@blamejs/pki 0.6.32 → 0.6.34

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,22 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.6.34 — 2026-09-04
+
+An injected transport that does not return a promise is reported as a typed option error naming the option, in every client that accepts one.
+
+### Changed
+
+- pki.est, pki.acme, pki.cmp, and pki.scep reject with est/bad-input, acme/bad-input, cmp/bad-input, or scep/bad-input when opts.transport returns something that is not a promise of the response, instead of failing with a raw TypeError or a misleading response verdict. A transport returning any thenable is still accepted, and the documented signature now states the promise contract.
+
+## v0.6.33 — 2026-09-04
+
+pki.transport reports the RFC 9266 tls-exporter channel binding of a TLS 1.3 connection, so every connection the toolkit opens now carries the binding its protocol version defines.
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.transport.https reports tls.tlsExporter, the RFC 9266 channel binding of a TLS 1.3 connection (32 bytes, label EXPORTER-Channel-Binding, zero-length context), on its response and on the argument passed to a request body given as a function. It is null below TLS 1.3, where RFC 9266 sec. 2 also requires the RFC 7627 extended master secret that Node cannot confirm, and null when the socket cannot export. tls.tlsUnique is unchanged, so a connection carries exactly the binding its version defines.
+
 ## v0.6.32 — 2026-09-04
 
 pki.est.simpleenroll and pki.est.simplereenroll accept a CSR builder, so an enrollment is signed over the tls-unique of the connection it is sent on (RFC 7030 sec. 3.5 channel binding).

