@blamejs/pki 0.6.2 → 0.6.4

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,31 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.6.4 — 2026-08-30
+
+The ACME client gains account update and order listing: pki.acme.client updates an account's contacts (RFC 8555 sec. 7.3.2) and fetches the account's orders list, following the paginated Link: rel="next" chain (sec. 7.1.2.1).
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.acme.client(...).updateAccount(opts) updates an ACME account (RFC 8555 sec. 7.3.2): a kid-signed POST to the account URL that sets opts.contact (RFC 6068 mailto hygiene applies; an empty array clears all contacts) and returns the resulting account object. The fields the server MUST ignore are refused at the door with a typed acme/bad-input naming the correct path: status (use deactivateAccount, sec. 7.3.6 is the only client-settable status), termsOfServiceAgreed (not client-updatable; a changed-terms CA answers a request with a userActionRequired problem, surfaced as acme/server-problem, rather than a client re-agreement), orders (server-assigned), and externalAccountBinding (not client-updatable). An unrecognized option is refused rather than sent.
+- pki.acme.client(...).listOrders(ordersUrl, opts?) fetches an account's orders list (RFC 8555 sec. 7.1.2.1) via POST-as-GET and returns { orders, pages, truncated }: orders is the aggregated array of order URLs, pages is how many pages were read, and truncated is true when the list was cut short by the page cap. It follows the sec. 7.1.2.1 Link: rel="next" pagination, bounded by opts.maxPages (default 50) and a visited-page dedupe so a looping or over-long next chain stops rather than fetching without end. Because the next header is delivered over TLS but not signed, and it steers an account-key-signed POST-as-GET, each next is https-gated and confined to the orders URL's own origin; an off-origin or non-https next is refused with acme/bad-link, and two distinct next targets (a singleton relation, RFC 8288 sec. 3.3) are ambiguous and refused.
+- pki.acme.updateAccount(opts) is a new message-layer builder (a top-level export alongside pki.acme.deactivate): it builds the kid-signed account-update JWS the client composes, so the message layer is usable without the stateful client.
+
+### Changed
+
+- The RFC 8288 Link response-header parser is now relation-parameterized: the sec. 7.4.2 alternate certificate-chain reader and the sec. 7.1.2.1 next orders-page reader share one hardened scan (byte cap, control-octet reject, relation-type well-formedness, anchor-context check, resolve, https gate, origin gate, and dedupe), so the same untrusted-header defenses cover both relations. Behavior for the alternate relation is unchanged.
+
+## v0.6.3 — 2026-08-30
+
+pki.cms builds and reads certs-only certificate-management messages: a degenerate CMS SignedData that conveys certificates and CRLs without signing anything (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8).
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.cms.certsOnly(certs, opts?) builds a certs-only certificate-management message (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8): a degenerate CMS SignedData with version 1, an empty digestAlgorithms and signerInfos, an id-data encapContentInfo with the eContent absent, and the caller's certificates in certificates [0] and any CRLs in crls [1], both DER-sorted and deduplicated. certs is a certificate or an array of them (DER Buffer or PEM string), and opts.crls carries CRLs the same way; at least one certificate or CRL is required. Each entry is parsed as a real X.509 certificate or CertificateList before it is embedded, so a non-certificate, a non-CRL, or a tagged CertificateChoices alternative is refused with a typed cms/bad-input rather than emitted. opts.pem returns a PEM string instead of DER.
+- pki.cms.parseCertsOnly(input, opts?) reads a certs-only message (DER Buffer or PEM) and returns { certificates, crls } as raw DER. It requires a degenerate SignedData (id-data with no eContent, empty signerInfos) and refuses a non-degenerate structure with cms/not-certs-only. Unlike the RFC 5272 Simple PKI Response that pki.est.parseCertsOnly reads, a CRL-only message is accepted (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8 conveys certificates and/or CRLs); a message carrying neither is refused. opts.maxCerts caps the number of certificates and CRLs parsed and returned, a bound on an untrusted bundle.
+- pki.cms.isCertsOnly(input) reports whether input is a certs-only message structurally, returning true for a SignedData with an id-data content, absent eContent, and empty signerInfos, and false for any other well-formed CMS. Undecodable bytes throw a typed CmsError.
+- pki.smime.buildCertsOnly(certs, opts?) wraps a certs-only message in one application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=certs-only; name=smime.p7c S/MIME entity (RFC 8551 sec. 3.2.1), with the certs-only DER as the base64 body. It accepts the same certificate and opts.crls inputs as pki.cms.certsOnly.
+
 ## v0.6.2 — 2026-08-30
 
 pki.scep builds and reads SCEP (RFC 8894) enrollment messages: a client assembles a PKCSReq or RenewalReq request and parses a CA's response back to its verified transaction attributes and issued certificates.

