@blamejs/pki 0.6.41 → 0.6.43

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,26 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.6.43 — 2026-09-06
+
+Path building finds a path through a mesh of cross-certified domains without walking the foreign branches first.
+
+### Changed
+
+- pki.path.build orders candidates in a mesh of cross-certified domains by the two RFC 4158 section 3.5 name heuristics it had not applied. A candidate is ranked by how many leading relative distinguished names it shares with the name the search is heading for: its issuer against a trust anchor's name when building forward (section 3.5.16), and its subject against the leaf's issuer when building in reverse (the section 3.5.16 and section 3.5.19 reverse methods). Names are compared under the RFC 5280 section 7.1 rule, so a certificate in the target's own domain is tried before one from a cross-certified domain. Forward building additionally sorts a candidate under every candidate that can complete the path when its basicConstraints path length constraint cannot cover the certificates already below it in the chain (section 3.5.7), counting the non-self-issued ones the way RFC 5280 section 6.1.4(m) does, so a key-rollover certificate below the candidate spends none of its budget. That ordering outranks the other hints rather than competing with them, so a key identifier match or an anchor-adjacent issuer does not raise a candidate whose constraint the path already exceeds. All of it is ordering alone: no candidate is removed, every assembled path is handed to pki.path.validate, and an unbounded search still reaches every path the pool holds. A build over a mesh reaches a path within a smaller opts.maxCandidatesConsidered budget and reports a lower candidatesConsidered. A bounded search spends that budget on whichever branches the order steers it to, so a build that reports path/build-limit where the earlier order succeeded wants a larger opts.maxCandidatesConsidered, and the same holds for the opts.maxAiaFetches allowance.
+
+## v0.6.42 — 2026-09-06
+
+A trust anchor carries the namespace a root program trusts a root for, so a certificate outside it is refused even where the root certificate states no such limit.
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.trust.anchor(entry, opts) accepts opts.nameConstraints, the namespace a root program applies to a root outside any extension the root certificate carries. It is a { permitted, excluded } pair of { tag, base } subtrees, the shape pki.path.validate takes for opts.initialPermittedSubtrees, and validate seeds it as the RFC 5280 section 6.1.1(h)(i) initial value: it intersects with each certificate's own nameConstraints so a leaf must satisfy both, and an excluded subtree rejects a name whatever the permitted set says. A verdict reports it at anchorConstraints.nameConstraintsApplied. The subtrees are copied out of the caller's object, so changing that object afterwards leaves the namespace an anchor already vouches for unchanged. An overlay naming no subtree, one carrying a malformed subtree, and one supplying its subtrees through an accessor are each refused with trust/bad-input, since carrying any of them would widen the namespace the operator asked to restrict.
+
+### Changed
+
+- pki.path.validate refuses a subtree in opts.initialPermittedSubtrees, opts.initialExcludedSubtrees, or a trust anchor's nameConstraints whose base is outside the form its tag names, with path/bad-input. Tag 1 is a mailbox, a host name, or a host name written as a subtree with a leading dot, and a mailbox may name its domain as a bracketed IPv4 or IPv6 address literal; tags 2 and 6 are host names, and a tag-6 base is the dotted host a certificate's URI is compared by rather than a URI; tag 4 names at least one relative name, with dotted-decimal object identifier types and string values; tag 7 is 8 bytes for IPv4 or 32 for IPv6. A host name is labels of letters, digits and hyphens, with a hyphen at neither edge of a label, 63 characters to a label and 253 to the name. An anchor whose nameConstraints names no subtree at all is refused the same way. Such a base previously reached the comparison, where it either matched every name, so a permitted subtree restricted nothing, or matched none, so an excluded subtree kept nothing out. A certificate's own nameConstraints extension is unaffected and is compared as the certificate wrote it.
+
 ## v0.6.41 — 2026-09-05
 
 A lookup table answers from its own entries, so a name taken off the wire cannot resolve to something the table never registered.

