@blamejs/pki 0.6.28 → 0.6.30

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,31 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.6.30 — 2026-09-04
+
+Reference documentation is corrected across the toolkit: a mistyped signed-attribute field name, and options and return fields the code accepts or returns that the reference had omitted.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Options and return fields the code accepts or returns are now documented across pki.cms, pki.tsp, pki.pkcs12, pki.hpke, pki.path, pki.ocsp, pki.asn1, pki.est, pki.acme, and pki.webauthn. In particular, pki.webauthn.verifyAssertion is documented as checking the challenge and origin when expectedChallenge / expectedOrigin / expectedTopOrigin are supplied with clientDataJSON.
+- Reference prose across the toolkit and the documentation site is reworded for consistency.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- pki.smime.sign documented additionalSignedAttributes as [{ oid, values }]; the code reads the type field, so a caller following the reference would pass an unrecognized field. The correct form is [{ type, values }].
+- pki.ocsp.buildErrorResponse is documented as returning a Buffer; the signature previously showed Buffer | string, but the verb has no PEM option and every path returns DER.
+- The pki.schema.all example output lists csrattrs, which the enumeration returns between cmp and ocsp-request.
+- The pki.acme.client method list documents updateAccount and listOrders, which the client returns.
+- pki.tsp.verify now includes policyName on a failure verdict; it already returned the resolved policy name on a valid verdict and the raw policy on both, so a refused token carries the same descriptive fields as a valid one.
+
+## v0.6.29 — 2026-09-03
+
+The EST, ACME, and CMP clients reach a CA through a forward HTTP proxy, with the same opts.proxy the SCEP client already accepts.
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.est.cacerts / simpleenroll / simplereenroll / serverkeygen / csrattrs / fullcmc, pki.acme.client, pki.cmp.transfer, and the pki.cmp.session client (which forwards it to every enrollment, polling, revocation, and confirmation leg) accept opts.proxy = { url, auth?, tls? } to reach the CA through a forward HTTP proxy, the same option pki.scep accepts. The origin TLS is negotiated inside the proxy's CONNECT tunnel under the identical origin trust policy; Basic authentication (RFC 7617) is sent only over an https:// proxy verified against proxy.tls, and an http:// proxy is tunnel-only. The option is deep-copied at the call so a later change to the caller's object cannot alter the proxy in use.
+
 ## v0.6.28 — 2026-09-02
 
 pki.path.build returns the best accepted path when the candidate cap is reached during policy ranking, instead of discarding it.

