@blamejs/pki 0.6.27 → 0.6.29

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,22 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.6.29 — 2026-09-03
+
+The EST, ACME, and CMP clients reach a CA through a forward HTTP proxy, with the same opts.proxy the SCEP client already accepts.
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.est.cacerts / simpleenroll / simplereenroll / serverkeygen / csrattrs / fullcmc, pki.acme.client, pki.cmp.transfer, and the pki.cmp.session client (which forwards it to every enrollment, polling, revocation, and confirmation leg) accept opts.proxy = { url, auth?, tls? } to reach the CA through a forward HTTP proxy, the same option pki.scep accepts. The origin TLS is negotiated inside the proxy's CONNECT tunnel under the identical origin trust policy; Basic authentication (RFC 7617) is sent only over an https:// proxy verified against proxy.tls, and an http:// proxy is tunnel-only. The option is deep-copied at the call so a later change to the caller's object cannot alter the proxy in use.
+
+## v0.6.28 — 2026-09-02
+
+pki.path.build returns the best accepted path when the candidate cap is reached during policy ranking, instead of discarding it.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- pki.path.build with userInitialPolicySet no longer throws path/build-limit after it has already accepted a valid path. When the candidate cap is reached during policy ranking, it returns the best-policy accepted path (forward and reverse directions), and candidatesConsidered reflects the full expansion count. It throws path/build-limit only when no valid path was accepted before the cap. This restores the pre-0.6.26 behavior for a policy set that no single path fully covers under a bounded search.
+
 ## v0.6.27 — 2026-09-02
 
 The SCEP client can reach a CA through a forward proxy, with Basic authentication over an https proxy.

