@blamejs/pki 0.6.22 → 0.6.23

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,14 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.6.23 — 2026-09-02
+
+The SCEP client can carry a PKIOperation over HTTP GET for a CA that does not support POST.
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.scep.enroll / renew / getCert / getCrl accept httpMethod: "POST" (default) or "GET". Under "GET" the client sends the PKIOperation message as GET SCEPPATH?operation=PKIOperation&message=<base64-CMS> with no body (RFC 8894 sec. 4.1), for a CA that does not advertise POST support. POST stays the default and the recommended transport; a bad httpMethod is refused with scep/bad-input.
+
 ## v0.6.22 — 2026-09-01
 
 pki.acme.client gains scheduleRenewal, the RFC 9773 auto-sleeping certificate-renewal loop.

package/README.md

@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.schema.cmp` | CMP messages (RFC 9810): the header (version, sender and recipient including the anonymous NULL-DN, nonces, transaction id, general info), the 27-arm body (certificate requests via the CRMF parser, an encrypted certificate's EnvelopedData via CMS, response / revocation / confirmation / error / support / polling arms structural, the rest raw), and the exact `headerBytes` and `bodyBytes` slices an external verifier reconstructs the protected part from. The CMP-before-OCSP dispatch order is enforced Fail-closed — `parse`, `pemDecode`, `pemEncode` |
 | `pki.schema.csrattrs` | EST CSR Attributes (`CsrAttrs`, RFC 8951 §3.5 / RFC 9908) — the `AttrOrOID` items a server sends to shape an enrollment: bare OIDs, attributes with raw values, and decoded views of the RFC 9908 meaningful types (extension requests, EC and RSA key-type conventions, the certification-request-info template). Unknown types are surfaced raw; structure and the RFC 9908 semantic MUSTs are fail-closed — `parse` |
 | `pki.est` | Enrollment over Secure Transport (RFC 7030 / 8951 / 9908 / 7616). The client verbs `cacerts`, `simpleenroll`, `simplereenroll`, `serverkeygen`, `csrattrs`, and `fullcmc` drive the RFC 7030 flow over `pki.transport` (inject your own via `opts.transport`, or take the fail-closed default): HTTPS only, an explicit trust anchor required, same-origin redirects followed while a downgrade or loop is refused, a 202 Retry-After surfaced but never slept, HTTP Basic or Digest (RFC 7616, SHA-256 / SHA-512-256; MD5 and no-qop refused by default) answered only after the server is authenticated, and the issued certificate chosen by public-key match. `serverkeygen` requests a server-generated key, cleartext or an opaque CMS EnvelopedData, with encryption bound to the CSR's key-identifier attribute over a confidentiality-bearing cipher. `csrattrs` fetches the CA's RFC 9908 attributes policy. `fullcmc` (§4.3) carries a CMC Full PKI Request and reduces the CA's answer through `pki.cmc.verify` to one terminal outcome, refusing a response that fails to echo the transaction and nonce the request carried, or that covers a key the request never asked for; a certs-only reply to a bound request is refused rather than read as an issuance. Under the verbs sit the transport-agnostic codecs they compose: the RFC 8951 base64 transfer codec (which ignores Content-Transfer-Encoding), the `multipart/mixed` splitter, the certs-only and serverkeygen response validators over CMS, the enroll-attribute builders, and the HTTP response classifier — `transferDecode`/`transferEncode`, `parseCertsOnly`, `splitMultipartMixed`, `parseServerKeygenResponse`, `findIssuedCert`, `classifyResponse`, `paths`, and the builders |