package/README.md

@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.scep` | SCEP pkiMessage codec (RFC 8894), the client side of Simple Certificate Enrollment. `build(spec)` assembles a `PKCSReq` or `RenewalReq` request: it verifies the PKCS#10 certification request's own proof-of-possession, encrypts it to the CA as the inner EnvelopedData (`pkcsPKIEnvelope`, AES-128-CBC), and signs that under the transaction attributes RFC 8894 §3.2 defines, a messageType, a caller-unique transactionId, and a 16-byte senderNonce. The recipient CA certificate must assert `keyEncipherment`. `parse(bytes, opts?)` reads a `PKCSReq`, `RenewalReq`, or `CertRep` back (the `CertPoll`, `GetCert`, and `GetCRL` client queries are refused): it verifies the outer signature first and refuses a message whose signature does not check, so the transaction attributes it returns come only from a verified signer, never alongside a false verdict. Because a valid signature only proves self-consistency with the embedded certificate, pass `opts.signerCert` to authenticate a CA response against the CA certificate you hold (a public-key mismatch is refused, `signerAuthenticated` reports the result); a caller that omits it gets a crypto-only verdict and must authenticate the surfaced `signerCert` itself. It maps the messageType, pkiStatus, failInfo, and the nonces from their RFC 8894 enumerants and refuses an unknown one; given `recipientKey` it decrypts the `pkcsPKIEnvelope` to the messageData, and given `expectedSenderNonce` it refuses a response whose recipientNonce does not echo it. It reads a CA's CertRep in full. Issuing a CertRep is not yet built — `build`, `parse` |
 | `pki.transport` | The shared, fail-closed `node:https` transport the enrollment clients drive. `pki.transport.https(defaults)` returns a `transport(request) → { status, headers, body, tls }`, where `tls` carries the negotiated `protocol`, `cipher`, and raw `peerCertificate`. This is the toolkit's only socket choke point: an explicit trust anchor (or an opt-in to the system store) is required, `rejectUnauthorized` is always on, TLS is floored at 1.2, the response body is capped while it streams, and a stalled socket times out. The EST, ACME, and CMP clients reuse it verbatim. If you inject your own transport, return `tls` too: `pki.est.serverkeygen` asserts the negotiated cipher can protect the delivered private key, and a transport that reports no cipher is trusted rather than refused, so omitting the field silently skips that check — `https` |
 | `pki.jose` | Flattened JWS (RFC 7515) and JWK thumbprints (RFC 7638). `sign` and `verify` run a Flattened JWS against declarative profiles (ACME outer, EAB inner, keyChange inner) that carry the required and forbidden header rules as data. `base64url` is the strict RFC 4648 §5 codec, rejecting padding, non-alphabet characters, and non-canonical trailing bits. `parseJson` is a bounded reader that refuses duplicate members at any depth. `thumbprint` is the RFC 7638 / 8037 / 9964 canonical digest. The algorithm registry binds each `alg` to its key type (ES/RS/PS/EdDSA/ML-DSA), leaving no code path for `alg:none`, an RS256→HS256 key confusion, or an all-zero ECDSA signature; `assertPublicJwk` refuses a JWK carrying private material, so an exported private key is never published. `opts.key` names the key a message must be signed under and governs: where the profile also permits an embedded header `jwk`, the two must be the same key — compared as RFC 7638 thumbprints, so member order cannot make equal keys differ — and a disagreement is refused rather than resolved in the message's favor. `keySource` reports which key answered, since a signature checked against a key you named is a different claim from one checked against the key the message carried — `sign`, `verify`, `base64url`, `parseJson`, `thumbprint`, `assertPublicJwk` |
-| `pki.acme` | ACME (RFC 8555 / 8737 / 8738 / 9773). `client(directoryUrl, opts)` is a stateful client driving a live CA directory over `pki.transport`: `newAccount`, `newOrder`, `newAuthz`, `getOrder`, `getAuthorization`, `getChallenge`, `respondToChallenge`, `finalize`, `pollOrder`, `pollAuthorization`, and `downloadCertificate` walk the issuance flow, with `newAuthz` pre-authorizing a single identifier (§7.4.1) and `downloadCertificate` binding the issued certificate to the order — its key, its identifiers, or both; at least one is required by default and the result reports `boundToKey` / `boundToIdentifiers` — before choosing among alternate chains (`Link rel="alternate"`, §7.4.2, via a `selectChain` predicate bounded by `maxAlternates`). `revokeCert` (account-key or certificate-key signed), `keyChange`, `deactivateAccount`, `deactivateAuthorization`, `renewalInfo` (ARI), and `renewalWindow` (the RFC 9773 §4.2/4.3 renewal decision) complete the lifecycle. Every URL is HTTPS only, an explicit trust anchor is required, each request carries a fresh single-use nonce with a bounded badNonce retry, reads are POST-as-GET, polling is bounded and sleeps on a Retry-After via an injectable sleeper capped by a poll count and a total-wait budget, and every response body is size-capped. The transport is injectable via `opts.transport`. Over the message layer it composes resource-object validators (closed status enums, conditional-required fields, unknown fields ignored), the three §7.1.6 state machines, the request builders (newAccount with External Account Binding, newOrder with `replaces`, finalize with a CSR identifier-set match and account-key-reuse rejection, challenge responses, deactivation, revokeCert in both key modes, the keyChange nested JWS, POST-as-GET), the http-01 / dns-01 / tls-alpn-01 challenge computations, the dns and ip identifier validators, and the ARI certID with serial sign-padding preserved — `client`, `validate`, `identify`, `assertTransition`, the builders, `keyAuthorization`, `http01`, `dns01`, `tlsAlpn01Extension`, `verifyTlsAlpn01`, `ariCertId` |
+| `pki.acme` | ACME (RFC 8555 / 8737 / 8738 / 9773). `client(directoryUrl, opts)` is a stateful client driving a live CA directory over `pki.transport`: `newAccount`, `newOrder`, `newAuthz`, `getOrder`, `getAuthorization`, `getChallenge`, `respondToChallenge`, `finalize`, `pollOrder`, `pollAuthorization`, and `downloadCertificate` walk the issuance flow, with `newAuthz` pre-authorizing a single identifier (§7.4.1) and `downloadCertificate` binding the issued certificate to the order — its key, its identifiers, or both; at least one is required by default and the result reports `boundToKey` / `boundToIdentifiers` — before choosing among alternate chains (`Link rel="alternate"`, §7.4.2, via a `selectChain` predicate bounded by `maxAlternates`). `revokeCert` (account-key or certificate-key signed), `keyChange`, `updateAccount` (change the account contacts, §7.3.2), `listOrders` (the account's orders list, following the §7.1.2.1 `Link rel="next"` pagination bounded by a page cap and confined to the orders origin), `deactivateAccount`, `deactivateAuthorization`, `renewalInfo` (ARI), and `renewalWindow` (the RFC 9773 §4.2/4.3 renewal decision) complete the lifecycle. Every URL is HTTPS only, an explicit trust anchor is required, each request carries a fresh single-use nonce with a bounded badNonce retry, reads are POST-as-GET, polling is bounded and sleeps on a Retry-After via an injectable sleeper capped by a poll count and a total-wait budget, and every response body is size-capped. The transport is injectable via `opts.transport`. Over the message layer it composes resource-object validators (closed status enums, conditional-required fields, unknown fields ignored), the three §7.1.6 state machines, the request builders (newAccount with External Account Binding, newOrder with `replaces`, finalize with a CSR identifier-set match and account-key-reuse rejection, challenge responses, deactivation, revokeCert in both key modes, the keyChange nested JWS, POST-as-GET), the http-01 / dns-01 / tls-alpn-01 challenge computations, the dns and ip identifier validators, and the ARI certID with serial sign-padding preserved — `client`, `validate`, `identify`, `assertTransition`, the builders, `keyAuthorization`, `http01`, `dns01`, `tlsAlpn01Extension`, `verifyTlsAlpn01`, `ariCertId` |
 | `pki.schema.smime` | S/MIME ESS signed-attribute values (RFC 5035 / RFC 8551). `parseSigningCertificate` and `parseSigningCertificateV2` bind a signature to its signing certificate (cert hash, hash algorithm, issuer `GeneralNames` and serial); `parseSmimeCapabilities` decodes the ordered capability list; `decodeAttribute` dispatches a CMS attribute by OID, enforcing the single-value rule and deferring on unknown types. A companion decoder for CMS signed attributes rather than an auto-routed format — `parseSigningCertificate`, `parseSigningCertificateV2`, `parseSmimeCapabilities`, `decodeAttribute` |
 | `pki.cmc` | Build and interpret CMC messages (RFC 5272). `build(spec, signer)` assembles a Full PKI Request across all three request arms (PKCS#10, CRMF, other) and signs it through `pki.cms.sign` under `id-cct-PKIData`. A PKCS#10 (`tcr`) request is verified against its own proof-of-possession before signing, so a request whose self-signature does not verify under its subject public key is refused rather than signed into a message a CA would reject. Body-part identifiers are unique across the whole message and never the reserved 0; a caller's clash is refused rather than renumbered, since a control may already reference it. An Identity Proof V2 witness is computed over the `reqSequence` bytes exactly as emitted (§6.2.1 step 1) rather than a re-serialization, a POP Link Witness is emitted only alongside the POP Link Random control §6.3.1.1 requires beside it, and a renewal carries neither Identification nor Identity Proof in either version. `verify(response, sent)` takes what the CA returned plus the state the client retained and reduces it to one terminal outcome: `issued`, `pending`, `confirm-required`, `pop-required`, or `rejected`. It binds the exchange first — Transaction Identifier, the Sender and Recipient Nonce echo compared in constant time and by full value so a truncation cannot match, and the Data Return echo — with each check applying only if the client sent that half, and, once sent, an absent or differing echo being a refusal, which is the replay defense. `bodyPartIDs` extends the same rule to what the response is about: a status reporting on a body part the request never sent is refused, which the transaction and nonce cannot catch, because a server can echo both correctly while answering about a different message. Several status controls are permitted and the worst governs, so a failure cannot hide behind an earlier success; the absence of any status control is success, per §6.1.2. The carrier's signature must verify (§3.2.1.3.4): a conforming SignedData carries its own signer certificate, so the ordinary build-then-verify flow needs nothing extra and the verdict reports `signatureVerified: true`. Where the signer is found nowhere the posture is fail-closed with a named opt-out — supply `certs` with the responder's certificate, or `allowUnverified: true`, in which case the verdict reports `signatureVerified: false`. Doing neither is refused, the opt-out never excuses a signature that is present and wrong, and a carrier with no signer at all is refused outright. The response's own `cmsSequence` and `otherMsgs` come back raw, since a request whose only arm was the other-message form has no certificate to return and §4.1 puts its answer there. Nothing is trusted: issued certificates are read from the CMS certificate bag (§4.2) and surfaced raw for `pki.path.validate`, and a Publish Trust Anchors control is surfaced with `trusted: false` rather than added to a store — `build`, `verify` |
 | `pki.schema.cmc` | Decode CMC messages (RFC 5272 as updated by RFC 6402): a Full PKI Request (`PKIData`) or Full PKI Response (`PKIResponse`) riding inside a CMS SignedData, reached by the encapsulated content type (`id-cct-PKIData` / `id-cct-PKIResponse`). Controls are surfaced in wire order with their values raw, so an unrecognized one is data rather than a fault. Tagged requests decode across all three arms. The status verdicts (`CMCStatusInfo` v1 and `CMCStatusInfoV2`) are collected as an ordered list, and the RFC 6402 two-module `OtherStatusInfo` ambiguity — `pendInfo` and `extendedFailInfo` are both untagged SEQUENCEs in the 1988 module, told apart only by their first element — is resolved by inspection and refused when it cannot be told apart. Body-part identity is unique across the whole message rather than per sequence, 0 is reserved as the reference to the enclosing PKIData, and the `reqSequence` bytes are surfaced exactly as they appeared so an Identity Proof witness is computed over the wire bytes. A companion decoder for CMS content rather than an auto-routed format — `parse`, `parsePkiData`, `parsePkiResponse` |
@@ -239,8 +239,8 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.crl` | CRL issuance and verification (RFC 5280 §5). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificateList` from a `spec` of `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate`, an optional `crlNumber`, a `revoked` array (each entry a `serialNumber` and `revocationDate` with an optional `reason` or `invalidityDate`), and an optional `extensions` object (authority key identifier, issuing distribution point, delta-CRL indicator, freshest CRL, authority information access) or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER, with an `issuer` of `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the issuer key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. The version is derived from the extension set (v2 when any CRL or entry extension is present, else v1), the outer `signatureAlgorithm` matches `tbsCertList.signature`, an empty revocation list omits the field rather than emitting an empty SEQUENCE, `reasonCode` is an ENUMERATED and `invalidityDate` is always GeneralizedTime, the RFC fixes per-extension criticality, and the produced signature is verified under the issuer key before return. `verify(crl, issuer)` checks a CRL signature through the one path-validation signature engine, algorithm-confusion and EdDSA low-order gates included; handed a certificate rather than a bare key it also asks what only a certificate can answer — that the certificate is the issuer the CRL names, and that its `keyUsage`, when present, asserts `cRLSign` — so a CRL minted under an end-entity certificate of the same CA does not verify as that CA's. `isRevoked(crl, serialNumber, opts)` looks a serial up, and first checks that the CRL is one a serial can be looked up in at all — it is handed a serial and nothing else, so a CRL that speaks for part of its issuer's certificates is refused rather than answered from. A delta CRL lists changes since a base, so an entry recording a release reads as a revocation when read alone; an indirect CRL carries other issuers' entries, whose serials are unrelated to yours; and any other `issuingDistributionPoint` narrows the CRL to one distribution point, one kind of certificate, or a subset of revocation reasons, none of which a serial can be matched against. A CRL speaks for a span as well as a set, so `opts.time` states the instant the question is asked at and a list that has stopped speaking for it — `nextUpdate` passed, `thisUpdate` later, or no `nextUpdate` stated at all — is refused rather than read as a clean bill of health; without `opts.time` the lookup is structural and an absent serial means only that it is not on that list. `pki.path.crlChecker` is the verb for all of them: it is handed the certificate, merges a delta with its base, performs the §6.3.3 correspondence, and decides currency against the material it fetched. Returns DER, or a PEM `X509 CRL` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrlError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crl.parse` — `sign`, `verify`, `isRevoked` |
 | `pki.key` | Key-material lifecycle (RFC 5958 / RFC 8018). `encrypt(privateKey, password, opts)` wraps a PKCS#8 private key (DER, PEM, or an extractable `CryptoKey`) into an `EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo` under PBES2 (PBKDF2 with AES-CBC-Pad), where `opts` selects the `cipher` (`aes-256-cbc` default, `aes-192-cbc`, `aes-128-cbc`), the `prf` (`hmacWithSHA256` default, SHA-384/512, SHA-1), the `iterations` (default 600000), and the `salt`. The plaintext is validated as PKCS#8 before encryption, a default `prf` and `keyLength` are omitted so the parameters are byte-exact with OpenSSL, and the output is re-parsed before return. `decrypt(encrypted, password, opts)` recovers the inner `PrivateKeyInfo`, re-validated through `pki.schema.pkcs8.parse`: only PBES2 / PBKDF2 / AES-CBC is accepted (PBES1, PBMAC1, and scrypt are refused), the salt and iteration count are bounded before any derivation (`opts.maxIterations` lowers the cap), and a malformed parameter set or wrong-length IV is a distinct typed error. Because a MAC-less PBES2-CBC decrypt must not become a padding oracle (RFC 8018 §8), a wrong password and a valid-pad-but-not-a-key both surface the one uniform `key/decrypt-failed`. `export(key, opts)` and `import(input, opts)` move a private key as PKCS#8 or a public key as SubjectPublicKeyInfo. The key may come from the platform's WebCrypto or from a separately installed copy of this toolkit, and is exported through whichever holds its material; a non-extractable key, or one whose implementation keeps its material out of reach, is refused with that as the reason. Encoding is delegated to WebCrypto, so RSA carries an explicit NULL, EC a named curve, and Ed25519/Ed448/X25519/X448 omit parameters, and an ambiguous RSA or EC import requires `opts.algorithm`. `generate(algorithm, opts)` produces a key pair over RSA, ECDSA/ECDH, the Edwards and Montgomery curves, and the FIPS post-quantum ML-DSA and ML-KEM; `publicFromPrivate(privateKey)` derives the public key. Returns DER or PEM, with a typed `KeyError` on failure. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs8.parse` — `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `export`, `import`, `generate`, `publicFromPrivate` |