package/README.md

@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.schema.csrattrs` | EST CSR Attributes (`CsrAttrs`, RFC 8951 §3.5 / RFC 9908) — the `AttrOrOID` items a server sends to shape an enrollment: bare OIDs, attributes with raw values, and decoded views of the RFC 9908 meaningful types (extension requests, EC and RSA key-type conventions, the certification-request-info template). Unknown types are surfaced raw; structure and the RFC 9908 semantic MUSTs are fail-closed — `parse` |
 | `pki.est` | Enrollment over Secure Transport (RFC 7030 / 8951 / 9908 / 7616). The client verbs `cacerts`, `simpleenroll`, `simplereenroll`, `serverkeygen`, `csrattrs`, and `fullcmc` drive the RFC 7030 flow over `pki.transport` (inject your own via `opts.transport`, or take the fail-closed default): HTTPS only, an explicit trust anchor required, same-origin redirects followed while a downgrade or loop is refused, a 202 Retry-After surfaced but never slept, HTTP Basic or Digest (RFC 7616, SHA-256 / SHA-512-256; MD5 and no-qop refused by default) answered only after the server is authenticated, and the issued certificate chosen by public-key match. `serverkeygen` requests a server-generated key, cleartext or an opaque CMS EnvelopedData, with encryption bound to the CSR's key-identifier attribute over a confidentiality-bearing cipher. `csrattrs` fetches the CA's RFC 9908 attributes policy. `fullcmc` (§4.3) carries a CMC Full PKI Request and reduces the CA's answer through `pki.cmc.verify` to one terminal outcome, refusing a response that fails to echo the transaction and nonce the request carried, or that covers a key the request never asked for; a certs-only reply to a bound request is refused rather than read as an issuance. Under the verbs sit the transport-agnostic codecs they compose: the RFC 8951 base64 transfer codec (which ignores Content-Transfer-Encoding), the `multipart/mixed` splitter, the certs-only and serverkeygen response validators over CMS, the enroll-attribute builders, and the HTTP response classifier — `transferDecode`/`transferEncode`, `parseCertsOnly`, `splitMultipartMixed`, `parseServerKeygenResponse`, `findIssuedCert`, `classifyResponse`, `paths`, and the builders |
 | `pki.scep` | SCEP pkiMessage codec (RFC 8894), the client side of Simple Certificate Enrollment. `build(spec)` assembles a request: a `PKCSReq` or `RenewalReq` wraps a PKCS#10 certification request, whose own proof-of-possession it verifies first; a `CertPoll` wraps an IssuerAndSubject naming the issuing CA and the request subject; and a `GetCert` or `GetCRL` wraps an IssuerAndSerialNumber naming a certificate by its issuer and a positive serial of at most 20 octets. It encrypts the messageData to the CA as the inner EnvelopedData (`pkcsPKIEnvelope`, AES-128-CBC), and signs that under the transaction attributes RFC 8894 §3.2 defines, a messageType, a caller-unique transactionId, and a 16-byte senderNonce. The recipient CA certificate must assert `keyEncipherment`. `build` also issues the CA-side `CertRep` response (§3.3.2): a SUCCESS envelopes a certs-only SignedData of the issued certificate (or the CRL for a GetCRL) to the requester and signs it under the CA key, while a FAILURE (carrying a `failInfo`) or a PENDING omits the pkcsPKIEnvelope and is signed detached, each echoing the request's senderNonce as `recipientNonce`. `parse(bytes, opts?)` reads a `PKCSReq`, `RenewalReq`, `CertPoll`, `GetCert`, `GetCRL`, or `CertRep` back (a messageType outside the RFC 8894 registry is refused): it verifies the outer signature first and refuses a message whose signature does not check, so the transaction attributes it returns come only from a verified signer, never alongside a false verdict. Because a valid signature only proves self-consistency with the embedded certificate, pass `opts.signerCert` to authenticate a CA response against the CA certificate you hold (a public-key mismatch is refused, `signerAuthenticated` reports the result); a caller that omits it gets a crypto-only verdict and must authenticate the surfaced `signerCert` itself. It maps the messageType, pkiStatus, failInfo, and the nonces from their RFC 8894 enumerants and refuses an unknown one; given `recipientKey` it decrypts the `pkcsPKIEnvelope` to the messageData, and given `expectedSenderNonce` it refuses a response whose recipientNonce does not echo it. It reads a CA's CertRep in full. `getCACaps(baseUrl, opts?)`, `getCACert(baseUrl, opts?)`, `getNextCACert(baseUrl, opts)`, `enroll(baseUrl, opts)`, `renew(baseUrl, opts)`, `getCert(baseUrl, opts)`, and `getCrl(baseUrl, opts)` carry that codec to a live CA over HTTP (RFC 8894 §4) through an injectable transport (`pki.transport.https` by default): `getCACaps` reports the CA's advertised capabilities and never lowers the client's algorithm choice on the unauthenticated response, `getCACert` pins the CA certificate to an out-of-band `expectedFingerprint` a returned certificate must match, `getNextCACert` fetches the CA's next (rollover) certificate and verifies the SignedData response against the current CA certificate (`caCertificate`) before returning it, refusing a response signed by any other key, and `enroll` and `renew` POST a PKCSReq or RenewalReq, authenticate the CertRep against the CA certificate and its nonce echo, select the issued certificate by public-key match, throw on a FAILURE with the CA's failInfo, and poll a PENDING response with CertPoll requests until the CA answers or a bounded poll-count and total-wait budget is spent. `getCert` and `getCrl` retrieve an already-issued certificate or a CA CRL by issuer and serial number, authenticated the same way; RFC 8894 §2.6, §2.7, and §3.3.4 recommend these queries only where HTTP certificate-store access (RFC 4387), LDAP, or a CRL distribution point is unavailable, so prefer those where a CA offers them. A PKIOperation goes over HTTP POST by default; `httpMethod: "GET"` carries it base64-encoded in the URL query for a legacy CA that accepts only GET (RFC 8894 §4.1). Every verb reaches an https CA through a forward proxy with `opts.proxy = { url, auth?, tls? }`: a `CONNECT` tunnel is opened to the proxy and the origin TLS is negotiated inside it, so the proxy carries the enrollment without being able to read it or substitute the origin certificate. Basic proxy authentication (RFC 7617) is sent only over an `https://` proxy, where it rides the authenticated TLS-to-proxy channel; an `http://` proxy is tunnel-only, and credentials over a plaintext proxy are refused rather than exposed (see `pki.transport`) — `build`, `parse`, `parseCapabilities`, `getCACaps`, `getCACert`, `getNextCACert`, `enroll`, `renew`, `getCert`, `getCrl` |
-| `pki.transport` | The shared, fail-closed `node:https` transport the enrollment clients drive. `pki.transport.https(defaults)` returns a `transport(request) → { status, headers, body, tls }`, where `tls` carries the negotiated `protocol`, `cipher`, and raw `peerCertificate`. This is the toolkit's only socket choke point: an explicit trust anchor (or an opt-in to the system store) is required, `rejectUnauthorized` is always on, TLS is floored at 1.2, the response body is capped while it streams, and a stalled socket times out. The EST, ACME, and CMP clients reuse it verbatim. A `request.proxy = { url, auth?, tls? }` reaches the origin through a forward proxy: a `CONNECT` tunnel is opened to the proxy and the origin TLS is negotiated inside it under the identical origin trust policy, so the proxy cannot read the origin's encrypted session or substitute an authenticated origin certificate. Basic proxy credentials are sent only over an `https://` proxy, whose own certificate is verified against `proxy.tls`, so they ride an authenticated channel; a plaintext `http://` proxy is tunnel-only and carrying `auth` on one is refused (`proxy-auth-requires-tls`) rather than exposing the credentials to the proxy hop. A malformed option, a failed CONNECT, an unverified proxy certificate, or an unaccepted credential fails closed. `pki.scep` threads it through as `opts.proxy`. If you inject your own transport, return `tls` too: `pki.est.serverkeygen` asserts the negotiated cipher can protect the delivered private key, and a transport that reports no cipher is trusted rather than refused, so omitting the field silently skips that check — `https` |
+| `pki.transport` | The shared, fail-closed `node:https` transport the enrollment clients drive. `pki.transport.https(defaults)` returns a `transport(request) → { status, headers, body, tls }`, where `tls` carries the negotiated `protocol`, `cipher`, and raw `peerCertificate`. This is the toolkit's only socket choke point: an explicit trust anchor (or an opt-in to the system store) is required, `rejectUnauthorized` is always on, TLS is floored at 1.2, the response body is capped while it streams, and a stalled socket times out. The EST, ACME, and CMP clients reuse it verbatim. A `request.proxy = { url, auth?, tls? }` reaches the origin through a forward proxy: a `CONNECT` tunnel is opened to the proxy and the origin TLS is negotiated inside it under the identical origin trust policy, so the proxy cannot read the origin's encrypted session or substitute an authenticated origin certificate. Basic proxy credentials are sent only over an `https://` proxy, whose own certificate is verified against `proxy.tls`, so they ride an authenticated channel; a plaintext `http://` proxy is tunnel-only and carrying `auth` on one is refused (`proxy-auth-requires-tls`) rather than exposing the credentials to the proxy hop. A malformed option, a failed CONNECT, an unverified proxy certificate, or an unaccepted credential fails closed. The SCEP, EST, ACME, and CMP clients each thread it through as `opts.proxy`. If you inject your own transport, return `tls` too: `pki.est.serverkeygen` asserts the negotiated cipher can protect the delivered private key, and a transport that reports no cipher is trusted rather than refused, so omitting the field silently skips that check — `https` |
 | `pki.jose` | Flattened JWS (RFC 7515) and JWK thumbprints (RFC 7638). `sign` and `verify` run a Flattened JWS against declarative profiles (ACME outer, EAB inner, keyChange inner) that carry the required and forbidden header rules as data. `base64url` is the strict RFC 4648 §5 codec, rejecting padding, non-alphabet characters, and non-canonical trailing bits. `parseJson` is a bounded reader that refuses duplicate members at any depth. `thumbprint` is the RFC 7638 / 8037 / 9964 canonical digest. The algorithm registry binds each `alg` to its key type (ES/RS/PS/EdDSA/ML-DSA), leaving no code path for `alg:none`, an RS256→HS256 key confusion, or an all-zero ECDSA signature; `assertPublicJwk` refuses a JWK carrying private material, so an exported private key is never published. `opts.key` names the key a message must be signed under and governs: where the profile also permits an embedded header `jwk`, the two must be the same key — compared as RFC 7638 thumbprints, so member order cannot make equal keys differ — and a disagreement is refused rather than resolved in the message's favor. `keySource` reports which key answered, since a signature checked against a key you named is a different claim from one checked against the key the message carried — `sign`, `verify`, `base64url`, `parseJson`, `thumbprint`, `assertPublicJwk` |
 | `pki.acme` | ACME (RFC 8555 / 8737 / 8738 / 9773). `client(directoryUrl, opts)` is a stateful client driving a live CA directory over `pki.transport`: `newAccount`, `newOrder`, `newAuthz`, `getOrder`, `getAuthorization`, `getChallenge`, `respondToChallenge`, `finalize`, `pollOrder`, `pollAuthorization`, and `downloadCertificate` walk the issuance flow, with `newAuthz` pre-authorizing a single identifier (§7.4.1) and `downloadCertificate` binding the issued certificate to the order — its key, its identifiers, or both; at least one is required by default and the result reports `boundToKey` / `boundToIdentifiers` — before choosing among alternate chains (`Link rel="alternate"`, §7.4.2, via a `selectChain` predicate bounded by `maxAlternates`). `revokeCert` (account-key or certificate-key signed), `keyChange`, `updateAccount` (change the account contacts, §7.3.2), `listOrders` (the account's orders list, following the §7.1.2.1 `Link rel="next"` pagination bounded by a page cap and confined to the orders origin), `deactivateAccount`, `deactivateAuthorization`, `renewalInfo` (ARI), `renewalWindow` (the RFC 9773 §4.2/4.3 renewal decision), and `scheduleRenewal` (the §4.1 auto-sleeping renewal loop that sleeps until the selected instant and refetches until it is time to renew, stopping at the certificate's notAfter) complete the lifecycle. Every URL is HTTPS only, an explicit trust anchor is required, each request carries a fresh single-use nonce with a bounded badNonce retry (and, when `opts.resignKeys` supplies caller-approved alternative account-key algorithms, a bounded RFC 8555 §6.2 badSignatureAlgorithm re-sign that the CA's advertised list can only filter, never widen, so it cannot force a weaker algorithm), reads are POST-as-GET, polling is bounded and sleeps on a Retry-After via an injectable sleeper capped by a poll count and a total-wait budget, and every response body is size-capped. The transport is injectable via `opts.transport`. Over the message layer it composes resource-object validators (closed status enums, conditional-required fields, unknown fields ignored), the three §7.1.6 state machines, the request builders (newAccount with External Account Binding, newOrder with `replaces`, finalize with a CSR identifier-set match and account-key-reuse rejection, challenge responses, deactivation, revokeCert in both key modes, the keyChange nested JWS, POST-as-GET), the http-01 / dns-01 / tls-alpn-01 challenge computations, the dns and ip identifier validators, and the ARI certID with serial sign-padding preserved — `client`, `validate`, `identify`, `assertTransition`, the builders, `keyAuthorization`, `http01`, `dns01`, `tlsAlpn01Extension`, `verifyTlsAlpn01`, `ariCertId` |
 | `pki.schema.smime` | S/MIME ESS signed-attribute values (RFC 5035 / RFC 8551). `parseSigningCertificate` and `parseSigningCertificateV2` bind a signature to its signing certificate (cert hash, hash algorithm, issuer `GeneralNames` and serial); `parseSmimeCapabilities` decodes the ordered capability list; `decodeAttribute` dispatches a CMS attribute by OID, enforcing the single-value rule and deferring on unknown types. A companion decoder for CMS signed attributes rather than an auto-routed format — `parseSigningCertificate`, `parseSigningCertificateV2`, `parseSmimeCapabilities`, `decodeAttribute` |