-| `pki.scep` | SCEP pkiMessage codec (RFC 8894), the client side of Simple Certificate Enrollment. `build(spec)` assembles a request: a `PKCSReq` or `RenewalReq` wraps a PKCS#10 certification request, whose own proof-of-possession it verifies first; a `CertPoll` wraps an IssuerAndSubject naming the issuing CA and the request subject; and a `GetCert` or `GetCRL` wraps an IssuerAndSerialNumber naming a certificate by its issuer and a positive serial of at most 20 octets. It encrypts the messageData to the CA as the inner EnvelopedData (`pkcsPKIEnvelope`, AES-128-CBC), and signs that under the transaction attributes RFC 8894 §3.2 defines, a messageType, a caller-unique transactionId, and a 16-byte senderNonce. The recipient CA certificate must assert `keyEncipherment`. `build` also issues the CA-side `CertRep` response (§3.3.2): a SUCCESS envelopes a certs-only SignedData of the issued certificate (or the CRL for a GetCRL) to the requester and signs it under the CA key, while a FAILURE (carrying a `failInfo`) or a PENDING omits the pkcsPKIEnvelope and is signed detached, each echoing the request's senderNonce as `recipientNonce`. `parse(bytes, opts?)` reads a `PKCSReq`, `RenewalReq`, `CertPoll`, `GetCert`, `GetCRL`, or `CertRep` back (a messageType outside the RFC 8894 registry is refused): it verifies the outer signature first and refuses a message whose signature does not check, so the transaction attributes it returns come only from a verified signer, never alongside a false verdict. Because a valid signature only proves self-consistency with the embedded certificate, pass `opts.signerCert` to authenticate a CA response against the CA certificate you hold (a public-key mismatch is refused, `signerAuthenticated` reports the result); a caller that omits it gets a crypto-only verdict and must authenticate the surfaced `signerCert` itself. It maps the messageType, pkiStatus, failInfo, and the nonces from their RFC 8894 enumerants and refuses an unknown one; given `recipientKey` it decrypts the `pkcsPKIEnvelope` to the messageData, and given `expectedSenderNonce` it refuses a response whose recipientNonce does not echo it. It reads a CA's CertRep in full. `getCACaps(baseUrl, opts?)`, `getCACert(baseUrl, opts?)`, `getNextCACert(baseUrl, opts)`, `enroll(baseUrl, opts)`, `renew(baseUrl, opts)`, `getCert(baseUrl, opts)`, and `getCrl(baseUrl, opts)` carry that codec to a live CA over HTTP (RFC 8894 §4) through an injectable transport (`pki.transport.https` by default): `getCACaps` reports the CA's advertised capabilities and never lowers the client's algorithm choice on the unauthenticated response, `getCACert` pins the CA certificate to an out-of-band `expectedFingerprint` a returned certificate must match, `getNextCACert` fetches the CA's next (rollover) certificate and verifies the SignedData response against the current CA certificate (`caCertificate`) before returning it, refusing a response signed by any other key, and `enroll` and `renew` POST a PKCSReq or RenewalReq, authenticate the CertRep against the CA certificate and its nonce echo, select the issued certificate by public-key match, throw on a FAILURE with the CA's failInfo, and poll a PENDING response with CertPoll requests until the CA answers or a bounded poll-count and total-wait budget is spent. `getCert` and `getCrl` retrieve an already-issued certificate or a CA CRL by issuer and serial number, authenticated the same way; RFC 8894 §2.6, §2.7, and §3.3.4 recommend these queries only where HTTP certificate-store access (RFC 4387), LDAP, or a CRL distribution point is unavailable, so prefer those where a CA offers them. GET-carried PKIOperation and HTTP proxy authentication are not yet built — `build`, `parse`, `parseCapabilities`, `getCACaps`, `getCACert`, `getNextCACert`, `enroll`, `renew`, `getCert`, `getCrl` |
