@blamejs/pki 0.6.43 → 0.6.44

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,18 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.6.44 — 2026-09-06
+
+An enrollment client reaches a certification authority through a proxy that demands Digest authentication.
+
+### Added
+
+- opts.proxy.auth.scheme accepts "digest" alongside "basic", so a client reaches a certification authority through a forward proxy that authenticates with RFC 7616 Digest. The first CONNECT carries no credential; the proxy's 407 carries its Proxy-Authenticate challenge, and the client answers it once, hashing the method CONNECT over the authority-form target (RFC 9112 section 3.2.3) that the proxy checks it against. The challenge is read by the same parser the origin verbs use and held to the same policy, so MD5 and a challenge carrying no qop are refused unless opts.proxy.auth.allowMD5 or allowLegacyQop says otherwise, surfacing transport/proxy-digest-weak-algorithm, transport/proxy-digest-unsupported-algorithm, transport/proxy-digest-no-qop, and transport/proxy-digest-bad-challenge (each under the calling client's own prefix, so a SCEP call reports scep/...). A proxy that offers no Digest challenge while digest is configured is transport/proxy-auth-required naming what it offered, and a rejected credential is transport/proxy-auth-failed after that single answer. Digest requires an https proxy on the same terms as Basic: credentials ride the authenticated channel to the proxy, and a plaintext http proxy carrying auth stays refused with transport/proxy-auth-requires-tls.
+
+### Removed
+
+- transport/proxy-unsupported-scheme is no longer raised. It reported that Digest proxy authentication was unavailable, and Digest is now supported; an unknown scheme is transport/bad-proxy, as it was before.
+
 ## v0.6.43 — 2026-09-06
 
 Path building finds a path through a mesh of cross-certified domains without walking the foreign branches first.

package/README.md

@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.schema.csrattrs` | EST CSR Attributes (`CsrAttrs`, RFC 8951 §3.5 / RFC 9908) — the `AttrOrOID` items a server sends to shape an enrollment: bare OIDs, attributes with raw values, and decoded views of the RFC 9908 meaningful types (extension requests, EC and RSA key-type conventions, the certification-request-info template). Unknown types are surfaced raw; structure and the RFC 9908 semantic MUSTs are fail-closed — `parse` |
 | `pki.est` | Enrollment over Secure Transport (RFC 7030 / 8951 / 9908 / 7616). The client verbs `cacerts`, `simpleenroll`, `simplereenroll`, `serverkeygen`, `csrattrs`, and `fullcmc` drive the RFC 7030 flow over `pki.transport` (inject your own via `opts.transport`, or take the fail-closed default): HTTPS only, an explicit trust anchor required, same-origin redirects followed while a downgrade or loop is refused, a 202 Retry-After surfaced but never slept, HTTP Basic or Digest (RFC 7616, SHA-256 / SHA-512-256; MD5 and no-qop refused by default) answered only after the server is authenticated, and the issued certificate chosen by public-key match. `serverkeygen` requests a server-generated key, cleartext or an opaque CMS EnvelopedData, with encryption bound to the CSR's key-identifier attribute over a confidentiality-bearing cipher. `csrattrs` fetches the CA's RFC 9908 attributes policy. For §3.5 channel binding, `simpleenroll` and `simplereenroll` accept a CSR builder `(tls) -> csr` instead of a CSR: it runs after the handshake with that connection's `tlsUnique`, so the request is signed over the session it is sent on, and it re-runs on any new connection a redirect or auth retry opens, recreating the CSR for that session (§3.2.1). A builder alongside Digest authentication is refused, since that header is computed over the body before the handshake. `fullcmc` (§4.3) carries a CMC Full PKI Request and reduces the CA's answer through `pki.cmc.verify` to one terminal outcome, refusing a response that fails to echo the transaction and nonce the request carried, or that covers a key the request never asked for; a certs-only reply to a bound request is refused rather than read as an issuance. Under the verbs sit the transport-agnostic codecs they compose: the RFC 8951 base64 transfer codec (which ignores Content-Transfer-Encoding), the `multipart/mixed` splitter, the certs-only and serverkeygen response validators over CMS, the enroll-attribute builders, and the HTTP response classifier — `transferDecode`/`transferEncode`, `parseCertsOnly`, `splitMultipartMixed`, `parseServerKeygenResponse`, `findIssuedCert`, `classifyResponse`, `paths`, and the builders |
