s.length) return false;
+  for (var j = i; j < s.length; j++) {
+    var c = s.charCodeAt(j);
+    if (c < CH_ZERO || c > CH_NINE) return false;
+  }
+  var leadingZero = s.charCodeAt(i) === CH_ZERO;
+  if (leadingZero && s.length - i > 1) return false;
+  return !(leadingZero && i === 1);
+}
+var CH_MINUS = 0x2d, CH_ZERO = 0x30, CH_NINE = 0x39;
+/** @internal A ceiling on the decimal string, not on the identifier: converting one to a BigInt costs
+ * more than linear time, so the length is bounded before the conversion runs. It sits above the widest
+ * identifier the codec encodes (an INTEGER of the maximum width takes about 2.41 digits per byte), and
+ * the encoder itself is what the door then holds the converted value to. */
+var CERTREQID_MAX_DIGITS = constants.LIMITS.DER_MAX_INTEGER_BYTES * 3;
 var MAX_EXTRA_CERTS = 32, MAX_EXTRA_SCAN = 256;
 var CAPUBS_MAX = 2 * MAX_EXTRA_CERTS;
 var SESSION_MAX_INTERMEDIATES = constants.LIMITS.PATH_BUILD_MAX_CANDIDATES - CAPUBS_MAX - MAX_EXTRA_CERTS;
@@ -229,11 +279,42 @@ function _certConfHash(certDer) {
  * confirms it (`certConf` -> `pkiConf`, unless an `implicitConfirm` was granted). A verified `rejection` /
  * `error` or a poll-budget timeout is a terminal typed verdict the caller reads (`outcome`:
  * `issued` / `rejected` / `poll-timeout`); a tampered / unverifiable / desynchronized response is a
- * hard-stop `CmpError` throw. Exactly one protection flavor: `{ key, cert }` (signature) XOR `{ mac }`
+ * hard-stop `CmpError` throw.
+ *
+ * A certification authority can take longer to answer than a process is held open, so a `poll-timeout`
+ * carries a `resumeToken` and `session.resumePoll(token)` continues the same transaction in a later
+ * one. The token is plain JSON: the transaction identifier, the nonce the next request must echo, the
+ * polled request identifier (a decimal string, so an identifier of any width survives) and the arm its
+ * grant arrives on, whether the request that opened the transaction asked for implicit confirmation,
+ * how the transaction authenticates, the polls already spent, the key the grant must certify, the signer identity the
+ * first process authenticated and, separately, the certificate it currently verifies a response with
+ * when that response omits its extraCerts, the certificates the authority had already sent, and the
+ * instant its own `checkAfter` allows the next poll. It carries no secret, because the protection material and the
+ * endpoint come from the session built to resume with, and it grants nothing: the resumed poll verifies
+ * and nonce-binds every response, holds it to the signer identity the token names, and holds the grant to
+ * the key the token names. Those fields are what the exchange is held to, so the token is
+ * integrity-sensitive: someone who can rewrite it can widen what the resumed session accepts, as far as
+ * that session's trust anchors and the authority's protection allow and no further. Store it the way the
+ * enrollment's own state is stored, and resume it in a session configured the way the first one was: the
+ * token carries what the transaction established, and the protection material, the trust anchors, the
+ * endpoint and an `expectedSender` pin are given again, so a resumed poll accepts and refuses exactly
+ * what an uninterrupted one in the same session would. The authority's polling interval is waited out
+ * before the first resumed request, while this session's own `maxTotalWait` still bounds it: a
+ * remainder longer than the budget times out now and hands the same due time on. A further timeout
+ * hands back a token again, so a wait can span any number of processes, and each timeout reports the
+ * waiting status whether or not that process read a CertResponse of its own. The authority's own
+ * diagnostic strings are not reproduced from the token, so a verdict never presents text as the
+ * authority's that it did not send in that exchange. A token is refused before a
+ * request is sent when it is mis-shaped, when the key it names is not a `SubjectPublicKeyInfo`, when a
+ * field that names a certificate is not one, or when it carries more certificates than the list it
+ * restores is built under. The two fields that bind the transaction are required rather than
+ * optional, since a token lives in storage where it can be edited and dropping a field must not drop
+ * the check it feeds: the key the grant is held to, and, for a signature session, the identity every
+ * response is held to. A shared-secret session pins no certificate, and its secret is the binding. Exactly one protection flavor: `{ key, cert }` (signature) XOR `{ mac }`
  * (PBMAC1). A crypto-valid response is not enough: the signer must chain to a supplied trust anchor
  * (signature) or the shared secret must match (MAC); a valid-but-untrusted response is a hard stop, so the
  * signature flavor REQUIRES `opts.trustAnchors` at construction. Returns a session with `enroll(request)`,
- * `revoke(request)`, `info(request)`,
+ * `resumePoll(token)`, `revoke(request)`, `info(request)`,
  * and read-only `transactionID` + `transcript` (each leg's request/response bytes, retained up to a
  * transaction-wide cap; a later leg beyond the cap keeps its metadata + `byteLength` but drops the payload as
  * `bytes: null, truncated: true`, so a padded-response flood across polls cannot exhaust memory). The granted certificate must be valid X.509, carry the key
@@ -361,11 +442,11 @@ function session(opts) {
   var maxTotalWait = guard.limits.cap(opts.maxTotalWait, "opts.maxTotalWait", DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_WAIT, { E: _err, code: "cmp/bad-input", min: 0, max: retryAfter.MAX_RETRY_AFTER_SECONDS });
   var sleep = opts.sleep || sleepUtil.sleep;
 
