@blamejs/pki 0.6.40 → 0.6.41

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,19 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.6.41 — 2026-09-05
+
+A lookup table answers from its own entries, so a name taken off the wire cannot resolve to something the table never registered.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Every object the toolkit publishes as a table carries no prototype: pki.C.TIME, pki.C.BYTES, pki.C.LIMITS, pki.C.NAMES and each name table under it, pki.asn1.TAGS, pki.asn1.build, pki.cbor.build, pki.ct.HASH_ALGORITHMS, pki.ct.SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS, pki.hpke.suites, pki.path.PROCESSED_EXTENSIONS and pki.path.TARGET_UNPROCESSED_IF_CRITICAL. The same holds for a map a verb returns that is keyed by names it read, rather than by a fixed set of fields. Among them: the results of pki.oid.all, pki.est.paths and pki.scep.parseCapabilities, the headers on a pki.transport response and on each part pki.est.splitMultipartMixed returns, the counts map on a pki.lint.certificate result, the extensions map on a pki.sigstore.verifyBundle identity, and the purposes map on each anchor from pki.trust.parseCertdata, pki.trust.parseCcadbCsv and pki.trust.anchor. A result read by a fixed set of field names keeps the prototype it had, which covers parsed certificates, decoded WebAuthn authenticator data, CMS recipient identifiers and the other parse records. Reading an entry, calling a member, listing the keys, spreading, destructuring and serializing to JSON are unchanged; calling an Object.prototype method on the object itself, such as table.hasOwnProperty(name), no longer works, so use Object.hasOwn(table, name).
+
+### Fixed
+
+- A lookup table carries no prototype, so a name the wire supplies resolves to an entry the table registered or to nothing. Two verbs were reachable: pki.webauthn.verify selected a verifier the table never held for an attestation naming constructor, toString or another Object.prototype member as its format, and pki.schema.c509.parse accepted a certificate whose subject-public-key algorithm named such a member instead of throwing c509/unknown-algorithm. The same change applies to the signature-scheme, content-encryption, key-agreement, extension-decoder and status-name registries.
+- Every verb that takes an injected opts.transport names the option when the value is not callable, refusing it with the module's own bad-input code at the door, before the message or the certificate is read. This covers all eighteen: the six pki.est verbs, the seven pki.scep verbs, pki.acme.client, pki.cmp.transfer, pki.cmp.session, pki.ct.fetchLogList and pki.path.build. Previously most of them let the value reach the call site, where the operator got a bare TypeError naming no option. A falsy transport and an explicit null are refused the same way. Either had been read as no transport supplied and replaced with the default network client, so a caller that believed it had injected a transport reached the CA instead, which is the case worth upgrading for. Only an option no lookup finds falls back, so a defaults object carrying the transport on its prototype still works. A value that passes for callable and then throws when it is called, which is what a class constructor does, is reported as that verb's typed error too, rather than escaping as a TypeError.
+
 ## v0.6.40 — 2026-09-05
 
 Every verify verdict now reaches its caller as the object the verb built, and a list the toolkit assembles carries the entries the toolkit put in it.

package/lib/acme.js

@@ -215,14 +215,14 @@ function _isUriString(v) { return _isString(v) && _isUriShape(v); }
 
 var CRL_REASONS = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10];
 
-var KNOWN_CHALLENGE_TYPES = { "http-01": 1, "dns-01": 1, "tls-alpn-01": 1 };
+var KNOWN_CHALLENGE_TYPES = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { "http-01": 1, "dns-01": 1, "tls-alpn-01": 1 });
 
-var STATUS = {
+var STATUS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   account:       ["valid", "deactivated", "revoked"],
   order:         ["pending", "ready", "processing", "valid", "invalid"],
   authorization: ["pending", "valid", "invalid", "deactivated", "expired", "revoked"],
   challenge:     ["pending", "processing", "valid", "invalid"],
-};
+});
 
 var SPECS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   directory: [
@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ var OID_AKI = oid.byName("authorityKeyIdentifier");
 var OID_CN = oid.byName("commonName");
 var _extNs = pkix.makeNS("acme", AcmeError, oid);
 var _extDecoders = pkix.certExtensionDecoders(_extNs);
-var _extCtx = { E: function (c, m, cause) { return new AcmeError(c, m, cause); }, oid: oid };
+var _extCtx = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { E: function (c, m, cause) { return new AcmeError(c, m, cause); }, oid: oid });
 