package/lib/acme.js

@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ function validate(kind, obj) {
  * @related    pki.acme.validate
  *
  * Classify an ACME JSON object into exactly one kind by its discriminating
- * member set -- `"jws"`, `"problem"`, `"directory"`, `"order"`, `"authorization"`,
+ * member set: `"jws"`, `"problem"`, `"directory"`, `"order"`, `"authorization"`,
  * `"challenge"`, `"account"`, `"renewalInfo"`, or `"unknown"`. The discriminators
  * are proven mutually exclusive; a DER structure identifies as `"unknown"`.
  *
@@ -1109,7 +1109,7 @@ async function finalize(o) {
  * @related    pki.acme.http01, pki.acme.dns01
  *
  * Build a challenge-response POST (RFC 8555 sec. 7.5.1): a kid-signed JWS whose
- * payload is the type-defined response object -- `{}` for the three registered
+ * payload is the type-defined response object: `{}` for the three registered
  * challenge types (http-01 / dns-01 / tls-alpn-01), which is DISTINCT from a
  * POST-as-GET empty payload. `opts` = `{ key, alg, nonce, url, kid, payload? }`
  * (payload default `{}`; pass a custom object for a future challenge type).
@@ -1139,7 +1139,7 @@ function challengeResponse(o) {
  * @related    pki.acme.validate
  *
  * Build a deactivation POST (RFC 8555 sec. 7.3.6 account / sec. 7.5.2
- * authorization): a kid-signed JWS with the payload `{"status":"deactivated"}` --
+ * authorization): a kid-signed JWS with the payload `{"status":"deactivated"}`,
  * the only client-settable status. `opts` = `{ key, alg, nonce, url, kid }`.
  *
  * @example
@@ -1196,7 +1196,7 @@ function updateAccount(o) {
  * Build a revokeCert request (RFC 8555 sec. 7.6): a JWS whose payload `certificate`
  * is the base64url of the DER certificate and optional `reason` is an assigned
  * RFC 5280 CRLReason (0-6, 8-10; 7 is unassigned). Signed EITHER by the account key (`kid` mode) OR by the
- * certificate key (`jwk` mode) -- pass exactly one. `opts` = `{ key, alg, nonce,
+ * certificate key (`jwk` mode). Pass exactly one. `opts` = `{ key, alg, nonce,
  * url, certificate (DER Buffer), reason?, kid? | jwk? }`.
  *
  * @example
@@ -1347,7 +1347,7 @@ function parseAriCertId(certId) {
  *
  * Validate an ARI RenewalInfo object (RFC 9773 sec. 4.2): a `suggestedWindow` with
  * RFC 3339 `start` and `end`, `end` strictly after `start` (an inverted or
- * zero-width window throws `acme/bad-renewal-window` -- the client treats it as no
+ * zero-width window throws `acme/bad-renewal-window`: the client treats it as no
  * response, defusing a renewal stampede), and an optional `explanationURL`.
  * Returns the object.
  *
@@ -1758,13 +1758,14 @@ function _parseLinkNext(headers, base) { var m = _parseLinkRelation(headers, bas
  * capped by a poll count and a total-wait budget. Returns a client
  * object: `directory`, `newAccount`, `newOrder`, `newAuthz`, `getOrder` / `getAuthorization` / `getChallenge`,
  * `respondToChallenge`, `finalize`, `pollOrder` / `pollAuthorization`, `downloadCertificate`,
- * `revokeCert`, `deactivateAccount` / `deactivateAuthorization`, `keyChange`, `renewalInfo`, `renewalWindow`, `scheduleRenewal`.
+ * `revokeCert`, `deactivateAccount` / `deactivateAuthorization`, `updateAccount`, `listOrders`, `keyChange`, `renewalInfo`, `renewalWindow`, `scheduleRenewal`.
  *
  * @opts
  *   - `accountKey` / `accountJwk` / `alg` -- REQUIRED: the account private key, its public JWK, and the JWS alg.
  *   - `transport` -- injectable transport(request) -> {status, headers, body}; default pki.transport.https.
  *   - `tls` -- { anchors, useSystemStore, cert, key, minVersion, servername, checkServerIdentity } for the default transport.
  *   - `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` / `maxRedirects` -- transport budgets; `maxNonceRetries` -- badNonce retry cap (default 1).
+ *   - `proxy` -- reach the ACME server through a forward HTTP proxy (`{ url, auth?, tls? }`; see pki.transport).
  *   - `maxPolls` / `maxTotalWait` / `sleep` -- poll-loop budgets + an injectable sleeper; `clock` -- an injectable receipt clock (default Date.now) for a Retry-After HTTP-date.
  *   - `resignKeys` -- optional ordered `[{ alg, key }]` enabling the RFC 8555 sec. 6.2 badSignatureAlgorithm re-sign. When a CA rejects the account `alg` and advertises the algs it supports, the first entry whose `alg` the CA advertised re-signs the request once and retries. Each `key` is a CryptoKey for the SAME account key material under that `alg`: an RSA account key signs RS256 and PS256 from one key, and its registered public JWK verifies either. The caller's order selects and the CA's list only filters, so a spoofed badSignatureAlgorithm cannot force a weaker alg (sec. 10). Absent, or with no advertised match, the badSignatureAlgorithm surfaces unchanged.
  *   - `newAuthz(identifier)` -- pre-authorize a single identifier (RFC 8555 sec. 7.4.1) -> { authorization, url }.
@@ -1778,7 +1779,7 @@ function _parseLinkNext(headers, base) { var m = _parseLinkRelation(headers, bas
  */
 var _CLIENT_OPTS = {
   accountKey: 1, accountJwk: 1, alg: 1, resignKeys: 1, transport: 1, tls: 1, timeout: 1, maxResponseBytes: 1,
-  maxRedirects: 1, maxNonceRetries: 1, maxPolls: 1, maxTotalWait: 1, sleep: 1, clock: 1,
+  maxRedirects: 1, maxNonceRetries: 1, maxPolls: 1, maxTotalWait: 1, sleep: 1, clock: 1, proxy: 1,
 };
 var _METHOD_OPTS = {
   finalize: { csr: 1, identifiers: 1 },
@@ -1845,6 +1846,7 @@ function client(directoryUrl, opts) {
   }
   var budgets = {
     tls: _clientTls(opts),
+    proxy: httpTransport.snapshotProxy(opts.proxy),
     timeout: guard.limits.cap(opts.timeout, "timeout", CLIENT_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT, { E: E, code: "acme/bad-input", min: 1, max: CLIENT_MAX_TIMEOUT }),
     maxResponseBytes: guard.limits.cap(opts.maxResponseBytes, "maxResponseBytes", constants.LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, { E: E, code: "acme/bad-input", min: 1, max: constants.LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES }),
     maxRedirects: guard.limits.cap(opts.maxRedirects, "maxRedirects", 5, { E: E, code: "acme/bad-input", min: 0, max: 32 }),
@@ -1908,7 +1910,7 @@ function client(directoryUrl, opts) {
   function _send(method, url, headers, body) { return _sendFollowing(method, url, headers, body, 0); }
   function _sendFollowing(method, url, headers, body, redirects) {
     var reqHeaders = Object.assign({ "user-agent": CLIENT_USER_AGENT }, headers || {});
-    return transport({ method: method, url: url, headers: reqHeaders, body: body, tls: _tlsFor(url), timeout: budgets.timeout, maxResponseBytes: budgets.maxResponseBytes }).then(function (res) {
+    return transport({ method: method, url: url, headers: reqHeaders, body: body, tls: _tlsFor(url), proxy: budgets.proxy, timeout: budgets.timeout, maxResponseBytes: budgets.maxResponseBytes }).then(function (res) {
       res = res || {};
       var h = {};
       Object.keys(res.headers || {}).forEach(function (k) { h[k.toLowerCase()] = res.headers[k]; });