 | `pki.pkcs12` | PKCS#12 (.p12/.pfx) issuance and reading (RFC 7292 / RFC 9579). `build(spec, opts)` assembles a store from the OpenSSL-style `{ key, cert, ca?, friendlyName?, localKeyId? }` or the full `{ safeContents: [...] }`, where each element is a plaintext or PBES2-encrypted `SafeContents` of key, shroudedKey, cert, crl, secret, or nested `safeContents` bags. Keys and certs are validated before wrapping, and `friendlyName` (BMPString) and `localKeyId` are single-value. Integrity is a classic Appendix B HMAC (the default, for maximum interoperability) or an RFC 9579 PBMAC1 (`opts.mac.algorithm`) over SHA-256/384/512, with shrouded keys and cert safes encrypted under RFC 8018 PBES2 (AES-128/192/256-CBC). Every password is encoded the PKCS#12 way — BMPString+NULL for the classic MAC, UTF-8 for the PBES2 bags and PBMAC1 — which is what OpenSSL and NSS consume, so a file it emits opens in both, cross-checked bidirectionally. The MAC covers the exact AuthenticatedSafe byte range, a DEFAULT-1 `MacData.iterations` is rejected up front, and the store is re-parsed before return. `verifyMac(pfx, password, opts)` recomputes a classic or PBMAC1 MAC over `macedBytes` and constant-time-compares it, throwing on a MAC-less or public-key-integrity store. Public-key integrity (`opts.integrity.mode: "public-key"`) wraps the AuthenticatedSafe in a CMS SignedData instead of a MAC, signed by any `pki.cms.sign` signer and carrying no MacData (§4); privacy stays independent, so `password` still PBES2-encrypts the bags. Public-key privacy wraps a SafeContents as a CMS EnvelopedData (AES-CBC, `id-envelopedData`, never GCM) encrypted to recipient public keys through the `pki.cms.encrypt` recipient model, via per-safe `recipients` or the `opts.recipientCerts` convenience, restricted to certificate recipients (RSA-OAEP, ECDH, X25519, X448, ML-KEM) since a password or KEK recipient could not be reopened by `open`. All four integrity-by-privacy combinations are permitted (§3.1). `open(pfx, password, opts)` reads a store back: it verifies the MAC first, so a wrong password is the MAC verdict rather than a decrypt error, then PBES2-decrypts every privacy safe and shrouded key bag and returns `{ integrityMode, macVerified, signers, keys, certs, crls, secrets }` — keys as re-validated PKCS#8 DER, certs, CRLs and secrets as raw DER, all with `friendlyName` and `localKeyId`, nested safes recursively. A MAC-less store is refused unless `opts.allowUnauthenticated`. A public-key-integrity store is verified through its CMS SignedData signature first (`pkcs12/signature-invalid` on failure), with the signer surfaced in `signers` but never trust-chained, which remains the caller's `pki.path.validate` step. A legacy-PBE store's Appendix C 3DES and RC2 bags are decrypted, RC2 through an in-tree RFC 2268 cipher, so an `openssl pkcs12 -legacy` or NSS store opens; the legacy RC4 schemes are refused. An `id-envelopedData` safe is decrypted with `opts.recipientKey` after the integrity gate (`pkcs12/no-recipient-key` when absent), every recipient-side fault and every post-integrity decrypt failure collapsing to the uniform `pkcs12/decrypt-failed`, and `opts.keys: 'crypto'` imports each key to a `CryptoKey`. It reads what OpenSSL and NSS produce. Returns DER or a PEM `PKCS12`, with a typed `Pkcs12Error` on failure. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs12.parse` — `build`, `verifyMac`, `open` |
-| `pki.cms` | CMS signing, verification, encryption, and compression (RFC 5652). `sign(content, signers, opts)` produces a SignedData (§5), attached or detached, with one or many signers over RSA, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, EdDSA, the post-quantum ML-DSA-44/65/87 (RFC 9882) and SLH-DSA (all twelve FIPS 205 sets, RFC 9814), and composite ML-DSA pairing ML-DSA with a traditional RSA, ECDSA, or EdDSA key (accepted only when both components verify, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs). It builds the signed attributes (content-type, message-digest, signing-time) as canonical DER, signs the exact §5.4 preimage, and emits a DER `Buffer` or PEM. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, which signs a large detached payload without holding it in memory: the payload is hashed incrementally under every signer's digest algorithm in one pass, and `verify` accepts the same streamed form as its `content` option. A signer may also be key-only — `{ key, spki, keyIdentifier }` with no certificate — which RFC 5272 §3.2 requires when a Full PKI Request's signer is the key of a certification request that request carries: the signer identifier takes the subjectKeyIdentifier form carrying the identifier the request declares, the signature scheme resolves from the request's own public key, and no certificate is embedded. `verify(input, opts)` parses a SignedData over the strict `pki.schema.cms` codec, locates each SignerInfo's signer certificate by its issuerAndSerialNumber or subjectKeyIdentifier, and checks the signature over the exact §5.4 preimage: with signed attributes present it confirms the message-digest attribute equals the content digest and verifies over the DER re-encoding of the SignedAttributes (the on-wire `[0]` tag replaced by a universal SET OF), and otherwise directly over the content. It returns a per-signer verdict with the matched signer certificate. `valid` and `trusted` are separate claims and neither implies the other: a SignedData carries its own certificates, so `valid` says the signature is sound under one of them and nothing about who signed, while `trusted` says every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`, validated through the same RFC 5280 path engine `pki.path.validate` uses. Without anchors there is nothing to chain to and `trusted` is `false`; anchors that cannot be read throw, rather than reading as untrusted. An unrecognized option is refused rather than ignored. `countersign(cms, signers, opts)` adds a countersignature (§11.4) — a `SignerInfo` over the countersigned SignerInfo's signature value, any signer algorithm, nestable, with the primary bytes preserved so it still verifies — attached as the id-countersignature unsigned attribute; `verify` returns each countersignature's verdict under `signers[i].countersignatures` and every unsigned attribute — including an RFC 3161 timestamp token, attachable via `sign`'s `unsignedAttributes` — under `signers[i].unsignedAttrs`, surfaced unauthenticated. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` produces an EnvelopedData, AuthEnvelopedData (AES-GCM, the authenticated default), or EncryptedData, with recipients auto-dispatched off the certificate key to key transport (RSAES-OAEP; v1.5 is never emitted), key agreement (ephemeral-static ECDH over P-256/384/521 with the X9.63 KDF, and X25519/X448 with HKDF), symmetric key wrap, password (PBKDF2 with RFC 3211 PWRI-KEK), or the post-quantum ML-KEM KEMRecipientInfo (RFC 9629/9936), wrapping one fresh content key for every recipient. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, streamed through the AES-GCM or AES-CBC content cipher so a large plaintext is encrypted without being buffered whole; the ciphertext is assembled before the definite-length encryptedContent is emitted, byte-for-byte the buffered form. `decrypt(input, keyMaterial, opts)` recovers the content through the matching arm and returns it with an `authenticated` flag; every secret-dependent failure collapses to one uniform `cms/decrypt-failed` verdict (Bleichenbacher, EFAIL, and password-oracle freedom), and PKCS#1 v1.5 is decrypt-only under the RFC 3218 implicit-rejection countermeasure. With `opts.stream: true` the recovered `content` is an async iterable of plaintext chunks instead of a single Buffer, for a payload too large to hold whole; the authenticated modes (AuthEnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, AES-GCM) verify integrity before the iterable yields, so a forged message throws before any plaintext is exposed, while a CBC EnvelopedData or EncryptedData yields the plaintext as the cipher produces it. Every key-establishment secret the toolkit allocates is wiped once used, on the failing path as well as the succeeding one: the KEM shared secret and its derived key-encryption key, the raw ECDH / X25519 / X448 agreement secret, a password-derived key-encryption key, and the content-encryption key itself, cleared once the message is complete since all recipients share it. Caller-supplied key material is never written to (best-effort; NIST SP 800-227 §4.2, RFC 9629 §7). `authenticate(content, recipients, opts)` produces an `id-ct-authData` (§9): cleartext content plus an HMAC-SHA-256/384/512 MAC, authenticated but not encrypted, with the fresh MAC key wrapped for every recipient through the same RecipientInfo model. The MAC covers the authenticated attributes (content-type and message-digest) re-tagged to the EXPLICIT SET OF (§9.2), or the content octets directly; `decrypt` recovers the MAC key, recomputes the MAC and independently the message-digest (§9.3), and releases the content only after both pass, with every secret-dependent failure collapsing to the uniform `cms/decrypt-failed`. `compress(content, opts)` and `decompress(input, opts)` produce and consume a CompressedData (RFC 3274; ZLIB, version 0, id-alg-zlibCompress); decompress bounds the uncompressed output at 16 MiB and stops before it is materialized, so a decompression bomb fails closed as `cms/decompress-too-large`. Compression is a size transform with no integrity or confidentiality (RFC 8551 §2.4.5). Fail-closed with typed `cms/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `countersign`, `encrypt`, `authenticate`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress` |
-| `pki.smime` | S/MIME message assembly, verification, encryption, and compression over the CMS layer (RFC 8551). `sign(content, signers, opts)` wraps a MIME entity in either form: `multipart/signed`, where the content stays readable in any MUA and a detached CMS SignedData rides alongside as `application/pkcs7-signature` with a matching `micalg`, or `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=signed-data`, where the whole entity is a base64 CMS SignedData. The signed bytes are the entity's §3.1.1 canonical form with CRLF line endings, and `verify(message, opts)` unwraps both forms and recomputes over the same canonicalizer, so a transport that re-wraps line endings still verifies while a tampered part fails. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` envelopes a MIME entity as an opaque `application/pkcs7-mime` message and `decrypt(message, keyMaterial, opts)` opens one, as `smime-type=authEnveloped-data` (AES-GCM, confidentiality and integrity, the default) or `smime-type=enveloped-data` (AES-CBC, confidentiality only, so `decrypt` reports `authenticated: false`, the §3.3 no-integrity caveat). The `smime-type` is derived from the CMS body rather than the header, and decryption is fail-closed and oracle-free. The crypto is entirely `pki.cms.sign` / `verify` / `encrypt` / `decrypt`, so it is algorithm-agnostic: any RSA / RSASSA-PSS / ECDSA / EdDSA / ML-DSA / SLH-DSA signer and any RSA-OAEP / ECDH / X25519 / X448 / AES-KW / PBKDF2 / ML-KEM recipient carries through. As with `cms.verify`, `verify` returns the per-signer verdict plus the recovered content, and `valid` and `trusted` are separate claims: `valid` says the signature is sound under a certificate the message carried, `trusted` says every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`. Anchoring here is validated for email at both ends of the chain — the signer certificate must carry `emailProtection` (RFC 8551 §4.4.4) and the anchor's own trust metadata must permit that purpose, since a root can be distrusted for email while remaining a good TLS root. Override either with `requiredEku` / `checkPurpose`. `compress(content, opts)` and `decompress(message, opts)` add the opaque `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=compressed-data; name=smime.p7z` frame (§3.6, RFC 3274), a size transform with no integrity or confidentiality (§2.4.5), bounded against a bomb; the recovered content, which may itself be signed or enveloped, is returned for the caller to re-verify. Header protection (RFC 9788): `sign` and `encrypt` take `opts.protectHeaders`, which inlines the caller's `opts.headers` on the Cryptographic Payload root (its Content-Type gaining `hp="clear"` when signed or `hp="cipher"` when encrypted) so the CMS signature or encryption covers them, defeating a transport that rewrites or reads Subject, From, and the rest. `verify` and `decrypt` surface the authenticated inner set as `protectedHeaders` plus `headerProtection { present, mode, fromMismatch, confidential, legacy }`, so a tampered outer header cannot alter it and `fromMismatch` flags an outer From that disagrees. Encryption applies a Header Confidentiality Policy: the default `hcp_baseline` obscures the outer Subject to `[...]` and removes Comments and Keywords, so the real values live only in the ciphertext, and `decrypt` recovers them. Every emitted header routes through a fail-closed injection guard that rejects a CR, LF, or NUL value and a non-ftext name, and a malformed or contradictory `hp` wrap fails closed as `smime/bad-header-protection` rather than silently downgrading. The CMS crypto is unchanged. Inbound legacy RFC 8551 header protection is recognized opt-in: `verify` and `decrypt` with `opts.legacyHeaderProtection` detect a legacy `message/rfc822`-wrapped payload by the RFC 9788 §4.10.1 four-condition identification and surface the inner headers under `headerProtection.legacy = { headers, mode, fromMismatch, confidential }`, where `headers` is an ordered `[{ name, value }]` array retaining legally repeated fields such as `Received`. Those never appear in `protectedHeaders` and never set `present: true`. Because a legacy message is structurally indistinguishable from an ordinary forwarded `message/rfc822`, this is an explicit heuristic (§4.10.2, "no strong end-to-end guarantees"): a caller keying trust off `present` or `protectedHeaders` is never misled, and only one that explicitly reads `headerProtection.legacy.headers` and cross-checks `legacy.fromMismatch` consumes it. It is off by default, and a nested crypto layer, an inner `hp=`, a non-`message/rfc822` payload, or a duplicate Content-Type reports `legacy: null`. Bidirectionally interoperable with `openssl smime` and `openssl cms`. Fail-closed with typed `smime/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress` |