package/README.md

@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.cmc` | Build and interpret CMC messages (RFC 5272). `build(spec, signer)` assembles a Full PKI Request across all three request arms (PKCS#10, CRMF, other) and signs it through `pki.cms.sign` under `id-cct-PKIData`. A PKCS#10 (`tcr`) request is verified against its own proof-of-possession before signing, so a request whose self-signature does not verify under its subject public key is refused rather than signed into a message a CA would reject. Body-part identifiers are unique across the whole message and never the reserved 0; a caller's clash is refused rather than renumbered, since a control may already reference it. An Identity Proof V2 witness is computed over the `reqSequence` bytes exactly as emitted (§6.2.1 step 1) rather than a re-serialization, a POP Link Witness is emitted only alongside the POP Link Random control §6.3.1.1 requires beside it, and a renewal carries neither Identification nor Identity Proof in either version. `verify(response, sent)` takes what the CA returned plus the state the client retained and reduces it to one terminal outcome: `issued`, `pending`, `confirm-required`, `pop-required`, or `rejected`. It binds the exchange first — Transaction Identifier, the Sender and Recipient Nonce echo compared in constant time and by full value so a truncation cannot match, and the Data Return echo — with each check applying only if the client sent that half, and, once sent, an absent or differing echo being a refusal, which is the replay defense. `bodyPartIDs` extends the same rule to what the response is about: a status reporting on a body part the request never sent is refused, which the transaction and nonce cannot catch, because a server can echo both correctly while answering about a different message. Several status controls are permitted and the worst governs, so a failure cannot hide behind an earlier success; the absence of any status control is success, per §6.1.2. The carrier's signature must verify (§3.2.1.3.4): a conforming SignedData carries its own signer certificate, so the ordinary build-then-verify flow needs nothing extra and the verdict reports `signatureVerified: true`. Where the signer is found nowhere the posture is fail-closed with a named opt-out — supply `certs` with the responder's certificate, or `allowUnverified: true`, in which case the verdict reports `signatureVerified: false`. Doing neither is refused, the opt-out never excuses a signature that is present and wrong, and a carrier with no signer at all is refused outright. The response's own `cmsSequence` and `otherMsgs` come back raw, since a request whose only arm was the other-message form has no certificate to return and §4.1 puts its answer there. Nothing is trusted: issued certificates are read from the CMS certificate bag (§4.2) and surfaced raw for `pki.path.validate`, and a Publish Trust Anchors control is surfaced with `trusted: false` rather than added to a store — `build`, `verify` |
 | `pki.schema.cmc` | Decode CMC messages (RFC 5272 as updated by RFC 6402): a Full PKI Request (`PKIData`) or Full PKI Response (`PKIResponse`) riding inside a CMS SignedData, reached by the encapsulated content type (`id-cct-PKIData` / `id-cct-PKIResponse`). Controls are surfaced in wire order with their values raw, so an unrecognized one is data rather than a fault. Tagged requests decode across all three arms. The status verdicts (`CMCStatusInfo` v1 and `CMCStatusInfoV2`) are collected as an ordered list, and the RFC 6402 two-module `OtherStatusInfo` ambiguity — `pendInfo` and `extendedFailInfo` are both untagged SEQUENCEs in the 1988 module, told apart only by their first element — is resolved by inspection and refused when it cannot be told apart. Body-part identity is unique across the whole message rather than per sequence, 0 is reserved as the reference to the enclosing PKIData, and the `reqSequence` bytes are surfaced exactly as they appeared so an Identity Proof witness is computed over the wire bytes. A companion decoder for CMS content rather than an auto-routed format — `parse`, `parsePkiData`, `parsePkiResponse` |
 | `pki.schema.engine` | The declarative ASN.1 structure-schema engine every format parser composes — `walk`, `encode`, `embeddedDer`, and the schema combinators |
-| `pki.path` | Certification-path validation (RFC 5280 §6). `validate` runs the §6.1 state machine over an ordered path and a trust anchor: signature chaining across RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and hybrid composite ML-DSA (a composite is accepted only when both its post-quantum and traditional components verify), validity windows, name chaining, basic constraints and path length, key usage, name constraints, and the certificate-policy tree. It returns a structured verdict with per-check reason codes and enforces a `pki.trust` anchor's per-purpose distrust-after dates and delegator purposes through `checkPurpose` — an anchor that carries either one with no purpose named to select by is refused as a configuration fault rather than validated as though it carried none. The verdict says what was established. `revocationChecked` takes the weakest outcome on the path: `false` with no checker supplied, `"determined"` when every certificate got an explicit good or revoked answer, `"waived"` when `softFail` turned an undetermined one into a pass, and `"undetermined"` when one could not be answered at all — which includes a checker that throws, a fault `softFail` does not waive because `softFail` opts into an undetermined answer, not into a broken checker. `anchorConstraints` names the purpose the anchor was judged under and whether each of its two constraints applied. `crlChecker` supplies CRL-based revocation, covering partitioned and sharded CRLs, whose §6.3.3 Distribution Point ↔ IDP correspondence lets corresponding shards accumulate reason coverage until all eight revocation reasons are covered, and delta CRLs, merged onto the complete CRL they may be combined with (§5.2.4) so a held certificate its delta releases reads good, while a delta that merges with nothing still reports what it lists and still withholds good. `ocspChecker` supplies OCSP-based revocation (RFC 6960: CertID binding, responder authorization, signature, currency) over the same pluggable hook. `build(leaf, opts)` is the discovering complement (RFC 4158): from a leaf, an untrusted pool of candidate CA certificates, and a trust store, it finds the ordered leaf-to-anchor path `validate` accepts, using name chaining plus the RFC 4158 §3.5 sort hints (an AKI/SKI match, an anchor-adjacent issuer, CA plus keyCertSign, validity at the check time — ordering hints, never filters), a depth-first search with backtracking so the first accepted path wins, and a bounded search (chain-length cap, candidate-expansion cap, identity-tuple visited set) so a cross-certificate cycle or Bridge-CA fan-out terminates deterministically. Every accept flows through `validate`, and its verdict is cross-checked against `openssl verify`. Opt-in AIA `caIssuers` fetching (`opts.fetchAia: true`) discovers a missing intermediate from a certificate's Authority Information Access URL (§4.2.2.1) over `pki.transport`, triggered only on a pool miss and bounded against SSRF and amplification: HTTPS only, a total fetch budget that caps fetching silently rather than throwing, a per-cert URL cap, a build-wide URL dedupe, a response-size and certificate-count cap, no redirect following, and every fault a silent skip. The TLS trust (`opts.tls`) stays distinct from the PKI `trustAnchors`, and every fetched certificate remains untrusted pool material that still flows through `validate` (never a trust anchor). It is off by default, so the default build is byte-identical offline. An `opts.direction` of `"reverse"` searches from a trust anchor toward the leaf (RFC 4158 §3.1), narrower when the anchor set is small and the leaf's issuer options fan out, and `"auto"` picks the direction by first-hop fan-out; reverse building reuses the same pool, visited set, caps, and `validate` gate, so the direction changes only search order, and the anchor is excluded from the returned path. Reverse building is pool-only and does not combine with `fetchAia`. When `opts.userInitialPolicySet` names acceptable certificate-policy OIDs and more than one path validates, build returns the accepted path whose user-constrained policy set best satisfies that set (RFC 4158 §4) rather than the first accepted path, the ranking bounded by the same candidate cap and a malformed set refused with `path/bad-input`; an `anyPolicy` entry is unconstrained and returns the first accepted path. Pure and re-entrant — `validate`, `build`, `crlChecker`, `ocspChecker` |
+| `pki.path` | Certification-path validation (RFC 5280 §6). `validate` runs the §6.1 state machine over an ordered path and a trust anchor: signature chaining across RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and hybrid composite ML-DSA (a composite is accepted only when both its post-quantum and traditional components verify), validity windows, name chaining, basic constraints and path length, key usage, name constraints, and the certificate-policy tree. It returns a structured verdict with per-check reason codes and enforces a `pki.trust` anchor's per-purpose distrust-after dates and delegator purposes through `checkPurpose` — an anchor that carries either one with no purpose named to select by is refused as a configuration fault rather than validated as though it carried none. The verdict says what was established. `revocationChecked` takes the weakest outcome on the path: `false` with no checker supplied, `"determined"` when every certificate got an explicit good or revoked answer, `"waived"` when `softFail` turned an undetermined one into a pass, and `"undetermined"` when one could not be answered at all — which includes a checker that throws, a fault `softFail` does not waive because `softFail` opts into an undetermined answer, not into a broken checker. `anchorConstraints` names the purpose the anchor was judged under and whether each of its two constraints applied. `crlChecker` supplies CRL-based revocation, covering partitioned and sharded CRLs, whose §6.3.3 Distribution Point ↔ IDP correspondence lets corresponding shards accumulate reason coverage until all eight revocation reasons are covered, and delta CRLs, merged onto the complete CRL they may be combined with (§5.2.4) so a held certificate its delta releases reads good, while a delta that merges with nothing still reports what it lists and still withholds good. `ocspChecker` supplies OCSP-based revocation (RFC 6960: CertID binding, responder authorization, signature, currency) over the same pluggable hook. `build(leaf, opts)` is the discovering complement (RFC 4158): from a leaf, an untrusted pool of candidate CA certificates, and a trust store, it finds the ordered leaf-to-anchor path `validate` accepts, using name chaining plus the RFC 4158 §3.5 sort hints (an AKI/SKI match, an anchor-adjacent issuer, CA plus keyCertSign, validity at the check time — ordering hints, never filters), a depth-first search with backtracking so the first accepted path wins, and a bounded search (chain-length cap, candidate-expansion cap, identity-tuple visited set) so a cross-certificate cycle or Bridge-CA fan-out terminates deterministically. Every accept flows through `validate`, and its verdict is cross-checked against `openssl verify`. Opt-in AIA `caIssuers` fetching (`opts.fetchAia: true`) discovers a missing intermediate from a certificate's Authority Information Access URL (§4.2.2.1) over `pki.transport`, triggered only on a pool miss and bounded against SSRF and amplification: HTTPS only, a total fetch budget that caps fetching silently rather than throwing, a per-cert URL cap, a build-wide URL dedupe, a response-size and certificate-count cap, no redirect following, and every fault a silent skip. The TLS trust (`opts.tls`) stays distinct from the PKI `trustAnchors`, and every fetched certificate remains untrusted pool material that still flows through `validate` (never a trust anchor). It is off by default, so the default build is byte-identical offline. An `opts.direction` of `"reverse"` searches from a trust anchor toward the leaf (RFC 4158 §3.1), narrower when the anchor set is small and the leaf's issuer options fan out, and `"auto"` picks the direction by first-hop fan-out; reverse building reuses the same pool, visited set, caps, and `validate` gate, so the direction changes only search order, and the anchor is excluded from the returned path. Reverse building is pool-only and does not combine with `fetchAia`. When `opts.userInitialPolicySet` names acceptable certificate-policy OIDs and more than one path validates, build returns the accepted path whose user-constrained policy set best satisfies that set (RFC 4158 §4) rather than the first accepted path, the ranking bounded by the same candidate cap and a malformed set refused with `path/bad-input`; an `anyPolicy` entry is unconstrained and returns the first accepted path. In a mesh of cross-certified domains, where many candidates chain by name to the same place, a candidate is ranked by how many leading relative distinguished names it shares with the name the search is heading for (§3.5.16 and the §3.5.19 reverse method), so a certificate in the target's own domain is tried before one from a cross-certified domain, and forward building sorts a candidate under every candidate that can complete the path when its path length constraint cannot cover the certificates already below it (§3.5.7), an ordering that outranks the other hints rather than competing with them. No candidate is removed and an unbounded search still reaches every path the pool holds; a bounded one spends `maxCandidatesConsidered` on whichever branches the order steers it to. Pure and re-entrant — `validate`, `build`, `crlChecker`, `ocspChecker` |
 | `pki.x509` | Certificate issuance (RFC 5280 §4). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a certificate from a `spec` of subject (a common-name string, an array of RDNs, or raw Name DER), the public key being certified, the validity window, an optional serial, and an optional `extensions` object. The `issuer` is a key alone (self-signed: issuer equals subject, signed with that key), a name plus public key plus key, or an issuing certificate plus key. The signature algorithm is resolved from the signing key through the shared registry, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA P-256/384/521, Ed25519, Ed448, ML-DSA-44/65/87, the twelve SLH-DSA sets, and the composite arms all issue without a per-algorithm branch. It encodes basic constraints, key usage, extended key usage, subject and authority key identifiers (the SKI derived by SHA-1 of the subject key), subject alternative names, and certificate policies from the spec, taking any other extension as pre-encoded DER. It derives the version from the field set and enforces the serial bounds, the UTCTime/GeneralizedTime cutover, the DER default omissions, and the CA cross-field rules; a violation throws a typed `CertificateError`. Returns DER, or a PEM `CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`. Every arm is independently verified by OpenSSL. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.x509.parse` — `sign` |