-  var transactionID = Buffer.from(webcrypto.webcrypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16)));
+  var transactionID = Buffer.from(webcrypto.webcrypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(constants.LIMITS.CMP_TRANSACTION_ID_BYTES)));
   var lastPeerNonce = null;
   var haveResponse = false;
   var cachedSignerCert = null;
-  var pinnedSignerCert = null, signerPinned = false;
+  var pinnedSignerCert = null, pinnedSignerDer = null, signerPinned = false;
   var cachedChain = [];
   var caPubsAccum = [];
   var caPubsSeen = Object.create(null);
@@ -377,12 +458,32 @@ function session(opts) {
   var expectedInfoOp = null;
   var crlQuery = null;
   var requestedSpki = null;
+  /** @internal What the request asked for, not what this session was configured with. A resumed poll
+   * finishes a transaction whose confirmation was negotiated in a request an earlier process sent, so
+   * the grant is confirmed the way that request asked and not the way this session's options read. */
+  var requestedImplicitConfirm = opts.implicitConfirm === true;
   var inFlight = false, completed = false, started = false;
   var transcript = [];
   var transcriptBytes = 0;
-  var _perRespCap = (typeof opts.maxResponseBytes === "number" && isFinite(opts.maxResponseBytes) && opts.maxResponseBytes > 0) ? opts.maxResponseBytes : constants.LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES;
+  /** @internal The response size is a bound the token decode and the certificate pools are measured
+   * against, so it is checked here rather than at the first transfer: a value that is not a positive
+   * whole number of bytes is refused where it is supplied, not carried into whatever reads it first. */
+  var _perRespCap = opts.maxResponseBytes == null ? constants.LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES
+    : guard.limits.cap(opts.maxResponseBytes, "opts.maxResponseBytes", constants.LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES,
+      { E: _err, code: "cmp/bad-input", min: 1, max: constants.LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES });
   var transcriptCap = _perRespCap * TRANSCRIPT_RETAIN_RESPONSES;
   var caPubsByteBudget = _perRespCap * TRANSCRIPT_RETAIN_RESPONSES;
+  /** @internal What a restored token's certificates are held to, which is what the list it restores can
+   * hold. Every bound below is a module constant or the response size, which `guard.limits.cap` has
+   * already refused unless it is a positive whole number, so none can arrive unusable. The authority's
+   * own pool arrives in responses, so it keeps both the response size and the
+   * total the session accumulates under. The chain that validates the signer is also built from
+   * `opts.intermediates`, whose certificates never crossed the wire and are bounded only by the path
+   * length and the codec, so those two are its bounds and it carries no third one: a session holds a
+   * caller's intermediates at that same size already, and a total below the two would refuse a token
+   * the session itself issued. */
+  var CAPUBS_LIMIT = { count: CAPUBS_MAX, each: _perRespCap, total: caPubsByteBudget };
+  var CHAIN_LIMIT = { count: constants.LIMITS.PATH_MAX_CERTS, each: CERT_MAX_BYTES, total: null };
 
   var NULL_DN = { directoryName: [] };
   var defaultSender = NULL_DN;
@@ -443,7 +544,7 @@ function session(opts) {
 
   async function _send(bodySpec, arm) {
     var fresh = Buffer.from(webcrypto.webcrypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16)));
-    var header = Object.assign(_baseHeader(fresh), ENROLL_ARMS[arm] && opts.implicitConfirm ? { generalInfo: [{ infoType: "implicitConfirm" }] } : {});
+    var header = Object.assign(_baseHeader(fresh), ENROLL_ARMS[arm] && requestedImplicitConfirm ? { generalInfo: [{ infoType: "implicitConfirm" }] } : {});
     var reqDer = await cmp.build({ header: header, body: bodySpec }, _buildOpts());
     _recordTranscript({ direction: "out", arm: arm, bytes: reqDer });
     var engaged = false;
@@ -476,7 +577,7 @@ function session(opts) {
       if (_expectedSenderCert && !cmp.senderBoundToCert(verdict.header.sender, _expectedSenderCert)) {
         throw _err("cmp/untrusted-signer", "the response signer does not match the expected CA identity (opts.expectedSender) -- refusing a response from a different trusted signer", null);
       }
-      if (!signerPinned) { pinnedSignerCert = x509.parse(verdict.signer.cert); signerPinned = true; }
+      if (!signerPinned) { pinnedSignerCert = x509.parse(verdict.signer.cert); pinnedSignerDer = Buffer.from(verdict.signer.cert); signerPinned = true; }
       else if (!cmp.senderBoundToCert(verdict.header.sender, pinnedSignerCert)) {
         throw _err("cmp/untrusted-signer", "the response signer identity changed mid-transaction -- a different trusted signer, not a same-identity certificate rotation; the transaction is NOT advanced", null);
       }
@@ -610,6 +711,60 @@ function session(opts) {
       return c;
     });
   }
+  /** @internal What a later process needs to carry THIS transaction on: the identifier the exchange is
+   * keyed by, the nonce the next request must echo, which request is being polled and on which arm its
+   * grant will arrive, and the key the grant must certify (RFC 9810 sec. 5.1.1). Plain JSON values, since
+   * it crosses a process boundary. Everything else, the protection material and the endpoint, comes from
+   * the session the caller builds to resume with, so the token carries no secret. */
+  /** @internal The instant an outstanding checkAfter falls due, or null when the authority named none. */
+  function _pollDueAt(dueInSeconds) {
+    if (typeof dueInSeconds !== "number" || !isFinite(dueInSeconds) || dueInSeconds <= 0) return null;
+    return guard.time.instantOf(new Date()) + constants.TIME.seconds(dueInSeconds);
+  }
+
+  function _resumeToken(polls, nextPollAt) {
+    /** @internal Only an enrollment reaches here, and only after a response, so the nonce to echo is the
+     * one thing that could still be missing: a responder that omitted its senderNonce leaves the chain
+     * unable to continue, and a token that cannot be continued is not offered. */
+    if (!Buffer.isBuffer(lastPeerNonce) || lastPeerNonce.length === 0) return null;
+    /** @internal Two different certificates: the identity pinned on the FIRST response, which every
+     * later response is bound to, and the one currently used to verify when a response omits its
+     * extraCerts. A same-identity rotation moves the second and never the first, so collapsing them
+     * would let a restart accept an identity the uninterrupted transaction refuses. */
+    var pinDer = pinnedSignerDer;
+    return {
+      transactionId: transactionID.toString("hex"),
+      recipNonce: lastPeerNonce.toString("base64"),
+      /** @internal A request identifier is an INTEGER of any width, so it travels as a decimal string:
+       * a BigInt is not JSON, and a token that cannot be serialized is not a resumable one. */
+      certReqId: activeCertReqId.toString(),
+      arm: expectedRespArm,
+      polls: polls,
+      /** @internal Negotiated in the request this token continues, so it travels with the transaction:
+       * a later process confirms the grant the way that request asked, whatever its own options say. */
+      implicitConfirm: requestedImplicitConfirm,
+      /** @internal How the exchange authenticates. The signer identity below is only a binding under
+       * signature protection; under a shared secret the secret is the binding, so a session resuming
+       * this transaction has to authenticate it the way the transaction already does. */
+      protection: isSig ? "signature" : "mac",
+      requestedSpki: requestedSpki ? Buffer.from(requestedSpki).toString("base64") : null,
+      /** @internal The identity the first process pinned on the first response it verified. Restoring it
+       * is what keeps a restart from admitting a DIFFERENT trusted signer, which an uninterrupted
+       * transaction refuses (RFC 9483 sec. 3.1), and it carries the certificate a responder that sent
+       * its chain only once would not send again. */
+      signer: pinDer ? Buffer.from(pinDer).toString("base64") : null,
+      signerCache: cachedSignerCert != null ? Buffer.from(cachedSignerCert).toString("base64") : null,
+      chain: cachedChain.map(function (c) { return Buffer.from(c).toString("base64"); }),
+      /** @internal An authority may deliver the issued certificate's intermediate in a WAITING response
+       * and omit it from the grant, so the certificates accumulated before the timeout travel too, or
+       * the resumed grant would fail a validation the uninterrupted transaction passes. */
+      caPubs: caPubsAccum.map(function (c) { return Buffer.from(c).toString("base64"); }),
+      /** @internal The instant the authority's own checkAfter allows the next poll. Resuming earlier
+       * would poll faster than it asked to be polled. */
+      nextPollAt: nextPollAt != null ? nextPollAt : null,
+    };
+  }
+
   function _terminal(outcome, extra) {
     return guard.verdict.of({
       outcome: outcome, certificate: null, chain: [], status: null, trusted: true,
@@ -618,8 +773,8 @@ function session(opts) {
     }, extra);
   }
 