package/lib/asn1-der.js

@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@
  *   turn a node into a JS value (BigInt, dotted OID, Date, string); the
  *   `build.*` helpers construct canonical DER from JS values. Because DER
  *   is canonical, each value the `build.*` helpers emit has exactly one
- *   valid encoding -- byte-identical to any other conformant DER encoder's
- *   output -- and decoding it reproduces the value it was built from.
+ *   valid encoding, byte-identical to any other conformant DER encoder's
+ *   output, and decoding it reproduces the value it was built from.
  *
  * @card
  *   Strict, fail-closed DER decode / encode with a navigable node tree
@@ -112,9 +112,10 @@ function _asBuffer(input, who) {
  *
  * Parse DER into a node tree. Each node is
  * `{ tagClass, constructed, tagNumber, header, length, content, children,
- * bytes }`, where `content` is the primitive value slice, `children` the
- * decoded sub-nodes of a constructed node, and `bytes` the full TLV slice
- * (all zero-copy views over the input).
+ * bytes, contentStart, contentEnd }`, where `content` is the primitive value slice, `children` the
+ * decoded sub-nodes of a constructed node, `bytes` the full TLV slice, and
+ * `contentStart` / `contentEnd` the content slice's byte offsets in the input
+ * (all slices are zero-copy views over the input).
  *
  * Throws `Asn1Error` on any non-DER shape: indefinite length, a
  * non-minimal length or a length that overruns the buffer, trailing bytes
@@ -124,13 +125,14 @@ function _asBuffer(input, who) {
  * `ber: true` is a scoped relaxation for formats whose content regions are
  * normatively BER (RFC 7292 PKCS#12): it accepts an indefinite length on a
  * constructed value and a constructed OCTET STRING, whose segments are
- * reassembled into one primitive `content`. Nothing else is relaxed --
+ * reassembled into one primitive `content`. Nothing else is relaxed:
  * definite lengths stay minimal, an indefinite length on a primitive value
  * and a foreign-type segment still reject, and the size / depth caps hold.
  *
  * @opts
  *   maxBytes:       number,   // default: C.LIMITS.DER_MAX_BYTES (16 MiB)
  *   maxDepth:       number,   // default: C.LIMITS.DER_MAX_DEPTH (64)
+ *   maxItems:       number,   // default: C.LIMITS.DER_MAX_ITEMS (total decoded node cap)
  *   allowTrailing:  boolean,  // default false; allow bytes after the top TLV
  *   ber:            boolean,  // default false; accept indefinite lengths +
  *                             // constructed OCTET STRINGs (BER content regions)
@@ -680,7 +682,7 @@ function encodeIdentifier(classBits, constructed, tagNumber) {
  * @spec       X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1
  * @related    pki.asn1.decode
  *
- * Low-level TLV encoder -- prepend the identifier + DER length to a content
+ * Low-level TLV encoder: prepend the identifier + DER length to a content
  * buffer. Most callers use the higher-level `build.*` helpers; this is the
  * escape hatch for context-tagged and implicitly-tagged constructions.
  *