package/README.md

@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.schema.csrattrs` | EST CSR Attributes (`CsrAttrs`, RFC 8951 §3.5 / RFC 9908) — the `AttrOrOID` items a server sends to shape an enrollment: bare OIDs, attributes with raw values, and decoded views of the RFC 9908 meaningful types (extension requests, EC and RSA key-type conventions, the certification-request-info template). Unknown types are surfaced raw; structure and the RFC 9908 semantic MUSTs are fail-closed — `parse` |
 | `pki.est` | Enrollment over Secure Transport (RFC 7030 / 8951 / 9908 / 7616). The client verbs `cacerts`, `simpleenroll`, `simplereenroll`, `serverkeygen`, `csrattrs`, and `fullcmc` drive the RFC 7030 flow over `pki.transport` (inject your own via `opts.transport`, or take the fail-closed default): HTTPS only, an explicit trust anchor required, same-origin redirects followed while a downgrade or loop is refused, a 202 Retry-After surfaced but never slept, HTTP Basic or Digest (RFC 7616, SHA-256 / SHA-512-256; MD5 and no-qop refused by default) answered only after the server is authenticated, and the issued certificate chosen by public-key match. `serverkeygen` requests a server-generated key, cleartext or an opaque CMS EnvelopedData, with encryption bound to the CSR's key-identifier attribute over a confidentiality-bearing cipher. `csrattrs` fetches the CA's RFC 9908 attributes policy. `fullcmc` (§4.3) carries a CMC Full PKI Request and reduces the CA's answer through `pki.cmc.verify` to one terminal outcome, refusing a response that fails to echo the transaction and nonce the request carried, or that covers a key the request never asked for; a certs-only reply to a bound request is refused rather than read as an issuance. Under the verbs sit the transport-agnostic codecs they compose: the RFC 8951 base64 transfer codec (which ignores Content-Transfer-Encoding), the `multipart/mixed` splitter, the certs-only and serverkeygen response validators over CMS, the enroll-attribute builders, and the HTTP response classifier — `transferDecode`/`transferEncode`, `parseCertsOnly`, `splitMultipartMixed`, `parseServerKeygenResponse`, `findIssuedCert`, `classifyResponse`, `paths`, and the builders |
 | `pki.scep` | SCEP pkiMessage codec (RFC 8894), the client side of Simple Certificate Enrollment. `build(spec)` assembles a request: a `PKCSReq` or `RenewalReq` wraps a PKCS#10 certification request, whose own proof-of-possession it verifies first; a `CertPoll` wraps an IssuerAndSubject naming the issuing CA and the request subject; and a `GetCert` or `GetCRL` wraps an IssuerAndSerialNumber naming a certificate by its issuer and a positive serial of at most 20 octets. It encrypts the messageData to the CA as the inner EnvelopedData (`pkcsPKIEnvelope`, AES-128-CBC), and signs that under the transaction attributes RFC 8894 §3.2 defines, a messageType, a caller-unique transactionId, and a 16-byte senderNonce. The recipient CA certificate must assert `keyEncipherment`. `build` also issues the CA-side `CertRep` response (§3.3.2): a SUCCESS envelopes a certs-only SignedData of the issued certificate (or the CRL for a GetCRL) to the requester and signs it under the CA key, while a FAILURE (carrying a `failInfo`) or a PENDING omits the pkcsPKIEnvelope and is signed detached, each echoing the request's senderNonce as `recipientNonce`. `parse(bytes, opts?)` reads a `PKCSReq`, `RenewalReq`, `CertPoll`, `GetCert`, `GetCRL`, or `CertRep` back (a messageType outside the RFC 8894 registry is refused): it verifies the outer signature first and refuses a message whose signature does not check, so the transaction attributes it returns come only from a verified signer, never alongside a false verdict. Because a valid signature only proves self-consistency with the embedded certificate, pass `opts.signerCert` to authenticate a CA response against the CA certificate you hold (a public-key mismatch is refused, `signerAuthenticated` reports the result); a caller that omits it gets a crypto-only verdict and must authenticate the surfaced `signerCert` itself. It maps the messageType, pkiStatus, failInfo, and the nonces from their RFC 8894 enumerants and refuses an unknown one; given `recipientKey` it decrypts the `pkcsPKIEnvelope` to the messageData, and given `expectedSenderNonce` it refuses a response whose recipientNonce does not echo it. It reads a CA's CertRep in full. `getCACaps(baseUrl, opts?)`, `getCACert(baseUrl, opts?)`, `getNextCACert(baseUrl, opts)`, `enroll(baseUrl, opts)`, `renew(baseUrl, opts)`, `getCert(baseUrl, opts)`, and `getCrl(baseUrl, opts)` carry that codec to a live CA over HTTP (RFC 8894 §4) through an injectable transport (`pki.transport.https` by default): `getCACaps` reports the CA's advertised capabilities and never lowers the client's algorithm choice on the unauthenticated response, `getCACert` pins the CA certificate to an out-of-band `expectedFingerprint` a returned certificate must match, `getNextCACert` fetches the CA's next (rollover) certificate and verifies the SignedData response against the current CA certificate (`caCertificate`) before returning it, refusing a response signed by any other key, and `enroll` and `renew` POST a PKCSReq or RenewalReq, authenticate the CertRep against the CA certificate and its nonce echo, select the issued certificate by public-key match, throw on a FAILURE with the CA's failInfo, and poll a PENDING response with CertPoll requests until the CA answers or a bounded poll-count and total-wait budget is spent. `getCert` and `getCrl` retrieve an already-issued certificate or a CA CRL by issuer and serial number, authenticated the same way; RFC 8894 §2.6, §2.7, and §3.3.4 recommend these queries only where HTTP certificate-store access (RFC 4387), LDAP, or a CRL distribution point is unavailable, so prefer those where a CA offers them. A PKIOperation goes over HTTP POST by default; `httpMethod: "GET"` carries it base64-encoded in the URL query for a legacy CA that accepts only GET (RFC 8894 §4.1). Every verb reaches an https CA through a forward proxy with `opts.proxy = { url, auth?, tls? }`: a `CONNECT` tunnel is opened to the proxy and the origin TLS is negotiated inside it, so the proxy carries the enrollment without being able to read it or substitute the origin certificate. Basic proxy authentication (RFC 7617) is sent only over an `https://` proxy, where it rides the authenticated TLS-to-proxy channel; an `http://` proxy is tunnel-only, and credentials over a plaintext proxy are refused rather than exposed (see `pki.transport`) — `build`, `parse`, `parseCapabilities`, `getCACaps`, `getCACert`, `getNextCACert`, `enroll`, `renew`, `getCert`, `getCrl` |
-| `pki.transport` | The shared, fail-closed `node:https` transport the enrollment clients drive. `pki.transport.https(defaults)` returns a `transport(request) → { status, headers, body, tls }`, where `tls` carries the negotiated `protocol`, `cipher`, and raw `peerCertificate`. This is the toolkit's only socket choke point: an explicit trust anchor (or an opt-in to the system store) is required, `rejectUnauthorized` is always on, TLS is floored at 1.2, the response body is capped while it streams, and a stalled socket times out. The EST, ACME, and CMP clients reuse it verbatim. A `request.proxy = { url, auth?, tls? }` reaches the origin through a forward proxy: a `CONNECT` tunnel is opened to the proxy and the origin TLS is negotiated inside it under the identical origin trust policy, so the proxy cannot read the origin's encrypted session or substitute an authenticated origin certificate. Basic proxy credentials are sent only over an `https://` proxy, whose own certificate is verified against `proxy.tls`, so they ride an authenticated channel; a plaintext `http://` proxy is tunnel-only and carrying `auth` on one is refused (`proxy-auth-requires-tls`) rather than exposing the credentials to the proxy hop. A malformed option, a failed CONNECT, an unverified proxy certificate, or an unaccepted credential fails closed. `pki.scep` threads it through as `opts.proxy`. If you inject your own transport, return `tls` too: `pki.est.serverkeygen` asserts the negotiated cipher can protect the delivered private key, and a transport that reports no cipher is trusted rather than refused, so omitting the field silently skips that check — `https` |
+| `pki.transport` | The shared, fail-closed `node:https` transport the enrollment clients drive. `pki.transport.https(defaults)` returns a `transport(request) → { status, headers, body, tls }`, where `tls` carries the negotiated `protocol`, `cipher`, and raw `peerCertificate`. This is the toolkit's only socket choke point: an explicit trust anchor (or an opt-in to the system store) is required, `rejectUnauthorized` is always on, TLS is floored at 1.2, the response body is capped while it streams, and a stalled socket times out. The EST, ACME, and CMP clients reuse it verbatim. A `request.proxy = { url, auth?, tls? }` reaches the origin through a forward proxy: a `CONNECT` tunnel is opened to the proxy and the origin TLS is negotiated inside it under the identical origin trust policy, so the proxy cannot read the origin's encrypted session or substitute an authenticated origin certificate. Basic proxy credentials are sent only over an `https://` proxy, whose own certificate is verified against `proxy.tls`, so they ride an authenticated channel; a plaintext `http://` proxy is tunnel-only and carrying `auth` on one is refused (`proxy-auth-requires-tls`) rather than exposing the credentials to the proxy hop. A malformed option, a failed CONNECT, an unverified proxy certificate, or an unaccepted credential fails closed. The SCEP, EST, ACME, and CMP clients each thread it through as `opts.proxy`. If you inject your own transport, return `tls` too: `pki.est.serverkeygen` asserts the negotiated cipher can protect the delivered private key, and a transport that reports no cipher is trusted rather than refused, so omitting the field silently skips that check — `https` |
 | `pki.jose` | Flattened JWS (RFC 7515) and JWK thumbprints (RFC 7638). `sign` and `verify` run a Flattened JWS against declarative profiles (ACME outer, EAB inner, keyChange inner) that carry the required and forbidden header rules as data. `base64url` is the strict RFC 4648 §5 codec, rejecting padding, non-alphabet characters, and non-canonical trailing bits. `parseJson` is a bounded reader that refuses duplicate members at any depth. `thumbprint` is the RFC 7638 / 8037 / 9964 canonical digest. The algorithm registry binds each `alg` to its key type (ES/RS/PS/EdDSA/ML-DSA), leaving no code path for `alg:none`, an RS256→HS256 key confusion, or an all-zero ECDSA signature; `assertPublicJwk` refuses a JWK carrying private material, so an exported private key is never published. `opts.key` names the key a message must be signed under and governs: where the profile also permits an embedded header `jwk`, the two must be the same key — compared as RFC 7638 thumbprints, so member order cannot make equal keys differ — and a disagreement is refused rather than resolved in the message's favor. `keySource` reports which key answered, since a signature checked against a key you named is a different claim from one checked against the key the message carried — `sign`, `verify`, `base64url`, `parseJson`, `thumbprint`, `assertPublicJwk` |
 | `pki.acme` | ACME (RFC 8555 / 8737 / 8738 / 9773). `client(directoryUrl, opts)` is a stateful client driving a live CA directory over `pki.transport`: `newAccount`, `newOrder`, `newAuthz`, `getOrder`, `getAuthorization`, `getChallenge`, `respondToChallenge`, `finalize`, `pollOrder`, `pollAuthorization`, and `downloadCertificate` walk the issuance flow, with `newAuthz` pre-authorizing a single identifier (§7.4.1) and `downloadCertificate` binding the issued certificate to the order — its key, its identifiers, or both; at least one is required by default and the result reports `boundToKey` / `boundToIdentifiers` — before choosing among alternate chains (`Link rel="alternate"`, §7.4.2, via a `selectChain` predicate bounded by `maxAlternates`). `revokeCert` (account-key or certificate-key signed), `keyChange`, `updateAccount` (change the account contacts, §7.3.2), `listOrders` (the account's orders list, following the §7.1.2.1 `Link rel="next"` pagination bounded by a page cap and confined to the orders origin), `deactivateAccount`, `deactivateAuthorization`, `renewalInfo` (ARI), `renewalWindow` (the RFC 9773 §4.2/4.3 renewal decision), and `scheduleRenewal` (the §4.1 auto-sleeping renewal loop that sleeps until the selected instant and refetches until it is time to renew, stopping at the certificate's notAfter) complete the lifecycle. Every URL is HTTPS only, an explicit trust anchor is required, each request carries a fresh single-use nonce with a bounded badNonce retry (and, when `opts.resignKeys` supplies caller-approved alternative account-key algorithms, a bounded RFC 8555 §6.2 badSignatureAlgorithm re-sign that the CA's advertised list can only filter, never widen, so it cannot force a weaker algorithm), reads are POST-as-GET, polling is bounded and sleeps on a Retry-After via an injectable sleeper capped by a poll count and a total-wait budget, and every response body is size-capped. The transport is injectable via `opts.transport`. Over the message layer it composes resource-object validators (closed status enums, conditional-required fields, unknown fields ignored), the three §7.1.6 state machines, the request builders (newAccount with External Account Binding, newOrder with `replaces`, finalize with a CSR identifier-set match and account-key-reuse rejection, challenge responses, deactivation, revokeCert in both key modes, the keyChange nested JWS, POST-as-GET), the http-01 / dns-01 / tls-alpn-01 challenge computations, the dns and ip identifier validators, and the ARI certID with serial sign-padding preserved — `client`, `validate`, `identify`, `assertTransition`, the builders, `keyAuthorization`, `http01`, `dns01`, `tlsAlpn01Extension`, `verifyTlsAlpn01`, `ariCertId` |
 | `pki.schema.smime` | S/MIME ESS signed-attribute values (RFC 5035 / RFC 8551). `parseSigningCertificate` and `parseSigningCertificateV2` bind a signature to its signing certificate (cert hash, hash algorithm, issuer `GeneralNames` and serial); `parseSmimeCapabilities` decodes the ordered capability list; `decodeAttribute` dispatches a CMS attribute by OID, enforcing the single-value rule and deferring on unknown types. A companion decoder for CMS signed attributes rather than an auto-routed format — `parseSigningCertificate`, `parseSigningCertificateV2`, `parseSmimeCapabilities`, `decodeAttribute` |