 | `pki.csr` | PKCS#10 certification-request issuance (RFC 2986 / RFC 2985). `sign(spec, key, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificationRequest` from a `spec` of subject (which may be empty), the public key being certified, an optional `extensionRequest` carrying the requested v3 extensions a CA copies into the issued certificate (subject alternative names, key usage, extended key usage, basic constraints, certificate policies, subject key identifier, or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER), and an optional `challengePassword`. `key` (or `{ key }`) is the subject's own private key: the request is self-signed to prove possession of the private half of `subjectPublicKey`, and that proof is verified before the request is returned, which is what `openssl req -verify` checks. The signature algorithm is resolved from the subject key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. Returns DER, or a PEM `CERTIFICATE REQUEST` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CsrError`. `verify(request)` asks the same question of a request someone else produced, over its exact signed `certificationRequestInfo` bytes under the `subjectPKInfo` inside them, through the one path-validation signature engine. It answers `{ verified, subject, subjectPublicKeyInfo, attributes, certificationRequestInfoBytes }`, all re-derived from the signed bytes, so a CA issues from the fields the signature covers rather than from the object it passed in. A `verified: true` says the producer held that private key and that the subject and requested extensions are the ones they signed; who they are is the enrollment protocol's question, not this one. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.csr.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
 | `pki.attrcert` | Attribute-certificate issuance (RFC 5755). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs an `AttributeCertificate` as an Attribute Authority: a `spec` of `holder` (exactly one of an entity name, a `baseCertificateID` reference, a `fromCertificate` binding, or an object digest), the validity window as GeneralizedTime, an optional serial (positive, at most 20 octets, randomly generated when omitted), the `attributes` (role, clearance, group, chargingIdentity, accessIdentity, authenticationInfo, or pre-encoded Attribute DER), and optional `extensions` (auditIdentity, targetInformation, noRevAvail, aaControls, acProxying, authorityKeyIdentifier, or pre-encoded Extension DER) each with its RFC 5755 criticality. An attribute certificate is never self-signed, so the `issuer` is the signing AA, supplied as `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the AA key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, and the signature is verified under the AA public key before the certificate is returned. Returns DER, or a PEM `ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `AttrCertError`. `verify(ac, issuer, opts)` is the receiving side, performing the RFC 5755 sec. 5 checks an attribute certificate and a named issuer can settle between them: the signature over the exact `AttributeCertificateInfo` bytes through the one path-validation signature engine, the AC naming the issuer this verifier trusts (compared as a distinguished name), the evaluation instant lying within the validity with equality at either bound succeeding as the section states, the sec. 4.3.2 targeting rule, and rejection of any critical extension this verb does not process (section 5 defines support as parsing the value AND rejecting where the value would reject, so `aaControls` and `acProxying`, whose constraints it does not evaluate, are refused when critical). It answers `{ verified, signatureValid, validityChecked, targetingChecked, holderBindingChecked, issuerPathChecked, holder, issuer, attributes, extensions, notBefore, notAfter, serialNumberHex, reason }` with the fields re-derived from the signed bytes; the holder's own certificate chain and the AC issuer's chain need certificates the verb is not given, so those slots report `false` rather than letting their absence read as a pass. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.attrcert.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.ocsp` | Online Certificate Status Protocol (RFC 6960), both the responder and relying-party surface. `buildRequest(query, opts)` builds an OCSPRequest for one or more `{ cert, issuer }` pairs, with the CertID hashed under SHA-1 by default per the RFC 5019 lightweight profile or under SHA-2, plus an optional RFC 9654 nonce and an optional requestor signature. `sign(responseData, responder, opts)` produces a signed BasicOCSPResponse over the exact `ResponseData` DER, from the issuing CA directly or a delegated responder, under any `pki.cms.sign` key including the post-quantum ML-DSA and SLH-DSA sets, with `good`, `revoked` (reason and time), or `unknown` per-certificate status. `buildErrorResponse(status)` produces the unsigned §2.3 error (`tryLater`, `unauthorized`, and the rest). `verify(response, opts)` verifies a response fail-closed against the same hardened gates `pki.path.ocspChecker` runs: the CertID binding, responder authorization (the issuing CA, or a CA-issued delegate bearing id-kp-OCSPSigning and id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck and passing the full out-of-path certificate gates), the signature over `tbsResponseDataBytes`, currency against `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate`, and the request-nonce echo. It returns `{ status: "good" / "revoked" / "unknown", ... }` and never silently accepts. `verifyRequest(request, opts)` is the responder-side inverse of `buildRequest`: it verifies a client's signed request (RFC 6960 §4.1.1) under the requestor certificate the request carries, trying each embedded certificate since the field is unordered, and reports `signed`, `signatureValid`, every certificate whose key verified (`signerCerts`, so a key carried under an expired certificate beside its renewal is not hidden behind ordering) with the first one's decoded subject, the full embedded certificate bag (`certs`, including intermediates for path building), and the request's CertIDs; an unsigned request is reported with `signed: false` rather than refused. Transport-free — `buildRequest`, `sign`, `buildErrorResponse`, `verify`, `verifyRequest` |
 | `pki.ct` | Certificate Transparency (RFC 6962). `parseSctList` decodes the `SignedCertificateTimestampList` a certificate or OCSP response carries, a TLS-presentation-language payload inside the §3.3 double DER wrap, into per-SCT log id, exact `timestamp` (BigInt), named signature algorithm, and raw signature. `reconstructSignedData` rebuilds the exact `digitally-signed` preimage, and `verifySct` verifies an SCT signature against a log's public key, routing an ECDSA signature through the strict DER-conformance gate and verifying through the crypto engine, resolving true or false and throwing a typed error on a structural fault. On the producing side, `encodeSctList` builds the extension value byte for byte as the exact inverse of `parseSctList`, and `signSct` performs a log's signing step. For trust, `parseLogList` ingests the CT log-list JSON into constraint-carrying trusted logs, recomputing each log's id as SHA-256 of its key and refusing a disagreeing id (a swapped key, §3.2) and decoding the state and temporal-interval constraints; `verifySctWithLogList` resolves the log key from an SCT's log id, enforces the state (usable, qualified, and readonly trusted; retired only before retirement; pending and rejected refused) and the temporal-interval window, then delegates the signature check to `verifySct`. `verifyLogListSignature(json, signature, publicKey)` verifies the detached `log_list.sig` over the raw log-list bytes against a caller-pinned signer key (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5/SHA-256 and an EC P-256 arm, with forgeable-key defenses failing closed), cross-checked against `openssl dgst`. `fetchLogList(opts)` turns that chain into a live client: it GETs the `log_list.json` and its detached `log_list.sig` over `pki.transport`, verifies the detached signature over the raw fetched bytes against a caller-pinned distributor key before parsing, so an unverified document is never parsed, read, cached, or surfaced, then ingests the same bytes through `parseLogList` and returns the trusted-log set plus the surfaced `version` and `timestamp`. Above the per-SCT layer, `verifySctList` renders a certificate-level verdict over every SCT a certificate carries (§3.3), reporting how many distinct trusted logs verified an SCT (so a duplicated SCT cannot inflate the count) and from how many distinct trusted operators against a caller's CT policy (`minScts` and `minOperators`, both defaulting to the RFC floor of one), where a policy shortfall is a verdict and a per-SCT failure is a recorded row rather than a thrown call; `x509CertEntry` reconstructs the precertificate log entry from a final certificate by removing the SCT-list extension from its TBSCertificate as byte surgery, so its embedded SCTs verify end to end (§3.2). The toolkit bakes in no vendor URL or key, TLS trust is explicit with `rejectUnauthorized` always on, each response is size-capped before the trust chain, and the transport is injectable so the whole path is testable offline — `parseSctList`, `reconstructSignedData`, `verifySct`, `encodeSctList`, `signSct`, `parseLogList`, `verifySctWithLogList`, `verifySctList`, `x509CertEntry`, `verifyLogListSignature`, `fetchLogList` |
 | `pki.merkle` | Merkle-tree proof verification (RFC 6962 / RFC 9162). `leafHash`, `nodeHash`, and `emptyRootHash` build the domain-separated (0x00 leaf, 0x01 node) SHA-256 tree hashes. `verifyInclusion` folds an audit proof back to a root, and `verifyConsistency` reconstructs both the old and new root, which is the append-only guarantee; each is constant-time-compared to a trusted checkpoint root. Fail-closed on bad geometry, sync hashing, transport-free — `leafHash`, `nodeHash`, `emptyRootHash`, `verifyInclusion`, `verifyConsistency` |
-| `pki.trust` | Mozilla and CCADB trust-store ingestion. `parseCertdata` reads the NSS `certdata.txt` object stream and `parseCcadbCsv` the CCADB CSV export, both into one constraint-carrying anchor shape: the per-purpose trust bits, where only `CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR` grants, and the per-purpose distrust-after dates the bare root list omits. Certificate and trust objects pair by byte-exact issuer and serial rather than adjacency and are cross-checked against the parsed DER, so metadata cannot attach to the wrong root. `anchor()` hands an entry to `pki.path.validate({ trustAnchors, checkPurpose })`. Offline, fail-closed, bounded — `parseCertdata`, `parseCcadbCsv`, `anchor` |
+| `pki.trust` | Mozilla and CCADB trust-store ingestion. `parseCertdata` reads the NSS `certdata.txt` object stream and `parseCcadbCsv` the CCADB CSV export, both into one constraint-carrying anchor shape: the per-purpose trust bits, where only `CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR` grants, and the per-purpose distrust-after dates the bare root list omits. Certificate and trust objects pair by byte-exact issuer and serial rather than adjacency and are cross-checked against the parsed DER, so metadata cannot attach to the wrong root. `anchor()` hands an entry to `pki.path.validate({ trustAnchors, checkPurpose })`, and `anchor(entry, { nameConstraints })` attaches the namespace a root program trusts a root for when that is narrower than the root certificate states, a `{ permitted, excluded }` pair of `{ tag, base }` subtrees that `validate` seeds as the RFC 5280 §6.1.1(h)(i) initial value, intersecting with each certificate's own constraints. Offline, fail-closed, bounded — `parseCertdata`, `parseCcadbCsv`, `anchor` |
 | `pki.shbs` | Stateful hash-based signature verification: HSS/LMS (RFC 8554), carried in X.509 by RFC 9802 and in CMS by RFC 9708, profiled by NIST SP 800-208 for CNSA 2.0 firmware signing. `verify` checks an HSS signature, where every level must pass, and `verifyLms` a single-tree LMS, over the raw public-key and signature blobs the parsers already surface. Pure public-input SHA-256 and SHAKE256 hashing, a data-driven typecode registry, and bounds-before-slice reads; a malformed blob throws a typed `ShbsError` while a well-formed but wrong signature returns `false`. Verification only by design, since stateful signing needs atomic one-time-key state that belongs in an HSM — `verify`, `verifyLms` |
 | `pki.hpke` | Hybrid Public Key Encryption (RFC 9180), the encrypt-to-a-public-key primitive behind TLS ECH, MLS, and OHTTP. `setupS` and `setupR` establish a sender or recipient context (KEM encapsulation plus the HKDF key schedule); the context's `seal` and `open` AEAD-encrypt with a sequence-counter nonce, and `export` derives further secrets; the module-level `seal` and `open` are single-shot wrappers. DHKEM (P-256, P-521, X25519, X448) by HKDF-SHA256/SHA512 by AES-GCM / ChaCha20Poly1305 / export-only, across all four modes, proven against the RFC 9180 Appendix A vectors. DHKEM(P-384) and HKDF-SHA384 are RFC-registered but Appendix A ships no vector for them, so they fail closed until an authoritative KAT exists. Pure composition over `node:crypto`; ML-KEM and X-Wing are a registry data-row extension pending stable drafts — `suites`, `setupS`, `setupR`, `seal`, `open` |
 | `pki.kem` | Composite ML-KEM key establishment (draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem), a post-quantum ML-KEM hybridized with a traditional RSA-OAEP, ECDH, X25519, or X448 so the established secret holds if either component is later broken. `encapsulate` turns a recipient's composite `SubjectPublicKeyInfo` into a 256-bit shared secret and a ciphertext; `decapsulate` recovers the same secret from the ciphertext and the composite PKCS#8 private key. Each component KEM runs independently and the two secrets are mixed through a SHA3-256 combiner that binds the traditional ciphertext, the traditional public key, and a per-algorithm label. The twelve algorithms pair ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 with RSA-OAEP 2048/3072/4096, ECDH over P-256/P-384/P-521 and brainpoolP256r1/P384r1, X25519, and X448, each verified against the draft Appendix G known-answer vectors; a malformed key or ciphertext, an unsupported algorithm, or a component decapsulation failure throws a typed `KemError` — `encapsulate`, `decapsulate` |