+| `pki.scep` | SCEP pkiMessage codec (RFC 8894), the client side of Simple Certificate Enrollment. `build(spec)` assembles a request: a `PKCSReq` or `RenewalReq` wraps a PKCS#10 certification request, whose own proof-of-possession it verifies first; a `CertPoll` wraps an IssuerAndSubject naming the issuing CA and the request subject; and a `GetCert` or `GetCRL` wraps an IssuerAndSerialNumber naming a certificate by its issuer and a positive serial of at most 20 octets. It encrypts the messageData to the CA as the inner EnvelopedData (`pkcsPKIEnvelope`, AES-128-CBC), and signs that under the transaction attributes RFC 8894 §3.2 defines, a messageType, a caller-unique transactionId, and a 16-byte senderNonce. The recipient CA certificate must assert `keyEncipherment`. `build` also issues the CA-side `CertRep` response (§3.3.2): a SUCCESS envelopes a certs-only SignedData of the issued certificate (or the CRL for a GetCRL) to the requester and signs it under the CA key, while a FAILURE (carrying a `failInfo`) or a PENDING omits the pkcsPKIEnvelope and is signed detached, each echoing the request's senderNonce as `recipientNonce`. `parse(bytes, opts?)` reads a `PKCSReq`, `RenewalReq`, `CertPoll`, `GetCert`, `GetCRL`, or `CertRep` back (a messageType outside the RFC 8894 registry is refused): it verifies the outer signature first and refuses a message whose signature does not check, so the transaction attributes it returns come only from a verified signer, never alongside a false verdict. Because a valid signature only proves self-consistency with the embedded certificate, pass `opts.signerCert` to authenticate a CA response against the CA certificate you hold (a public-key mismatch is refused, `signerAuthenticated` reports the result); a caller that omits it gets a crypto-only verdict and must authenticate the surfaced `signerCert` itself. It maps the messageType, pkiStatus, failInfo, and the nonces from their RFC 8894 enumerants and refuses an unknown one; given `recipientKey` it decrypts the `pkcsPKIEnvelope` to the messageData, and given `expectedSenderNonce` it refuses a response whose recipientNonce does not echo it. It reads a CA's CertRep in full. `getCACaps(baseUrl, opts?)`, `getCACert(baseUrl, opts?)`, `getNextCACert(baseUrl, opts)`, `enroll(baseUrl, opts)`, `renew(baseUrl, opts)`, `getCert(baseUrl, opts)`, and `getCrl(baseUrl, opts)` carry that codec to a live CA over HTTP (RFC 8894 §4) through an injectable transport (`pki.transport.https` by default): `getCACaps` reports the CA's advertised capabilities and never lowers the client's algorithm choice on the unauthenticated response, `getCACert` pins the CA certificate to an out-of-band `expectedFingerprint` a returned certificate must match, `getNextCACert` fetches the CA's next (rollover) certificate and verifies the SignedData response against the current CA certificate (`caCertificate`) before returning it, refusing a response signed by any other key, and `enroll` and `renew` POST a PKCSReq or RenewalReq, authenticate the CertRep against the CA certificate and its nonce echo, select the issued certificate by public-key match, throw on a FAILURE with the CA's failInfo, and poll a PENDING response with CertPoll requests until the CA answers or a bounded poll-count and total-wait budget is spent. `getCert` and `getCrl` retrieve an already-issued certificate or a CA CRL by issuer and serial number, authenticated the same way; RFC 8894 §2.6, §2.7, and §3.3.4 recommend these queries only where HTTP certificate-store access (RFC 4387), LDAP, or a CRL distribution point is unavailable, so prefer those where a CA offers them. A PKIOperation goes over HTTP POST by default; `httpMethod: "GET"` carries it base64-encoded in the URL query for a legacy CA that accepts only GET (RFC 8894 §4.1). HTTP proxy authentication is not yet built — `build`, `parse`, `parseCapabilities`, `getCACaps`, `getCACert`, `getNextCACert`, `enroll`, `renew`, `getCert`, `getCrl` |