 | `pki.scep` | SCEP pkiMessage codec (RFC 8894), the client side of Simple Certificate Enrollment. `build(spec)` assembles a request: a `PKCSReq` or `RenewalReq` wraps a PKCS#10 certification request, whose own proof-of-possession it verifies first; a `CertPoll` wraps an IssuerAndSubject naming the issuing CA and the request subject; and a `GetCert` or `GetCRL` wraps an IssuerAndSerialNumber naming a certificate by its issuer and a positive serial of at most 20 octets. It encrypts the messageData to the CA as the inner EnvelopedData (`pkcsPKIEnvelope`, AES-128-CBC), and signs that under the transaction attributes RFC 8894 §3.2 defines, a messageType, a caller-unique transactionId, and a 16-byte senderNonce. The recipient CA certificate must assert `keyEncipherment`. `build` also issues the CA-side `CertRep` response (§3.3.2): a SUCCESS envelopes a certs-only SignedData of the issued certificate (or the CRL for a GetCRL) to the requester and signs it under the CA key, while a FAILURE (carrying a `failInfo`) or a PENDING omits the pkcsPKIEnvelope and is signed detached, each echoing the request's senderNonce as `recipientNonce`. `parse(bytes, opts?)` reads a `PKCSReq`, `RenewalReq`, `CertPoll`, `GetCert`, `GetCRL`, or `CertRep` back (a messageType outside the RFC 8894 registry is refused): it verifies the outer signature first and refuses a message whose signature does not check, so the transaction attributes it returns come only from a verified signer, never alongside a false verdict. Because a valid signature only proves self-consistency with the embedded certificate, pass `opts.signerCert` to authenticate a CA response against the CA certificate you hold (a public-key mismatch is refused, `signerAuthenticated` reports the result); a caller that omits it gets a crypto-only verdict and must authenticate the surfaced `signerCert` itself. It maps the messageType, pkiStatus, failInfo, and the nonces from their RFC 8894 enumerants and refuses an unknown one; given `recipientKey` it decrypts the `pkcsPKIEnvelope` to the messageData, and given `expectedSenderNonce` it refuses a response whose recipientNonce does not echo it. It reads a CA's CertRep in full. `getCACaps(baseUrl, opts?)`, `getCACert(baseUrl, opts?)`, `getNextCACert(baseUrl, opts)`, `enroll(baseUrl, opts)`, `renew(baseUrl, opts)`, `getCert(baseUrl, opts)`, and `getCrl(baseUrl, opts)` carry that codec to a live CA over HTTP (RFC 8894 §4) through an injectable transport (`pki.transport.https` by default): `getCACaps` reports the CA's advertised capabilities and never lowers the client's algorithm choice on the unauthenticated response, `getCACert` pins the CA certificate to an out-of-band `expectedFingerprint` a returned certificate must match, `getNextCACert` fetches the CA's next (rollover) certificate and verifies the SignedData response against the current CA certificate (`caCertificate`) before returning it, refusing a response signed by any other key, and `enroll` and `renew` POST a PKCSReq or RenewalReq, authenticate the CertRep against the CA certificate and its nonce echo, select the issued certificate by public-key match, throw on a FAILURE with the CA's failInfo, and poll a PENDING response with CertPoll requests until the CA answers or a bounded poll-count and total-wait budget is spent. `getCert` and `getCrl` retrieve an already-issued certificate or a CA CRL by issuer and serial number, authenticated the same way; RFC 8894 §2.6, §2.7, and §3.3.4 recommend these queries only where HTTP certificate-store access (RFC 4387), LDAP, or a CRL distribution point is unavailable, so prefer those where a CA offers them. A PKIOperation goes over HTTP POST by default; `httpMethod: "GET"` carries it base64-encoded in the URL query for a legacy CA that accepts only GET (RFC 8894 §4.1). Every verb reaches an https CA through a forward proxy with `opts.proxy = { url, auth?, tls? }`: a `CONNECT` tunnel is opened to the proxy and the origin TLS is negotiated inside it, so the proxy carries the enrollment without being able to read it or substitute the origin certificate. Basic proxy authentication (RFC 7617) is sent only over an `https://` proxy, where it rides the authenticated TLS-to-proxy channel; an `http://` proxy is tunnel-only, and credentials over a plaintext proxy are refused rather than exposed (see `pki.transport`) — `build`, `parse`, `parseCapabilities`, `getCACaps`, `getCACert`, `getNextCACert`, `enroll`, `renew`, `getCert`, `getCrl` |