-  async function _pollLoop(lastWaitingResp) {
-    var polls = 0, waited = 0, lastStatus = _statusOf(lastWaitingResp);
+  async function _pollLoop(lastWaitingResp, alreadyWaited) {
+    var polls = 0, waited = alreadyWaited || 0, lastStatus = _statusOf(lastWaitingResp);
     for (;;) {
       if (polls >= maxPolls || waited > maxTotalWait) return { timeout: true, polls: polls, status: lastStatus };
       var verdict = await _send({ pollReq: [{ certReqId: activeCertReqId }] }, "pollReq");
@@ -632,8 +787,11 @@ function session(opts) {
         if (!entry) return { done: { state: "unexpected", reason: "a pollRep carried no entry for certReqId " + activeCertReqId }, polls: polls, header: verdict.header };
         var checkAfter = typeof entry.checkAfter === "number" ? entry.checkAfter : 0;
         waited += checkAfter;
-        if (waited > maxTotalWait) return { timeout: true, polls: polls, status: lastStatus };
-        if (polls >= maxPolls) return { timeout: true, polls: polls, status: lastStatus };
+        /** @internal The authority asked to be polled again after `checkAfter`, and the budget ran out
+         * before that wait was taken. Reporting it lets a resumed poll honor the interval rather than
+         * poll immediately in a new process. */
+        if (waited > maxTotalWait) return { timeout: true, polls: polls, status: lastStatus, dueIn: checkAfter };
+        if (polls >= maxPolls) return { timeout: true, polls: polls, status: lastStatus, dueIn: checkAfter };
         await sleep(checkAfter * constants.TIME.seconds(1));
         continue;
       }
@@ -643,7 +801,7 @@ function session(opts) {
   }
 
   async function _confirm(certDer, header, info) {
-    if (opts.implicitConfirm && _implicitConfirmGranted(header)) return { confirmed: true, implicit: true };
+    if (requestedImplicitConfirm && _implicitConfirmGranted(header)) return { confirmed: true, implicit: true };
     var accept = true;
     if (typeof opts.acceptCert === "function") accept = (await opts.acceptCert(Buffer.from(certDer), info)) === true;
     var h = _certConfHash(certDer);
@@ -664,8 +822,13 @@ function session(opts) {
     var parsed;
     try { parsed = x509.parse(cert); }
     catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-cert-response", "the granted CertResponse's certificate is not a valid X.509 certificate", e); }
-    if (requestedSpki != null && _spkiKeyIdentity(parsed.subjectPublicKeyInfo.bytes) !== _spkiKeyIdentity(requestedSpki)) {
-      throw _err("cmp/bad-cert-response", "the issued certificate's public key does not match the requested key -- a misrouted certificate the caller has no private key for");
+    if (requestedSpki != null) {
+      var granted, wanted;
+      try { granted = _spkiKeyIdentity(parsed.subjectPublicKeyInfo.bytes); wanted = _spkiKeyIdentity(requestedSpki); }
+      catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-cert-response", "the issued certificate's public key cannot be compared with the requested key", e); }
+      if (granted !== wanted) {
+        throw _err("cmp/bad-cert-response", "the issued certificate's public key does not match the requested key -- a misrouted certificate the caller has no private key for");
+      }
     }
     return cert;
   }
@@ -780,7 +943,7 @@ function session(opts) {
       if (t.state === "waiting") {
         var polled = await _pollLoop(t.resp);
         pollCount = polled.polls;
-        if (polled.timeout) return _terminal("poll-timeout", { status: polled.status, polls: pollCount });
+        if (polled.timeout) return _terminal("poll-timeout", { status: polled.status, polls: pollCount, resumeToken: _resumeToken(pollCount, _pollDueAt(polled.dueIn)) });
         t = polled.done;
         grantHeader = polled.header;
         t.polls = pollCount;
@@ -794,6 +957,248 @@ function session(opts) {
     }
   }
 