package/lib/attrcert-sign.js

@@ -583,17 +583,17 @@ function _unsupportedCritical(ac) {
  * @defends attribute-certificate-forgery (CWE-347)
  * @related pki.attrcert.sign, pki.path.validate, pki.schema.attrcert.parse
  *
- * Verify an RFC 5755 attribute certificate. An AC carries privilege attributes -- a role, a group, a
- * clearance -- so a consumer that reads them without this grants privileges on unauthenticated
+ * Verify an RFC 5755 attribute certificate. An AC carries privilege attributes (a role, a group, a
+ * clearance), so a consumer that reads them without this grants privileges on unauthenticated
  * input. `ac` is a DER `Buffer`, a PEM string, or a parsed attribute certificate; `issuer` is
  * `{ name, publicKey }`, the AC issuer this verifier trusts as an AC issuer, which section 5 item 4
  * makes the verifier's own configuration and this verb therefore refuses to infer from the AC.
- * `issuer.name` takes every form `pki.attrcert.sign` accepts for the issuing AA -- a string, an
- * array of RDNs, or raw `Name` DER -- and is compared as a distinguished name (RFC 5280 section
+ * `issuer.name` takes every form `pki.attrcert.sign` accepts for the issuing AA (a string, an
+ * array of RDNs, or raw `Name` DER) and is compared as a distinguished name (RFC 5280 section
  * 7.1), so an AC issued under a multi-RDN authority name is verifiable under that same name.
  *
  * Both options are read at the call, before signature verification suspends it, so a caller that
- * reuses or rewrites its options object -- including calling `setTime` on the `Date` it passed in --
+ * reuses or rewrites its options object (including calling `setTime` on the `Date` it passed in)
  * cannot change the verdict that call returns.
  *
  * The checks it performs are section 5's items 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7: the signature over the exact
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ function _unsupportedCritical(ac) {
  * (RFC 5280 sec. 7.2), a mailbox matches its local-part exactly and its host-part case-insensitively
  * (sec. 7.5), and a directoryName goes through the same distinguished-name comparison the rest of
  * the toolkit uses (sec. 7.1). A URI compares as encoded, because sec. 7.4 makes URI equality a full
- * RFC 3987 normalization -- percent-encoding, path segments and scheme-based rules -- and a partial
+ * RFC 3987 normalization (percent-encoding, path segments and scheme-based rules) and a partial
  * one could match a URI it should not. A form with no comparison here (otherName, ediPartyName,
  * x400Address) leaves `targetingChecked: false` and never a pass. Every one of those limits can
  * refuse a target a fuller comparison would accept, and none can accept one it would refuse.
@@ -627,8 +627,8 @@ function _unsupportedCritical(ac) {
  *
  * Revocation is section 6, outside the seven. This verb implements that section's "never revoke"
  * scheme, which AC users MUST support: it holds no revocation evidence and follows no pointer out
- * of the certificate. The section states the consequence -- "If only the 'never revoke' scheme is
- * supported, then all ACs that do not contain a noRevAvail extension, MUST be rejected" -- because
+ * of the certificate. The section states the consequence, "If only the 'never revoke' scheme is
+ * supported, then all ACs that do not contain a noRevAvail extension, MUST be rejected", because
  * an issuer that omits noRevAvail is stating that revocation status checks are supported, and a
  * verdict that skipped one would grant privileges the issuer expected to be able to withdraw. So an
  * AC carrying `noRevAvail` verifies with `revocationChecked: true` and `noRevAvail: true`, and one

package/lib/byte-reader.js

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @internal
- * lib/byte-reader.js -- a bounded big-endian byte cursor: the shared ENCODING-layer
+ * lib/byte-reader.js: a bounded big-endian byte cursor, the shared ENCODING-layer
  * primitive under the toolkit's non-ASN.1 length-prefixed wire formats (TLS-vector
  * SCTs in pki.ct, the packed big-endian TPM2B_* / authenticatorData structures in
  * pki.webauthn). Every read is length-checked against a hard [pos, end) window

package/lib/byte-writer.js

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @internal
- * lib/byte-writer.js -- a growable big-endian byte sink: the ENCODING-layer twin of
+ * lib/byte-writer.js: a growable big-endian byte sink, the ENCODING-layer twin of
  * lib/byte-reader.js, the shared producer under the toolkit's non-ASN.1 length-prefixed
  * wire formats (the TLS-vector SCT list pki.ct emits; any future TLS-presentation
  * producer). Every fixed-width integer is range-checked against its field width and

package/lib/cmc-verify.js

@@ -200,11 +200,11 @@ function _governingStatus(statuses, outcome) {
  * Interpret a Full PKI Response into one terminal verdict. `response` is the DER or a PEM `CMS`
  * block; an already-parsed message is interpreted too, but only under `allowUnverified: true`,
  * because both carriers authenticate over BYTES and a parsed object the caller still owns pins
- * none. `sent` is what the client retained from its request --
+ * none. `sent` is what the client retained from its request:
  * `transactionId`, `senderNonce`, `dataReturn`, and `bodyPartIDs` (every identifier the request
  * carried). Each of those is checked only if it was sent, and once sent an absent or differing
  * echo is a refusal: that asymmetry is the replay defense. `bodyPartIDs` is the same rule applied
- * to what the response is ABOUT -- a status naming a body part the request never sent is refused
+ * to what the response is ABOUT: a status naming a body part the request never sent is refused
  * with `cmc/body-part-unknown`, which the transaction and nonce cannot catch, since a server can
  * echo both correctly while reporting on something else.
  *
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ function _governingStatus(statuses, outcome) {
  * The carrier's signature MUST be verified (RFC 5272 sec. 3.2.1.3.4). A conforming SignedData
  * carries its own signer certificate, so the ordinary case needs nothing from the caller: the
  * signature is checked and the verdict reports `signatureVerified: true`. Where the signer cannot be
- * found -- not embedded and not supplied -- the posture is fail-closed with a NAMED opt-out rather
+ * found (not embedded and not supplied), the posture is fail-closed with a NAMED opt-out rather
  * than a silent one: pass `certs` with the responder's certificate, or `allowUnverified: true` and
  * the verdict reports `signatureVerified: false`. Doing neither is refused, because that is the case
  * where a caller would otherwise assume a check happened. The opt-out covers "could not check",
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ function _governingStatus(statuses, outcome) {
  * who holds the key gets an authenticated verdict instead of the unauthenticated opt-out.
  *
  * Nothing is trusted here. `certificates` is the CMS certificate bag, where RFC 5272 sec. 4.2
- * puts the issued certificates -- surfaced raw for the caller to run through `pki.path.validate`,
+ * puts the issued certificates, surfaced raw for the caller to run through `pki.path.validate`,
  * and a Publish Trust Anchors control is surfaced as `publishTrustAnchors` with `trusted: false`,
  * never added to any store (RFC 5272 sec. 6.15 makes accepting one a four-part manual decision).
  * The CMS signature is likewise the caller's to verify through `pki.cms.verify`.

package/lib/cmp-build.js

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
  * @title      Certificate management protocol messages
  * @fullname   CMP (Certificate Management Protocol, RFC 4210)
  * @intro The RFC 9810 Certificate Management Protocol producing side. `pki.cmp.build` assembles a
- *   `PKIMessage` -- a `PKIHeader` (sender / recipient / transaction metadata), a `PKIBody` carrying one
+ *   `PKIMessage`: a `PKIHeader` (sender / recipient / transaction metadata), a `PKIBody` carrying one
  *   request or transaction (an `ir` / `cr` / `kur` certificate request via `pki.crmf.build`, a `p10cr`
  *   PKCS#10 via `pki.csr.sign`, a `certConf` / `pollReq` / `genm` / `rr`, or a `nested` wrapper of other
  *   PKIMessages an RA forwards), and an optional
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ function _collectExtraCerts(opts, protCertDer) {
  * @spec       RFC 9810, RFC 9481, RFC 9579
  * @related    pki.schema.cmp.parse
  *
- * Build an RFC 9810 CMP `PKIMessage` -- the producing-side inverse of `pki.schema.cmp.parse`. `message` is
+ * Build an RFC 9810 CMP `PKIMessage`, the producing-side inverse of `pki.schema.cmp.parse`. `message` is
  * `{ header, body }`: `header` carries the `sender` / `recipient` GeneralNames plus optional transaction
  * metadata (`transactionID`, `senderNonce`, `messageTime`, `freeText`, `generalInfo`, ...); `body` is a
  * single-key object naming the arm. Request-side: `{ ir }` / `{ cr }` / `{ kur }` / `{ krr }` (key recovery,
@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ var DEFAULT_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT = constants.TIME.seconds(30);
 var MAX_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT = constants.TIME.seconds(600);
 var PKIXCMP = "application/pkixcmp";
 var PKIXCMP_POLL = "application/pkixcmp-poll";
-var KNOWN_TRANSFER_OPTS = { transport: 1, tls: 1, headers: 1, timeout: 1, maxResponseBytes: 1 };
+var KNOWN_TRANSFER_OPTS = { transport: 1, tls: 1, headers: 1, timeout: 1, maxResponseBytes: 1, proxy: 1 };
 