 /**
  * @primitive  pki.acme.tlsAlpn01Extension
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ async function verifyTlsAlpn01(certDer, token, accountJwk, identifier) {
 
 
 function _outerHeader(o) {
-  var h = { alg: o.alg, nonce: o.nonce, url: o.url };
+  var h = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { alg: o.alg, nonce: o.nonce, url: o.url });
   if (_hasOwn(o, "kid")) h.kid = o.kid;
   if (_hasOwn(o, "jwk")) h.jwk = o.jwk;
   return h;
@@ -1778,11 +1778,11 @@ function _parseLinkNext(headers, base) { var m = _parseLinkRelation(headers, bas
  *   var acct = await acme.newAccount({ termsOfServiceAgreed: true });
  *   var ord = await acme.newOrder({ identifiers: [{ type: "dns", value: "example.org" }] });
  */
-var _CLIENT_OPTS = {
+var _CLIENT_OPTS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   accountKey: 1, accountJwk: 1, alg: 1, resignKeys: 1, transport: 1, tls: 1, timeout: 1, maxResponseBytes: 1,
   maxRedirects: 1, maxNonceRetries: 1, maxPolls: 1, maxTotalWait: 1, sleep: 1, clock: 1, proxy: 1,
-};
-var _METHOD_OPTS = {
+});
+var _METHOD_OPTS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   finalize: { csr: 1, identifiers: 1 },
   poll: { maxPolls: 1, maxTotalWait: 1, onRetryAfter: 1 },
   download: { expectedSpki: 1, identifiers: 1, requireBinding: 1, selectChain: 1, maxAlternates: 1 },
@@ -1792,12 +1792,20 @@ var _METHOD_OPTS = {
   scheduleRenewal: { random: 1, shouldStop: 1, renew: 1, maxChecks: 1, maxWait: 1, longTermRetrySeconds: 1, temporaryBaseSeconds: 1 },
   updateAccount: { contact: 1 },
   listOrders: { maxPages: 1 },
-};
+});
 function _gateOpts(bag, whitelist, name) {
   bag = guard.identifier.optionsObject(bag, E, "acme/bad-input", "pki.acme " + name + " options");
   guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(bag, whitelist, E, "acme/bad-input", "unknown " + name + " option ");
   return bag;
 }
+/** @internal Refused at the door and again where the value is used. The checked value is RETURNED
+ * and it is that one the caller uses: reading the option again would ask a second time, and an
+ * accessor can answer differently on each read. */
+function _assertTransport(opts) {
+  return guard.identifier.assertCallableOption(opts, "transport", E, "acme/bad-input", "opts.transport",
+    "(request) => Promise<{ status, headers, body }>");
+}
+
 function _resignKeysOf(raw) {
   if (raw == null) return null;
   if (!_isArrayI(raw) || raw.length === 0) throw E("acme/bad-input", "resignKeys, when set, must be a non-empty array of { alg, key } (RFC 8555 sec. 6.2)");
@@ -1821,7 +1829,7 @@ function _chooseResign(resignKeys, serverAlgs) {
   return null;
 }
 function _jwkForAlg(jwk, alg) {
-  var out = {};
+  var out = intrinsic.create(null);
   var keys = intrinsic.ownKeys(jwk);
   for (var i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) { out[keys[i]] = jwk[keys[i]]; }
   out.alg = alg;
@@ -1830,6 +1838,9 @@ function _jwkForAlg(jwk, alg) {
 function client(directoryUrl, opts) {
   opts = guard.identifier.optionsObject(opts, E, "acme/bad-input", "pki.acme.client options");
   guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(opts, _CLIENT_OPTS, E, "acme/bad-input", "unknown pki.acme.client option ");
+  /** @internal Read once, at the door, and carried from here. Asking again would let an option that
+   * answers differently on each read hand back something other than the value that was checked. */
+  var checkedTransport = _assertTransport(opts);
   if (!opts.accountKey) throw E("acme/bad-input", "client requires opts.accountKey (the account private key)");
   if (!_isObject(opts.accountJwk)) throw E("acme/bad-input", "client requires opts.accountJwk (the account public JWK)");
   if (!_isString(opts.alg)) throw E("acme/bad-input", "client requires opts.alg (the account-key JWS alg)");
@@ -1838,7 +1849,7 @@ function client(directoryUrl, opts) {
   var accountKey = opts.accountKey, accountJwk = opts.accountJwk, alg = opts.alg;
   var resignKeys = _resignKeysOf(opts.resignKeys);
 