package/README.md

@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.schema.csrattrs` | EST CSR Attributes (`CsrAttrs`, RFC 8951 §3.5 / RFC 9908) — the `AttrOrOID` items a server sends to shape an enrollment: bare OIDs, attributes with raw values, and decoded views of the RFC 9908 meaningful types (extension requests, EC and RSA key-type conventions, the certification-request-info template). Unknown types are surfaced raw; structure and the RFC 9908 semantic MUSTs are fail-closed — `parse` |
 | `pki.est` | Enrollment over Secure Transport (RFC 7030 / 8951 / 9908 / 7616). The client verbs `cacerts`, `simpleenroll`, `simplereenroll`, `serverkeygen`, `csrattrs`, and `fullcmc` drive the RFC 7030 flow over `pki.transport` (inject your own via `opts.transport`, or take the fail-closed default): HTTPS only, an explicit trust anchor required, same-origin redirects followed while a downgrade or loop is refused, a 202 Retry-After surfaced but never slept, HTTP Basic or Digest (RFC 7616, SHA-256 / SHA-512-256; MD5 and no-qop refused by default) answered only after the server is authenticated, and the issued certificate chosen by public-key match. `serverkeygen` requests a server-generated key, cleartext or an opaque CMS EnvelopedData, with encryption bound to the CSR's key-identifier attribute over a confidentiality-bearing cipher. `csrattrs` fetches the CA's RFC 9908 attributes policy. For §3.5 channel binding, `simpleenroll` and `simplereenroll` accept a CSR builder `(tls) -> csr` instead of a CSR: it runs after the handshake with that connection's `tlsUnique`, so the request is signed over the session it is sent on, and it re-runs on any new connection a redirect or auth retry opens, recreating the CSR for that session (§3.2.1). A builder alongside Digest authentication is refused, since that header is computed over the body before the handshake. `fullcmc` (§4.3) carries a CMC Full PKI Request and reduces the CA's answer through `pki.cmc.verify` to one terminal outcome, refusing a response that fails to echo the transaction and nonce the request carried, or that covers a key the request never asked for; a certs-only reply to a bound request is refused rather than read as an issuance. Under the verbs sit the transport-agnostic codecs they compose: the RFC 8951 base64 transfer codec (which ignores Content-Transfer-Encoding), the `multipart/mixed` splitter, the certs-only and serverkeygen response validators over CMS, the enroll-attribute builders, and the HTTP response classifier — `transferDecode`/`transferEncode`, `parseCertsOnly`, `splitMultipartMixed`, `parseServerKeygenResponse`, `findIssuedCert`, `classifyResponse`, `paths`, and the builders |
 | `pki.scep` | SCEP pkiMessage codec (RFC 8894), the client side of Simple Certificate Enrollment. `build(spec)` assembles a request: a `PKCSReq` or `RenewalReq` wraps a PKCS#10 certification request, whose own proof-of-possession it verifies first; a `CertPoll` wraps an IssuerAndSubject naming the issuing CA and the request subject; and a `GetCert` or `GetCRL` wraps an IssuerAndSerialNumber naming a certificate by its issuer and a positive serial of at most 20 octets. It encrypts the messageData to the CA as the inner EnvelopedData (`pkcsPKIEnvelope`, AES-128-CBC), and signs that under the transaction attributes RFC 8894 §3.2 defines, a messageType, a caller-unique transactionId, and a 16-byte senderNonce. The recipient CA certificate must assert `keyEncipherment`. `build` also issues the CA-side `CertRep` response (§3.3.2): a SUCCESS envelopes a certs-only SignedData of the issued certificate (or the CRL for a GetCRL) to the requester and signs it under the CA key, while a FAILURE (carrying a `failInfo`) or a PENDING omits the pkcsPKIEnvelope and is signed detached, each echoing the request's senderNonce as `recipientNonce`. `parse(bytes, opts?)` reads a `PKCSReq`, `RenewalReq`, `CertPoll`, `GetCert`, `GetCRL`, or `CertRep` back (a messageType outside the RFC 8894 registry is refused): it verifies the outer signature first and refuses a message whose signature does not check, so the transaction attributes it returns come only from a verified signer, never alongside a false verdict. Because a valid signature only proves self-consistency with the embedded certificate, pass `opts.signerCert` to authenticate a CA response against the CA certificate you hold (a public-key mismatch is refused, `signerAuthenticated` reports the result); a caller that omits it gets a crypto-only verdict and must authenticate the surfaced `signerCert` itself. It maps the messageType, pkiStatus, failInfo, and the nonces from their RFC 8894 enumerants and refuses an unknown one; given `recipientKey` it decrypts the `pkcsPKIEnvelope` to the messageData, and given `expectedSenderNonce` it refuses a response whose recipientNonce does not echo it. It reads a CA's CertRep in full. `getCACaps(baseUrl, opts?)`, `getCACert(baseUrl, opts?)