-| `pki.transport` | The shared, fail-closed `node:https` transport the enrollment clients drive. `pki.transport.https(defaults)` returns a `transport(request) → { status, headers, body, tls }`, where `tls` carries the negotiated `protocol`, `cipher`, raw `peerCertificate`, and one channel binding per TLS version: on TLS 1.2 the RFC 5929 `tlsUnique` that `pki.est.challengePasswordFromTlsUnique` links to an EST enrollment (RFC 7030 §3.5), and on TLS 1.3 the RFC 9266 `tlsExporter` (32 bytes under the label `EXPORTER-Channel-Binding`, zero-length context). Each is `null` on the version that does not define it, and `tlsExporter` is withheld below TLS 1.3 because RFC 9266 §2 also requires the RFC 7627 extended master secret, which Node gives no way to confirm. Since `tlsUnique` on the response arrives after the body was sent, a request `body` may instead be a function `(tls) -> bytes` the transport invokes after the handshake and before it writes the body, so the caller builds a channel-bound CSR from `tlsUnique` on the same connection it posts over. It may return a promise, so the CSR can be signed with `pki.csr.sign` while the connection is held open; a callback that throws, rejects, or returns anything other than bytes or a string fails the request closed rather than posting an empty enrollment. This is the toolkit's only socket choke point: an explicit trust anchor (or an opt-in to the system store) is required, `rejectUnauthorized` is always on, TLS is floored at 1.2, the response body is capped while it streams, and a stalled socket times out. The EST, ACME, and CMP clients reuse it verbatim. A `request.proxy = { url, auth?, tls? }` reaches the origin through a forward proxy: a `CONNECT` tunnel is opened to the proxy and the origin TLS is negotiated inside it under the identical origin trust policy, so the proxy cannot read the origin's encrypted session or substitute an authenticated origin certificate. Basic proxy credentials are sent only over an `https://` proxy, whose own certificate is verified against `proxy.tls`, so they ride an authenticated channel; a plaintext `http://` proxy is tunnel-only and carrying `auth` on one is refused (`proxy-auth-requires-tls`) rather than exposing the credentials to the proxy hop. A malformed option, a failed CONNECT, an unverified proxy certificate, or an unaccepted credential fails closed. The SCEP, EST, ACME, and CMP clients each thread it through as `opts.proxy`. If you inject your own transport, return `tls` too: `pki.est.serverkeygen` asserts the negotiated cipher can protect the delivered private key, and a transport that reports no cipher is trusted rather than refused, so omitting the field silently skips that check — `https` |
+| `pki.transport` | The shared, fail-closed `node:https` transport the enrollment clients drive. `pki.transport.https(defaults)` returns a `transport(request) → { status, headers, body, tls }`, where `tls` carries the negotiated `protocol`, `cipher`, raw `peerCertificate`, and one channel binding per TLS version: on TLS 1.2 the RFC 5929 `tlsUnique` that `pki.est.challengePasswordFromTlsUnique` links to an EST enrollment (RFC 7030 §3.5), and on TLS 1.3 the RFC 9266 `tlsExporter` (32 bytes under the label `EXPORTER-Channel-Binding`, zero-length context). Each is `null` on the version that does not define it, and `tlsExporter` is withheld below TLS 1.3 because RFC 9266 §2 also requires the RFC 7627 extended master secret, which Node gives no way to confirm. Since `tlsUnique` on the response arrives after the body was sent, a request `body` may instead be a function `(tls) -> bytes` the transport invokes after the handshake and before it writes the body, so the caller builds a channel-bound CSR from `tlsUnique` on the same connection it posts over. It may return a promise, so the CSR can be signed with `pki.csr.sign` while the connection is held open; a callback that throws, rejects, or returns anything other than bytes or a string fails the request closed rather than posting an empty enrollment. This is the toolkit's only socket choke point: an explicit trust anchor (or an opt-in to the system store) is required, `rejectUnauthorized` is always on, TLS is floored at 1.2, the response body is capped while it streams, and a