@blamejs/pki 0.6.14 → 0.6.16

package/lib/x509-sign.js

@@ -15,12 +15,6 @@
  * @spec RFC 5280
  * @card Build and sign an X.509 certificate, self-signed or CA-signed, over any registry algorithm.
  */
-//
-// The whole algorithm matrix comes from the shared sign-scheme resolver (the same registry
-// pki.cms.sign / pki.tsp.sign drive), so a new algorithm is a registry row, never a branch here. The
-// TBS + extension DER is hand-assembled through the canonical asn1.build.* layer (the shipped
-// cms/tsp/ocsp producing pattern); the strict schema-x509 decoder round-trips it, and that round-trip
-// (plus OpenSSL interop) is the divergence guard.
 
 var asn1 = require("./asn1-der");
 var oid = require("./oid");
@@ -28,9 +22,6 @@ var x509 = require("./schema-x509");
 var signScheme = require("./sign-scheme");
 var guard = require("./guard-all");
 var intrinsic = require("./guard-intrinsic");
-// This test picks which FORM the caller's extension spec is in, so it decides which fields are read
-// and therefore what is signed into the certificate. Read live, a replacement answering true sends
-// an object down the list arm and the extensions it carries are never seen.
 var _isArray = intrinsic.isArray;
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
 var schema = require("./schema-engine");
@@ -38,43 +29,20 @@ var pkix = require("./schema-pkix");
 var pkiBuild = require("./pki-build");
 
 var CertificateError = frameworkError.CertificateError;
-// The x509 schema namespace and Name parser: the same RDNSequence parser pki.schema.x509.parse uses, so
-// a raw Name DER is validated fully (structure, DirectoryString types) with the frozen x509/* codes.
 var NS = pkix.makeNS("x509", CertificateError, oid);
 var NAME_SCHEMA = pkix.name(NS);
 var SPKI_SCHEMA = pkix.spki(NS);
-// The same RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1 extension value decoders pki.schema.x509.parse uses, so a recognized
-// pre-encoded (array-form) extension is fully validated with the frozen x509/* codes.
 var EXT_DECODERS = pkix.certExtensionDecoders(NS).byOid;
 var b = asn1.build;
-// Two error factories (cms-sign.js pattern): `_err` takes a full x509/* code; `_signE` prepends the
-// domain so the shared sign-scheme resolver/signer faults keep the x509/* codes. Both are FACTORIES
-// -- guard.time.assertValid and resolveSignScheme invoke them as `E(code, msg)` with no `new`.
 function _err(code, message, cause) { return new CertificateError(code, message, cause); }
 function _signE(kind, message, cause) { return new CertificateError("x509/" + kind, message, cause); }
 function O(n) { return oid.byName(n); }
 
 var OID_SKI = O("subjectKeyIdentifier");
 
-// The recognized keys of the `extensions` spec object; an unknown key is a typo and throws at
-// config-time (a custom extension is passed as pre-encoded DER via the array form).
-// The three caller-owned objects pki.x509.sign reads, each with its own door. A key nothing here
-// names is a typo or a misplaced argument, and the failure it causes is invisible: the certificate
-// builds, signs, and simply does not carry what was asked for. `spec.extension` (one letter short
-// of `extensions`) emitted a certificate with NO extensions at all -- no basicConstraints on an
-// intended CA, no keyUsage on an intended constrained leaf. `spec.issuer` is the other shape: the
-// issuer is argument TWO, and nesting it in the spec left the certificate SELF-SIGNED with nothing
-// to read as a failure.
-//
-// Every table is derived from what the function actually reads, not from the doc block, because a
-// table naming a key nothing reads reopens the hole it was added to close.
 var KNOWN_SPEC_KEYS = {
   subject: 1, subjectPublicKey: 1, notBefore: 1, notAfter: 1, serialNumber: 1, extensions: 1,
 };
-// The issuer names itself in one of two FORMS, and the cert form wins unconditionally: when
-// `issuer.cert` is present the builder takes the DN and the public key from it and never reads
-// `name` or `publicKey`. A union accepted `{ key, cert, name: "Different CA", publicKey }` and
-// signed under the certificate's identity while discarding the identity the caller wrote out.
 var KNOWN_ISSUER_CERT_KEYS = { key: 1, cert: 1 };
 var KNOWN_ISSUER_EXPLICIT_KEYS = { key: 1, name: 1, publicKey: 1 };
 var KNOWN_SIGN_OPTS = { digestAlgorithm: 1, pem: 1, pss: 1 };
@@ -85,9 +53,6 @@ var KNOWN_EXT_KEYS = {
   certificatePolicies: 1, certificatePoliciesCritical: 1,
 };
 