+| `pki.cms` | CMS signing, verification, encryption, and compression (RFC 5652). `sign(content, signers, opts)` produces a SignedData (§5), attached or detached, with one or many signers over RSA, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, EdDSA, the post-quantum ML-DSA-44/65/87 (RFC 9882) and SLH-DSA (all twelve FIPS 205 sets, RFC 9814), and composite ML-DSA pairing ML-DSA with a traditional RSA, ECDSA, or EdDSA key (accepted only when both components verify, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs). It builds the signed attributes (content-type, message-digest, signing-time) as canonical DER, signs the exact §5.4 preimage, and emits a DER `Buffer` or PEM. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, which signs a large detached payload without holding it in memory: the payload is hashed incrementally under every signer's digest algorithm in one pass, and `verify` accepts the same streamed form as its `content` option. A signer may also be key-only — `{ key, spki, keyIdentifier }` with no certificate — which RFC 5272 §3.2 requires when a Full PKI Request's signer is the key of a certification request that request carries: the signer identifier takes the subjectKeyIdentifier form carrying the identifier the request declares, the signature scheme resolves from the request's own public key, and no certificate is embedded. `verify(input, opts)` parses a SignedData over the strict `pki.schema.cms` codec, locates each SignerInfo's signer certificate by its issuerAndSerialNumber or subjectKeyIdentifier, and checks the signature over the exact §5.4 preimage: with signed attributes present it confirms the message-digest attribute equals the content digest and verifies over the DER re-encoding of the SignedAttributes (the on-wire `[0]` tag replaced by a universal SET OF), and otherwise directly over the content. It returns a per-signer verdict with the matched signer certificate. `valid` and `trusted` are separate claims and neither implies the other: a SignedData carries its own certificates, so `valid` says the signature is sound under one of them and nothing about who signed, while `trusted` says every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`, validated through the same RFC 5280 path engine `pki.path.validate` uses. Without anchors there is nothing to chain to and `trusted` is `false`; anchors that cannot be read throw, rather than reading as untrusted. An unrecognized option is refused rather than ignored. `countersign(cms, signers, opts)` adds a countersignature (§11.4) — a `SignerInfo` over the countersigned SignerInfo's signature value, any signer algorithm, nestable, with the primary bytes preserved so it still verifies — attached as the id-countersignature unsigned attribute; `verify` returns each countersignature's verdict under `signers[i].countersignatures` and every unsigned attribute — including an RFC 3161 timestamp token, attachable via `sign`'s `unsignedAttributes` — under `signers[i].unsignedAttrs`, surfaced unauthenticated. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` produces an EnvelopedData, AuthEnvelopedData (AES-GCM, the authenticated default), or EncryptedData, with recipients auto-dispatched off the certificate key to key transport (RSAES-OAEP; v1.5 is never emitted), key agreement (ephemeral-static ECDH over P-256/384/521 with the X9.63 KDF, and X25519/X448 with HKDF), symmetric key wrap, password (PBKDF2 with RFC 3211 PWRI-KEK), or the post-quantum ML-KEM KEMRecipientInfo (RFC 9629/9936), wrapping one fresh content key for every recipient. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, streamed through the AES-GCM or AES-CBC content cipher so a large plaintext is encrypted without being buffered whole; the ciphertext is assembled before the definite-length encryptedContent is emitted, byte-for-byte the buffered form. `decrypt(input, keyMaterial, opts)` recovers the content through the matching arm and returns it with an `authenticated` flag; every secret-dependent failure collapses to one uniform `cms/decrypt-failed` verdict (Bleichenbacher, EFAIL, and password-oracle freedom), and PKCS#1 v1.5 is decrypt-only under the RFC 3218 implicit-rejection countermeasure. With `opts.stream: true` the recovered `content` is an async iterable of plaintext chunks instead of a single Buffer, for a payload too large to hold whole; the authenticated modes (AuthEnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, AES-GCM) verify integrity before the iterable yields, so a forged message throws before any plaintext is exposed, while a CBC EnvelopedData or EncryptedData yields the plaintext as the cipher produces it. Every key-establishment secret the toolkit allocates is wiped once used, on the failing path as well as the succeeding one: the KEM shared secret and its derived key-encryption key, the raw ECDH / X25519 / X448 agreement secret, a password-derived key-encryption key, and the content-encryption key itself, cleared once the message is complete since all recipients share it. Caller-supplied key material is never written to (best-effort; NIST SP 800-227 §4.2, RFC 9629 §7). `authenticate(content, recipients, opts)` produces an `id-ct-authData` (§9): cleartext content plus an HMAC-SHA-256/384/512 MAC, authenticated but not encrypted, with the fresh MAC key wrapped for every recipient through the same RecipientInfo model. The MAC covers the authenticated attributes (content-type and message-digest) re-tagged to the EXPLICIT SET OF (§9.2), or the content octets directly; `decrypt` recovers the MAC key, recomputes the MAC and independently the message-digest (§9.3), and releases the content only after both pass, with every secret-dependent failure collapsing to the uniform `cms/decrypt-failed`. `compress(content, opts)` and `decompress(input, opts)` produce and consume a CompressedData (RFC 3274; ZLIB, version 0, id-alg-zlibCompress); decompress bounds the uncompressed output at 16 MiB and stops before it is materialized, so a decompression bomb fails closed as `cms/decompress-too-large`. Compression is a size transform with no integrity or confidentiality (RFC 8551 §2.4.5). `certsOnly(certs, opts?)` builds a certs-only certificate-management message (RFC 8551 §3.8): a degenerate SignedData with an empty signerInfos and no eContent that conveys certificates and CRLs without signing anything, `parseCertsOnly(input, opts?)` reads one back to its raw certificate and CRL DER (a CRL-only message is valid here, unlike the cert-required RFC 5272 form that `pki.est.parseCertsOnly` reads), and `isCertsOnly(input)` recognizes one structurally. Fail-closed with typed `cms/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `countersign`, `encrypt`, `authenticate`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress`, `certsOnly`, `parseCertsOnly`, `isCertsOnly` |
+| `pki.smime` | S/MIME message assembly, verification, encryption, and compression over the CMS layer (RFC 8551). `sign(content, signers, opts)` wraps a MIME entity in either form: `multipart/signed`, where the content stays readable in any MUA and a detached CMS SignedData rides alongside as `application/pkcs7-signature` with a matching `micalg`, or `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=signed-data`, where the whole entity is a base64 CMS SignedData. The signed bytes are the entity's §3.1.1 canonical form with CRLF line endings, and `verify(message, opts)` unwraps both forms and recomputes over the same canonicalizer, so a transport that re-wraps line endings still verifies while a tampered part fails. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` envelopes a MIME entity as an opaque `application/pkcs7-mime` message and `decrypt(message, keyMaterial, opts)` opens one, as `smime-type=authEnveloped-data` (AES-GCM, confidentiality and integrity, the default) or `smime-type=enveloped-data` (AES-CBC, confidentiality only, so `decrypt` reports `authenticated: false`, the §3.3 no-integrity caveat). The `smime-type` is derived from the CMS body rather than the header, and decryption is fail-closed and oracle-free. The crypto is entirely `pki.cms.sign` / `verify` / `encrypt` / `decrypt`, so it is algorithm-agnostic: any RSA / RSASSA-PSS / ECDSA / EdDSA / ML-DSA / SLH-DSA signer and any RSA-OAEP / ECDH / X25519 / X448 / AES-KW / PBKDF2 / ML-KEM recipient carries through. As with `cms.verify`, `verify` returns the per-signer verdict plus the recovered content, and `valid` and `trusted` are separate claims: `valid` says the signature is sound under a certificate the message carried, `trusted` says every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`. Anchoring here is validated for email at both ends of the chain — the signer certificate must carry `emailProtection` (RFC 8551 §4.4.4) and the anchor's own trust metadata must permit that purpose, since a root can be distrusted for email while remaining a good TLS root. Override either with `requiredEku` / `checkPurpose`. `compress(content, opts)` and `decompress(message, opts)` add the opaque `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=compressed-data; name=smime.p7z` frame (§3.6, RFC 3274), a size transform with no integrity or confidentiality (§2.4.5), bounded against a bomb; the recovered content, which may itself be signed or enveloped, is returned for the caller to re-verify. Header protection (RFC 9788): `sign` and `encrypt` take `opts.protectHeaders`, which inlines the caller's `opts.headers` on the Cryptographic Payload root (its Content-Type gaining `hp="clear"` when signed or `hp="cipher"` when encrypted) so the CMS signature or encryption covers them, defeating a transport that rewrites or reads Subject, From, and the rest. `verify` and `decrypt` surface the authenticated inner set as `protectedHeaders` plus `headerProtection { present, mode, fromMismatch, confidential, legacy }`, so a tampered outer header cannot alter it and `fromMismatch` flags an outer From that disagrees. Encryption applies a Header Confidentiality Policy: the default `hcp_baseline` obscures the outer Subject to `[...]` and removes Comments and Keywords, so the real values live only in the ciphertext, and `decrypt` recovers them. Every emitted header routes through a fail-closed injection guard that rejects a CR, LF, or NUL value and a non-ftext name, and a malformed or contradictory `hp` wrap fails closed as `smime/bad-header-protection` rather than silently downgrading. The CMS crypto is unchanged. Inbound legacy RFC 8551 header protection is recognized opt-in: `verify` and `decrypt` with `opts.legacyHeaderProtection` detect a legacy `message/rfc822`-wrapped payload by the RFC 9788 §4.10.1 four-condition identification and surface the inner headers under `headerProtection.legacy = { headers, mode, fromMismatch, confidential }`, where `headers` is an ordered `[{ name, value }]` array retaining legally repeated fields such as `Received`. Those never appear in `protectedHeaders` and never set `present: true`. Because a legacy message is structurally indistinguishable from an ordinary forwarded `message/rfc822`, this is an explicit heuristic (§4.10.2, "no strong end-to-end guarantees"): a caller keying trust off `present` or `protectedHeaders` is never misled, and only one that explicitly reads `headerProtection.legacy.headers` and cross-checks `legacy.fromMismatch` consumes it. It is off by default, and a nested crypto layer, an inner `hp=`, a non-`message/rfc822` payload, or a duplicate Content-Type reports `legacy: null`. Bidirectionally interoperable with `openssl smime` and `openssl cms`. `buildCertsOnly(certs, opts?)` wraps a `pki.cms.certsOnly` certificate-management message in one `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=certs-only; name=smime.p7c` entity, read back by OpenSSL's `pkcs7 -print_certs`. Fail-closed with typed `smime/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress`, `buildCertsOnly` |
 | `pki.tsp` | Time-Stamp Protocol (RFC 3161). `sign(messageImprint, tsa, opts)` produces a TimeStampToken: a CMS SignedData over `pki.cms.sign` whose content is a `TSTInfo` carrying the timestamped message imprint, the TSA policy, a serial number, and `genTime` with optional accuracy, nonce, and ordering, plus the §2.4.2 signing-certificate attribute binding the token to the TSA certificate (SHA-2 imprints, any `pki.cms.sign` TSA key). `request` and `parseRequest` build and parse the TimeStampReq a client sends (imprint, requested policy, nonce, certReq); `response` and `parseResponse` handle the TimeStampResp a TSA returns, either a granted status wrapping a token or a rejection with PKIStatus and failure info, with the §2.4.2 status-to-token coupling enforced in both directions. `verify(token, data, opts)` verifies a token fail-closed: the CMS signature over the exact signed bytes, the message imprint recomputed from the data, the TSTInfo content type, the ESSCertID(V2) binding to the TSA certificate, the §2.3 critical timeStamping-only extendedKeyUsage, the request nonce when used, and, with a trust anchor supplied, full certification-path validation of the TSA certificate at the token's `genTime` — judged under the `timeStamping` purpose, so an anchor's own per-purpose trust metadata reaches the decision rather than sitting inert. It returns `{ valid, trusted, genTime, serialNumber, tstInfo, ... }`, where `trusted` is the separate claim that the authority chained to an anchor you named: without one there is nothing to chain to and it is `false`, which is the distinction a timestamp re-read years later turns on — `sign`, `request`, `parseRequest`, `response`, `parseResponse`, `verify` |
 | `pki.ocsp` | Online Certificate Status Protocol (RFC 6960), both the responder and relying-party surface. `buildRequest(query, opts)` builds an OCSPRequest for one or more `{ cert, issuer }` pairs, with the CertID hashed under SHA-1 by default per the RFC 5019 lightweight profile or under SHA-2, plus an optional RFC 9654 nonce and an optional requestor signature. `sign(responseData, responder, opts)` produces a signed BasicOCSPResponse over the exact `ResponseData` DER, from the issuing CA directly or a delegated responder, under any `pki.cms.sign` key including the post-quantum ML-DSA and SLH-DSA sets, with `good`, `revoked` (reason and time), or `unknown` per-certificate status. `buildErrorResponse(status)` produces the unsigned §2.3 error (`tryLater`, `unauthorized`, and the rest). `verify(response, opts)` verifies a response fail-closed against the same hardened gates `pki.path.ocspChecker` runs: the CertID binding, responder authorization (the issuing CA, or a CA-issued delegate bearing id-kp-OCSPSigning and id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck and passing the full out-of-path certificate gates), the signature over `tbsResponseDataBytes`, currency against `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate`, and the request-nonce echo. It returns `{ status: "good" / "revoked" / "unknown", ... }` and never silently accepts. `verifyRequest(request, opts)` is the responder-side inverse of `buildRequest`: it verifies a client's signed request (RFC 6960 §4.1.1) under the requestor certificate the request carries, trying each embedded certificate since the field is unordered, and reports `signed`, `signatureValid`, every certificate whose key verified (`signerCerts`, so a key carried under an expired certificate beside its renewal is not hidden behind ordering) with the first one's decoded subject, the full embedded certificate bag (`certs`, including intermediates for path building), and the request's CertIDs; an unsigned request is reported with `signed: false` rather than refused. Transport-free — `buildRequest`, `sign`, `buildErrorResponse`, `verify`, `verifyRequest` |
 | `pki.ct` | Certificate Transparency (RFC 6962). `parseSctList` decodes the `SignedCertificateTimestampList` a certificate or OCSP response carries, a TLS-presentation-language payload inside the §3.3 double DER wrap, into per-SCT log id, exact `timestamp` (BigInt), named signature algorithm, and raw signature. `reconstructSignedData` rebuilds the exact `digitally-signed` preimage, and `verifySct` verifies an SCT signature against a log's public key, routing an ECDSA signature through the strict DER-conformance gate and verifying through the crypto engine, resolving true or false and throwing a typed error on a structural fault. On the producing side, `encodeSctList` builds the extension value byte for byte as the exact inverse of `parseSctList`, and `signSct` performs a log's signing step. For trust, `parseLogList` ingests the CT log-list JSON into constraint-carrying trusted logs, recomputing each log's id as SHA-256 of its key and refusing a disagreeing id (a swapped key, §3.2) and decoding the state and temporal-interval constraints; `verifySctWithLogList` resolves the log key from an SCT's log id, enforces the state (usable, qualified, and readonly trusted; retired only before retirement; pending and rejected refused) and the temporal-interval window, then delegates the signature check to `verifySct`. `verifyLogListSignature(json, signature, publicKey)` verifies the detached `log_list.sig` over the raw log-list bytes against a caller-pinned signer key (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5/SHA-256 and an EC P-256 arm, with forgeable-key defenses failing closed), cross-checked against `openssl dgst`. `fetchLogList(opts)` turns that chain into a live client: it GETs the `log_list.json` and its detached `log_list.sig` over `pki.transport`, verifies the detached signature over the raw fetched bytes against a caller-pinned distributor key before parsing, so an unverified document is never parsed, read, cached, or surfaced, then ingests the same bytes through `parseLogList` and returns the trusted-log set plus the surfaced `version` and `timestamp`. Above the per-SCT layer, `verifySctList` renders a certificate-level verdict over every SCT a certificate carries (§3.3), reporting how many distinct trusted logs verified an SCT (so a duplicated SCT cannot inflate the count) and from how many distinct trusted operators against a caller's CT policy (`minScts` and `minOperators`, both defaulting to the RFC floor of one), where a policy shortfall is a verdict and a per-SCT failure is a recorded row rather than a thrown call; `x509CertEntry` reconstructs the precertificate log entry from a final certificate by removing the SCT-list extension from its TBSCertificate as byte surgery, so its embedded SCTs verify end to end (§3.2). The toolkit bakes in no vendor URL or key, TLS trust is explicit with `rejectUnauthorized` always on, each response is size-capped before the trust chain, and the transport is injectable so the whole path is testable offline — `parseSctList`, `reconstructSignedData`, `verifySct`, `encodeSctList`, `signSct`, `parseLogList`, `verifySctWithLogList`, `verifySctList`, `x509CertEntry`, `verifyLogListSignature`, `fetchLogList` |