package/lib/acme.js

@@ -1765,6 +1765,7 @@ function _parseLinkNext(headers, base) { var m = _parseLinkRelation(headers, bas
  *   - `transport` -- injectable transport(request) -> {status, headers, body}; default pki.transport.https.
  *   - `tls` -- { anchors, useSystemStore, cert, key, minVersion, servername, checkServerIdentity } for the default transport.
  *   - `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` / `maxRedirects` -- transport budgets; `maxNonceRetries` -- badNonce retry cap (default 1).
+ *   - `proxy` -- reach the ACME server through a forward HTTP proxy (`{ url, auth?, tls? }`; see pki.transport).
  *   - `maxPolls` / `maxTotalWait` / `sleep` -- poll-loop budgets + an injectable sleeper; `clock` -- an injectable receipt clock (default Date.now) for a Retry-After HTTP-date.
  *   - `resignKeys` -- optional ordered `[{ alg, key }]` enabling the RFC 8555 sec. 6.2 badSignatureAlgorithm re-sign. When a CA rejects the account `alg` and advertises the algs it supports, the first entry whose `alg` the CA advertised re-signs the request once and retries. Each `key` is a CryptoKey for the SAME account key material under that `alg`: an RSA account key signs RS256 and PS256 from one key, and its registered public JWK verifies either. The caller's order selects and the CA's list only filters, so a spoofed badSignatureAlgorithm cannot force a weaker alg (sec. 10). Absent, or with no advertised match, the badSignatureAlgorithm surfaces unchanged.
  *   - `newAuthz(identifier)` -- pre-authorize a single identifier (RFC 8555 sec. 7.4.1) -> { authorization, url }.
@@ -1778,7 +1779,7 @@ function _parseLinkNext(headers, base) { var m = _parseLinkRelation(headers, bas
  */
 var _CLIENT_OPTS = {
   accountKey: 1, accountJwk: 1, alg: 1, resignKeys: 1, transport: 1, tls: 1, timeout: 1, maxResponseBytes: 1,
-  maxRedirects: 1, maxNonceRetries: 1, maxPolls: 1, maxTotalWait: 1, sleep: 1, clock: 1,
+  maxRedirects: 1, maxNonceRetries: 1, maxPolls: 1, maxTotalWait: 1, sleep: 1, clock: 1, proxy: 1,
 };
 var _METHOD_OPTS = {
   finalize: { csr: 1, identifiers: 1 },
@@ -1845,6 +1846,7 @@ function client(directoryUrl, opts) {
   }
   var budgets = {
     tls: _clientTls(opts),
+    proxy: httpTransport.snapshotProxy(opts.proxy),
     timeout: guard.limits.cap(opts.timeout, "timeout", CLIENT_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT, { E: E, code: "acme/bad-input", min: 1, max: CLIENT_MAX_TIMEOUT }),
     maxResponseBytes: guard.limits.cap(opts.maxResponseBytes, "maxResponseBytes", constants.LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, { E: E, code: "acme/bad-input", min: 1, max: constants.LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES }),
     maxRedirects: guard.limits.cap(opts.maxRedirects, "maxRedirects", 5, { E: E, code: "acme/bad-input", min: 0, max: 32 }),
@@ -1908,7 +1910,7 @@ function client(directoryUrl, opts) {
   function _send(method, url, headers, body) { return _sendFollowing(method, url, headers, body, 0); }
   function _sendFollowing(method, url, headers, body, redirects) {
     var reqHeaders = Object.assign({ "user-agent": CLIENT_USER_AGENT }, headers || {});
-    return transport({ method: method, url: url, headers: reqHeaders, body: body, tls: _tlsFor(url), timeout: budgets.timeout, maxResponseBytes: budgets.maxResponseBytes }).then(function (res) {
+    return transport({ method: method, url: url, headers: reqHeaders, body: body, tls: _tlsFor(url), proxy: budgets.proxy, timeout: budgets.timeout, maxResponseBytes: budgets.maxResponseBytes }).then(function (res) {
       res = res || {};
       var h = {};
       Object.keys(res.headers || {}).forEach(function (k) { h[k.toLowerCase()] = res.headers[k]; });

package/lib/cmp-build.js

@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ var DEFAULT_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT = constants.TIME.seconds(30);
 var MAX_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT = constants.TIME.seconds(600);
 var PKIXCMP = "application/pkixcmp";
 var PKIXCMP_POLL = "application/pkixcmp-poll";
-var KNOWN_TRANSFER_OPTS = { transport: 1, tls: 1, headers: 1, timeout: 1, maxResponseBytes: 1 };
+var KNOWN_TRANSFER_OPTS = { transport: 1, tls: 1, headers: 1, timeout: 1, maxResponseBytes: 1, proxy: 1 };
 