`, `getNextCACert(baseUrl, opts)`, `enroll(baseUrl, opts)`, `renew(baseUrl, opts)`, `getCert(baseUrl, opts)`, and `getCrl(baseUrl, opts)` carry that codec to a live CA over HTTP (RFC 8894 §4) through an injectable transport (`pki.transport.https` by default): `getCACaps` reports the CA's advertised capabilities and never lowers the client's algorithm choice on the unauthenticated response, `getCACert` pins the CA certificate to an out-of-band `expectedFingerprint` a returned certificate must match, `getNextCACert` fetches the CA's next (rollover) certificate and verifies the SignedData response against the current CA certificate (`caCertificate`) before returning it, refusing a response signed by any other key, and `enroll` and `renew` POST a PKCSReq or RenewalReq, authenticate the CertRep against the CA certificate and its nonce echo, select the issued certificate by public-key match, throw on a FAILURE with the CA's failInfo, and poll a PENDING response with CertPoll requests until the CA answers or a bounded poll-count and total-wait budget is spent. `getCert` and `getCrl` retrieve an already-issued certificate or a CA CRL by issuer and serial number, authenticated the same way; RFC 8894 §2.6, §2.7, and §3.3.4 recommend these queries only where HTTP certificate-store access (RFC 4387), LDAP, or a CRL distribution point is unavailable, so prefer those where a CA offers them. A PKIOperation goes over HTTP POST by default; `httpMethod: "GET"` carries it base64-encoded in the URL query for a legacy CA that accepts only GET (RFC 8894 §4.1). Every verb reaches an https CA through a forward proxy with `opts.proxy = { url, auth?, tls? }`: a `CONNECT` tunnel is opened to the proxy and the origin TLS is negotiated inside it, so the proxy carries the enrollment without being able to read it or substitute the origin certificate. Basic proxy authentication (RFC 7617) is sent only over an `https://` proxy, where it rides the authenticated TLS-to-proxy channel; an `http://` proxy is tunnel-only, and credentials over a plaintext proxy are refused rather than exposed (see `pki.transport`) — `build`, `parse`, `parseCapabilities`, `getCACaps`, `getCACert`, `getNextCACert`, `enroll`, `renew`, `getCert`, `getCrl` |
-| `pki.transport` | The shared, fail-closed `node:https` transport the enrollment clients drive. `pki.transport.https(defaults)` returns a `transport(request) → { status, headers, body, tls }`, where `tls` carries the negotiated `protocol`, `cipher`, raw `peerCertificate`, and, on a TLS 1.2 connection, the RFC 5929 `tlsUnique` channel binding that `pki.est.challengePasswordFromTlsUnique` links to an EST enrollment (RFC 7030 §3.5; `null` on TLS 1.3). Since `tlsUnique` on the response arrives after the body was sent, a request `body` may instead be a function `(tls) -> bytes` the transport invokes after the handshake and before it writes the body, so the caller builds a channel-bound CSR from `tlsUnique` on the same connection it posts over. It may return a promise, so the CSR can be signed with `pki.csr.sign` while the connection is held open; a callback that throws, rejects, or returns anything other than bytes or a string fails the request closed rather than posting an empty enrollment. This is the toolkit's only socket choke point: an explicit trust anchor (or an opt-in to the system store) is required, `rejectUnauthorized` is always on, TLS is floored at 1.2, the response body is capped while it streams, and a stalled socket times out. The EST, ACME, and CMP clients reuse it verbatim. A `request.proxy = { url, auth?, tls? }` reaches the origin through a forward proxy: a `CONNECT` tunnel is opened to the proxy and the origin TLS is negotiated inside it under the identical origin trust policy, so the proxy cannot read the origin's encrypted session or substitute an authenticated origin certificate. Basic proxy credentials are sent only over an `https://` proxy, whose own certificate is verified against `proxy.tls`, so they ride an authenticated channel; a plaintext `http://` proxy is tunnel-only and carrying `auth` on one is refused (`proxy-auth-requires-tls`) rather than exposing the credentials to the proxy hop. A malformed option, a failed CONNECT, an unverified proxy certificate, or an unaccepted credential fails closed. The SCEP, EST, ACME, and CMP clients each thread it through as `opts.proxy`. If you inject your own transport, return `tls` too: `pki.est.serverkeygen` asserts the negotiated cipher can protect the delivered private key, and a transport that reports no cipher is trusted rather than refused, so omitting the field silently skips that check — `https` |
+| `pki.transport` | The shared, fail-closed `node:https` transport the enrollment clients drive. `pki.transport.https(defaults)` returns a `transport(request) → { status, headers, body, tls }`, where `tls` carries the negotiated `protocol`, `cipher`, raw `peerCertificate`, and one channel binding per TLS version: on TLS 1.2 the RFC 5929 `tlsUnique` that `pki.est.challengePasswordFromTlsUnique` links to an EST enrollment (RFC 7030 §3.5), and on TLS 1.3 the RFC 9266 `tlsExporter` (32 bytes under the label `EXPORTER-Channel-Binding`, zero-length context). Each is `null` on the version that does not define it, and `tlsExporter` is withheld below TLS 1.3 because RFC 9266 §2 also requires the RFC 7627 extended master secret, which Node gives no way to confirm. Since `tlsUnique` on the response arrives after the body was sent, a request `body` may instead be a function `(tls) -> bytes` the transport invokes after the handshake and before it writes the body, so the caller builds a channel-bound CSR from `tlsUnique` on the same connection it posts over. It may return a promise, so the CSR can be signed with `pki.csr.sign` while the connection is held open; a callback that throws, rejects, or returns anything other than bytes or a string fails the request closed rather than posting an empty enrollment. This is the toolkit's only socket choke point: an explicit trust anchor (or an opt-in to the system store) is required, `rejectUnauthorized` is always on, TLS is floored at 1.2, the response body is capped while it streams, and a stalled socket times out. The EST, ACME, and CMP clients reuse it verbatim. A `request.proxy = { url, auth?, tls? }` reaches the origin through a forward proxy: a `CONNECT` tunnel is opened to the proxy