+  /** @internal The state a poll-timeout handed the caller, read back. It is the caller's own record of
+   * a transaction it started, so it says WHICH exchange to continue, never who may continue it: the
+   * protection material and the endpoint come from this session, every response is verified the way the
+   * first process verified them, and the grant is still bound to the key the token names. */
+  function _readResumeToken(token) {
+    if (token === null || typeof token !== "object" || Array.isArray(token)) {
+      throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "resumePoll expects the resumeToken a poll-timeout verdict carried");
+    }
+    guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(token, RESUME_TOKEN_KEYS, _err, "cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken has an unknown field ");
+    /** @internal Every field is taken once, here, and the checks below run on what was taken. A token is
+     * any object a caller hands in, so a field read a second time can answer differently than it did when
+     * it was checked, and the restored state would carry the second answer past the check. */
+    var raw = {
+      transactionId: token.transactionId, recipNonce: token.recipNonce, certReqId: token.certReqId,
+      arm: token.arm, polls: token.polls, requestedSpki: token.requestedSpki, signer: token.signer,
+      signerCache: token.signerCache, chain: token.chain, caPubs: token.caPubs,
+      nextPollAt: token.nextPollAt, implicitConfirm: token.implicitConfirm,
+      protection: token.protection,
+    };
+    var txn = _hexField(raw.transactionId, "transactionId");
+    /** @internal The width a first message opens a transaction with (RFC 9483 sec. 3.1), which is the
+     * width this session writes, so a token naming any other names a transaction it cannot have opened. */
+    if (txn.length !== constants.LIMITS.CMP_TRANSACTION_ID_BYTES) {
+      throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken transactionId must name the transaction to continue, as the " + constants.LIMITS.CMP_TRANSACTION_ID_BYTES + " bytes a first message opens one with (RFC 9483 sec. 3.1)");
+    }
+    var nonce = _b64Field(raw.recipNonce, "recipNonce");
+    /** @internal The same floor a received message is held to, so a nonce no response could have carried
+     * is refused here rather than echoed into a request that cannot continue the chain. */
+    if (nonce.length < constants.LIMITS.CMP_MIN_NONCE_BYTES) {
+      throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken recipNonce must carry the nonce the next request echoes, at least " + constants.LIMITS.CMP_MIN_NONCE_BYTES + " bytes of it (RFC 9483 sec. 3.5)");
+    }
+    /** @internal A decimal string, so an identifier of any width a request can carry survives the round
+     * trip, including the PKCS#10 sentinel (-1, which names the whole message rather than one request).
+     * The reader accepts every identifier an enrollment can put in a token: it names which response to
+     * match, and the grant is bound by the nonce, the protection, the signer and the key. */
+    var certReqId;
+    if (typeof raw.certReqId !== "string" || raw.certReqId.length === 0 || raw.certReqId.length > CERTREQID_MAX_DIGITS) {
+      throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken certReqId must be a decimal string identifying the polled request, of at most " + CERTREQID_MAX_DIGITS + " characters");
+    }
+    /** @internal `BigInt` also reads a hexadecimal, binary or octal literal, a leading plus and
+     * surrounding whitespace, none of which a token carries: the identifier is written the way the
+     * emitting session writes it, so anything else names a different request than it appears to. */
+    if (!_isCanonicalDecimal(raw.certReqId)) {
+      throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken certReqId must be written as the emitting session writes it, in decimal with no sign but a leading minus, no leading zero and no surrounding space");
+    }
+    try { certReqId = BigInt(raw.certReqId); }
+    catch (_e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken certReqId must be a decimal string identifying the polled request"); }
+    /** @internal The identifier is encoded again on the next request, so the door asks the encoder what
+     * it accepts rather than approximating it from a digit count: a width the encoder refuses would
+     * otherwise pass here and fail after the restored state had already consumed the session. */
+    try { asn1.build.integer(certReqId); }
+    catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken certReqId is wider than a CertReqMsg request identifier can encode", e); }
+    var arm = raw.arm;
+    if (typeof arm !== "string" || RESUMABLE_ARMS[arm] !== 1) {
+      throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken arm must be an enrollment response arm (ip, cp or kup), got " + guard.text.showValue(arm));
+    }
+    var polls = raw.polls;
+    if (polls != null && (!Number.isInteger(polls) || polls < 0)) {
+      throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken polls must be a non-negative integer count of the polls already spent");
+    }
+    /** @internal A token is state a caller stored, and storage is where it can be edited. Dropping a
+     * field must not drop the check that field feeds, so the two that bind the transaction are required:
+     * the key the grant is held to, and, for a signature session, the identity every response is held
+     * to. A shared-secret session pins no certificate, and its secret is the binding instead. */
+    if (raw.requestedSpki == null) {
+      throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken requestedSpki must name the key the granted certificate certifies -- without it the grant would be bound to nothing");
+    }
+    var spki = _b64Field(raw.requestedSpki, "requestedSpki", CERT_MAX_BYTES);
+    /** @internal Read at the door, not when the grant arrives: stored state that is not a public key
+     * would otherwise advance the exchange with the authority before it was found to be unusable. */
+    try { _spkiKeyIdentity(spki); }
+    catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken requestedSpki is not a SubjectPublicKeyInfo", e); }
+    var signer = null;
+    if (raw.signer != null) signer = _certField(raw.signer, "signer", CERT_MAX_BYTES);
+    else if (isSig) {
+      throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken signer must name the identity the transaction authenticated -- without it a resumed response from a different trusted signer would be accepted (RFC 9483 sec. 3.1)");
+    }
+    var signerCache = null;
+    if (raw.signerCache != null) signerCache = _certField(raw.signerCache, "signerCache", CERT_MAX_BYTES);
+    var chain = _certListField(raw.chain, "chain", CHAIN_LIMIT);
+    var caPubs = _certListField(raw.caPubs, "caPubs", CAPUBS_LIMIT);
+    /** @internal How the transaction authenticates is fixed by the request that opened it, and the two
+     * flavors bind a response differently: under signature protection the pinned signer identity is the
+     * binding, and under a shared secret the secret is. A session that authenticates the other way would
+     * carry the transaction on under a binding it never had, so it is refused rather than adapted to.
+     * A token trimmed of the field is read from its own contents rather than from this session, since
+     * taking it from the session would let either flavor answer for the other: a signature transaction
+     * pins the signer it authenticated, and a shared-secret one has none to pin. */
+    var protection = raw.protection == null ? (raw.signer != null ? "signature" : "mac") : raw.protection;
+    if (typeof protection !== "string" || RESUMABLE_PROTECTION[protection] !== 1) {
+      throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken protection must name how the transaction authenticates, either signature or mac, got " + guard.text.showValue(raw.protection));
+    }
+    if ((protection === "signature") !== isSig) {
+      throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken continues a transaction protected by " + protection + ", so it cannot be resumed by a session protected by " + (isSig ? "signature" : "mac") + " (RFC 9483 sec. 3.1 binds a transaction to how its sender authenticates)");
+    }
+    /** @internal Read from the token, never from this session's option, since it is what the request
+     * that opened the transaction asked for. A token that omits it resumes as though the request asked
+     * for nothing, which sends a certConf the authority may already have made unnecessary but never
+     * accepts an implicit confirmation the request did not solicit. */
+    var implicitConfirm = raw.implicitConfirm == null ? false : raw.implicitConfirm;