 function _cmpMessageDer(input) {
   var der;
@@ -799,6 +799,9 @@ function _transfer(url, message, opts) {
   }
   var timeout = guard.limits.cap(opts.timeout, "timeout", DEFAULT_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT, { E: _err, code: "cmp/bad-input", min: 1, max: MAX_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT });
   var maxResponseBytes = guard.limits.cap(opts.maxResponseBytes, "maxResponseBytes", constants.LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, { E: _err, code: "cmp/bad-input", min: 1, max: constants.LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES });
+  var proxy;
+  try { proxy = httpTransport.snapshotProxy(opts.proxy); }
+  catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "the options object could not be read", e); }
   var headers = {};
   Object.keys(opts.headers || {}).forEach(function (k) {
     var lk = k.toLowerCase();
@@ -806,7 +809,7 @@ function _transfer(url, message, opts) {
   });
   headers["content-type"] = PKIXCMP;
   var tls = _tlsForTransfer(opts);
-  return Promise.resolve(transport({ method: "POST", url: parsedUrl.href, headers: headers, body: der, tls: tls, timeout: timeout, maxResponseBytes: maxResponseBytes })).then(function (res) {
+  return Promise.resolve(transport({ method: "POST", url: parsedUrl.href, headers: headers, body: der, tls: tls, proxy: proxy, timeout: timeout, maxResponseBytes: maxResponseBytes })).then(function (res) {
     res = res || {};
     var h = {};
     Object.keys(res.headers || {}).forEach(function (k) { h[k.toLowerCase()] = res.headers[k]; });
@@ -900,6 +903,7 @@ function wellKnownUrl(base, opts) {
  *     overridable (any casing), and the request-framing headers (`content-length`, `transfer-encoding`) are
  *     stripped -- the transport computes Content-Length from the exact body, so a caller cannot desync framing.
  *   - `timeout` -- ms (default 30s); `maxResponseBytes` -- streaming cap, tightenable downward only.
+ *   - `proxy` -- reach the CA through a forward HTTP proxy (`{ url, auth?, tls? }`; see pki.transport).
  * @example
  *   var reqDer = await pki.cmp.build(
  *     { header: { sender: { directoryName: "CN=client" }, recipient: { directoryName: "CN=CA" } },

package/lib/cmp-session.js

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ var webcrypto = require("./webcrypto");
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
 var sleepUtil = require("./sleep");
 var retryAfter = require("./http-retry-after");
+var httpTransport = require("./http-transport");
 
 var CmpError = frameworkError.CmpError;
 function _err(code, message, cause) { return new CmpError(code, message, cause); }
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ var COMPOSITE_PH_HASHALG = { "SHA-256": "sha256", "SHA-384": "sha384", "SHA-512"
 var KNOWN_SESSION_OPTS = {
   url: 1, key: 1, cert: 1, mac: 1, trustAnchors: 1, intermediates: 1, recipient: 1, sender: 1,
   extraCerts: 1, implicitConfirm: 1, maxPolls: 1, maxTotalWait: 1, sleep: 1, time: 1,
-  transport: 1, tls: 1, headers: 1, timeout: 1, maxResponseBytes: 1, pss: 1, digestAlgorithm: 1,
+  transport: 1, tls: 1, headers: 1, timeout: 1, maxResponseBytes: 1, proxy: 1, pss: 1, digestAlgorithm: 1,
   acceptCert: 1, senderKID: 1, recipKID: 1, expectedSender: 1,
 };
 
@@ -286,6 +287,7 @@ function _certConfHash(certDer) {
  *   - `acceptCert` -- an async policy `(certDer, { status, grantedWithMods }) => boolean` consulted before the certConf; return true to accept, anything else to veto (a `grantedWithMods` certificate the CA changed). A veto sends a rejecting certConf and yields `outcome: "rejected"` with the certificate still surfaced. Incompatible with `implicitConfirm` (no reject leg exists), so the combination throws at construction.
  *   - `transport` -- injectable transport(request) -> {status, headers, body}; default pki.transport.https.
  *   - `tls` / `headers` / `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` -- transport config + budgets.
+ *   - `proxy` -- reach the CA through a forward HTTP proxy (`{ url, auth?, tls? }`; see pki.transport).
  *   - `maxPolls` / `maxTotalWait` / `sleep` -- poll-loop budgets + an injectable sleeper; `time` -- verify-time clock.
  *   - `extraCerts` / `pss` / `digestAlgorithm` -- passed through to the request protection build.
  * @example
@@ -304,6 +306,7 @@ function _certConfHash(certDer) {
 function session(opts) {
   if (opts == null) opts = {};
   guard.identifier.assertPlainRecord(opts, _err, "cmp/bad-input", "opts");
+  guard.identifier.optionsObject(opts, _err, "cmp/bad-input", "opts");
   guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(opts, KNOWN_SESSION_OPTS, _err, "cmp/bad-input", "unknown session opts field ");
   opts = Object.assign({}, opts);
   if (typeof opts.url !== "string" || !opts.url) throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "opts.url (the CMP endpoint) is required");
@@ -319,6 +322,7 @@ function session(opts) {
   if (isMac && Array.isArray(opts.trustAnchors) && opts.trustAnchors.length === 0) opts.trustAnchors = null;
   if (opts.trustAnchors != null && _engine && _engine.toAnchor) _asCertList(opts.trustAnchors).forEach(function (a) { try { _engine.toAnchor(a); } catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "opts.trustAnchors: each entry must be a certificate (DER/PEM/parsed) or a { name, publicKey, algorithm } anchor tuple -- " + ((e && e.message) || e), e); } });
   if (opts.intermediates != null && _engine && _engine.coerceCert) _asCertList(opts.intermediates).forEach(function (c) { try { _engine.coerceCert(c); } catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "opts.intermediates: each entry must be a certificate (DER/PEM/parsed) -- " + ((e && e.message) || e), e); } });
+  var _proxySnap = httpTransport.snapshotProxy(opts.proxy);
   var _expectedSenderCert = null;
   var _expectedSenderDer = null;
   if (opts.expectedSender != null) {
@@ -428,6 +432,7 @@ function session(opts) {
   function _transferOpts() {
     var o = {};
     ["transport", "tls", "headers", "timeout", "maxResponseBytes"].forEach(function (k) { if (opts[k] != null) o[k] = opts[k]; });
+    if (_proxySnap != null) o.proxy = _proxySnap;
     return o;
   }
 

package/lib/constants.js

@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ var LIMITS = {
   SCT_MAX_BYTES: BYTES.kib(64) + 1,
   SCT_MAX_COUNT: 256,
   MERKLE_MAX_PROOF_NODES: 65,
+  PROXY_MAX_TLS_ANCHORS: 256,
   PATH_MAX_CERTS: 100,
   PATH_MAX_POLICY_NODES: 4096,
   PATH_BUILD_MAX_DEPTH: 20,

package/lib/est.js

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ var OPERATIONS = ["cacerts", "simpleenroll", "simplereenroll", "fullcmc", "serve
 
 var CLIENT_OPTS = {
   transport: 1, tls: 1, label: 1, timeout: 1, maxResponseBytes: 1, maxRedirects: 1, now: 1,
-  auth: 1, username: 1, password: 1, allowCrossOriginRedirect: 1,
+  auth: 1, username: 1, password: 1, allowCrossOriginRedirect: 1, proxy: 1,
 };
 function _withClient(extra) {
   var out = {};
@@ -133,6 +133,9 @@ function _knownOpts(opts, known, verb) {
   });
 }
 