 | `pki.transport` | The shared, fail-closed `node:https` transport the enrollment clients drive. `pki.transport.https(defaults)` returns a `transport(request) → { status, headers, body, tls }`, where `tls` carries the negotiated `protocol`, `cipher`, and raw `peerCertificate`. This is the toolkit's only socket choke point: an explicit trust anchor (or an opt-in to the system store) is required, `rejectUnauthorized` is always on, TLS is floored at 1.2, the response body is capped while it streams, and a stalled socket times out. The EST, ACME, and CMP clients reuse it verbatim. If you inject your own transport, return `tls` too: `pki.est.serverkeygen` asserts the negotiated cipher can protect the delivered private key, and a transport that reports no cipher is trusted rather than refused, so omitting the field silently skips that check — `https` |
 | `pki.jose` | Flattened JWS (RFC 7515) and JWK thumbprints (RFC 7638). `sign` and `verify` run a Flattened JWS against declarative profiles (ACME outer, EAB inner, keyChange inner) that carry the required and forbidden header rules as data. `base64url` is the strict RFC 4648 §5 codec, rejecting padding, non-alphabet characters, and non-canonical trailing bits. `parseJson` is a bounded reader that refuses duplicate members at any depth. `thumbprint` is the RFC 7638 / 8037 / 9964 canonical digest. The algorithm registry binds each `alg` to its key type (ES/RS/PS/EdDSA/ML-DSA), leaving no code path for `alg:none`, an RS256→HS256 key confusion, or an all-zero ECDSA signature; `assertPublicJwk` refuses a JWK carrying private material, so an exported private key is never published. `opts.key` names the key a message must be signed under and governs: where the profile also permits an embedded header `jwk`, the two must be the same key — compared as RFC 7638 thumbprints, so member order cannot make equal keys differ — and a disagreement is refused rather than resolved in the message's favor. `keySource` reports which key answered, since a signature checked against a key you named is a different claim from one checked against the key the message carried — `sign`, `verify`, `base64url`, `parseJson`, `thumbprint`, `assertPublicJwk` |
 | `pki.acme` | ACME (RFC 8555 / 8737 / 8738 / 9773). `client(directoryUrl, opts)` is a stateful client driving a live CA directory over `pki.transport`: `newAccount`, `newOrder`, `newAuthz`, `getOrder`, `getAuthorization`, `getChallenge`, `respondToChallenge`, `finalize`, `pollOrder`, `pollAuthorization`, and `downloadCertificate` walk the issuance flow, with `newAuthz` pre-authorizing a single identifier (§7.4.1) and `downloadCertificate` binding the issued certificate to the order — its key, its identifiers, or both; at least one is required by default and the result reports `boundToKey` / `boundToIdentifiers` — before choosing among alternate chains (`Link rel="alternate"`, §7.4.2, via a `selectChain` predicate bounded by `maxAlternates`). `revokeCert` (account-key or certificate-key signed), `keyChange`, `updateAccount` (change the account contacts, §7.3.2), `listOrders` (the account's orders list, following the §7.1.2.1 `Link rel="next"` pagination bounded by a page cap and confined to the orders origin), `deactivateAccount`, `deactivateAuthorization`, `renewalInfo` (ARI), `renewalWindow` (the RFC 9773 §4.2/4.3 renewal decision), and `scheduleRenewal` (the §4.1 auto-sleeping renewal loop that sleeps until the selected instant and refetches until it is time to renew, stopping at the certificate's notAfter) complete the lifecycle. Every URL is HTTPS only, an explicit trust anchor is required, each request carries a fresh single-use nonce with a bounded badNonce retry (and, when `opts.resignKeys` supplies caller-approved alternative account-key algorithms, a bounded RFC 8555 §6.2 badSignatureAlgorithm re-sign that the CA's advertised list can only filter, never widen, so it cannot force a weaker algorithm), reads are