and the origin TLS is negotiated inside it under the identical origin trust policy, so the proxy cannot read the origin's encrypted session or substitute an authenticated origin certificate. Basic proxy credentials are sent only over an `https://` proxy, whose own certificate is verified against `proxy.tls`, so they ride an authenticated channel; a plaintext `http://` proxy is tunnel-only and carrying `auth` on one is refused (`proxy-auth-requires-tls`) rather than exposing the credentials to the proxy hop. A malformed option, a failed CONNECT, an unverified proxy certificate, or an unaccepted credential fails closed. The SCEP, EST, ACME, and CMP clients each thread it through as `opts.proxy`. If you inject your own transport, return `tls` too: `pki.est.serverkeygen` asserts the negotiated cipher can protect the delivered private key, and a transport that reports no cipher is trusted rather than refused, so omitting the field silently skips that check — `https` |
 | `pki.jose` | Flattened JWS (RFC 7515) and JWK thumbprints (RFC 7638). `sign` and `verify` run a Flattened JWS against declarative profiles (ACME outer, EAB inner, keyChange inner) that carry the required and forbidden header rules as data. `base64url` is the strict RFC 4648 §5 codec, rejecting padding, non-alphabet characters, and non-canonical trailing bits. `parseJson` is a bounded reader that refuses duplicate members at any depth. `thumbprint` is the RFC 7638 / 8037 / 9964 canonical digest. The algorithm registry binds each `alg` to its key type (ES/RS/PS/EdDSA/ML-DSA), leaving no code path for `alg:none`, an RS256→HS256 key confusion, or an all-zero ECDSA signature; `assertPublicJwk` refuses a JWK carrying private material, so an exported private key is never published. `opts.key` names the key a message must be signed under and governs: where the profile also permits an embedded header `jwk`, the two must be the same key — compared as RFC 7638 thumbprints, so member order cannot make equal keys differ — and a disagreement is refused rather than resolved in the message's favor. `keySource` reports which key answered, since a signature checked against a key you named is a different claim from one checked against the key the message carried — `sign`, `verify`, `base64url`, `parseJson`, `thumbprint`, `assertPublicJwk` |
 | `pki.acme` | ACME (RFC 8555 / 8737 / 8738 / 9773). `client(directoryUrl, opts)` is a stateful client driving a live CA directory over `pki.transport`: `newAccount`, `newOrder`, `newAuthz`, `getOrder`, `getAuthorization`, `getChallenge`, `respondToChallenge`, `finalize`, `pollOrder`, `pollAuthorization`, and `downloadCertificate` walk the issuance flow, with `newAuthz` pre-authorizing a single identifier (§7.4.1) and `downloadCertificate` binding the issued certificate to the order — its key, its identifiers, or both; at least one is required by default and the result reports `boundToKey` / `boundToIdentifiers` — before choosing among alternate chains (`Link rel="alternate"`, §7.4.2, via a `selectChain` predicate bounded by `maxAlternates`). `revokeCert` (account-key or certificate-key signed), `keyChange`, `updateAccount` (change the account contacts, §7.3.2), `listOrders` (the account's orders list, following the §7.1.2.1 `Link rel="next"` pagination bounded by a page cap and confined to the orders origin), `deactivateAccount`, `deactivateAuthorization`, `renewalInfo` (ARI), `renewalWindow` (the RFC 9773 §4.2/4.3 renewal decision), and `scheduleRenewal` (the §4.1 auto-sleeping renewal loop that sleeps until the selected instant and refetches until it is time to renew, stopping at the certificate's notAfter) complete the lifecycle. Every URL is HTTPS only, an explicit trust anchor is required, each request carries a fresh single-use nonce with a bounded badNonce retry (and, when `opts.resignKeys` supplies caller-approved alternative account-key algorithms, a bounded RFC 8555 §6.2 badSignatureAlgorithm re-sign that the CA's advertised list can only filter, never widen, so it cannot force a weaker algorithm), reads are POST-as-GET, polling is bounded and sleeps on a Retry-After via an injectable sleeper capped by a poll count and a total-wait budget, and every response body is size-capped. The transport is injectable via `opts.transport`. Over the message layer it composes resource-object validators (closed status enums, conditional-required fields, unknown fields ignored), the three §7.1.6 state machines, the request builders (newAccount with External Account Binding, newOrder with `replaces`, finalize with a CSR identifier-set match and account-key-reuse rejection, challenge responses, deactivation, revokeCert in both key modes, the keyChange nested JWS, POST-as-GET), the http-01 / dns-01 / tls-alpn-01 challenge computations, the dns and ip identifier validators, and the ARI certID with serial sign-padding preserved — `client`, `validate`, `identify`, `assertTransition`, the builders, `keyAuthorization`, `http01`, `dns01`, `tlsAlpn01Extension`, `verifyTlsAlpn01`, `ariCertId` |
 | `pki.schema.smime` | S/MIME ESS signed-attribute values (RFC 5035 / RFC 8551). `parseSigningCertificate` and `parseSigningCertificateV2` bind a signature to its signing certificate (cert hash, hash algorithm, issuer `GeneralNames` and serial); `parseSmimeCapabilities` decodes the ordered capability list; `decodeAttribute` dispatches a CMS attribute by OID, enforcing the single-value rule and deferring on unknown types. A companion decoder for CMS signed attributes rather than an auto-routed format — `parseSigningCertificate`, `parseSigningCertificateV2`, `parseSmimeCapabilities`, `decodeAttribute` |