package/index.js

@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ module.exports = {
   // its path builder through. That is plumbing between two internal modules, not an operator verb,
   // and exporting the module wholesale would put it on the public surface.
   cms:       { verify: cms.verify, sign: cms.sign, countersign: cms.countersign, encrypt: cms.encrypt,
-    authenticate: cms.authenticate, decrypt: cms.decrypt, compress: cms.compress, decompress: cms.decompress },
+    authenticate: cms.authenticate, decrypt: cms.decrypt, compress: cms.compress, decompress: cms.decompress,
+    certsOnly: cms.certsOnly, parseCertsOnly: cms.parseCertsOnly, isCertsOnly: cms.isCertsOnly },
   smime:     smime,
   // `cmc` interprets an RFC 5272 Full PKI Response into one terminal verdict;
   // `pki.schema.cmc` is the decoder underneath it.

package/lib/acme.js

@@ -330,6 +330,9 @@ var SPECS = {
     { name: "suggestedWindow", type: "object", required: true },
     { name: "explanationURL", type: "url" },
   ],
+  ordersList: [
+    { name: "orders", type: "array", required: true, elemType: "url" },   // RFC 8555 sec. 7.1.2.1 -- an array of order URLs
+  ],
 };
 
 function _checkType(kind, field, value, obj) {
@@ -895,7 +898,13 @@ function postAsGet(o) {
 // as opaque strings (the server decides support via unsupportedContact).
 function _assertContacts(contacts) {
   if (!Array.isArray(contacts)) throw E("acme/bad-contact", "contact must be an array of URL strings");
-  contacts.forEach(function (c) {
+  // An own-index loop, NOT forEach: forEach SKIPS a hole in a sparse array (`new Array(1)`), so the hole
+  // would never be validated and JSON serialization would sign `{"contact":[null]}`. Every index is
+  // read through an own-property check, so a sparse hole -- or a nullish entry -- is a typed
+  // acme/bad-contact rather than a silently-signed null.
+  for (var i = 0; i < contacts.length; i++) {
+    if (!_hasOwn(contacts, i)) throw E("acme/bad-contact", "contact[" + i + "] is missing (a sparse array is not allowed)");
+    var c = contacts[i];
     if (!_isUriString(c)) throw E("acme/bad-contact", "each contact must be a URI string (RFC 8555 sec. 7.1.2)");
     // URI schemes are case-insensitive (RFC 3986), so detect mailto regardless of
     // case -- "MAILTO:a@b?..." must still hit the RFC 6068 header-field guards.
@@ -905,7 +914,7 @@ function _assertContacts(contacts) {
       if (addr.indexOf(",") !== -1) throw E("acme/bad-contact", "a mailto contact must be a single addr-spec, not a comma list (RFC 8555 sec. 7.3)");
       if (_countAtSigns(addr) !== 1) throw E("acme/bad-contact", "a mailto contact must be exactly one addr-spec");
     }
-  });
+  }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1315,7 +1324,11 @@ async function finalize(o) {
   }
   if (o.identifiers !== undefined) {
     if (!Array.isArray(o.identifiers) || o.identifiers.length === 0) throw E("acme/bad-input", "finalize identifiers must be the non-empty order identifier array");
-    o.identifiers.forEach(_validateOrderIdentifier);   // caller-supplied -> validate before comparing (no raw TypeError)
+    // An own-index loop, NOT forEach: forEach skips a hole in a sparse array, leaving it unvalidated.
+    for (var ii = 0; ii < o.identifiers.length; ii++) {
+      if (!_hasOwn(o.identifiers, ii)) throw E("acme/bad-input", "finalize identifiers[" + ii + "] is missing (a sparse array is not allowed)");
+      _validateOrderIdentifier(o.identifiers[ii]);   // caller-supplied -> validate before comparing (no raw TypeError)
+    }
     _assertCsrIdentifiers(parsed, o.identifiers);
   }
   var payload = { csr: jose.base64url.encode(csrBuf) };
@@ -1378,6 +1391,35 @@ function deactivate(o) {
   });
 }
 