POST-as-GET, polling is bounded and sleeps on a Retry-After via an injectable sleeper capped by a poll count and a total-wait budget, and every response body is size-capped. The transport is injectable via `opts.transport`. Over the message layer it composes resource-object validators (closed status enums, conditional-required fields, unknown fields ignored), the three §7.1.6 state machines, the request builders (newAccount with External Account Binding, newOrder with `replaces`, finalize with a CSR identifier-set match and account-key-reuse rejection, challenge responses, deactivation, revokeCert in both key modes, the keyChange nested JWS, POST-as-GET), the http-01 / dns-01 / tls-alpn-01 challenge computations, the dns and ip identifier validators, and the ARI certID with serial sign-padding preserved — `client`, `validate`, `identify`, `assertTransition`, the builders, `keyAuthorization`, `http01`, `dns01`, `tlsAlpn01Extension`, `verifyTlsAlpn01`, `ariCertId` |

package/lib/scep.js

@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ var _defaultSleep = require("./sleep").sleep;
 var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
 
 function _err(code, msg, cause) { return new ScepError(code, msg, cause); }
+function _showValue(v) {
+  if (typeof v === "string") return JSON.stringify(v);
+  if (typeof v === "number" || typeof v === "boolean" || typeof v === "bigint") return String(v);
+  if (v === null) return "null";
+  return "a value of type " + typeof v;
+}
 
 var _KU_NS = pkix.makeNS("scep", ScepError, oid);
 
@@ -257,7 +263,7 @@ function _captureRecipientKey(rk) {
 async function build(spec) {
   spec = guard.identifier.optionsObject(spec, _err, "scep/bad-input", "pki.scep.build spec");
   var mtCode = MESSAGE_TYPE[spec.messageType];
-  if (mtCode == null) throw _err("scep/bad-message-type", "unknown messageType " + JSON.stringify(spec.messageType) + " (RFC 8894 sec. 3.2.1.2)");
+  if (mtCode == null) throw _err("scep/bad-message-type", "unknown messageType " + _showValue(spec.messageType) + " (RFC 8894 sec. 3.2.1.2)");
   if (spec.messageType === "CertRep") {
     guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(spec, _CERTREP_KEYS, _err, "scep/bad-input", "pki.scep.build (CertRep) has an unknown option: ");
     return await _buildCertRep(spec);
@@ -312,7 +318,7 @@ var _CERTREP_KEYS = { messageType: 1, signer: 1, transactionId: 1, senderNonce:
 
 async function _buildCertRep(spec) {
   if (spec.signer == null || typeof spec.signer !== "object") throw _err("scep/bad-input", "a signer { cert, key } is required");
-  if (typeof spec.pkiStatus !== "string") throw _err("scep/bad-input", "a CertRep pkiStatus must be SUCCESS, FAILURE, or PENDING (RFC 8894 sec. 3.2.1.3), got " + JSON.stringify(spec.pkiStatus));
+  if (typeof spec.pkiStatus !== "string") throw _err("scep/bad-input", "a CertRep pkiStatus must be SUCCESS, FAILURE, or PENDING (RFC 8894 sec. 3.2.1.3), got " + _showValue(spec.pkiStatus));
   var statusCode = PKI_STATUS[spec.pkiStatus];
   if (statusCode == null) throw _err("scep/bad-input", "a CertRep pkiStatus must be SUCCESS, FAILURE, or PENDING (RFC 8894 sec. 3.2.1.3), got " + JSON.stringify(spec.pkiStatus));
   var txnId = _transactionId(spec.transactionId);
@@ -355,7 +361,7 @@ async function _buildCertRep(spec) {
     }
     if (spec.pkiStatus === "FAILURE") {
       var failCode = FAIL_INFO[spec.failInfo];
-      if (failCode == null) throw _err("scep/bad-input", "a FAILURE CertRep must carry a failInfo of badAlg / badMessageCheck / badRequest / badTime / badCertId (RFC 8894 sec. 3.2.1.4), got " + JSON.stringify(spec.failInfo));
+      if (failCode == null) throw _err("scep/bad-input", "a FAILURE CertRep must carry a failInfo of badAlg / badMessageCheck / badRequest / badTime / badCertId (RFC 8894 sec. 3.2.1.4), got " + _showValue(spec.failInfo));