 function _cmpMessageDer(input) {
   var der;
@@ -799,6 +799,9 @@ function _transfer(url, message, opts) {
   }
   var timeout = guard.limits.cap(opts.timeout, "timeout", DEFAULT_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT, { E: _err, code: "cmp/bad-input", min: 1, max: MAX_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT });
   var maxResponseBytes = guard.limits.cap(opts.maxResponseBytes, "maxResponseBytes", constants.LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, { E: _err, code: "cmp/bad-input", min: 1, max: constants.LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES });
+  var proxy;
+  try { proxy = httpTransport.snapshotProxy(opts.proxy); }
+  catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the options object could not be read", e); }
   var headers = {};
   Object.keys(opts.headers || {}).forEach(function (k) {
     var lk = k.toLowerCase();
@@ -806,7 +809,7 @@ function _transfer(url, message, opts) {
   });
   headers["content-type"] = PKIXCMP;
   var tls = _tlsForTransfer(opts);
-  return Promise.resolve(transport({ method: "POST", url: parsedUrl.href, headers: headers, body: der, tls: tls, timeout: timeout, maxResponseBytes: maxResponseBytes })).then(function (res) {
+  return Promise.resolve(transport({ method: "POST", url: parsedUrl.href, headers: headers, body: der, tls: tls, proxy: proxy, timeout: timeout, maxResponseBytes: maxResponseBytes })).then(function (res) {
     res = res || {};
     var h = {};
     Object.keys(res.headers || {}).forEach(function (k) { h[k.toLowerCase()] = res.headers[k]; });
@@ -900,6 +903,7 @@ function wellKnownUrl(base, opts) {
  *     overridable (any casing), and the request-framing headers (`content-length`, `transfer-encoding`) are
  *     stripped -- the transport computes Content-Length from the exact body, so a caller cannot desync framing.
  *   - `timeout` -- ms (default 30s); `maxResponseBytes` -- streaming cap, tightenable downward only.
+ *   - `proxy` -- reach the CA through a forward HTTP proxy (`{ url, auth?, tls? }`; see pki.transport).
  * @example
  *   var reqDer = await pki.cmp.build(
  *     { header: { sender: { directoryName: "CN=client" }, recipient: { directoryName: "CN=CA" } },
@@ -920,7 +924,7 @@ function wellKnownUrl(base, opts) {
  *
  * Build an RFC 9811 sec. 3.4 CMP request-URI under the `/.well-known/cmp` prefix (RFC 8615). The four forms:
  * `<base>/.well-known/cmp`, `.../<operation>`, `.../p/<label>`, and `.../p/<label>/<operation>`. A pure string
- * builder over an authority-rooted well-known path (RFC 8615) -- https vs http is left to the transport (both
+ * builder over an authority-rooted well-known path (RFC 8615): https vs http is left to the transport (both
  * forms are accepted, RFC 9811 sec. 3.4), but the `base` MUST be an http(s) URL. It rejects (`cmp/bad-url`) an
  * unparseable `base`, a non-http(s) scheme (`file:`/`data:`/a custom scheme has an opaque origin), a `base`
  * carrying a path / query / fragment (a well-known URI is authority-rooted; a path would capture it), and a

package/lib/cmp-session.js

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ var webcrypto = require("./webcrypto");
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
 var sleepUtil = require("./sleep");
 var retryAfter = require("./http-retry-after");
+var httpTransport = require("./http-transport");
 
 var CmpError = frameworkError.CmpError;
 function _err(code, message, cause) { return new CmpError(code, message, cause); }
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ var COMPOSITE_PH_HASHALG = { "SHA-256": "sha256", "SHA-384": "sha384", "SHA-512"
 var KNOWN_SESSION_OPTS = {
   url: 1, key: 1, cert: 1, mac: 1, trustAnchors: 1, intermediates: 1, recipient: 1, sender: 1,
   extraCerts: 1, implicitConfirm: 1, maxPolls: 1, maxTotalWait: 1, sleep: 1, time: 1,
-  transport: 1, tls: 1, headers: 1, timeout: 1, maxResponseBytes: 1, pss: 1, digestAlgorithm: 1,
+  transport: 1, tls: 1, headers: 1, timeout: 1, maxResponseBytes: 1, proxy: 1, pss: 1, digestAlgorithm: 1,
   acceptCert: 1, senderKID: 1, recipKID: 1, expectedSender: 1,
 };
 
