@blamejs/pki 0.6.2 → 0.6.3

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,17 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.6.3 — 2026-08-30
+
+pki.cms builds and reads certs-only certificate-management messages: a degenerate CMS SignedData that conveys certificates and CRLs without signing anything (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8).
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.cms.certsOnly(certs, opts?) builds a certs-only certificate-management message (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8): a degenerate CMS SignedData with version 1, an empty digestAlgorithms and signerInfos, an id-data encapContentInfo with the eContent absent, and the caller's certificates in certificates [0] and any CRLs in crls [1], both DER-sorted and deduplicated. certs is a certificate or an array of them (DER Buffer or PEM string), and opts.crls carries CRLs the same way; at least one certificate or CRL is required. Each entry is parsed as a real X.509 certificate or CertificateList before it is embedded, so a non-certificate, a non-CRL, or a tagged CertificateChoices alternative is refused with a typed cms/bad-input rather than emitted. opts.pem returns a PEM string instead of DER.
+- pki.cms.parseCertsOnly(input, opts?) reads a certs-only message (DER Buffer or PEM) and returns { certificates, crls } as raw DER. It requires a degenerate SignedData (id-data with no eContent, empty signerInfos) and refuses a non-degenerate structure with cms/not-certs-only. Unlike the RFC 5272 Simple PKI Response that pki.est.parseCertsOnly reads, a CRL-only message is accepted (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8 conveys certificates and/or CRLs); a message carrying neither is refused. opts.maxCerts caps the number of certificates and CRLs parsed and returned, a bound on an untrusted bundle.
+- pki.cms.isCertsOnly(input) reports whether input is a certs-only message structurally, returning true for a SignedData with an id-data content, absent eContent, and empty signerInfos, and false for any other well-formed CMS. Undecodable bytes throw a typed CmsError.
+- pki.smime.buildCertsOnly(certs, opts?) wraps a certs-only message in one application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=certs-only; name=smime.p7c S/MIME entity (RFC 8551 sec. 3.2.1), with the certs-only DER as the base64 body. It accepts the same certificate and opts.crls inputs as pki.cms.certsOnly.
+
 ## v0.6.2 — 2026-08-30
 
 pki.scep builds and reads SCEP (RFC 8894) enrollment messages: a client assembles a PKCSReq or RenewalReq request and parses a CA's response back to its verified transaction attributes and issued certificates.