package/lib/acme.js

@@ -1763,7 +1763,7 @@ function _parseLinkNext(headers, base) { var m = _parseLinkRelation(headers, bas
  *
  * @opts
  *   - `accountKey` / `accountJwk` / `alg` -- REQUIRED: the account private key, its public JWK, and the JWS alg.
- *   - `transport` -- injectable transport(request) -> {status, headers, body}; default pki.transport.https.
+ *   - `transport` -- injectable `transport(request) -> Promise<{status, headers, body}>`; default pki.transport.https. It must return a promise of the response; anything else is `acme/bad-input`.
  *   - `tls` -- { anchors, useSystemStore, cert, key, minVersion, servername, checkServerIdentity } for the default transport.
  *   - `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` / `maxRedirects` -- transport budgets; `maxNonceRetries` -- badNonce retry cap (default 1).
  *   - `proxy` -- reach the ACME server through a forward HTTP proxy (`{ url, auth?, tls? }`; see pki.transport).
@@ -1911,7 +1911,9 @@ function client(directoryUrl, opts) {
   function _send(method, url, headers, body) { return _sendFollowing(method, url, headers, body, 0); }
   function _sendFollowing(method, url, headers, body, redirects) {
     var reqHeaders = Object.assign({ "user-agent": CLIENT_USER_AGENT }, headers || {});
-    return transport({ method: method, url: url, headers: reqHeaders, body: body, tls: _tlsFor(url), proxy: budgets.proxy, timeout: budgets.timeout, maxResponseBytes: budgets.maxResponseBytes }).then(function (res) {
+    return guard.async.deferred(function () {
+      return guard.async.awaited(transport({ method: method, url: url, headers: reqHeaders, body: body, tls: _tlsFor(url), proxy: budgets.proxy, timeout: budgets.timeout, maxResponseBytes: budgets.maxResponseBytes }), E, "acme/bad-input", "opts.transport");
+    }).then(function (res) {
       res = res || {};
       var h = {};
       Object.keys(res.headers || {}).forEach(function (k) { h[k.toLowerCase()] = res.headers[k]; });