@@ -264,14 +265,14 @@ function _certConfHash(certDer) {
  * requirements, whose template must omit `publicKey`, `serialNumber`, `signingAlg`, `issuerUID` and
  * `subjectUID`, and whose `keySpec` states key requirements as `algId` (a non-RSA AlgorithmIdentifier) or
  * `rsaKeyLen` (a positive integer); and `{ crlUpdate: { issuer, dpn?, thisUpdate? } }` for a CRL from a
- * named source, held to that source -- the issuer under the RFC 5280 sec. 7.1 rule, a distribution point
- * against the CRL's own `issuingDistributionPoint` where it states one -- and to the supplied `thisUpdate`.
+ * named source, held to that source (the issuer under the RFC 5280 sec. 7.1 rule, a distribution point
+ * against the CRL's own `issuingDistributionPoint` where it states one) and to the supplied `thisUpdate`.
  * A request naming both sends the dpn (sec. 4.3.4: the dpn choice when a distribution point name is
  * available) and holds the answer to the issuer as well. The issuer is REQUIRED, since a distribution
  * point name alone leaves the answer unbound: a complete CRL states no scope to compare it against.
  * Terminal `outcome`: `answered` (with `operation`, `present`, and the decoded `value`),
  * `rejected`, or `poll-timeout`. An absent response value is `present: false` with a null `value`, which is
- * how each of the four says "nothing available" -- never conflated with an empty result. Delayed delivery
+ * how each of the four says "nothing available", never conflated with an empty result. Delayed delivery
  * for both verbs arrives as an error message carrying the `waiting` status (sec. 4.4) and drives the same
  * bounded poll loop, with the `pollReq` referring to the whole message.
  *
@@ -286,6 +287,7 @@ function _certConfHash(certDer) {
  *   - `acceptCert` -- an async policy `(certDer, { status, grantedWithMods }) => boolean` consulted before the certConf; return true to accept, anything else to veto (a `grantedWithMods` certificate the CA changed). A veto sends a rejecting certConf and yields `outcome: "rejected"` with the certificate still surfaced. Incompatible with `implicitConfirm` (no reject leg exists), so the combination throws at construction.
  *   - `transport` -- injectable transport(request) -> {status, headers, body}; default pki.transport.https.
  *   - `tls` / `headers` / `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` -- transport config + budgets.
+ *   - `proxy` -- reach the CA through a forward HTTP proxy (`{ url, auth?, tls? }`; see pki.transport).
  *   - `maxPolls` / `maxTotalWait` / `sleep` -- poll-loop budgets + an injectable sleeper; `time` -- verify-time clock.
  *   - `extraCerts` / `pss` / `digestAlgorithm` -- passed through to the request protection build.
  * @example
@@ -304,6 +306,7 @@ function _certConfHash(certDer) {
 function session(opts) {
   if (opts == null) opts = {};
   guard.identifier.assertPlainRecord(opts, _err, "cmp/bad-input", "opts");
+  guard.identifier.optionsObject(opts, _err, "cmp/bad-input", "opts");
   guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(opts, KNOWN_SESSION_OPTS, _err, "cmp/bad-input", "unknown session opts field ");
   opts = Object.assign({}, opts);
   if (typeof opts.url !== "string" || !opts.url) throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "opts.url (the CMP endpoint) is required");
@@ -319,6 +322,7 @@ function session(opts) {
   if (isMac && Array.isArray(opts.trustAnchors) && opts.trustAnchors.length === 0) opts.trustAnchors = null;
   if (opts.trustAnchors != null && _engine && _engine.toAnchor) _asCertList(opts.trustAnchors).forEach(function (a) { try { _engine.toAnchor(a); } catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "opts.trustAnchors: each entry must be a certificate (DER/PEM/parsed) or a { name, publicKey, algorithm } anchor tuple -- " + ((e && e.message) || e), e); } });
   if (opts.intermediates != null && _engine && _engine.coerceCert) _asCertList(opts.intermediates).forEach(function (c) { try { _engine.coerceCert(c); } catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "opts.intermediates: each entry must be a certificate (DER/PEM/parsed) -- " + ((e && e.message) || e), e); } });
+  var _proxySnap = httpTransport.snapshotProxy(opts.proxy);
   var _expectedSenderCert = null;
   var _expectedSenderDer = null;
   if (opts.expectedSender != null) {
@@ -428,6 +432,7 @@ function session(opts) {
   function _transferOpts() {
     var o = {};
     ["transport", "tls", "headers", "timeout", "maxResponseBytes"].forEach(function (k) { if (opts[k] != null) o[k] = opts[k]; });
+    if (_proxySnap != null) o.proxy = _proxySnap;
     return o;
   }
 

package/lib/cms-verify.js

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * @nav        Verification
  * @title      CMS
  * @fullname   CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax) signing and verification
- * @intro Verify a CMS SignedData signature (RFC 5652 sec. 5) -- the structure S/MIME signed
+ * @intro Verify a CMS SignedData signature (RFC 5652 sec. 5), the structure S/MIME signed
  *   mail, RFC 3161 timestamp tokens, and code-signing all rest on. `verify(cms, opts)` parses
  *   the SignedData (over the strict `pki.schema.cms` codec), locates each SignerInfo's signer
  *   certificate by its issuerAndSerialNumber or subjectKeyIdentifier, and checks the signature
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ async function _verifyOneCountersig(vDer, targetSig, parsedCerts) {
 