+    if (typeof implicitConfirm !== "boolean") {
+      throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken implicitConfirm must be a boolean saying whether the request that opened this transaction asked for implicit confirmation");
+    }
+    /** @internal The same pairing the constructor refuses, refused again where the token can reintroduce
+     * it: an implicitly confirmed grant has no certConf leg, so a policy that vets one would never run. */
+    if (implicitConfirm === true && typeof opts.acceptCert === "function") {
+      throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken continues a transaction that asked for implicit confirmation, which leaves no certConf leg for opts.acceptCert to reject on -- resume it with a session that vets no grant");
+    }
+    var nextPollAt = raw.nextPollAt;
+    if (nextPollAt != null && (typeof nextPollAt !== "number" || !isFinite(nextPollAt) || nextPollAt < 0)) {
+      throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken nextPollAt must be the instant the next poll is due, in milliseconds since the epoch");
+    }
+    return { transactionID: txn, recipNonce: nonce, certReqId: certReqId, arm: arm,
+      implicitConfirm: implicitConfirm,
+      polls: polls || 0, requestedSpki: spki, signer: signer, signerCache: signerCache,
+      chain: chain, caPubs: caPubs,
+      nextPollAt: nextPollAt != null ? nextPollAt : null };
+  }
+
+  /** @internal The token crosses a process boundary as text, so each field is decoded through the
+   * canonical readers, which refuse a non-alphabet character, a short group and a re-encoding that does
+   * not reproduce the input, and cap the size before allocating. */
+  function _hexField(v, name) {
+    return guard.encoding.hex(v, _perRespCap, _err, "cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken " + name);
+  }
+
+  function _b64Field(v, name, cap) {
+    return guard.encoding.base64(v, cap || _perRespCap, _err, "cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken " + name);
+  }
+
+  /** @internal A certificate the token carries. Parsed at the door, not when it is first needed: stored
+   * bytes that are not a certificate would otherwise advance the exchange with the authority, spending a
+   * nonce the token cannot be used again after, before they were found to be unusable. The cap is the
+   * one the bytes were admitted under. A response-borne certificate is held to the response size, while
+   * the signer identity and the chain that validates it can be a certificate the caller supplied through
+   * `opts.intermediates`, which never crossed the wire and is bounded by the codec instead. */
+  function _certField(v, name, cap) {
+    var der = _b64Field(v, name, cap);
+    try { x509.parse(der); }
+    catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken " + name + " is not a certificate", e); }
+    return der;
+  }
+
+  /** @internal A list of certificates the token carries, held to the count and the total size the list it
+   * restores is built under, so a token cannot hand a resumed transaction a larger pool than the
+   * transaction itself could reach. */
+  function _certListField(v, name, limit) {
+    if (v == null) return [];
+    if (!Array.isArray(v)) throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken " + name + " must be an array of base64 certificates");
+    if (v.length > limit.count) throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken " + name + " carries more than the " + limit.count + " certificates a transaction holds");
+    var out = [], total = 0;
+    for (var i = 0; i < v.length; i++) {
+      var der = _certField(v[i], name + "[" + i + "]", limit.each);
+      total += der.length;
+      if (limit.total !== null && total > limit.total) {
+        throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken " + name + " exceeds the " + limit.total + "-byte pool a transaction holds");
+      }
+      out.push(der);
+    }
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  /** @internal Continue polling a transaction an earlier process started, and finish it the way that
+   * process would have: the grant is confirmed, bound to the requested key, and returned as the same
+   * verdict `enroll` returns. A further timeout hands back a token again, so a long wait can span any
+   * number of processes. */
+  async function resumePoll(token) {
+    _assertFresh("resumed poll");
+    var t = _readResumeToken(token);
+    inFlight = true;
+    try {
+      txnKind = "enroll";
+      /** @internal Installing the restored state consumes the session, whether or not a request follows:
+       * this session now holds another transaction's identifier and nonce, and a later enroll on it would
+       * open a new enrollment under them (RFC 9810 sec. 5.1.1 gives each transaction its own identifier). */
+      started = true;
+      transactionID = t.transactionID;
+      lastPeerNonce = t.recipNonce;
+      haveResponse = true;
+      activeCertReqId = t.certReqId;
+      expectedRespArm = t.arm;
+      requestedSpki = t.requestedSpki;
+      requestedImplicitConfirm = t.implicitConfirm;
+      /** @internal Restoring the pinned identity is what makes a restart no weaker than staying in one
+       * process: the resumed responses are held to the signer the first process authenticated, and the
+       * certificates it had already been sent are available to verify them with. */
+      if (t.signer != null) {
+        try { pinnedSignerCert = x509.parse(t.signer); pinnedSignerDer = t.signer; signerPinned = true; }
+        catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the resumeToken signer is not a valid X.509 certificate", e); }
+      }
+      /** @internal The pin and the cache are separate state and stay separate here. The pin says which
+       * identity every response is held to; the cache is the certificate the first process had actually
+       * been sent to verify one with, and a token that names no cache is a transaction that had none, so
+       * standing the pin in for it would let a resumed poll read a response, and validate a grant, that
+       * the same exchange in one process refuses. */
+      cachedSignerCert = t.signerCache;
+      cachedChain = t.chain;
+      /** @internal The certificates the earlier process was sent, restored under the same bookkeeping the
+       * session accumulates with, so the pool stays bounded across the restart. */
+      for (var ci = 0; ci < t.caPubs.length; ci++) {
+        var pub = t.caPubs[ci];
+        var pk = pub.toString("base64");
+        if (caPubsSeen[pk]) continue;
+        caPubsSeen[pk] = true;
+        caPubsBytes += pub.length;
+        guard.list.append(caPubsAccum, pub);
+      }
+      /** @internal Every restored certificate arrived on a waiting leg, so it is evictable the same way:
+       * leaving the count at zero would stop the grant's own issuer displacing one when the pool is full. */
+      caPubsWaitingCount = caPubsAccum.length;
+      /** @internal The authority's own interval is honored, but the CALLER's wait budget still bounds
+       * this process: a remainder longer than the budget is a timeout now, carrying the same due time on
+       * so a later process with more room can still wait it out. */
+      var restWaited = 0;
+      if (t.nextPollAt != null) {
+        var waitMs = t.nextPollAt - guard.time.instantOf(new Date());
+        if (waitMs > 0) {
+          var waitSeconds = Math.ceil(waitMs / constants.TIME.seconds(1));
+          if (waitSeconds > maxTotalWait) {
+            return _terminal("poll-timeout", { status: _waitingStatus(), polls: t.polls, resumeToken: _resumeToken(t.polls, t.nextPollAt) });
+          }
+          await sleep(waitMs);
+          restWaited = waitSeconds;
+        }
+      }
+      var polled = await _pollLoop(null, restWaited);
+      var spent = t.polls + polled.polls;
+      if (polled.timeout) return _terminal("poll-timeout", { status: polled.status || _waitingStatus(), polls: spent, resumeToken: _resumeToken(spent, _pollDueAt(polled.dueIn)) });
+      var done = polled.done;
+      if (done.state === "granted") {
+        var r = await _finish({ resp: done.resp, polls: spent, code: done.code }, polled.header);
+        r.polls = spent;
+        return r;
+      }
+      if (done.state === "rejected") return _terminal("rejected", { status: done.status || _statusOf(done.resp), polls: spent });
+      throw _err("cmp/unexpected-arm", done.reason || "the resumed enrollment reached an unexpected state");
+    } finally {
+      inFlight = false;
+      completed = started;
+    }
+  }
+
   function _assertRevokingOwnCertificate(certTemplateDer) {
     var own;
     try {
@@ -1123,6 +1528,7 @@ function session(opts) {
 