package/lib/cmp-build.js

@@ -809,7 +809,7 @@ function _transfer(url, message, opts) {
   });
   headers["content-type"] = PKIXCMP;
   var tls = _tlsForTransfer(opts);
-  return Promise.resolve(transport({ method: "POST", url: parsedUrl.href, headers: headers, body: der, tls: tls, proxy: proxy, timeout: timeout, maxResponseBytes: maxResponseBytes })).then(function (res) {
+  return guard.async.awaited(transport({ method: "POST", url: parsedUrl.href, headers: headers, body: der, tls: tls, proxy: proxy, timeout: timeout, maxResponseBytes: maxResponseBytes }), _err, "cmp/bad-input", "opts.transport").then(function (res) {
     res = res || {};
     var h = {};
     Object.keys(res.headers || {}).forEach(function (k) { h[k.toLowerCase()] = res.headers[k]; });

package/lib/cmp-session.js

@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ function _certConfHash(certDer) {
  *   - `expectedSender` -- optional CA signer certificate (DER Buffer / PEM string / already-parsed `pki.schema.x509.parse` object); when set, every signed response's authenticated header sender MUST bind to it under the RFC 5280 sec. 7 subject-or-subjectAltName rule cmp.verify uses, so a re-encoded-but-equivalent DN and an empty-subject CA named only by a directoryName SAN both match. Given as bytes/PEM it also resolves a first response that omits its own extraCerts (a CA that assumes the client already holds its certificate). Absent, the session pins the first signed response's signer certificate and requires every later leg's sender to bind to it, rejecting a switch to a different trusted signer while permitting same-identity certificate/key rotation.
  *   - `implicitConfirm` -- request implicit confirmation (skip the certConf leg when the CA grants it).
  *   - `acceptCert` -- an async policy `(certDer, { status, grantedWithMods }) => boolean` consulted before the certConf; return true to accept, anything else to veto (a `grantedWithMods` certificate the CA changed). A veto sends a rejecting certConf and yields `outcome: "rejected"` with the certificate still surfaced. Incompatible with `implicitConfirm` (no reject leg exists), so the combination throws at construction.
- *   - `transport` -- injectable transport(request) -> {status, headers, body}; default pki.transport.https.
+ *   - `transport` -- injectable `transport(request) -> Promise<{status, headers, body}>`; default pki.transport.https. It must return a promise of the response; anything else is `cmp/bad-input`.
  *   - `tls` / `headers` / `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` -- transport config + budgets.
  *   - `proxy` -- reach the CA through a forward HTTP proxy (`{ url, auth?, tls? }`; see pki.transport).
  *   - `maxPolls` / `maxTotalWait` / `sleep` -- poll-loop budgets + an injectable sleeper; `time` -- verify-time clock.