-  var transport = opts.transport;
+  var transport = checkedTransport;
   if (!transport) {
     var t0 = opts.tls || {};
     var hasAnchors = t0.anchors !== undefined && t0.anchors !== null && !(Array.isArray(t0.anchors) && t0.anchors.length === 0);
@@ -1912,10 +1923,10 @@ function client(directoryUrl, opts) {
   function _sendFollowing(method, url, headers, body, redirects) {
     var reqHeaders = Object.assign({ "user-agent": CLIENT_USER_AGENT }, headers || {});
     return guard.async.deferred(function () {
-      return guard.async.awaited(transport({ method: method, url: url, headers: reqHeaders, body: body, tls: _tlsFor(url), proxy: budgets.proxy, timeout: budgets.timeout, maxResponseBytes: budgets.maxResponseBytes }), E, "acme/bad-input", "opts.transport");
+      return guard.async.invoked(transport, [{ method: method, url: url, headers: reqHeaders, body: body, tls: _tlsFor(url), proxy: budgets.proxy, timeout: budgets.timeout, maxResponseBytes: budgets.maxResponseBytes }], E, "acme/bad-input", "opts.transport");
     }).then(function (res) {
       res = res || {};
-      var h = {};
+      var h = intrinsic.create(null);
       Object.keys(res.headers || {}).forEach(function (k) { h[k.toLowerCase()] = res.headers[k]; });
       var blen = res.body == null ? 0 : (typeof res.body === "string" ? Buffer.byteLength(res.body, "utf8")
         : (Buffer.isBuffer(res.body) ? guard.bytes.lengthOf(res.body) : guard.bytes.lengthOf(guard.bytes.source(res.body, E, "acme/bad-response", "the response body"))));

package/lib/asn1-der.js

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ function _asn1Error(c, m) { return new Asn1Error(c, m); }
 function _oidErr(c, m) { return new OidError(c, m); }
 
 
-var UNIVERSAL_TYPES = {
+var UNIVERSAL_TYPES = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   BOOLEAN:           { tag: 0x01, form: "primitive" },
   INTEGER:           { tag: 0x02, form: "primitive" },
   BIT_STRING:        { tag: 0x03, form: "primitive" },
@@ -69,9 +69,9 @@ var UNIVERSAL_TYPES = {
   UNIVERSAL_STRING:  { tag: 0x1c, form: "primitive" },
   CHARACTER_STRING:  { tag: 0x1d, form: "constructed" },
   BMP_STRING:        { tag: 0x1e, form: "primitive" },
-};
+});
 
-var TAGS = {};
+var TAGS = intrinsic.create(null);
 Object.keys(UNIVERSAL_TYPES).forEach(function (k) { TAGS[k] = UNIVERSAL_TYPES[k].tag; });
 
 var CLASS_UNIVERSAL   = 0x00;
@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ function _utcTimeString(date) {
  *     pki.asn1.build.utf8("example.com"),
  *   ]);
  */
-var build = {
+var build = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   boolean:  function (v) { return _universal(TAGS.BOOLEAN, false, Buffer.from([v ? 0xff : 0x00])); },
   integer:  function (v) { return _universal(TAGS.INTEGER, false, _intContent(v, "build.integer")); },
   enumerated: function (v) { return _universal(TAGS.ENUMERATED, false, _intContent(v, "build.enumerated")); },
@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ var build = {
     return encodeTLV(CLASS_CONTEXT, node.constructed, tagNumber, buf.slice(buf.length - node.length));
   },
   raw:      function (buf) { return _asBuffer(buf, "build.raw"); },
-};
+});
 intrinsic.freeze(build);
 
 function _intContent(v, who) {

package/lib/attrcert-sign.js

@@ -45,21 +45,21 @@ var _b = pkiBuild.makeBuilder({
   NAME_SCHEMA: pkix.name(NS), SPKI_SCHEMA: pkix.spki(NS), EXT_DECODERS: EXT_DECODERS,
 });
 