package/lib/guard-name.js

@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@
 // @internal
 
 var intrinsic = require("./guard-intrinsic");
+var _append = require("./guard-list").append;
+var _assertCanonicalOid = require("./guard-identifier").assertCanonicalOid;
+var _ipUtils = require("./ip-utils");
+var _isIPv4 = _ipUtils.isIPv4;
+var _expandIpv6Hex = _ipUtils.expandIpv6Hex;
 
 var _charCodeAt = intrinsic.uncurry(String.prototype.charCodeAt);
 var _charAt = intrinsic.uncurry(String.prototype.charAt);
@@ -11,6 +16,7 @@ var _toLowerCase = intrinsic.uncurry(String.prototype.toLowerCase);
 var _toUpperCase = intrinsic.uncurry(String.prototype.toUpperCase);
 var _strSlice = intrinsic.uncurry(String.prototype.slice);
 var _lastIndexOf = intrinsic.uncurry(String.prototype.lastIndexOf);
+var _indexOf = intrinsic.uncurry(String.prototype.indexOf);
 var _numToString = intrinsic.uncurry(Number.prototype.toString);
 var _create = intrinsic.create;
 var _hasOwn = intrinsic.hasOwn;
@@ -197,9 +203,274 @@ function lowerAscii(s) {
   return out;
 }
 
+function _charTable(chars) {
+  var t = _create(null);
+  for (var i = 0; i < chars.length; i++) t[_charCodeAt(chars, i)] = true;
+  return t;
+}
+var _FQDN_TABLE = _charTable("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789.-");
+var _DIGDOT_TABLE = _charTable("0123456789.");
+function _allCharsIn(s, table) {
+  if (s.length === 0) return false;
+  for (var i = 0; i < s.length; i++) if (!table[_charCodeAt(s, i)]) return false;
+  return true;
+}
+
+function stripTrailingDot(s) { return _charAt(s, s.length - 1) === "." ? _strSlice(s, 0, -1) : s; }
+
+/** @internal A host name of two or more labels that is not an address, which is the form a URI
+ * name constraint is compared by (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.10). */
+function isFqdnHost(host) {
+  var h = stripTrailingDot(host);
+  if (h === "" || _indexOf(h, ".") === -1) return false;
+  if (!_allCharsIn(h, _FQDN_TABLE)) return false;
+  if (_allCharsIn(h, _DIGDOT_TABLE)) return false;
+  return true;
+}
+
+var _LDH_ALNUM = _charTable("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789");
+var MAX_LABEL = 63;
+var MAX_HOST = 253;
+var MAX_LOCAL_PART = 64;
+
+/** @internal One label of a host name (RFC 1034 sec. 3.5, RFC 1123 sec. 2.1): letters, digits and
+ * hyphens, with a hyphen at neither edge, and 63 characters at most. */
+function _isHostLabel(s, from, to) {
+  var n = to - from;
+  if (n === 0 || n > MAX_LABEL) return false;
+  if (!_LDH_ALNUM[_charCodeAt(s, from)] || !_LDH_ALNUM[_charCodeAt(s, to - 1)]) return false;
+  for (var i = from + 1; i < to - 1; i++) {
+    var c = _charCodeAt(s, i);
+    if (!_LDH_ALNUM[c] && c !== 0x2d) return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+/** @internal A host name written as labels separated by dots, carrying no trailing dot: the caller
+ * strips the one dot the comparison strips, so a second one is an empty label and is refused. */
+function _isHostName(s) {
+  if (s.length === 0 || s.length > MAX_HOST) return false;
+  var start = 0;
+  for (var i = 0; i <= s.length; i++) {
+    if (i === s.length || _charCodeAt(s, i) === 0x2e) {
+      if (!_isHostLabel(s, start, i)) return false;
+      start = i + 1;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+var _ATEXT_TABLE = _charTable("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789!#$%&'*+-/=?^_`{|}~");
+
+/** @internal A quoted local part (RFC 5321 sec. 4.1.2 Quoted-string): printable ASCII between
+ * quotes, where a backslash escapes the character after it. */
+function _isQuotedLocal(s) {
+  var n = s.length;
+  if (n < 2 || _charCodeAt(s, n - 1) !== 0x22) return false;
+  for (var i = 1; i < n - 1; i++) {
+    var c = _charCodeAt(s, i);
+    if (c === 0x5c) {
+      i += 1;
+      if (i >= n - 1) return false;
+      var e = _charCodeAt(s, i);
+      if (e < 0x20 || e > 0x7e) return false;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (c < 0x20 || c > 0x7e || c === 0x22) return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+/** @internal The local part of a mailbox (RFC 5321 sec. 4.1.2): either a quoted string, or atoms
+ * separated by dots, which is the form a certificate's mailbox is compared against. */
+function _isMailboxLocal(s) {
+  if (s.length === 0 || s.length > MAX_LOCAL_PART) return false;
+  if (_charCodeAt(s, 0) === 0x22) return _isQuotedLocal(s);
+  var pieceLen = 0;
+  for (var i = 0; i < s.length; i++) {
+    var c = _charCodeAt(s, i);
+    if (c === 0x2e) {
+      if (pieceLen === 0) return false;
+      pieceLen = 0;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!_ATEXT_TABLE[c]) return false;
+    pieceLen += 1;
+  }
+  return pieceLen > 0;
+}
+
+var _IPV6_TAG = "ipv6:";
+/** @internal An address literal (RFC 5321 sec. 4.1.3), the other form a mailbox may name its domain
+ * in: an IPv4 address in brackets, or an IPv6 address behind the tag that introduces one. The
+ * comparison holds a mailbox constraint's domain to an exact match, so a literal is a domain it can
+ * reach a verdict on. */
+function _isAddressLiteral(s) {
+  var n = s.length;
+  if (n < 3 || _charCodeAt(s, 0) !== 0x5b || _charCodeAt(s, n - 1) !== 0x5d) return false;
+  var inner = _strSlice(s, 1, n - 1);
+  if (_toLowerCase(_strSlice(inner, 0, _IPV6_TAG.length)) === _IPV6_TAG) {
+    return _expandIpv6Hex(_strSlice(inner, _IPV6_TAG.length)) !== null;
+  }
+  return _isIPv4(inner);
+}
+
+/** @internal The two halves of a mailbox, `null` when it carries no separator and the string
+ * "ambiguous" when it carries more than one. This is the split the rfc822Name comparison runs, so a
+ * constraint the comparison cannot separate is one this answers the same way. */
+function splitMailbox(addr) {
+  var first = _indexOf(addr, "@");
+  if (first === -1) return null;
+  if (first !== _lastIndexOf(addr, "@")) return "ambiguous";
+  return [_strSlice(addr, 0, first), _strSlice(addr, first + 1)];
+}
+
+/** @internal A host name, optionally written as a subtree with a leading dot, and with the one
+ * trailing dot the comparison strips. */
+function _hostConstraintBody(s) {
+  var h = stripTrailingDot(s);
+  return _charAt(h, 0) === "." ? _strSlice(h, 1) : h;
+}
+
+/** @internal Why a name-constraint base cannot be enforced, or null when it can. A base outside the
+ * form its tag names is not a narrower namespace: an empty dNSName base matches every name, and a
+ * base holding characters no host name can hold matches none, so the same value that reads as a
+ * restriction either lifts one or applies to nothing. The comparisons this mirrors are in
+ * lib/path-validate.js, and a base refused here is one they would answer with no verdict. */
+function constraintBaseRefusal(tag, base) {
+  if (typeof base !== "string") return "must be a string for tag " + tag;
+  if (tag === 1) {
+    var mb = splitMailbox(base);
+    if (mb === null) {
+      if (_isAddressLiteral(base)) return null;
+      return _isHostName(_hostConstraintBody(base)) ? null
+        : "must be a mailbox, a host name, or a host name written as a subtree with a leading dot";
+    }
+    if (mb === "ambiguous") {
+      return "carries more than one at-sign, so the comparison cannot tell which one separates the mailbox";
+    }
+    if (!_isMailboxLocal(mb[0])) return "must carry the local part of a mailbox before its at-sign";
+    if (_isAddressLiteral(mb[1])) return null;
+    return _isHostName(stripTrailingDot(mb[1])) ? null
+      : "must end in the host name or bracketed address literal of a mailbox";
+  }
+  if (tag === 2) {
+    return _isHostName(_hostConstraintBody(base)) ? null
+      : "must be a host name, optionally written as a subtree with a leading dot";
+  }
+  if (tag === 6) {
+    var h = _hostConstraintBody(_toLowerCase(base));
+    var dotted = _isHostName(h) && _indexOf(h, ".") !== -1 && !_allCharsIn(h, _DIGDOT_TABLE);
+    return dotted ? null
+      : "must be a dotted host name, which is the part of a URI a certificate is compared by";
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+var _ATV_KEYS = ["type", "value", "name"];
+
+/** @internal A distinguished name a caller supplied, copied into fresh plain objects by reading
+ * descriptors only. A Proxy answers its own reads and an accessor runs caller code, so either one
+ * at any level is refused before anything is copied: a name that decides what it says while it is
+ * being read can show a narrow value to a check and a wide one to the use, and where the name is a
+ * namespace restriction that is the difference between a certificate being refused and admitted. */
+function copyDnRdns(rdns, E, code, who) {
+  assertPlainDnRdns(rdns, E, code, who);
+  /** @internal A name of no relative names is a prefix of every name, so as a constraint it reaches
+   * the same verdict on all of them. */
+  if (rdns.length === 0) throw E(code, who + " must name at least one relative distinguished name");
+  var out = [];
+  for (var i = 0; i < rdns.length; i++) {
+    var rd = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(rdns, i);
+    if (rd === undefined) throw E(code, who + " index " + i + " is a hole or is inherited; every entry must be its own");
+    var rdn = rd.value;
+    if (!_isArray(rdn)) throw E(code, who + "[" + i + "] must be an array of attributes");
+    if (rdn.length === 0) throw E(code, who + "[" + i + "] must carry at least one attribute");
+    var rdnOut = [];
+    for (var j = 0; j < rdn.length; j++) {
+      var ad = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(rdn, j);
+      if (ad === undefined) throw E(code, who + "[" + i + "] index " + j + " is a hole or is inherited; every entry must be its own");
+      var atv = ad.value;
+      if (atv === null || typeof atv !== "object") throw E(code, who + "[" + i + "][" + j + "] must be an attribute object carrying a type and a value");
+      var atvOut = {};
+      for (var k = 0; k < _ATV_KEYS.length; k++) {
+        var fd = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(atv, _ATV_KEYS[k]);
+        if (fd === undefined) continue;
+        intrinsic.defineProperty(atvOut, _ATV_KEYS[k], { value: fd.value, enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true });
+      }
+      if (!_hasOwn(atvOut, "type") || !_hasOwn(atvOut, "value")) {
+        throw E(code, who + "[" + i + "][" + j + "] must carry its type and value as own data properties");
+      }
+      /** @internal Every attribute a certificate's name is compared against is a string compared to
+       * a string, so an attribute holding anything else is equal to nothing it will ever meet, and
+       * NaN is not even equal to itself. A name built out of those is not a narrower namespace. */
+      _assertCanonicalOid(atvOut.type, E, code, who + "[" + i + "][" + j + "].type");
+      if (typeof atvOut.value !== "string") {
+        throw E(code, who + "[" + i + "][" + j + "].value must be a string, the form a name is compared in");
+      }
+      assertNoControlBytes(atvOut.value, E, code, who + "[" + i + "][" + j + "].value");
+      _append(rdnOut, atvOut);
+    }
+    _append(out, rdnOut);
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** @internal The shape check the copy above relies on. */
+function assertPlainDnRdns(rdns, E, code, who) {
+  if (intrinsic.types.isProxy(rdns)) throw E(code, who + " must be a plain array, not a Proxy");
+  for (var i = 0; i < rdns.length; i++) {
+    var rd = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(rdns, i);
+    if (rd === undefined) continue;
+    if (!_hasOwn(rd, "value")) throw E(code, who + " entry " + i + " must be a data property, not an accessor");
+    var rdn = rd.value;
+    if (!_isArray(rdn)) continue;
+    if (intrinsic.types.isProxy(rdn)) throw E(code, who + "[" + i + "] must be a plain array, not a Proxy");
+    for (var j = 0; j < rdn.length; j++) {
+      var ad = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(rdn, j);
+      if (ad === undefined) continue;
+      if (!_hasOwn(ad, "value")) throw E(code, who + "[" + i + "] entry " + j + " must be a data property, not an accessor");
+      var atv = ad.value;
+      if (atv === null || typeof atv !== "object") continue;
+      if (intrinsic.types.isProxy(atv)) throw E(code, who + "[" + i + "][" + j + "] must not be a Proxy");
+      if (_isArray(atv)) throw E(code, who + "[" + i + "][" + j + "] must be an attribute object, not an array");
+      for (var k = 0; k < _ATV_KEYS.length; k++) {
+        var fd = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(atv, _ATV_KEYS[k]);
+        if (fd !== undefined && !_hasOwn(fd, "value")) {
+          throw E(code, who + "[" + i + "][" + j + "]." + _ATV_KEYS[k] + " must be a data property, not an accessor");
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/** @internal The `rdns` of a directoryName base, captured the same way. An inherited Proxy answers
+ * `in` through its has trap, which is caller code running inside a read meant to be getter-free, so
+ * the prototype chain is walked before the property is asked for at all. Returns undefined when the
+ * base carries no rdns array, which the caller reads as "not a directoryName base". */
+function capturedRdns(base, E, code, who) {
+  if (intrinsic.types.isProxy(base)) throw E(code, who + " must not be a Proxy");
+  var baseProto = intrinsic.getPrototypeOf(base);
+  while (baseProto !== null) {
+    if (intrinsic.types.isProxy(baseProto)) throw E(code, who + " must not inherit from a Proxy");
+    baseProto = intrinsic.getPrototypeOf(baseProto);
+  }
+  var d = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(base, "rdns");
+  if (d === undefined) {
+    if ("rdns" in base) throw E(code, who + " rdns must be an own data property, not inherited");
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  if (!_hasOwn(d, "value")) throw E(code, who + " rdns must be a data property, not an accessor");
+  if (!_isArray(d.value)) return undefined;
+  return copyDnRdns(d.value, E, code, who + " rdns");
+}
+
 module.exports = intrinsic.freeze({
+  capturedRdns: capturedRdns, copyDnRdns: copyDnRdns,
   assertNoControlBytes: assertNoControlBytes, assertPrintableIa5: assertPrintableIa5,
   dnEqual: dnEqual, rdnEqual: rdnEqual, emailEqual: emailEqual, dpnCorresponds: dpnCorresponds,
   escapeControlBytes: escapeControlBytes, escapeDnValue: escapeDnValue,
   lowerAscii: lowerAscii,
+  stripTrailingDot: stripTrailingDot, isFqdnHost: isFqdnHost, splitMailbox: splitMailbox,
+  constraintBaseRefusal: constraintBaseRefusal,
 });