stalled socket times out. The EST, ACME, and CMP clients reuse it verbatim. A `request.proxy = { url, auth?, tls? }` reaches the origin through a forward proxy: a `CONNECT` tunnel is opened to the proxy and the origin TLS is negotiated inside it under the identical origin trust policy, so the proxy cannot read the origin's encrypted session or substitute an authenticated origin certificate. Proxy credentials are sent only over an `https://` proxy, whose own certificate is verified against `proxy.tls`, so they ride an authenticated channel; a plaintext `http://` proxy is tunnel-only and carrying `auth` on one is refused (`proxy-auth-requires-tls`) rather than exposing the credentials to the proxy hop. `auth.scheme` is `"basic"` (RFC 7617), which sends its credential on the first CONNECT, or `"digest"` (RFC 7616), which answers the proxy's `Proxy-Authenticate` challenge on a `407` by hashing the method `CONNECT` over the authority-form target, and answers exactly once, so a proxy repeating its challenge has rejected the credential rather than obtained another attempt. Digest runs the policy the origin verbs apply, refusing MD5 and a challenge carrying no `qop` unless `auth.allowMD5` / `auth.allowLegacyQop` says otherwise. A malformed option, a failed CONNECT, an unverified proxy certificate, or an unaccepted credential fails closed. The SCEP, EST, ACME, and CMP clients each thread it through as `opts.proxy`. If you inject your own transport, return `tls` too: `pki.est.serverkeygen` asserts the negotiated cipher can protect the delivered private key, and a transport that reports no cipher is trusted rather than refused, so omitting the field silently skips that check — `https` |
 | `pki.jose` | Flattened JWS (RFC 7515) and JWK thumbprints (RFC 7638). `sign` and `verify` run a Flattened JWS against declarative profiles (ACME outer, EAB inner, keyChange inner) that carry the required and forbidden header rules as data. `base64url` is the strict RFC 4648 §5 codec, rejecting padding, non-alphabet characters, and non-canonical trailing bits. `parseJson` is a bounded reader that refuses duplicate members at any depth. `thumbprint` is the RFC 7638 / 8037 / 9964 canonical digest. The algorithm registry binds each `alg` to its key type (ES/RS/PS/EdDSA/ML-DSA), leaving no code path for `alg:none`, an RS256→HS256 key confusion, or an all-zero ECDSA signature; `assertPublicJwk` refuses a JWK carrying private material, so an exported private key is never published. `opts.key` names the key a message must be signed under and governs: where the profile also permits an embedded header `jwk`, the two must be the same key — compared as RFC 7638 thumbprints, so member order cannot make equal keys differ — and a disagreement is refused rather than resolved in the message's favor. `keySource` reports which key answered, since a signature checked against a key you named is a different claim from one checked against the key the message carried — `sign`, `verify`, `base64url`, `parseJson`, `thumbprint`, `assertPublicJwk` |
 | `pki.acme` | ACME (RFC 8555 / 8737 / 8738 / 9773). `client(directoryUrl, opts)` is a stateful client driving a live CA directory over `pki.transport`: `newAccount`, `newOrder`, `newAuthz`, `getOrder`, `getAuthorization`, `getChallenge`, `respondToChallenge`, `finalize`, `pollOrder`, `pollAuthorization`, and `downloadCertificate` walk the issuance flow, with `newAuthz` pre-authorizing a single identifier (§7.4.1) and `downloadCertificate` binding the issued certificate to the order — its key, its identifiers, or both; at least one is required by default and the result reports `boundToKey` / `boundToIdentifiers` — before choosing among alternate chains (`Link rel="alternate"`, §7.4.2, via a `selectChain` predicate bounded by `maxAlternates`). `revokeCert` (account-key or certificate-key signed), `keyChange`, `updateAccount` (change the account contacts, §7.3.2), `listOrders` (the account's orders list, following the §7.1.2.1 `Link rel="next"` pagination bounded by a page cap and confined to the orders origin), `deactivateAccount`, `deactivateAuthorization`, `renewalInfo` (ARI), `renewalWindow` (the RFC 9773 §4.2/4.3 renewal decision), and `scheduleRenewal` (the §4.1 auto-sleeping renewal loop that sleeps until the selected instant and refetches until it is time to renew, stopping at the certificate's notAfter) complete the lifecycle. Every URL is HTTPS only, an explicit trust anchor is