+function _snapProxy(opts) { return httpTransport.snapshotProxy(opts.proxy); }
+function _rej(e) { return Promise.reject(e); }
+
 
 /**
  * @primitive  pki.est.transferDecode
@@ -846,7 +849,7 @@ function _drive(method, url, body, headers, opts, transport, budgets) {
     return hh;
   }
   function step() {
-    return transport({ method: method, url: url.href, headers: _headersFor(url), body: body, tls: _tlsFor(url), timeout: budgets.timeout, maxResponseBytes: budgets.maxResponseBytes }).then(function (res) {
+    return transport({ method: method, url: url.href, headers: _headersFor(url), body: body, tls: _tlsFor(url), proxy: budgets.proxy, timeout: budgets.timeout, maxResponseBytes: budgets.maxResponseBytes }).then(function (res) {
       res = res || {};
       var blen = _bodyLen(res);
       if (blen > budgets.maxResponseBytes) throw E("est/response-too-large", "the response body (" + blen + " bytes) exceeds the " + budgets.maxResponseBytes + "-byte cap (RFC 7030 sec. 6)");
@@ -909,7 +912,7 @@ function _drive(method, url, body, headers, opts, transport, budgets) {
   return step();
 }
 
-function _client(op, method, baseUrl, body, headers, opts) {
+function _client(op, method, baseUrl, body, headers, opts, proxySnap) {
   var base;
   try { base = new URL(String(baseUrl)); }
   catch (e) { throw E("est/bad-url", "the EST base URL did not parse: " + guard.text.showValue(baseUrl), e); }
@@ -924,6 +927,7 @@ function _client(op, method, baseUrl, body, headers, opts) {
   }
   var budgets = {
     tls: _tlsForRequest(opts),
+    proxy: proxySnap,
     timeout: guard.limits.cap(opts.timeout, "timeout", DEFAULT_TIMEOUT, { E: E, code: "est/bad-input", min: 1, max: MAX_TIMEOUT }),
     maxResponseBytes: guard.limits.cap(opts.maxResponseBytes, "maxResponseBytes", constants.LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, { E: E, code: "est/bad-input", min: 1, max: constants.LIMITS.HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES }),
     maxRedirects: guard.limits.cap(opts.maxRedirects, "maxRedirects", 5, { E: E, code: "est/bad-input", min: 0, max: 32 }),
@@ -1012,7 +1016,7 @@ function _certsResult(op, res, opts, csrSpki) {
  * response is SURFACED, never acted on (RFC 5272 sec. 6.15 makes accepting one a manual decision).
  *
  * @opts
- *   - `transport` / `tls` / `label` / `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` / `maxRedirects` / `now`, as in pki.est.cacerts.
+ *   - `transport` / `tls` / `label` / `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` / `maxRedirects` / `proxy` / `now`, as in pki.est.cacerts.
  *   - `transactionId` / `senderNonce` / `dataReturn`: what the request sent. The values are read out
  *     of the request itself; supplying them here cross-checks that, and a disagreement is refused.
  *   - `responderCerts`: extra certificates for CMC signer lookup, for a response that does not carry
@@ -1049,16 +1053,18 @@ function fullcmc(baseUrl, request, opts) {
   try {
     if (typeof opts !== "object" || Buffer.isBuffer(opts)) throw E("est/bad-input", "pki.est.fullcmc options must be an object");
     _knownOpts(opts, FULLCMC_OPTS, "fullcmc");
+    var proxySnap;
+    try { proxySnap = _snapProxy(opts); } catch (_pe) { throw E("est/bad-input", "the options object could not be read", _pe); }
     der = _cmcRequestDer(request);
     wanted = _requestedPublicKeys(der);
     sent = _cmcSent(opts, der);
     opts = _shallowCopy(opts);
     var body = transferEncode(der);
     return _client("fullcmc", "POST", baseUrl, body,
-      { accept: "application/pkcs7-mime", "content-type": "application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=CMC-request" }, opts)
+      { accept: "application/pkcs7-mime", "content-type": "application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=CMC-request" }, opts, proxySnap)
       .then(function (res) { return _fullcmcResult(res, opts, wanted, sent); });
   } catch (e) {
-    return Promise.reject(e);
+    return _rej(e);
   }
 }
 
@@ -1357,11 +1363,11 @@ function _tryDecodeCmcFault(res, sent) {
   }).then(null, function () { return null; });
 }
 
-function _enroll(op, baseUrl, csrInput, opts) {
+function _enroll(op, baseUrl, csrInput, opts, proxySnap) {
   var csrDer = _csrDer(csrInput);
   var spki = csr.parse(csrDer).subjectPublicKeyInfo;
   var body = transferEncode(csrDer);
-  return _client(op, "POST", baseUrl, body, { accept: "application/pkcs7-mime", "content-type": "application/pkcs10" }, opts)
+  return _client(op, "POST", baseUrl, body, { accept: "application/pkcs7-mime", "content-type": "application/pkcs10" }, opts, proxySnap)
     .then(function (res) { return _certsResult(op, res, opts, spki); });
 }
 
@@ -1386,6 +1392,7 @@ function _enroll(op, baseUrl, csrInput, opts) {
  *   - `transport`: an injected transport(request) -> {status, headers, body, tls}; default pki.transport.https.
  *   - `tls` -- { anchors, useSystemStore, cert, key, minVersion, servername, checkServerIdentity }.
  *   - `label` -- an OPTIONAL CA label path segment; `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` / `maxRedirects` -- budgets.
+ *   - `proxy` -- reach the CA through a forward HTTP proxy (`{ url, auth?, tls? }`; see pki.transport).
  *   - `now` -- receipt time (epoch ms) to render a 202 Retry-After HTTP-date as seconds.
  *   - `auth` -- HTTP authentication: `{ scheme: "basic" | "digest", username, password, allowMD5, allowLegacyQop, maxStaleRetries }`.
  *     There is no `"auto"`: the scheme is chosen here, not by whatever a server offers. `username` / `password`
@@ -1399,9 +1406,10 @@ function _enroll(op, baseUrl, csrInput, opts) {
  */
 function cacerts(baseUrl, opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
+  var proxySnap; try { proxySnap = _snapProxy(opts); } catch (_pe) { return _rej(E("est/bad-input", "the options object could not be read", _pe)); }
   return Promise.resolve().then(function () {
     _knownOpts(opts, CACERTS_OPTS, "cacerts");
-    return _client("cacerts", "GET", baseUrl, null, { accept: "application/pkcs7-mime" }, opts);
+    return _client("cacerts", "GET", baseUrl, null, { accept: "application/pkcs7-mime" }, opts, proxySnap);
   }).then(function (res) { return _certsResult("cacerts", res, opts, null); });
 }
 