package/lib/path-validate.js

@@ -323,12 +323,7 @@ function requireCriticalExt(ext, name, checks) {
 }
 
 
-function splitMailbox(addr) {
-  var first = addr.indexOf("@");
-  if (first === -1) return null;
-  if (first !== addr.lastIndexOf("@")) return "ambiguous";
-  return [addr.slice(0, first), addr.slice(first + 1)];
-}
+var splitMailbox = guard.name.splitMailbox;
 
 function emailMatch(constraint, mailbox) {
   var mb = splitMailbox(mailbox);
@@ -346,7 +341,7 @@ function emailMatch(constraint, mailbox) {
   return host === c;
 }
 
-function stripTrailingDot(s) { return s.charAt(s.length - 1) === "." ? s.slice(0, -1) : s; }
+var stripTrailingDot = guard.name.stripTrailingDot;
 
 function hostConstraintMatch(constraint, host) {
   var c = stripTrailingDot(constraint.toLowerCase()), h = stripTrailingDot(host.toLowerCase());
@@ -356,13 +351,6 @@ function hostConstraintMatch(constraint, host) {
 }
 
 function _charTable(chars) { var t = []; for (var i = 0; i < chars.length; i++) t[_charCodeAt(chars, i)] = true; return t; }
-var _FQDN_TABLE = _charTable("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789.-");
-var _DIGDOT_TABLE = _charTable("0123456789.");
-function _allCharsIn(s, table) {
-  if (s.length === 0) return false;
-  for (var i = 0; i < s.length; i++) if (!table[_charCodeAt(s, i)]) return false;
-  return true;
-}
 function _startsWithDigit(s) { if (s.length === 0) return false; var c = _charCodeAt(s, 0); return c >= 48 && c <= 57; }
 
 var _SCHEME_TABLE = _charTable("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789+.-");
@@ -389,13 +377,7 @@ function _stripBrackets(s) {
   return (n >= 2 && _charCodeAt(s, 0) === 91 && _charCodeAt(s, n - 1) === 93) ? s.slice(1, n - 1) : s;
 }
 