       attrs.push(_attr("scepFailInfo", b.printable(failCode)));
       if (spec.failInfoText != null) attrs.push(_attr("scepFailInfoText", b.utf8(String(spec.failInfoText))));
     }
@@ -395,7 +401,7 @@ function _serialToInteger(s) {
   else if (typeof s === "number") { if (!Number.isSafeInteger(s)) throw _err("scep/bad-input", "serialNumber as a number must be a safe integer"); n = BigInt(s); }
   else if (typeof s === "string" && s.length > 0) {
     var t = (s.slice(0, 2) === "0x" || s.slice(0, 2) === "0X") ? s.slice(2) : s;
-    try { n = BigInt("0x" + t); } catch (_e) { throw _err("scep/bad-input", "serialNumber must be a hex string, a non-negative safe integer, or a BigInt: " + JSON.stringify(s)); }
+    try { n = BigInt("0x" + t); } catch (_e) { throw _err("scep/bad-input", "serialNumber must be a hex string, a non-negative safe integer, or a BigInt: " + _showValue(s)); }
   } else {
     throw _err("scep/bad-input", "serialNumber must be a hex string, a non-negative safe integer, or a BigInt");
   }
@@ -668,6 +674,20 @@ function _scepUrl(baseUrl, operation) {
   url.searchParams.set("operation", operation);
   return url;
 }
+function _pkiMethod(opts) {
+  var m = opts.httpMethod;
+  if (m == null) return "POST";
+  if (m !== "POST" && m !== "GET") throw _err("scep/bad-input", "httpMethod must be \"POST\" or \"GET\" (RFC 8894 sec. 4.1), got " + _showValue(m));
+  return m;
+}
+function _pkiRequest(method, opUrl, reqMsg, clientOpts) {
+  if (method === "GET") {
+    var getUrl = new URL(opUrl.href);
+    getUrl.searchParams.set("message", Buffer.from(reqMsg).toString("base64"));
+    return _client("GET", getUrl, null, {}, clientOpts);
+  }
+  return _client("POST", opUrl, reqMsg, { "content-type": CT_PKI_MESSAGE }, clientOpts);
+}
 function _drive(method, url, body, headers, opts, transport, budgets) {
   var redirects = 0, curMethod = method, curBody = body, initialOrigin = url.origin;
   var tlsBase = _tlsForRequest(opts);
@@ -816,7 +836,7 @@ function findIssuedCert(certs, wantSpki) {
 function _normalizeFingerprint(fp, algName) {
   var algorithm = _foldLower(String(algName == null ? "sha256" : algName));
   try { nodeCrypto.createHash(algorithm); }
-  catch (_e) { throw _err("scep/bad-input", "fingerprintAlgorithm " + JSON.stringify(algorithm) + " is not an available hash"); }
+  catch (_e) { throw _err("scep/bad-input", "fingerprintAlgorithm " + _showValue(algorithm) + " is not an available hash"); }
   var value;
   if (Buffer.isBuffer(fp)) value = Buffer.from(fp);
   else if (typeof fp === "string") {
@@ -991,7 +1011,7 @@ async function _pollForIssuance(ctx) {
     var sn = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(16);
     lastNonce = sn;
     var certPoll = await build({ messageType: "CertPoll", requestSubject: ctx.csrSubject, issuer: issuerName, recipient: ctx.caCert, signer: ctx.signer, transactionId: ctx.transactionId, senderNonce: sn });
-    res = await _client("POST", ctx.postUrl, certPoll, { "content-type": CT_PKI_MESSAGE }, ctx.clientOpts);
+    res = await _pkiRequest(ctx.httpMethod, ctx.postUrl, certPoll, ctx.clientOpts);
     var body = _requireOk(res, [CT_PKI_MESSAGE], "PKIOperation");
     var rep = await parse(body, { signerCert: ctx.signerCert, expectedSenderNonce: sn, recipientKey: ctx.recipientKey });
     var d = _dispatchCertRep(rep, ctx.transactionId, ctx.spki);
@@ -1019,6 +1039,7 @@ async function _pkiOperation(messageType, baseUrl, opts, verbName) {
     maxResponseBytes: opts.maxResponseBytes,
   };
   var postUrl = _scepUrl(baseUrl, "PKIOperation");
+  var httpMethod = _pkiMethod(opts);
   var csrView = guard.bytes.snapshotSource(opts.csr, ScepError, "scep/bad-input", "the csr");
   var spki, csrSubject;
   try { var _pcsr = schemaCsr.parse(csrView); spki = _pcsr.subjectPublicKeyInfo; csrSubject = _pcsr.subject.bytes; }