-// The shared PKIX producing primitives (lib/pki-build.js), bound to the x509 namespace so they keep the
-// frozen x509/* codes. Thin local aliases let the x509 call sites read unchanged. csr-sign binds the same
-// builder to its own namespace: one encode definition, no per-format hand-roll.
 var _b = pkiBuild.makeBuilder({ ErrorClass: CertificateError, prefix: "x509", O: O, NS: NS, NAME_SCHEMA: NAME_SCHEMA, SPKI_SCHEMA: SPKI_SCHEMA, EXT_DECODERS: EXT_DECODERS });
 var _encodeName = _b.encodeName, _isEmptyName = _b.isEmptyName, _reqDer = _b.reqDer,
   _assertValidSpki = _b.assertValidSpki, _assertValidExtension = _b.assertValidExtension,
@@ -97,11 +62,10 @@ var _encodeName = _b.encodeName, _isEmptyName = _b.isEmptyName, _reqDer = _b.req
   _extAki = _b.extAki, _extSan = _b.extSan, _extCertPolicies = _b.extCertPolicies,
   _skiKeyId = _b.skiKeyId, _spkiKeyId = _b.spkiKeyId, _serialInteger = _b.serialInteger;
 
-// ---- issuer-side extension helpers (subjectKeyIdentifier lookup + authorityKeyIdentifier) ----
 
 function _skiValueOf(caCert) {
   var ext = (caCert.extensions || []).filter(function (e) { return e.oid === OID_SKI; })[0];
-  if (ext) { try { return asn1.read.octetString(asn1.decode(ext.value)); } catch (_e) { /* fall through to re-derive from the issuer SPKI */ } }
+  if (ext) { try { return asn1.read.octetString(asn1.decode(ext.value)); } catch (_e) { } }   // allow:swallow-unverified -- a malformed CA SKI is read as absent; _akiKeyId then derives the authorityKeyIdentifier keyIdentifier from the issuer public key
   return null;
 }
 function _akiKeyId(val, ctx) {
@@ -113,14 +77,9 @@ function _akiKeyId(val, ctx) {
   throw _err("x509/bad-input", "authorityKeyIdentifier must be true (auto-derive from the issuer) or a Buffer key id");
 }
 
-// Build the extensions [3] block from the spec object (or pass through an array of pre-encoded
-// Extension DER buffers). Enforces the RFC 5280 CA cross-field gates, then emits a deterministic order.
 function _buildExtensions(extSpec, ctx) {
   if (extSpec == null) return [];
   if (_isArray(extSpec)) {
-    // Validate each pre-encoded extension, reject a duplicate extnID (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2 allows at most one
-    // instance of an extension), and decode basicConstraints + keyUsage to apply the same CA
-    // cross-field rules the object form enforces (below), so the array escape hatch cannot bypass them.
     var seenExt = {}, arrCa = false, arrKeyCertSign = false, arrPathLen = false;
     var oidBc = O("basicConstraints"), oidKu = O("keyUsage");
     var arr = extSpec.map(function (e, i) {
@@ -130,9 +89,6 @@ function _buildExtensions(extSpec, ctx) {
       var extnId = asn1.read.oid(n.children[0]);
       if (seenExt[extnId]) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "duplicate extension " + extnId + " in the extensions array (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2 -- at most one instance of an extension)");
       seenExt[extnId] = true;
-      // Fully validate a RECOGNIZED extension by running its real value decoder (which enforces the
-      // RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1 rules and throws a typed x509/* on malformed), and take the CA cross-field
-      // inputs from the decoded value; an unrecognized extension is opaque (the caller's own concern).
       var dec = EXT_DECODERS[extnId];
       if (dec) {
         var decoded;
@@ -143,8 +99,6 @@ function _buildExtensions(extSpec, ctx) {
         }
         if (extnId === oidBc) {
           arrCa = decoded.cA === true; arrPathLen = decoded.pathLenConstraint != null;
-          // RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9 -- a CA's basicConstraints MUST be critical (3 children = an explicit
-          // TRUE critical flag, since _assertValidExtension already rejects an explicit FALSE).
           if (arrCa && n.children.length !== 3) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "a CA certificate's basicConstraints MUST be critical (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9)");
         }
         else if (extnId === oidKu) { arrKeyCertSign = decoded.keyCertSign === true; }
@@ -156,8 +110,6 @@ function _buildExtensions(extSpec, ctx) {
     return arr;
   }
   if (typeof extSpec !== "object") throw _err("x509/bad-input", "extensions must be an object or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER");
-  // Reject a typo'd or unsupported extension key at config-time instead of silently dropping it (a
-  // misspelled `keyUsag` would otherwise omit keyUsage). A custom extension goes in the array form.
   guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(extSpec, KNOWN_EXT_KEYS, _err, "x509/bad-input", function (k) {
     return "unknown extension " + JSON.stringify(k) + " in the extensions spec; pass a pre-encoded Extension DER via the array form for a custom extension";
   });
@@ -167,9 +119,7 @@ function _buildExtensions(extSpec, ctx) {
   var caTrue = !!(bc && bc.cA === true);
   var ku = extSpec.keyUsage;
   var assertsKeyCertSign = _isArray(ku) && ku.indexOf("keyCertSign") >= 0;
-  // RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.3 -- keyCertSign requires basicConstraints cA=TRUE.
   if (assertsKeyCertSign && !caTrue) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "keyUsage keyCertSign requires basicConstraints cA=TRUE (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.3)");
-  // RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9 -- pathLenConstraint requires cA=TRUE AND keyCertSign.
   if (bc && bc.pathLen != null) {
     if (!caTrue) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "basicConstraints pathLenConstraint requires cA=TRUE (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9)");
     if (!assertsKeyCertSign) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "basicConstraints pathLenConstraint requires keyUsage keyCertSign (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9)");
@@ -181,7 +131,6 @@ function _buildExtensions(extSpec, ctx) {
   if (ku != null) out.push(_ext(O("keyUsage"), extSpec.keyUsageCritical !== false, _extKeyUsage(ku)));
   if (extSpec.extendedKeyUsage != null) out.push(_ext(O("extKeyUsage"), !!extSpec.extendedKeyUsageCritical, _extExtKeyUsage(extSpec.extendedKeyUsage)));
   if (bc != null) {
-    // RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9 -- a CA certificate's basicConstraints MUST be critical.
     if (bc.cA === true && bc.critical === false) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "a CA certificate's basicConstraints MUST be critical (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9)");
     out.push(_ext(O("basicConstraints"), bc.critical !== false, _extBasicConstraints(bc)));
   }
@@ -190,15 +139,8 @@ function _buildExtensions(extSpec, ctx) {
   return out;
 }
 