   return {
     enroll: enroll,
+    resumePoll: resumePoll,
     revoke: revoke,
     info: info,
     get transactionID() { return Buffer.from(transactionID); },

package/lib/cmp-verify.js

@@ -349,7 +349,8 @@ function _headerChecks(m, opts) {
   if (!guard.bytes.isByteSource(m.header.transactionID)) {
     return { code: "cmp/bad-transaction-id", reason: "the header transactionID is absent; a received PKIMessage MUST carry one (RFC 9483 sec. 3.5)" };
   }
-  if (!guard.bytes.isByteSource(m.header.senderNonce) || guard.bytes.lengthOf(m.header.senderNonce) < 16) {
+  if (!guard.bytes.isByteSource(m.header.senderNonce) ||
+      guard.bytes.lengthOf(m.header.senderNonce) < constants.LIMITS.CMP_MIN_NONCE_BYTES) {
     return { code: "cmp/bad-sender-nonce", reason: "the header senderNonce is absent or shorter than 128 bits (RFC 9483 sec. 3.5)" };
   }
   if (opts.transactionID != null && !_bufEq(m.header.transactionID, opts.transactionID)) {

package/lib/constants.js

@@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ var LIMITS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
   SAFETYNET_JWS_MAX_BYTES: BYTES.kib(64),
   SAFETYNET_CERT_MAX_BYTES: BYTES.kib(64),
   ACME_TOKEN_MIN_CHARS: 22,
+  CMP_MIN_NONCE_BYTES: 16,
+  CMP_TRANSACTION_ID_BYTES: 16,
   SCEP_TRANSACTION_ID_MAX: 255,
   OCSP_MAX_CERTS: 32,
   HSS_MAX_LEVELS: 8,

package/lib/sigstore.js

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ var pkix = require("./schema-pkix");
 var pathValidate = require("./path-validate");
 var merkle = require("./merkle");
 var oid = require("./oid");
+var ct = require("./ct");
 var edwardsPoint = require("./edwards-point");
 
 var C = constants;
@@ -387,6 +388,81 @@ function _pathToAnchor(leaf, anchor, intBySubject) {
   return null;
 }
 