@@ -1424,7 +1432,7 @@ function cacerts(baseUrl, opts) {
  * the transport already authenticated the server.
  *
  * @opts
- *   - `transport` / `tls` / `label` / `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` / `maxRedirects` / `now`, as in pki.est.cacerts.
+ *   - `transport` / `tls` / `label` / `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` / `maxRedirects` / `proxy` / `now`, as in pki.est.cacerts.
  *   - `strict`: reject an enroll response that carries more than the single issued certificate.
  *   - `username` / `password` -- HTTP Basic credentials, answered only after server authorization (empty username allowed).
  *   - `allowCrossOriginRedirect` -- opt in to following a cross-origin redirect on this POST.
@@ -1437,9 +1445,10 @@ function cacerts(baseUrl, opts) {
  */
 function simpleenroll(baseUrl, csrInput, opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
+  var proxySnap; try { proxySnap = _snapProxy(opts); } catch (_pe) { return _rej(E("est/bad-input", "the options object could not be read", _pe)); }
   return Promise.resolve().then(function () {
     _knownOpts(opts, SIMPLEENROLL_OPTS, "simpleenroll");
-    return _enroll("simpleenroll", baseUrl, csrInput, opts);
+    return _enroll("simpleenroll", baseUrl, csrInput, opts, proxySnap);
   });
 }
 
@@ -1470,11 +1479,12 @@ function simpleenroll(baseUrl, csrInput, opts) {
  */
 function simplereenroll(baseUrl, csrInput, opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
+  var proxySnap; try { proxySnap = _snapProxy(opts); } catch (_pe) { return _rej(E("est/bad-input", "the options object could not be read", _pe)); }
   return Promise.resolve().then(function () {
     _knownOpts(opts, SIMPLEREENROLL_OPTS, "simplereenroll");
     if (!opts.oldCert) throw E("est/bad-input", "simplereenroll requires opts.oldCert (the certificate being renewed, RFC 7030 sec. 4.2.2)");
     reenrollGuard(opts.oldCert, _csrDer(csrInput));
-    return _enroll("simplereenroll", baseUrl, csrInput, opts);
+    return _enroll("simplereenroll", baseUrl, csrInput, opts, proxySnap);
   });
 }
 
@@ -1613,6 +1623,7 @@ async function _serverkeygenResult(res, opts, derived) {
  */
 function serverkeygen(baseUrl, csrInput, opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
+  var proxySnap; try { proxySnap = _snapProxy(opts); } catch (_pe) { return _rej(E("est/bad-input", "the options object could not be read", _pe)); }
   return Promise.resolve().then(function () {
     _knownOpts(opts, SERVERKEYGEN_OPTS, "serverkeygen");
     var csrDer = _csrDer(csrInput);
@@ -1631,7 +1642,7 @@ function serverkeygen(baseUrl, csrInput, opts) {
     if ((opts.expectedRecipientKeyId !== undefined || opts.expectedRecipientIssuerSerial != null) && !derived.requestedEncryption) {
       throw E("est/bad-input", "a recipient expectation (expectedRecipientKeyId / expectedRecipientIssuerSerial) implies an encrypted key, but the CSR advertised no DecryptKeyIdentifier / AsymmetricDecryptKeyIdentifier attribute (RFC 7030 sec. 4.4.1)");
     }
-    return _client("serverkeygen", "POST", baseUrl, transferEncode(csrDer), { accept: "multipart/mixed", "content-type": "application/pkcs10" }, opts)
+    return _client("serverkeygen", "POST", baseUrl, transferEncode(csrDer), { accept: "multipart/mixed", "content-type": "application/pkcs10" }, opts, proxySnap)
       .then(function (res) { return _serverkeygenResult(res, opts, derived); });
   });
 }
@@ -1673,9 +1684,10 @@ function _csrattrsResult(res, opts) {
  */
 function csrattrs(baseUrl, opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
+  var proxySnap; try { proxySnap = _snapProxy(opts); } catch (_pe) { return _rej(E("est/bad-input", "the options object could not be read", _pe)); }
   return Promise.resolve().then(function () {
     _knownOpts(opts, CSRATTRS_OPTS, "csrattrs");
-    return _client("csrattrs", "GET", baseUrl, null, { accept: "application/csrattrs" }, opts);
+    return _client("csrattrs", "GET", baseUrl, null, { accept: "application/csrattrs" }, opts, proxySnap);
   }).then(function (res) { return _csrattrsResult(res, opts); });
 }
 

package/lib/guard-identifier.js

@@ -309,11 +309,27 @@ function _isBuiltinExotic(v) {
     t.isBoxedPrimitive(v) || t.isNativeError(v) || t.isArgumentsObject(v) || t.isGeneratorObject(v);
 }
 
+function _proxyInChain(v) {
+  if (v === null || typeof v !== "object") return false;
+  var visited = new _Set();
+  for (var o = v; o && !_setHas(visited, o); o = _getPrototypeOf(o)) {
+    _setAdd(visited, o);
+    if (util.types.isProxy(o)) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+function isPlainRecord(v) {
+  if (v === null || typeof v !== "object") return false;
+  if (_proxyInChain(v)) return false;
+  if (_isNodeBuffer(v) || _isArray(v)) return false;
+  return !_isBuiltinExotic(v);
+}
 // @enforced-by behavioral -- a plain-record refusal has no single rename-proof code shape worth a
 function assertPlainRecord(v, E, code, label) {
   _requireFactory(E);
-  if (v === null || typeof v !== "object" || _isNodeBuffer(v) || _isArray(v)) throw E(code, label + " must be a plain object");
+  if (v === null || typeof v !== "object") throw E(code, label + " must be a plain object");
   _refuseUnenumerable(v, E, code, label);
+  if (_isNodeBuffer(v) || _isArray(v)) throw E(code, label + " must be a plain object");
   if (_isBuiltinExotic(v)) throw E(code, label + " must be a plain object (a built-in exotic such as a Date or Map is refused)");
 }
 
@@ -378,6 +394,7 @@ module.exports = intrinsic.freeze({
   assertCanonicalOid: assertCanonicalOid,
   assertKnownKeys: assertKnownKeys,
   assertPlainRecord: assertPlainRecord,
+  isPlainRecord: isPlainRecord,
   optionsObject: optionsObject,
   refuseAccessorFields: refuseAccessorFields,
   readableNames: readableNames,

package/lib/guard-limits.js

@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ function counter(max, E, code, label) {
       n += 1;
       if (n > max) throw E(code, (label || "decoded item") + " count exceeds the cap " + max);
     },
+    count: function () { return n; },
   };
 }
 

package/lib/http-transport.js

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ var nodeHttp = require("node:http");
 var nodeNet = require("node:net");
 var nodeTls = require("node:tls");
 var nodeDns = require("node:dns");
+var nodeUtil = require("node:util");
 var constants = require("./constants");
 var guard = require("./guard-all");
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
@@ -197,13 +198,70 @@ var PROXY_KEYS = _keySet(["url", "auth", "tls"]);
 var PROXY_AUTH_KEYS = _keySet(["scheme", "username", "password"]);
 var PROXY_TLS_KEYS = _keySet(["anchors", "useSystemStore", "servername", "minVersion"]);
 