package/README.md

@@ -239,8 +239,8 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.crl` | CRL issuance and verification (RFC 5280 §5). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificateList` from a `spec` of `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate`, an optional `crlNumber`, a `revoked` array (each entry a `serialNumber` and `revocationDate` with an optional `reason` or `invalidityDate`), and an optional `extensions` object (authority key identifier, issuing distribution point, delta-CRL indicator, freshest CRL, authority information access) or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER, with an `issuer` of `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the issuer key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. The version is derived from the extension set (v2 when any CRL or entry extension is present, else v1), the outer `signatureAlgorithm` matches `tbsCertList.signature`, an empty revocation list omits the field rather than emitting an empty SEQUENCE, `reasonCode` is an ENUMERATED and `invalidityDate` is always GeneralizedTime, the RFC fixes per-extension criticality, and the produced signature is verified under the issuer key before return. `verify(crl, issuer)` checks a CRL signature through the one path-validation signature engine, algorithm-confusion and EdDSA low-order gates included; handed a certificate rather than a bare key it also asks what only a certificate can answer — that the certificate is the issuer the CRL names, and that its `keyUsage`, when present, asserts `cRLSign` — so a CRL minted under an end-entity certificate of the same CA does not verify as that CA's. `isRevoked(crl, serialNumber, opts)` looks a serial up, and first checks that the CRL is one a serial can be looked up in at all — it is handed a serial and nothing else, so a CRL that speaks for part of its issuer's certificates is refused rather than answered from. A delta CRL lists changes since a base, so an entry recording a release reads as a revocation when read alone; an indirect CRL carries other issuers' entries, whose serials are unrelated to yours; and any other `issuingDistributionPoint` narrows the CRL to one distribution point, one kind of certificate, or a subset of revocation reasons, none of which a serial can be matched against. A CRL speaks for a span as well as a set, so `opts.time` states the instant the question is asked at and a list that has stopped speaking for it — `nextUpdate` passed, `thisUpdate` later, or no `nextUpdate` stated at all — is refused rather than read as a clean bill of health; without `opts.time` the lookup is structural and an absent serial means only that it is not on that list. `pki.path.crlChecker` is the verb for all of them: it is handed the certificate, merges a delta with its base, performs the §6.3.3 correspondence, and decides currency against the material it fetched. Returns DER, or a PEM `X509 CRL` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrlError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crl.parse` — `sign`, `verify`, `isRevoked` |
 | `pki.key` | Key-material lifecycle (RFC 5958 / RFC 8018). `encrypt(privateKey, password, opts)` wraps a PKCS#8 private key (DER, PEM, or an extractable `CryptoKey`) into an `EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo` under PBES2 (PBKDF2 with AES-CBC-Pad), where `opts` selects the `cipher` (`aes-256-cbc` default, `aes-192-cbc`, `aes-128-cbc`), the `prf` (`hmacWithSHA256` default, SHA-384/512, SHA-1), the `iterations` (default 600000), and the `salt`. The plaintext is validated as PKCS#8 before encryption, a default `prf` and `keyLength` are omitted so the parameters are byte-exact with OpenSSL, and the output is re-parsed before return. `decrypt(encrypted, password, opts)` recovers the inner `PrivateKeyInfo`, re-validated through `pki.schema.pkcs8.parse`: only PBES2 / PBKDF2 / AES-CBC is accepted (PBES1, PBMAC1, and scrypt are refused), the salt and iteration count are bounded before any derivation (`opts.maxIterations` lowers the cap), and a malformed parameter set or wrong-length IV is a distinct typed error. Because a MAC-less PBES2-CBC decrypt must not become a padding oracle (RFC 8018 §8), a wrong password and a valid-pad-but-not-a-key both surface the one uniform `key/decrypt-failed`. `export(key, opts)` and `import(input, opts)` move a private key as PKCS#8 or a public key as SubjectPublicKeyInfo. The key may come from the platform's WebCrypto or from a separately installed copy of this toolkit, and is exported through whichever holds its material; a non-extractable key, or one whose implementation keeps its material out of reach, is refused with that as the reason. Encoding is delegated to WebCrypto, so RSA carries an explicit NULL, EC a named curve, and Ed25519/Ed448/X25519/X448 omit parameters, and an ambiguous RSA or EC import requires `opts.algorithm`. `generate(algorithm, opts)` produces a key pair over RSA, ECDSA/ECDH, the Edwards and Montgomery curves, and the FIPS post-quantum ML-DSA and ML-KEM; `publicFromPrivate(privateKey)` derives the public key. Returns DER or PEM, with a typed `KeyError` on failure. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs8.parse` — `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `export`, `import`, `generate`, `publicFromPrivate` |
 | `pki.pkcs12` | PKCS#12 (.p12/.pfx) issuance and reading (RFC 7292 / RFC 9579). `build(spec, opts)` assembles a store from the OpenSSL-style `{ key, cert, ca?, friendlyName?, localKeyId? }` or the full `{ safeContents: [...] }`, where each element is a plaintext or PBES2-encrypted `SafeContents` of key, shroudedKey, cert, crl, secret, or nested `safeContents` bags. Keys and certs are validated before wrapping, and `friendlyName` (BMPString) and `localKeyId` are single-value. Integrity is a classic Appendix B HMAC (the default, for maximum interoperability) or an RFC 9579 PBMAC1 (`opts.mac.algorithm`) over SHA-256/384/512, with shrouded keys and cert safes encrypted under RFC 8018 PBES2 (AES-128/192/256-CBC). Every password is encoded the PKCS#12 way — BMPString+NULL for the classic MAC, UTF-8 for the PBES2 bags and PBMAC1 — which is what OpenSSL and NSS consume, so a file it emits opens in both, cross-checked bidirectionally. The MAC covers the exact AuthenticatedSafe byte range, a DEFAULT-1 `MacData.iterations` is rejected up front, and the store is re-parsed before return. `verifyMac(pfx, password, opts)` recomputes a classic or PBMAC1 MAC over `macedBytes` and constant-time-compares it, throwing on a MAC-less or public-key-integrity store. Public-key integrity (`opts.integrity.mode: "public-key"`) wraps the AuthenticatedSafe in a CMS SignedData instead of a MAC, signed by any `pki.cms.sign` signer and carrying no MacData (§4); privacy stays independent, so `password` still PBES2-encrypts the bags. Public-key privacy wraps a SafeContents as a CMS EnvelopedData (AES-CBC, `id-envelopedData`, never GCM) encrypted to recipient public keys through the `pki.cms.encrypt` recipient model, via per-safe `recipients` or the `opts.recipientCerts` convenience, restricted to certificate recipients (RSA-OAEP, ECDH, X25519, X448, ML-KEM) since a password or KEK recipient could not be reopened by `open`. All four integrity-by-privacy combinations are permitted (§3.1). `open(pfx, password, opts)` reads a store back: it verifies the MAC first, so a wrong password is the MAC verdict rather than a decrypt error, then PBES2-decrypts every privacy safe and shrouded key bag and returns `{ integrityMode, macVerified, signers, keys, certs, crls, secrets }` — keys as re-validated PKCS#8 DER, certs, CRLs and secrets as raw DER, all with `friendlyName` and `localKeyId`, nested safes recursively. A MAC-less store is refused unless `opts.allowUnauthenticated`. A public-key-integrity store is verified through its CMS SignedData signature first (`pkcs12/signature-invalid` on failure), with the signer surfaced in `signers` but never trust-chained, which remains the caller's `pki.path.validate` step. A legacy-PBE store's Appendix C 3DES and RC2 bags are decrypted, RC2 through an in-tree RFC 2268 cipher, so an `openssl pkcs12 -legacy` or NSS store opens; the legacy RC4 schemes are refused. An `id-envelopedData` safe is decrypted with `opts.recipientKey` after the integrity gate (`pkcs12/no-recipient-key` when absent), every recipient-side fault and every post-integrity decrypt failure collapsing to the uniform `pkcs12/decrypt-failed`, and `opts.keys: 'crypto'` imports each key to a `CryptoKey`. It reads what OpenSSL and NSS produce. Returns DER or a PEM `PKCS12`, with a typed `Pkcs12Error` on failure. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs12.parse` — `build`, `verifyMac`, `open` |