required, each request carries a fresh single-use nonce with a bounded badNonce retry (and, when `opts.resignKeys` supplies caller-approved alternative account-key algorithms, a bounded RFC 8555 §6.2 badSignatureAlgorithm re-sign that the CA's advertised list can only filter, never widen, so it cannot force a weaker algorithm), reads are POST-as-GET, polling is bounded and sleeps on a Retry-After via an injectable sleeper capped by a poll count and a total-wait budget, and every response body is size-capped. The transport is injectable via `opts.transport`. Over the message layer it composes resource-object validators (closed status enums, conditional-required fields, unknown fields ignored), the three §7.1.6 state machines, the request builders (newAccount with External Account Binding, newOrder with `replaces`, finalize with a CSR identifier-set match and account-key-reuse rejection, challenge responses, deactivation, revokeCert in both key modes, the keyChange nested JWS, POST-as-GET), the http-01 / dns-01 / tls-alpn-01 challenge computations, the dns and ip identifier validators, and the ARI certID with serial sign-padding preserved — `client`, `validate`, `identify`, `assertTransition`, the builders, `keyAuthorization`, `http01`, `dns01`, `tlsAlpn01Extension`, `verifyTlsAlpn01`, `ariCertId` |
 | `pki.schema.smime` | S/MIME ESS signed-attribute values (RFC 5035 / RFC 8551). `parseSigningCertificate` and `parseSigningCertificateV2` bind a signature to its signing certificate (cert hash, hash algorithm, issuer `GeneralNames` and serial); `parseSmimeCapabilities` decodes the ordered capability list; `decodeAttribute` dispatches a CMS attribute by OID, enforcing the single-value rule and deferring on unknown types. A companion decoder for CMS signed attributes rather than an auto-routed format — `parseSigningCertificate`, `parseSigningCertificateV2`, `parseSmimeCapabilities`, `decodeAttribute` |

package/lib/http-transport.js

@@ -239,7 +239,8 @@ function _classifyError(e, C) {
 
 function _keySet(names) { var m = Object.create(null); for (var i = 0; i < names.length; i++) m[names[i]] = true; return m; }
 var PROXY_KEYS = _keySet(["url", "auth", "tls"]);
-var PROXY_AUTH_KEYS = _keySet(["scheme", "username", "password"]);
+var PROXY_AUTH_KEYS = _keySet(["scheme", "username", "password", "allowMD5", "allowLegacyQop"]);
+var PROXY_DIGEST_KNOBS = ["allowMD5", "allowLegacyQop"];
 var PROXY_TLS_KEYS = _keySet(["anchors", "useSystemStore", "servername", "minVersion"]);
 
 function _copyAnchor(a) { return (a !== null && typeof a === "object" && nodeUtil.types.isProxy(a)) ? a : (Buffer.isBuffer(a) ? Buffer.from(a) : a); }
@@ -319,11 +320,17 @@ function _validateProxy(request, defaults, E, C, url) {
     if (!_copyableRecord(proxy.auth)) throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.auth must be a plain object with only own enumerable data properties");
     guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(proxy.auth, PROXY_AUTH_KEYS, E, C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.auth has an unknown option ");
     var scheme = proxy.auth.scheme;
-    if (scheme === "digest") throw E(C("proxy-unsupported-scheme"), "Digest proxy authentication is not supported in this release; use 'basic' over an https proxy");
-    if (scheme !== "basic") throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.auth.scheme must be 'basic', got " + guard.text.showValue(scheme));
+    if (scheme !== "basic" && scheme !== "digest") throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.auth.scheme must be 'basic' or 'digest', got " + guard.text.showValue(scheme));
     if (typeof proxy.auth.username !== "string" || typeof proxy.auth.password !== "string") throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.auth requires a string username and password");
-    if (proxy.auth.username.indexOf(":") !== -1) throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "a Basic proxy user-id must not contain a colon (RFC 7617 sec. 2)");
-    auth = { scheme: "basic", username: proxy.auth.username, password: proxy.auth.password };
+    for (var ki = 0; ki < PROXY_DIGEST_KNOBS.length; ki++) {
+      var kn = PROXY_DIGEST_KNOBS[ki], kv = proxy.auth[kn];
+      if (kv === undefined) continue;
+      if (scheme !== "digest") throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.auth." + kn + " applies only to Digest authentication");