package/lib/est.js

@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ function _drive(method, url, body, headers, opts, transport, budgets) {
   }
   function step() {
     var hopBody = (typeof body === "function" && budgets.onAttempt) ? budgets.onAttempt() : body;
-    return transport({ method: method, url: url.href, headers: _headersFor(url), body: hopBody, tls: _tlsFor(url), proxy: budgets.proxy, timeout: budgets.timeout, maxResponseBytes: budgets.maxResponseBytes }).then(function (res) {
+    return guard.async.awaited(transport({ method: method, url: url.href, headers: _headersFor(url), body: hopBody, tls: _tlsFor(url), proxy: budgets.proxy, timeout: budgets.timeout, maxResponseBytes: budgets.maxResponseBytes }), E, "est/bad-input", "opts.transport").then(function (res) {
       res = res || {};
       var blen = _bodyLen(res);
       if (blen > budgets.maxResponseBytes) throw E("est/response-too-large", "the response body (" + blen + " bytes) exceeds the " + budgets.maxResponseBytes + "-byte cap (RFC 7030 sec. 6)");
@@ -1486,7 +1486,7 @@ function _enroll(op, baseUrl, csrInput, opts, proxySnap) {
  * anchor on the next call.
  *
  * @opts
- *   - `transport`: an injected transport(request) -> {status, headers, body, tls}; default pki.transport.https.
+ *   - `transport`: an injected `transport(request) -> Promise<{status, headers, body, tls}>`; default pki.transport.https. It must return a promise of the response; anything else is `est/bad-input`.
  *   - `tls` -- { anchors, useSystemStore, cert, key, minVersion, servername, checkServerIdentity }.
  *   - `label` -- an OPTIONAL CA label path segment; `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` / `maxRedirects` -- budgets.
  *   - `proxy` -- reach the CA through a forward HTTP proxy (`{ url, auth?, tls? }`; see pki.transport).

package/lib/guard-async.js

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 var _intrinsic = require("./guard-intrinsic");
 var _resolve = _intrinsic.uncurry(_intrinsic.promiseResolve);
 var _reject = _intrinsic.uncurry(_intrinsic.promiseReject);
+var _apply = _intrinsic.apply;
 var _Promise = Promise;
 // @internal
 // @enforced-by behavioral -- the rule has no rename-proof code shape (it is the ABSENCE of a wrapper
@@ -13,4 +14,19 @@ function deferred(body) {
   catch (e) { return _reject(_Promise, e); }
 }
 
-module.exports = _intrinsic.freeze({ deferred: deferred });
+// @internal
+// @enforced-by behavioral -- a RED vector in each client suite refuses a transport yielding no thenable
+function awaited(value, E, code, label) {
+  var thenFn;
+  try { thenFn = value == null ? null : value.then; }
+  catch (_te) { thenFn = null; }
+  if (typeof thenFn !== "function") {
+    throw E(code, label + " must return a promise of the response; got " +
+      (value === null ? "null" : typeof value));
+  }
+  return _resolve(_Promise, {
+    then: function (resolve, reject) { _apply(thenFn, value, [resolve, reject]); },
+  });
+}
+
+module.exports = _intrinsic.freeze({ deferred: deferred, awaited: awaited });

package/lib/http-transport.js

@@ -19,11 +19,19 @@
  *   into the socket layer: the transport owns socket lifecycle, the TLS trust policy,
  *   the streaming size cap, and the timeout budget; the caller owns HTTP status,
  *   content-type, redirect, and authentication decisions. `tls` reports the negotiated
- *   channel, `{ protocol, cipher, peerCertificate, tlsUnique }`, facts a caller cannot
- *   recover from the response bytes. `tlsUnique` is the RFC 5929 channel binding (the first
- *   TLS Finished) on a TLS 1.2 connection, which `pki.est.challengePasswordFromTlsUnique`
- *   base64-encodes into an EST challengePassword (RFC 7030 sec. 3.5); it is `null` on TLS 1.3,
- *   where RFC 5929 defines no tls-unique. An INJECTED substitute should return these too:
+ *   channel, `{ protocol, cipher, peerCertificate, tlsUnique, tlsExporter }`, facts a caller
+ *   cannot recover from the response bytes. The two bindings are complementary, one per version,
+ *   so a caller reads whichever the negotiated protocol defines. `tlsUnique` is the RFC 5929
+ *   channel binding (the first TLS Finished) on a TLS 1.2 connection, which
+ *   `pki.est.challengePasswordFromTlsUnique` base64-encodes into an EST challengePassword
+ *   (RFC 7030 sec. 3.5); it is `null` on TLS 1.3, where RFC 5929 defines no tls-unique.
+ *   `tlsExporter` is the RFC 9266 binding on a TLS 1.3 connection: 32 bytes exported under the
+ *   label `EXPORTER-Channel-Binding` with a zero-length context, the value both peers derive.
+ *   It is `null` below TLS 1.3, where RFC 9266 sec. 2 additionally requires the RFC 7627 extended
+ *   master secret, which node gives no way to confirm, so the binding is withheld rather than
+ *   offered unproven; it is also `null` if the socket cannot export. No shipped verb consumes
+ *   tls-exporter yet: RFC 7030 sec. 3.5 binds tls-unique specifically, so a caller must not put a
+ *   tls-exporter value in that challengePassword. An INJECTED substitute should return these too:
  *   `pki.est.serverkeygen` asserts the negotiated cipher can protect the private key it
  *   is about to accept, and a transport that reports no cipher is trusted instead of
  *   refused (so a loopback test channel works), which means omitting the field silently
@@ -93,6 +101,17 @@ function _stripIpv6Brackets(s) {
   return (s.length >= 2 && s.charAt(0) === "[" && s.charAt(s.length - 1) === "]") ? s.slice(1, s.length - 1) : s;
 }
 