-| `pki.cms` | CMS signing, verification, encryption, and compression (RFC 5652). `sign(content, signers, opts)` produces a SignedData (§5), attached or detached, with one or many signers over RSA, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, EdDSA, the post-quantum ML-DSA-44/65/87 (RFC 9882) and SLH-DSA (all twelve FIPS 205 sets, RFC 9814), and composite ML-DSA pairing ML-DSA with a traditional RSA, ECDSA, or EdDSA key (accepted only when both components verify, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs). It builds the signed attributes (content-type, message-digest, signing-time) as canonical DER, signs the exact §5.4 preimage, and emits a DER `Buffer` or PEM. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, which signs a large detached payload without holding it in memory: the payload is hashed incrementally under every signer's digest algorithm in one pass, and `verify` accepts the same streamed form as its `content` option. A signer may also be key-only — `{ key, spki, keyIdentifier }` with no certificate — which RFC 5272 §3.2 requires when a Full PKI Request's signer is the key of a certification request that request carries: the signer identifier takes the subjectKeyIdentifier form carrying the identifier the request declares, the signature scheme resolves from the request's own public key, and no certificate is embedded. `verify(input, opts)` parses a SignedData over the strict `pki.schema.cms` codec, locates each SignerInfo's signer certificate by its issuerAndSerialNumber or subjectKeyIdentifier, and checks the signature over the exact §5.4 preimage: with signed attributes present it confirms the message-digest attribute equals the content digest and verifies over the DER re-encoding of the SignedAttributes (the on-wire `[0]` tag replaced by a universal SET OF), and otherwise directly over the content. It returns a per-signer verdict with the matched signer certificate. `valid` and `trusted` are separate claims and neither implies the other: a SignedData carries its own certificates, so `valid` says the signature is sound under one of them and nothing about who signed, while `trusted` says every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`, validated through the same RFC 5280 path engine `pki.path.validate` uses. Without anchors there is nothing to chain to and `trusted` is `false`; anchors that cannot be read throw, rather than reading as untrusted. An unrecognized option is refused rather than ignored. `countersign(cms, signers, opts)` adds a countersignature (§11.4) — a `SignerInfo` over the countersigned SignerInfo's signature value, any signer algorithm, nestable, with the primary bytes preserved so it still verifies — attached as the id-countersignature unsigned attribute; `verify` returns each countersignature's verdict under `signers[i].countersignatures` and every unsigned attribute — including an RFC 3161 timestamp token, attachable via `sign`'s `unsignedAttributes` — under `signers[i].unsignedAttrs`, surfaced unauthenticated. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` produces an EnvelopedData, AuthEnvelopedData (AES-GCM, the authenticated default), or EncryptedData, with recipients auto-dispatched off the certificate key to key transport (RSAES-OAEP; v1.5 is never emitted), key agreement (ephemeral-static ECDH over P-256/384/521 with the X9.63 KDF, and X25519/X448 with HKDF), symmetric key wrap, password (PBKDF2 with RFC 3211 PWRI-KEK), or the post-quantum ML-KEM KEMRecipientInfo (RFC 9629/9936), wrapping one fresh content key for every recipient. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, streamed through the AES-GCM or AES-CBC content cipher so a large plaintext is encrypted without being buffered whole; the ciphertext is assembled before the definite-length encryptedContent is emitted, byte-for-byte the buffered form. `decrypt(input, keyMaterial, opts)` recovers the content through the matching arm and returns it with an `authenticated` flag; every secret-dependent failure collapses to one uniform `cms/decrypt-failed` verdict (Bleichenbacher, EFAIL, and password-oracle freedom), and PKCS#1 v1.5 is decrypt-only under the RFC 3218 implicit-rejection countermeasure. With `opts.stream: true` the recovered `content` is an async iterable of plaintext chunks instead of a single Buffer, for a payload too large to hold whole; the authenticated modes (AuthEnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, AES-GCM) verify integrity before the iterable yields, so a forged message throws before any plaintext is exposed, while a CBC EnvelopedData or EncryptedData yields the plaintext as the cipher produces it. Every key-establishment secret the toolkit allocates is wiped once used, on the failing path as well as the succeeding one: the KEM shared secret and its derived key-encryption key, the raw ECDH / X25519 / X448 agreement secret, a password-derived key-encryption key, and the content-encryption key itself, cleared once the message is complete since all recipients share it. Caller-supplied key material is never written to (best-effort; NIST SP 800-227 §4.2, RFC 9629 §7). `authenticate(content, recipients, opts)` produces an `id-ct-authData` (§9): cleartext content plus an HMAC-SHA-256/384/512 MAC, authenticated but not encrypted, with the fresh MAC key wrapped for every recipient through the same RecipientInfo model. The MAC covers the authenticated attributes (content-type and message-digest) re-tagged to the EXPLICIT SET OF (§9.2), or the content octets directly; `decrypt` recovers the MAC key, recomputes the MAC and independently the message-digest (§9.3), and releases the content only after both pass, with every secret-dependent failure collapsing to the uniform `cms/decrypt-failed`. `compress(content, opts)` and `decompress(input, opts)` produce and consume a CompressedData (RFC 3274; ZLIB, version 0, id-alg-zlibCompress); decompress bounds the uncompressed output at 16 MiB and stops before it is materialized, so a decompression bomb fails closed as `cms/decompress-too-large`. Compression is a size transform with no integrity or confidentiality (RFC 8551 §2.4.5). Fail-closed with typed `cms/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `countersign`, `encrypt`, `authenticate`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress` |
-| `pki.smime` | S/MIME message assembly, verification, encryption, and compression over the CMS layer (RFC 8551). `sign(content, signers, opts)` wraps a MIME entity in either form: `multipart/signed`, where the content stays readable in any MUA and a detached CMS SignedData rides alongside as `application/pkcs7-signature` with a matching `micalg`, or `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=signed-data`, where the whole entity is a base64 CMS SignedData. The signed bytes are the entity's §3.1.1 canonical form with CRLF line endings, and `verify(message, opts)` unwraps both forms and recomputes over the same canonicalizer, so a transport that re-wraps line endings still verifies while a tampered part fails. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` envelopes a MIME entity as an opaque `application/pkcs7-mime` message and `decrypt(message, keyMaterial, opts)` opens one, as `smime-type=authEnveloped-data` (AES-GCM, confidentiality and integrity, the default) or `smime-type=enveloped-data` (AES-CBC, confidentiality only, so `decrypt` reports `authenticated: false`, the §3.3 no-integrity caveat). The `smime-type` is derived from the CMS body rather than the header, and decryption is fail-closed and oracle-free. The crypto is entirely `pki.cms.sign` / `verify` / `encrypt` / `decrypt`, so it is algorithm-agnostic: any RSA / RSASSA-PSS / ECDSA / EdDSA / ML-DSA / SLH-DSA signer and any RSA-OAEP / ECDH / X25519 / X448 / AES-KW / PBKDF2 / ML-KEM recipient carries through. As with `cms.verify`, `verify` returns the per-signer verdict plus the recovered content, and `valid` and `trusted` are separate claims: `valid` says the signature is sound under a certificate the message carried, `trusted` says every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`. Anchoring here is validated for email at both ends of the chain — the signer certificate must carry `emailProtection` (RFC 8551 §4.4.4) and the anchor's own trust metadata must permit that purpose, since a root can be distrusted for email while remaining a good TLS root. Override either with `requiredEku` / `checkPurpose`. `compress(content, opts)` and `decompress(message, opts)` add the opaque `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=compressed-data; name=smime.p7z` frame (§3.6, RFC 3274), a size transform with no integrity or confidentiality (§2.4.5), bounded against a bomb; the recovered content, which may itself be signed or enveloped, is returned for the caller to re-verify. Header protection (RFC 9788): `sign` and `encrypt` take `opts.protectHeaders`, which inlines the caller's `opts.headers` on the Cryptographic Payload root (its Content-Type gaining `hp="clear"` when signed or `hp="cipher"` when encrypted) so the CMS signature or encryption covers them, defeating a transport that rewrites or reads Subject, From, and the rest. `verify` and `decrypt` surface the authenticated inner set as `protectedHeaders` plus `headerProtection { present, mode, fromMismatch, confidential, legacy }`, so a tampered outer header cannot alter it and `fromMismatch` flags an outer From that disagrees. Encryption applies a Header Confidentiality Policy: the default `hcp_baseline` obscures the outer Subject to `[...]` and removes Comments and Keywords, so the real values live only in the ciphertext, and `decrypt` recovers them. Every emitted header routes through a fail-closed injection guard that rejects a CR, LF, or NUL value and a non-ftext name, and a malformed or contradictory `hp` wrap fails closed as `smime/bad-header-protection` rather than silently downgrading. The CMS crypto is unchanged. Inbound legacy RFC 8551 header protection is recognized opt-in: `verify` and `decrypt` with `opts.legacyHeaderProtection` detect a legacy `message/rfc822`-wrapped payload by the RFC 9788 §4.10.1 four-condition identification and surface the inner headers under `headerProtection.legacy = { headers, mode, fromMismatch, confidential }`, where `headers` is an ordered `[{ name, value }]` array retaining legally repeated fields such as `Received`. Those never appear in `protectedHeaders` and never set `present: true`. Because a legacy message is structurally indistinguishable from an ordinary forwarded `message/rfc822`, this is an explicit heuristic (§4.10.2, "no strong end-to-end guarantees"): a caller keying trust off `present` or `protectedHeaders` is never misled, and only one that explicitly reads `headerProtection.legacy.headers` and cross-checks `legacy.fromMismatch` consumes it. It is off by default, and a nested crypto layer, an inner `hp=`, a non-`message/rfc822` payload, or a duplicate Content-Type reports `legacy: null`. Bidirectionally interoperable with `openssl smime` and `openssl cms`. Fail-closed with typed `smime/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress` |