+function _copyAnchor(a) { return (a !== null && typeof a === "object" && nodeUtil.types.isProxy(a)) ? a : (Buffer.isBuffer(a) ? Buffer.from(a) : a); }
+function _noopProxyErr(code, message) { var e = new Error(message); e.code = code; e.isPkiError = true; return e; }
+function _copyableRecord(p) {
+  if (!guard.identifier.isPlainRecord(p)) return false;
+  var proto = Object.getPrototypeOf(p);
+  if (proto !== Object.prototype && proto !== null) return false;
+  if (Object.getOwnPropertySymbols(p).length !== 0) return false;
+  var ownEnumData = 0;
+  var names = Object.getOwnPropertyNames(p);
+  for (var i = 0; i < names.length; i++) {
+    var d = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(p, names[i]);
+    if (!d.enumerable || d.get || d.set) return false;
+    ownEnumData++;
+  }
+  var readable = guard.identifier.readableNames(p, _noopProxyErr, "transport/bad-proxy", "opts.proxy");
+  if (readable.length !== ownEnumData) return false;
+  for (var j = 0; j < readable.length; j++) {
+    var rd = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(p, readable[j]);
+    if (!rd || !rd.enumerable || rd.get || rd.set) return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+function _copyableArray(a) {
+  if (a === null || typeof a !== "object" || nodeUtil.types.isProxy(a) || !Array.isArray(a) || Object.getPrototypeOf(a) !== Array.prototype) return false;
+  if (a.length > constants.LIMITS.PROXY_MAX_TLS_ANCHORS) return false;
+  if (Object.getOwnPropertySymbols(a).length !== 0) return false;
+  var names = Object.getOwnPropertyNames(a);
+  for (var i = 0; i < names.length; i++) {
+    var d = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(a, names[i]);
+    if (d.get || d.set) return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+function snapshotProxy(p) {
+  try {
+    if (!_copyableRecord(p)) return p;
+    var out = Object.assign(Object.create(null), p);
+    if (_copyableRecord(p.auth)) out.auth = Object.assign(Object.create(null), p.auth);
+    if (_copyableRecord(p.tls)) {
+      out.tls = Object.assign(Object.create(null), p.tls);
+      var a = p.tls.anchors;
+      if (_copyableArray(a)) {
+        var copied = [];
+        for (var i = 0; i < a.length; i++) copied[i] = _copyAnchor(a[i]);
+        out.tls.anchors = copied;
+      } else if (typeof a === "string") out.tls.anchors = a;
+      else if (a !== null && typeof a === "object" && !nodeUtil.types.isProxy(a) && Buffer.isBuffer(a)) out.tls.anchors = Buffer.from(a);
+    }
+    return out;
+  } catch (_e) {
+    // allow:swallow-unverified an input whose introspection throws (a revoked Proxy, a throwing trap) returns unchanged for _validateProxy to refuse
+    return p;
+  }
+}
+
 function _validateProxy(request, defaults, E, C, url) {
   var proxy = request.proxy !== undefined ? request.proxy : defaults.proxy;
   if (proxy === undefined || proxy === null) return null;
   guard.identifier.assertPlainRecord(proxy, E, C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy");
+  if (!_copyableRecord(proxy)) throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy must be a plain object with only own enumerable data properties");
   guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(proxy, PROXY_KEYS, E, C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy has an unknown option ");
+  if (typeof proxy.url !== "string") throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.url must be a string, got " + guard.text.showValue(proxy.url));
   var purl;
-  try { purl = new URL(String(proxy.url)); }
+  try { purl = new URL(proxy.url); }
   catch (e) { throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.url did not parse: " + guard.text.showValue(proxy.url), e); }
   if (purl.protocol !== "http:" && purl.protocol !== "https:") throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.url must be an http or https URL, got " + purl.protocol);
   if (purl.username || purl.password) throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.url must not carry credentials in its userinfo; supply opts.proxy.auth over an https proxy");
@@ -214,6 +272,7 @@ function _validateProxy(request, defaults, E, C, url) {
   if (proxy.auth !== undefined && proxy.auth !== null) {
     if (!secure) throw E(C("proxy-auth-requires-tls"), "proxy credentials cannot be sent over a plaintext http proxy, where the proxy hop would expose them; use an https proxy URL");
     guard.identifier.assertPlainRecord(proxy.auth, E, C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.auth");
+    if (!_copyableRecord(proxy.auth)) throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.auth must be a plain object with only own enumerable data properties");
     guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(proxy.auth, PROXY_AUTH_KEYS, E, C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.auth has an unknown option ");
     var scheme = proxy.auth.scheme;
     if (scheme === "digest") throw E(C("proxy-unsupported-scheme"), "Digest proxy authentication is not supported in this release; use 'basic' over an https proxy");
@@ -228,22 +287,25 @@ function _validateProxy(request, defaults, E, C, url) {
     var ptls = proxy.tls;
     if (ptls !== undefined && ptls !== null) {
       guard.identifier.assertPlainRecord(ptls, E, C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.tls");
+      if (!_copyableRecord(ptls)) throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.tls must be a plain object with only own enumerable data properties");
       guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(ptls, PROXY_TLS_KEYS, E, C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.tls has an unknown option ");
       if (ptls.servername !== undefined && ptls.servername !== null && typeof ptls.servername !== "string") throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.tls.servername must be a string");
     }
     var pAnchors = ptls ? ptls.anchors : undefined;
+    if (pAnchors !== undefined && pAnchors !== null && typeof pAnchors === "object" && nodeUtil.types.isProxy(pAnchors)) throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.tls.anchors must not be a Proxy");
     var pUseSystem = ptls ? ptls.useSystemStore === true : false;
     var pHasAnchors = pAnchors !== undefined && pAnchors !== null && !(Array.isArray(pAnchors) && pAnchors.length === 0);
     if (!pHasAnchors && !pUseSystem) throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "an https proxy requires explicit tls trust: set proxy.tls.anchors or proxy.tls.useSystemStore");
     if (pHasAnchors) {
+      if (Array.isArray(pAnchors) && !_copyableArray(pAnchors)) throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.tls.anchors must be a plain array of PEM strings or DER Buffers");
       var pAnchorList = Array.isArray(pAnchors) ? pAnchors : [pAnchors];
       for (var pai = 0; pai < pAnchorList.length; pai++) {
         var pan = pAnchorList[pai];
-        if (typeof pan !== "string" && !Buffer.isBuffer(pan)) throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.tls.anchors must be a PEM string or a DER Buffer (or an array of them)");
+        if ((pan !== null && typeof pan === "object" && nodeUtil.types.isProxy(pan)) || (typeof pan !== "string" && !Buffer.isBuffer(pan))) throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy.tls.anchors must be a PEM string or a DER Buffer (or an array of them)");
       }
     }
-    var pMinVersion = (ptls && ptls.minVersion) || DEFAULT_MIN_VERSION;
-    if (pMinVersion !== "TLSv1.2" && pMinVersion !== "TLSv1.3") throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "proxy.tls.minVersion must be 'TLSv1.2' or 'TLSv1.3', got " + pMinVersion);
+    var pMinVersion = (ptls && ptls.minVersion !== undefined && ptls.minVersion !== null) ? ptls.minVersion : DEFAULT_MIN_VERSION;
+    if (pMinVersion !== "TLSv1.2" && pMinVersion !== "TLSv1.3") throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "proxy.tls.minVersion must be 'TLSv1.2' or 'TLSv1.3', got " + guard.text.showValue(pMinVersion));
     var pCa = [];
     if (pHasAnchors) pCa = pCa.concat(_pemifyAnchors(pAnchors));
     if (pUseSystem) pCa = pCa.concat(_systemCa());
@@ -370,7 +432,17 @@ function httpsTransport(defaults) {
         return callerCsi(host, cert2);
       };
     }
-    var proxyInfo = _validateProxy(request, defaults, E, C, url);
+    var proxyInfo;
+    try { proxyInfo = _validateProxy(request, defaults, E, C, url); }
+    catch (e) {
+      var typedProxyError = false;
+      try {
+        var ec = (e instanceof Error) && !nodeUtil.types.isProxy(e) ? e.code : undefined;
+        typedProxyError = ec === C("bad-proxy") || ec === C("proxy-auth-requires-tls") || ec === C("proxy-unsupported-scheme");
+      } catch (_ie) { /* allow:swallow-unverified reading .code on a hostile error object can throw; treat any such failure as untyped */ }
+      if (typedProxyError) throw e;
+      throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "opts.proxy could not be validated", e);
+    }
     var blockPrivate = (request.blockPrivateAddresses !== undefined ? request.blockPrivateAddresses : defaults.blockPrivateAddresses) === true;
     if (blockPrivate && proxyInfo) throw E(C("bad-proxy"), "blockPrivateAddresses cannot be enforced through a forward proxy, which resolves the origin itself and would reach a private origin the transport never checks; use a direct connection for a private-address-blocked fetch");
     if (blockPrivate) {
@@ -526,4 +598,4 @@ function httpsTransport(defaults) {
   return _transportFn;
 }
 