+var TLS_EXPORTER_LABEL = "EXPORTER-Channel-Binding";
+var TLS_EXPORTER_LENGTH = 32;
+
+function _tlsExporter(socket, proto) {
+  if (proto !== "TLSv1.3" || !socket || typeof socket.exportKeyingMaterial !== "function") return null;
+  var out;
+  try { out = socket.exportKeyingMaterial(TLS_EXPORTER_LENGTH, TLS_EXPORTER_LABEL, Buffer.alloc(0)); }
+  catch (_ee) { return null; }
+  return (Buffer.isBuffer(out) && out.length === TLS_EXPORTER_LENGTH) ? out : null;
+}
+
 function _tlsInfo(socket) {
   var proto = socket && socket.getProtocol ? socket.getProtocol() : null;
   var cipher = socket && socket.getCipher ? socket.getCipher() : null;
@@ -101,7 +120,8 @@ function _tlsInfo(socket) {
   var tlsUnique = (socket && socket.getFinished && socket.getPeerFinished && proto === "TLSv1.2")
     ? (reused ? socket.getPeerFinished() : socket.getFinished()) : null;
   if (tlsUnique != null && tlsUnique.length === 0) tlsUnique = null;
-  return { protocol: proto, cipher: cipher, peerCertificate: peer && peer.raw ? peer.raw : null, tlsUnique: tlsUnique };
+  var tlsExporter = _tlsExporter(socket, proto);
+  return { protocol: proto, cipher: cipher, peerCertificate: peer && peer.raw ? peer.raw : null, tlsUnique: tlsUnique, tlsExporter: tlsExporter };
 }
 
 function _pemifyAnchor(a) {

package/lib/scep.js

@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ function _drive(method, url, body, headers, opts, transport, budgets) {
     var req = { method: curMethod, url: current.href, headers: headers, tls: _hopTls(current), timeout: budgets.timeout, maxResponseBytes: budgets.maxResponseBytes };
     if (proxySnap != null) req.proxy = proxySnap;
     if (curBody != null) req.body = curBody;
-    return transport(req).then(function (res) {
+    return guard.async.awaited(transport(req), _err, "scep/bad-input", "opts.transport").then(function (res) {
       res = res || {};
       var blen = _responseLen(res.body);
       if (blen > budgets.maxResponseBytes) throw _err("scep/response-too-large", "the response body (" + blen + " bytes) exceeds the " + budgets.maxResponseBytes + "-byte cap");

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.6.32",
+  "version": "0.6.34",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:83c6b183-9fb9-43d2-8e3d-fc7b945449bc",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:c595f123-cf34-46db-924e-ffa5c0c5018e",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-09-04T18:25:04.206Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-09-04T22:46:35.510Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.32",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.34",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.6.32",
+      "version": "0.6.34",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.32",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.34",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.32",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.34",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]