+| `pki.cms` | CMS signing, verification, encryption, and compression (RFC 5652). `sign(content, signers, opts)` produces a SignedData (§5), attached or detached, with one or many signers over RSA, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, EdDSA, the post-quantum ML-DSA-44/65/87 (RFC 9882) and SLH-DSA (all twelve FIPS 205 sets, RFC 9814), and composite ML-DSA pairing ML-DSA with a traditional RSA, ECDSA, or EdDSA key (accepted only when both components verify, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs). It builds the signed attributes (content-type, message-digest, signing-time) as canonical DER, signs the exact §5.4 preimage, and emits a DER `Buffer` or PEM. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, which signs a large detached payload without holding it in memory: the payload is hashed incrementally under every signer's digest algorithm in one pass, and `verify` accepts the same streamed form as its `content` option. A signer may also be key-only — `{ key, spki, keyIdentifier }` with no certificate — which RFC 5272 §3.2 requires when a Full PKI Request's signer is the key of a certification request that request carries: the signer identifier takes the subjectKeyIdentifier form carrying the identifier the request declares, the signature scheme resolves from the request's own public key, and no certificate is embedded. `verify(input, opts)` parses a SignedData over the strict `pki.schema.cms` codec, locates each SignerInfo's signer certificate by its issuerAndSerialNumber or subjectKeyIdentifier, and checks the signature over the exact §5.4 preimage: with signed attributes present it confirms the message-digest attribute equals the content digest and verifies over the DER re-encoding of the SignedAttributes (the on-wire `[0]` tag replaced by a universal SET OF), and otherwise directly over the content. It returns a per-signer verdict with the matched signer certificate. `valid` and `trusted` are separate claims and neither implies the other: a SignedData carries its own certificates, so `valid` says the signature is sound under one of them and nothing about who signed, while `trusted` says every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`, validated through the same RFC 5280 path engine `pki.path.validate` uses. Without anchors there is nothing to chain to and `trusted` is `false`; anchors that cannot be read throw, rather than reading as untrusted. An unrecognized option is refused rather than ignored. `countersign(cms, signers, opts)` adds a countersignature (§11.4) — a `SignerInfo` over the countersigned SignerInfo's signature value, any signer algorithm, nestable, with the primary bytes preserved so it still verifies — attached as the id-countersignature unsigned attribute; `verify` returns each countersignature's verdict under `signers[i].countersignatures` and every unsigned attribute — including an RFC 3161 timestamp token, attachable via `sign`'s `unsignedAttributes` — under `signers[i].unsignedAttrs`, surfaced unauthenticated. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` produces an EnvelopedData, AuthEnvelopedData (AES-GCM, the authenticated default), or EncryptedData, with recipients auto-dispatched off the certificate key to key transport (RSAES-OAEP; v1.5 is never emitted), key agreement (ephemeral-static ECDH over P-256/384/521 with the X9.63 KDF, and X25519/X448 with HKDF), symmetric key wrap, password (PBKDF2 with RFC 3211 PWRI-KEK), or the post-quantum ML-KEM KEMRecipientInfo (RFC 9629/9936), wrapping one fresh content key for every recipient. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, streamed through the AES-GCM or AES-CBC content cipher so a large plaintext is encrypted without being buffered whole; the ciphertext is assembled before the definite-length encryptedContent is emitted, byte-for-byte the buffered form. `decrypt(input, keyMaterial, opts)` recovers the content through the matching arm and returns it with an `authenticated` flag; every secret-dependent failure collapses to one uniform `cms/decrypt-failed` verdict (Bleichenbacher, EFAIL, and password-oracle freedom), and PKCS#1 v1.5 is decrypt-only under the RFC 3218 implicit-rejection countermeasure. With `opts.stream: true` the recovered `content` is an async iterable of plaintext chunks instead of a single Buffer, for a payload too large to hold whole; the authenticated modes (AuthEnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, AES-GCM) verify integrity before the iterable yields, so a forged message throws before any plaintext is exposed, while a CBC EnvelopedData or EncryptedData yields the plaintext as the cipher produces it. Every key-establishment secret the toolkit allocates is wiped once used, on the failing path as well as the succeeding one: the KEM shared secret and its derived key-encryption key, the raw ECDH / X25519 / X448 agreement secret, a password-derived key-encryption key, and the content-encryption key itself, cleared once the message is complete since all recipients share it. Caller-supplied key material is never written to (best-effort; NIST SP 800-227 §4.2, RFC 9629 §7). `authenticate(content, recipients, opts)` produces an `id-ct-authData` (§9): cleartext content plus an HMAC-SHA-256/384/512 MAC, authenticated but not encrypted, with the fresh MAC key wrapped for every recipient through the same RecipientInfo model. The MAC covers the authenticated attributes (content-type and message-digest) re-tagged to the EXPLICIT SET OF (§9.2), or the content octets directly; `decrypt` recovers the MAC key, recomputes the MAC and independently the message-digest (§9.3), and releases the content only after both pass, with every secret-dependent failure collapsing to the uniform `cms/decrypt-failed`. `compress(content, opts)` and `decompress(input, opts)` produce and consume a CompressedData (RFC 3274; ZLIB, version 0, id-alg-zlibCompress); decompress bounds the uncompressed output at 16 MiB and stops before it is materialized, so a decompression bomb fails closed as `cms/decompress-too-large`. Compression is a size transform with no integrity or confidentiality (RFC 8551 §2.4.5). `certsOnly(certs, opts?)` builds a certs-only certificate-management message (RFC 8551 §3.8): a degenerate SignedData with an empty signerInfos and no eContent that conveys certificates and CRLs without signing anything, `parseCertsOnly(input, opts?)` reads one back to its raw certificate and CRL DER (a CRL-only message is valid here, unlike the cert-required RFC 5272 form that `pki.est.parseCertsOnly` reads), and `isCertsOnly(input)` recognizes one structurally. Fail-closed with typed `cms/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `countersign`, `encrypt`, `authenticate`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress`, `certsOnly`, `parseCertsOnly`, `isCertsOnly` |
+| `pki.smime` | S/MIME message assembly, verification, encryption, and compression over the CMS layer (RFC 8551). `sign(content, signers, opts)` wraps a MIME entity in either form: `multipart/signed`, where the content stays readable in any MUA and a detached CMS SignedData rides alongside as `application/pkcs7-signature` with a matching `micalg`, or `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=signed-data`, where the whole entity is a base64 CMS SignedData. The signed bytes are the entity's §3.1.1 canonical form with CRLF line endings, and `verify(message, opts)` unwraps both forms and recomputes over the same canonicalizer, so a transport that re-wraps line endings still verifies while a tampered part fails. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` envelopes a MIME entity as an opaque `application/pkcs7-mime` message and `decrypt(message, keyMaterial, opts)` opens one, as `smime-type=authEnveloped-data` (AES-GCM, confidentiality and integrity, the default) or `smime-type=enveloped-data` (AES-CBC, confidentiality only, so `decrypt` reports `authenticated: false`, the §3.3 no-integrity caveat). The `smime-type` is derived from the CMS body rather than the header, and decryption is fail-closed and oracle-free. The crypto is entirely `pki.cms.sign` / `verify` / `encrypt` / `decrypt`, so it is algorithm-agnostic: any RSA / RSASSA-PSS / ECDSA / EdDSA / ML-DSA / SLH-DSA signer and any RSA-OAEP / ECDH / X25519 / X448 / AES-KW / PBKDF2 / ML-KEM recipient carries through. As with `cms.verify`, `verify` returns the per-signer verdict plus the recovered content, and `valid` and `trusted` are separate claims: `valid` says the signature is sound under a certificate the message carried, `trusted` says every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`. Anchoring here is validated for email at both ends of the chain — the signer certificate must carry `emailProtection` (RFC 8551 §4.4.4) and the anchor's own trust metadata must permit that purpose, since a root can be distrusted for email while remaining a good TLS root. Override either with `requiredEku` / `checkPurpose`. `compress(content, opts)` and `decompress(message, opts)` add the opaque `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=compressed-data; name=smime.p7z` frame (§3.6, RFC 3274), a size transform with no integrity or confidentiality (§2.4.5), bounded against a bomb; the recovered content, which may itself be signed or enveloped, is returned for the caller to re-verify. Header protection (RFC 9788): `sign` and `encrypt` take `opts.protectHeaders`, which inlines the caller's `opts.headers` on the Cryptographic Payload root (its Content-Type gaining `hp="clear"` when signed or `hp="cipher"` when encrypted) so the CMS signature or encryption covers them, defeating a transport that rewrites or reads Subject, From, and the rest. `verify` and `decrypt` surface the authenticated inner set as `protectedHeaders` plus `headerProtection { present, mode, fromMismatch, confidential, legacy }`, so a tampered outer header cannot alter it and `fromMismatch` flags an outer From that disagrees. Encryption applies a Header Confidentiality Policy: the default `hcp_baseline` obscures the outer Subject to `[...]