+      if (typeof kv !== "boolean") throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.auth." + kn + " must be a boolean, got " + guard.text.showValue(kv));
+    }
+    if (scheme === "basic" && proxy.auth.username.indexOf(":") !== -1) throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "a Basic proxy user-id must not contain a colon (RFC 7617 sec. 2)");
+    auth = { scheme: scheme, username: proxy.auth.username, password: proxy.auth.password,
+      allowMD5: proxy.auth.allowMD5 === true, allowLegacyQop: proxy.auth.allowLegacyQop === true };
   }
 
   var proxyTls = null;
@@ -365,6 +372,30 @@ function _validateProxy(request, defaults, E, C, url) {
 function _basicProxyHeader(auth) {
   return "Basic " + Buffer.from(auth.username + ":" + auth.password, "utf8").toString("base64");
 }
+
+/** @internal The `Proxy-Authorization` value answering a proxy's `Proxy-Authenticate: Digest` challenge
+ * (RFC 7616 sec. 3.3, RFC 9110 sec. 11.7.1). The challenge grammar is the one the origin uses, so the
+ * shipped parser reads it unchanged; a CONNECT hashes the method `CONNECT` over the authority-form target
+ * the request line carries (RFC 9112 sec. 3.2.3), which is the pair the proxy checks it against. */
+function _digestProxyCredential(headers, pinfo, C, E) {
+  var httpDigest = require("./http-digest");   // allow:inline-require -- circular load: http-digest -> schema-pkix -> ct -> this module
+  var offered = String((headers && headers["proxy-authenticate"]) || "");
+  var policy = {
+    allowMD5: pinfo.auth.allowMD5, allowLegacyQop: pinfo.auth.allowLegacyQop,
+    codes: {
+      unsupportedAlgorithm: C("proxy-digest-unsupported-algorithm"), weakAlgorithm: C("proxy-digest-weak-algorithm"),
+      noQop: C("proxy-digest-no-qop"), badChallenge: C("proxy-digest-bad-challenge"),
+    },
+  };
+  var challenge = httpDigest.parseChallenge(offered, E, C("proxy-digest-bad-challenge"), policy);
+  if (!challenge) {
+    throw E(C("proxy-auth-required"), "opts.proxy.auth.scheme is \"digest\" but the proxy offered no usable Digest challenge: " + guard.text.showValue(offered));
+  }
+  return httpDigest.answer(challenge, {
+    method: "CONNECT", uri: pinfo.originAuthority,
+    username: pinfo.auth.username, password: pinfo.auth.password, nc: 1, policy: policy,
+  }, E);
+}
 function _proxyErrorClass(e, C) {
   var code = String((e && e.code) || "");
   if (code.indexOf("ERR_TLS") === 0 || code.indexOf("ERR_SSL") === 0 || code.indexOf("SSL") !== -1 ||
@@ -405,7 +436,7 @@ function _proxyErrorClass(e, C) {
  *   - `tls.servername` / `tls.checkServerIdentity` -- SNI + RFC 6125 identity; may tighten, never disable.
  *   - `timeout` -- ms (default C.TIME.seconds(30)); `maxResponseBytes` -- default LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, tightenable downward only.
  *   - `blockPrivateAddresses` -- boolean; when true, an IP-literal host OR a hostname resolving to a private / loopback / link-local address is refused (`transport/blocked-address`), and a resolved address is pinned for the connection. For fetching an untrusted-certificate URL (AIA caIssuers); default false. It cannot be combined with `proxy`: a forward proxy resolves the origin itself, so the transport cannot enforce the block on it, and the combination is refused (`transport/bad-proxy`).
- *   - `proxy` -- reach the https origin through a forward HTTP proxy: `{ url: "http://proxy:3128" | "https://proxy:3128", auth?: { scheme: "basic", username, password }, tls?: { anchors, useSystemStore, servername, minVersion } }`. A CONNECT tunnel is opened to the proxy and the origin's TLS is negotiated inside it under the identical origin trust policy, so the proxy cannot read the origin's encrypted session or substitute the origin certificate. `auth` requires an `https://` proxy: Basic credentials ride the authenticated TLS-to-proxy channel (verified against `proxy.tls`, which is required for an https proxy), so a plaintext `http://` proxy carrying `auth` is refused (`transport/proxy-auth-requires-tls`) rather than leaking the credentials to the proxy hop. An `http://` proxy is tunnel-only. Digest is not supported (`transport/proxy-unsupported-scheme`). A `407` is `transport/proxy-auth-failed` (credentials rejected) or `transport/proxy-auth-required` (none supplied); a proxy certificate that does not verify is `transport/proxy-tls-failed`; a non-2xx CONNECT is `transport/proxy-connect-failed`; a malformed option is `transport/bad-proxy`. Off by default (a direct connection).