@@ -1030,14 +1051,14 @@ async function _pkiOperation(messageType, baseUrl, opts, verbName) {
   var senderNonce = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(16);
   var transactionId = opts.transactionId != null ? opts.transactionId : _defaultTransactionId();
   var reqMsg = await build({ messageType: messageType, messageData: csrView, recipient: caCert, signer: signer, transactionId: transactionId, senderNonce: senderNonce });
-  var res = await _client("POST", postUrl, reqMsg, { "content-type": CT_PKI_MESSAGE }, clientOpts);
+  var res = await _pkiRequest(httpMethod, postUrl, reqMsg, clientOpts);
   var body = _requireOk(res, [CT_PKI_MESSAGE], "PKIOperation");
   var rep = await parse(body, { signerCert: signerCert, expectedSenderNonce: senderNonce, recipientKey: recipientKey });
   var d = _dispatchCertRep(rep, transactionId, spki);
   if (!d.pending) return d.result;
   if (pollCount <= 0) return { status: "PENDING", transactionId: rep.transactionId, senderNonce: senderNonce };
   return _pollForIssuance({
-    firstResponse: res, firstSenderNonce: senderNonce, postUrl: postUrl, clientOpts: clientOpts,
+    firstResponse: res, firstSenderNonce: senderNonce, postUrl: postUrl, httpMethod: httpMethod, clientOpts: clientOpts,
     caCert: caCert, csrSubject: csrSubject, issuerCert: issuerCert, signer: signer, signerCert: signerCert, recipientKey: recipientKey,
     spki: spki, transactionId: transactionId, pollCount: pollCount, maxTotalWait: maxTotalWait,
     sleep: sleep, onRetryAfter: onRetryAfter,
@@ -1079,6 +1100,7 @@ async function _pkiOperation(messageType, baseUrl, opts, verbName) {
  *   - `maxTotalWait` -- the total Retry-After sleep budget in seconds across all polls (default the Retry-After horizon).
  *   - `sleep` -- an injectable sleeper `(ms) -> Promise` for the Retry-After wait (default a real timer).
  *   - `onRetryAfter` -- an optional observer `(delaySeconds) -> void` called before each poll sleep.
+ *   - `httpMethod` -- `"POST"` (default) or `"GET"`. RFC 8894 sec. 4.1 sends the PKIOperation message over POST; `"GET"` carries it base64-encoded in the URL `message` query for a legacy CA that lacks POST.
  *   - `transport` / `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` / `maxRedirects` / `tls` / `allowCrossOriginRedirect` -- transport bounds.
  * @example
  *   // requires: scepCsr, caCertDer, clientCertDer, clientKeyPkcs8, scepTransport
@@ -1158,8 +1180,9 @@ async function _queryOperation(messageType, baseUrl, opts, verbName) {
   var clientOpts = { transport: opts.transport, tls: opts.tls != null ? Object.assign({}, opts.tls) : opts.tls, maxRedirects: opts.maxRedirects, allowCrossOriginRedirect: opts.allowCrossOriginRedirect, timeout: opts.timeout, maxResponseBytes: opts.maxResponseBytes };
   var senderNonce = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(16);
   var transactionId = opts.transactionId != null ? opts.transactionId : _defaultTransactionId();
+  var httpMethod = _pkiMethod(opts);
   var reqMsg = await build(Object.assign({ messageType: messageType, recipient: caCert, signer: signer, transactionId: transactionId, senderNonce: senderNonce }, want.buildSpec));
-  var res = await _client("POST", _scepUrl(baseUrl, "PKIOperation"), reqMsg, { "content-type": CT_PKI_MESSAGE }, clientOpts);
+  var res = await _pkiRequest(httpMethod, _scepUrl(baseUrl, "PKIOperation"), reqMsg, clientOpts);
   var body = _requireOk(res, [CT_PKI_MESSAGE], "PKIOperation");
   var rep = await parse(body, { signerCert: signerCert, expectedSenderNonce: senderNonce, recipientKey: recipientKey });
   _dispatchQueryRep(rep, transactionId);
@@ -1192,6 +1215,7 @@ async function _queryOperation(messageType, baseUrl, opts, verbName) {
  *   - `recipientKey` -- `{ cert, key }`, the RSA key the CA encrypts the response to, to decrypt the CertRep.