+/**
+ * @primitive  pki.acme.updateAccount
+ * @signature  pki.acme.updateAccount(opts) -> Promise<object>
+ * @since      0.6.4
+ * @status     stable
+ * @spec       RFC 8555
+ * @related    pki.acme.client, pki.acme.newAccount, pki.acme.deactivate
+ *
+ * Build an account-update POST (RFC 8555 sec. 7.3.2): a kid-signed JWS whose payload carries the
+ * account fields a client may set. `contact` is that field (RFC 6068 mailto hygiene applies; an empty
+ * array clears all contacts). `opts` = `{ key, alg, nonce, url, kid, contact }`. The server ignores
+ * updates to `status`, `termsOfServiceAgreed`, `orders`, and unrecognized fields (sec. 7.3.2), so the
+ * `pki.acme.client` wrapper refuses those at the door rather than emit a silently-discarded payload.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var ec = await pki.key.generate({ name: "ECDSA", namedCurve: "P-256" });
+ *   var key = ec.privateKey;
+ *   var nonce = "oFvnlFP1wIhRlYS2jTaXbA";
+ *   var kid = "https://ca.example/acct/1";
+ *   await pki.acme.updateAccount({ key, alg: "ES256", nonce, url: kid, kid, contact: ["mailto:admin@example.org"] });
+ */
+function updateAccount(o) {
+  return _promised(function () {
+    if (!_isObject(o)) throw E("acme/bad-input", "a request options object is required");
+    _assertContacts(o.contact);   // RFC 6068 mailto hygiene; an empty array clears all contacts
+    return _signOuter({ key: o.key, alg: o.alg, nonce: o.nonce, url: o.url, kid: o.kid }, { contact: o.contact });
+  });
+}
+
 /**
  * @primitive  pki.acme.revokeCert
  * @signature  pki.acme.revokeCert(opts) -> Promise<object>
@@ -2040,11 +2082,11 @@ function _splitLinkParams(rest) {
 }
 // Does an RFC 8288 rel value (a space-separated relation-type list) contain "alternate" as a WHOLE token,
 // case-insensitively (RFC 8288 sec. 3.3)? Never a substring -- "alternateX" / "xalternate" do not match.
-function _relHasAlternate(rel) {
+function _relHas(rel, relName) {
   // The rel value is a SPACE-separated relation-type list (RFC 8288 sec. 3.3) -- split on SP only, NOT a tab
-  // or other whitespace, so "alternate<TAB>index" is a single (non-matching) relation-type, not a false match.
+  // or other whitespace, so "next<TAB>index" is a single (non-matching) relation-type, not a false match.
   var toks = String(rel).split(" ");
-  for (var i = 0; i < toks.length; i++) { if (toks[i].toLowerCase() === "alternate") return true; }
+  for (var i = 0; i < toks.length; i++) { if (toks[i].toLowerCase() === relName) return true; }
   return false;
 }
 // Parse one link-value `"<" URI-Reference ">" *( ";" link-param )` -> { uri, rel } (rel "" if absent);
@@ -2084,20 +2126,28 @@ function _parseLinkValue(raw) {
   }
   return { uri: uri, rel: rel, anchor: anchor, relSeen: relSeen };
 }
-// Parse an RFC 8288 Link response header for rel="alternate" certificate-chain targets (RFC 8555 sec.
-// 7.4.2): read the (case-insensitive, node-lower-cased) `link` field -- a combined string OR an array --
-// bound its length, split into link-values, keep the alternate-rel ones, resolve each against the download
-// URL, https-gate, and dedupe by resolved URL. An UNTRUSTED header: every malformed shape or non-https /
-// unresolvable target fails closed as acme/bad-link. Scoped to the alternate relation the download consumes.
-function _parseLinkAlternates(headers, base) {
+// Parse an RFC 8288 Link response header for the targets of ONE relation type -- the sec. 7.4.2
+// `alternate` certificate chains and the sec. 7.1.2.1 `next` orders page share every byte-cap /
+// control-octet / rel-well-formedness / anchor-context / resolve / https-gate / origin-gate / dedupe
+// rule, and only the matched relation and the singleton rule vary. Read the (case-insensitive,
+// node-lower-cased) `link` field -- a combined string OR an array -- bound its length, split into
+// link-values, keep the `relName`-rel ones, resolve each against `base`, https-gate, origin-gate to
+// `base`'s origin, and dedupe by resolved URL. An UNTRUSTED header: every malformed shape or non-https /
+// off-origin / unresolvable target fails closed as acme/bad-link. opts.singleton (RFC 8288 sec. 3.3)
+// makes >1 DISTINCT target ambiguous -> acme/bad-link, for a singleton relation such as `next`.
+function _parseLinkRelation(headers, base, relName, opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
   var raw = null;
   for (var k in headers) { if (_hasOwn(headers, k) && k.toLowerCase() === "link") { raw = headers[k]; break; } }
   if (raw == null) return [];
-  var baseUrl = new URL(base), baseOrigin = baseUrl.origin, baseHref = baseUrl.href;   // the download URL
-  var fields = Array.isArray(raw) ? raw : [raw], out = [], seen = Object.create(null), totalBytes = 0;
-  // Seed the dedup set with the PRIMARY download URL: a CA that advertises the certificate URL itself as a
-  // rel="alternate" (it is not an alternate of itself, RFC 8555 sec. 7.4.2) must not cause a redundant re-fetch.
-  seen[_dedupKey(baseHref)] = true;
+  var baseUrl = new URL(base), baseOrigin = baseUrl.origin, baseHref = baseUrl.href;   // the request URL
+  var baseKey = _dedupKey(baseHref);
+  var fields = Array.isArray(raw) ? raw : [raw], out = [], seen = Object.create(null), distinctCount = 0, totalBytes = 0;
+  // The base URL is not a relation OF itself -- a certificate advertised as its own rel="alternate" (RFC 8555
+  // sec. 7.4.2), or an orders page advertised as its own rel="next" -- so it is excluded from the followable
+  // set below and never causes a redundant re-fetch. It is still COUNTED toward the singleton test, so a
+  // self-link plus a distinct target is the two distinct targets RFC 8288 sec. 3.3 makes ambiguous, rather
+  // than one target with the self-link silently dropped.
   for (var fi = 0; fi < fields.length; fi++) {
     var field = String(fields[fi]);
     // Cap the AGGREGATE across every Link field (CWE-770): an injected transport / duplicate-Link array can
@@ -2123,7 +2173,7 @@ function _parseLinkAlternates(headers, base) {
       // list malformed, even if another token is "alternate". (Empty tokens are internal 1*SP -- skip them.)
       var relToks = lv.rel === "" ? [] : lv.rel.split(" ");
       for (var ri = 0; ri < relToks.length; ri++) { if (relToks[ri] !== "" && !_validRelType(relToks[ri])) throw E("acme/bad-link", "a Link rel value contains a token that is not a valid relation-type (RFC 8288 sec. 3.3): " + JSON.stringify(lv.rel)); }
-      if (!_relHasAlternate(lv.rel)) continue;
+      if (!_relHas(lv.rel, relName)) continue;
       // RFC 8288 sec. 3.2: an `anchor` overrides the link's CONTEXT. A certificate alternate's context is the
       // certificate itself (the download URL); a link anchored to another resource is an alternate of THAT
       // resource, not this certificate -- skip it. No anchor, or one resolving to the download URL, is ours.
@@ -2143,12 +2193,15 @@ function _parseLinkAlternates(headers, base) {
       var resolved;
       try { resolved = _resolveLocation(lv.uri, base); }   // resolves a relative ref + enforces the https gate
       catch (e) {
-        // A non-https alternate is a security-relevant anomaly -> fail the whole header closed. A target that is a
+        // A non-https target is a security-relevant anomaly -> fail the whole header closed. A target that is a
         // valid RFC 3986 reference but not a canonical ACME request URL (literal dot-segments, or a sub-delim
         // WHATWG would re-encode in a special-scheme query) cannot be signed AND requested byte-identically
-        // (RFC 8555 sec. 6.4), so it is merely UNUSABLE -> skip THIS alternate and keep the others (sec. 7.4.2
-        // permits several), rather than discarding every valid alternate over one non-canonical spelling.
-        if (e && e.code === "acme/insecure-url") throw E("acme/bad-link", "a rel=\"alternate\" Link target is not an https URL: " + JSON.stringify(lv.uri), e);
+        // (RFC 8555 sec. 6.4), so it is UNUSABLE. For a MULTI-target relation (alternate) it is skipped and the
+        // others are kept (sec. 7.4.2 permits several), rather than discarding every valid alternate over one
+        // non-canonical spelling. For a SINGLETON relation (next) there is only the one target, so skipping it
+        // would silently END pagination and omit orders -- an unusable singleton fails closed instead.
+        if (e && e.code === "acme/insecure-url") throw E("acme/bad-link", "a rel=\"" + relName + "\" Link target is not an https URL: " + JSON.stringify(lv.uri), e);
+        if (opts.singleton) throw E("acme/bad-link", "a rel=\"" + relName + "\" Link target is not a usable ACME request URL: " + _stringify(lv.uri), e);
         continue;
       }
       // Origin-gate: an alternate is fetched with the ACCOUNT-KEY-signed POST-as-GET, so an untrusted (TLS-
@@ -2157,18 +2210,28 @@ function _parseLinkAlternates(headers, base) {
       // directory" threat the cross-origin mTLS-credential strip already defends (RFC 8555 sec. 7.4.2
       // alternates are the CA's own chains, served alongside the certificate).
       var parsed = new URL(resolved);
-      if (parsed.origin !== baseOrigin) throw E("acme/bad-link", "a rel=\"alternate\" Link target is not on the certificate download's origin (SSRF guard): " + JSON.stringify(lv.uri));
+      if (parsed.origin !== baseOrigin) throw E("acme/bad-link", "a rel=\"" + relName + "\" Link target is not on the request URL's origin (SSRF guard): " + JSON.stringify(lv.uri));
       // Dedup by the RFC 3986 sec. 6.2.2-normalized href (lowercased scheme+host, no default :443, no dot-segments,
       // unreserved pct-escapes decoded), so equivalent spellings ("acme.example" vs "ACME.EXAMPLE:443", "/alt" vs
       // "/%61lt") collapse to one fetch (CWE-770 amplification) -- while the VERBATIM resolved string is what is
       // fetched + signed (RFC 8555 sec. 6.4 exact-URL match).
       var key = _dedupKey(parsed.href);
-      if (!seen[key]) { seen[key] = true; out.push(resolved); }
+      if (seen[key]) continue;                  // an equivalent spelling of this target already counted
+      seen[key] = true;
+      distinctCount += 1;                        // every distinct matched target, INCLUDING a self-link
+      if (key !== baseKey) out.push(resolved);   // the base is not followable, but it still counted above
     }
   }
+  // RFC 8288 sec. 3.3: `next` is a singleton relation-type, so more than one DISTINCT target is ambiguous.
+  // The deduped set already collapses equivalent spellings, so this fires only on genuinely different URLs.
+  if (opts.singleton && distinctCount > 1) throw E("acme/bad-link", "the Link header names more than one distinct rel=\"" + relName + "\" target (RFC 8288 sec. 3.3, a singleton relation)");
   return out;
 }
 
+function _parseLinkAlternates(headers, base) { return _parseLinkRelation(headers, base, "alternate", {}); }
+// The single sec. 7.1.2.1 `next` orders-page target resolved against `base`, or null when the header names none.
+function _parseLinkNext(headers, base) { var m = _parseLinkRelation(headers, base, "next", { singleton: true }); return m.length ? m[0] : null; }
+
 /**
  * @primitive  pki.acme.client
  * @signature  pki.acme.client(directoryUrl, opts) -> client
@@ -2224,6 +2287,8 @@ var _METHOD_OPTS = {
   revoke: { certAlg: 1, certJwk: 1, certKey: 1, certificate: 1, reason: 1 },
   keyChange: { newAlg: 1, newJwk: 1, newKey: 1 },
   renewalWindow: { random: 1, clock: 1, replaced: 1, previous: 1 },
+  updateAccount: { contact: 1 },
+  listOrders: { maxPages: 1 },
 };
 // Settle a per-method options bag the way the constructor settles its own: guard.identifier.optionsObject
 // snapshots the bag and refuses one a getter rewrites mid-read (a `requireBinding` getter that grows a
@@ -2713,6 +2778,58 @@ function client(directoryUrl, opts) {
   function _deactivateAccount() { return _promised(function () { return _post(_requireKid(), deactivate, null, "kid").then(function (res) { return validate("account", _json(res)); }); }); }
   function _deactivateAuthorization(url) { return _promised(function () { return _post(_clientUrl(url), deactivate, null, "kid").then(function (res) { return validate("authorization", _json(res)); }); }); }
 
+  // updateAccount (RFC 8555 sec. 7.3.2): a kid-signed POST to the account URL updating the caller's
+  // contact set. The options bag is snapshotted FIRST (a getter that grows a key after the check cannot
+  // slip past), then the fields the server MUST ignore are refused with guidance -- a caller that sends
+  // one has silently not done what they asked, so the client will not emit a payload the CA discards.
+  function _updateAccount(o) {
+    return _promised(function () {
+      o = guard.identifier.optionsObject(o, E, "acme/bad-input", "pki.acme updateAccount options");
+      if (o.status !== undefined) throw E("acme/bad-input", "updateAccount cannot change the account status; use deactivateAccount (RFC 8555 sec. 7.3.6 is the only client-settable status)");
+      // RFC 8555 sec. 7.3.2 says the server MUST IGNORE a termsOfServiceAgreed update to the account, so
+      // sending it is a silently-dropped no-op; this client refuses it at the door instead. termsOfServiceAgreed
+      // is set at account creation (sec. 7.3.1 newAccount), and a CA whose terms have changed answers with a
+      // 403 userActionRequired problem (sec. 7.3.3) that directs a HUMAN to the terms URL -- it is not re-agreed
+      // through an account update.
+      if (o.termsOfServiceAgreed !== undefined) throw E("acme/bad-input", "the server MUST ignore a termsOfServiceAgreed update to the account (RFC 8555 sec. 7.3.2); it is set at account creation, and a changed-terms CA answers with a userActionRequired problem (sec. 7.3.3) directing a human to the terms URL");
+      if (o.orders !== undefined) throw E("acme/bad-input", "the account orders URL is server-assigned and cannot be updated (RFC 8555 sec. 7.3.2)");
+      if (o.externalAccountBinding !== undefined) throw E("acme/bad-input", "externalAccountBinding is not updateable by the client (RFC 8555 sec. 7.1.2 / 7.3.4)");
+      guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(o, _METHOD_OPTS.updateAccount, E, "acme/bad-input", "unknown updateAccount option ");
+      var account = _requireKid();
+      return _post(account, updateAccount, { contact: o.contact }, "kid").then(function (res) { return validate("account", _json(res)); });
+    });
+  }
+
+  // listOrders (RFC 8555 sec. 7.1.2.1): a POST-as-GET to the account's orders URL, aggregating the
+  // sec. 7.1.2.1 `Link: rel="next"` pages. The `next` header is untrusted (TLS-delivered, unsigned) and
+  // steers the next account-key-signed POST-as-GET, so it is https-gated, confined to the request URL's
+  // origin (SSRF), deduped against a visited-page loop, and bounded by maxPages (CWE-770 amplification).
+  function _listOrders(ordersUrl, o) {
+    return _promised(function () {
+      o = _gateOpts(o, _METHOD_OPTS.listOrders, "listOrders");
+      var maxPages = guard.limits.cap(o.maxPages, "maxPages", 50, { E: E, code: "acme/bad-input", min: 1 });
+      var out = [], seen = intrinsic.create(null), pages = 0, truncated = false;
+      function fetchPage(pageUrl) {
+        seen[_dedupKey(pageUrl)] = true;   // pageUrl is a canonical _clientUrl output, so the dedup key is consistent
+        return _postAsGet(pageUrl).then(function (res) {
+          pages += 1;
+          var body = validate("ordersList", _json(res));
+          for (var i = 0; i < body.orders.length; i++) _push(out, body.orders[i]);
+          var next = _parseLinkNext(res.headers, pageUrl);   // resolved against this page, https + origin-gated, singleton
+          if (next == null) return;
+          var nextUrl = _clientUrl(next);   // re-affirm the https gate on the followed target
+          // The loop guard runs BEFORE the cap decision: a next to an already-visited page names nothing new,
+          // so the list is COMPLETE (not truncated). Only a next to an unseen page that the cap forbids is a
+          // truncation -- a cycle landing exactly on the cap must not be reported as one.
+          if (seen[_dedupKey(nextUrl)]) return;
+          if (pages >= maxPages) { truncated = true; return; }
+          return fetchPage(nextUrl);
+        });
+      }
+      return fetchPage(_clientUrl(ordersUrl)).then(function () { return { orders: out, pages: pages, truncated: truncated }; });
+    });
+  }
+
   function _keyChange(o) { return _promised(function () { return _keyChangeBody(o); }); }
   function _keyChangeBody(o) {
     o = _gateOpts(o, _METHOD_OPTS.keyChange, "keyChange");
@@ -2878,6 +2995,8 @@ function client(directoryUrl, opts) {
     revokeCert: _revokeCert,
     deactivateAccount: _deactivateAccount,
     deactivateAuthorization: _deactivateAuthorization,
+    updateAccount: _updateAccount,
+    listOrders: _listOrders,
     keyChange: _keyChange,
     renewalInfo: _renewalInfo,
     renewalWindow: _renewalWindow,
@@ -2905,6 +3024,7 @@ module.exports = {
   finalize: finalize,
   challengeResponse: challengeResponse,
   deactivate: deactivate,
+  updateAccount: updateAccount,
   revokeCert: revokeCert,
   keyChange: keyChange,
   // ARI (RFC 9773)