` and removes Comments and Keywords, so the real values live only in the ciphertext, and `decrypt` recovers them. Every emitted header routes through a fail-closed injection guard that rejects a CR, LF, or NUL value and a non-ftext name, and a malformed or contradictory `hp` wrap fails closed as `smime/bad-header-protection` rather than silently downgrading. The CMS crypto is unchanged. Inbound legacy RFC 8551 header protection is recognized opt-in: `verify` and `decrypt` with `opts.legacyHeaderProtection` detect a legacy `message/rfc822`-wrapped payload by the RFC 9788 §4.10.1 four-condition identification and surface the inner headers under `headerProtection.legacy = { headers, mode, fromMismatch, confidential }`, where `headers` is an ordered `[{ name, value }]` array retaining legally repeated fields such as `Received`. Those never appear in `protectedHeaders` and never set `present: true`. Because a legacy message is structurally indistinguishable from an ordinary forwarded `message/rfc822`, this is an explicit heuristic (§4.10.2, "no strong end-to-end guarantees"): a caller keying trust off `present` or `protectedHeaders` is never misled, and only one that explicitly reads `headerProtection.legacy.headers` and cross-checks `legacy.fromMismatch` consumes it. It is off by default, and a nested crypto layer, an inner `hp=`, a non-`message/rfc822` payload, or a duplicate Content-Type reports `legacy: null`. Bidirectionally interoperable with `openssl smime` and `openssl cms`. `buildCertsOnly(certs, opts?)` wraps a `pki.cms.certsOnly` certificate-management message in one `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=certs-only; name=smime.p7c` entity, read back by OpenSSL's `pkcs7 -print_certs`. Fail-closed with typed `smime/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress`, `buildCertsOnly` |
 | `pki.tsp` | Time-Stamp Protocol (RFC 3161). `sign(messageImprint, tsa, opts)` produces a TimeStampToken: a CMS SignedData over `pki.cms.sign` whose content is a `TSTInfo` carrying the timestamped message imprint, the TSA policy, a serial number, and `genTime` with optional accuracy, nonce, and ordering, plus the §2.4.2 signing-certificate attribute binding the token to the TSA certificate (SHA-2 imprints, any `pki.cms.sign` TSA key). `request` and `parseRequest` build and parse the TimeStampReq a client sends (imprint, requested policy, nonce, certReq); `response` and `parseResponse` handle the TimeStampResp a TSA returns, either a granted status wrapping a token or a rejection with PKIStatus and failure info, with the §2.4.2 status-to-token coupling enforced in both directions. `verify(token, data, opts)` verifies a token fail-closed: the CMS signature over the exact signed bytes, the message imprint recomputed from the data, the TSTInfo content type, the ESSCertID(V2) binding to the TSA certificate, the §2.3 critical timeStamping-only extendedKeyUsage, the request nonce when used, and, with a trust anchor supplied, full certification-path validation of the TSA certificate at the token's `genTime` — judged under the `timeStamping` purpose, so an anchor's own per-purpose trust metadata reaches the decision rather than sitting inert. It returns `{ valid, trusted, genTime, serialNumber, tstInfo, ... }`, where `trusted` is the separate claim that the authority chained to an anchor you named: without one there is nothing to chain to and it is `false`, which is the distinction a timestamp re-read years later turns on — `sign`, `request`, `parseRequest`, `response`, `parseResponse`, `verify` |
 | `pki.ocsp` | Online Certificate Status Protocol (RFC 6960), both the responder and relying-party surface. `buildRequest(query, opts)` builds an OCSPRequest for one or more `{ cert, issuer }` pairs, with the CertID hashed under SHA-1 by default per the RFC 5019 lightweight profile or under SHA-2, plus an optional RFC 9654 nonce and an optional requestor signature. `sign(responseData, responder, opts)` produces a signed BasicOCSPResponse over the exact `ResponseData` DER, from the issuing CA directly or a delegated responder, under any `pki.cms.sign` key including the post-quantum ML-DSA and SLH-DSA sets, with `good`, `revoked` (reason and time), or `unknown` per-certificate status. `buildErrorResponse(status)` produces the unsigned §2.3 error (`tryLater`, `unauthorized`, and the rest). `verify(response, opts)` verifies a response fail-closed against the same hardened gates `pki.path.ocspChecker` runs: the CertID binding, responder authorization (the issuing CA, or a CA-issued delegate bearing id-kp-OCSPSigning and id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck and passing the full out-of-path certificate gates), the signature over `tbsResponseDataBytes`, currency against `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate`, and the request-nonce echo. It returns `{ status: "good" / "revoked" / "unknown", ... }` and never silently accepts. `verifyRequest(request, opts)` is the responder-side inverse of `buildRequest`: it verifies a client's signed request (RFC 6960 §4.1.1) under the requestor certificate the request carries, trying each embedded certificate since the field is unordered, and reports `signed`, `signatureValid`, every certificate whose key verified (`signerCerts`, so a key carried under an expired certificate beside its renewal is not hidden behind ordering) with the first one's decoded subject, the full embedded certificate bag (`certs`, including intermediates for path building), and the request's CertIDs; an unsigned request is reported with `signed: false` rather than refused. Transport-free — `buildRequest`, `sign`, `buildErrorResponse`, `verify`, `verifyRequest` |
 | `pki.ct` | Certificate Transparency (RFC 6962). `parseSctList` decodes the `SignedCertificateTimestampList` a certificate or OCSP response carries, a TLS-presentation-language payload inside the §3.3 double DER wrap, into per-SCT log id, exact `timestamp` (BigInt), named signature algorithm, and raw signature. `reconstructSignedData` rebuilds the exact `digitally-signed` preimage, and `verifySct` verifies an SCT signature against a log's public key, routing an ECDSA signature through the strict DER-conformance gate and verifying through the crypto engine, resolving true or false and throwing a typed error on a structural fault. On the producing side, `encodeSctList` builds the extension value byte for byte as the exact inverse of `parseSctList`, and `signSct` performs a log's signing step. For trust, `parseLogList` ingests the CT log-list JSON into constraint-carrying trusted logs, recomputing each log's id as SHA-256 of its key and refusing a disagreeing id (a swapped key, §3.2) and decoding the state and temporal-interval constraints; `verifySctWithLogList` resolves the log key from an SCT's log id, enforces the state (usable, qualified, and readonly trusted; retired only before retirement; pending and rejected refused) and the temporal-interval window, then delegates the signature check to `verifySct`. `verifyLogListSignature(json, signature, publicKey)` verifies the detached `log_list.sig` over the raw log-list bytes against a caller-pinned signer key (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5/SHA-256 and an EC P-256 arm, with forgeable-key defenses failing closed), cross-checked against `openssl dgst`. `fetchLogList(opts)` turns that chain into a live client: it GETs the `log_list.json` and its detached `log_list.sig` over `pki.transport`, verifies the detached signature over the raw fetched bytes against a caller-pinned distributor key before parsing, so an unverified document is never parsed, read, cached, or surfaced, then ingests the same bytes through `parseLogList` and returns the trusted-log set plus the surfaced `version` and `timestamp`. Above the per-SCT layer, `verifySctList` renders a certificate-level verdict over every SCT a certificate carries (§3.3), reporting how many distinct trusted logs verified an SCT (so a duplicated SCT cannot inflate the count) and from how many distinct trusted operators against a caller's CT policy (`minScts` and `minOperators`, both defaulting to the RFC floor of one), where a policy shortfall is a verdict and a per-SCT failure is a recorded row rather than a thrown call; `x509CertEntry` reconstructs the precertificate log entry from a final certificate by removing the SCT-list extension from its TBSCertificate as byte surgery, so its embedded SCTs verify end to end (§3.2). The toolkit bakes in no vendor URL or key, TLS trust is explicit with `rejectUnauthorized` always on, each response is size-capped before the trust chain, and the transport is injectable so the whole path is testable offline — `parseSctList`, `reconstructSignedData`, `verifySct`, `encodeSctList`, `signSct`, `parseLogList`, `verifySctWithLogList`, `verifySctList`, `x509CertEntry`, `verifyLogListSignature`, `fetchLogList` |