-function isFqdnHost(host) {
-  var h = stripTrailingDot(host);
-  if (h === "" || h.indexOf(".") === -1) return false;
-  if (!_allCharsIn(h, _FQDN_TABLE)) return false;
-  if (_allCharsIn(h, _DIGDOT_TABLE)) return false;
-  return true;
-}
+var isFqdnHost = guard.name.isFqdnHost;
 
 function uriMatch(constraint, uri) {
   var host = uriHost(uri);
@@ -544,7 +526,7 @@ function treeIsEmpty(tree) { return tree.children.length === 0; }
 
 function isSubtreeBaseValid(tag, base) {
   switch (tag) {
-    case 1: case 2: case 6: return typeof base === "string";
+    case 1: case 2: case 6: return guard.name.constraintBaseRefusal(tag, base) === null;
     case 7: return Buffer.isBuffer(base) && (base.length === 8 || base.length === 32);
     case 4: return base !== null && typeof base === "object" && !!base.rdns && intrinsic.isArray(base.rdns);
     default: return base !== undefined;
@@ -923,7 +905,13 @@ function validateCriticalExtensionStructure(cert) {
  * intermediate's own `nameConstraints` extension intersects with them and a leaf
  * must satisfy both. They are a separate generation from
  * `opts.initialPermittedSubtrees`, so those two intersect as well. A mis-shaped
- * subtree is refused with `path/bad-input` rather than left inert.
+ * subtree is refused with `path/bad-input` rather than left inert, and so is one
+ * whose base is outside the form its tag names: a host name for tags 2 and 6, a
+ * mailbox or host name for tag 1, at least one relative name with object
+ * identifier types and string values for tag 4, and 8 or 32 bytes for tag 7. An
+ * anchor whose `nameConstraints` names no subtree at all is refused the same way.
+ * A certificate's own `nameConstraints` extension is compared as the certificate
+ * wrote it; this rule is on the subtrees a caller supplies.
  *
  * @example
  *   var pair = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
@@ -1996,82 +1984,8 @@ var _ATV_KEYS = ["type", "value", "name"];
  * and nothing deeper, so exactly those levels are walked and a self-referencing array is refused
  * rather than followed.
  */
-function _copyDnRdns(rdns, who) {
-  _assertPlainDnRdns(rdns, who);
-  var out = [];
-  for (var i = 0; i < rdns.length; i++) {
-    var rd = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(rdns, i);
-    if (rd === undefined) throw E("path/bad-input", who + " index " + i + " is a hole or is inherited; every entry must be its own");
-    var rdn = rd.value;
-    if (!intrinsic.isArray(rdn)) throw E("path/bad-input", who + "[" + i + "] must be an array of attributes");
-    var rdnOut = [];
-    for (var j = 0; j < rdn.length; j++) {
-      var ad = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(rdn, j);
-      if (ad === undefined) throw E("path/bad-input", who + "[" + i + "] index " + j + " is a hole or is inherited; every entry must be its own");
-      var atv = ad.value;
-      if (atv === null || typeof atv !== "object") throw E("path/bad-input", who + "[" + i + "][" + j + "] must be an attribute object carrying a type and a value");
-      var atvOut = {};
-      for (var k = 0; k < _ATV_KEYS.length; k++) {
-        var fd = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(atv, _ATV_KEYS[k]);
-        if (fd === undefined) continue;
-        intrinsic.defineProperty(atvOut, _ATV_KEYS[k], { value: fd.value, enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true });
-      }
-      if (!intrinsic.hasOwn(atvOut, "type") || !intrinsic.hasOwn(atvOut, "value")) {
-        throw E("path/bad-input", who + "[" + i + "][" + j + "] must carry its type and value as own data properties");
-      }
-      guard.list.append(rdnOut, atvOut);
-    }
-    guard.list.append(out, rdnOut);
-  }
-  return out;
-}
-/**
- * @internal The shape check the copy above relies on: a Proxy answers its own reads and an accessor
- * runs caller code, so either one at any level of the directoryName is refused before it is copied.
- */
-function _assertPlainDnRdns(rdns, who) {
-  if (intrinsic.types.isProxy(rdns)) throw E("path/bad-input", who + " must be a plain array, not a Proxy");
-  for (var i = 0; i < rdns.length; i++) {
-    var rd = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(rdns, i);
-    if (rd === undefined) continue;
-    if (!intrinsic.hasOwn(rd, "value")) throw E("path/bad-input", who + " entry " + i + " must be a data property, not an accessor");
-    var rdn = rd.value;
-    if (!intrinsic.isArray(rdn)) continue;
-    if (intrinsic.types.isProxy(rdn)) throw E("path/bad-input", who + "[" + i + "] must be a plain array, not a Proxy");
-    for (var j = 0; j < rdn.length; j++) {
-      var ad = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(rdn, j);
-      if (ad === undefined) continue;
-      if (!intrinsic.hasOwn(ad, "value")) throw E("path/bad-input", who + "[" + i + "] entry " + j + " must be a data property, not an accessor");
-      var atv = ad.value;
-      if (atv === null || typeof atv !== "object") continue;
-      if (intrinsic.types.isProxy(atv)) throw E("path/bad-input", who + "[" + i + "][" + j + "] must not be a Proxy");
-      if (intrinsic.isArray(atv)) throw E("path/bad-input", who + "[" + i + "][" + j + "] must be an attribute object, not an array");
-      for (var k = 0; k < _ATV_KEYS.length; k++) {
-        var fd = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(atv, _ATV_KEYS[k]);
-        if (fd !== undefined && !intrinsic.hasOwn(fd, "value")) {
-          throw E("path/bad-input", who + "[" + i + "][" + j + "]." + _ATV_KEYS[k] + " must be a data property, not an accessor");
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
 function _capturedRdns(base, who) {
-  if (intrinsic.types.isProxy(base)) throw E("path/bad-input", who + ": a trustAnchor nameConstraints directoryName base must not be a Proxy");
-  /** @internal An inherited Proxy answers `in` through its has trap, which is caller code running
-   * inside what is meant to be a getter-free read. */
-  var baseProto = intrinsic.getPrototypeOf(base);
-  while (baseProto !== null) {
-    if (intrinsic.types.isProxy(baseProto)) throw E("path/bad-input", who + ": a trustAnchor nameConstraints directoryName base must not inherit from a Proxy");
-    baseProto = intrinsic.getPrototypeOf(baseProto);
-  }
-  var d = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(base, "rdns");
-  if (d === undefined) {
-    if ("rdns" in base) throw E("path/bad-input", who + ": a trustAnchor nameConstraints directoryName rdns must be an own data property, not inherited");
-    return undefined;
-  }
-  if (!intrinsic.hasOwn(d, "value")) throw E("path/bad-input", who + ": a trustAnchor nameConstraints directoryName rdns must be a data property, not an accessor");
-  if (!intrinsic.isArray(d.value)) return undefined;
-  return _copyDnRdns(d.value, who + ": a trustAnchor nameConstraints directoryName rdns");
+  return guard.name.capturedRdns(base, E, "path/bad-input", who + ": a trustAnchor nameConstraints directoryName base");
 }
 var _NC_SUBTREE_KEYS = ["tag", "base"];
 var _NC_LIST_KEYS = ["permitted", "excluded"];
@@ -2168,6 +2082,12 @@ function _copyAnchorNameConstraints(nc, who) {
     var checkedList = checkedSubtreeSeeds(copiedList, "trustAnchors[].nameConstraints." + key);
     intrinsic.defineProperty(out, key, { value: checkedList, enumerable: true, configurable: true, writable: true });
   }
+  /** @internal An anchor carrying the option but naming no subtree restricts nothing, and reads to
+   * whoever built it as a namespace that has been applied. */
+  if ((out.permitted === undefined || out.permitted.length === 0) &&
+      (out.excluded === undefined || out.excluded.length === 0)) {
+    throw E("path/bad-input", who + ": a trustAnchor nameConstraints must name at least one permitted or excluded subtree");
+  }
   return out;
 }
 
@@ -2363,16 +2283,76 @@ function _candBaseScore(cand, time) {
   return score;
 }
 
+/** @internal A relative name that cannot be compared ends the shared prefix below; the count is a sort hint
+ * and every candidate is still tried, so the comparison fault decides nothing. */
+function _rdnEqualSoft(a, b) {
+  try { return rdnEqual(a, b); }
+  catch (_e) { return false; } // allow:swallow-unverified a name the comparison refuses ends the shared prefix
+}
+
+/** @internal How many leading relative names two distinguished names share, under the RFC 5280 sec. 7.1
+ * comparison. Names in a public-key infrastructure are built as a tree, so in a mesh of cross-certified domains
+ * a certificate in the target's own domain shares a prefix with it and one from a foreign domain shares little
+ * or none (RFC 4158 sec. 3.5.16, sec. 3.5.19). */
+function rdnPrefixLength(a, b) {
+  if (!intrinsic.isArray(a) || !intrinsic.isArray(b)) return 0;
+  var n = a.length < b.length ? a.length : b.length;
+  for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+    if (!_rdnEqualSoft(a[i], b[i])) return i;
+  }
+  return n;
+}
+
+var RDN_PREFIX_WEIGHT = 5;
+/** @internal Within the name term, a shared prefix is the weaker signal and stays under an exact match,
+ * however many relative names it shares. The terms are summed the way the rest of the RFC 4158 sec. 3.5
+ * hints are, so this bounds the name term rather than the whole score. */
+var RDN_PREFIX_MAX = 95;
+var EXACT_NAME_BONUS = 100;
+function _prefixScore(a, b) {
+  var s = rdnPrefixLength(a, b) * RDN_PREFIX_WEIGHT;
+  return s > RDN_PREFIX_MAX ? RDN_PREFIX_MAX : s;
+}
+
+/** @internal RFC 4158 sec. 3.5.7: a certificate whose path length constraint cannot cover the certificates
+ * already below it in the path cannot complete that path. The constraint counts the non-self-issued
+ * certificates that follow (RFC 5280 sec. 6.1.4(m)), which forward building knows from the chain it holds, so
+ * a key-rollover certificate below the candidate spends none of the budget. */
+function _forwardPathLenIneligible(cand, chain) {
+  /** @internal A forward chain is built by prepending, so the leaf is its last entry and every entry before
+   * it is an intermediate the candidate would sit above. */
+  var below = 0;
+  for (var i = 0; i < chain.length - 1; i++) {
+    if (!selfIssued(chain[i])) below += 1;
+  }
+  if (below === 0) return false;
+  var bc = softDecode(cand, OID.basicConstraints);
+  var lim = bc && bc.value ? bc.value.pathLenConstraint : undefined;
+  if (typeof lim !== "number") return false;
+  return lim < below;
+}
+
+/** @internal Reverse building holds no such count: it knows what lies between a candidate and the anchor, and
+ * the constraint governs what lies between the candidate and the target, which is the part not yet built. Every
+ * candidate at one frame would take the same penalty, which orders nothing, so the rule is forward-only here. */
+
+/** @internal RFC 4158 sec. 3.5.19, a candidate whose subject shares more relative names with the target's
+ * issuer, orders nothing in this direction: forward building selects a candidate BY its subject matching the
+ * current certificate's issuer, so every candidate at one decision point carries that same name. Reverse
+ * building selects by issuer instead, and there the rule is the ordering below. */
 function scoreCandidate(cand, childAki, anchors, time) {
   var score = _candBaseScore(cand, time);
   if (childAki) {
     var d = softDecode(cand, OID.subjectKeyIdentifier);
     if (d && Buffer.isBuffer(d.value) && d.value.equals(childAki)) score += 1000;
   }
+  var best = 0;
   for (var i = 0; i < anchors.length; i++) {
-    if (nameMatchSoft(cand.issuer.rdns, anchors[i].name.rdns)) { score += 100; break; }
+    if (nameMatchSoft(cand.issuer.rdns, anchors[i].name.rdns)) { best = EXACT_NAME_BONUS; break; }
+    var p = _prefixScore(cand.issuer.rdns, anchors[i].name.rdns);
+    if (p > best) best = p;
   }
-  return score;
+  return score + best;
 }
 