+ *   - `proxy` -- reach the https origin through a forward HTTP proxy: `{ url: "http://proxy:3128" | "https://proxy:3128", auth?: { scheme: "basic" | "digest", username, password, allowMD5?, allowLegacyQop? }, tls?: { anchors, useSystemStore, servername, minVersion } }`. A CONNECT tunnel is opened to the proxy and the origin's TLS is negotiated inside it under the identical origin trust policy, so the proxy cannot read the origin's encrypted session or substitute the origin certificate. `auth` requires an `https://` proxy: the credentials ride the authenticated TLS-to-proxy channel (verified against `proxy.tls`, which is required for an https proxy), so a plaintext `http://` proxy carrying `auth` is refused (`transport/proxy-auth-requires-tls`) rather than exposing them to the proxy hop. An `http://` proxy is tunnel-only. Basic (RFC 7617) sends its credential on the first CONNECT. Digest (RFC 7616) answers the proxy's `Proxy-Authenticate` challenge on a `407`, hashing the method `CONNECT` over the authority-form target, and answers exactly once: a proxy that repeats its challenge has rejected the credential. The Digest policy is the one the origin verbs use, so MD5 and a challenge carrying no `qop` are refused unless `allowMD5` / `allowLegacyQop` says otherwise (`transport/proxy-digest-weak-algorithm`, `transport/proxy-digest-unsupported-algorithm`, `transport/proxy-digest-no-qop`, `transport/proxy-digest-bad-challenge`). A `407` is `transport/proxy-auth-failed` (credentials rejected) or `transport/proxy-auth-required` (none supplied, or none of the offered schemes is the configured one); a proxy certificate that does not verify is `transport/proxy-tls-failed`; a non-2xx CONNECT is `transport/proxy-connect-failed`; a malformed option is `transport/bad-proxy`. Off by default (a direct connection).
  * @example
  *   var t = pki.transport.https({ tls: { anchors: [caPem] } });
  *   var res = await t({ method: "GET", url: "https://ca.example/.well-known/est/cacerts" });
@@ -485,7 +516,7 @@ function httpsTransport(defaults) {
       var typedProxyError = false;
       try {
         var ec = (e instanceof Error) && !nodeUtil.types.isProxy(e) ? e.code : undefined;
-        typedProxyError = ec === C("bad-proxy") || ec === C("proxy-auth-requires-tls") || ec === C("proxy-unsupported-scheme");
+        typedProxyError = ec === C("bad-proxy") || ec === C("proxy-auth-requires-tls");
       } catch (_ie) { /* allow:swallow-unverified reading .code on a hostile error object can throw; treat any such failure as untyped */ }
       if (typedProxyError) throw e;
       throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy could not be validated", e);
@@ -595,25 +626,43 @@ function httpsTransport(defaults) {
       if (!prep.proxy) { issue(prep.options); return; }
 
       var pinfo = prep.proxy;
-      var pheaders = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { Host: pinfo.originAuthority, Connection: "keep-alive" });
-      if (pinfo.auth) pheaders["Proxy-Authorization"] = _basicProxyHeader(pinfo.auth);
-      var connectOpts = { host: pinfo.host, port: pinfo.port, method: "CONNECT", path: pinfo.originAuthority, headers: pheaders, agent: false };
-      var cr;
-      try {
-        if (pinfo.secure) {
-          connectOpts.ca = pinfo.proxyTls.ca;
-          connectOpts.rejectUnauthorized = true;
-          connectOpts.minVersion = pinfo.proxyTls.minVersion;
-          var pIdentity = pinfo.proxyTls.servername || pinfo.host;
-          connectOpts.servername = (pIdentity && !nodeNet.isIP(pIdentity)) ? pIdentity : "";
-          connectOpts.checkServerIdentity = function (host, cert) { return nodeTls.checkServerIdentity(pIdentity, cert); };
-          cr = nodeHttps.request(connectOpts);
-        } else {
-          cr = nodeHttp.request(connectOpts);
-        }
-      } catch (e) { fail(C("proxy-connect-failed"), "the CONNECT request could not be initiated: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)), e); return; }
-      creq = cr;
-      var done = false;
+      /** @internal The client counts its own attempts. A 407 is answered once, from the challenge the proxy
+       * sent; a proxy that answers the credentialed CONNECT with another 407 has rejected the credential,
+       * and repeating its challenge cannot obtain a further attempt. */
+      var digestAnswered = false;
+      var cr, done;
+
+      function issueConnect(credential) {
+        var pheaders = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { Host: pinfo.originAuthority, Connection: "keep-alive" });
+        if (credential) pheaders["Proxy-Authorization"] = credential;