package/index.js

@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ module.exports = {
   // its path builder through. That is plumbing between two internal modules, not an operator verb,
   // and exporting the module wholesale would put it on the public surface.
   cms:       { verify: cms.verify, sign: cms.sign, countersign: cms.countersign, encrypt: cms.encrypt,
-    authenticate: cms.authenticate, decrypt: cms.decrypt, compress: cms.compress, decompress: cms.decompress },
+    authenticate: cms.authenticate, decrypt: cms.decrypt, compress: cms.compress, decompress: cms.decompress,
+    certsOnly: cms.certsOnly, parseCertsOnly: cms.parseCertsOnly, isCertsOnly: cms.isCertsOnly },
   smime:     smime,
   // `cmc` interprets an RFC 5272 Full PKI Response into one terminal verdict;
   // `pki.schema.cmc` is the decoder underneath it.

package/lib/cms-sign.js

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 var asn1 = require("./asn1-der");
 var oid = require("./oid");
 var x509 = require("./schema-x509");
+var crlSchema = require("./schema-crl");
 var pkix = require("./schema-pkix");
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
 
@@ -576,6 +577,71 @@ function _dedupe(ders) {
   return out;
 }
 
+// ---- pki.cms.certsOnly (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8 / RFC 5652 sec. 5.1) --------------
+// A certificate-management ("certs-only") message: a degenerate SignedData that conveys
+// certificates and/or CRLs and signs nothing. Documented by the @primitive block in cms-verify.js
+// (the @module pki.cms home).
+var KNOWN_CERTS_ONLY_OPTS = { crls: 1, pem: 1 };
+
+// A single entity or an array of them -> a dense array (empty when the argument is nullish).
+// reqDenseArray snapshots the array structure and refuses a sparse hole or a nullish entry
+// (M15), so a caller array that mutates under iteration cannot reintroduce a hole.
+function _certsOnlyList(v, what) {
+  if (v == null) return [];
+  return intrinsic.isArray(v) ? _b.reqDenseArray(v, what) : [v];
+}
+
+// Normalize one caller-supplied certificate/CRL to validated raw DER: snapshot the byte source at
+// the door so a later mutation cannot swap the bytes (M15), accept a PEM block, then parse it with
+// `parseFn` so a non-<thing> -- including a tagged CertificateChoices / RevocationInfoChoice
+// alternative, whose first byte is a context tag rather than 0x30 -- is a typed cms/bad-input and is
+// never embedded (M9/M10/M11). `pemLabel` is the PEM armor type.
+function _normEntityDer(v, what, pemLabel, parseFn) {
+  var der;
+  if (guard.bytes.isByteSource(v)) {
+    der = guard.bytes.snapshotSource(v, CmsError, "cms/bad-input", what);
+    if (der[0] !== 0x30) {
+      var decoded = pkix.pemDecodeLenient(intrinsic.bufToString(der, "latin1"), pemLabel);
+      if (decoded === null) throw _err("cms/bad-input", what + " must be a plain DER " + pemLabel + " (a tagged alternative is not permitted) or a PEM block");
+      der = decoded;
+    }
+  } else if (typeof v === "string") {
+    var d2 = pkix.pemDecodeLenient(v, pemLabel);
+    if (d2 === null) throw _err("cms/bad-input", what + " PEM is not a " + pemLabel + " block");
+    der = d2;
+  } else {
+    throw _err("cms/bad-input", what + " must be a DER Buffer or a PEM string");
+  }
+  try { parseFn(der); }
+  catch (e) { throw _err("cms/bad-input", what + " is not a valid " + pemLabel, e); }
+  return der;
+}
+function _parseX509(der) { return x509.parse(der); }
+function _parseCrl(der) { return crlSchema.parse(der); }
+
+function certsOnly(certs, opts) {
+  opts = guard.identifier.optionsObject(opts, _err, "cms/bad-input", "pki.cms.certsOnly options");
+  guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(opts, KNOWN_CERTS_ONLY_OPTS, _err, "cms/bad-input", "unknown opts field ");
+  var certList = _certsOnlyList(certs, "certificates");
+  var crlList = _certsOnlyList(opts.crls, "crls");
+  // RFC 8551 sec. 3.8 conveys "certificates and/or CRLs"; a message with neither conveys nothing.
+  if (!certList.length && !crlList.length) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "a certs-only message must carry at least one certificate or CRL (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8)");
+  // Each entity validated + snapshotted at the door, then DER-sorted + deduped (X.690 sec. 11.6).
+  var certDers = intrinsic.sort(_dedupe(intrinsic.map(certList, function (c) { return _normEntityDer(c, "a certificate", "CERTIFICATE", _parseX509); })), intrinsic.compare);
+  var crlDers = intrinsic.sort(_dedupe(intrinsic.map(crlList, function (c) { return _normEntityDer(c, "a CRL", "X509 CRL", _parseCrl); })), intrinsic.compare);
+  // The degenerate SignedData (RFC 5652 sec. 5.1): version 1 (all choices plain, id-data, no signer),
+  // an empty digestAlgorithms + signerInfos, an id-data encapContentInfo with eContent ABSENT, and the
+  // caller certificates [0] / crls [1]. The strict re-parse enforces the version<->contents coupling.
+  var encap = b.sequence([b.oid(OID_DATA)]);
+  var sdFields = [b.integer(1n), b.set([]), encap];
+  if (certDers.length) intrinsic.push(sdFields, b.contextConstructed(0, intrinsic.bufferConcat(certDers)));   // [0] IMPLICIT SET OF
+  if (crlDers.length) intrinsic.push(sdFields, b.contextConstructed(1, intrinsic.bufferConcat(crlDers)));     // [1] IMPLICIT SET OF
+  intrinsic.push(sdFields, b.set([]));                                                                        // signerInfos SET OF {}
+  var signedData = b.sequence(sdFields);
+  var contentInfo = b.sequence([b.oid(OID_SIGNED_DATA), b.explicit(0, signedData)]);
+  return opts.pem ? pkix.pemEncode(contentInfo, "CMS", frameworkError.PemError) : contentInfo;
+}
+
 function _toBuf(v, what) {
   if (guard.bytes.isByteSource(v)) return guard.bytes.snapshotSource(v, CmsError, "cms/bad-input", what);
   throw _err("cms/bad-input", what + " must be a Buffer");
@@ -785,7 +851,7 @@ function _countersign(cmsInput, signers, opts) {
 //   * the `crls [1]` preservation branches in `countersign`. pki.cms.sign never emits a crls field,
 //     so a store this producer countersigns never carries one to preserve.
 module.exports = {
-  sign: sign, countersign: countersign,
+  sign: sign, countersign: countersign, certsOnly: certsOnly,
   // @internal -- the signer-descriptor field tables, for a verb that AUTHORS signer descriptors
   // from its own caller's options and gates them at its own door.
   KNOWN_SIGNER_CERT_KEYS: KNOWN_SIGNER_CERT_KEYS,

package/lib/cms-verify.js

@@ -1440,5 +1440,129 @@ var compress = cmsCompress.compress;
  */
 var decompress = cmsCompress.decompress;
 