 function scoreCandidateReverse(cand, parentCert, leafCert, time) {
@@ -2384,7 +2364,8 @@ function scoreCandidateReverse(cand, parentCert, leafCert, time) {
       if (d && intrinsic.isBuffer(d.value) && intrinsic.bufferEquals(d.value, candAki)) score += 1000;
     }
   }
-  if (nameMatchSoft(leafCert.issuer.rdns, cand.subject.rdns)) score += 100;
+  if (nameMatchSoft(leafCert.issuer.rdns, cand.subject.rdns)) score += EXACT_NAME_BONUS;
+  else score += _prefixScore(cand.subject.rdns, leafCert.issuer.rdns);
   return score;
 }
 
@@ -2431,8 +2412,14 @@ function _assertUserInitialPolicySet(uips, prefix) {
   }
 }
 
+/** @internal Sorted so the candidate tried FIRST is last in the array, since the caller pushes onto a stack.
+ * A candidate whose path length constraint cannot cover the certificates below it sorts under every candidate
+ * that can, whatever the heuristics score it, and the score orders within each of the two groups. */
 function _pushCandidates(frame, scored, stack, counter, down) {
-  scored.sort(function (a, b) { return a.score - b.score; });
+  scored.sort(function (a, b) {
+    if (!a.ineligible !== !b.ineligible) return a.ineligible ? -1 : 1;
+    return a.score - b.score;
+  });
   var n = 0;
   for (var ci = 0; ci < scored.length; ci++) {
     counter.tick();
@@ -2545,7 +2532,25 @@ async function _fetchAiaIssuers(current, aia) {
  * Candidate issuers are matched by RFC 5280 7.1 name chaining, prioritized by the RFC 4158 3.5
  * heuristics (a subjectKeyIdentifier/authorityKeyIdentifier match, an anchor-adjacent issuer,
  * CA + keyCertSign, validity at the check time; each orders the search without excluding a
- * candidate), and searched depth-first with backtracking: the first ordered path that
+ * candidate).
+ *
+ * Where cross-certified domains meet, several candidates chain by name and the order they are
+ * tried in decides how much of the mesh is walked. Two more RFC 4158 3.5 orderings apply there.
+ * A candidate is ranked by how many leading relative names it shares with the name the search is
+ * heading for, its issuer against a trust anchor's name going forward (3.5.16) and its subject
+ * against the leaf's issuer going in reverse (3.5.16 and 3.5.19 reverse methods), so a
+ * certificate in the target's own domain is tried before one from a cross-certified domain.
+ * Forward building also sorts a candidate under every candidate that can complete the path when its
+ * `basicConstraints` path length constraint cannot cover the certificates already below it (3.5.7,
+ * counting the non-self-issued ones the way 5280 6.1.4(m) does). That one outranks the other hints
+ * rather than competing with them, so a key identifier or an anchor-adjacent issuer does not raise
+ * a candidate whose constraint the path already exceeds. All of it is ordering alone: no candidate
+ * is removed, every assembled path is handed to `validate`, and an unbounded search still reaches
+ * every path the pool holds. A bounded one spends its budget on whichever branches it is steered
+ * to, so a build that reports `path/build-limit` where an earlier order succeeded wants a larger
+ * `maxCandidatesConsidered`, and the same holds for the `maxAiaFetches` allowance.
+ *
+ * The search runs depth-first with backtracking: the first ordered path that
  * `pki.path.validate` accepts wins. A name or key-identifier match is only an ordering hint;
  * every accept flows through `validate`, so `build` never weakens or duplicates a 6.1 check. The
  * search over the untrusted pool is bounded: a depth cap on chain length, a total-work cap on
@@ -2782,7 +2787,8 @@ async function build(leaf, opts) {
       var fbScored = [];
       for (var pj = fb.poolMark; pj < pool.length; pj++) {
         if (nameMatchSoft(pool[pj].subject.rdns, fbCur.issuer.rdns)) {
-          guard.list.append(fbScored, { cand: pool[pj], score: scoreCandidate(pool[pj], fbAki, anchors, opts.time) });
+          guard.list.append(fbScored, { cand: pool[pj], score: scoreCandidate(pool[pj], fbAki, anchors, opts.time),
+            ineligible: _forwardPathLenIneligible(pool[pj], fb.chain) });
         }
       }
       fb.poolMark = pool.length;
@@ -2810,7 +2816,8 @@ async function build(leaf, opts) {
     var scored = [];
     for (var pi = 0; pi < pool.length; pi++) {
       if (nameMatchSoft(pool[pi].subject.rdns, current.issuer.rdns)) {
-        guard.list.append(scored, { cand: pool[pi], score: scoreCandidate(pool[pi], childAki, anchors, opts.time) });
+        guard.list.append(scored, { cand: pool[pi], score: scoreCandidate(pool[pi], childAki, anchors, opts.time),
+          ineligible: _forwardPathLenIneligible(pool[pi], frame.chain) });
       }
     }
     if (aiaCtx && frame.hop < maxDepth && aiaCtx.fetches < aiaCtx.maxFetches) {