-module.exports = { https: httpsTransport, isBlockedIp: _isBlockedIp, _makeGuardedLookup: _makeGuardedLookup, MAX_TIMEOUT: MAX_TIMEOUT };
+module.exports = { https: httpsTransport, isBlockedIp: _isBlockedIp, _makeGuardedLookup: _makeGuardedLookup, MAX_TIMEOUT: MAX_TIMEOUT, snapshotProxy: snapshotProxy };

package/lib/path-validate.js

@@ -2305,7 +2305,7 @@ async function _fetchAiaIssuers(current, aia) {
  * @opts  maxAiaPerCert          Cap on caIssuers URLs tried per certificate (default `C.LIMITS.PATH_AIA_MAX_PER_CERT`).
  * @opts  aiaTimeout             Per-fetch timeout in ms, forwarded to the transport.
  * @opts  maxResponseBytes       Per-fetch response size cap, forwarded to the transport (tightenable downward only).
- * @opts  (validate options)     Every `pki.path.validate` option (`requiredEku`, `revocationChecker`, `checkPurpose`, the initial policy inputs, ...) is forwarded unchanged. When `userInitialPolicySet` is supplied, build returns the accepted path whose user-constrained policy set best satisfies it (RFC 4158 sec. 4 forward policy chaining) rather than the first accepted path; `validate` still gates every path, so this changes only which valid path is chosen. The ranking explores more of the candidate graph than a first-accept build, so it is bounded by `maxCandidatesConsidered` like the rest of the search: a cap too tight for the ranking reaches `path/build-limit`. An `anyPolicy` entry makes the set unconstrained, so ranking is skipped and the first accepted path is returned.
+ * @opts  (validate options)     Every `pki.path.validate` option (`requiredEku`, `revocationChecker`, `checkPurpose`, the initial policy inputs, ...) is forwarded unchanged. When `userInitialPolicySet` is supplied, build returns the accepted path whose user-constrained policy set best satisfies it (RFC 4158 sec. 4 forward policy chaining) rather than the first accepted path; `validate` still gates every path, so this changes only which valid path is chosen. The ranking explores more of the candidate graph than a first-accept build, so it is bounded by `maxCandidatesConsidered` like the rest of the search. Reaching that cap means stop looking, not nothing found: if a valid path was already accepted, build returns the best-policy one of those; it reaches `path/build-limit` only when the cap is hit before any valid path is accepted. An `anyPolicy` entry makes the set unconstrained, so ranking is skipped and the first accepted path is returned.
  * @example
  *   var pair = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
  *   var pemString = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "Example Root", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
@@ -2424,6 +2424,7 @@ async function build(leaf, opts) {
   }
   var accepted = selectByPolicy ? [] : null;
 
+  try {
   if (direction === "reverse") {
     var rstack = [];
     for (var rsi = 0; rsi < anchors.length; rsi++) intrinsic.push(rstack, { chain: [], hop: 0, keys: new Set([identityKey(leafCert)]), anchor: anchors[rsi] });
@@ -2523,6 +2524,11 @@ async function build(leaf, opts) {
     considered += _pushCandidates(frame, scored, stack, counter);
   }
   }
+  } catch (_limitErr) {
+    // allow:swallow-unverified the candidate cap means "stop looking", not "nothing found": once a valid path has
+    if (!(selectByPolicy && accepted && accepted.length && _limitErr && _limitErr.code === "path/build-limit")) throw _limitErr;
+    considered = counter.count();
+  }
 
   if (selectByPolicy && !success && accepted.length) success = _bestByPolicy(accepted, uipsDistinct);
 

package/lib/scep.js

@@ -717,19 +717,7 @@ function _drive(method, url, body, headers, opts, transport, budgets) {
   }
   return step(url);
 }
-function _copyAnchor(a) { return Buffer.isBuffer(a) ? Buffer.from(a) : a; }
-function _snapshotProxy(p) {
-  if (p == null || typeof p !== "object" || Array.isArray(p)) return p;
-  var out = Object.assign({}, p);
-  if (p.auth != null && typeof p.auth === "object" && !Array.isArray(p.auth)) out.auth = Object.assign({}, p.auth);
-  if (p.tls != null && typeof p.tls === "object" && !Array.isArray(p.tls)) {
-    out.tls = Object.assign({}, p.tls);
-    var a = p.tls.anchors;
-    if (Array.isArray(a)) out.tls.anchors = a.map(_copyAnchor);
-    else if (a != null) out.tls.anchors = _copyAnchor(a);
-  }
-  return out;
-}
+function _snapshotProxy(p) { return httpTransport.snapshotProxy(p); }
 function _client(method, url, body, headers, opts) {
   var transport = opts.transport || httpTransport.https({ E: _err, errPrefix: "scep" });
   var budgets = {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.6.27",
+  "version": "0.6.29",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:9742df6c-59a0-4fce-a64b-ddc916ee2fba",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:e72c9e5f-07a6-48ad-bf71-a361b1470bef",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-09-02T20:36:04.064Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-09-03T05:34:38.589Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.27",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.29",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.6.27",
+      "version": "0.6.29",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.27",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.29",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.27",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.29",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]