+// A certs-only reader/recognizer input: a DER Buffer (snapshotted at the door so a later mutation
+// cannot swap the bytes the verdict describes) or a PEM CMS/PKCS7 block. An undecodable input is a
+// typed cms/bad-input, never a raw throw.
+var KNOWN_PARSE_CERTS_ONLY_OPTS = { maxCerts: 1 };
+function _certsOnlyInputDer(input, verb) {
+  if (guard.bytes.isByteSource(input)) {
+    var buf = guard.bytes.snapshotSource(input, CmsError, "cms/bad-input", verb + " input");
+    if (buf[0] === 0x30) return buf;
+    input = intrinsic.bufToString(buf, "latin1");
+  }
+  if (typeof input === "string") {
+    var der = pkix.pemDecodeLenient(input, "CMS");
+    if (der === null) der = pkix.pemDecodeLenient(input, "PKCS7");
+    if (der === null) throw _err("cms/bad-input", verb + " input is neither DER nor a PEM CMS/PKCS7 block");
+    return der;
+  }
+  throw _err("cms/bad-input", verb + " input must be a DER Buffer or a PEM string");
+}
+
+/**
+ * @primitive  pki.cms.certsOnly
+ * @signature  pki.cms.certsOnly(certs, opts?) -> Buffer | string
+ * @since      0.6.3
+ * @status     stable
+ * @spec       RFC 8551, RFC 5652
+ * @related    pki.cms.parseCertsOnly, pki.cms.isCertsOnly, pki.smime.buildCertsOnly
+ *
+ * Build a "certs-only" certificate-management message (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8): a degenerate CMS
+ * `SignedData` that conveys certificates and/or CRLs and signs nothing. The emitted structure is
+ * version 1 with an empty `digestAlgorithms`, an id-data `encapContentInfo` whose `eContent` is absent,
+ * the certificates in `certificates [0]` and any CRLs in `crls [1]` (both DER-sorted and deduplicated),
+ * and an empty `signerInfos`. It is how an AIA `caIssuers` bundle or an `application/pkcs7-mime;
+ * smime-type=certs-only` attachment distributes a set of certificates. `certs` is a certificate or an
+ * array of them (DER `Buffer` or PEM string), each parsed before embedding so a non-certificate is a
+ * typed `CmsError` and is never emitted. At least one certificate or CRL is required.
+ *
+ * @opts crls A CRL or array of CRLs (DER Buffer or PEM string) to convey alongside the certificates.
+ * @opts pem  Return a PEM string instead of a DER Buffer.
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
+ *   var leafDer = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "Leaf", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
+ *     notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2036-01-01T00:00:00Z") }, { key: await pki.key.export(pair.privateKey) });
+ *   var bundle = pki.cms.certsOnly([leafDer]);
+ *   var r = pki.cms.parseCertsOnly(bundle);   // { certificates: [leafDer], crls: [] }
+ */
+var certsOnly = cmsSign.certsOnly;
+
+/**
+ * @primitive  pki.cms.parseCertsOnly
+ * @signature  pki.cms.parseCertsOnly(input, opts?) -> { certificates, crls }
+ * @since      0.6.3
+ * @status     stable
+ * @spec       RFC 8551, RFC 5652
+ * @related    pki.cms.certsOnly, pki.cms.isCertsOnly, pki.est.parseCertsOnly
+ *
+ * Read a certs-only certificate-management message (DER Buffer or PEM) and recover the raw certificate
+ * and CRL DER it carries. It requires a degenerate `SignedData` (id-data with no eContent, empty
+ * `signerInfos`) and returns `{ certificates: [DER], crls: [DER] }`; a non-degenerate structure is a
+ * typed `cms/not-certs-only`. A CRL-only message is accepted (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8 conveys "certificates
+ * and/or CRLs"), unlike the stricter RFC 5272 Simple PKI Response `pki.est.parseCertsOnly`; a message
+ * carrying neither certificates nor CRLs is refused. Each embedded certificate and CRL is validated
+ * before it is returned.
+ *
+ * @opts maxCerts Cap the number of certificates and CRLs parsed and returned (a DoS bound on an untrusted bundle).
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
+ *   var certDer = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "Leaf", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
+ *     notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2036-01-01T00:00:00Z") }, { key: await pki.key.export(pair.privateKey) });
+ *   var bundleDer = pki.cms.certsOnly([certDer]);
+ *   var r = pki.cms.parseCertsOnly(bundleDer);
+ *   r.certificates;   // array of raw certificate DER Buffers
+ */
+function parseCertsOnly(input, opts) {
+  opts = guard.identifier.optionsObject(opts, _err, "cms/bad-input", "pki.cms.parseCertsOnly options");
+  guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(opts, KNOWN_PARSE_CERTS_ONLY_OPTS, _err, "cms/bad-input", "pki.cms.parseCertsOnly has an unknown option ");
+  // maxCerts bounds the parse of an untrusted bundle, so the bound itself is validated at the door: a
+  // negative, fractional, NaN, or non-numeric cap that slice would silently treat as no cap (or, for
+  // -1, as "all but the last") is refused rather than forwarded (guard.limits.cap). Absent or null
+  // leaves the count uncapped.
+  var maxCerts = guard.limits.cap(opts.maxCerts == null ? undefined : opts.maxCerts, "maxCerts", undefined, { E: _err, code: "cms/bad-input" });
+  return cms.parseCertsOnly(_certsOnlyInputDer(input, "pki.cms.parseCertsOnly"), _err, "cms", maxCerts, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * @primitive  pki.cms.isCertsOnly
+ * @signature  pki.cms.isCertsOnly(input) -> boolean
+ * @since      0.6.3
+ * @status     stable
+ * @spec       RFC 8551, RFC 5652
+ * @related    pki.cms.certsOnly, pki.cms.parseCertsOnly
+ *
+ * Recognize a certs-only certificate-management message structurally: `true` when `input` (DER Buffer
+ * or PEM) is a CMS `SignedData` with an id-data `encapContentInfo` whose `eContent` is absent and an
+ * empty `signerInfos`, `false` for any other well-formed CMS (a signed message, an EnvelopedData).
+ * Undecodable bytes throw a typed `CmsError`.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
+ *   var certDer = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "Leaf", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
+ *     notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2036-01-01T00:00:00Z") }, { key: await pki.key.export(pair.privateKey) });
+ *   pki.cms.isCertsOnly(pki.cms.certsOnly([certDer]));   // true
+ */
+function isCertsOnly(input) {
+  // A certs-only message is a SignedData with an id-data content, absent eContent, and no signer.
+  // digestAlgorithms is deliberately NOT constrained: RFC 5652 sec. 5.1 permits a non-empty set even
+  // with no signer, so a valid but non-canonical bundle (an EST or AIA response) is still recognized.
+  var der = _certsOnlyInputDer(input, "pki.cms.isCertsOnly");
+  var r;
+  try {
+    r = cms.parse(der);
+  } catch (e) {
+    // A well-formed CMS ContentInfo whose content type this toolkit does not model (a bare id-data,
+    // a DigestedData) is definitively not a certs-only SignedData, so the predicate reports false
+    // rather than making a caller catch an exception for a valid non-SignedData CMS. Truly
+    // undecodable bytes (not a ContentInfo at all) still throw.
+    if (e && e.code === "cms/unsupported-content-type") return false;
+    throw e;
+  }
+  return r.contentTypeName === "signedData" &&
+    r.encapContentInfo.eContentType === oid.byName("data") &&
+    r.encapContentInfo.eContent === null &&
+    r.signerInfos.length === 0;
+}
+
 // `setEngine` is @internal -- the path-validate injection seam, never part of pki.cms.
-module.exports = { verify: verify, sign: sign, countersign: countersign, encrypt: encrypt, authenticate: authenticate, decrypt: decrypt, compress: compress, decompress: decompress, setEngine: setEngine };
+module.exports = { verify: verify, sign: sign, countersign: countersign, encrypt: encrypt, authenticate: authenticate, decrypt: decrypt, compress: compress, decompress: decompress, certsOnly: certsOnly, parseCertsOnly: parseCertsOnly, isCertsOnly: isCertsOnly, setEngine: setEngine };