package/lib/trust.js

@@ -722,8 +722,39 @@ function parseCcadbCsv(text) {
  * store catches the wrong root before a single validation runs (the
  * authoritative gate stays inside `validate`).
  *
+ * `opts.nameConstraints` attaches the namespace a root program trusts a root
+ * for, when that is narrower than the root certificate itself states. Such a
+ * restriction lives in the program's data rather than in any `nameConstraints`
+ * extension the certificate carries, so it has to be supplied here. It is a
+ * `{ permitted, excluded }` pair of `{ tag, base }` subtrees, the same shape
+ * `pki.path.validate` takes for `opts.initialPermittedSubtrees`, and validate
+ * seeds it as the RFC 5280 sec. 6.1.1(h)(i) initial value: it intersects with
+ * every certificate's own constraints, so a leaf must satisfy both, and an
+ * excluded subtree rejects whatever is permitted. The subtrees are copied out
+ * of the caller's object, so changing that object afterwards does not change
+ * the namespace an anchor already vouches for. An overlay naming no subtree,
+ * or one supplying its subtrees through an accessor, is refused rather than
+ * carried, since either would widen the namespace the operator meant to
+ * restrict. A verdict reports `anchorConstraints.nameConstraintsApplied`.
+ *
+ * A base is held to the form its tag names, and one outside that form is
+ * refused here rather than carried to a comparison that cannot reach a verdict
+ * on it. Tag 1 (`rfc822Name`) is a mailbox, a host name, or a host name written
+ * as a subtree with a leading dot, and a mailbox may name its domain as a
+ * bracketed address literal; tag 2 (`dNSName`) is a host name, with or
+ * without that leading dot; tag 6 (`uniformResourceIdentifier`) is the dotted
+ * host name a certificate's URI is compared by, not a URI; tag 4
+ * (`directoryName`) is `{ rdns }` naming at least one relative name, whose
+ * attribute types are dotted-decimal object identifiers and whose values are
+ * strings; tag 7 (`iPAddress`) is 8 bytes for IPv4 or 32 for IPv6, an address
+ * followed by its mask. A host name is labels of letters, digits and hyphens,
+ * with a hyphen at neither edge of a label, 63 characters to a label and 253 to
+ * the name, and it may carry the one trailing dot the comparison strips. Tags
+ * outside that set are refused.
+ *
  * @opts
  *   purpose: string   // "serverAuth" | "emailProtection" | "codeSigning"; fail-fast purpose check
+ *   nameConstraints: { permitted?: [{ tag, base }], excluded?: [{ tag, base }] }   // the root program's applied namespace; tags 1, 2, 4, 6, 7
  *
  * @example
  *   var ca = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
@@ -746,7 +777,138 @@ function parseCcadbCsv(text) {
  *   await pki.path.validate([pki.schema.x509.parse(der)],
  *     { time: new Date("2026-06-01T00:00:00Z"), trustAnchors: anchor, checkPurpose: "serverAuth" });
  */
-var _ANCHOR_OPTS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { purpose: 1 });
+var _ANCHOR_OPTS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { purpose: 1, nameConstraints: 1 });
+
+/** @internal A subtree list copied entry by entry, reading `tag` and `base` from their own data
+ * properties. An accessor could answer with a narrow subtree while it is checked and a wide one
+ * when it is read again, and a dropped entry widens the namespace the anchor vouches for, so a
+ * list that does not describe itself in plain values is refused rather than partly copied. */
+function _copySubtrees(list, where) {
+  if (list === undefined || list === null) return [];
+  if (!intrinsic.isArray(list) || intrinsic.types.isProxy(list)) {
+    throw E("trust/bad-input", "anchor: nameConstraints." + where + " must be a plain array of { tag, base } subtree entries");
+  }
+  var out = [];
+  for (var i = 0; i < list.length; i++) {
+    var d = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(list, i);
+    if (!d || !_hasOwn(d, "value")) {
+      throw E("trust/bad-input", "anchor: nameConstraints." + where + " entry " + i + " must be a data property, not a hole or an accessor");
+    }
+    var st = d.value;
+    if (!st || typeof st !== "object" || intrinsic.types.isProxy(st)) {
+      throw E("trust/bad-input", "anchor: nameConstraints." + where + " entry " + i + " must be a { tag, base } object");
+    }
+    var tagD = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(st, "tag");
+    var baseD = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(st, "base");
+    if (!tagD || !_hasOwn(tagD, "value") || !baseD || !_hasOwn(baseD, "value")) {
+      throw E("trust/bad-input", "anchor: nameConstraints." + where + " entry " + i + " must carry its own tag and base as plain values");
+    }
+    var tag = tagD.value;
+    if (typeof tag !== "number" || !intrinsic.isInteger(tag) || tag < 0 || tag > 8) {
+      throw E("trust/bad-input", "anchor: nameConstraints." + where + " entry " + i + " tag must be a GeneralName tag number 0..8, got " + guard.text.showValue(tag));
+    }
+    _assertSubtreeBaseForm(tag, baseD.value, where, i);
+    /** @internal Appended through the list guard: a setter planted on the array prototype swallows
+     * a plain index assignment, and a subtree list that came back empty would restrict nothing. */
+    guard.list.append(out, { tag: tag, base: _copySubtreeBase(tag, baseD.value, where) });
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** @internal The base of one subtree, copied by its name form so the anchor holds no reference the
+ * caller can still reach. A byte base is snapshotted through the byte guard, which accepts every
+ * source `pki.path.validate` does rather than Buffers alone, so bytes changed afterwards do not
+ * change the namespace. A directoryName goes through the guard that owns distinguished-name
+ * capture, which refuses a Proxy or an accessor anywhere in the name instead of running it: reading
+ * such a name is caller code, and it could clear the restriction it is being asked to describe. */
+function _copySubtreeBase(tag, base, where) {
+  if (typeof base === "string") return base;
+  if (tag === 7) {
+    return guard.bytes.snapshotSource(base, TrustError, "trust/bad-input", "anchor: nameConstraints." + where + " iPAddress base");
+  }
+  var rdns = guard.name.capturedRdns(base, E, "trust/bad-input", "anchor: nameConstraints." + where + " directoryName base");
+  if (rdns === undefined) {
+    throw E("trust/bad-input", "anchor: nameConstraints." + where + " directoryName base must carry its own rdns array");
+  }
+  return { rdns: rdns };
+}
+
+var _NC_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { permitted: 1, excluded: 1 });
+
+/** @internal One of the overlay's two subtree lists, taken from its own data property. A list the
+ * object only inherits is refused rather than read as absent: treating it as absent drops the
+ * restriction it carries, and dropping an exclusion admits the namespace it was written to keep
+ * out. An accessor is refused for the same reason, since it decides what it says while it is read. */
+function _subtreeListDescriptor(nc, key) {
+  var d = intrinsic.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(nc, key);
+  if (d === undefined) {
+    if (key in intrinsic.Object(nc)) {
+      throw E("trust/bad-input", "anchor: opts.nameConstraints." + key + " must be the object's own property, not one it inherits");
+    }
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  if (!_hasOwn(d, "value")) {
+    throw E("trust/bad-input", "anchor: opts.nameConstraints." + key + " must be a plain value, not an accessor");
+  }
+  return d;
+}
+
+/** @internal A subtree base held to the form its tag names, so a base that cannot describe a
+ * namespace is refused here rather than carried to the validator, and so no shape falls through to
+ * being returned by reference: a base the anchor still shares with the caller is one the caller can
+ * complete afterwards, which moves the namespace an anchor has already vouched for. */
+function _assertSubtreeBaseForm(tag, base, where, index) {
+  var who = "anchor: nameConstraints." + where + " entry " + index;
+  if (tag === 1 || tag === 2 || tag === 6) {
+    var why = guard.name.constraintBaseRefusal(tag, base);
+    if (why !== null) throw E("trust/bad-input", who + " base " + why);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (tag === 7) {
+    if (!guard.bytes.isByteSource(base)) throw E("trust/bad-input", who + " iPAddress base must be a byte source");
+    /** @internal An iPAddress subtree is an address followed by its mask, so 8 bytes for IPv4 and
+     * 32 for IPv6. Any other length names no range, and the validator refuses it later; refusing it
+     * here means the anchor an operator is handed is one that can be enforced. */
+    var ipLen = guard.bytes.lengthOf(guard.bytes.source(base, TrustError, "trust/bad-input", who + " iPAddress base"));
+    if (ipLen !== 8 && ipLen !== 32) {
+      throw E("trust/bad-input", who + " iPAddress base must be 8 bytes (IPv4 address and mask) or 32 (IPv6), got " + ipLen);
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+  if (tag === 4) {
+    if (base === null || typeof base !== "object") throw E("trust/bad-input", who + " directoryName base must be an object carrying rdns");
+    return;
+  }
+  throw E("trust/bad-input", who + " tag " + tag + " names a form this overlay cannot constrain; use tag 1, 2, 4, 6 or 7");
+}
+
+/** @internal The overlay a root program applies to a root outside any nameConstraints extension the
+ * certificate carries. It only ever narrows, so an absent one is the status quo and is left off the
+ * anchor entirely; a malformed one is refused, since carrying it wrongly would widen a namespace the
+ * operator meant to restrict. The subtrees are held to their shapes again by `pki.path.validate`,
+ * which is where the RFC 5280 sec. 6.1.1(h)(i) seeding happens. */
+function _copyNameConstraints(nc) {
+  if (nc === undefined || nc === null) return null;
+  if (typeof nc !== "object" || intrinsic.isArray(nc) || intrinsic.types.isProxy(nc)) {
+    throw E("trust/bad-input", "anchor: opts.nameConstraints must be a { permitted, excluded } object of { tag, base } subtree entries");
+  }
+  /** @internal Runs before the membership tests below, which is what makes them safe to ask: this
+   * refuses an overlay inheriting from a Proxy, whose has trap would otherwise answer `in` with
+   * caller code while the lists are being read. It also names a misspelled field, which would
+   * otherwise be read as an absent list, and an absent excluded list admits the namespace the
+   * operator wrote it to keep out. */
+  guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(nc, _NC_KEYS, E, "trust/bad-input", "anchor: opts.nameConstraints has an unknown field ");
+  var pD = _subtreeListDescriptor(nc, "permitted");
+  var eD = _subtreeListDescriptor(nc, "excluded");
+  var out = {
+    permitted: _copySubtrees(pD ? pD.value : null, "permitted"),
+    excluded: _copySubtrees(eD ? eD.value : null, "excluded"),
+  };
+  if (!out.permitted.length && !out.excluded.length) {
+    throw E("trust/bad-input", "anchor: opts.nameConstraints names no subtree; omit it rather than passing an empty restriction");
+  }
+  return out;
+}
 function anchor(entry, opts) {
   if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object") {
     throw E("trust/bad-input", "anchor expects a trust-store entry ({ name, publicKey, algorithm, ... })");
@@ -770,7 +932,8 @@ function anchor(entry, opts) {
   if (!derived && (entry.purposes != null || (entry.distrustAfter && Object.keys(entry.distrustAfter).length))) {
     throw E("trust/bad-input", "this entry carries a trust store's per-purpose metadata but is not the entry the store produced -- it has been rebuilt, and the metadata is a statement about the key the store read, not about whichever key the copy now names. Pass pki.trust.parseCertdata / parseCcadbCsv output unmodified");
   }
-  return {
+  var nameConstraints = _copyNameConstraints(opts.nameConstraints);
+  var out = {
     name: _copyName(meta.name),
     publicKey: Buffer.isBuffer(meta.publicKey) ? Buffer.from(meta.publicKey) : meta.publicKey,
     algorithm: meta.algorithm,
@@ -779,6 +942,12 @@ function anchor(entry, opts) {
     distrustAfter: _copyDistrustAfter(meta.distrustAfter),
     purposes: _copyPurposes(meta.purposes),
   };
+  /** @internal Set only when an overlay was supplied, so an anchor without one is the object this
+   * verb returned before the option existed, and defined rather than assigned: an accessor planted
+   * on Object.prototype under this name would otherwise take the assignment and leave the anchor
+   * carrying no restriction at all. */
+  if (nameConstraints) guard.verdict.set(out, "nameConstraints", nameConstraints);
+  return out;
 }
 
 module.exports = {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.6.41",
+  "version": "0.6.43",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:c14ed2d9-f3d5-4322-88e1-51afbe3a3fbe",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:226aab27-22ce-4c29-9028-5849c0bf6587",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-09-06T02:19:25.175Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-09-06T06:39:34.959Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.41",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.43",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.6.41",
+      "version": "0.6.43",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.41",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.43",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.41",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.43",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]