-// ---- serial + validity + key plumbing --------------------------------------
 
-// RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.5 UTCTime/GeneralizedTime cutover -- the shared builder primitive (pki-build), a
-// thin wrapper here so the certificate validity label reads "certificate notBefore/notAfter".
 function _timeDer(date, which) { return _b.timeDer(date, "certificate " + which); }
-// A supplied issuer certificate MUST be a CA that may sign certificates: basicConstraints present AND
-// critical AND cA=TRUE (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9), plus, when a keyUsage extension is present, the
-// keyCertSign bit (sec. 4.2.1.3). Refuse a non-CA issuer instead of minting a certificate that will not
-// chain. Returns the issuer's pathLenConstraint (or null) so the caller can honor it.
 function _assertIssuerIsCa(issuerCert) {
   var exts = issuerCert.extensions || [];
   function ext(name) { return exts.filter(function (x) { return x.oid === O(name); })[0] || null; }
@@ -216,10 +158,8 @@ function _assertIssuerIsCa(issuerCert) {
     catch (e) { if (e instanceof CertificateError) throw e; throw _err("x509/bad-input", "the issuer certificate keyUsage is malformed", e); }
     if (ku.keyCertSign !== true) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "the issuer certificate keyUsage does not assert keyCertSign -- it cannot sign certificates (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.3)");
   }
-  return bc.pathLenConstraint;   // BigInt-narrowed integer or null
+  return bc.pathLenConstraint;
 }
-// The cA flag + pathLenConstraint of the certificate being issued, from either the object or the
-// pre-encoded array extensions form (used to honor a supplied issuer's pathLenConstraint).
 function _issuedCaInfo(extSpec) {
   if (extSpec == null) return { cA: false, pathLen: null };
   if (!_isArray(extSpec)) {
@@ -234,9 +174,6 @@ function _issuedCaInfo(extSpec) {
   }
   return { cA: false, pathLen: null };
 }
-// Does the extensions spec carry a subjectAltName that will be emitted critical? The object form forces
-// SAN critical when the subject is empty (so any subjectAltName qualifies); the pre-encoded array form
-// is decoded to look for an Extension whose extnID is subjectAltName with a TRUE critical flag.
 function _hasCriticalSan(extSpec) {
   if (extSpec == null) return false;
   if (!_isArray(extSpec)) return !!extSpec.subjectAltName;
@@ -248,7 +185,6 @@ function _hasCriticalSan(extSpec) {
   return false;
 }
 