+        var connectOpts = { host: pinfo.host, port: pinfo.port, method: "CONNECT", path: pinfo.originAuthority, headers: pheaders, agent: false };
+        try {
+          if (pinfo.secure) {
+            connectOpts.ca = pinfo.proxyTls.ca;
+            connectOpts.rejectUnauthorized = true;
+            connectOpts.minVersion = pinfo.proxyTls.minVersion;
+            var pIdentity = pinfo.proxyTls.servername || pinfo.host;
+            connectOpts.servername = (pIdentity && !nodeNet.isIP(pIdentity)) ? pIdentity : "";
+            connectOpts.checkServerIdentity = function (host, cert) { return nodeTls.checkServerIdentity(pIdentity, cert); };
+            cr = nodeHttps.request(connectOpts);
+          } else {
+            cr = nodeHttp.request(connectOpts);
+          }
+        } catch (e) { fail(C("proxy-connect-failed"), "the CONNECT request could not be initiated: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)), e); return; }
+        creq = cr;
+        done = false;
+        cr.on("connect", function (res, socket) { onProxyResponse(res, socket); });
+        cr.on("response", function (res) {
+          // allow:swallow-unverified draining the proxy error body is best-effort; the verdict is the status
+          res.on("data", function () { });
+          res.on("error", function () { });
+          res.on("end", function () { });
+          onProxyResponse(res, null);
+        });
+        cr.on("error", function (e) { fail(pinfo.secure ? _proxyErrorClass(e, C) : C("proxy-connect-failed"), "the CONNECT request failed: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)), e); });
+        cr.end();
+      }
+
       function onProxyResponse(res, socket) {
         if (done) { if (socket) _quietDestroy(socket); return; }
         done = true;
@@ -646,19 +695,22 @@ function httpsTransport(defaults) {
           return;
         }
         if (socket) _quietDestroy(socket);
-        if (sc === 407) { fail(C(pinfo.auth ? "proxy-auth-failed" : "proxy-auth-required"), pinfo.auth ? "the proxy rejected the supplied credentials (HTTP 407)" : "the proxy requires authentication; supply proxy.auth over an https proxy (HTTP 407)"); return; }
+        if (sc === 407) {
+          if (pinfo.auth && pinfo.auth.scheme === "digest" && !digestAnswered) {
+            digestAnswered = true;
+            var credential;
+            try { credential = _digestProxyCredential(res.headers, pinfo, C, E); }
+            catch (e) { fail(e.code || C("proxy-auth-failed"), e.message, e); return; }
+            issueConnect(credential);
+            return;
+          }
+          fail(C(pinfo.auth ? "proxy-auth-failed" : "proxy-auth-required"), pinfo.auth ? "the proxy rejected the supplied credentials (HTTP 407)" : "the proxy requires authentication; supply proxy.auth over an https proxy (HTTP 407)");
+          return;
+        }
         fail(C("proxy-connect-failed"), "the proxy answered CONNECT with HTTP " + sc);
       }
-      cr.on("connect", function (res, socket) { onProxyResponse(res, socket); });
-      cr.on("response", function (res) {
-        // allow:swallow-unverified draining the proxy error body is best-effort; the verdict is the status
-        res.on("data", function () { });
-        res.on("error", function () { });
-        res.on("end", function () { });
-        onProxyResponse(res, null);
-      });
-      cr.on("error", function (e) { fail(pinfo.secure ? _proxyErrorClass(e, C) : C("proxy-connect-failed"), "the CONNECT request failed: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)), e); });
-      cr.end();
+
+      issueConnect(pinfo.auth && pinfo.auth.scheme === "basic" ? _basicProxyHeader(pinfo.auth) : null);
     });
   };
   _transportFn.blocksPrivateAddresses = true;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.6.43",
+  "version": "0.6.44",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:226aab27-22ce-4c29-9028-5849c0bf6587",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:3a1167b9-bd57-4112-8a1e-58236cee3f31",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-09-06T06:39:34.959Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-09-06T07:45:11.202Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.43",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.44",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.6.43",
+      "version": "0.6.44",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.43",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.44",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.43",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.44",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]