  *   - `responderCert` -- the certificate to authenticate the CA response signature against (defaults to `caCert`).
  *   - `transactionId` -- a caller-unique PrintableString (defaults to 16 random bytes, hex-encoded).
+ *   - `httpMethod` -- `"POST"` (default) or `"GET"`. RFC 8894 sec. 4.1 sends the PKIOperation message over POST; `"GET"` carries it base64-encoded in the URL `message` query for a legacy CA that lacks POST.
  *   - `transport` / `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` / `maxRedirects` / `tls` / `allowCrossOriginRedirect` -- transport bounds.
  * @example
  *   // requires: clientCertDer, caCertDer, clientKeyPkcs8, scepTransport
@@ -1240,6 +1264,7 @@ async function getCert(baseUrl, opts) {
  *   - `recipientKey` -- `{ cert, key }`, the RSA key the CA encrypts the response to.
  *   - `responderCert` -- the certificate to authenticate the CA response against (defaults to `caCert`).
  *   - `transactionId` -- a caller-unique PrintableString (defaults to 16 random bytes, hex-encoded).
+ *   - `httpMethod` -- `"POST"` (default) or `"GET"`. RFC 8894 sec. 4.1 sends the PKIOperation message over POST; `"GET"` carries it base64-encoded in the URL `message` query for a legacy CA that lacks POST.
  *   - `transport` / `timeout` / `maxResponseBytes` / `maxRedirects` / `tls` / `allowCrossOriginRedirect` -- transport bounds.
  * @example
  *   // requires: clientCertDer, caCertDer, clientKeyPkcs8, scepTransport
@@ -1268,8 +1293,8 @@ function _withKeys(extra) { var o = {}, k; for (k in _TRANSPORT_KEYS) o[k] = 1;
 var _CACAPS_KEYS = _withKeys({ expectSCEPStandard: 1, requireStrongProfile: 1 });
 var _CACERT_KEYS = _withKeys({ expectedFingerprint: 1, fingerprintAlgorithm: 1 });
 var _NEXTCACERT_KEYS = _withKeys({ caCertificate: 1 });
-var _ENROLL_KEYS = _withKeys({ csr: 1, caCert: 1, signer: 1, recipientKey: 1, responderCert: 1, issuerCert: 1, transactionId: 1, pollCount: 1, maxTotalWait: 1, sleep: 1, onRetryAfter: 1 });
-var _QUERY_KEYS = _withKeys({ certificate: 1, issuer: 1, serialNumber: 1, caCert: 1, signer: 1, recipientKey: 1, responderCert: 1, transactionId: 1 });
+var _ENROLL_KEYS = _withKeys({ csr: 1, caCert: 1, signer: 1, recipientKey: 1, responderCert: 1, issuerCert: 1, transactionId: 1, pollCount: 1, maxTotalWait: 1, sleep: 1, onRetryAfter: 1, httpMethod: 1 });
+var _QUERY_KEYS = _withKeys({ certificate: 1, issuer: 1, serialNumber: 1, caCert: 1, signer: 1, recipientKey: 1, responderCert: 1, transactionId: 1, httpMethod: 1 });
 
 module.exports = {
   build: build,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.6.22",
+  "version": "0.6.23",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:79647de9-cba8-48fb-9af1-d6ec9bebf2be",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:8c346ebb-fdb5-431d-8bcb-e43e18ff74a7",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-09-02T01:10:34.456Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-09-02T02:02:10.321Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.22",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.23",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.6.22",
+      "version": "0.6.23",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.22",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.23",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.22",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.23",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]