-// ---- the primitive ---------------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * @primitive pki.x509.sign
@@ -296,13 +232,6 @@ function _hasCriticalSan(extSpec) {
  *   pki.schema.x509.parse(root).subject.dn;   // "CN=Example Root CA"
  */
 function sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
-  // EVERY caller-owned argument is copied before a field of any of them is read, and every copy is
-  // cleared when the call settles. The checks below run NOW, and the values they approved are
-  // encoded, signed and emitted several promise turns afterwards, while the caller still owns all
-  // three objects -- so a spec, an option or a signer read again after the first turn need not be
-  // the one that passed. Copying only some of them leaves the rest reachable; copying without the
-  // release leaves a duplicate of whatever secret was nested in them. guard.bytes.fixArguments is
-  // both halves, and is what every producing verb in the toolkit opens with.
   return guard.bytes.fixedCall(CertificateError, "x509/bad-input", [
     [spec, "the certificate spec"], [issuer, "the issuer"], [opts, "pki.x509.sign options"],
   ], _sign);
@@ -312,9 +241,6 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
   if (!spec || typeof spec !== "object" || Buffer.isBuffer(spec)) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "the certificate spec must be an object");
   issuer = issuer || {};
-  // Before a single field is read, so a misspelling is a refusal rather than an omission carried
-  // into a signed certificate. The issuer message names its own argument because the mistake this
-  // catches most often is putting the issuer inside the spec, where it self-signed in silence.
   guard.identifier.assertKnownKeys(spec, KNOWN_SPEC_KEYS, _err, "x509/bad-input", function (k) {
     return "unknown certificate spec field " + JSON.stringify(k) +
       (k === "issuer" ? "; the issuer is the SECOND argument to pki.x509.sign, not a spec field" : "") +
@@ -335,18 +261,12 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
   var subjectDer = _encodeName(spec.subject == null ? [] : spec.subject);
   var subjectEmpty = _isEmptyName(subjectDer);
 
-  // Resolve the issuer name + signing-key SPKI. `{ key }` alone -> self-signed.
   var issuerDer, issuerSpki, issuerCert = null, issuerPathLen = null;
   var selfSigned = issuer.name == null && issuer.cert == null && issuer.publicKey == null;
   if (selfSigned) {
     issuerDer = subjectDer;
     issuerSpki = spki;
   } else if (issuer.cert != null) {
-    // The CA-ness gate, the issuer name and the signing key are all read off this object, so a
-    // partial one decides them on fields that are not there.
-    // Re-derived from the bytes its parser read. The issuer certificate's subject and key identifier
-    // are copied into the certificate being signed, so they are a claim about who issued it -- an
-    // assembled object could name an issuer whose bytes the signer never saw.
     issuerCert = guard.parsed.acceptDerived(issuer.cert, "certificate", x509.parse, _err, "x509/bad-input", "issuer.cert");
     issuerPathLen = _assertIssuerIsCa(issuerCert);
     issuerDer = pkiBuild.tbsNameField(issuerCert, "subject");
@@ -356,41 +276,24 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
     issuerSpki = _reqDer(issuer.publicKey, "issuer.publicKey (the issuer SPKI DER)");
     _assertValidSpki(issuerSpki, "issuer.publicKey");
   }
-  // RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.4 -- the issuer MUST be a non-empty distinguished name.
   if (_isEmptyName(issuerDer)) throw _err("x509/bad-issuer", "issuer must be a non-empty distinguished name");
 
-  // Resolve the signature scheme from the SIGNING key's SPKI algorithm (the whole registry, for free).
   var scheme = signScheme.resolveSignScheme(_certLikeFromSpki(issuerSpki), { combinedRsaSig: true, pss: opts.pss, digestAlgorithm: opts.digestAlgorithm }, true, _signE);
 
   var serialTlv = _serialInteger(spec.serialNumber);
-  // Validate both instants, then reject an inverted window before encoding (a notBefore after notAfter
-  // is a nonsensical validity period, RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.5).
   guard.time.assertValid(spec.notBefore, _err, "x509/bad-input", "notBefore");
   guard.time.assertValid(spec.notAfter, _err, "x509/bad-input", "notAfter");
   // allow:nan-date-comparison-unguarded -- both operands are guard.time.assertValid'd on the two lines above (an Invalid Date throws before this comparison).
   if (guard.time.instantOf(spec.notBefore) > guard.time.instantOf(spec.notAfter)) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "notBefore must not be after notAfter (RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.5)");
   var validityDer = b.sequence([_timeDer(spec.notBefore, "notBefore"), _timeDer(spec.notAfter, "notAfter")]);
 