-var KNOWN_SPEC_KEYS = { holder: 1, notBeforeTime: 1, notAfterTime: 1, serialNumber: 1, attributes: 1, extensions: 1 };
-var KNOWN_HOLDER_KEYS = { entityName: 1, baseCertificateID: 1, fromCertificate: 1, objectDigestInfo: 1 };
-var ATTR_OID_NAME = {
+var KNOWN_SPEC_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { holder: 1, notBeforeTime: 1, notAfterTime: 1, serialNumber: 1, attributes: 1, extensions: 1 });
+var KNOWN_HOLDER_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { entityName: 1, baseCertificateID: 1, fromCertificate: 1, objectDigestInfo: 1 });
+var ATTR_OID_NAME = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   role: "role", clearance: "clearance", group: "group", chargingIdentity: "chargingIdentity",
   accessIdentity: "accessIdentity", authenticationInfo: "authenticationInfo",
-};
-var EXT_META = {
+});
+var EXT_META = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   auditIdentity:          { name: "acAuditIdentity",       critical: true },
   targetInformation:      { name: "targetInformation",     critical: true },
   noRevAvail:             { name: "noRevAvail",            critical: false },
   aaControls:             { name: "aaControls",            critical: true },
   acProxying:             { name: "acProxying",            critical: true },
   authorityKeyIdentifier: { name: "authorityKeyIdentifier", critical: false },
-};
-var REQUIRED_CRITICALITY = {};
+});
+var REQUIRED_CRITICALITY = intrinsic.create(null);
 Object.keys(EXT_META).forEach(function (k) { REQUIRED_CRITICALITY[O(EXT_META[k].name)] = EXT_META[k].critical; });
 var CLASSLIST_BIT = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { unmarked: 0, unclassified: 1, restricted: 2, confidential: 3, secret: 4, topSecret: 5 });
 
@@ -196,14 +196,14 @@ function _encodeSvceAuthInfo(sai, authInfoAllowed, label) {
   return b.sequence(parts);
 }
 
-var ATTR_VALUE_ENCODER = {
+var ATTR_VALUE_ENCODER = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   role:               function (v) { return _encodeRole(v); },
   clearance:          function (v) { return _encodeClearance(v); },
   group:              function (v) { return _encodeIetfAttrSyntax(v); },
   chargingIdentity:   function (v) { return _encodeIetfAttrSyntax(v); },
   authenticationInfo: function (v) { return _encodeSvceAuthInfo(v, true, "authenticationInfo"); },
   accessIdentity:     function (v) { return _encodeSvceAuthInfo(v, false, "accessIdentity"); },
-};
+});
 
 
 function _encodeTarget(t) {
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ function _extensionValue(key, val, aaSpki) {
 
 
 function _buildAttributes(attrSpec) {
-  var attrs = [], seen = {};
+  var attrs = [], seen = intrinsic.create(null);
   function add(type, valueTlv) {
     if (seen[type]) throw _err("attrcert/duplicate-attribute", "duplicate " + (oid.name(type) || type) + " attribute (RFC 5755 sec. 4.2.7)");
     seen[type] = true;
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ function _buildExtensions(extSpec, aaSpki) {
   if (extSpec == null) return null;
   if (Array.isArray(extSpec)) {
     if (!extSpec.length) return null;
-    var seenA = {};
+    var seenA = intrinsic.create(null);
     var exts = extSpec.map(function (e, i) {
       var der = _b.reqDer(e, "extension");
       _b.assertValidExtension(der, i);
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ function _buildExtensions(extSpec, aaSpki) {
   guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(extSpec, EXT_META, _err, "attrcert/bad-input", function (k) {
     return "unknown extension " + JSON.stringify(k) + "; pass a pre-encoded Extension DER via the array form for a custom extension";
   });
-  var out = [], seen = {};
+  var out = [], seen = intrinsic.create(null);
   Object.keys(extSpec).forEach(function (k) {
     if (extSpec[k] == null) return;
     var meta = EXT_META[k], eOid = O(meta.name);
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
   });
 }
 
-var KNOWN_VERIFY_OPTS = { time: 1, target: 1, revocationStatus: 1 };
+var KNOWN_VERIFY_OPTS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { time: 1, target: 1, revocationStatus: 1 });
 var REVOCATION_STATUS = Object.create(null);
 REVOCATION_STATUS.notRevoked = 1;
 REVOCATION_STATUS.revoked = 1;
@@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ function _checkTargeting(ac, want) {
     reason: "this attribute certificate does not name this verifier among its targets (RFC 5755 sec. 4.3.2)" };
 }
 
-var SUPPORTED_CRITICAL = {};
+var SUPPORTED_CRITICAL = intrinsic.create(null);
 SUPPORTED_CRITICAL[O("targetInformation")] = 1;
 SUPPORTED_CRITICAL[O("acAuditIdentity")] = 1;
 