+var OID_SCT_LIST = oid.byName("signedCertificateTimestampList");
+
+/** @internal The certificate-transparency logs a caller pins, in the shape the Rekor keys take: an
+ * operator builds both from the one trusted-root document. An empty array is refused rather than read
+ * as "no logs to check against", which would turn an opted-in check into a silent pass. */
+function _normCtLogs(ctLogs) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(ctLogs)) throw _err("sigstore/bad-input", "ctLogs must be an array of { keyId, spki, validFor? }");
+  if (ctLogs.length === 0) throw _err("sigstore/bad-input", "ctLogs is empty; omit the option to skip the certificate-transparency check rather than supplying no logs");
+  return ctLogs.map(function (l, i) {
+    if (l === null || typeof l !== "object") throw _err("sigstore/bad-input", "ctLogs[" + i + "] must be { keyId, spki, validFor? }");
+    if (!Buffer.isBuffer(l.keyId)) throw _err("sigstore/bad-input", "ctLogs[" + i + "].keyId must be the log id as a Buffer");
+    if (!Buffer.isBuffer(l.spki)) throw _err("sigstore/bad-input", "ctLogs[" + i + "].spki must be the log's SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER");
+    return { keyId: l.keyId, spki: l.spki, validFor: l.validFor || null };
+  });
+}
+
+/** @internal RFC 6962 sec. 3.2: Fulcio logs the certificate as it issues it and embeds the log's
+ * receipt, so the receipt covers the certificate WITHOUT that extension, under the issuer's key hash.
+ * `pki.ct.x509CertEntry` reconstructs exactly that entry from the final certificate, and each receipt
+ * is checked against the log the caller pinned for it. At least one must verify, which is the sec. 3.3
+ * floor; a receipt from a log the caller did not pin counts for nothing. */
+async function _verifyEmbeddedScts(leaf, leafDer, issuer, ctLogs, timeMs, atMs) {
+  if (ctLogs === undefined || ctLogs === null) return { checked: false, validScts: 0 };
+  var logs = _normCtLogs(ctLogs);
+  var ext = null;
+  var exts = leaf.extensions || [];
+  for (var i = 0; i < exts.length; i++) { if (exts[i].oid === OID_SCT_LIST) { ext = exts[i]; break; } }
+  if (!ext) {
+    throw _err("sigstore/sct-missing", "ctLogs was supplied but the Fulcio certificate carries no signedCertificateTimestampList extension (RFC 6962 sec. 3.3)");
+  }
+  var entry, list;
+  try {
+    entry = ct.x509CertEntry(leafDer, issuer);
+    list = ct.parseSctList(ext.value);
+  } catch (e) { throw _err("sigstore/sct-unverified", "the embedded certificate-transparency receipt could not be read: " + e.message, e); }
+  var valid = 0;
+  for (var s = 0; s < list.scts.length; s++) {
+    var sct = list.scts[s];
+    /** @internal A log key's window says when that key was the log's, so the receipt is held to the
+     * window as it stood when the receipt was signed, not when the artifact was later logged. */
+    var log = _ctLogFor(logs, sct.logId, _sctMs(sct));
+    if (!log) continue;
+    /** @internal RFC 6962 sec. 5.2: a client rejects a receipt dated after the instant it is checking
+     * at, which a log cannot have issued yet. The reference is the caller's own `opts.time` and never
+     * the Rekor entry time, which records whole seconds while a receipt carries milliseconds, so a
+     * receipt issued in the same second as the entry would read as dated after it. The bound is the end
+     * of that second instead, so the granularity is allowed for and nothing later is. The timestamp is a
+     * BigInt and a relational comparison against a Number is exact for both. */
+    if (sct.timestamp != null && sct.timestamp > atMs) continue;
+    if (await _sctVerifies(entry, sct, log.spki)) valid += 1;
+  }
+  if (valid < 1) {
+    throw _err("sigstore/sct-unverified", "no embedded certificate-transparency receipt verified against a pinned log (RFC 6962 sec. 3.3)");
+  }
+  return { checked: true, validScts: valid };
+}
+
+/** @internal A receipt the verifier refuses structurally counted as verified would be the whole leg
+ * lost, so a fault is an unverified receipt and the next one is still tried. */
+function _sctVerifies(entry, sct, spki) {
+  return ct.verifySct(entry, sct, spki).then(function (ok) { return ok === true; }, function () { return false; });
+}
+
+/** @internal A receipt's own instant, in milliseconds. The parser's `timestampMs` is this same value
+ * wherever it is representable, and above 2^53 there is no reachable instant either way. */
+function _sctMs(sct) { return Number(sct.timestamp || 0); }
+
+function _ctLogFor(logs, logIdBytes, timeMs) {
+  var want = Buffer.isBuffer(logIdBytes) ? logIdBytes : Buffer.from(logIdBytes || []);
+  for (var i = 0; i < logs.length; i++) {
+    if (logs[i].keyId.equals(want) && _inWindow(timeMs, logs[i].validFor)) return logs[i];
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
 async function _verifyChain(leaf, chainDers, fulcioRoots, timeMs) {
   var roots = _normRoots(fulcioRoots);
   var bundleLinks = chainDers.slice(1).map(function (d, i) { return _parseCert(d, "bundle intermediate [" + i + "]"); });
@@ -408,7 +484,11 @@ async function _verifyChain(leaf, chainDers, fulcioRoots, timeMs) {
         trustAnchors: { name: anchor.subject, publicKey: spki.bytes, algorithm: spki.algorithm.oid, parameters: spki.algorithm.parameters },
         requiredEku: ["codeSigning"],
       });
-      if (res.valid) return;
+      /** @internal The path is anchor-proximal first and leaf last, so the certificate directly above
+       * the leaf issued it, and the anchor did when the leaf sits alone. Returning it here is what lets
+       * the certificate-transparency leg reconstruct the logged entry without resolving the issuer a
+       * second time, from a chain this leg has already validated. */
+      if (res.valid) return { issuer: path.length > 1 ? path[path.length - 2] : anchor };
       lastErr = _err("sigstore/chain-invalid", "the Fulcio certificate chain is not valid as of the log time");
     } catch (e) {
       lastErr = _err("sigstore/chain-invalid", "the Fulcio certificate chain failed validation: " + e.message, e);
@@ -468,7 +548,7 @@ function _fulcioExtValue(ext, leafArc) {
 