 /**
  * @primitive  pki.cms.verify
- * @signature  pki.cms.verify(input, opts?) -> Promise<{ valid, trusted, eContentType, signers }>
+ * @signature  pki.cms.verify(input, opts?) -> Promise<{ valid, trusted, eContentType, eContent, signers }>
  * @since      0.2.14
  * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 5652
@@ -416,15 +416,16 @@ async function _verifyOneCountersig(vDer, targetSig, parsedCerts) {
  * @related    pki.schema.cms.parse, pki.path.validate
  *
  * Verify a CMS SignedData signature (RFC 5652 sec. 5). `input` is a PEM string, a DER
- * `Buffer`, or a parsed `pki.schema.cms` object. Returns `{ valid, trusted, eContentType, signers }`
- * where each `signers[i]` is `{ ok, sid, cert, trusted, signedAttributesPresent }` (`cert` the
- * matched signer certificate DER) or carries a `code` on a structural failure; `valid` is true when
+ * `Buffer`, or a parsed `pki.schema.cms` object. Returns `{ valid, trusted, eContentType, eContent, signers }`
+ * (`eContent` the encapsulated content when present, else null) where each `signers[i]` is
+ * `{ ok, sid, cert, trusted, signedAttributesPresent, signedAttributes, unsignedAttrs, digestAlgorithm, countersignatures }`
+ * (`cert` the matched signer certificate DER) or carries a `code` on a structural failure; `valid` is true when
  * there is at least one signer and every signer verified.
  *
  * `eContentType` and `signedAttributesPresent` are there for a caller whose profile is stricter
- * than RFC 5652's. Signing WITH attributes and signing the content directly are different claims --
+ * than RFC 5652's. Signing WITH attributes and signing the content directly are different claims:
  * attributes bind a content type and a signing time alongside the digest, content-only binds
- * nothing but the bytes -- and one message may carry a signer of each. A profile that requires
+ * nothing but the bytes. One message may carry a signer of each. A profile that requires
  * attributes (RFC 8551 S/MIME does) or a particular content type can enforce it from the verdict,
  * with no need to parse the message a second time.
  *
@@ -434,9 +435,8 @@ async function _verifyOneCountersig(vDer, targetSig, parsedCerts) {
  * certificate, sign with it, and embed it, so that says nothing about WHO signed. `trusted` says
  * every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`, validated through the same RFC 5280
  * path engine `pki.path.validate` uses. Without anchors there is nothing to chain to and `trusted`
- * is `false` -- a definite answer, not a missing one. Anchors that cannot be read are a
- * configuration fault and throw. Absorbing them into `trusted: false` would report a verdict
- * about the message for a check that never ran.
+ * is `false`, a definite answer, not a missing one. Anchors that cannot be read are a
+ * configuration fault and throw.
  *
  * Trust is decided from the certificate the SignerInfo selected, the one reported as
  * `signers[i].cert`, never from another certificate that happens to share its key. A
@@ -706,6 +706,9 @@ function _addCert(out, der) {
  * @opts  eContentType      The encapsulated content type (an OID name). Default `data`.
  * @opts  signedAttributes  Include signed attributes (content-type, message-digest, signing-time);
  *                          false signs the content directly. Default true.
+ * @opts  additionalSignedAttributes  Extra signed attributes to add to every SignerInfo, each
+ *                          `{ type, values }` (`type` an OID name or dotted string, `values` an
+ *                          array of DER value `Buffer`s). Covered by the signature.
  * @opts  signingTime       A `Date` for the signing-time attribute, or false to omit it.
  * @opts  sid               `"issuerAndSerial"` (default) or `"ski"` (subjectKeyIdentifier).
  * @opts  certificates      Embed the signer certificates in the output. Default true.
@@ -739,7 +742,7 @@ var sign = cmsSign.sign;
  * Add one or more countersignatures to an existing CMS SignedData (RFC 5652 sec. 11.4). A
  * countersignature is itself a `SignerInfo` whose signature covers the CONTENTS of the countersigned
  * SignerInfo's signature value (not the content), attached as the `id-countersignature` unsigned
- * attribute -- the construction Authenticode timestamps and signature-attestation workflows rest on.
+ * attribute, the construction Authenticode timestamps and signature-attestation workflows rest on.
  * `cms` is the SignedData (a DER `Buffer` or a PEM `CMS` string; the wire bytes are preserved, so
  * the countersigned primary still verifies byte-for-byte). Each `signers[i]` is the same descriptor
  * `pki.cms.sign` takes (`{ cert, key, digestAlgorithm?, pss? }`, any RSA / RSASSA-PSS / ECDSA /
@@ -784,7 +787,7 @@ var countersign = cmsSign.countersign;
  * Encrypt content as a CMS EnvelopedData (CBC content), AuthEnvelopedData (AEAD content, the
  * default), or EncryptedData. `recipients` is an ARRAY of recipient descriptors for the enveloped
  * family, each wrapping the same fresh content-encryption key: `{ cert }` auto-dispatches off the
- * recipient certificate's public-key algorithm -- RSA yields a ktri with RSAES-OAEP-SHA256 (PKCS#1
+ * recipient certificate's public-key algorithm: RSA yields a ktri with RSAES-OAEP-SHA256 (PKCS#1
  * v1.5 is never emitted); EC P-256/384/521 a kari with ephemeral-static ECDH and the X9.63 KDF;
  * X25519/X448 a kari per RFC 8418 (HKDF); ML-KEM-512/768/1024 an ori/KEMRecipientInfo per RFC
  * 9629 + 9936; a composite ML-KEM (id-MLKEM768-* / id-MLKEM1024-*, draft-lamps-pq-composite-kem) the
@@ -827,7 +830,7 @@ var encrypt = cmsEncrypt.encrypt;
  * @spec RFC 5652, RFC 2104, RFC 4231, RFC 3370
  * @related pki.cms.decrypt, pki.schema.cms.parse
  *
- * Produce a CMS AuthenticatedData (RFC 5652 sec. 9): CLEARTEXT content plus a MAC (HMAC-SHA-2) --
+ * Produce a CMS AuthenticatedData (RFC 5652 sec. 9): CLEARTEXT content plus a MAC (HMAC-SHA-2),
  * authenticated but not encrypted, the authenticated-only sibling of AuthEnvelopedData. A single
  * fresh MAC key is minted and wrapped for every recipient with the same RecipientInfo model
  * `pki.cms.encrypt` uses for a content-encryption key, so `recipients` is the identical array of
@@ -835,8 +838,8 @@ var encrypt = cmsEncrypt.encrypt;
  * `{ password }` (pwri), or `{ kek, kekId }` (kekri). By default the MAC covers the authenticated
  * attributes (a content-type and a message-digest = digest of the content) re-tagged to the EXPLICIT
  * SET OF (RFC 5652 sec. 9.2); with `authenticatedAttributes: false` (id-data content only) it covers
- * the content octets directly. `pki.cms.decrypt` recovers the MAC key, recomputes the MAC, and --
- * with authenticated attributes -- independently confirms the message-digest before releasing the
+ * the content octets directly. `pki.cms.decrypt` recovers the MAC key, recomputes the MAC, and
+ * (with authenticated attributes) independently confirms the message-digest before releasing the
  * content, returning `authenticated: true`. Malformed input throws a typed `CmsError`.
  *
  * @opts macAlgorithm `"hmac-sha256"` (default) / `"hmac-sha384"` / `"hmac-sha512"`.
@@ -847,6 +850,8 @@ var encrypt = cmsEncrypt.encrypt;
  * @opts authAttrs Extra authenticated attributes appended to the content-type + message-digest pair.
  * @opts contentType The encapsulated content type (an OID name). Default `data`.
  * @opts keyIdentifier `"issuerAndSerial"` (default) or `"subjectKeyIdentifier"`.
+ * @opts oaepHash The RSAES-OAEP hash for ktri recipients wrapping the MAC key: `"sha256"` (default) / `"sha384"` / `"sha512"`.
+ * @opts ukm User keying material (a Buffer) for kari / kemri recipients.
  * @opts pem Return a PEM string (`-----BEGIN CMS-----`) instead of a DER Buffer.
  * @example
  *   // authenticate a message to an RSA recipient, then verify the MAC via decrypt
@@ -890,7 +895,7 @@ var authenticate = cmsEncrypt.authenticate;
  * recipient type: a `ktri` or ephemeral-static `kari` message is minted by anyone holding the recipient's
  * PUBLIC key, and a `pwri` or `kekri` message by any co-recipient sharing the secret. Read
  * `authenticated: true` as "these bytes were not altered after the key was chosen", and do not read it as
- * a sender identity -- to bind one, verify a signature (`pki.cms.verify`) over the plaintext.
+ * a sender identity. To bind one, verify a signature (`pki.cms.verify`) over the plaintext.
  * `authenticatedBy` names what the integrity rests on (`"content-encryption-key"` for AEAD,
  * `"message-authentication-key"` for AuthenticatedData, `null` for an unauthenticated cipher).
  * `originatorInfo` is surfaced as the sender supplied it and is UNAUTHENTICATED: it sits outside the
@@ -958,7 +963,7 @@ var compress = cmsCompress.compress;
  * decompression-bomb / resource-exhaustion defense (CWE-409): a cap breach throws
  * `cms/decompress-too-large`, and every malformed / truncated / corrupt stream collapses to the uniform
  * `cms/decompress-failed`. `opts.maxOutputBytes` tightens the cap DOWNWARD only. The verdict carries NO
- * `authenticated` / `valid` field -- CompressedData is not a security assertion (RFC 8551 sec. 2.4.5).
+ * `authenticated` / `valid` field. CompressedData is not a security assertion (RFC 8551 sec. 2.4.5).
  *
  * @opts maxOutputBytes Lower the decompressed-output cap (a DoS bound; downward only).
  * @example

package/lib/composite-kem.js

@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
  *   recovers the same secret from that ciphertext and the composite private key. Each component KEM
  *   runs independently, and the two secrets are mixed through the SHA3-256 combiner that also binds the
  *   traditional ciphertext, the traditional public key, and a per-algorithm label. All twelve registered
- *   algorithms -- ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 paired with RSA-OAEP 2048/3072/4096, ECDH over
- *   P-256/P-384/P-521 and brainpool, X25519, and X448 -- are verified against the draft Appendix G
+ *   algorithms (ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 paired with RSA-OAEP 2048/3072/4096, ECDH over
+ *   P-256/P-384/P-521 and brainpool, X25519, and X448) are verified against the draft Appendix G
  *   known-answer vectors.
  * @spec draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem
  * @card Establish a shared secret with a hybrid post-quantum plus traditional KEM.

package/lib/constants.js

@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ var LIMITS = {
   SCT_MAX_BYTES: BYTES.kib(64) + 1,
   SCT_MAX_COUNT: 256,
   MERKLE_MAX_PROOF_NODES: 65,
+  PROXY_MAX_TLS_ANCHORS: 256,
   PATH_MAX_CERTS: 100,
   PATH_MAX_POLICY_NODES: 4096,
   PATH_BUILD_MAX_DEPTH: 20,