package/lib/cbor-det.js

@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ function _head(mt, argument, who) {
   if (a < 4294967296n) { b = Buffer.alloc(5); b[0] = mtb | 26; b.writeUInt32BE(Number(a), 1); return b; }
   b = Buffer.alloc(9); b[0] = mtb | 27; b.writeBigUInt64BE(a, 1); return b;
 }
-var build = {
+var build = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
   uint: function (n) { var a = typeof n === "bigint" ? n : BigInt(n); if (a < 0n) throw new CborError("cbor/bad-argument", "build.uint: value must be non-negative"); return _head(0, a, "build.uint"); },
   nint: function (n) { var a = typeof n === "bigint" ? n : BigInt(n); if (a >= 0n) throw new CborError("cbor/bad-argument", "build.nint: value must be negative"); return _head(1, -1n - a, "build.nint"); },
   int:  function (n) { var a = typeof n === "bigint" ? n : BigInt(n); return a >= 0n ? _head(0, a, "build.int") : _head(1, -1n - a, "build.int"); },
@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ var build = {
     return build.tag(1, build.int(secs));
   },
   oid: function (dotted) { return build.tag(111, build.byteString(asn1.encodeOidContent(dotted))); },
-};
+});
 
 module.exports = {
   decode: decode,

package/lib/cmc-build.js

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ var OID_IDENTIFICATION = O("id-cmc-identification");
 var OID_SHA256 = O("sha256");
 var OID_HMAC_SHA256 = O("hmacWithSHA256");
 
-var RENEWAL_FORBIDDEN = {};
+var RENEWAL_FORBIDDEN = intrinsic.create(null);
 RENEWAL_FORBIDDEN[OID_IDENTIFICATION] = "Identification";
 RENEWAL_FORBIDDEN[O("id-cmc-identityProof")] = "Identity Proof";
 RENEWAL_FORBIDDEN[OID_IDENTITY_PROOF_V2] = "Identity Proof V2";
@@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ var OID_RESPONSE_BODY = O("id-cmc-responseBody");
 
 var POP_LINK_RANDOM_BYTES = 64;
 
-var KNOWN_SPEC_KEYS = {
+var KNOWN_SPEC_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   requests: 1, controls: 1, cmsSequence: 1, otherMsgSequence: 1,
   identityProof: 1, popLink: 1, renewal: 1,
   transactionId: 1, senderNonce: 1, dataReturn: 1,
-};
+});
 
 var OID_TRANSACTION_ID = O("id-cmc-transactionId");
 var OID_SENDER_NONCE = O("id-cmc-senderNonce");
@@ -96,10 +96,10 @@ function makeIdAllocator() {
 }
 
 
-var KNOWN_REQUEST_KEYS = { tcr: 1, crm: 1, orm: 1, bodyPartID: 1 };
-var KNOWN_CONTROL_KEYS = { type: 1, value: 1 };
-var KNOWN_IDENTITY_PROOF_KEYS = { identity: 1, secret: 1 };
-var KNOWN_POP_LINK_KEYS = { secret: 1 };
+var KNOWN_REQUEST_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { tcr: 1, crm: 1, orm: 1, bodyPartID: 1 });
+var KNOWN_CONTROL_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { type: 1, value: 1 });
+var KNOWN_IDENTITY_PROOF_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { identity: 1, secret: 1 });
+var KNOWN_POP_LINK_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { secret: 1 });
 
 function fixedRequestId(req, index) {
   if (!req || typeof req !== "object") throw E("cmc/bad-input", "each request must be an object");
@@ -209,24 +209,24 @@ function _claimRawElement(el, ids, what) {
   return der;
 }
 
-var BINDING_BY_OID = {};
+var BINDING_BY_OID = intrinsic.create(null);
 BINDING_BY_OID[O("id-cmc-transactionId")] = "transactionId";
 BINDING_BY_OID[O("id-cmc-senderNonce")] = "senderNonce";
 BINDING_BY_OID[O("id-cmc-dataReturn")] = "dataReturn";
 
-var BINDING_READER = {
+var BINDING_READER = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   transactionId: function (node) { return asn1.read.integer(node); },
   senderNonce: function (node) { return asn1.read.octetString(node); },
   dataReturn: function (node) { return asn1.read.octetString(node); },
-};
-var BINDING_TYPE_NAME = {
+});
+var BINDING_TYPE_NAME = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   transactionId: "an INTEGER (RFC 5272 sec. 6.6)",
   senderNonce: "an OCTET STRING (RFC 5272 sec. 6.6)",
   dataReturn: "an OCTET STRING (RFC 5272 sec. 6.4)",
-};
+});
 
 function _assertNoDuplicateBinding(callerControls, spec) {
-  var seen = {};
+  var seen = intrinsic.create(null);
   callerControls.forEach(function (c) {
     var field = BINDING_BY_OID[_oidOf(c.type)];
     if (!field) return;
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ function _oidOf(v) {
 }
 