-  // Read ONCE. Three separate consumers test which form this spec is in -- the encoder, the
-  // empty-subject rule below and the path-length rule under it -- and each answering for its own
-  // read is three chances to answer differently about one certificate. The door deep-copies the
-  // spec, so today they cannot disagree; taking the value once means they still cannot if the
-  // shape of that door ever changes.
   var extSpec = spec.extensions;
   var exts = _buildExtensions(extSpec, { spki: spki, issuerSpki: issuerSpki, issuerCert: issuerCert, subjectEmpty: subjectEmpty });
-  // RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.6 -- an empty subject requires a critical subjectAltName (recognized in both the
-  // object form and a pre-encoded array-form extension).
   if (subjectEmpty && !_hasCriticalSan(extSpec)) {
     throw _err("x509/bad-input", "an empty subject requires a critical subjectAltName (RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.6)");
   }
-  // Honor a supplied issuer's pathLenConstraint (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9): a CA certificate issued below
-  // it consumes one unit of path length, so pathLen=0 forbids issuing a CA below it, and an issued CA's
-  // own pathLenConstraint must leave room within the issuer's remaining depth.
   if (issuerPathLen != null) {
     var issued = _issuedCaInfo(extSpec);
-    // A self-issued CA certificate (subject == issuer, e.g. a CA key rollover) does NOT consume path
-    // length (RFC 5280 sec. 6.1 counts only non-self-issued intermediates), so it is permitted even at
-    // pathLen 0. Compare canonically (sec. 7.1) via the parsed RDN sequences.
     var selfIssued = guard.name.dnEqual(
       schema.walk(NAME_SCHEMA, asn1.decode(subjectDer), NS).result.rdns,
       schema.walk(NAME_SCHEMA, asn1.decode(issuerDer), NS).result.rdns,
@@ -400,14 +303,12 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
       if (issued.pathLen != null && issued.pathLen > issuerPathLen - 1) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "the issued CA certificate pathLenConstraint exceeds the issuer's remaining path length (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9)");
     }
   }
-  // Version is derived from the emitted field set (RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.1); the builder never emits
-  // unique identifiers, so extensions => v3, otherwise v1 (the [0] tag is omitted under DER DEFAULT).
   var version = exts.length ? 3 : 1;
 
   var tbsChildren = [];
-  if (version !== 1) tbsChildren.push(b.explicit(0, b.integer(BigInt(version - 1))));   // v2->INTEGER 1, v3->INTEGER 2
+  if (version !== 1) tbsChildren.push(b.explicit(0, b.integer(BigInt(version - 1))));
   tbsChildren.push(serialTlv);
-  tbsChildren.push(scheme.sigAlgId);   // signature == signatureAlgorithm (RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.1.2), single source
+  tbsChildren.push(scheme.sigAlgId);
   tbsChildren.push(issuerDer);
   tbsChildren.push(validityDer);
   tbsChildren.push(subjectDer);
@@ -416,16 +317,11 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
   var tbsDer = b.sequence(tbsChildren);
 
   return signScheme.signOverTbs(scheme, issuer.key, tbsDer, _signE).then(function (sig) {
-    // The signature MUST verify under the issuer public key, or the certificate would not chain (the
-    // composite arm returns a promise; the classical/PQC path throws synchronously on a mismatch).
     return Promise.resolve(_assertCertVerifies(tbsDer, sig, issuerSpki, scheme)).then(function () {
       var certDer = b.sequence([tbsDer, scheme.sigAlgId, b.bitString(sig, 0)]);
       return opts.pem ? x509.pemEncode(certDer, "CERTIFICATE") : certDer;
     });
   }, function (e) {
-    // A signing failure at a well-formed tbs is a bad signing key or a key/algorithm mismatch; keep a
-    // typed CertificateError (composite key-shape faults already are), and re-type a raw WebCrypto
-    // rejection to x509/bad-input rather than leaking a DOMException from the boundary.
     if (e instanceof CertificateError) throw e;
     throw _err("x509/bad-input", "signing the certificate failed -- the signing key does not match the resolved algorithm or is invalid", e);
   });

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.6.14",
+  "version": "0.6.16",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:427d5ce1-3756-4d29-ab2b-4e530ae0f322",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:e63bdf7d-807a-4e39-8cb7-7eb6a47b5808",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-09-01T03:46:40.994Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-09-01T10:42:10.477Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.14",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.16",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.6.14",
+      "version": "0.6.16",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.14",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.6.16",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.14",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.6.16",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]