package/lib/cms-sign.js

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 var asn1 = require("./asn1-der");
 var oid = require("./oid");
 var x509 = require("./schema-x509");
+var crlSchema = require("./schema-crl");
 var pkix = require("./schema-pkix");
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
 
@@ -576,6 +577,71 @@ function _dedupe(ders) {
   return out;
 }
 
+// ---- pki.cms.certsOnly (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8 / RFC 5652 sec. 5.1) --------------
+// A certificate-management ("certs-only") message: a degenerate SignedData that conveys
+// certificates and/or CRLs and signs nothing. Documented by the @primitive block in cms-verify.js
+// (the @module pki.cms home).
+var KNOWN_CERTS_ONLY_OPTS = { crls: 1, pem: 1 };
+
+// A single entity or an array of them -> a dense array (empty when the argument is nullish).
+// reqDenseArray snapshots the array structure and refuses a sparse hole or a nullish entry
+// (M15), so a caller array that mutates under iteration cannot reintroduce a hole.
+function _certsOnlyList(v, what) {
+  if (v == null) return [];
+  return intrinsic.isArray(v) ? _b.reqDenseArray(v, what) : [v];
+}
+
+// Normalize one caller-supplied certificate/CRL to validated raw DER: snapshot the byte source at
+// the door so a later mutation cannot swap the bytes (M15), accept a PEM block, then parse it with
+// `parseFn` so a non-<thing> -- including a tagged CertificateChoices / RevocationInfoChoice
+// alternative, whose first byte is a context tag rather than 0x30 -- is a typed cms/bad-input and is
+// never embedded (M9/M10/M11). `pemLabel` is the PEM armor type.
+function _normEntityDer(v, what, pemLabel, parseFn) {
+  var der;
+  if (guard.bytes.isByteSource(v)) {
+    der = guard.bytes.snapshotSource(v, CmsError, "cms/bad-input", what);
+    if (der[0] !== 0x30) {
+      var decoded = pkix.pemDecodeLenient(intrinsic.bufToString(der, "latin1"), pemLabel);
+      if (decoded === null) throw _err("cms/bad-input", what + " must be a plain DER " + pemLabel + " (a tagged alternative is not permitted) or a PEM block");
+      der = decoded;
+    }
+  } else if (typeof v === "string") {
+    var d2 = pkix.pemDecodeLenient(v, pemLabel);
+    if (d2 === null) throw _err("cms/bad-input", what + " PEM is not a " + pemLabel + " block");
+    der = d2;
+  } else {
+    throw _err("cms/bad-input", what + " must be a DER Buffer or a PEM string");
+  }
+  try { parseFn(der); }
+  catch (e) { throw _err("cms/bad-input", what + " is not a valid " + pemLabel, e); }
+  return der;
+}
+function _parseX509(der) { return x509.parse(der); }
+function _parseCrl(der) { return crlSchema.parse(der); }
+
+function certsOnly(certs, opts) {
+  opts = guard.identifier.optionsObject(opts, _err, "cms/bad-input", "pki.cms.certsOnly options");
+  guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(opts, KNOWN_CERTS_ONLY_OPTS, _err, "cms/bad-input", "unknown opts field ");
+  var certList = _certsOnlyList(certs, "certificates");
+  var crlList = _certsOnlyList(opts.crls, "crls");
+  // RFC 8551 sec. 3.8 conveys "certificates and/or CRLs"; a message with neither conveys nothing.
+  if (!certList.length && !crlList.length) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "a certs-only message must carry at least one certificate or CRL (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8)");
+  // Each entity validated + snapshotted at the door, then DER-sorted + deduped (X.690 sec. 11.6).
+  var certDers = intrinsic.sort(_dedupe(intrinsic.map(certList, function (c) { return _normEntityDer(c, "a certificate", "CERTIFICATE", _parseX509); })), intrinsic.compare);
+  var crlDers = intrinsic.sort(_dedupe(intrinsic.map(crlList, function (c) { return _normEntityDer(c, "a CRL", "X509 CRL", _parseCrl); })), intrinsic.compare);
+  // The degenerate SignedData (RFC 5652 sec. 5.1): version 1 (all choices plain, id-data, no signer),
+  // an empty digestAlgorithms + signerInfos, an id-data encapContentInfo with eContent ABSENT, and the
+  // caller certificates [0] / crls [1]. The strict re-parse enforces the version<->contents coupling.
+  var encap = b.sequence([b.oid(OID_DATA)]);
+  var sdFields = [b.integer(1n), b.set([]), encap];
+  if (certDers.length) intrinsic.push(sdFields, b.contextConstructed(0, intrinsic.bufferConcat(certDers)));   // [0] IMPLICIT SET OF
+  if (crlDers.length) intrinsic.push(sdFields, b.contextConstructed(1, intrinsic.bufferConcat(crlDers)));     // [1] IMPLICIT SET OF
+  intrinsic.push(sdFields, b.set([]));                                                                        // signerInfos SET OF {}
+  var signedData = b.sequence(sdFields);
+  var contentInfo = b.sequence([b.oid(OID_SIGNED_DATA), b.explicit(0, signedData)]);
+  return opts.pem ? pkix.pemEncode(contentInfo, "CMS", frameworkError.PemError) : contentInfo;
+}
+
 function _toBuf(v, what) {
   if (guard.bytes.isByteSource(v)) return guard.bytes.snapshotSource(v, CmsError, "cms/bad-input", what);
   throw _err("cms/bad-input", what + " must be a Buffer");
@@ -785,7 +851,7 @@ function _countersign(cmsInput, signers, opts) {
 //   * the `crls [1]` preservation branches in `countersign`. pki.cms.sign never emits a crls field,
 //     so a store this producer countersigns never carries one to preserve.
 module.exports = {
-  sign: sign, countersign: countersign,
+  sign: sign, countersign: countersign, certsOnly: certsOnly,
   // @internal -- the signer-descriptor field tables, for a verb that AUTHORS signer descriptors
   // from its own caller's options and gates them at its own door.
   KNOWN_SIGNER_CERT_KEYS: KNOWN_SIGNER_CERT_KEYS,

package/lib/cms-verify.js

@@ -1440,5 +1440,129 @@ var compress = cmsCompress.compress;
  */
 var decompress = cmsCompress.decompress;
 