 
-var REQUEST_FORBIDDEN_CONTROL = {};
+var REQUEST_FORBIDDEN_CONTROL = intrinsic.create(null);
 REQUEST_FORBIDDEN_CONTROL[OID_RESPONSE_BODY] =
   "id-cmc-responseBody may appear only in the control sequence of a PKIResponse (RFC 6402 sec. 2.6)";
 REQUEST_FORBIDDEN_CONTROL[O("id-cmc-statusInfo")] =
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ async function _build(spec, signer, opts) {
 function _copySigners(signer, owned) {
   function one(s) {
     if (!s || typeof s !== "object") return s;
-    var out = {}, k;
+    var out = intrinsic.create(null), k;
     for (k in s) {
       if (!_hasOwn(s, k)) continue;
       out[k] = copyValue(s[k], k === "key");
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ function _copySigners(signer, owned) {
     }
     if (Buffer.isBuffer(v) || v instanceof Uint8Array) return _own(Buffer.from(v), true);   // allow:byte-source-narrow -- private key bytes (Buffer borrowed / Uint8Array copied+wiped)
     if (!v || typeof v !== "object" || typeof v.type === "string") return v;
-    var c = {}, ck;
+    var c = intrinsic.create(null), ck;
     for (ck in v) {
       if (!_hasOwn(v, ck)) continue;
       var cv = v[ck];

package/lib/cmc-verify.js

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ var OID_DATA_RETURN = O("id-cmc-dataReturn");
 var OID_TRUSTED_ANCHORS = O("id-cmc-trustedAnchors");
 var OID_CONFIRM_CERT_ACCEPTANCE = O("id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance");
 
-var OUTCOME_BY_STATUS = {
+var OUTCOME_BY_STATUS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   success: "issued",
   pending: "pending",
   partial: "pending",
@@ -48,9 +48,9 @@ var OUTCOME_BY_STATUS = {
   popRequired: "pop-required",
   failed: "rejected",
   noSupport: "rejected",
-};
+});
 
-var OUTCOME_SEVERITY = { rejected: 4, "pop-required": 3, "confirm-required": 2, pending: 1, issued: 0 };
+var OUTCOME_SEVERITY = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { rejected: 4, "pop-required": 3, "confirm-required": 2, pending: 1, issued: 0 });
 
 function _singleValue(control, what) {
   if (control.values.length !== 1) {
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ function _copyAnyBytes(v) {
 }
 
 function _snapshotSent(sent) {
-  var out = {}, k;
+  var out = intrinsic.create(null), k;
   for (k in sent) { if (_hasOwn(sent, k)) out[k] = sent[k]; }
   if (out.transactionId != null) {
     out.transactionIdValue = guard.range.authoredInteger(out.transactionId, E, "cmc/bad-input", "sent.transactionId");
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ function _snapshotSent(sent) {
     out.bodyPartPaths = out.bodyPartPaths.map(function (p) { return Array.isArray(p) ? p.slice() : p; });
   }
   if (out.recipient && typeof out.recipient === "object") {
-    var r = {}, rk;
+    var r = intrinsic.create(null), rk;
     for (rk in out.recipient) {
       if (!_hasOwn(out.recipient, rk)) continue;
       r[rk] = _copyAnyBytes(out.recipient[rk]);

package/lib/cmp-build.js

@@ -71,10 +71,10 @@ var _b = pkiBuild.makeBuilder({
   NAME_SCHEMA: pkix.name(NS), SPKI_SCHEMA: pkix.spki(NS), EXT_DECODERS: EXT_DECODERS,
 });
 