 var IDENTITY_FIELDS = ["san", "issuer", "sourceRepositoryURI"];
 var IDENTITY_KEYS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { san: 1, issuer: 1, sourceRepositoryURI: 1 });
-var _VERIFY_BUNDLE_OPTS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { fulcioRoots: 1, rekorKeys: 1, identity: 1, predicateType: 1, time: 1 });
+var _VERIFY_BUNDLE_OPTS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { fulcioRoots: 1, rekorKeys: 1, ctLogs: 1, identity: 1, predicateType: 1, time: 1 });
 
 function _checkIdentity(id, policy) {
   // allow:registry-table-inherits-object-prototype -- the identityChecked record an operator reads by field name, whose three keys are the fixed IDENTITY_FIELDS rather than anything the bundle supplies
@@ -525,13 +605,31 @@ function _statement(payload, payloadType, expectedPredicate) {
  * the log entry bound to this exact signature; and the in-toto SLSA statement.
  * Any leg failing throws a typed `sigstore/*` error. On success returns
  * `{ valid: true, verified: true, payload, statement, subjects, predicateType, predicate,
- * identity, identityChecked, predicateTypeChecked, integratedTime, logIndex, logId }` (`valid` is the
+ * identity, identityChecked, predicateTypeChecked, sctChecked, validScts, integratedTime, logIndex, logId }` (`valid` is the
  * canonical toolkit-wide verdict alias of `verified`, `predicateTypeChecked` says whether a pinned
  * `opts.predicateType` was checked, and `logIndex` / `logId` identify the attested Rekor log entry).
  * `payload` is the raw verified
  * envelope bytes (never a re-serialization), and the caller confirms a
  * `subjects[].digest` matches the published artifact.
  *
+ * Fulcio logs every certificate it issues to a certificate-transparency log and
+ * embeds the log's receipt in the certificate (RFC 6962 sec. 3.2). Supplying
+ * `opts.ctLogs` checks it: the receipt is verified over the certificate as it
+ * stood before the receipt was added, under the key of the log that issued it,
+ * and at least one receipt must verify against a pinned log (sec. 3.3). It is
+ * what says the signing certificate was public when it was issued rather than
+ * handed out quietly. The option is opt-in, so a caller that pins no log is
+ * unaffected and `sctChecked` reports `false`; supplying an empty array is
+ * refused rather than read as a policy that checks nothing. `validScts` counts
+ * the receipts that verified.
+ *
+ * A log's `validFor` window is read at the instant the receipt was signed, since
+ * that is when the key was the log's, not at the time the artifact was later
+ * logged. A receipt dated after the instant being validated at is not counted
+ * (RFC 6962 sec. 5.2); with no `opts.time` that instant is the end of the Rekor
+ * entry's own second, which allows for the entry recording whole seconds while a
+ * receipt carries milliseconds, and accepts nothing beyond it.
+ *
  * `verified: true` says the artifact was signed and logged; it says nothing about
  * who. Fulcio issues a certificate to anyone who completes an OIDC flow, so who
  * signed is decided only by `opts.identity`, and `identityChecked` reports which of
@@ -543,6 +641,7 @@ function _statement(payload, payloadType, expectedPredicate) {
  * @opts
  *   fulcioRoots:   Array,      // the Fulcio CA anchors: a DER Buffer or { der, validFor } each
  *   rekorKeys:     Array,      // [{ keyId, spki, validFor? }] the Rekor log public keys
+ *   ctLogs:        Array,      // optional [{ keyId, spki, validFor? }] certificate-transparency logs; when given, the certificate's embedded receipt is checked
  *   identity:      object,     // optional policy: { san, issuer, sourceRepositoryURI }; at least one required when present
  *   predicateType: string,     // optional: require this in-toto predicateType (e.g. the SLSA URI)
  *   time:          Date,       // optional check-date override (default: the Rekor integratedTime)
@@ -586,7 +685,12 @@ async function verifyBundle(bundle, opts) {
   var integratedTime = rekor.integratedTime;
 
   var checkTime = guard.time.isDate(opts.time) ? guard.time.instantOf(opts.time) : C.TIME.seconds(integratedTime);
-  await _verifyChain(leaf, _chainDers(vm), fulcioRoots, checkTime);
+  var chain = await _verifyChain(leaf, _chainDers(vm), fulcioRoots, checkTime);
+  /** @internal With no caller instant the reference is the authenticated log-entry time, whose whole
+   * second is inclusive: a certificate logged in the same second as its entry is not dated after it,
+   * and nothing beyond that second is accepted. */
+  var sctBound = guard.time.isDate(opts.time) ? checkTime : C.TIME.seconds(integratedTime) + 999;
+  var sctResult = await _verifyEmbeddedScts(leaf, leafDer, chain.issuer, opts.ctLogs, checkTime, sctBound);
   var identity = _identity(leaf);
   var identityChecked = _checkIdentity(identity, opts.identity);
 
@@ -603,6 +707,8 @@ async function verifyBundle(bundle, opts) {
     identity: identity,
     identityChecked: identityChecked,
     predicateTypeChecked: opts.predicateType != null,
+    sctChecked: sctResult.checked,
+    validScts: sctResult.validScts,
     integratedTime: integratedTime,
     logIndex: rekor.logIndex,
     logId: rekor.logId,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.6.45",
+  "version": "0.6.47",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:4620569f-fe72-4f1e-9c26-386a3869ff76",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:39d93a95-6e56-4af5-9029-94a73a8e00c4",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-09-06T09:29:44.881Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-09-06T15:41:11.254Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.45",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.47",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.6.45",
+      "version": "0.6.47",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.45",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.47",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.45",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.47",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]