package/lib/schema-cms.js

@@ -1400,7 +1400,13 @@ function assertAttachedCiphertext(eci, E, code, label) {
 // `maxCerts` (optional) caps how many certificates / CRLs are validated + returned, BEFORE the per-element
 // X.509 / CRL parse -- so an untrusted source (an AIA caIssuers URL) cannot force tens of thousands of parses
 // with one in-cap-bytes bundle; the EST client passes no cap (a /cacerts chain is small and fully returned).
-function parseCertsOnly(der, E, prefix, maxCerts) {
+// `requireCert` (default true) sets the profile floor: the RFC 5272 sec. 4.1 Simple PKI Response the
+// EST client and path builder read REQUIRES at least one certificate, so they pass nothing and get the
+// strict floor. The general RFC 8551 sec. 3.8 / RFC 5652 sec. 5.1 certificate-management message
+// permits "certificates and/or CRLs", so pki.cms.parseCertsOnly passes `requireCert: false` and a
+// CRL-only message is accepted; a message with neither is still refused.
+function parseCertsOnly(der, E, prefix, maxCerts, requireCert) {
+  var needCert = requireCert !== false;
   var r;
   try { r = parse(der); }
   catch (e) { throw E(prefix + "/bad-response", "a certs-only response did not decode as CMS: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)), e); }
@@ -1409,9 +1415,21 @@ function parseCertsOnly(der, E, prefix, maxCerts) {
     throw E(prefix + "/not-certs-only", "a certs-only Simple PKI Response must carry id-data with no eContent (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1)");
   }
   if (r.signerInfos.length !== 0) throw E(prefix + "/not-certs-only", "a certs-only Simple PKI Response must have empty signerInfos (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1)");
-  if (!r.certificates || r.certificates.length === 0) throw E(prefix + "/no-certificates", "a certs-only response must contain at least one certificate (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1)");
-  // Cap BEFORE the per-certificate X.509 parse: bound parse work by count, not only by the decoded byte size.
-  var certs = (maxCerts != null && r.certificates.length > maxCerts) ? r.certificates.slice(0, maxCerts) : r.certificates;
+  // digestAlgorithms is NOT required to be empty: RFC 5652 sec. 5.1 permits any number of elements
+  // (including algorithms no SignerInfo uses), so a valid EST /cacerts or AIA caIssuers bundle may
+  // carry a non-empty set. The builder emits an empty one (the canonical form), but the reader
+  // accepts a non-empty one rather than rejecting valid CMS.
+  var allCerts = r.certificates;   // parse always surfaces certificates and crls as arrays (empty when the field is absent)
+  var allCrls = r.crls;
+  if (needCert) {
+    if (allCerts.length === 0) throw E(prefix + "/no-certificates", "a certs-only response must contain at least one certificate (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1)");
+  } else if (allCerts.length === 0 && allCrls.length === 0) {
+    throw E(prefix + "/no-certificates", "a certs-only message must contain at least one certificate or CRL (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8)");
+  }
+  // Cap BEFORE the per-element parse: bound parse work by count, not only by the decoded byte size. The
+  // cap is on the COMBINED number of certificates and CRLs, so a bundle carrying both cannot force up to
+  // 2*maxCerts parses: certificates are counted first and CRLs draw only from the remaining budget.
+  var certs = (maxCerts != null && allCerts.length > maxCerts) ? allCerts.slice(0, maxCerts) : allCerts;
   for (var i = 0; i < certs.length; i++) {
     // A universal-SEQUENCE CertificateChoice must be a well-formed X.509 Certificate, not merely any SEQUENCE;
     // a tagged CertificateChoices alternative (attribute cert / other) is not a plain certificate.
@@ -1419,8 +1437,8 @@ function parseCertsOnly(der, E, prefix, maxCerts) {
     try { schemaX509.parse(certs[i].bytes); }
     catch (e) { throw E(prefix + "/bad-certificate", "a certs-only response carried a non-certificate in its certificates field (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1)", e); }
   }
-  var allCrls = r.crls || [];
-  var crls = (maxCerts != null && allCrls.length > maxCerts) ? allCrls.slice(0, maxCerts) : allCrls;
+  var crlCap = maxCerts != null ? (maxCerts - certs.length) : null;   // the budget certificates left for CRLs
+  var crls = (crlCap != null && allCrls.length > crlCap) ? allCrls.slice(0, crlCap) : allCrls;
   for (var j = 0; j < crls.length; j++) {
     if (crls[j].tagClass !== "universal") throw E(prefix + "/bad-crl", "a certs-only response CRL must be a plain X.509 CertificateList, not a tagged otherRevInfo alternative (RFC 5652 sec. 10.2.1)");
     try { schemaCrl.parse(crls[j].bytes); }

package/lib/smime.js

@@ -1266,4 +1266,35 @@ function _decodeCms(ent) {
 
 function _toBuf(v) { return Buffer.isBuffer(v) ? v : Buffer.from(v); }
 
-module.exports = { sign: sign, verify: verify, encrypt: encrypt, decrypt: decrypt, compress: compress, decompress: decompress };
+var CERTS_ONLY_OPTS = { crls: 1 };
+
+/**
+ * @primitive  pki.smime.buildCertsOnly
+ * @signature  pki.smime.buildCertsOnly(certs, opts?) -> Buffer
+ * @since      0.6.3
+ * @status     stable
+ * @spec       RFC 8551, RFC 5652
+ * @related    pki.cms.certsOnly, pki.cms.parseCertsOnly, pki.smime.encrypt
+ *
+ * Wrap a certs-only certificate-management message (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8) in one S/MIME
+ * `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=certs-only; name=smime.p7c` entity: the base64 body is the
+ * `pki.cms.certsOnly` DER, with `Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7c` (RFC 8551
+ * sec. 3.2.1). `certs` and `opts.crls` are the certificate/CRL inputs `pki.cms.certsOnly` accepts, and
+ * at least one certificate or CRL is required. A certs-only message carries no user content, so the
+ * header-protection options of `pki.smime.encrypt` do not apply here.
+ *
+ * @opts crls A CRL or array of CRLs (DER Buffer or PEM string) to convey alongside the certificates.
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = await pki.key.generate("Ed25519");
+ *   var leafDer = await pki.x509.sign({ subject: "Leaf", subjectPublicKey: await pki.key.export(pair.publicKey),
+ *     notBefore: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"), notAfter: new Date("2036-01-01T00:00:00Z") }, { key: await pki.key.export(pair.privateKey) });
+ *   var p7c = pki.smime.buildCertsOnly([leafDer]);
+ */
+function buildCertsOnly(certs, opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  _knownOpts(opts, CERTS_ONLY_OPTS, "buildCertsOnly");
+  var der = _toBuf(cms.certsOnly(certs, { crls: opts.crls }));
+  return _capped(Buffer.concat([_pkcs7MimeHead("certs-only", "smime.p7c"), _base64Body(der), mime.CRLF]));
+}
+
+module.exports = { sign: sign, verify: verify, encrypt: encrypt, decrypt: decrypt, compress: compress, decompress: decompress, buildCertsOnly: buildCertsOnly };

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.6.2",
+  "version": "0.6.3",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:54d1c599-3174-4b94-9968-3bf7cc9d4fd8",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:85d92993-2810-4099-a38f-0556df923c66",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-08-30T21:10:28.418Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-08-30T22:55:28.945Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.2",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.3",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.6.2",
+      "version": "0.6.3",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.2",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.3",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.2",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.3",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]