-var KNOWN_HEADER_KEYS = {
+var KNOWN_HEADER_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   sender: 1, recipient: 1, pvno: 1, messageTime: 1, senderKID: 1, recipKID: 1,
   transactionID: 1, senderNonce: 1, recipNonce: 1, freeText: 1, generalInfo: 1,
-};
+});
 var KNOWN_BODY_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
   ir: 1, cr: 1, kur: 1, krr: 1, ccr: 1, p10cr: 1, certConf: 1, pollReq: 1, genm: 1, rr: 1,
   ip: 1, cp: 1, kup: 1, ccp: 1, krp: 1, rp: 1, genp: 1, error: 1, pollRep: 1, pkiconf: 1,
@@ -87,11 +87,11 @@ var BODY_TAG = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), {
 });
 var CRMF_BODY = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { ir: 1, cr: 1, kur: 1, krr: 1, ccr: 1 });
 var CERT_REP_ARM = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { ip: 1, cp: 1, kup: 1, ccp: 1 });
-var KNOWN_OPTS_KEYS = { key: 1, cert: 1, mac: 1, extraCerts: 1, pem: 1, pss: 1, digestAlgorithm: 1 };
-var KNOWN_OPTS_SIG_KEYS = { key: 1, cert: 1, extraCerts: 1, pem: 1, pss: 1, digestAlgorithm: 1 };
-var KNOWN_OPTS_MAC_KEYS = { mac: 1, extraCerts: 1, pem: 1 };
-var KNOWN_MESSAGE_KEYS = { header: 1, body: 1 };
-var KNOWN_MAC_KEYS = { secret: 1, salt: 1, iterationCount: 1, prf: 1, keyLength: 1, algorithm: 1 };
+var KNOWN_OPTS_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { key: 1, cert: 1, mac: 1, extraCerts: 1, pem: 1, pss: 1, digestAlgorithm: 1 });
+var KNOWN_OPTS_SIG_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { key: 1, cert: 1, extraCerts: 1, pem: 1, pss: 1, digestAlgorithm: 1 });
+var KNOWN_OPTS_MAC_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { mac: 1, extraCerts: 1, pem: 1 });
+var KNOWN_MESSAGE_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { header: 1, body: 1 });
+var KNOWN_MAC_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { secret: 1, salt: 1, iterationCount: 1, prf: 1, keyLength: 1, algorithm: 1 });
 
 var PBMAC1_DEFAULT_ITER = 100000;
 var PBMAC1_DEFAULT_SALT_BYTES = 16;
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ var PBMAC1_MAX_KEYLEN = 1024;
 var PBMAC1_MIN_ITER = 1000;
 var PBMAC1_PRF = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { "SHA-256": "hmacWithSHA256", "SHA-384": "hmacWithSHA384", "SHA-512": "hmacWithSHA512" });
 var PBMAC1_MAC_OID = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { "SHA-256": "hmacWithSHA256", "SHA-384": "hmacWithSHA384", "SHA-512": "hmacWithSHA512" });
-var PBMAC1_PRF_HLEN = { "SHA-256": 32, "SHA-384": 48, "SHA-512": 64 };
+var PBMAC1_PRF_HLEN = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { "SHA-256": 32, "SHA-384": 48, "SHA-512": 64 });
 var FAIL_INFO_NAMES = ["badAlg", "badMessageCheck", "badRequest", "badTime", "badCertId", "badDataFormat",
   "wrongAuthority", "incorrectData", "missingTimeStamp", "badPOP", "certRevoked", "certConfirmed",
   "wrongIntegrity", "badRecipientNonce", "timeNotAvailable", "unacceptedPolicy", "unacceptedExtension",
@@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ function _encodeRevDetails(rd) {
   return b.sequence(children);
 }
 
-var KNOWN_REV_DETAILS_KEYS = { certDetails: 1, crlEntryDetails: 1 };
-var KNOWN_CRL_ENTRY_DETAIL_KEYS = { reason: 1 };
+var KNOWN_REV_DETAILS_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { certDetails: 1, crlEntryDetails: 1 });
+var KNOWN_CRL_ENTRY_DETAIL_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { reason: 1 });
 var CRL_REASON_BY_NAME = intrinsic.create(null);
 _forEach(_keys(constants.NAMES.CRL_REASON), function (v) { CRL_REASON_BY_NAME[constants.NAMES.CRL_REASON[v]] = intrinsic.Number(v); });
 function _encodeCrlEntryDetails(spec) {
@@ -272,8 +272,8 @@ function _encodeCrlEntryDetails(spec) {
   return b.sequence([_b.ext(O("reasonCode"), false, b.enumerated(_bigInt(code)))]);
 }
 
-var KNOWN_CRL_STATUS_KEYS = { dpn: 1, issuer: 1, thisUpdate: 1 };
-var KNOWN_DPN_KEYS = { fullName: 1 };
+var KNOWN_CRL_STATUS_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { dpn: 1, issuer: 1, thisUpdate: 1 });
+var KNOWN_DPN_KEYS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { fullName: 1 });
 function buildCrlStatusList(spec) {
   if (!spec || typeof spec !== "object" || _isBuffer(spec)) throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "a crlUpdate request must be an object { dpn | issuer, thisUpdate? }");
   guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(spec, KNOWN_CRL_STATUS_KEYS, _err, "cmp/bad-input", "unknown crlUpdate field ");
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ function _encodeKeyRecRepContent(spec, state) {
   return b.sequence(children);
 }
 