+// A certs-only reader/recognizer input: a DER Buffer (snapshotted at the door so a later mutation
+// cannot swap the bytes the verdict describes) or a PEM CMS/PKCS7 block. An undecodable input is a
+// typed cms/bad-input, never a raw throw.
+var KNOWN_PARSE_CERTS_ONLY_OPTS = { maxCerts: 1 };
+function _certsOnlyInputDer(input, verb) {
+  if (guard.bytes.isByteSource(input)) {
+    var buf = guard.bytes.snapshotSource(input, CmsError, "cms/bad-input", verb + " input");
+    if (buf[0] === 0x30) return buf;
+    input = intrinsic.bufToString(buf, "latin1");
+  }
+  if (typeof input === "string") {
+    var der = pkix.pemDecodeLenient(input, "CMS");
+    if (der === null) der = pkix.pemDecodeLenient(input, "PKCS7");
+    if (der === null) throw _err("cms/bad-input", verb + " input is neither DER nor a PEM CMS/PKCS7 block");
+    return der;
+  }
+  throw _err("cms/bad-input", verb + " input must be a DER Buffer or a PEM string");
+}
+
+/**
+ * @primitive  pki.cms.certsOnly
+ * @signature  pki.cms.certsOnly(certs, opts?) -> Buffer | string
+ * @since      0.6.3
+ * @status     stable
+ * @spec       RFC 8551, RFC 5652
+ * @related    pki.cms.parseCertsOnly, pki.cms.isCertsOnly, pki.smime.buildCertsOnly
+ *
+ * Build a "certs-only" certificate-management message (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8): a degenerate CMS
+ * `SignedData` that conveys certificates and/or CRLs and signs nothing. The emitted structure is
+ * version 1 with an empty `digestAlgorithms`, an id-data `encapContentInfo` whose `eContent` is absent,
+ * the certificates in `certificates [0]` and any CRLs in `crls [1]` (both DER-sorted and deduplicated),
+ * and an empty `signerInfos`. It is how an AIA `caIssuers` bundle or an `application/pkcs7-mime;
+ * smime-type=certs-only` attachment distributes a set of certificates. `certs` is a certificate or an
+ * array of them (DER `Buffer` or PEM string), each parsed before embedding so a non-certificate is a
+ * typed `CmsError` and is never emitted. At least one certificate or CRL is required.
+ *
+ * @opts crls A CRL or array of CRLs (DER Buffer or PEM string) to convey alongside the certificates.
+ * @opts pem  Return a PEM string instead of a DER Buffer.
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
+ *   var leafDer = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "Leaf", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
+ *     notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2036-01-01T00:00:00Z") }, { key: await pki.key.export(pair.privateKey) });
+ *   var bundle = pki.cms.certsOnly([leafDer]);
+ *   var r = pki.cms.parseCertsOnly(bundle);   // { certificates: [leafDer], crls: [] }
+ */
+var certsOnly = cmsSign.certsOnly;
+
+/**
+ * @primitive  pki.cms.parseCertsOnly
+ * @signature  pki.cms.parseCertsOnly(input, opts?) -> { certificates, crls }
+ * @since      0.6.3
+ * @status     stable
+ * @spec       RFC 8551, RFC 5652
+ * @related    pki.cms.certsOnly, pki.cms.isCertsOnly, pki.est.parseCertsOnly
+ *
+ * Read a certs-only certificate-management message (DER Buffer or PEM) and recover the raw certificate
+ * and CRL DER it carries. It requires a degenerate `SignedData` (id-data with no eContent, empty
+ * `signerInfos`) and returns `{ certificates: [DER], crls: [DER] }`; a non-degenerate structure is a
+ * typed `cms/not-certs-only`. A CRL-only message is accepted (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8 conveys "certificates
+ * and/or CRLs"), unlike the stricter RFC 5272 Simple PKI Response `pki.est.parseCertsOnly`; a message
+ * carrying neither certificates nor CRLs is refused. Each embedded certificate and CRL is validated
+ * before it is returned.
+ *
+ * @opts maxCerts Cap the number of certificates and CRLs parsed and returned (a DoS bound on an untrusted bundle).
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
+ *   var certDer = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "Leaf", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
+ *     notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2036-01-01T00:00:00Z") }, { key: await pki.key.export(pair.privateKey) });
+ *   var bundleDer = pki.cms.certsOnly([certDer]);
+ *   var r = pki.cms.parseCertsOnly(bundleDer);
+ *   r.certificates;   // array of raw certificate DER Buffers
+ */
+function parseCertsOnly(input, opts) {
+  opts = guard.identifier.optionsObject(opts, _err, "cms/bad-input", "pki.cms.parseCertsOnly options");
+  guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(opts, KNOWN_PARSE_CERTS_ONLY_OPTS, _err, "cms/bad-input", "pki.cms.parseCertsOnly has an unknown option ");
+  // maxCerts bounds the parse of an untrusted bundle, so the bound itself is validated at the door: a
+  // negative, fractional, NaN, or non-numeric cap that slice would silently treat as no cap (or, for
+  // -1, as "all but the last") is refused rather than forwarded (guard.limits.cap). Absent or null
+  // leaves the count uncapped.
+  var maxCerts = guard.limits.cap(opts.maxCerts == null ? undefined : opts.maxCerts, "maxCerts", undefined, { E: _err, code: "cms/bad-input" });
+  return cms.parseCertsOnly(_certsOnlyInputDer(input, "pki.cms.parseCertsOnly"), _err, "cms", maxCerts, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * @primitive  pki.cms.isCertsOnly
+ * @signature  pki.cms.isCertsOnly(input) -> boolean
+ * @since      0.6.3
+ * @status     stable
+ * @spec       RFC 8551, RFC 5652
+ * @related    pki.cms.certsOnly, pki.cms.parseCertsOnly
+ *
+ * Recognize a certs-only certificate-management message structurally: `true` when `input` (DER Buffer
+ * or PEM) is a CMS `SignedData` with an id-data `encapContentInfo` whose `eContent` is absent and an
+ * empty `signerInfos`, `false` for any other well-formed CMS (a signed message, an EnvelopedData).
+ * Undecodable bytes throw a typed `CmsError`.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
+ *   var certDer = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "Leaf", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
+ *     notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2036-01-01T00:00:00Z") }, { key: await pki.key.export(pair.privateKey) });
+ *   pki.cms.isCertsOnly(pki.cms.certsOnly([certDer]));   // true
+ */
+function isCertsOnly(input) {
+  // A certs-only message is a SignedData with an id-data content, absent eContent, and no signer.
+  // digestAlgorithms is deliberately NOT constrained: RFC 5652 sec. 5.1 permits a non-empty set even
+  // with no signer, so a valid but non-canonical bundle (an EST or AIA response) is still recognized.
+  var der = _certsOnlyInputDer(input, "pki.cms.isCertsOnly");
+  var r;
+  try {
+    r = cms.parse(der);
+  } catch (e) {
+    // A well-formed CMS ContentInfo whose content type this toolkit does not model (a bare id-data,
+    // a DigestedData) is definitively not a certs-only SignedData, so the predicate reports false
+    // rather than making a caller catch an exception for a valid non-SignedData CMS. Truly
+    // undecodable bytes (not a ContentInfo at all) still throw.
+    if (e && e.code === "cms/unsupported-content-type") return false;
+    throw e;
+  }
+  return r.contentTypeName === "signedData" &&
+    r.encapContentInfo.eContentType === oid.byName("data") &&
+    r.encapContentInfo.eContent === null &&
+    r.signerInfos.length === 0;
+}
+
 // `setEngine` is @internal -- the path-validate injection seam, never part of pki.cms.
-module.exports = { verify: verify, sign: sign, countersign: countersign, encrypt: encrypt, authenticate: authenticate, decrypt: decrypt, compress: compress, decompress: decompress, setEngine: setEngine };
+module.exports = { verify: verify, sign: sign, countersign: countersign, encrypt: encrypt, authenticate: authenticate, decrypt: decrypt, compress: compress, decompress: decompress, certsOnly: certsOnly, parseCertsOnly: parseCertsOnly, isCertsOnly: isCertsOnly, setEngine: setEngine };

package/lib/schema-cms.js

@@ -1400,7 +1400,13 @@ function assertAttachedCiphertext(eci, E, code, label) {
 // `maxCerts` (optional) caps how many certificates / CRLs are validated + returned, BEFORE the per-element
 // X.509 / CRL parse -- so an untrusted source (an AIA caIssuers URL) cannot force tens of thousands of parses
 // with one in-cap-bytes bundle; the EST client passes no cap (a /cacerts chain is small and fully returned).
-function parseCertsOnly(der, E, prefix, maxCerts) {
+// `requireCert` (default true) sets the profile floor: the RFC 5272 sec. 4.1 Simple PKI Response the
+// EST client and path builder read REQUIRES at least one certificate, so they pass nothing and get the
+// strict floor. The general RFC 8551 sec. 3.8 / RFC 5652 sec. 5.1 certificate-management message
+// permits "certificates and/or CRLs", so pki.cms.parseCertsOnly passes `requireCert: false` and a
+// CRL-only message is accepted; a message with neither is still refused.
+function parseCertsOnly(der, E, prefix, maxCerts, requireCert) {
+  var needCert = requireCert !== false;
   var r;
   try { r = parse(der); }
   catch (e) { throw E(prefix + "/bad-response", "a certs-only response did not decode as CMS: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)), e); }
@@ -1409,9 +1415,21 @@ function parseCertsOnly(der, E, prefix, maxCerts) {
     throw E(prefix + "/not-certs-only", "a certs-only Simple PKI Response must carry id-data with no eContent (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1)");
   }
   if (r.signerInfos.length !== 0) throw E(prefix + "/not-certs-only", "a certs-only Simple PKI Response must have empty signerInfos (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1)");
-  if (!r.certificates || r.certificates.length === 0) throw E(prefix + "/no-certificates", "a certs-only response must contain at least one certificate (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1)");
-  // Cap BEFORE the per-certificate X.509 parse: bound parse work by count, not only by the decoded byte size.
-  var certs = (maxCerts != null && r.certificates.length > maxCerts) ? r.certificates.slice(0, maxCerts) : r.certificates;
+  // digestAlgorithms is NOT required to be empty: RFC 5652 sec. 5.1 permits any number of elements
+  // (including algorithms no SignerInfo uses), so a valid EST /cacerts or AIA caIssuers bundle may
+  // carry a non-empty set. The builder emits an empty one (the canonical form), but the reader
+  // accepts a non-empty one rather than rejecting valid CMS.
+  var allCerts = r.certificates;   // parse always surfaces certificates and crls as arrays (empty when the field is absent)
+  var allCrls = r.crls;
+  if (needCert) {
+    if (allCerts.length === 0) throw E(prefix + "/no-certificates", "a certs-only response must contain at least one certificate (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1)");
+  } else if (allCerts.length === 0 && allCrls.length === 0) {
+    throw E(prefix + "/no-certificates", "a certs-only message must contain at least one certificate or CRL (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8)");
+  }
+  // Cap BEFORE the per-element parse: bound parse work by count, not only by the decoded byte size. The
+  // cap is on the COMBINED number of certificates and CRLs, so a bundle carrying both cannot force up to
+  // 2*maxCerts parses: certificates are counted first and CRLs draw only from the remaining budget.
+  var certs = (maxCerts != null && allCerts.length > maxCerts) ? allCerts.slice(0, maxCerts) : allCerts;
   for (var i = 0; i < certs.length; i++) {
     // A universal-SEQUENCE CertificateChoice must be a well-formed X.509 Certificate, not merely any SEQUENCE;
     // a tagged CertificateChoices alternative (attribute cert / other) is not a plain certificate.
@@ -1419,8 +1437,8 @@ function parseCertsOnly(der, E, prefix, maxCerts) {
     try { schemaX509.parse(certs[i].bytes); }
     catch (e) { throw E(prefix + "/bad-certificate", "a certs-only response carried a non-certificate in its certificates field (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1)", e); }
   }
-  var allCrls = r.crls || [];
-  var crls = (maxCerts != null && allCrls.length > maxCerts) ? allCrls.slice(0, maxCerts) : allCrls;
+  var crlCap = maxCerts != null ? (maxCerts - certs.length) : null;   // the budget certificates left for CRLs
+  var crls = (crlCap != null && allCrls.length > crlCap) ? allCrls.slice(0, crlCap) : allCrls;
   for (var j = 0; j < crls.length; j++) {
     if (crls[j].tagClass !== "universal") throw E(prefix + "/bad-crl", "a certs-only response CRL must be a plain X.509 CertificateList, not a tagged otherRevInfo alternative (RFC 5652 sec. 10.2.1)");
     try { schemaCrl.parse(crls[j].bytes); }

package/lib/smime.js

@@ -1266,4 +1266,35 @@ function _decodeCms(ent) {
 
 function _toBuf(v) { return Buffer.isBuffer(v) ? v : Buffer.from(v); }
 
-module.exports = { sign: sign, verify: verify, encrypt: encrypt, decrypt: decrypt, compress: compress, decompress: decompress };
+var CERTS_ONLY_OPTS = { crls: 1 };
+
+/**
+ * @primitive  pki.smime.buildCertsOnly
+ * @signature  pki.smime.buildCertsOnly(certs, opts?) -> Buffer
+ * @since      0.6.3
+ * @status     stable
+ * @spec       RFC 8551, RFC 5652
+ * @related    pki.cms.certsOnly, pki.cms.parseCertsOnly, pki.smime.encrypt
+ *
+ * Wrap a certs-only certificate-management message (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8) in one S/MIME
+ * `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=certs-only; name=smime.p7c` entity: the base64 body is the
+ * `pki.cms.certsOnly` DER, with `Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7c` (RFC 8551
+ * sec. 3.2.1). `certs` and `opts.crls` are the certificate/CRL inputs `pki.cms.certsOnly` accepts, and
+ * at least one certificate or CRL is required. A certs-only message carries no user content, so the
+ * header-protection options of `pki.smime.encrypt` do not apply here.
+ *
+ * @opts crls A CRL or array of CRLs (DER Buffer or PEM string) to convey alongside the certificates.
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
+ *   var leafDer = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "Leaf", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
+ *     notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2036-01-01T00:00:00Z") }, { key: await pki.key.export(pair.privateKey) });
+ *   var p7c = pki.smime.buildCertsOnly([leafDer]);
+ */
+function buildCertsOnly(certs, opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  _knownOpts(opts, CERTS_ONLY_OPTS, "buildCertsOnly");
+  var der = _toBuf(cms.certsOnly(certs, { crls: opts.crls }));
+  return _capped(Buffer.concat([_pkcs7MimeHead("certs-only", "smime.p7c"), _base64Body(der), mime.CRLF]));
+}
+
+module.exports = { sign: sign, verify: verify, encrypt: encrypt, decrypt: decrypt, compress: compress, decompress: decompress, buildCertsOnly: buildCertsOnly };

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.6.2",
+  "version": "0.6.4",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:54d1c599-3174-4b94-9968-3bf7cc9d4fd8",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:60d582b7-d6d3-4b88-ada8-0fefee2ea11f",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-08-30T21:10:28.418Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-08-31T01:06:56.435Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.2",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.4",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.6.2",
+      "version": "0.6.4",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.2",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.4",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.2",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.4",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]