-var CMP2021_POP_METHODS = { agreeMAC: 1, encryptedKey: 1 };
+var CMP2021_POP_METHODS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { agreeMAC: 1, encryptedKey: 1 });
 function _popNeedsCmp2021(crmfDer) {
   var messages;
   try { messages = schemaCrmf.parse(crmfDer).messages; }
@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ var DEFAULT_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT = constants.TIME.seconds(30);
 var MAX_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT = constants.TIME.seconds(600);
 var PKIXCMP = "application/pkixcmp";
 var PKIXCMP_POLL = "application/pkixcmp-poll";
-var KNOWN_TRANSFER_OPTS = { transport: 1, tls: 1, headers: 1, timeout: 1, maxResponseBytes: 1, proxy: 1 };
+var KNOWN_TRANSFER_OPTS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { transport: 1, tls: 1, headers: 1, timeout: 1, maxResponseBytes: 1, proxy: 1 });
 
 function _cmpMessageDer(input) {
   var der;
@@ -783,14 +783,24 @@ function transfer(url, message, opts) {
   return guard.async.deferred(function () { return _transfer(url, message, opts); });
 }
 
+/** @internal Refused at the door and again where the value is used. The checked value is RETURNED
+ * and it is that one the caller uses: reading the option again would ask a second time, and an
+ * accessor can answer differently on each read. */
+function _assertTransport(opts) {
+  return guard.identifier.assertCallableOption(opts, "transport", _err, "cmp/bad-input", "opts.transport",
+    "(request) => Promise<{ status, headers, body }>");
+}
+
 function _transfer(url, message, opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
   guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(opts, KNOWN_TRANSFER_OPTS, _err, "cmp/bad-input", "unknown opts field ");
+  /** @internal Read once, at the door, and carried from here. Asking again would let an option that
+   * answers differently on each read hand back something other than the value that was checked. */
+  var transport = _assertTransport(opts);
   var der = _cmpMessageDer(message);
   var parsedUrl;
   try { parsedUrl = new URL(String(url)); }
   catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-url", "the CMP URL did not parse: " + guard.text.showValue(url), e); }
-  var transport = opts.transport;
   if (!transport) {
     var t = opts.tls || {};
     var hasAnchors = t.anchors !== undefined && t.anchors !== null && !(Array.isArray(t.anchors) && t.anchors.length === 0);
@@ -802,16 +812,16 @@ function _transfer(url, message, opts) {
   var proxy;
   try { proxy = httpTransport.snapshotProxy(opts.proxy); }
   catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the options object could not be read", e); }
-  var headers = {};
+  var headers = intrinsic.create(null);
   Object.keys(opts.headers || {}).forEach(function (k) {
     var lk = k.toLowerCase();
     if (lk !== "content-length" && lk !== "transfer-encoding" && lk !== "content-type") headers[k] = opts.headers[k];
   });
   headers["content-type"] = PKIXCMP;
   var tls = _tlsForTransfer(opts);
-  return guard.async.awaited(transport({ method: "POST", url: parsedUrl.href, headers: headers, body: der, tls: tls, proxy: proxy, timeout: timeout, maxResponseBytes: maxResponseBytes }), _err, "cmp/bad-input", "opts.transport").then(function (res) {
+  return guard.async.invoked(transport, [{ method: "POST", url: parsedUrl.href, headers: headers, body: der, tls: tls, proxy: proxy, timeout: timeout, maxResponseBytes: maxResponseBytes }], _err, "cmp/bad-input", "opts.transport").then(function (res) {
     res = res || {};
-    var h = {};
+    var h = intrinsic.create(null);
     Object.keys(res.headers || {}).forEach(function (k) { h[k.toLowerCase()] = res.headers[k]; });
     var body = guard.bytes.isByteSource(res.body)
       ? guard.bytes.source(res.body, CmpError, "cmp/bad-response", "the CMP response body")
@@ -835,7 +845,7 @@ function _wellKnownSeg(v, name) {
   catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-url", "the CMP " + name + " is not encodable (e.g. an unpaired surrogate): " + JSON.stringify(s), e); }
 }
 
-var KNOWN_WELLKNOWN_OPTS = { label: 1, operation: 1 };
+var KNOWN_WELLKNOWN_OPTS = intrinsic.assign(intrinsic.create(null), { label: 1, operation: 1 });
 
 function _isAsciiLetter(ch) { return (ch >= "A" && ch <= "Z") || (ch >= "a" && ch <= "z"); }
 function _stripSchemeAuthority(s) {